Kargil War Thread - VI

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Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Rakesh » 13 Oct 2006 07:57


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Postby Tilak » 14 Oct 2006 09:50

X-posted from Irot Thread

Zafar is a liar if he doesn’t speak on Kargil: Musharraf
Daily Times Monitor

[quote]LAHORE: President Gen Pervez Musharraf has said that he personally briefed Nawaz Sharif on the military situation in Kargil at a Defence Committee of the Cabinet meeting, and “I call Raja Zafarul Haq a liar if he does not speak the truth nowâ€

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Postby ramana » 16 Oct 2006 23:07

Teluguportal.net has the follwoing review of Zhut Namah by Gurmeet Kanwal.

Columns : Musharraf's shoddy attempt to rewrite military history

General Pervez Musharraf's brazen attempt in his memoirs "In the Line of Fire" to whitewash the Pakistan Army's defeat during the Kargil conflict with India has once again focussed attention on the events of the summer of 1999.

The chapter in the general's book on the Kargil conflict is a compilation of gross self-serving lies. It is worth recalling exactly what had transpired seven years ago.

Even as the Lahore peace process was under way, the Pakistan Army launched 'Operation Badr', an ill-conceived military adventure, across the Line of Control (LoC) into Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir in the summer months of 1999.

By infiltrating its soldiers in civilian clothes through gaps in the Indian defences along the LoC, to physically occupy large areas of ground, the Pakistan Army added a new dimension to its 10-year-old proxy war against India.

Pakistan's provocative action compelled India to launch a firm but measured military operation to clear the intruders from the Indian side of the LoC.

The Pakistan Army's nefarious designs in the Kargil sector took India's military planners completely by surprise. It was a clear failure of intelligence and threat assessment.

However, India's fight back was determined and well planned. Additional troops and artillery units were systematically inducted into Kargil and one by one the mountains occupied by the Pakistan Army were courageously taken back.

Besides a swift army response, air strikes from fighter-ground attack (FGA) aircraft and attack helicopters of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and manoeuvres by the Indian Navy in the Arabian Sea contributed to making Pakistan capitulate.

India's 'Operation Vijay' (victory) was finely calibrated to limit military action to the Indian side of the LoC. The aim was to ensure that the intrusions in Kargil were vacated quickly and Pakistan's military adventurism was not allowed to escalate into a larger conflict.

The primary objective of India's military campaign was to conclude military operations against Pakistani forces as early as possible without enlarging the scope of the ongoing conflict. This was achieved on July 26, 1999, when the last of the Pakistani intruders was successfully evicted.

Finding the Indian government unrelenting in its resolve to evict every intruder from its territory, even as the Pakistan Army suffered one reverse after another, Pakistan's then prime minister Nawaz Sharif rushed to Washington in the first week of July 1999 (at the behest of General Musharraf) and agreed in his talks with president Bill Clinton that Pakistan would pull out its troops from Kargil unconditionally.

India's resounding victory at Tiger Hill, the news of which came even as Sharif was meeting Clinton, contributed significantly to this politico-military decision.

As a face saving device, Pakistan's widely anticipated pullback was couched in euphemistic terms. Pakistan would "appeal to the Kashmiri freedom fighters to pull out from their positions in Kargil", the Pakistan government announced - the same so-called mujahideen over whom it had repeatedly emphasised that it had no control!

Why did the Pakistan Army undertake a military operation that was foredoomed to failure?

It did so because it was becoming increasingly frustrated with India's success in containing the militancy in J&K to within manageable limits. The army saw in the Kashmiri people's open expression of their preference for normalcy, the evaporation of all its hopes and desires to bleed India through a strategy of "a thousand cuts".

Nawaz Sharif's government appeared to be inclined to accept India's hand of friendship, in keeping with the mood of popular opinion within Pakistan, and was committed to opening up trade, liberalising the visa regime and encouraging people-to-people, cultural and sports contacts.

Though it did not feature in black and white in the Lahore Declaration of 1999, the acceptance of the concept of the LoC as a permanent border between India and Pakistan was gaining currency due to the strong public opinion in this regard in both the countries. People on both sides of the Radcliff Line wished to put the acrimonious past behind them and move on to usher in an era of friendship and cooperation.

