Discussion on Indian Special Forces

[RayC]

The Army and the paramiitary have their Field Security Units, who gather local intelligence.

In CI areas, they depend more on their intelligence units rather than that of the civil police who are locals and have their personal interests and motivation.

Further, there is always coordination between all units in the field and the intelligence is shared to the extent their of certain limitations.

[somnath]

The Army and the paramiitary have their Field Security Units, who gather local intelligence.

In CI areas, they depend more on their intelligence units rather than that of the civil police who are locals and have their personal interests and motivation.

Further, there is always coordination between all units in the field and the intelligence is shared to the extent their of certain limitations.

They are typically not locals, and are not posted in the area for a very long period at a stretch....There arent that many instancecs of military intel mounting successful CI in India, at least I havent read of any..The successful CI ops till now have been:

Bengal Naxal 70s - police action, backed by police intel (mostly humint)
Punjab - police action, local police intel, strategic intel action by RAW
Mizoram - Lalthanhawla brought back into the mainstream - IB led operation (Ajit Doval earned his reputation doing this)
Nagaland - the ceasefire agreement and 10 year long talks with Issac-Muivah - IB led operation
Andhra anti-naxal ops (partial success) - police led ops - police intel, especially thana level in NAxal areas, at the forefront

[ParGha]

Decentralization is going to happen... quite regardless of what opinions central and state governments (and their respective supporters) have of each other. And quite likely both are likely to find out that if they don't do it in time, others will do it. Recently I found an executive from a mid-sized Indian tech company asking for legal advice on the prohibited-bore waiver and arms-import laws for ex-servicemen hired in security capacity. Another larger company is supposedly planning an entire response plan - from medical aid and firefighting to armed defense - which completely precludes the government. A small sign of things to come?

SEEKING PROTECTION—FAST

If south Mumbai is visited by violence again, the 110-plus multinationals with regional offices there could be targets. Citigroup (C), Bank of America (BAC), ABN Amro, HSBC (HBC), Goldman Sachs (GS), Morgan Stanley (MS), JPMorgan Chase (JPM)—all have offices there. "The targets identified demonstrate that the intention is to create panic and shatter the confidence of investors in India and global investors coming to India," says Habil Khorakiwala, managing director of Indian drugmaker Wockhardt. The private equity arms of Morgan Stanley, and Englefield Capital, which have offices in the Oberoi Trident Hotel, are looking for new premises in the city, according to an investment banker.

No wonder Raghu Raman's phone has been ringing nonstop. An ex-Indian Army man, Raman is CEO of Mahindra Special Services Group, which offers security to blue-chip clients like Hindustan Unilever, Merrill Lynch (MER), ABN Amro, HSBC, and others, many of whom want to beef up their security. Prospective clients also want protection fast. Raman says some multinationals have temporarily flown their top expat execs out of India.

Indian executives are even more alarmed than the multinationals. "We virtually handed Mumbai on a platter to the terrorists," says Rahul Mehta, managing director of Creative Group, a textile exporter in Mumbai that supplies clients such as J.C. Penney (JCP) and Target (TGT). Referring to reports that intelligence agencies had predicted an attack, he adds, "[The government] was forewarned, so why didn't they act on it? We've been ravaged by terror attacks since 1993."

In Mumbai, anger courses through the city. "How can I invest more in a city which does not protect me?" asks Abhay Mansukhani, who makes auto parts. Now he's tempted to relocate: He's holding off expanding his plant in north Mumbai as he contemplates a shift to Pune, 124 miles away.

Some executives, undeterred, are staying put. Gautam Patel, managing partner of Battery Ventures, was on a conference call when his window shattered from an explosion outside the Oberoi. He's furious with the government, but he's not budging: "Let's do something to get Bombay back on its feet," he says.

What concerns managers like Patel and Mansukhani is that the government they depend on for so much is so weak. The attacks of the past two years have made Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's administration appear incompetent. Inflation has eaten away at the meager gains of the poor, who in India vote far more reliably than the middle class. Promised reforms have either been checked by the necessities of coalition politics or stalled in the Kafkaesque bureaucracy called the Indian Administrative Service, which pretty much runs the country.

http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/co ... page_2.htm

[ticky]

Discussion is strayin OT but still...

@ somnath, regarding successful CI ops, the cease-fire agreement between GOI & NSCN in Nagaland is something you hardly call successful at best. Yes the army/para-mil does have to go out and fight them anymore, but the real effect of the ceasefire is that these insurgent groups now move around in complete freedom & without fear, to extort, intimidate & terrorize the general populace. This is a roaring business nowadays.

[Rahul M]

by discussing thana level intelligence/informers and what not we are missing the basic point of the proposed NSG hubs.
their mandate is not COIN unlike punjab, naxal or NE but high intensity CT/HR ops.
that requires not informers and intelligence(it's simply not possible to have that) but information about layout of a locality and similar local knowledge that any pandu on the beat can provide.

none of the proposed NSG hubs is home to a insurgency movement of any definition and discussing that is not germane to this discussion.

[RayC]

The Army and the paramiitary have their Field Security Units, who gather local intelligence.

In CI areas, they depend more on their intelligence units rather than that of the civil police who are locals and have their personal interests and motivation.

Further, there is always coordination between all units in the field and the intelligence is shared to the extent their of certain limitations.

They are typically not locals, and are not posted in the area for a very long period at a stretch....There arent that many instancecs of military intel mounting successful CI in India, at least I havent read of any..The successful CI ops till now have been:

Bengal Naxal 70s - police action, backed by police intel (mostly humint)
Punjab - police action, local police intel, strategic intel action by RAW
Mizoram - Lalthanhawla brought back into the mainstream - IB led operation (Ajit Doval earned his reputation doing this)
Nagaland - the ceasefire agreement and 10 year long talks with Issac-Muivah - IB led operation
Andhra anti-naxal ops (partial success) - police led ops - police intel, especially thana level in NAxal areas, at the forefront

The issue of what are locals is an interesting matter of contention.

Let me explain, if I may.

State police are from various districts and in States the ethnicity is varied. And some don't speak the majority language and some have different cultural background.

