Discussion on Indian Special Forces

[Aditya G]

Now with local police investing and scaling up their local SWAT units, where does that leave NSG's "Ranger" i.e. CAPF battalions? The possibility of Bluestar or Black Thunder style sieges seems remote, which was the rationale behind SRGs. Taj Hotel and EDI attacks happened but we did not exactly see NSG battalions poured into each room to secure and cutoff the terrorists. What is the point of having such a large force?

NSG exercise with Force 1 in Mumbai:

[Theeran]

I learnt this while watching the Dallas shooter story. the dude was doing what they call slicing the pie around the pillar. Shouldn't these guys be doing the same? granted it is just one photo and there is no context here. Just wondering.

[Aditya G]

9SF achievements - for records.

1998 - Trans LC ops

Also noticed Op Rakshak phase is IV now

[rkhanna]

"I learnt this while watching the Dallas shooter story. the dude was doing what they call slicing the pie around the pillar. Shouldn't these guys be doing the same? granted it is just one photo and there is no context here. Just wondering.
"

The Operators would have already "Sliced the Pie" to come to the Position they are currently in. Also - Factor in multiple team members covering multiple angles (not just one/two shooters) - - This is open space and a fairly large Team would have to spread out and advance pretty quickly to cover such a large Garage.

[Aditya G]

MARCOs with SVD-K - desi version of HITRON?

The purpose of SVDK is to deal with targets which are too hard for standard 7.62×54mmR sniper rifles like SV-98 or SVD, such as assault troops in heavy body armor or enemy snipers behind cover.

[sum]

From Maverick blog(Clicky)

In the days of old a warlord in a distant land approached a very capable police officer in India and spoke about his fears that India's neighbor was building and testing nuclear weapons. To find out if this was actually the case a special group of people was set up. The selection process for this special group was quite tough. People with a certain flair for independent thinking and coherent action were selected. The emphasis was on people who were very fit but did not have to be given very detailed orders for every little thing and were willing and able to do whatever was needed to make it all hold together.

This special group climbed mountains and looked over the horizon at what was happening. They also trekked deep within the neighbor's yard and repeatedly picked up the neighbor's family members and asked them if they knew anything about his nuclear intentions. As long as they could determine that neighbor did not intend to deploy nuclear weapons in his back yard there was a chance that the peace of a thousand years could remain.

The people of this special group sat in a set of old huts behind the President's house. They had unfettered access to parts of Hindon and Palam - which all they really seemed to need. It was a small low/no profile affair.

And as time wore on, the warlord lost interest in this part of the world but his friend the police officer grew in national stature. It was after all a small country back then and everyone knew everyone. The police officer was asked by his commander to help solve a vexing problem along the eastern border. Again he fell back on the men of the special group. Again they delivered. This became a pattern whatever was asked - they delivered with no questions. They did grumble occasionally but it was nothing compared to what they delivered.

What started as a small group of misfits - gradually morphed into a real but nameless establishment with a real sense of national thought. As they were usually the last steps of the national thought process - they became the real stakeholders in all policy making. Never has a small group of people had so much influence on the nation since the companions of Gandhiji.

What emerged from this establishment was a very lean and mean version of India's national security policy. A minimalist national thinking - long on substance and short on bullshit. Long after the policeman retired, the group continued to affect the way India thought about critical issues. As the national sphere expanded and threats morphed, the group grew in size to meet the various needs. Eventually a place was set up in Himachal Pradesh to gradually fill the ranks. The place was managed by the Army and the volunteers from the Army staffed the ranks. The standards were extremely high - about 1% of those that applied actually made it through. Those that got through were capable of picking up new languages, dialects, adapting to new cultures while still retaining the capacity for extreme physical exertion. This establishment became the mothership from which all other conflict resolution capabilities emerged. Whether it was hostage rescue, or riot control a variety of policing functions grew naturally from their roots planted by the establishment.

There was a catch though. Per the policeman's world view - if you were to become part of this special group - you could not be part of the uniformed services. The rationale was that a member of the uniformed services being caught in a foreign land could be interpreted as an act of war. So you could only join this group by renouncing the connection to your parent cadre or service. From that point on - you were a civilian.

Now over the last decade, things have been changing. The Armed forces came in and expanded the setup in Himachal. They came to have a bigger and bigger role in the day to day affairs of the establishment. It became harder and harder to claim that the establishment and the Armed forces were not tied at the hip. The policeman's principle of separating the two elements became increasingly unworkable.