Pakistan's military establishment was unable to come to terms with the fact that more than 10 years of its concerted efforts in de-stabilising India through its proxy war in J&K had yielded almost no tangible gains.

The military establishment thought the peace overtures between the two countries would further undermine its efforts to annex Kashmir from India.

Moves towards peace, leading to the acceptance of the LoC as a permanent border, were viewed by the military establishment as a disgraceful compromise since the Pakistani armed forces have been fed the rhetoric that the only unfinished agenda of Partition is the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan.

Pakistan's generals were concerned that peace with India would lead to a diminishing role for the army in Pakistan's affairs.

It was in such a scenario that, in an act more of desperation than any grand strategic planning, the Pakistan Army and ISI decided to launch an organised intrusion into the un-held remote areas of Kargil district to once again ignite the spark of militancy and gain moral ascendancy over the Indian security forces.

The Pakistan Army's eviction from Kargil was not the only reverse that it had to suffer. It left behind the bodies of over 200 hundred of its soldiers and even denied that they were its own men. No professional army has ever before disowned its regular soldiers and refused to claim its dead.

Under General Musharraf, the Pakistan Army not only suffered a humiliating military defeat in Kargil, it also sunk to an abysmally low point in the eyes of military professionals all over the world.

Musharraf now has the gumption to write that the intervention in Kargil was a victory. He has disgraced the memory of over 1,000 Pakistani soldiers who sacrificed their lives for a dubious cause.

He has once again focussed Indian attention on the issue whether any Pakistani general can ever be trusted. Above all else, through his shoddy attempt to re-write military history, he has disgraced the calling of soldiering.

Military history may have forgiven the Pakistani generals for poor strategic planning and professional ineptitude but it will not forgive Musharraf's megalomaniacal grandstanding.

(Gurmeet Kanwal is Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He can be reached at gurmeetkanwal@gmail.com..)

--By Gurmeet Kanwal



Good jahpad. Sat siri Akal.

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Postby Jagan » 19 Oct 2006 06:42

An old article but hasnt been archived anywhere. this was from the defunct vijay in kargil site. feel free to distribute.

http://www.warbirds.in/downloads/HeraldKargil.pdf

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Postby Babui » 19 Oct 2006 23:13

In his chp on Kargil, Mush says that his army intruded in 5 areas. At the end of the conflict, they still held 2 areas (according to Mushy i.e.). While much of the book is lies and megalomania, I'm wondering about those so-called '2 areas' (note - Mushy is not very clear on which side of the LOC those 2 areas were - but, obviously, I'm assuming on our side of the LOC). I wonder if Mushy was referring to Point 5353 as one of the areas? Remember - the brouhaha after the war on whether it was held by us or the Pakis.

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Postby Amitabh » 20 Oct 2006 01:37

There are two maps in the book that show where the original intrusions were and the extent of territory the Pakistanis lost in two months of combat, according to Musharraf.

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Postby sunilUpa » 20 Oct 2006 02:17

I came across thesis titled 'High Altitude Warfare: The Kargil Conflict and The Future' by Marcus P. Acosta, Captain, United States Army. The thesis examines in detail the role played by NLI, Indian Army and Indian Air force and how Indian Army, Air force adopted to situation after some initial reverses. He also compares the Kargil Operation to Operation Anaconda launched by US forces in 2002 against Al Qaida in Shah-I-Kot valley in Afghanistn. According to him the Massed Artillay of Indian Army played a decisive role and lack of the same hampered US operation. Even the formidable USAF could not do much with its high-tech weapons on mountains.

I am pasting some excerpts. Sorry if this is too long, but I am trying to capture some important parts from a 100 page thesis.