Take West Bengal. You have Bengalis, Gurkhas, Rajbonshis, Adivasis, Kamatipura people, Biharis, Oriyas, UP people etc and they are hardly locals. The culture of North Bengal is way different from Central Bengal and so on. If the Gurkhas or the Kamatipura people, Rajbonshis and even Boros or Bodos who are on the border of Bengal and Assam along the Sankosh River were of the same ethnicity as the Bengalis and spoke the same language as the Bengalis, then they would be locals, even if the matter is stretched to prove so. Even the Adivais from South Bengal don't speak Bengali and their culture is different! Therefore, policemen who are from North Bengal or Advasis from South Bengal would hardly qualify as locals in the term desired for reckoning.

In Nagaland, it has a a whole lot of different tribes and they are different and fiercely attached to their tribes and their customs. There are the Angami, Ao, Chakesang, Khiamniungan, Konyak, Lotha, Phom, Rengma, Mukaware, SAngtam, Sema, Tikhir, Yimchuger, Zeliang, GAros, Chir/BodoKachari/Mikir and others. Tangkuls are Nagas, but they are from Manipur and would hardly be an asset to the Manipuri police even though they are 'local'! The Meities cannot stand their sight and vice versa.

Therefore, who is a local to have intimate knowledge? The geographical entity in no way blurs the ethnicity and interests!

Take Mizoram. There are the Mizos, Paitem Hmar, Riang, Poi, Lakher/Pawi, Chakma, Bangladeshi and Myanmar immigrants.

In Andhra, they may speak the same language, but the ethos is different as in Telengana or even Hyderabad. Srikakulam borders Orissa and there is a marked ethnicity with the Oriya or hybrid. The forests bordering MP and Maharastra has an unique mix. In fact, in AP, there are many Marathi speaking villages like Gowliguda near Hyderabad.

In Nagaland, the Shillong Accord came into being because of the creation of Bangadesh (and thereby losing the support base) and because of the successful CI ops. However, it was short lived, since the military coup in Bangladesh and Pak alignment, once again restored the support base and the NSCN took birth. But the NSCN split into the Issa Muviah group and the Khaplang group (again this indicates the tribal divides). It is because of the successful SF operations that the NSCN (I&M) were forced out of Nagaland and into Myanmar, Bangladesh and Thailand. Due to the successful SF operations, and public pressure that the ceasefire came into being again.

In Mizoram, CI Ops were launched in 1966 which were successful, in particular when Pakistan was defeated in 1971. Mizoram was declared an Union territory and the elections were held. With the political process started, the MNF losts it s popularity The talks were held with the insurgents and with the SF operations stepped up after the coup in Bangladesh, the Mizo Accord came into being.

To wit, all these Accords and ceasefire are the work of all the agencies of the govt and the govt itself.

In the Punjab, the Army was at border sealing and there were activities under Op Rakshak. KPS Gill, no doubt did a good job and so did the Punjab Police. However, it was politically expedient to focus the limelight on the Gill and the Punjab Police and no one has any heartburns on the issue since they did an excellent job.

Therefore, it may not be true that geographical entity equates being 'locals', having a vast knowledge of the surroundings!

To wit, Telegraph used to bring out a weekly supplementary for social, political and cultural events separately for North Calcutta and South Calcutta. If indeed all Calcuttans were 'locals', then why would the newspaper publish local news separately for South and North Calcutta. After all, as locals they would be in the know! In fact, these supplements did indicate the vast difference in many fields in Calcutta of the South and North.

To me, it makes no difference how the govt decides to recruit, organise and kit its Rapid Action organisation (whatever be the name), so long as India's security is guaranteed to the extent it is humanly possible.

And indeed, what is the Mission of the NSG?

I concede that one has to know the area in general for various operational and logistic reasons and the layout of the likely targets in particular.

However, they are to take on terrorists and the intelligence of a strike will be, hopefully, provided by the Intelligence agencies and the NSG will take appropriate action. If a Mumbai type of surprise attack happens, the target layout being known, the action will be faster! Being in a hub, the reaction will be faster and the terrorist will not be able to consolidate and undertake an unacceptably high mayhem!

[Raja Bose]

somnath,

You are missing the point by quoting success of COIN ops as examples. The purpose of NSG hubs is not to go after naxals or other home grown terrorists. The state police (esp. in South India) have shown good initiative in trying to tackle that threat. Moreover, NSG is not a COIN force in any shape or form but is an elite CT/HR force which goes in, does the job in ferocious manner and clears out (very unlike any dedicated COIN op). NSG's job as one postor pointed out is high intensity CT/HR ops period. And as of now and atleast for some years to come none of our police (including comparatively well-equipped forces like Delhi Police) have the capability to do that. Do they need to have atleast some level of capability to do that? Absolutely Yes! But that will take time.

After Ray sir's initial post on NSG hubs, the value I saw in having such distributed regional hubs is summarized as follows:

1) Provide interim CT/HRT resources at state level with faster deployment during crisis while we are bring our police forces to a better level of capability. For faster deployment from NSG hubs to be totally successful, we will need dedicated air assets (esp. choppers, since range of deployment will be much shorter) at these regional hubs...otherwise we are just replacing Manesar traffic jam with Dum Dum traffic jam.

2) Have real-time access to local intelligence and get to know the specific threats, targets, lay of land etc. of the area the hub is responsible for. Instead of having Manesar deal with the entire Indian landmass....makes much sense to have distributed NSG assets close to specifics areas of responsibility. Unlike US which computerized records for everything and can efficiently track an individual electronically, Indian intel is still largely humint locally. Moreover India is vastly more heterogeneous than US (believe it or not!). Hence, in order to cultivate such intel, one requires different approaches for different areas based on culture, existing police system etc. Having a regional hub and giving that hub's officers and NCOs some leeway, support and resources in deciding how to liason with the local police and public (and do some hearts and minds) will go a long way in building and cementing successful relations. That way they get to know who are the power centers, who are the local dadas, who can get things done, who keeps an eye on what happens in the neighborhood (& immediately knows when new 'fair complexioned' students from out-of-state start renting a house), who is a goonda but is also a patriot (case in point, that Shiv Sena fella who arranged volunteers for food during Nariman House op) etc. Given the heterogenity of India, all such dynamics count and how to do this will also differ state-by-state, region-by-region.