The old members of the establishment looked upon this with disdain. They felt the standard were being diluted and pretty soon the special group would spend its time painting anything that didn't move. They reconciled to all this with the understanding that whatever new capabilities were raised outside the needs of the special group would remain confined to national borders. This was all effectively a glorified internal security operation.

But that was not to be. By crossing the borders and then crowing about it in public - the enfant terrible of the establishment made it clear that it was not going to remain subservient to the older ways and do what it felt was right.

Who is the distant warlord and which were the events in the east which the SG participated in and did well?
Im assuming the policeman is Shri Kao

[sum]

Another good one from the blog:

A visual guide to India's special operations capabilities

I think a lot of media folk are finding it hard to distinguish between the various groups of Indian special operators.

India (despite what you hear in the press) is still not rich enough to bring all its armed forces to very high levels of readiness and training. So the GoI decided to do this piecemeal. Where possible they raised special units with some immediate justification and then used the units to incubate a gradual improvement in the training and quality of the main force. I think the scheme has paid off - to an extent - but the result is a massive proliferation of special forces. This making the landscape visually complicated.

One my pet peeves is when a local channel attempts to pass off footage of special forces people as something completely different. Recently a channel was showing some SOG people and then talking about them as if it was footage of actually Jihadis. That is not a good thing.

I hear that a somewhat related problem in the Op Rakshak Theater is IFF. There should be a color-of-the-day but that is quite risky so the alternative is to simply shoot first and ask questions later. Worst case you get chewed out by your CO for being trigger-happy - best case you immobilize a threat.

Anyway - here is a visual guide with some information.

1) SG/22/Mavericks - No uniform, facial camouflage, any weapon.[Ex. Maj. Sudhir Kumar, Maj. Amit Deswal, Maj. Udai Singh] - if you see a name against a photo of one of these people - it most likely implies they are dead. Their faces are seldom exposed, they perform a lot of undercover work. There are many sub-branches of this establishment (Ex. Vikas Regiment) very few have been photographed. I have even heard of Ladakh Scouts people being lumped with this establishment.

2) IA - SF in the valley - Maroon beret/patka, facial camouflage, Tavor or AK.[Ex. RR Cdo] Mainly provide high endurance interdiction of known Jihadi modules over adverse terrain.

3) Unified Command - SOG in the valley - Mixed fatigues, No Patka/Beret, face covered, AK variant [Ex. Pulwama SOG]. This organization used to have two parts - the SOG and the STF. The STF component AFAIK is no longer active. Typically used for intelligence gathering and targeted operations.

4) "SG-I and SG-II" (Most likely under UC) - Fatigues, no head gear, AK variant. Limited to operations in the Pir Panjals. Comprised of Gujjars and other natives of the area - these units help interdict an arms supply channel from Pakistan. I have only seen one set of photos of these guys - it was circa 2003 and I'm not sure if these units are still on active status.

5) JK-Ikhwan/National Security Organization (UC) - Shalwar kameez, beards, AK variants, (Ex. This Guy). Limited levels of active duty personnel. Most units disbanded.

6) IA - SF (Para) in the valley - Maroon beret, no facial camouflage, Tavor/AK variant. Deploy from ALH for AIOS security roles - exposed faces mean they are not assigned undercover roles. [see here]

7) MHA-NSG (Phantom) - Black attire, conspicuous webbing, HRT gear, black balaclava masks. [Ex. This Guy] - primarily HRT roles. Usually a subset something called 51-SAG.

MHA-NSG (SRG) - Black dungarees, Black or Maroom Beret, usually with HKMP5 or MP5k variant. Typically assigned to VIP security. [See these people]

9) MHA-SPG - Usually seen around PMs and ex-PMs or family of ex-PMs. Hard to mistake for anything else [Here their Counter-Fire Team]

10) IN - MARCOS - Black attire, facial camouflage, scuba gear, rarely seen in public barring the occasional media spectacle. [See here]

11) IAF - Garud - Peculiar fatigues, Cloth hats, helmets, eyes covered and faces shaved. Seen at airbases and the odd security detail for senior IAF officers in a sensitive area [see here]

12) CRPF - Cobra - Jungle fatigues, cloth hats, helmets, faces exposed, Tavors [a typical image]. One typically sees these guys in the Maoist insurgency areas.

13) CISF Commandos - Mixed fatigues, cloth hats, peculiar balaclava with white stripes. AK variants some Tavors [see here]. Mostly seen on YouTube - supposedly trained to provide QRFs at critical installations.

