RajitO wrote: Why one has a more "cussed" response to point 3, is simple:
a) Something will be better than nothing, next time in Mumbai. But what about Ahmedabad, Jaipur, or Agra?
The chaps who planned 26/11 were so ahead in the game, what makes us think they will attack "protected" cities the next time around?
b) The 2 Para (SF) guys will do a great take down in some IT Park in Bangalore. What will they do with a hijacked Airbus at Bangalore International Airport?
The public and the media has been sold an image of black dungareed, MP5-toting, Kevlar clad "brown" knights, who despite their best efforts will not be up to the range of hyper-specialized situations which fall even under the catch-all term of Urban CT Ops.
RajitO - your points fall under the category of professional's approach to problem solving as I outlined earlier. What you're asking for is a more in-depth analysis of situation along with a structure which can handle maximum/most threatening of gamed scenarios. However, as I said earlier, this is unlikely to happen given the structural issues in our decision making apparatus.
Coming to your specific points mentioned earlier - allow me to expand on my idea of a regional hub. Yes, I know I am falling into the trap of outlining the Utopian requirement versus what is available on ground - and how my fantasy actually highlights your concerns about inadequacy of current set-up. But what the heck! a man can play armchair general once in a while
(a) This is where I would want regional hubs to be self-sustaining centers which can handle crisis in a given geography. Something like Pune being able to handle Western India inclusive of Maharashtra and Gujarat. The presence of air force base in Pune can allow for basing of detachment of aircraft and helicopters for movement of troops. IMO, placing NSG in Mumbai makes them too city specific and beats the purpose of 'regional hub'.
(b) Given the extent of our geography, we cannot provide for NSG level troops everywhere. Ideal situation would be for the local police to have trained assets - at least 100-150 odd men - to manage the situation before NSG or IN/IA special forces can intervene. I would have NSG run modules (at Manesar or preferably regional hubs) for such such a body of police personnel from various states to create the local SWAT team for larger tier-2 cities like Ahmedabad or Nagpur or Surat or Baroda.
(c) To extend it further - the NSG regional hubs and basing of IN/IA special forces should form a grid which covers maximum part of India. We had a poster give us the details of Para (SF) battalion holding under each Command - a joint strategy to address internal security issue of 26/11 type should factor into account these units as well. Like I said earlier, I don't think it is too difficult to run the Para (SF) battalions through dedicated Urban CT modules - it would only add to what they are already doing while learning urban CQB skills.
IMO, the idea should be to maximize on the assets we have and make best use of them through integrated and joint planning.
You mentioned about hijacking situation in Bangalore and response of 2 Para (SF) - well, anti-hijacking is super specialized field and only one body of troops is trained in India to handle that. But I would expect 2 Para (SF) to contain the situation and be trained to not allow the a/c to run away to far-far land...
II) Actually, you have answered it in a way. All our Para (SF) units have a fixed base, yet assault teams and smaller components keep deploying all over the place - on detachments and rotations. Training, C&C, admin is centralized...operations are not.
If I were to replicate this example in case of internal security scenario - I would want the regional hubs to provide the base from where teams can rotate to important/vulnerable areas under their geographical responsibility. Rather than come all the way from HQ in Delhi - something which is happening today. Remember the news about NSG traveling to A&N using the recently acquired C-130J assets all the way from NCR? Wouldn't the response be more timely from Chennai regional hub in case of an emergency? And if we managed to integrate the MARCOS group under Eastern Naval Command to respond to situations in conjunction with NSG?
I understand the availability of assets like C-130J would be limiting factor - and that is why I would want to integrate NSG into a grid comprising of IA/IN/IAF special forces assets.
Have you been watching the farce unfold on Special Group/Operation Sundown on Headlines Today/India Today? 30 years ago we had come up with our "JSOC-lite" structure including excellent "organic" air mobility. Yet...big-army politics, and other institutional apathy led us to lose the plot. The NSG was needed, yes, but its sanctioned strength was 1,000 operators for a reason.
My friend, you've just touched upon the most sensitive topic on BRF...
I half expect Surya to emerge from nowhere and send us looking for cover!
Well, jokes apart, let us look into this Special Group issue - I've been reading on whatever is available in open literature - which is pretty much nothing - and hope to put together an blog post on the topic.
SG actually has nothing to do with the Indian Army - except for the fact that men are drawn from IA. And from all over the IA including gentlemen with maroon berets and Balidan badges, or only maroon berets. This particular formation comes under the control of Cabinet Secretariat - which is the euphemism for R&AW.
Allow me to quote Colonel KD Pathak, writing in
Special Forces: Doctrine, Structures, and Employment Across Spectrum of Conflict in the Indian Context about Special Group:
" The Special Group under SFF, which is presently the strike force for our civilian intelligence agencies should be reorganized with the best talent from the SF battalions, voluntarily for fixed tenure, and it should be brought under the control of the army, working directly under the joint Special Operations Committee."
The book was published in 2006 and is basically collection of articles and essays and discussions on the issue of special forces organized by CLAW.
http://www.amazon.in/Special-Forces-Doc ... 8187966394
So, we have a situation where there is something equivalent to Delta Force in our case but the control of which rests with 'civilian intelligence agencies' and whose utilization is outside the purview Indian Army. BTW, does it now become clear who SAS is likely to have advised on the covert action to take out Bhindarwale?
As is usual in our case, there is no coordination and well thought out planning - SG was spawned from SFF (but all Indian personnel) keeping in view the increasing threat of urban counter terrorism and desire to have SAS (surprise?) like force available for use by the executive in case of sensitive situations. And while this was happening, IA was itself toying with the idea of creating a 'super-commando' battalion which was again modeled on - you guessed it, SAS - and which was to function as AHQ strategic reserve. This is how 1 Para (SF) came into being. And all other Para Commando battalions also got modeled on new structure adopted for this super-commando battalion.
No one in R&AW thought it worthwhile to consult IA and use the existing manpower in 9 or 10 Para Commando battalions and upgrade the same to 'special force' level. And let me give you another data point - NSG was spawned out from Special Group; SG was tasked for what NSG does.
And all this happened by 1985.
So, we have this phantom super-duper special force (unofficially known as 22 Special Force, nickname Mavericks) which has best of the world in terms of ARC support, R&AW intel and weapons and all that - but is standalone force w/o any integration with other special forces in the country.
III) If it can be established that quantity and not training, equipment, C&C, mobility, intel are the burning priorities...OK. Usually quantity becomes a fig leaf for all of these and in actual ops it's a debate as to what it brings to the table.
Well, a country the size of India cannot do with only 51 and 52 SAG - even here only one is true blue urban counter terrorism force. Unless, we are OK with having regional hubs with mixed battalion with company each from SAG and SRG.
Shabeg Singh was never Para SF, died during Op. Bluestar rather than in the late 80s, was killed by the Indian Army in the Akal Takht rather than the Delhi Police in a residential area in Delhi. My grandfather knew him slightly when he was posted in NE.
) All our venal netas have not been able to subvert things to the level they used to pre-Seshan.
