Siachen News & Discussion

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 19 Mar 2013 03:31

ACM Tyagi's arrest coincide with Italiano Marines' Escape from UPA RAJ . IMHO, he will come out with permanent gag and no one will know who actually ate the the Euro Churoo after HeraFerrii.

Nikhil T · Post by **Nikhil T** » 19 Mar 2013 03:57

ShauryaT wrote:Augusta deal is way too small for a major political chain to be involved beyond the bureaucracy and defense leadership. However, the Augusta deal is just the tip of the ice berg. The major scams are not in defense procurement for the defenses, it is all the sundry procurements from services to supplies. It is a corrupt place all through and through. It is a well known open secret.

ShauryaJi how's a Rs 3600 crore deal "too small for politicians" but large enough for bureaucracy and defense leadership? Politicians were involved in Bofors and post-Kargil Coffin scams - both these deals were smaller than AugustaWestland.

ShauryaT wrote: ACM Tyagi is toast, because he has been caught as simple as that. His leadership on Siachen talks was token. I guess the way Delhi works, they may actually let ACM Tyagi off the hook due to honor et al of services, but then he will have to stay below the radar forever. If this government really cares for the services, it should send a message and book him, if guilty. But going by the Adarsh scam, do not have hopes here.

ACM Tyagi has not been caught with anything yet. Documents with NDTV yesterday show that NSA MK Narayanan, and SPG Dir Wanchoo and others were the ones cheerleading this program. The first two names are known loyalists to the family and that's why they are Governors today.

And finally with the Adarsh scam, the Govt did not let go of Service personnel because "it cares about the services". It was because bigger fish including serving and ex-Chief Ministers of the ruling coalition were involved.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 19 Mar 2013 04:15

I do not mean to absolve the political class. Please do not read it as such, just that the rot in MoD is as deep as in the political class. Times from the 80's have changed sir. There is enough internal capital now to be involved in a relatively small and high profile deal such as this. A person such as AKA at the helm at defense serves the purpose of not letting the political class in on the matter of defense but that does not mean there is a cleanup - the rest of the entire government is WIDE open to loot, as evidenced. It is just a viewpoint and on ACM Tyagi's role, well, we may never know the final story but the word on the street is his hands are in all the way. FWIW.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 19 Mar 2013 05:22

Much is being made here of the link between the AugustaWestland corruption issue and the marines being let go. I'd actually be very surprised if the Italians risked a multi-billion dollar contract and future arms sales to India for a couple of marines. An example of the kind of arms sales being risked includes the billion+ dollar torpedo deal (WASS vs Atlas Elektronik). Italian politicos are about as venal and mercenary as our own if not more.

Reddy · Post by **Reddy** » 19 Mar 2013 06:55

KrishnaK wrote:Much is being made here of the link between the AugustaWestland corruption issue and the marines being let go. I'd actually be very surprised if the Italians risked a multi-billion dollar contract and future arms sales to India for a couple of marines. An example of the kind of arms sales being risked includes the billion+ dollar torpedo deal (WASS vs Atlas Elektronik). Italian politicos are about as venal and mercenary as our own if not more.

They are not worried about multi-billion dollar contracts - if this govt is back in power in 2014 all these deals will be back online one way or the other. However, if govt changes next year it'll be almost impossible to stop two marines serving their time in our jail, which will be a major embarrassment for ITALY. In addition, if a new govt takes over next year they can patch up with it by giving the list of people who took bribes and try to reopen arms sales line. So, any which way you look they took a best route to bitch slap us.

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 19 Mar 2013 07:19

ShauryaTji,

AKA has been the defense minister since 2005. What did he achieve in past 8 years? Did he catch and punish a single person related to defense scandals?

vic · Post by **vic** » 19 Mar 2013 11:26

The job of the saint was to slowly destroy indigenous production, encourage imports and allow free flow of bribes to the family. He did his job well.

KrishnaK · Post by **KrishnaK** » 19 Mar 2013 22:42

Reddy wrote:They are not worried about multi-billion dollar contracts - if this govt is back in power in 2014 all these deals will be back online one way or the other. However, if govt changes next year it'll be almost impossible to stop two marines serving their time in our jail, which will be a major embarrassment for ITALY. In addition, if a new govt takes over next year they can patch up with it by giving the list of people who took bribes and try to reopen arms sales line. So, any which way you look they took a best route to bitch slap us.

If it were that easy, we'd be procuring from the likes of Bofors & Rheinmetall.

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 19 Mar 2013 22:50

THat is not how corruption works. Even when each case is too small for MoD to look into it, the bureacracy has to send a share to politicos upwards consolidating those smaller cases. Every month a fixed amount is sent to them increasing with double inflation, come hell or highway.