If NSG (being a national force) can station men who are local to the specific states, that will help also since they will already have the advantage of language, culture and liasing with their 'own' people - after all in India regional identities are still extremely strong regardless of actual state borders.

3) As an extension of cooperation in (2), introduce local police to NSG capabilities, provide training to the local police to be the holding force such as what you are suggesting and more importantly also do inter-operational training so that the local police know how to function smoothly in cooperation with the NSG hub when crisis happens. In the end, the police should be proud to cooperate with NSG and not see them as dogs invading their home turf.

CT/HR ops require use of air assets such as choppers and extensive training in their use. Unlike US where local police of even mid-sized towns have their own air assets which police force in India has that and also has the capability to use them in operations other than transporting VIPs???

All this will take time and years. Hopefully once this happens some scale back of hubs can occur but till then (1) above is why the NSG regional hubs will be required.

All said and done, I really hope our GoI allocates all the monies and resources required by NSG to get this going including dedicated distributed air assets. If things are again done in usual half-measures, nothing is going to come out of having these hubs except a big chunk of taxpayer money wasted and more lives lost.

[somnath]

HRT is but one, and small, part of tackling terror threats to the cities.

by discussing thana level intelligence/informers and what not we are missing the basic point of the proposed NSG hubs.
their mandate is not COIN unlike punjab, naxal or NE but high intensity CT/HR ops.
that requires not informers and intelligence(it's simply not possible to have that) but information about layout of a locality and similar local knowledge that any pandu on the beat can provide.

none of the proposed NSG hubs is home to a insurgency movement of any definition and discussing that is not germane to this discussion.

No terror operation can be carried out without significant local input, even though it is expedient for us to typically lay the blame on some Paki outfit completely. The "special forces" response to that has to start from the "thana" level, in terms of intel and first response.

The problem with distributed NSG hubs is multiferous. It would take much more time and effort to set up 4 "mini-Manesars" than to set up adequate SWAT teams in the state police forces. Distributed air assets would require even more time and money than centralised ones - and today NSG doesnt even have centralised air assets.

Raja Bose, NSG is not set up to do an y of the "policing" activities, in intel or otherwise. It is a dedicated HRT force. The requirement is of mobility of the HRT force, and localisation of the force does not increase mobility necessarily. If thjere was an NSG unit in Navi Mumbai on 26/11, it would have taken probably the same time as it did from Delhi to reach Apollo Bunder! If the response to that is each hub should have its own air assets etc - well, is that more efficient (creating all that infra) than creating the same at Manesar and setting up a competent enough local SWAT setup?

Unfortunately, our politicians have this tendency of creating what Ajai Sahni refers to frequently as the "Rambo solution" to terror/insurgent problems. So set up some sort of a "commando" force in response to any terror situation. Instead of looking at the gist of the issue, which is more on intel and "adequate" (as opposed to uber) capabilities at the police level.

A good example would be the Batla House affiar. The police had good intel, but it went in with the approach of a typical local police, made numerous tactical errors, and a brave officer was killed, and one suspect got away. If the DP had even a modicum of a SWAT team, they would have approached it differently. That is where capabilities need to be built up.

NSG type units need a lot of resources to be "elite" - even rich countries cant afford "tens of thousands" of such elite forces. When we talk of expanding the forcce (already 8000 strong), we can be sure that it would be at the expense of true capacity building.

[Rahul M]

HRT is but one, and small, part of tackling terror threats to the cities.

and that small part is the exclusive domain of NSG type forces.
that is their job, not intelligence gathering, not keeping a tab on the local criminal gangs, none of it.

AND, this thread is NOT for discussion on general ways of "tackling terror threats to the cities" !!

this thread is exclusively for discussion of Indian SF and will stay that way.
general discussion on terror is absolutely irrelevant here.

[Raja Bose]

NSG is not set up to do an y of the "policing" activities, in intel or otherwise. It is a dedicated HRT force. The requirement is of mobility of the HRT force, and localisation of the force does not increase mobility necessarily. If thjere was an NSG unit in Navi Mumbai on 26/11, it would have taken probably the same time as it did from Delhi to reach Apollo Bunder! If the response to that is each hub should have its own air assets etc - well, is that more efficient (creating all that infra) than creating the same at Manesar and setting up a competent enough local SWAT setup?

somnath,

Every CT/HRT worth its name in this world has an intelligence component, becoz otherwise you are groping in the dark.

What you are referring to 'policing' activities are vital to CT/HR and yes, NSG has extensive operational experience in it and their men train for it (it just doesn't get into the news that is all). In fact that is one of the reasons why NSG was created as an integrated organization with civilian mandate, when Army SF had already existed for 20-25 years. NSG is a police organization of sorts (hybrid you can say) as per the NSG act! Please read one of the original B-R feature pages on the NSG if it is still around and the statements made by Col. Dutta as to what was the rationale behind NSG, why it was created and what gaps it fills.

I agree that local SWAT like units have to be created but as of now creation of regional hubs will be a faster process than setting up local SWATs because unlike the police, NSG already has training doctrine in place for training its men, knowing what specialized equipment they need and how to get it and has evolved these tactics over so many years.

While it looks good on paper to talk about rapidly setting up SWAT-type units for our police....in reality it is a really uphill challenge. Our state/city police by and large are nowhere even half-way down the road to have minimum capabilities to field SWAT-like units...even their basic mindset is different. It will take a while to get them to shape up and provide men in significant numbers, who even meet the minimum skill standards required to even take part in the NSG selection process. One might argue that we can dilute the skill requirement but are you willing to bet the lives to be lost on the next 26/11 on that assumption?? We have seen and know over the years that what the NSG trains for works and their tactics with some minor exceptions are successful. The shortcoming is their central location in Manesar, which is what is being addressed by the regional hubs. OTOH the shortcomings on the police side to set up SWAT teams are much more extensive and expensive in the long run. Unlike NSG which already has trained manpower, experience etc., on the police side you are talking about training from scratch.

