Kargil War Thread - VI

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby kaangeya » 29 Jan 2009 10:51

Air Cmde Tufail is as straight as the PAF gets.

I am not surprised about his Op Vijay IAF Orbat knowledge. Not at all. Remember this is 10 years since it happened. There's heck a lot of information floating around.

I am surprised A/C Tufail doesn't realise the irony of his rather bland words as here,

One-third of the aircraft were modern, ‘high-threat’ fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.


And how long will the PAF keep harking back to 1965 and Chamb? Is it some sort of voodoo planning that conjures up scenarios past and summons the spirits to re-enact them in the present?

The IAF mobilised according to him 150 aircraft, of which 50 were modern ones. That's v. serious numbers. That must have been enough to give the PAF a cold sweat. Lt.Gen. Kiani is more grounded that way, in saying flat out that the IAF outnumbers the PF 4:1, while the PN is not in the same league in any way against the IN, which is why the TSPA matters.
Last edited by kaangeya on 29 Jan 2009 18:31, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Vivek K » 29 Jan 2009 11:22

Didn't the IAF deploy Su-30ks also during Kargil as top-cover for the Mirages?

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Aditya G » 29 Jan 2009 20:23

sum wrote:Always had believed that only a single lock on had occured when a MiG-29 locked to a F-16. Amazing that so many "close encounters" occurred


FWIW in Akash Yodha CO of MiG-29 squadron mentioned that they "chased away" Pak F-16s ....

Per a post in the first version of warbirds of india forum a gent claimed that it was he who locked on to Paki F-16s but Chibber got the credit because jaguar pilot lobby wanted him to get a medal :roll:

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby manjgu » 29 Jan 2009 22:51

looks like our biggest ally is the blundering officer corps of PA :rotfl: Sorry for kaiser !

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Jagan » 30 Jan 2009 04:48

Aditya G wrote:[

Per a post in the first version of warbirds of india forum a gent claimed that it was he who locked on to Paki F-16s but Chibber got the credit because jaguar pilot lobby wanted him to get a medal :roll:


That was Sqn Ldr K B V Singh (link). He basically said that there were quite a few lock ons. and that Gaurav Chibber was given an award because he was a casuality - and someone wanted to recognise one of the only two jaguar pilots to make the transition to MiG-29s. As per him Gaurav Chibber's accident was SD/CFIT

He had some interesting information to disclose -he was one of the MiG-29s that escorted the damaged Canberra back to base. It never appeared he had a grudge or anything, he was a sport who was rather open about the whole thing.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby andy B » 30 Jan 2009 06:48

Reading Air Cmde Tufail's article is an eye opener. I mean in a way it is reassuring that the IA is facing some big delusionists. But in another way you also cant miss the fact that hatred runs so deep in these guys blood that it pretty much makes them disillusioned about what they should expect from an opponent especially one such as the IA who is by now well versed with dealing with the PA. It is quite worrying in that way that these buggers are not going to learn anytime soon....just serves as a very very dark and sad premonition.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby sanjaykumar » 30 Jan 2009 07:55

:?:

I thought it was a sober article, and as an added bonus no mention of Islam (which may detract from the A/C's authenticity).

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby manjgu » 30 Jan 2009 08:18

andy B ... well said.. but in a way their extreme hatred is clouding sensible and rational judgement.... i think the 71 thingy has increased that hatred.... and they cant seem to be able to come to terms with it.. and it was the army which waved the white flag so it is they who carry the cross of defeat !! and are trying to redeem that and digging bigger holes for themselves....

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby soumik » 30 Jan 2009 09:09

pakistan still lives in the shadow of the 1971 defeat , remember that the entire concept of a martial race theory and defenders of islam theory had it's back broken in that one conflict the Pakistanis simply cannot seem to let that go!

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby andy B » 30 Jan 2009 10:14

manjgu wrote:andy B ... well said.. but in a way their extreme hatred is clouding sensible and rational judgement.... i think the 71 thingy has increased that hatred.... and they cant seem to be able to come to terms with it.. and it was the army which waved the white flag so it is they who carry the cross of defeat !! and are trying to redeem that and digging bigger holes for themselves....


^^^ Thats the biggest thing that I got out of it...the level of hatred and how deep it has rooted itself in their society not that the armed forces. I am no paki sympathiser, I understand that 71 must have been a very hard wake up call for these buggers. But instead of then developing whatever they were left with and making a strong case for itself economically the country has just been handed over from one dictator to another in the last 3 decades since the 71 war.