Big cases involvement is direct and the lower levels as a percentage share get less.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 23 Mar 2013 00:47

Siachen: Possible New International Moves for ‘Mediation’ - IDSA

The back channel parleys over Siachen sponsored by some international think tanks were in the news a few months back. A wide section of India’s strategic community took exception to what was purportedly agreed to by Indian participants in these parleys. These confabulations, held under the aegis of the Atlantic Council and other US/NATO linked think tanks, gave an impression to many to be promoting a demilitarization of the glacier and the adjoining ridges without settling the issue of territorial jurisdiction or proper and adequate authentication of the current position of the Indian and Pakistani troops in the region. In addition, no measures appeared to be on the table to ensure confidence building and an honest implementation of the proposed agreement. Since then, however, the din and the dust raised by these Indo-Pakistani contacts have subsided and on the surface things seem to be back to square one again. Or, are they really?

There are indications that some US think tanks, believed to be close to the US Administration, are working assiduously behind the scenes to revive India-Pakistan contacts on Siachen, both at the official as well as non-governmental levels. The US Administration’s interest in this seems to be driven by the desire to continue to engage Pakistan, as also to use the expectations of a US sponsored ‘settlement’ on Siachen as one of the levers to manipulate Pakistan in the period leading to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and thereafter. In September 2012, when the US made overtures to Pakistan to mend ties frayed by the raid on Osama bin-Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad earlier that year, the US Sate Department prepared a package of “various acts of goodwill” for Pakistan. One of those “acts of goodwill” was stated to be an offer to encourage mediation between India and Pakistan through US NGOs like the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), a State Department supported entity given to researching and promoting the negotiated resolution of various international disputes. Other US NGOs linked with the project are the US National Laboratory at Sandia, linked with the US Department for Energy, and the Atlantic Council. These organisations have been studying the issue of mediation on Siachen for quite some time. IMTD is not an entirely new player in Indo-Pak relations; it claims to have conceptually developed the proposal to start the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and has been working behind the scenes to promote Indo-Pakistani relations in other fields.

The key argument developed by IMTD and its associate institutions to pressure India, and Pakistan, through an international campaign if necessary, is the impact of the military conflict in the Siachen region on the ecology of the glacier. The military presence, it is propounded, is maximizing the impact of global warming on the glacier, which is fast shrinking. This would affect the flow of water in the Indus river with its potentially devastating implications for South Asia’s increasing population. Starting from Siachen, IMTD seeks to increase awareness about the protection of the entire Himalayan ecosystem – its forests, wet lands, biodiversity and cryosphere – as a means to ensure the availability of adequate water in the long term. Dealing with this looming crisis would require combined efforts by all the nations in the Himalayan basin, the US NGO contends.

On Siachen, the IMTD wants to bring the focus of international study on the fate of Himalayan glaciers and the impact of global warming on them. IMDT envisions cooperation of the Indian and Pakistani governments to establish international ‘science centers’ on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC). Initially it toyed with the idea of having these centres in Muzaffarabad under the ‘Azad Jammu & Kashmir University’ and in Srinagar under the Sher-e-Kashmir University. These centres were expected to eventually supplant the current military presence on the Siachen glacier with an international scientific one. The Sandia National Laboratory is said to have been studying the demilitarization of the glacier for the last 20 years and seeks to have the area declared a ‘peace park and science center’. The two NGOs have somewhat modified the initial working proposal and now seek to locate the Siachen science centres in Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir at the base of the Saltoro ridge, and at Kargil on the Indian side. In order to facilitate movement between the two centres, the IMTD and Sandia intend to work with the Indian and Pakistani military establishments and governments to open the Skardu-Kargil road for their journey back and forth. In fact, the opening of the Science Centres and the Skardu-Kargil road would be the starting point of multilateral contacts, which these NGOs seek to initiate with the Indian and Pakistan governments as well as academics from the two countries (three from each side). IMTD is also toying with the idea of associating the Chinese with these discussions. Various UN agencies would also be there to, what may amount to, totally undercutting India’s approach of bilateralism in dealing with its neighbours.

symontk · Post by **symontk** » 23 Mar 2013 08:41

Why Sandia National Laboratory? Presence of nuclear materials in the region?

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 23 Mar 2013 14:54

What's in it for America? Is it just to internationalize the issue and in doing so appease Pakistan for their co-operation in Afghanistan?

Using the northern China border, a huge triangle would come into being and become the object of a Pakistan-India joint proposal to the United Nations to designate that area as an International Peace Park with access measures similar to those of the Antarctic Treaty. A Siachen International Treaty would prohibit any form of military intrusion on the glacier. Both armies would disengage and vacate the designated site and have access to international monitoring data to assure that their territories are not being encroached. And, scientists (as well as mountain climbing expeditions and tourists) would have secure access to the Siachen glacier region while joint military contingents would be available for logistical assistance, transport and rescue.