Let me use an OT analogy. For example, if GTRE is developing the Kaveri engine, the NSG option followed with training of Police SWAT teams is equivalent to getting foreign support to immediately build the core and have our engineers master the tech as we go along so we have an engine which works in the immediate future and meanwhile also slowly build the capability to develop our own 100% indig. engine in future. So the LCA gets to fly and IAF is able to defend Indian airspace albeit with a slightly foreign engine which is not 100% indig. but will do for the interim. In comparison the police SWAT team option that you are suggesting, will equivalent to halt all work on the engine, and wait while we recruit fresh engineers, train them in basics, then send them for advanced courses, then have them do PhDs, then give them experience and finally in a decade or so build our engine. The latter option is more swadeshi and looks great on paper but totally impractical because the immediate tangibles are nowhere in sight (and of dubious quality) while only longterm goals are being looked at. So while these purely indig. efforts go on, there is no engine, LCA is not flying and the IAF is left with nothing to fly and defend with, when Pakistan attacks!

In US where the police has an overwhelmingly militaristic outlook in how it operates and its chain of command and tons more money, it took a lot of time to get the SWAT teams they have now (and these are just capable of being holding forces). So one can safely assume that in case of India it will take even longer given our heterogeneity and financial limitations. So in the meantime the regional hubs will have to do. Once our police is up to speed, the regional hubs can be scaled back, till then NSG is the only thing we got.

[somnath]

HRT is but one, and small, part of tackling terror threats to the cities.

and that small part is the exclusive domain of NSG type forces.
that is their job, not intelligence gathering, not keeping a tab on the local criminal gangs, none of it.

AND, this thread is NOT for discussion on general ways of "tackling terror threats to the cities" !!

this thread is exclusively for discussion of Indian SF and will stay that way.
general discussion on terror is absolutely irrelevant here.

Your "bold and underlined" bits are quite amusing...Will leave it at that...If you want to analyse special ops (and forces) against terrorism/insurgency, read up on the basics first...British experience in Northern Ireland, British experience in Malaya, our own experiences (Ranjit Gupta's book on the Naxalbari, or more pertinently KPS Gill's accounts of the Punjab experience)...Special ops is not only limited to guys with MP5s...

Raja Bose, I guess its a question of perspective in terms of what can be set up quicker. NSG (more specifically SAG) to be raised in bigger numbers and more infrastructure set up across the country or create from the existing police setups HRT forces, utilising the existing infrastructcure.

Most professionals talk logistics first. To set up 4 NSG hubs, even if they are half the scale of Manesar, would require the kind of land acquisition that is a nightmare in any Indian city. Then, the budgets. I think pretty much everyone agrees that the existing NSG setup has a long way to go in terms of getting equipped as an "elite" forcce - to create 4 other suhc setups would stretch it even more. The biggest issue I see is that of manpower. Peremptory transfers of personnel from the IA apart, most "elite" units of this sort ariund the world are pretty small (GSG9, FBI HRT, Sayaret) - sometimes in their 100s. We already have about 8k operators in NSG (maybe 3k for SAG), and we are talking of more numbers. The unit no longer can possibly remain "elite", especially with Indian budgets.

What I am most concerned about in the NSG hubbing strategy is the sub scale nature of each centre. As a spearate forcec, it would need offices, training facilites, living quarters, (maybe) dedicated airlift...All for about 500 operators?

If we are to "dilute" the standards, we might as well do it in city police setups with existing infra in terms of land, training facilities, and above all, local knowledge. In a 26/11 kind of scenario, a Mumbai SWAT cop who has spent his life there would have far greater familiarity with the alleyways of Apollo Bunder than a someone who hasnt. So even if "inferior" to the NSG, he would be able to react faster in a given situation like the intinerant...

In any case, on this we would need to wait and see how it pans out...NSG "hubbing" that is..

[Rahul M]

well, I too find it no less amusing that a person of your exalted intelligence can't understand the scope of a thread from a simple reading of the thread title and insists on discussing counter insurgency tactics in a thread dedicated to SF. FYI there already exists more than one thread for that. all it takes to find those is a little effort !

in any case, I can't let my continued amusement to interfere with my mod duties and let this thread be another victim of someone's arcane beliefs, as evident in discussions in Indian army thread and a past armoured vehicles thread.
For those who need the above statement to be spelled out, it means that henceforth, OT posts would be relocated to the trash bin, no questions asked or excuses sought.

rest of the response is so predictable, it would have been funny if it wasn't tiresome.
"throw five names of authors and books spiced up with smart-sounding rhetoric whenever you run out of arguments".

regards everybody !

[RayC]

Even professional forget about logistics.

Logistics is what actually supports the issue.

Without logistics, it is glitch!

Ask Musharraf.

I find it amusing that when in India, where POTA is abandoned, howls over Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and squealing over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act are rampant, people feel that the concept of the gung ho SWAT teams will pass muster.

The head not the heart must rule supreme!

[Raja Bose]

Ray sir,

Unfortunately in our country, neither the head nor the heart rules. What rules is some obscure perverted desire of our leaders to look 'Gandhian' and have a 'moral high ground' seeking approval of the rest of the world.......often at the peril of the lives of those fine men you led into battle, whose shoes our so-called leaders are not worthy of licking.

[somnath]

About the whole question of the logistics of an outfit like NSG - and the question of numbers. Most "elite" units are failry "small" in numbers terms. To rejig the memory, did some R&D:

FBI HRT - 90 (!)
Delta Force - 2,500
GSG9 - 250

Many of the numbers are obviously classified...But net net, the numbers are amazingly small...In comparison, we have some massive numbers - 8k of NSG, another 7-8k of Army (SF). And planning to increase the nos...Where does the money come from to make them truly elite? they would need all t\he money we can spare just to bring the existing units up to scrath!

[Raja Bose]

somnath,

Please look at the threat environment of the countries whose force strengths you are quoting. BTW your Delta numbers are way off.