[quote]1. The Capture of Tololing
2 RAJ RIF, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) M.B. Ravindranath,
prepared his unit for ground combat at high altitude and won a series of impressive victories. 2 RAJ RIF deployed to Sonamarg from the Kashmir Valley, where it was conducting CI operations. The battalion remained in Sonamarg for a few days before departing for the combat zone in Dras. At Sonamarg LTC Ravindranath initiated planning, forming teams of senior leaders charged with creating a mountain assault doctrine, an acclimatization program, and a logistic support plan.
LTC Ravindranath reported to 56 Mountain Brigade on 3 June and received the order to seize Tololing. 18 Grenadiers, still sitting under fire around the peaks and unable to advance, would support 2 RAJ RIF’s attack with suppressive fire. Twenty artillery batteries totaling over 120 guns would support the operation as well. After a
thorough reconnaissance, LTC Ravindranath identified two avenues of approach to the Pakistani positions, over which he could launch multi-directional attacks and achieve surprise.On the night of 12 June, a massive six-hour bombardment by all twenty artillery batteries preceded the assault. The companies moved quickly on both axes of advance.
Fire by 18 Grenadiers and the artillery batteries allowed Ravindranath’s troops to seize their initial objectives in a matter of hours. The artillery barrage continued unabated until soldiers reached to within 200 meters of their objectives; at that point, 18 Grenadiers
picked up a heavy volume of fire that effectively suppressed the Pakistani positions. By early morning the battalion had captured Tololing Top and beaten back several desperate Pakistani counterattacks. Point 5140 fell a week later, on 20 June, following another multi-directional attack supported by the full complement of twenty artillery batteries. 2
RAJ RIF had given the Indian Army its first major victory in the war.

2. Victory at Tiger Hill
8 Sikh had attempted to scale the heights of Tiger Hill in late May, only to be repulsed by heavy artillery and small arms fire. Poorly coordinated assaults initiated without adequate artillery support failed under heavy fire from an entrenched enemy. Unable to press the attack, the soldiers dug in and surrounded the hill. 192 Mountain Brigade assumed command of the operations at Tiger Hill in late June, and received 18 Grenadiers, fresh from participating in the victory at Tololing. 18 Grenadiers picked up
the assault, supported by the concentrated fire of twenty-two artillery batteries and 8 Sikh. In freezing rain on the night of 3 July, 18 Grenadiers launched an assault on the 16,700-foot (5,062 m) Tiger Top that began with a twelve-hour, vertical climb using fixed ropes. 18 Grenadiers achieved surprise and made initial gains, yet the assault stalled near
the top under heavy resistance. Sensing the loss of initiative, Major Ravinder Singh of 8 Sikh launched a daring attack. He and a detachment of fifty-two soldiers climbed up the side of the adjoining Western Ridge, splitting the Pakistani defense on the night of 5 July. The group held off several counterattacks. Most of the Sikh soldiers attacked without
cold weather gear, and many of the wounded died from exposure. After three more days of heavy fighting, the bold plan paid off, and 18 Grenadiers resumed the attack on an NLI force facing attack from two directions. 18 Grenadiers seized Tiger Hill Top on the morning of 8 July. Daring maneuver on an unexpected approach, in coordination
with overwhelming firepower, had ended the stalemate on Tiger Hill.
3. Attack on “Balal Postâ€

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Postby Mohan Raju » 20 Oct 2006 07:33

sunilUpa wrote:I am pasting some excerpts. Sorry if this is too long, but I am trying to capture some important parts from a 100 page thesis.


That paper has been widely discussed on BRF already. I believe you can find a link to it somewhere in our archives, if you search around.

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Postby JCage » 20 Oct 2006 07:56

Jagan wrote:An old article but hasnt been archived anywhere. this was from the defunct vijay in kargil site. feel free to distribute.

http://www.warbirds.in/downloads/HeraldKargil.pdf


Wiki'ed.

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Postby RayC » 20 Oct 2006 20:33

Thin air affects the trajectory of all projectiles and it improves the efficiency because of the reduction of drag, and the projectile hits higher than it would at sea level. At an elevation of 10,000 feet (3,050 m), a round fired at a target at a distance of 1,000 meters will impact almost 70 inches higher than at sea level. Artillery shells are equally affected and their accuracy and predictability suffers. To obviate this, the Indian Army through experience and study in the Siachen Glacier area has devised new range tables for High Altitude.