That would allow Pakistan bragging rights and for ever destroy the Simla Agreement of 1972 that binds the two countries "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations". This would create a precedence for all current and future Pakistani demands to be internationalize, preferably involving US and UN.

A Siachen International Treaty on the lines of the Antarctic Treaty would allow every tom, dick and harry to have nay demand access to Siachen glacier region. So now Pakistan and China will have full access to Siachen under the guise of this treaty.

<Speculation Alert>
Perhaps there is more to it than meets the eye and implications go beyond the above. The involvement of Sandia Lab is very very interesting indeed.

What is to stop UN (i.e. US) from installing missile defense radars and other assorted spying equipment under the guise of weather radar in this Antarctica like "international area"? What will stop deployment of nuclear test monitoring equipment? What is to stop instillation of Ground Reference Stations/beacons for differential correction to improve the GPS signal over India, Pakistan, China and CAR regions.

Perhaps Siachen can meet all the US requirement (except troop deployment) for which they had desired a base in Afghanistan in perpetuity. Siachen is not Afghanistan but still can provide near similar advantage being not too far from it.

Perhaps such "peaceful" and "defensive" military equipment deployment can be done openly as allowed under Article 1 of Antarctic Treaty

Antarctic Treaty System

Article 1 – The area to be used for peaceful purposes only; military activity, such as weapons testing, is prohibited but military personnel and equipment may be used for scientific research or any other peaceful purpose;

Also,

Article 11 – All disputes to be settled peacefully by the parties concerned or, ultimately, by the International Court of Justice;

</Speculation Alert>

Useful questions to ponder
1. Who gets to decide who can be admitted to the Siachen Glacier?
2. Who gets to decide what materials/equipment get inducted on to the Siachen Glacier?
3. If project/work/people/equipment inimical to the India's interest is discovered in the 'peace park', does India get a right to expel such people and equipment?
4. Where will the disputes between parties involved in the project be decided?
5. If in the future the 'peace park' is closed, who get the control of the region then?

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 23 Mar 2013 23:40

pankajs wrote:What's in it for America? Is it just to internationalize the issue and in doing so appease Pakistan for their co-operation in Afghanistan?
Using the northern China border, a huge triangle would come into being and become the object of a Pakistan-India joint proposal to the United Nations to designate that area as an International Peace Park with access measures similar to those of the Antarctic Treaty. A Siachen International Treaty would prohibit any form of military intrusion on the glacier. Both armies would disengage and vacate the designated site and have access to international monitoring data to assure that their territories are not being encroached. And, scientists (as well as mountain climbing expeditions and tourists) would have secure access to the Siachen glacier region while joint military contingents would be available for logistical assistance, transport and rescue.

No foreign country has a role to play in the Indian sub continent.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 24 Mar 2013 09:02

^^^

Tell that to the UPA.

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 24 Mar 2013 09:42

If Siachen is up for negotiations by GOI then this clear Indication by India that not only its a weak country but also a stupid country. instead let India propose that fresh water reserves in China, Russia, Brazil, USA etc to be brought under international treaty. After all water is a global environmental issue and belong to whole humanity.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 30 Mar 2013 18:24

Death of Soldiers in Siachen - MOD,GOI

The following fatal casualties occurred due to avalanches during the last three years and the current year in Siachen:-

Code: Select all

                  Year               No. of Casualties due to Avalanches
                  2010               06
                  2011               05
                  2012               07
                  2013               NIL

The troops deployed in this area are suitably equipped, trained and organized to face the operational challenges and carry out their mandated tasks.

Any deployment/redeployment of troops in the area is contingent upon the threat perception, ground situation, operational and strategic considerations.

This information was given by Defence Minister Shri AK Antony in a written reply to Shri N.S.V. Chitthanand others in Lok Sabha today.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 24 Apr 2013 04:29

For kanwal & co.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1446029

SSridhar wrote:In fact, this Chinese intrusion well beyond DBO and almost to the nape of Siachen must open the eyes of those who were arguing for turning Siachen into a peace park and India withdrawing its soldiers. They are forgetting that TSPA and PLA are together in their nefarious activities.

Vipul · Post by **Vipul** » 12 May 2013 18:20

Chinese intrusion threatening Siachen.

Even for the most intrepid helicopter pilots of the Indian Air Force, flying a sortie to the desolate outpost of Daulat Beg Oldi on the Line of Actual Control with China has always meant pushing the limits.

Wing Commander Abdul Hanfee, who had won a Vir Chakra for his devil-may-care flying in Siachen, would take off from the Siachen Base Camp with his Mi-17 helicopter loaded with rations and fuel and set course for Saser La, the 17,753-foot pass on the Karakoram range.