14) "Ghatak/Commando" - Slightly better kitted versions of their peers mainly for serving HRM (High Risk Missions) and providing local QRFs. Closer to the F-INSAS standard promoted some years ago. Usually have a prominent personal comm-link on the left top. [see here]

[rohitvats]

Lot of fancy language with mixed up data point - Special Group/ 22 SF/ Mavericks is also known an 4 Vikas Regiment. That is how it started out with SFF. There are about 10-12 battalions under Vikas Regiment or SFF. 4 Vikas is your Special Group.

There is only ONE army SF unit and that is Para (Special Forces). Over or Covert ops are their responsibility. SG does not figure in army's chain of command. Comes under R&AW.

[Aditya G]

NSG (Phantom) is a secret unit - it is selected from the SAGs.

Further to Rohits post, my understanding is that Special Group was subsumed within NSG but later re-raised by converting 4 Vikas.

Establishment 22 is effectively the regimental centre for SFF where all batallions are named Vikas Battalions.

We should also acknowledge Marine Commando Flight (zappers) and 202 squadron army as a SOF units

[Aditya G]

The policeman being spoken off is probably RN Kao.

Any idea what are the S, A and B groups?

[IWill things split as they have in other lands? Will the establishment separate into an "Activity" and a "Command" like they have in the US? Perhaps. Or will they remain unified but separate the S, A and B groups?[/I]

[Philip]

http://defencenews.in/article/Dedicated ... ndia-28896

Dedicated Special Force for Indo-China Border needed to counter Chinese Intrusions into India
Wednesday, October 26, 2016
By: Daily Mail UK

India is facing a difficult situation on its borders. Though we obsessively focus on the western front vis-à-vis Pakistan, what goes mostly ignored is the Chinese side.

Between 200 and 300 Chinese intrusions inside the Indian territory occur every year but for the sake of ‘normalisation’ of relations with Beijing, Delhi keeps them under wraps.

There is perhaps a solution to improve the situation - a better administration of our border areas.

For security purposes, the Indo-Tibet Border Police Force (ITBPF) is deployed from Karakoram Pass in Ladakh to Jachep La in Arunachal Pradesh along the 3,488-km Indo-Tibetan border, manning border outposts in the three sectors of the Himalayan frontier.

While the ITBPF, raised on October 24, 1962, is a specialised mountain force with professionally trained mountaineers, the civil administration in these areas is still in the hands of young IAS officers, unequipped and often unwilling to go through the hardship necessary to interact and help the local population.

Today, there is an acute need for a special cadre to administer India’s borders, especially in the Himalayas.
Is the government ready to take a first step in this direction? Probably not, as it may ruffle many feathers starting with the powerful IAS lobby.

It is worth noting that Jawaharlal Nehru did it, though with romantic concerns. He wrote: “I am not at all sure which is the better way of living, the tribal or our own.

"In some respects, I am quite certain theirs is better. Therefore, it is grossly presumptuous on our part to approach them with an air of superiority".

Though constitutionally a part of Assam, in the 1950s, the NEFA was administered by the ministry of external affairs, with governor of Assam acting as agent to the President of India, seconded by a senior officer (often from the ICS), designated as advisor to the governor.

Nehru took a great initiative in creating a separate cadre for India’s frontiers, mainly NEFA, Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan.

When on April 4, 1952, the then Prime Minster mentioned to Jairamdas Doulatram, the Governor of Assam, the need of a ‘special’ cadre; the idea was not appreciated by all.

Finally, in 1954, the first batch of officers, drawn mainly from the Army but also from the All-India services, was posted on the frontiers.
The initial recruitment to the Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS) was made through a Special Selection Board.

Sixty years later, one realises that though the idea was good, the over-romantic views about the border population amounted to the segregation of a large chunk of the Indian population and triggered underdevelopment of the border areas, which still exists today.

KC Johorey, who later became chief secretary in Goa, was one of the pioneers to join the IFAS.

He still remembers what Nehru told his batch: “The staff must go along with the flag and the typewriters can follow later on.”

Johorey recalls his first posting along the Siang Frontier Division: “There were two houses, one for the burra sahib (for Yusuf Ali, his boss), and behind another smaller hut.

"The houses were really huts made of bamboos, palm leaves and canes.

"Even the tables and the beds were of bamboos. There were no mattresses, no electricity and no furniture. The houses were very clean and airy. That was all,” he says.

One of the most famous members of the IFAS is Maj Ranenglao ‘Bob’ Khathing, who single-handedly brought Tawang under Indian administration in February 1951.