Aircraft engines produce less power at high altitudes, reducing maneuverability and limiting load capacity. In addition to a reduction in engine power, helicopters lose rotor efficiency in low air pressure. Hovering is difficult and risky, and most helicopters are unable to lift normal loads at altitudes above 13,000 feet (3,965 m). Most attack helicopters are too heavy to fly at high altitude. The physical limitations of the high altitude environment prohibit most helicopter operations, yet India has successfully used light helicopters with exceptionally high service ceilings.

Fixed wing aircraft suffer similar limitations. The drag reduction caused by low air pressure alters the aerodynamics of high performance aircraft. Thin air forces a greater turning radius and increases the height lost in a pullout following a dive. The lost height forces the pilot to initiate the pullout higher, or earlier, than at sea level. Pilots must increase the weapon release height to make up for the change. Aerial-delivered munitions can be wildly inaccurate if pilots are not trained to expect variations in performance. Low air pressure affects aerial weapon trajectory as well, causing even precision-guided munitions (PGM) to perform significantly different than sea-level specifications predict.

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Postby rkhanna » 22 Oct 2006 17:27

This is an old Article. But i just came across it. One of the best written pieces on kargil (from an emotional standpoint)..

It takes 10 minutes to read . (its long) but its worth the time.


http://www.himalmag.com/june2001/perspective.html

During the Kargil War, Barkha Dutt’s was a familiar face on the television screen, bringing live action on the Star News channel. But she was not telling us the complete story. Now she does.


I am not doing this for the country, Ma’am, I am doing it for my paltan." Allegiance to their unit, platoon, was usually the closest it got. That, and the belief that this was somehow a life test and the world was looking over their shoulders to see if they would make it through. "If we fail," said a 23-year-old Nepali soldier from Dehradun, his eyes misty with sadness, "then our entire existence cannot be justified. Anyone can turn around and say, you are not fit to join the army."

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Postby John Snow » 24 Oct 2006 03:13

Home __________________________________


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Samachar

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Clinton man recalls Pak Kargil chaos - By Anwar Iqbal

SA out to scale lankan mountain - By Taus Rizvi


Clinton man recalls Pak Kargil chaos 10/24/2006 12:04:46 AM
- By Anwar Iqbal


Washington, Oct. 23: There was confusion in Islamabad during the Kargil crisis and it was not clear who was calling the shots, says Bruce Riedel, President Clinton’s special assistant for South Asian affairs who played a key role in the US-Pakistan talks on the issue.

Mr Riedel, who was the only person to attend the Sharif-Clinton talks in Washington on July 4, 1999, said in a paper on "America, Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil summit" that the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ‘seemed genuinely interested in pursuing the Lahore process’.

Mr Sharif had argued eloquently with a series of American guests, including Washington’s UN ambassador Bill Richardson, that he wanted an end to the 50-year old quarrel with India, Mr Riedel said.

"His military chief, General Pervez Musharraf, seemed to be in a different mould — he was said to be a hardliner on Kashmir, a man some feared was determined to humble India once and for all."

Commenting on the current controversy between Gen. Musharraf and Mr Sharif, he said, "We will probably never know for sure the exact calculus of decision making in Islamabad. Each of the players has his own reasons for selling a particular version of the process. Gen. Musharraf and Mr Sharif have already put out different versions of who said what to whom.

"What is clear is that the civil-military dynamic between Sharif in Islamabad and Gen. Musharraf in Rawalpindi was confused and tense," he added.

Explaining what worried the Americans most, Mr Riedel said, "The danger was that the Indians would grow weary of attacking uphill (actually up-mountain) into well-dug Pakistani positions. The casualties the Indian forces were taking were mounting. New Delhi could easily decide to open another front elsewhere along the Line of Control (LoC) to ease its burden and force the Pakistanis to fight on territory favourable to India." Mr Riedel’s version shows the former Prime Minister as getting ‘increasingly desperate’ to end the crisis.

He said, "(Mr) Sharif became increasingly desperate as he saw how isolated Pakistan was in the world. He urgently requested American intervention to stop the Indian counter-attack. Washington was clear the solution required a Pakistani withdrawal behind the LoC, nothing else would do."