With the helicopter rotors shuddering as they clawed through the thin air, Hanfee would look down from his cockpit as he flew over the pass still littered with the bones of camels, ponies and human wayfarers -- the detritus of a bygone era when arbitrary frontiers had not disrupted the centuries-old patterns of trade and connectivity.

This was the Old Silk Route that connected Ladakh and Kashmir with Xinjiang -- now, like Tibet, an "autonomous region" of China.
Well into the 20th century, camel caravans laden with silk, jade and hemp would set out from Yarkand and Khotan in East Turkestan to Leh and Kashmir from where they would bring back Pashmina wool, saffron, tea and calligraphy.

After crossing the Karakoram Pass into India, the traders would leave their camels at Daulat Beg Oldi and transfer their goods onto pack ponies for the cruel journey over Saser La into the more hospitable Shyok river valley that led on to Leh, Turtok or Srinagar.

This isolation has defeated even the Border Roads Organisation which has laboured for over a decade, so far unsuccessfully, to build an all-weather road over Saser La that will connect Daulat Beg Oldi (or DBO, in military phraseology) with Leh, Partapur and Kargil. BRO has failed equally in bringing another road northwards to DBO from the Pangong Tso Lake, along the Indian side of LAC.

Without road links to the rest of Ladakh, DBO remains an isolated enclave across the Karakoram and Ladakh ranges, dependent upon IAF for food, fuel, ammunition and quick troop replenishments.

Going there on foot involves an exhausting five-day march at altitudes that would exhaust an ibex. The military calls this enclave Sub-Sector North (SSN) and regards it as crucial for the defence of Siachen and Leh.

According to Lt Gen Kamleshwar Davar, a former commander of 3 Infantry Division, under which this area comes, "If the Chinese were to come up to Saser La, our control over the Siachen Glacier would be seriously compromised since Saser La overlooks that area. SSN provides a protective buffer to the Siachen sector and also provides depth to the northeastern approaches to Leh. It is our land access to Central Asia, along the Old Silk Route through the Karakoram Pass."

RoyG · Post by **RoyG** » 06 Jun 2013 05:29

What ever happened to that piss park that a few BRFites were advocating? Haven't heard much about it lately.

Vipul · Post by **Vipul** » 06 Jun 2013 07:18

Yeah i have been wondering what happened to all those who were/are suffering from Stockholm Syndrome?

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 06 Jun 2013 15:05

Vipul wrote: According to Lt Gen Kamleshwar Davar, a former commander of 3 Infantry Division, under which this area comes, "If the Chinese were to come up to Saser La, our control over the Siachen Glacier would be seriously compromised since Saser La overlooks that area. SSN provides a protective buffer to the Siachen sector and also provides depth to the northeastern approaches to Leh. It is our land access to Central Asia, along the Old Silk Route through the Karakoram Pass."

When I said that a pincer was possible, I was almost mocked at.

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 06 Jun 2013 16:18

^^^

If the PLA launches a pincer attack along with the TSP against Siachen. Will the Indian state buckle or will it fight like it had at kargil. Moreover, can the position survive an encirclement.

Vipul · Post by **Vipul** » 04 Dec 2013 20:45

Pakistan asks India to withdraw army from Siachen glacier.

Having lost Siachen Militarily, Shitistan is now saying envionment ke naam pe Siachen dede baba. They think everybody is inbred and have low IQ's like themselves to believe in this sudden concern for the environment?

Pakistan on Wednesday asked India to withdraw its troops from Siachen, claiming their presence on the glacier was damaging the environment and polluting one of the country’s main sources of water supplies.

Sartaj Aziz, adviser to the prime minister on national security and foreign affairs, claimed Indian forces on Siachen posed a “serious threat” to Pakistan’s environment. Pakistan is facing a water shortage and Indian troops are damaging the “virgin snow” of Siachen—one of the largest sources of Pakistani water, he said. He further claimed that items of daily use disposed of by Indian soldiers were threatening the glacier’s existence.

Describing the presence of Indian forces on the glacier as a “big issue”, he urged India to resolve the Siachen issue “on priority basis by pulling out its troops”. Aziz said Pakistan and India are engaged to resolve outstanding water issues through multiple channels, including the composite dialogue and Indus Waters Commission. He said the implications of water scarcity are grave in view of climate change.

Indian and Pakistani troops have been locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation on Siachen, the world’s highest and coldest battlefield, since 1984. The guns have been largely silent along the Actual Ground Position Line since the two sides put in place a ceasefire in 2003 but adverse weather conditions on the glacier have claimed more lives on both sides than actual hostilities.