Another officer, Maj SM Krishnatry, has left an extraordinary account of his ‘tour’ report in what is today the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh.

Krishnatry, who had earlier been posted for seven years in Tibet, provides a detailed description of his adventures: “(Earlier) most exploratory expeditions in the tribal frontiers have been armed or armoured with heavy escorts much to the cost and suppression of human rights, occupation of their lands, burning of villages, molestation of women, looting of livestock, crops and banning of trade.”

Unfortunately, Verrier Elwin could only see the anthropological side of the issue, forgetting the strategic as well the economic aspects of the border development; it resulted in a huge development gap between the frontier areas and the rest of India, which became critical after Tibet’s invasion in 1950.

As a result, when China attacked India in October 1962, the country was unable to give Mao’s troops a befitting response.

The IFAS, an ad-hoc creation of Nehru, was dissolved in the mid-1960s and the intrepid IFAS officers were ‘merged’ with the ‘boring’ IFS, IAS or IPS. It is perhaps time to review the concept and create a new IFAS (or an Indo-Tibet Border Administrative Service), with daring officers coming from different walks of life (perhaps mainly from the Army to start with), but who would be willing to undertake the vital task to develop Indian frontiers.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The writer, a France-born author, is an expert on Tibet and China
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[rkhanna]

Who is the distant warlord

Bhutan? Or Nepal?

[rkhanna]

"NSG (Phantom) is a secret unit - it is selected from the SAGs."

I am not so sure. The best I have been able to figure out that the "Phantom" Moniker has to do with the grading system in selection. They dont form the a separate Unit.

A CT/HRT Unit does not particularly need a "Secret Unit".

[Akshay D]

Distant warlord is probably the USA(CIA). The neighbor is probably China. Policeman could also be B.N Mullick

The write-up seems to fit well with the early 60's when the SFF ('62) was setup and when the CIA and RAW/IB installed (or tried to) a nuclear powered device at Nanda Devi (65-67) to track china's nuclear program. One of the devices was never found.

[rohitvats]

NSG (Phantom) is a secret unit - it is selected from the SAGs.
Further to Rohits post, my understanding is that Special Group was subsumed within NSG but later re-raised by converting 4 Vikas.
Establishment 22 is effectively the regimental centre for SFF where all batallions are named Vikas Battalions.<SNIP>

Special Group was raised to be our SAS equivalent - a single organization responsible for all CT Ops. It was raised under the aegis of R&AW which chose elements from SFF. But it consisted of only Indian soldiers and officers. No Tibetans.

Post Operation Bluestar, elements from this unit were raised for creating NSG. As against an agile unit, NSG became what it became. The core concept got diluted.

[Raja Bose]

The issue on the east might be Mukti Bahini and East Pakistan. Heard some interesting stories on that from my granddad.

[sudhan]

Why don't the SPG counter assault operators wear helmets? I have seen multiple videos of these commandoes.. none show any operator wearing helmets..

[sum]

Was this posted before?

Video with ton loads of MARCOS training clips:

Linky(in case embed not working)

[rkhanna]

MARCOS with Brazlian and South African Naval SF




Marcos with Sri Lankan SF



Para SF- Recent COIN/CT






Paras





Captain Pawan -


NSG - During Training Ops at a port

[Viv S]

Cross-posting from Mil. Aviation thread.

V-22s for India? Aside from carrier logistics and (potentially) AEW&C, one very real role I can see is special operations/counter-terrorism.

Currently the NSG has only four metropolitan hubs in addition to the one at Manesar. If its needed anywhere else in the country, the NSG team will need to get to an airport and requisition an aircraft, civil or military. That will only get it to the closest airport to the target. From there on it needs to commandeer some buses/trucks and their drivers, negotiate traffic jams and then perhaps foot it the rest of the way.

A ready flight of two V-22s based at a central location like say.. Nagpur can take two teams (40 cdos) anywhere within 90% of the country in 2 hours (3hrs for the NE), brief them in the air, rope them down in close proximity to the target and provide persistent aerial/recce support. And, if needed, fire support too through the tail-gunner.

Just to put that in perspective, in rush hour, it takes far more than two hours to get from one end of a typical metro. State authority exercised through hard power and available 24x7, anywhere in the country at a moment's notice. Whether its a local strongmen turned wannabe warlord or an ambushed CRPF team.

Worth spending $1 bn for six units (incl. support)? I'd say so.