According to Mr Riedel, by end of June 1999, Mr Sharif began to ask to see President Clinton directly to plead his case. "The President also consulted with (the then) Indian Prime Minister (Atal Bihari) Vajpayee on the phone. The Indians were adamant: withdrawal to the LoC was essential. (Mr) Vajpayee would not negotiate under the threat of aggression." President Clinton "sought to reassure Mr Vajpayee that we would not countenance Pakistani aggression, not reward them for violating the LoC and that we stood by our commitment to the Lahore process, i.e. direct talks between India and Pakistan were the only solution to Kashmir, not third party intervention."

Mr Riedel then explains how before meeting Mr Sharif, President Clinton had asked his advisers to prepare two statements about the results of the meeting.

"The first was a draft statement the President would issue if (Mr) Sharif agreed to pull back his forces to the LoC, the second a statement which would be used if (Mr) Sharif refused. The latter would make clear that the blame for the crisis in South Asia lay solely with Pakistan," he said.(Dawn)

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Postby Vivek_A » 28 Oct 2006 04:44

‘Musharraf knew about Kargil pullout’

Washington: A US source with knowledge of what passed on between the United States and Pakistan over Kargil has expressed surprise at General Pervez Mushaaraf’s flat denial of the then CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni’s assertion that Gen Musharraf was party and privy to the decision to pull out of Kargil.

When asked last week in an interview on Geo to comment on Gen Zinni’s assertion in his book ‘Battle Ready’ that he convinced both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and him that Pakistan’s failure to withdraw from Kargil would “bring war and nuclear annihilationâ€

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Postby Lalmohan » 29 Oct 2006 02:29

musharraf's lies are for his domestic audience, hence speaking in urdu. there have been too many sources of reasonable weight to have claimed otherwise.

before the lamp post is upon him, the mush will try all the tricks

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Postby Digvijay » 29 Oct 2006 15:05

RayC wrote:Thin air affects the trajectory of all projectiles and it improves the efficiency because of the reduction of drag, and the projectile hits higher than it would at sea level. At an elevation of 10,000 feet (3,050 m), a round fired at a target at a distance of 1,000 meters will impact almost 70 inches higher than at sea level. Artillery shells are equally affected and their accuracy and predictability suffers. To obviate this, the Indian Army through experience and study in the Siachen Glacier area has devised new range tables for High Altitude.

Aircraft engines produce less power at high altitudes, reducing maneuverability and limiting load capacity. In addition to a reduction in engine power, helicopters lose rotor efficiency in low air pressure. Hovering is difficult and risky, and most helicopters are unable to lift normal loads at altitudes above 13,000 feet (3,965 m). Most attack helicopters are too heavy to fly at high altitude. The physical limitations of the high altitude environment prohibit most helicopter operations, yet India has successfully used light helicopters with exceptionally high service ceilings.

Fixed wing aircraft suffer similar limitations. The drag reduction caused by low air pressure alters the aerodynamics of high performance aircraft. Thin air forces a greater turning radius and increases the height lost in a pullout following a dive. The lost height forces the pilot to initiate the pullout higher, or earlier, than at sea level. Pilots must increase the weapon release height to make up for the change. Aerial-delivered munitions can be wildly inaccurate if pilots are not trained to expect variations in performance. Low air pressure affects aerial weapon trajectory as well, causing even precision-guided munitions (PGM) to perform significantly different than sea-level specifications predict.


Good info. Since one has to assume that what you write above is well known to our forces the question is why was LOC not crossed and men dropped on the other side so that they could attack the ******** from both ends.

-Digvijay

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Postby Shankar » 29 Oct 2006 22:59

The reduction of air resistance at an altitude of 18000ft or more as experienced in kargil actually worked to our advantage in quite afew instances .