I think at this stage and by now the paki mentality has quite literally forgotten or lost the focus of national development. I am not saying at any point that we are perfect but we have set up and achieved some pretty amazing things in the last 3 decades and this is all inspite of the bureaucracy, corruption, social problems that India faces.

IMVHO the Paki's are not a bunch of dumb a$$es, they are as a matter of fact quite capable people and I think this makes it even more dangerous when a populace as these get so dissillusioned abt their actual and factual situation. Some time back on BRF I read about the interview with the Paki general that said he would gladly press the nuke button on India. I mean wake up for god sake going hot is not even an option for them given their country depth.

What worries me most is not that Paki land getting annhilated in a all out war but the unnecessary damage that India will have to incur to shut these guys out once and for all :(

soumik wrote:pakistan still lives in the shadow of the 1971 defeat , remember that the entire concept of a martial race theory and defenders of islam theory had it's back broken in that one conflict the Pakistanis simply cannot seem to let that go!


You are absoultely spot on saar, until and unless they start forgetting the 71 defeat hardly anything is going to improve for them. Ideally an intelligent opponent learns from their defeat and works to improve their situation in this case its the complete opposite. :evil:

Note: Admins please remove is considered inappropriate.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Jagan » 07 Feb 2009 05:12

from the earlier http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/200 ... force.html which mentions

As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), the first occasion when I got an opportunity to interact with the Army’s Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Taj called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when did the PAF last carry out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army’s interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. Next day, Brig Taj again called, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who also had the same to say as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.


my attention was bought to this addition by Brigadier Simon (Pak Army) on this page
http://indopakmilitaryhistory.blogspot. ... -with.html


BRIGADIERS SIMONS OBSERVATIONS:--

First a correction. It was Brigadier Nadeem Ahmad, now Lt. Gen and Commander 1 Corps and not Nadeem Taj.

I was the Deputy Director Military Operations and asked to give my view on the Indian Political Response.

First, I was surprised and shocked of such an operation being planned under the Nuclear Shadow. My assertion was that Pakistan was out to prove the Thesis of Nuclear Stabilty Wrong.

Secondly, my comment on Indian political reaction was that Infdia will react with full political and military force, while not violationg the Pakistani space, while ensuring that the nuclear threat ensured keeping the conflict localised. I also commented that the Mujahadeen Bogey, (an airy fairy wish Wash)would relagate Kashmir to a terrorism issue from one of liberation.

Except Lt. Col Mufti, now Major General Mufti, everyone laughed at my comments. Major Gen Tauqir Zia the DGMO never had his heart in this adventure and commented that finally it would be a dialect of opposing wills in which Pakistan has fissures.

The role of Air Force is praiseworthy that it contained the conflict.

November 10, 2008 9:20 PM


Additional comments by Major Amin

THE ASSERTION OF BRIGADIER SIMON THAT GEN TAUQIR ZIA DID NOT HAVE HIS HEART IS A TYPICAL REFLECTION OF THE WINDBAG INDO PAKISTAN GENERALS WHO LACK THE COURAGE TO DISAGREE.THE SAME PROBLEM WAS IN US ARMY WHERE THE US GENERALS HAD NO BALLS TO DISAGREE.THIS WAS ONLY THE GREATNESS OF THE GERMAN ARMY TO BE INTELLECTUALLY HONEST.BUT CAN YOU COMPARE THE GERMANS WITH AMERICANS.GIANTS VERSUS PYGMIES.I MEAN GERMANS OF THAT TIME.NOT THIS GUTTERSNIPE GERMAN ARMY OF TODAY.

I HAVE NEVER SERVED OR EVEN SEEN TAUQIR ZIA IN SERVICE IN THE ARMOURED CORPS.HOWEVER I WAS QUITE DISAPPOINTED BY HIS DECISION OF CONVERTING 5 INDEPENDENT ARMOURED SQUADRON THAT I WAS COMMANDING,TO BE RAISED AT 14 LANCERS IN 14 DIVISION.EVEN A LOWEST RANKING SOLDIER IN THE ARMOURED CORPS KNOWS THAT A NEW ARMOURED REGIMENT MUST BE RAISED IN AN ARMOURED DIVISION WHERE IT RECIEVES A GOOD TRAINING ENVIRONMENT.BUT TAUQIR ZIA DID NOT GAVE A DAMN ABOUT PROFESSIONALISM.AT LEAST THIS WAS ONE EXAMPLE.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby RayC » 07 Feb 2009 11:33

Jagan,

Since you wrote it is a MUST READ article, I read.