[somnath]

somnath,

Please look at the threat environment of the countries whose force strengths you are quoting. BTW your Delta numbers are way off.

Of corse the threat environment is a factor, but in terms of training and equipment, its finally the money that counts. If with all the money that US/UK can spare, they can only raise these numbers, what quality can we expect with our budgets and the numbers we are talking about?

About the Delta numbers...
http://www.specwarnet.net/americas/delta.htm

These numbers are classified, so some of it pure guesswork...But the key point is that people spending far higher amounts have much smaller forces..Our "elite" forces in their present strength, need a lot more money to become elite -increasing numbers is a drag on that procecss..

Gaurav Sawants book on Kargil narrated an incident where the troops of the Army (SF) were talking about how they only a "little bit" better equipped than the regular infantry..

Even professional forget about logistics.

Logistics is what actually supports the issue.

Without logistics, it is glitch!

Ask Musharraf.

I find it amusing that when in India, where POTA is abandoned, howls over Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and squealing over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act are rampant, people feel that the concept of the gung ho SWAT teams will pass muster.

The head not the heart must rule supreme!

the "gung ho" bit is on the operational philosophy, and that is dictated by the powers that be..As for the force composition itself, most city police forces have Anti terror squads of some sort..What is required is a modicum of proper training and a decent equipment fit out for these guys as a start...IMHO would be quicker than sperate NSG cecntres in 4 cities..Greyhounds is a good example, in a slightly different context..

[RayC]

The HRT commonly functions as a national SWAT team in highly sensitive or dangerous situations.

FBI's 56 field office SWAT teams or the 14 'enhanced' SWAT teams.

Therefore, 56 + 14 hubs?

So many teams and yet no hostile neighbours with a porous border who carry out terrorist attacks repeatedly as it happens in India?

Delta Force's primary tasks are counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and national intervention operations, although it is an extremely versatile group capable of assuming many covert missions, including, but not limited to, rescuing hostages, raids, and eliminating covert enemy forces. Delta Force conducts missions similar to those attributed to the British Special Air Service (SAS), on which it was originally modelled.

It is SF. Our SF is also doing the same!

Interestingly, the US cannot even check the Mexixcans pouring in, inspite of bounties and sheriffs and others having the licence to kill!

GSG9. Not comparable. The vastness of the India overshadows Germany and they have no hostile neighbours who repeatedly carry out terrorist attacks.

One cuts the cloth as per the suit!

[RayC]

Gaurav Sawant's book mentions IIRC that Madras troops where sitting alongside the trench on the road off the Brigade HQ braving the cold!

Were there units of the Madras Regiment?

[RayC]

One or two members of the local police assist the unit, which will have hand-held GPRS facility and UHF wireless to contact the headquarters from any place in the state. The Greyhound commandos undergo rigorous training. One is expected to run for a minimum of 15 km with a 5-10 kg load without a break.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... stry-1.cms

That much for discussion that 'locals' would be able to do the job.

The 'locals' require the real local!

So, whether Greyhound or anyone, it is the same!

The IA does 40 kms march with 20 kgs without a break and in a set time. One can barely walk, if one has to qualify! It a run all the way! And it is not for specialised troops alone!

[somnath]

One cuts the cloth as per the suit!

Exactly, but the "cloth" is money AND requirmeent - not requirement only. Decentralisation is absolutely necessary, question is what form. The limited point is that even with vastly different level of budgets the really "elite" units everywhere have much smaller troop stregths..

Gaurav Sawant's book has a mention of his tet-e-tet with the troops of Para (SF) - forget the page number now, can dig out - he mentions how the Para (SF) has "slightly better" equipment than reg infantry..

The Greyhound example is absolultely moot for a CI environment, the point I made about "Rambo" solutions. Creation of a "special" force is no solution in itself - the whole policing infra has to be set up. The merit of the "local" SWAT teams in cities is however a little more pertinent. "City boys" know the place and the city police know of the "underbellies" much more than anyone else...A little different from large sprawling states of India...The familiarity quotient is quite a comparaqtivev advantage there IMHO...

[RayC]

One cuts the cloth as per the suit!

Exactly, but the "cloth" is money AND requirmeent - not requirement only. Decentralisation is absolutely necessary, question is what form. The limited point is that even with vastly different level of budgets the really "elite" units everywhere have much smaller troop strengths..

Gaurav Sawant's book has a mention of his tet-e-tet with the troops of Para (SF) - forget the page number now, can dig out - he mentions how the Para (SF) has "slightly better" equipment than reg infantry..

The Greyhound example is absolultely moot for a CI environment, the point I made about "Rambo" solutions. Creation of a "special" force is no solution in itself - the whole policing infra has to be set up. The merit of the "local" SWAT teams in cities is however a little more pertinent. "City boys" know the place and the city police know of the "underbellies" much more than anyone else...A little different from large sprawling states of India...The familiarity quotient is quite a comparaqtivev advantage there IMHO...

Let us analyse the logic.

There is a requirement for the Armed Forces. But the money is not there which can make it as efficient as the SWAT compared to the Police.

So, why have the armed forces?

Is that the logic?

Nothing is cheap if the Sovereignty and Security of the country is to be maintained.

The national cloth has to be cut to suit the suit!

You win some and you lose some!

The choice is yours!

City boys know their city, but then sometimes the PS alone knows their beat, while the others 'generally' know it! I have operated in IS duties in Allahabad, Kanpur, Hyderabad and I know who knows what and how much. I am not here to convince you.

I have operated against the Naxals in Adilabad, Nizamabad, Karimnagar, I am aware of their strength and weaknesses. Greyhound is doing a good job, but comparing them with other forces would be slightly off the mark.

Gaurav Sawant was a young, on the go, rookie reporter them. Then and now, he tends to make issues 'spectacular' and 'exclusive'! Like the troops braving the cold outside the Brigade HQ from the Madras Regiment!