- ability to achieve greater firing range than it would have been possible at ground level .In a way this allowed the so called direct firing mode use of howitzers like fh77b particularly during capture of tiger hill and tooling .This ofcourse called for re calcualtion of the ballistics table as mentioned by Ray sir based on siachin experience but may be in the end the effort was well worth the devastating ressult

- the same is some extent true for the air delivered bombs both smart and not so smart ones . The comparitively low air resistance all along the flight path of the projectile allows it to travel longer horizantal distance from the point of release for the same vertical height diffrential comapared to if it were used on sea level target .The weapons follow a more flatter trajectory to the target and the accuracy is more due to wind drafts in the folds of the mountains which tend to push the gliding bombs with or without fin away from the aim line as it encounters the sudden stong gusts of wind comming up from the valleys.In fact the fin equipped smart bombs have a greater chance of missing the target since the response of the bomb to the corrective movements of the fin is much less efficeant due to lower air density

-attack helicopters like mi 24 /35s were designed first and last to be used against advancing or with advancing tank columns over the undulating plains of germany and was never really an option in kargil.The same logic holds true mostly for the mi-17s .

Compared to this use of fixed wing aircraft with high weight to power ratio was perhaps the only viable option (mirage 2000,mig 29/su-30 ) to make an effective contribution towards the basic objective - maximum damage .All of these aircrafts are designed to operate at 30000ft plus and much higher with full combat load and at the same time have maximum level of self defense capability against shoulder launched missiles like anaaz and stinger . They are designed to operate at this altitude and higher and the logic that thier performance suffers any significant extent at 30k ft may not be fully true .In fact all nato countries in kosavo and afganistan uses standard operating altitude as 26- 32000ft and the pilots are required to take special permission to go down below 25000ft. All these aircrafts fly in fact better at higher altitude and faster except jaguars none of thes would go supersonic normally at sea level but over 20000ft they will cross mach 2 without thinking .Turn radius incerase with speed and as such it is always a trade off for any combat pilot whether he wants a sharp turn capability or fast getaway from danger zone .Turn capability is perhaps more important in an air to air comabt slow speed and within visual range for bomb dropping mission faster the better .The standard usaf ops procedure is to minimise time over target by ging supersonic just before bomb release .

To summarise -we should have used medium altitude bombing precisio type much more and could have used our mig 29s too in a big way rather than reserving them only for area air defense missions .

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Postby Harry » 30 Oct 2006 00:35


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Postby Rakesh » 30 Oct 2006 00:41

Nice Video!

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Postby CPrakash » 30 Oct 2006 00:48

Harry wrote:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X3FJP4i0JM8

H&D busted! :twisted:


:twisted: Watchout for the shrill whines from across the border on india violating the geneva convention by interviewing pows /soldiers that were not supposed to exist in the first place at Kargil..... where are my ear plugs...

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Postby Rakesh » 30 Oct 2006 00:49

Watch that video suddenly disappear :D

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Postby Harry » 30 Oct 2006 00:55

Rakesh wrote:Watch that video suddenly disappear :D


???

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Postby CPrakash » 30 Oct 2006 01:02

Stop watch on - lets see how long it will take before it appears on the forum we are not supposed to link here :twisted:

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Postby Surya » 30 Oct 2006 01:46

Why is this not on BR?

Isn't this from Kunal Verma's CD?

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Postby gauravs » 30 Oct 2006 01:47

Kinda feel sorry for those POWs. They paid the price for their inept generals. Specially for the guy who was left behind by his "comrades".

Good to see they were well taken care of by our forces.

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Postby Jagan » 30 Oct 2006 01:55

Surya wrote:Why is this not on BR?

Isn't this from Kunal Verma's CD?


Yep its from Kunal Verma's Kargil CD.

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Postby JCage » 30 Oct 2006 02:26

Jagan did you get the files?

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Postby Mohan Raju » 30 Oct 2006 05:05

Isn't this from Kunal Verma's CD?


Yes, it's from the Kargil VCD (hint, hint... available from BRF's online store).

Now let me go into marketing mode and say that it would be nice if all the jingo enthusiasts here would go online and actually order the disk (as well as other VCDs). How about it, guys? Talking patriotism is nice, but why doesn't everyone who doesn't already own these videos put their money where their mouth is and actually buy them?

And one last point -- I have no connection with BRF Online Store, Kunal Verma or anyone else. I am simply a happy owner of their VCDs.

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Postby Mohan Raju » 30 Oct 2006 05:10

Digvijay wrote:Good info. Since one has to assume that what you write above is well known to our forces...