The Lowdown On Osprey’s Indian Hover

Shiv Aroor, Nov 22 2016

Does India need the V-22 Osprey? Need. That often powerless little word in the world of military modernisation globally — and certainly in India. Far more powerful impulses edge out straitlaced motivations like actual need in militaries. For instance, diplomatic necessity. Or, as a bite-the-bullet bridge to something bigger. Or, simply, want. So let’s re-frame that question: does India want the V-22 Osprey in any form? Well, here’s the thing. It’s complicated. And Livefist has some exclusive new information indicative of a structured plan Boeing is looking to pursue towards actually landing a deal for the Osprey in India.

India first solicited interest in the V-22 at the start of this decade in late 2010. First and second level of detail presentations were promptly made to the Indian Air Force. In 2012, Boeing confirmed that preliminary discussions were under way and that they saw a good deal of interest from India:



In 2013, the Indian Navy joined the conversation, throwing a glance at the V-22 and thinking of it for the carrier logistics and re-supply role. The navy dialed the US Navy asking for price and availability data on the Osprey platform. In 2015, reports emerged that the Indian military (presumably the Indian Air Force) was interested in procuring six V-22s for ‘rapid troop insertion in border areas’. Things have swum along in the realm of information sharing and presentations so far, understandably with less than a fraction of the expense or aggression being poured into more concrete programmes like the F/A-18 Super Hornet or the successfully concluded Apache & Chinook deals. The V-22, after all, doesn’t address a direct, clearly defined requirement — nor would it immediately figure in a prospective list of aircraft purchase priorities. Nevertheless, Livefist learns there’s a serious campaign afoot.

Top sources at Boeing tell Livefist the company is aiming to bring India on board as an operator of the V-22 Osprey within the next decade — by 2025 to be precise. As part of ongoing shape and capture opportunities, which saw Japan sign on as the first intetnational customer of the V-22 last year, Boeing is looking at 2025 as the year by which India should be a customer of the V-22. It is understood that airframes aimed at India will be from the third production tranche (called Multi-Year Procurement or MYP III) or the U.S. Marines MV-22 Common Configuration – Readiness and Modernization (CC-RAM) — a federal contract opportunity to beef up the Osprey, published earlier this year. This projection suggests Boeing is aiming at both a logistics-resupply role as well as a full-fledged special forces battlefield role for potential Ospreys in India. The U.S. Marine Corps, it has been known for a while, are looking to lethalize their MV-22s with a slew of arms add-ons, including rockets, mini-guns and missiles.

The U.S. Navy, currently validating the V-22 (it will ultimately be called the CMV-22B in naval service) for carrier on-board delivery to replace its C-2A Greyhound fleet starting 2018 has had hiccups. When your correspondent visited the U.S. Navy’s Naval Air Station Oceana in Virginia earlier this month, Commander Scott Miller006, an F/A-18 pilot with many tours on board aircraft carriers sounded skeptical about the Osprey. He highlighted two issues he saw as as big worries: the time it took for a V-22 to fold up (and that when it landed, it pretty much stopped all other air ops on deck), and the fact that its downward pointing nacelle exhaust plumes melted the flight deck surface coating on carriers during tests. Asked for a comment on these two issues, Rick Lemaster, Boeing’s Director, Global Sales & Marketing for Tiltrotor Programs said these were common ‘myths’ about the V-22. He said the Osprey folded up in 90 seconds, and a standard operating procedure had been evolved during carrier landings for Osprey pilots to oscillate the nacelles every few minutes to ensure there was no flightdeck burn. While this to-and-fro between the U.S. Navy and Boeing may be expected to continue, the question is of India.

The Indian Navy has been known for a while to want a variety of carrier-launched capabilities, chiefly logistics & resupply, but also carrier-launched airborne early warning and anti-submarine warfare. Boeing’s Lemaster confirms the programme has been lately looking at early warning radars and other kit that could convert the Osprey into an AEW/ASW/ASuW platform — part of what the U.S. Marine Corps wants for the aircraft anyway.

Starting with the P-8I deal of 2009 and C-17 deal in 2011, Boeing has had a relentlessly successful run with the Indian military, scoring big wins with twin rotorcraft deals with the Indian Air Force and Harpoon missiles for the Indian Navy. Several platforms like the V-22 wait in the wings as it were to service potential Indian interest. These include the AH-6i Little Bird and 737 AEW&C Wedgetail, both part of Boeing’s catalogue on the Indian table. Others like the InSitu Scan Eagle are part of active contests.