[Rahul M]

Ray Sir, do you think it would be impossible to find 500 odd capable and fit men (may be not upto NSG level but close) from a state police force if they are given certain privileges like higher bonuses etc ??

would it be possible for a SWAT type force of such men funded and controlled by the MHA and trained by NSG to its standards(close) to be effective instead of the proposed NSG hubs ?

don't you think asking the army to commit even more of its men and officers to what is essentially a civilian force would harm its interests in the long term ?

[RayC]

Ray Sir, do you think it would be impossible to find 500 odd capable and fit men (may be not upto NSG level but close) from a state police force if they are given certain privileges like higher bonuses etc ??

would it be possible for a SWAT type force of such men funded and controlled by the MHA and trained by NSG to its standards(close) to be effective instead of the proposed NSG hubs ?

don't you think asking the army to commit even more of its men and officers to what is essentially a civilian force would harm its interests in the long term ?

The Greyhounds get 70% extra pay than the ordinary policeman!

I am sure everything is possible.

The problem in India is that there are too many Forces doing the same thing. The BSF was raised basically because of the fear that the IA could do a coup and so the govt had an equivalent force to counter it. Hence was placed under the MHA. That is but one of the reason left unsaid. The BSF is equipped in a similar fashion as the Armed Forces in a manner of speaking.

I remember when I was a 2/Lt there was a police rebellion in UP and elsewhere, especially those guarding installations and the Army was used to quell it and Anti Tank weapons were used. The CISF was set up thereafter.

The CRPF was raised originally as CRP(Crown Representative Police) on 27 July 1939, with 2 Battalions. Its primary duty at that time was to protect the British Residents in sensitive states. In 1949, Sardar Patel had it renamed as CRPF under the CRPF Act. The Sixties saw major expansion of CRPF in which many State Reserve Police Battalions were merged with CRPF. It is a reserve police force and now used also for CI. They were also used at the border in 1965. So, they are a jack of all trades. If they apply CI tactics where they combat terrorists to quell unruly mobs as would a reserve police do, there will be an outcry, but then their psyche has changed.

So, it is hotch potch and everything is done by the govt with a kam chalao jo ho. so ho attitude. I will qualify this, Though the Cold Start Doctrine was mooted to the govt during Gen Joshi's time and was rejected, it was promptly agreed when the Govt ate crow with Op Parakrama with the strategic surprise lost!

With so many forces at work, there is hardly an coordination.

I remember it was said at a meeting at the Unified Command that the BSF was doing a better job than the Army. The Army suggested then that the whole issue of COIN be handed over to the BSF and then all baulked!

Too much of glib talk.

The problem is simple - too many cooks spoil the broth!

Indeed, the NSG should be a separate force, but then someone will rope them into CI and then they will unlearn their original task.

SWAT is not the answer since the modus operandi is very aggressive and they are practically above the law as the NYPD and other police organisations of the US.

Our psyche is closer to the British. Remember the uproar when one chap was shot in the UK mistakenly for a terrorist? We are softer than the British. Had it happened in the US, none would be bothered. Change the Indian psyche and go ahead with anything one wants.

[somnath]

One must giev it to the Americans for simply access to data..Some details on the budget of the US SOCOM.

http://www.thefreelibrary.com/%22Specia ... 0155089113

About 50k strong SOCOM, a budget of 6.6 billion in 2006....Of course it includes everything, reservists, rangers et al...But still thats a staggerin number...And a good snippet of info about the CIA paramil - so its now part of the US SOCOM?

Even with such staggering budgets, there is a feeling that "basic" equipment needs are not being met, and fresh allocations are being asked for..

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf

With our kind of budgetary levels, the challenge is only obvious...

Its tough to get data on Indian stuff in these things, so one can only extrapolate..Going back to the Punjab example, a few years back IK Gujral waived off a debt (incurred almost purely on anti terror infrastructure) of 3k crores for Punjab - the amount of monies required now for the kind of "special ops" we have to (and aspire to) do would be very different..

[sum]

About 50k strong SOCOM, a budget of 6.6 billion in 2006....Of course it includes everything, reservists, rangers et al...But still thats a staggerin number...And a good snippet of info about the CIA paramil - so its now part of the US SOCOM?

50K SF??

Thats a HUUUGE number....

I was always under the impression that India with ~20K SF( NSG+ SG+ SFF +Para) was quite bloated for a "elite" unit....

[Rahul M]

Ray sir, I used the term SWAT to simply mean police staffed CT/HR force, not as an exact counterpart of US SWAT in doctrine and tactics.

in fact my idea would be same as a NSG SAG but at the state level staffed by state police forces.

yup sum, bharat karnad always goes on and on about why we should raise 35,000 SF in all.

[somnath]

^^^

Yeah, but it encompasses a lot of stuff inside itself - not just SEALS and Delta, but also Rangers, Marine Special ops etc etc. Even (possibly) the CIA paramil....Includes the National Guard components as well...SO I guess not all forces within SOCOM are really that "special" - its a question of mission - these units are assigned "special ops" missions, even if there is a huge gap in the capabilities of a Delta unit to a Rangers unit.

The nos of the really "elite" units, ie, Delta, SEALS are much smaller (about 2.5-3k each)...Even "elite" airborne light infantry is grouped under the SOCOM..

Stretching the same definition, in our scenario, Army SF, Garud, MARCOS would be clubbed with entities like the Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles, SFF, Vikas Regiment (units in "special ops" missions) and put together in one umbrella command....

Of course, once the command and mission structures and doctrines are established, the details of ORBAT are interesting, but just that, details...

[KiranM]

^^^ Those 50K in US SOCOM are not really the number of jack of all SF trades front teeth.

1) It also includes the supporting tail.

2) Also includes members of the 160 Special Aviation Regiment (Army helicopter pilots, jump masters, etc), AF combat airmen (involved in weather ops, FAC, etc), Navy Special Boat Teams (boat crew to transport SEALs/ Marines)

3) Throw in the US Rangers, who are not exactly SF. They are Special Operations capable - supporting Delta/ Green Berets, carrying out high tempo raids in large numbers behind enemy lines, etc.

Cut out 1), 2) and 3) we have a smaller number.

Regards.