Yes, that's a pretty safe assumption, considering that all this information actually comes from Indian military sources as a result of their vast combat experience in mountain warfare. In particular the Kargill campaign of 1999.

...the question is why was LOC not crossed and men dropped on the other side so that they could attack the ******** from both ends.


This is a political question that has been debated to death a million times on this forum already. It is not a question that military men can answer; only the civilian GoI can answer this.

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Postby Digvijay » 30 Oct 2006 10:31

Mohan Raju wrote:
Digvijay wrote:Good info. Since one has to assume that what you write above is well known to our forces...


Yes, that's a pretty safe assumption, considering that all this information actually comes from Indian military sources as a result of their vast combat experience in mountain warfare. In particular the Kargill campaign of 1999.

...the question is why was LOC not crossed and men dropped on the other side so that they could attack the ******** from both ends.


This is a political question that has been debated to death a million times on this forum already. It is not a question that military men can answer; only the civilian GoI can answer this.


Question is if GOI is filled with idiots. why are our commanders not stubborn enough to tell the PM/Def Min that "THIS IS THE ONLY WAY THIS WAR CAN BE FOUGHT".

-Digvijay

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Postby Jagan » 30 Oct 2006 21:19

gauravs wrote:Kinda feel sorry for those POWs. .


I can share the story that Kunal once told me. Kunal was on the frontline during the fighting - and having spent time with the officers, jawans and other folks during those days he should know what he was talking about.

He was given a call out of the blue one day and was asked if he wants to interview the POWs. This was towards the end of the Kargil fighting, and after the gungho euphoria of the previous days, he went there expecting the enemy. But what he saw and recorded left him feeling sorry for them. (I know this goes against the basic feeling on this forum) and that they were 'no different from our own jawans'. Esp when they talk about their villages, their parents, or families. And he asks, why do these simple guys had to come to the Kargil and die?

While our troops died for a cause, of liberating homeland, what exactly did the Pakistani troops die for? The pakistani top brass who ordered them on this one-way sucide mission onto the kargil hts have much to answer to their families for their tactical brilliance.

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Postby rocky » 30 Oct 2006 22:04

Jagan wrote:And he asks, why do these simple guys had to come to the Kargil and die?
Because they are paid professional killers, paid to die on the job, and they swore themselves to an oath to such effect?

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Postby Shankar » 30 Oct 2006 23:27

I know it is not right to feel pity for your enemy when you are fighting a war and particualrly when those same pows were responsible for death of so many of our best but still may be we should pause a moment and think about

- those NLI soldiers joined the pakistani army not out of any specific grudge against us or to kill us ,they joined so that they can feed thier family and maybe buy a little land for farming
- those poorsods had no idea the implication of india retaliation ,the effect of living on sub zero temp with survival ration and the demoralising effect of your own officers and men disowning you when you are defeated and down

- they in thier uneducated mind did not even realize they are being used by the pakistani elite including the military as cannon fodder knowing very well they are sending those simple minded rustics to death and a war that they cn never win.

- they did not realise officers of army can lie to thier men
-they did not realise the oficer breed of pakistani army have lsot all its integrity and character and now just apawn to alquaida and punjabi ruling elite

- most of them had idea how the rest of the world is viewing thier action they did not know english .All the informantion they were privy to is what the junior officers and ncos told them who themselves were in as much dark as the men they were extollingto fight

They were trained to shoot and that they did that ,they were conditioned to obey orders unquestioningly -they did that

They were expected to die on the frozen heights and they did that too without acompalint .

Yes I also do feel sorry for them -for they were born in a country who does not know how to even respect her dead sons ,where basic education is a privilage enjoyed by the ruling class and where religion in a distorted version is the food for soul .

Where poverty is all pervasive and hatred the currency of human relations where deception is a honoured tradition and betrayal of trust is an accepted fact of life

I do feel sorry for them -for being born in acountry led by people like parveez musharaf who being a general denied the respect to his dead .soldiers .

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Postby Digvijay » 31 Oct 2006 01:17

Jagan wrote:
gauravs wrote:Kinda feel sorry for those POWs. .