But the V-22 faces a combination of challenges in country — budget, acquisition priority in the medium term and a visible absence of any convincing reason to acquire the sort of capability that the Osprey offers to the Indian combat requirement vis-a-vis, say, what the incoming Chinooks would easily deliver. Then again, Boeing’s track record suggests they’ve been able to read Indian requirements and ‘capture’ them pretty well. And they’ve got a specific 2025 deadline to score.

[Viv S]

Marcos with Sri Lankan SF

Para SF- Recent COIN/CT

Could you fix the images please? Thanks.

[rkhanna]

"Could you fix the images please? Thanks."

Hey sorry didn't understand. You mean sizing?

[Viv S]

"Could you fix the images please? Thanks."

Hey sorry didn't understand. You mean sizing?

Its actually not showing on my screen. Like so..




I think you need to be logged in at IDF for the hotlinked pics to show.

Images #4 & #5 (above) and the last two.

[Raja Bose]

Nice Discovery shakinaw documentary on IA Para SF selection. Needs to be widely disseminated in paki and other fora for re-education purposes.



Shows things typically not highlighted such as language skills training and how trainees are broken down before being built up.

[ArmenT]

^^^^
Added to BR's own Army site (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/multimedia.html)

[arshyam]

^^ It might be copyright protected, pls exercise due caution before linking on the main site.

[Gerard]

India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations Forces along the Sino-Indian Border

[sum]

^^ Very interesting read. Thanks for posting.

Some interesting points in the article:

U.S. SOFs, having observed their
Indian counterparts during training exercises, noticed that in many cases Indian
paratroopers preferred to discard their expensive Israeli-designed Tavor rifles—
which are ill suited for Himalayan conditions and occasionally jam—in favor of
the more reliable AK-47

There is a broad consensus within
India’s SOF community that where the Garud truly needs to focus its efforts is
on developing a core of highly trained JTACs and forward-deployed air combat–
control teams.162 Another core objective would be to specialize in the emergency
extraction of downed IAF pilots or groups of SFFs or Para SFs isolated behind
enemy lines.163 Yet, according to most interviewees, until now not much progress
has been made on these fronts.

[vaibhav.n]

I really don't know where this chap is getting his information from. Most AK's have been phased out of SF teams for half a decade plus now besides the point that the Tavor is known within SF units for being rugged and reliable.

[Rakesh]

Great Special Forces shot
https://twitter.com/ShivAroor/status/820533742624083968

[pattnayak]

Demonstrations on surgical strike methods on Army Day 2017. I see new new helmets being worn by the troops. Also two Rudras make an appearance.

[Raja Bose]

I like the prisoner snatch at the end, getting lifted up in the sky by the chopper. A not so subtle psyops warning to the Pakis on the fate that awaits Haafiz Suar.

[Aditya G]

How come the scanias are still in service? I imagined that tatras or desi alternative would have replaced them by now

[Nick_S]

NSG to take part for first time in Republic Day parade
https://twitter.com/DDNewsHindi/status/ ... 3592987648

[SaiK]

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/iafs ... 62847.html

DRDO should still be the primary point to develop or collaborate to make in India for anything and everything

[Pratyush]

NSG to take part for first time in Republic Day parade
https://twitter.com/DDNewsHindi/status/ ... 3592987648

Why???

Some things are better left off behind the veil. Special forces units should never be advertised.

[Karan M]

agree. silliness of the highest order.

[Singha]

someone has seen Le Assault movie. good for the intimidation factor for the Daura-E-Khas recruits now undergoing training in TSP. nothing like looking at death in the face to shake the resolve of the waverers

there are hordes of youtube videos of CT units of other nations. movies are made of everything for USCG rescue swimmers, LAPD SWAT, FBI HRT, delta force, seal teams .... sometimes with real operators and definitely help in equipment and sets. USN lays out the red carpet to anyone who features the huge Khan CVNs and soothing surge of takeoffs

[NRao]

[url=IAF's Garud commandos to be equipped with new arms and bullet proof jackets]http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/iafs-garud-commandos-to-be-equipped-with-new-arms-and-bullet-proof-jackets/1/862847.html[/url]

DRDO should still be the primary point to develop or collaborate to make in India for anything and everything

Those gloves are for auto mechanics - keep hands clean. They provide some grip, but not sure they are good for combat purposes. Cheap tho' and available at any WalMart.

[Singha]

most of the time, COTS is good enough .... drdo need not reinvent every wheel.

the US army just finalized after a TEN year selection process a Siig sauer pistol for its next handgun (with some mods) over the current Beretta