[Raja Bose]

I dont what problem our babus and service chiefs have with a unified special operations command for the Indian SF. Sometimes it seems turf wars will be the end of us all. Shows in our personal psyche also....put 3 bengalis in a room and you immediately can start a rabid fight on political ideologies!

<@somnath>
You will always hear complaints about 'lack of basic equipment' in every force in the world. Unfortunately in case of India it is also a harsh reality (and not just a tactic to keep the upgradation going). Amongst US SF it is more of making sure the Pentagon is always listening coz otherwise the babus there will say that US SF is so well equipped now so lets divert some of their funds elsewhere. Big difference between what US SF considers 'basic equipment' and what our forces consider 'basic equipment' so please don't go purely by their statements. If you have personal access to some personnel there, you can get some idea of their basic equipment load-out...nobody even comes close to that...not even 'super-duper' SAS.
</@somnath>

US SWAT has authority to 'use force with extreme prejudice' but even then their capabilities don't extend to what SAG does. From what I have seen first hand of their functioning, they are more in line with the holding force we are talking about even with all their aggressive posture. The aggressiveness they portray is basically through use of overwhelming massive firepower and men against relatively lesser armed threats such as drug dealers, crazed civilians holding their daughter at gunpoint etc. (this itself originates from the basic mindset US police has). Taking on motivated well-trained terrorists with combat experience is not their cup of tea at present despite all the fancy gear you see them toting around. So in India what we need amongst police is not a diluted SWAT in terms of training, doctrine but something equivalent to that. I guess there some compromise will be done in high-end equipment terms but one has to live with that. Who knows maybe what we need is to send some of our bright young police officers to US to the SWAT training academies....perhaps that might induce some bright spark just like it did to Charlie Beckwith when he was deputed to SAS and then came back to form Delta. Of course unlike Beckwith who was too smitten with propah SAS which also might have contributed to initial poor performance of Delta, our officers will have to adapt those ideas to the Indian context. Just look at what 3 Indian Navy officers achieved after just 1 deputation to a USN SEAL Team!

[Jagan]

I have seen the greyhounds up close. Even though they are no NSG, they infuse much higher confidence than the regular police constabulary. The bunch I saw were young, fit and looked alert and were all armed with AKs. (and hopefully well trained). And the AKs were well maintained, not the type with paint flaking off and rust patches sticking out of magazines. (if you seen some of the guns of the police up close - you wil know what i mean )

I dont remember if one of their batallions are based in Hyderabad, but I would expect that they would be the first responders in a mumbai style attack and they would do much better.

[kaangeya]

The problem in India is that there are too many Forces doing the same thing. The BSF was raised basically because of the fear that the IA could do a coup and so the govt had an equivalent force to counter it. Hence was placed under the MHA. That is but one of the reason left unsaid.

Talking thru the hat - maybe not yours. Absolutely no record official or otherwise about this. The late 70s police mutinies broke out in UP, and then at a few CRPF detachments here and there, and of all places in Avadi! The CRPF was first called to quell the UP PAC mutiny, and then when the CRPF revolted for some other obscure reason, the BSF was called out to quell them. The CISF was established to secure public sector enterprise premises and of course the many sensitive D/S/ extablishments incl DAE/ISRO etc.

[somnath]

@Rajabose,

Of course what is basic for the Us is very different from what it is for India. the main thrust of my argument is that even with such staggering budgets (it must be in the 8 bil range now), the cutting edge of the US spear (Delta, SEALS etc) are such small teams. With our kind of budgets, we would struggle to even equip half decently the current strength of our "specials". So all this talk of raising their number is a bit strange.

the rationale for a special ops command is so compelling and immediate that its criminal for not setting it up even now. I have posted about this in the past, but the blame in this case should almost completely lie with the services bureaucracy. The govt would have no problems if the services got together and created a special ops command within the IDS structure (just like the DIA). But the services are too "narrow focussed" on respective turfs - there is not one true blue joint services cadre. OT here, but even the Strategic Forces Command is manned by deputationists who have to go back to their parent cadres, and hence are always "protecting" the interests of the same..

the police SWAT capabilities would be a question of again the "cloth", read money that is deployed. the advantage of the police solution, rather than the NSG hubbing one, would be in terms of infrastructrue and logistics costs (and timings) - almost the entire effort can be dedicated to training, selection and fit-out of the personnel, rather than start from Ground zero in terms of offices, housing, training facilities etc etc that would have to be for NSG hubbing.

All (rather most) city police forces have an "anti terror squad". There are three basic elements to their responsibilities:

1. Tactical intel
2. Criminal investigation
3. CT/HRT

So the challenge is to create from within the ATS (or Greyhound, or Octopus, or whichever acronym is relevant!) a small SWAT capability that can react first and professionally, and at least "hold" the ground properly till the uber specialists from NSG arrive. For Batla House type episoedes, they wil be more than good enough - rather than the ham handed approach of the ATS personnel (not trained in CT at all) today.

One small point on the BSF - it was set up after the 1965 war, when the need was felt for a unified border management force (experience of Ops Grand Slam I guess). In case there was an unstated "hedge against coup" reason, it was a bit late in the day. By 1965, coup was pretty much a "faded threat" - if the govt had to do it, it would have in the '50s, when the republic was more fledgling..

[kaangeya]

Special Forces Command - again? That assumes that there is one kind of special forces assignment or else why ever would one need a separate command? There's no jointness? I am tired of hearing this. So the Marcos securing Wular is all about the IN's needs rather than the IA? Beats me. If this is not jointness what is it? What does our not having a SF command mean? That we aren't interested in SF? Or we have no doctrine? Or what? Our problems lie elsewhere

[somnath]

Special Forces Command - again? That assumes that there is one kind of special forces assignment or else why ever would one need a separate command? There's no jointness? I am tired of hearing this. So the Marcos securing Wular is all about the IN's needs rather than the IA? Beats me. If this is not jointness what is it? What does our not having a SF command mean? That we aren't interested in SF? Or we have no doctrine? Or what? Our problems lie elsewhere

As a smiple point - a special ops command would mean that the commander of the MARCOS detachment wont be on TV giving interviews while the NSG operation is still on. But that is really a bit flimsy. The real reasons for a joint services command would be pooling of resources, creation of a proper special ops doctrine, reducing the admin drag and generally faster execution in response to crises. Not to mention creation of more of the special critical resources like language trained manpower, optimum use of surveillance assets etc. The Wullar lake is a good example, but an isolated one. A joint services command would be doing a lot mroe of "Wullar" type ops.