India has insisted that the demilitarisation of Siachen must be preceded by recording the existing troop positions but this has been rejected by Pakistan

Rejecting the Indian demand of recording existing troop position is more important to the lip-service otherwise regarding Environmental degradation.What's next - Allah ke naam pe Siachen dede baba?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 04 Dec 2013 20:51

Pakistan is a threat to itself. Destroy it.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 04 Dec 2013 20:53

Re Siachen environmentalism.
Another cause for our apostle of peace shri ShauryaT ji to push for.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 04 Dec 2013 21:07

Does anyone know the extent of our forces deployed in SSN?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 05 Dec 2013 09:17

Paul wrote:Does anyone know the extent of our forces deployed in SSN?

Not exact details but reports speak of ITBP battalion (spread over a wide sector) along with a company or two of Ladakh Scouts. BTW, for me SSN means the DBO sector - DBO proper to the staging area cum post at Murgo.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 05 Dec 2013 13:28

Thanks Rohit....seems this sector is set up for a Chushul type of battle in the future. Hope the Chinese infrastructure is not too developed on the other side. We need another Thangaraju (he developed a mule track in Zoji to the current NH1A in 1948, we were able to deploy tanks here and save Ladakh) to lay down a 5 ton roadway from Leh to DBO ASAP, it is only a matter of time before this develops into the next hotspot in this region.

But if the Chinese do decide to outflank us in Siachen, they can do that also from the northern side in Shaksgam valley which ceded to them in 1963. In the last Indo -pak discussions on Siachen IIRC, the pakis had asked India to include China in the discussions.

Hope we have some keeping an eye on Karakorum pass too.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 20 Mar 2014 22:49

"Pakistanis were not buying snow clothing for picnic"

In 2012, when the clamour for de-militarising Siachen following the death of 130 Pakistani soldiers in an avalanche accident was at its peak, Sood referred to the meeting with Lt Gen Hoon in an article.

"The venue: Badami Bagh, Srinagar, Headquarters of the Corps Commander 15 Corps, Lt Gen Prem Hoon

The year: 1983

The participants: The Corps Commander and the R&AW station chief.

The subject: Siachen and reported Pakistani activities in that region according to intelligence reports from across the LoC.

It would be untrue to suggest that this meeting led to the assault on the Soltoro Ridge which is actually west of the Siachen glacier, but the fact is, that the matter had assumed serious proportions and Indira Gandhi's government was deeply concerned.

The reports, that the Pakistanis were making probes ostensibly through tourism and mountaineering groups, were disturbing. The obvious aim of the Pakistanis appeared to be to cross the Saltoro heights and head for the Karakoram Pass on the Jammu and Kashmir border with Tibet (China)..."

Even Gen Chibber's note to Army HQ in 1983-84 justifying the need to launch an operation to occupy the passes on the Saltoro ridge had details of Pakistani activities and intentions in the area.

He told Army HQ: "Pakistan had inducted a column consisting of one Cdo(Commando) Coy (Company) and one NLI (Northern Light Infantry) Coy supported by a mor pl (Mortar platoon) to Sia La. Pakistan build up of this column was apparently delayed due to the late arrival from abroad of snow clothing and equipment."

The note continued: "Whilst we were planning and preparing for Operation Meghdoot, there were intelligence reports that indicted Pak had designs of launching a military operation in the area. Some of the pertinent indicators were as follows:

(a) Cancellation of leave: In Jan 84, it was learnt that the turnover of troops/units, as also leave of persons in Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA) had been suspended till Sept 84.
(b) Laying lines of communication: In Dec 1983, intelligence reported laying of line of communications ahead of Skardu. Later in Apr 84, reports pertaining to establishment of an exchange at Khapalu were also received.
(c) Procurement of high altitude equipment: Reports in November 1983 had indicated Pak procuring approximately 1000 sets of high altitude clothing and other related equipment."

The assessment of the Indian Army's Northern Command was later borne out by Lt. Gen Jahandad Khan (then Commander of Rawalpindi-based X Corps) in his book.

"When the SSG Company got across Bilafond La Pass (in 1983), the helicopter pilot reported an Indian location 1000 yards ahead in the Siachen area. After seeing our helicopter, the Indian troops, comprising Ladakh Scouts, left their location in a great hurry abandoning all their rations and tentage. The SSG Company stayed in this area for 10 days but was ordered to withdraw in the first week of September 1983 as it had started snowing and the company did not have equipment for survival in the winter season under thirty to forty feet of snow, which is normal snow range.

The withdrawal of the SSG Company was followed by many meetings in the GHQ to decide our plan of action for the summer of 1984 when the Indians were bound to come in greater numbers. Also taken into consideration was the fact that whoever succeeded in occupying the passes first would be able to hold them as it was impossible to dislodge them from these positions due to the terrain and the conditions. As Corps Commander, I gave the following assessment to the GHQ.

