- Link to 2007 SANDIA National Laboratories Report on De-militarization of Siachen authored by Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Indian Army-retd.) and Brigadier Asad Hakeem (Pakistan Army-retd). This was actually prepared in 2005 and published in 2006 and 2007.
Some other papers from same think-tank to show the focus on Siachen has existed for a long time. Along with other areas.
- 1998 Paper from Co-operative Monitoring Center (CMC) of Sandia National Laboratories titled: Reducing Risk in South Asia: Managing India-Pakistan Tensions. The Siachen aspect features prominently in the paper.
- 1998 Paper titled: Siachen Science Center: A Concept for Cooperation at the Top of the World
- Another 1998 Paper on Enhancing Security Through a Cooperative Border Monitoring Experiment: A Proposal for India and Pakistan
- 2000 Paper on Preventing Another India-Pakistan War: Enhancing Stability Along the Border
If one goes through these papers (and others linked under Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) heading on Sandia National Laboratories website), one can see that 2005 Paper by Gurmeet Kanwal and ex-PA Brigadier builds on studies and recommendations made earlier in these papers.
The CBM paper on Siachen De-militarization released by Atlantic Council Of Ottawa was withdrawn from their website. Here is the content of the same which was saved for posterity during discussion on the subject on BRF.
CBM Paper link URL which does not work now -
The Siachen Proposal
India-Pakistan CBMs Project
There was further discussion on the proposal for the demilitarisation of the region and for stringent and cooperative monitoring and verification of this.
After considerable discussion a suggestion achieved consensus which seeks to have these activities occur as part of an overall package. Recognising that both countries have a divergence of views, it was felt that such an approach is more likely to create forward movement.
Accordingly, as a part of the comprehensive resolution of the Siachen dispute, and notwithstanding the claims of each country, both sides should agree to withdraw from the conflict area while retaining the option of punitive action should the other side renege on the commitments. The following clear package of integrated and inter-linked stipulations were laid down for the demilitarisation of the area and delineation of the line:
-Set up a joint commission to delineate the line beyond NJ 9842, consistent with existing Agreements;
-The present ground positions would be jointly recorded and the records exchanged;
-The determination of the places to which redeployment will be affected would be jointly agreed;
-Disengagement and demilitarization would occur in accordance with a mutually acceptable time frame to be agreed (see Annex 1);
-Prior to withdrawal, each side will undertake to remove munitions and other military equipment and waste from areas of its control; and
-Ongoing cooperative monitoring of these activities and the resulting demilitarized zone would be agreed to ensure/assure transparency (see Annex 2).
In keeping with the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration both sides should undertake that resolution of this issue is a bilateral matter and that there will be no change in the status of the area and also that no personnel of any third country will be permitted
within it unless cleared by the two countries jointly.
Suggested Time Frame for Demilitarisation
Schedule for Demilitarisation
• Establish a Joint Working Group to recommend detailed re-deployment and oversee implementation of the process.
• Variability in process is likely due to frequently changing weather conditions.
Weather forces disengagement to be conducted during the summer season (May –
Determination of the place (s) to which redeployment will be effected and the time frame to be recommended by the Joint Working Group.
Mechanism for joint management of the demilitarized zone to be recommended by the Joint Working Group.
Possible Phases of Demilitarisation (with appropriate waste and munitions removal at each phase)
Phase 1: Withdraw medium artillery located near Base Camps (e.g., Dzingrulma, Gyari)
Phase 2: Withdraw troops and field artillery from Northern, Central, and Southern battalion sub-sectors
• Forward posts, including crew-served weapons posts
• Declare staging camps where troops from forward positions will transit through in the process of re-deployment
• Dismantle camps after withdrawal
Phase 3: Withdraw from forward logistics camps on or near the Glacier
Phase 4: Dismantle remaining logistics camps
Phase 5: Withdraw from base camps
Phase 6: Dismantle or convert base camps to scientific/civil use
Ongoing: Cooperative monitoring and verification of demilitarization (see Annex 3)
Monitoring and Verification of the Demilitarisation
• Monitoring initially, by national technical means
• Phase 1: Monitoring and verification of disengagement during the establishment of the DMZ
o Verify that posts, logistics centers, and base camps vacated
• Phase 2: Post-disengagement monitoring of the DMZ
o Verify that military personnel and equipment do not re-enter the DMZ
• On an ongoing basis, the primary monitoring and verification mechanisms will be both bilateral and cooperative
Goal is to verify withdrawal and dismantlement of military facilities
• Visual: The withdrawal from Indian and Pakistani posts within line of sight of each other is to be coordinated so each side can observe the activities of the other. Ammunition and heavy weapons which cannot be moved immediately will be temporarily stored in-place and subject to joint verification and monitoring.
• Joint Aerial Reconnaissance: A pair of Indian and Pakistani helicopters will rendezvous at an agreed location and then fly together along the Forward Battle Positions in the agreed sector to visually verify and photographically record
withdrawal and dismantlement of post or logistics camp.
• On-site inspection: Both sides have the right to request that its representative land by helicopter at a location to confirm withdrawal and dismantlement.
• Unilateral activities: Both sides should agree not to interfere with the other’s national technical means Goal of detecting illicit re-occupation of positions within the DMZ
• Monitoring and verification considerations:
o Nothing happens quickly on Siachen; logistics and weather drive all
o The possibility of a quick, stealthy reoccupation, without an air bridge, is remote
Aerial operations are obvious
Small-scale intrusions are neither significant nor sustainable
• Monitoring and verification should focus on logistics
o All Indian logistics flows through Dzingrulma
o Pakistan has multiple logistics routes through civilian villages
List of delegates from both the sides:
General Jehangir Karamat (Pakistan Army Retd), CHAIR
Admiral Tariq Khan (Pakistan Navy, Retd)
General Tariq Majid (Pakistan Army, Retd)
Lieutenant General Sikander Afzal (Pakistan Army, Retd)
Lieutenant General (Retd) Tariq Ghazi (former Defense Secretary of Pakistan)
Major General Qasim Qureshi (Pakistan Army, Retd)
Air Vice Marshal Shahzad Chaudhry (Pakistan Air Force, Retd)
Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi (Pakistan Foreign Service, Retd)
Ambassador Aziz Khan (Pakistan Foreign Service, Retd)
Ambassador Riaz Khan (former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan)
Air Chief Marshal Shashi Tyagi (Indian Air Force Retd), CHAIR
Lieutenant General BS Pawar (Indian Army, Retd)
Vice Admiral A.K. Singh (Indian Navy, Retd)
Lieutenant General Aditya Singh (Indian Army, Retd)
Lieutenant General Arvinder Singh Lamba (Indian Army, Retd)
Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal (Indian Army, Retd)
Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Indian Army, Retd)
Col Ajai Shukla (Journalist)
Rana Banerji (former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, India)
Ambassador Vivek Katju (Indian Foreign Service, Retd)
Ambassador Lalit Mansingh (former Foreign Secretary of India)