[kaangeya]

The real reasons for a joint services command would be pooling of resources, creation of a proper special ops doctrine, reducing the admin drag and generally faster execution in response to crises.

A joint SF doctrine can exist only in the context of a joint armed forces doctrine - which in turn is different from a national military doctrine. We have the 3rd of these three, but we don't have the 2nd yet. How crucial is that? I am not sure. Even without a joint forces doctrine (nothing but certain axioms) it is possible to respond when required. The US SF command exists in the context of several other combined force commands, with the constituent forces (A, N, AF, M) being organized very differently. While the US Army is now organized by Brigades (don't know if this light, flexible org will be reorg'd again in the light of the GOAT experience), the other three are still organized in grandiose fashion, with the USAF in a bit of identity crisis of late. Whatever the reasons for our not-as-quickly-as-we-want-it SF capabilities, the lack of a joint command isn't one of them. Also it would help to have some perspective on the workings of commands in the US armed forces.

[somnath]

Again, one has to give it to the US for making data accessible. Some interesting literature about the structure and operations of the US SOCOM:

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf

http://popp.gmu.edu/Hashem.pdf

http://www.pegc.us/archive/DoD/docs/Joi ... ne_101.ppt

[RayC]

The problem in India is that there are too many Forces doing the same thing. The BSF was raised basically because of the fear that the IA could do a coup and so the govt had an equivalent force to counter it. Hence was placed under the MHA. That is but one of the reason left unsaid.

Talking thru the hat - maybe not yours. Absolutely no record official or otherwise about this. The late 70s police mutinies broke out in UP, and then at a few CRPF detachments here and there, and of all places in Avadi! The CRPF was first called to quell the UP PAC mutiny, and then when the CRPF revolted for some other obscure reason, the BSF was called out to quell them. The CISF was established to secure public sector enterprise premises and of course the many sensitive D/S/ extablishments incl DAE/ISRO etc.

If you read my post carefully, it said 'left unsaid'. I wouldn't know from which hat it emerged. Now, if till 1965, the borders were guarded successfully by local armed police, what was the requirement for the BSF? Centralised control? Instead of multiple agencies could not the Army strength be increased and border duties assigned? Not only would they be able to guard the border, but also in an emergency fend of Pakistani attacks? During the Partition, the Borders were guarded by Border Scouts. They were amalgamated in the Army. It is better to have one unified force for better command and control and coordination, rather than a multifarious organisations. Because there is a plethora of organisations, there is no unified action as we see in J&K.

Here is something about the PAC revolt.

The P.A.C. in U.P. started a violent agitation in May, 1973 in support of their demands. It was sparked off by the students and Union of Lucknow University. Members of the Provincial Armed Constabulary were posted in the Campus during the examinations. On 20th May, 1973, members of the Students' Union and 40 soldiers slogans celebrating their unity. The agitation assumed gigantic proportions. The State administration pressed military in service.
There was violence on 22nd May, resulting in 39 deaths. For next three days there were armed encounters between the P.A.C. and military at different places. The agitation was eventually put down completely on 25th May, 1973. The toll of life amounted to 34 and
the number of arrested policemen rose to 380.
http://www.bprd.gov.in/writereaddata/li ... 814608.pdf

[RayC]

Just take the SAS

The Special Air Service is a Corps of the British Army under the United Kingdom legal system which authorises the raising of military forces and comprises three battalion-sized units, one Regular and two Territorial Army (TA), each styled as 'regiments' in accordance with British Army practice; 22 Regiment SAS being the Regular unit, with 21 Regiment SAS (Artists) and 23 Regiment SAS as the TA units, known together as the Special Air Service (Reserve) or SAS(R). Under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of the Director Special Forces.

Each Regiment comprises a number of "Sabre" Squadrons with some supporting functions being undertaken within 22 SAS; Headquarters, Planning, and Intelligence Section, Operational Research Section, Counter Revolutionary Warfare Wing, and Training Wing. ('Sabre' Squadrons are so called to distinguish the operational squadrons from administrative or HQ squadrons.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/22_Regimen ... 2_Regiment

One can well imagine what the strength would be - battalion sized - three of them!!

And the UK is but a tiny island!!

Singapore is a small island, but its Armed Force is quite large (It is capable of mobilising over 300,000 reserves and has an active force of 72,500 for the defence of Singapore.)! One could wonder whatever for do Singapore requires such a huge armed force and reserve and with sophisticated weaponry. In fact, if artillery fires, it will go into the sea! Yet, Singapore's Threat Perception (Singapore is known to be using a forward-defence military doctrine) demands it!

[KiranM]

Just take the SAS

The Special Air Service is a Corps of the British Army under the United Kingdom legal system which authorises the raising of military forces and comprises three battalion-sized units, one Regular and two Territorial Army (TA), each styled as 'regiments' in accordance with British Army practice; 22 Regiment SAS being the Regular unit, with 21 Regiment SAS (Artists) and 23 Regiment SAS as the TA units, known together as the Special Air Service (Reserve) or SAS(R). Under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of the Director Special Forces.

Each Regiment comprises a number of "Sabre" Squadrons with some supporting functions being undertaken within 22 SAS; Headquarters, Planning, and Intelligence Section, Operational Research Section, Counter Revolutionary Warfare Wing, and Training Wing. ('Sabre' Squadrons are so called to distinguish the operational squadrons from administrative or HQ squadrons.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/22_Regimen ... 2_Regiment

One can well imagine what the strength would be - battalion sized - three of them!!

And the UK is but a tiny island!!

Counter Revolutionary Wing is not really a supporting section. Its function is akin to NSG. Used primarily for Internal CT/HR.

Regards.