Next year (1984), India is most likely to pre-empt the occupation of the main passes of Saltoro Ridge with two battalion strength of occupation and a third battalion as reserve. It would need another brigade to provide them with logistics support. Maximum helicopter force will have to be utilised for logistics support. The air force will be available for air cover and also air drop of supplies and equipment.

We will need a brigade group with a battalion plus to occupy these passes and the rest of the force to provide relief and logistics support. We would also need maximum porter force to carry supplies and ammunition from Goma to the glacier positions. All our helicopter force, both Aloutte and Puma, will have to be mobilised for recce and logistics cover.. The PAF has to stand by to provide air cover. I had also cautioned GHQ that this operation will be very costly in logistics support. Our military intelligence must be alerted to keep us informed of all enemy movements beyond Leh to forestall their occupation of the glacier area.

A meeting was held in in December 1983, the GHQ Operation Room under the chairmanship of President Gen Zia ul- Haq. After listening to the 10 Corps Plan, the COAS thought that operations on both sides would be of a limited scale, involving not more than a brigade on the Indian side and a battalion on Pakistan side. The COAS had obviously underestimated the quantum of force required by both sides. He had also underestimated the logistics problem of this operation as presented to him by the logistics staff of the GHQ. In this meeting it was decided to incorporate the PAF in this operation and Maj Gen Pir Dad Khan (Commander of the Northern Areas) was given the task of pre-empting the occupation of the passes, reaching there not before May 1984, as weather conditions before that period would not allow the use of helicopters and the PAF. This decision was to be approved by the Defence Coordination Committee (DCC), attended by Chairman, Joint Staffs Committee and all service chiefs. So preparatory work was started on procurement of high altitude equipment and clothing, improvement of roads and tracks, recruitment of porters etc. All these preparations were to be completed by April 1984.

I handed over command of 10 Corps to Lt. Gen Zahid Ali Akbar Khan on 31 March 1984 after completing my tenure of four years. I gave him a detailed briefing about this operational plan and particularly stressed the importance of intelligence keeping a watch on Indian moves beyond Leh. However, I learned later that when our troops approached the SaltoroRidge passes during the third week of May 1984, the Indians were already in occupation of Gyong Pass in the south, strategically important because it could interfere with the enemy's line of logistics support. As it was impossible to dislodge the Indians, we had no option but to occupy the next highest feature opposite them. This was a great setback for Pakistan, although all plans, including the timing of the troop movement, had been laid down at the highest level. We had obviously failed to detect the movement of a brigade size force in this area. It was learnt that the Indians had moved up their troops from Leh in the second half of April 1984.

After the occupation of these positions by both sides, opposite each other, the border became active. Both sides started inducting heavy weapons including artillery guns, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft missiles. Fire duels, patrol clashes and engagement of helicopters through anti-aircraft guns became a daily affair. Both sides also brought up more troops to counter each other. Since then there has been no substantial change in the relative positions on both sides. It was in the winter of 1984 that the Pakistani troops first experienced operating at that altitude. But the troops were provided high altitude equipment and there was no abnormal loss of life due to weather conditions."

If further proof of Pakistani intentions in 1983-84 was required, it was provided in an article titled 'Geopolitics of the Siachen Glacier' published in the November 1985 issue of the Asian Defence Journal, written by Zulfikar A. Khan. It said, in parts: "To protect what is regards as its territory and prevent violation by Indian troops, Pakistan decided to establish a permanent picket at Siachen. To pre-empt this move, the Indians airlifted a Kumaon Battalion by helicopters..."

Of course it wasn't a battalion (1,000 men), but just a platoon plus strength (about 30 soldiers) of 4 Kumaon which commenced Operation Meghdoot!

Gen Chibber, who was associated with Siachen in one way or the other since 1978, was also aware of the possible violent reaction by Pakistan if Indian troops occupied Sia La and Bilafond La. "That our operation in the Siachen Glacier could result in a local conflict which may further escalate was a distinct possibility. I was aware that Operation Meghdoot had the potential for escalation ranging from a conflict of a local nature to one of major magnitude either along the LC in Kashmir, or along the whole of the international border with Pakistan," the then Northern Army Commander told Army HQ in an official note.

Despite the possibility of escalation, Army HQ in consultation with the Prime Minister's Office and particularly on the directive of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to launch Operation Meghdoot. As Gen Chibber now recalls: "I gave an assessment to the highest quarters that if we were to prevent the Pakistani side from presenting us with a fait accompli, we had to act fast." He remembers telling Army HQ and the PMO: "If they (the Pakistanis) were to establish posts on the Siachen glacier it would be very costly to evict them. The probability that we may not be able to do so at all was also very high."