I can share the story that Kunal once told me. Kunal was on the frontline during the fighting - and having spent time with the officers, jawans and other folks during those days he should know what he was talking about.

He was given a call out of the blue one day and was asked if he wants to interview the POWs. This was towards the end of the Kargil fighting, and after the gungho euphoria of the previous days, he went there expecting the enemy. But what he saw and recorded left him feeling sorry for them. (I know this goes against the basic feeling on this forum) and that they were 'no different from our own jawans'. Esp when they talk about their villages, their parents, or families. And he asks, why do these simple guys had to come to the Kargil and die?

While our troops died for a cause, of liberating homeland, what exactly did the Pakistani troops die for? The pakistani top brass who ordered them on this one-way sucide mission onto the kargil hts have much to answer to their families for their tactical brilliance.


Jagan/Shankar,
This is not the entire picture. Most of the jihaadis occupying the heights were pakistani/arab mercenaries and were killed and yes we did capture POWS of paki army too. There is no remorse for people who are waging a jihaad against India and Hindus. Period.

What saddens me most is that we loose some of our best people to the scum from the Islamic world just because these bast*s can raise the call of jihaad and have umpteen idiots line up to get training and launch themselves in India.

I wish the govt had a better strategy to deal with these rats.

-Digvijay

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Postby Harry » 31 Oct 2006 01:20

Wrong. They were all Pak Army regulars.

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Postby Digvijay » 31 Oct 2006 01:25

Harry wrote:Wrong. They were all Pak Army regulars.

No. There were mercenaries who were promised lakhs if they died and ofcourse paki regulars.

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Postby Raman » 31 Oct 2006 01:37

I was struck by how they started and ended almost every sentence with "Sir" --- seems like a sense of servility was conditioned into them by the officer class.

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Postby Harry » 31 Oct 2006 01:40

Digvijay wrote:
Harry wrote:Wrong. They were all Pak Army regulars.

No. There were mercenaries who were promised lakhs if they died and ofcourse paki regulars.


Proof? They were mostly Pak regulars which has been stated and shown time and again by the Army.

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Postby Digvijay » 31 Oct 2006 01:51

Harry wrote:
Digvijay wrote:
Harry wrote:Wrong. They were all Pak Army regulars.

No. There were mercenaries who were promised lakhs if they died and ofcourse paki regulars.


Proof? They were mostly Pak regulars which has been stated and shown time and again by the Army.


Pak is fighting the proxy war in kashmir with a strategy where they make sure that the impression gets created "that the common man's uprising" is taking place in kashmir. And do read Musharraf's book where he says that his army was supporting jihad mongrels. These jihaad mongrels are nothing but hardened/trained millitia from millitant orgs as well as muslim criminals who are trained by ISI to use arms against India. It is promised to them that there families will get lakhs on there jihaad (but ofcourse not a penny is given).

-Digvijay

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Postby Prem » 31 Oct 2006 02:01

Digvijay wrote:
Harry wrote:
Digvijay wrote:
Harry wrote:Wrong. They were all Pak Army regulars.

No. There were mercenaries who were promised lakhs if they died and ofcourse paki regulars.


Proof? They were mostly Pak regulars which has been stated and shown time and again by the Army.


Pak is fighting the proxy war in kashmir with a strategy where they make sure that the impression gets created "that the common man's uprising" is taking place in kashmir. And do read Musharraf's book where he says that his army was supporting jihad mongrels. These jihaad mongrels are nothing but hardened/trained millitia from millitant orgs as well as muslim criminals who are trained by ISI to use arms against India. It is promised to them that there families will get lakhs on there jihaad (but ofcourse not a penny is given).

-Digvijay


We still have Maharana Partap syndrome.
Let them go today and tomorrow they come back to slit throats.
I dont understand why feel sorry for Jihadis and then complain softness of GOI.
Even Lord Krishna has to remind Arjun of Abhimanu's fate while dealing with inhuman enemy.

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Postby Jagan » 31 Oct 2006 02:19

Digvijay wrote: And do read Musharraf's book where he says that his army was supporting jihad mongrels.


C'mon, you really dont believe everything Musharraf wrote in his book . do you?


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