In retrospect, it can be safely said that intelligence provided by RA&W, Army's own assessment coupled with the tone and tenor of the Pakistani protest notes in 1983 hastened preparations for launching the operations on the glacier. They commenced soon after Patrol Polar Bear had returned in September 1983. According to official notes of the time, Gen Chibber had a number of discussions with Lt Gen PN Hoon and his staff between September and December 1983. He gave them broad guidelines to plan ahead for operations in a "deliberate and comprehensive manner".

Gen Chibber noted: "Our presence in this area till 1983 had been in the form of expeditions and patrols, which were considered inadequate to meet possible Pakistani reaction. It was, therefore decided to launch a sizeable force suitably equipped to operate in the Siachen glacier during 1984."

Operation Meghdoot was now just months away!

Anthony Hines · Post by **Anthony Hines** » 21 Mar 2014 00:01

Again?

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 21 Mar 2014 00:42

I really dont want the "give away Siachen" brigade discussions back.

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 21 Mar 2014 00:48

For topics like this, or say reports on Indo-China war; can't help but think along the lines of "What would Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh do?"

Link from bharat-rakshak.com - Personnel

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 21 Mar 2014 00:52

ok, Fai has been released and he is already back to his old job for ISI.
http://www.gnfai.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syed_Ghulam_Nabi_Fai

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 21 Mar 2014 11:50

vishvak wrote:For topics like this, or say reports on Indo-China war; can't help but think along the lines of "What would Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh do?"

Link from bharat-rakshak.com - Personnel

Indian army would have given a better performance on the western front in 1971 had Harbaksh been in Maneckshaw's place. The outcome of the battle in east pakistan was a foregone conclusion with the overwhelming superiority of Indian armed forces. Gen K K Singh GOC Ist corps would have been replaced by Harbaksh for his defensive mindset and replaced by a more forward thinking officer.

Indira preferring Maneckshaw over Harbaksh per the link below /**edited per guidelines**/

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 21 Mar 2014 14:26

Ah, cut the crap. Manecksaw was senior to Harbaksh singh. Manecksaw belonged to 1934 batch while harbaksh belonged to 1935 batch.
http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/oct/18spec3.htm

Ironically, many believe that India is getting a Sikh four-star general 36 years too late, after Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, GOC, Western Command, 1968, was overlooked by the then political leadership. Indira Gandhi, the then prime minister had picked Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal) S H F J Manekshaw, who later led the Indian Army to its finest victory yet over Pakistan in 1971.

Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, before he died in 1999, had claimed that he was denied the chief of staff post after being promised the same by Indira Gandhi and by then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was most impressed with his brilliant tactics that allowed the Indian Army to reach the outskirts of Lahore in 1965.

But Major General Ashok Mehta (retd) claims that story is untrue. "Manekshaw was the senior of the two and Indira stuck to the seniority principle," he says. And there is no doubt that Manekshaw's record was equally impressive, if not better. Given that both men were brilliant and eminently capable, the final choice often boils down to aspects such as seniority and the ability to get along with the civilian leadership.

I am reporting your post for rabble -rousing and trying to inflame religious sentiments.

There was only one general who was wronged in that fashion, S.K. Sinha. He was superceded by A S Vaidya under Indira's orders. Vaidya was murdered within months of his retiring.
http://archive.asianage.com/columnists/ ... nerals-138

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 21 Mar 2014 15:35

You need to brush up on your facts. Even though Manekshaw was senior, Gen Kumaramangalam the GOC had recommended Harbaksh Singh to be his successor on account of his better combat performance but was disregarded by the powers that be.

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/book ... 44628.html

Harbakhsh recounts Kumaramangalam had recommended his name and initially the Cabinet had ratified it. Harbakhsh was informed of this "on telephone by Mr Malik of Intelligence, almost immediately ... (But) I am told that he (foreign minister Dinesh Singh) advised her that as a prime minister her desire should prevail. Accordingly, she had it announced in the next day's papers that the next COAS was going to be her choice-General Manekshaw". It was as simple as that.

He fixed NEFA by taking command of 4th corps and restored order and morale after Kaul's mess in 1962. His superb performance in 1965 needs no elaboration. Had it not been for his resistance, the IA would have to withdraw behind the Beas river on the GOC's orders.

his command of 4 Corps, where he took over the reins from an inefficient and ill but politically well-connected General B.M. Kaul who had by then gifted away NEFA to the Chinese in 1962; and finally his masterly conduct of operations on the western front in 1965.

Furthermore, who will explain the below average performance of the IA on the western front in 1971 - The loss of Chamb with it's population going over to Pakistan; 1st corps's dismal performance in Zafarwal, they advanced a grand total of 8 miles on 2 weeks.

Thirdly, the Southern command's spoiling attack in Rajasthan was not carried out. This was covered by the superlative defensive action of 23rd Punjab in Longowal. India was fortunate that Pakistan did not cater for air cover in this region. Had there been a few sabres here, it would have been curtains as PA could have walked upto Jaisalmer.

http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.in/2009 ... -thar.html

From a Paki blog
Despite the battering that it took at Longewala, it can be said that 18 Division’s venture, foolhardy though it was, did not go in vain and, it was somehow able to prevent a befuddled 12 Division Commander, Major General R K Khambata, from achieving his main task of truncating West Pakistan. The Indian Official History of 1971 Indo-Pak War succinctly sums up 12 Division’s disappointment thus: “Had it detected the Pak thrust on 4 December, the Division could have met and dissipated it, and gone ahead with its offensive as originally planned [3].”

Manekshaw was obsessed with a non happening Paki army withdrawal to Burma and preventing this was his pet project. He would not listen to reason on this. From a online pdf written by Gen Gill.

Uban’s men attacked the Dohazari bridge because Manekshaw held the baseless fear that
Pakistani troops would escape south into Burma along the old “Arakan Road.” This concern also
motivated him to order an amphibious assault south of Cox’s Bazar toward the end of the war
under a plan named Operation Beaver. It quickly became a pet project, which no amount of earnest
staff advice could scuttle.

On total he was a lucky commander, but based on past combat performance wise Harbaksh Singh was far superior to him.

Now over to you. Good luck with your Google search.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 21 Mar 2014 15:46

There was only one general who was wronged in that fashion, S.K. Sinha. He was superceded by A S Vaidya under Indira's orders. Vaidya was murdered within months of his retiring.
http://archive.asianage.com/columnists/ ... nerals-138

You are wrong here as well. The immensely popular Gen Bhagat was denied promotion in 1974 due to the problems being faced with Manekshaw. Read up some more.

The Army Chief, General G.G. Bewoor, was due to retire on 11 April 1974. (At that time, the retirement age for the Chief was 58, and 56 for Lieutenant Generals). Since Prem was to reach the age of 56 only on 13 October 1974, he was almost certain to become the next Chief, being senior most. But the bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry had other ideas. Having dealt with an intractable Chief like Sam Manekshaw for four years, they did not want another strong Chief on their hands. A routine letter is sent to officers who are due to retire, about six months in advance. This was done in case of Prem also. In order to bring pressure on him, and force him to resign, this fact was leaked to the Press, which speculated that he would now seek premature retirement. Prem was furious, and made it clear that he had no such intentions.

The Government now realised that the only way to deny Prem the post of Chief of Army Staff was to supersede him. However, by now he had become immensely popular, and his supersession would have had wide ranging repercussions. So another ploy was thought of. Due the extension granted to Manekshaw, Bewoor's tenure had been reduced, and he had been Chief just for a year and half. To compensate him, it was decided that he should be given a year's extension. This would ensure that Prem would retire, as a Lieut General, without technically being superseded.

http://veekay-militaryhistory.blogspot. ... -pvsm.html

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 21 Mar 2014 18:04

^^^Paul - there is no denying the military capability of Lt. General Harbaksh Singh with the Battle of Assal Uttar being the finest hour.

However, if you hold Manekshaw responsible for operational short-comings in 1971 war, then should the 'blame' overall performance of 11 Corps opposite Lahore fall on Harbaksh Sing? Similarly, what about the performance of 1 Corps - especially 1st Armored Division - in the Shakkargarh area when PA was completely was caught completely off-guard?

The military history is more complicated than how you make it out to be.

pragnya · Post by **pragnya** » 21 Mar 2014 18:45

was Gen Manekshaw what he is made out to be post 71'war?? atleast by reading Sir Jacob's book, the impression i get is somewhat different!! though he does not show any disrespect or takes digs (infact very respectful of the chief), fact remains most planning (including timing of the war) and execution was done by mr.Jacob, which is an acknowledged fact. he quotes IIRC instances where Sir Manekshaw was at a loss in dealing with the operations.

being chief it is obvious Sir Manekshaw got the credit for the war.

anjan · Post by **anjan** » 22 Mar 2014 03:55

pragnya wrote:was Gen Manekshaw what he is made out to be post 71'war?? atleast by reading Sir Jacob's book, the impression i get is somewhat different!! though he does not show any disrespect or takes digs (infact very respectful of the chief), fact remains most planning (including timing of the war) and execution was done by mr.Jacob, which is an acknowledged fact. he quotes IIRC instances where Sir Manekshaw was at a loss in dealing with the operations.

If the COAS was doing operational planning instead of allowing an Army Commander to do so then he would fail in his job. The Army commander and his general staff are the correct people to do it. The COAS facilitates this job.