A great insight into what was happening.

Very educative.

Thanks.

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Re:

Postby svinayak » 07 Feb 2009 12:46

This timeline must be tied to the information from this PAF officer.
The info about Skardu PAF capability in March 1999 coincides with April 1999 political uncertainity of the govt. It looks as if there is a inside information about what is happening inside Indian political circle- like imminent drop of support by one of the party



KARGIL TIMELINE


1998


June 1998 - first and most important warning was a June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta
In June 1998 the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team (BIT) reported that ammunition supplies were being dumped and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector.


July 1998 - July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities.

Aug 1998 - In August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC. Pakistani artillery flowed in as winter approached, a reversal of the normal practice.

Oct 1998 - Pervez Musharaff appointed COAS
By October, RAW was sufficiently concerned about developments to issue an express warning about the prospect of a "limited swift offensive", pointing in particular to the "constant induction of more troops from peacetime locations like Mangla, Lahore, Gujranwala and Okara into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." Its assertion that a war was possible provoked an immediate challenge by the Director-General of Military Intelligence, and an inconclusive verbal discussion followed.

Nov 1998 - Northern Command, in its own internal assessments, recorded that November 1998 saw a three-fold increase in Pakistani troop movement in the Kargil sector when compared with November 1997. Vehicular movement doubled, while pack-animal movement increased nine-fold. As late as November 1998, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban troops who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999.


1999



Feb 1999 - On February 9, 1999, troops of the 5 Para Regiment spotted movement on the top of Point 5770, a strategic height in the southern Siachen area on the Indian side of the LoC.

Feb 1999 - The Lahore Declaration was a historic declaration signed by the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, and the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, in Lahore on February 21, 1999.

Mar 1999 - Again, on March 4, between eight and ten Pakistani soldiers were seen removing snow from a concrete bunker to the west of the summit of Point 5770. That evening, fire was exchanged over the area.

Strangely, the Siachen-based 102 Infantry Brigade removed the officer who had reported the intrusion, Major Manish Bhatnagar, not the Pakistani troops who had occupied the position. On the eve of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan, it is likely that India had no desire to initiate a bruising exchange of fire on Siachen. The 121 Brigade, which ought to have been told that Pakistan troops had demonstrated aggressive intent in an adjoining area, was not even informed of the development.

For one, despite both the flow of intelligence on possible infiltration in the Kargil sector, troops were actually pulled out from frontline positions. Soon after the loss of Point 5770, 9 Mahar Regiment was removed from its defensive positions along the Yaldor Langpa stream and stationed at a rear position near Leh. The 26 Maratha Light Infantry, which protected the crucial infiltration route from Mashkoh to Dras, was also pulled off forward duties.

Despite the summary removal of approximately a quarter of its troops, there is evidence to show that 121 Brigade did act. Troops were withdrawn from the Mashkoh area for just 80 days in the winter of 1999, down from 177 days in 1997 and 116 days in 1998. Yaldor was left undefended for 64 days from February to April, where troops had been withdrawn for 120 days in 1997 and 119 days in 1998. Kaksar, another key area, was undefended for just 38 days, where it was left open for over 200 days in previous years.


April 1999

April 11 - India says it has successfully test-fired a longer-range model of its Agni ballistic missile.

April 14 - The AIADMK withdraws support from the ruling coalition. President K.R. Narayanan asks the government to seek a confidence vote in parliament.

April 17 - India's 13-month-old BJP-led government falls after losing a confidence motion by just one vote. This may have been a trigger for Pakistan to be aggressive in Kargil

April 26 - India's parliament is dissolved and early elections are called. This may be one of major reason for the Pakistan Military to start the aggressive operation in Kargil.

Why was it that commanders in Leh and Srinagar were so slow to respond not just to the intelligence warnings that were available, but to the growing worries of their own subordinates?

General Malik argued that no troops were withdrawn by XV Corps from 3 Infantry Division's area of responsibility. This is, without dispute, true, since 9 Mahar and 26 Maratha battalions remained around Leh. Yet, General Malik's letter does not explain why General Budhwar chose to pull back soldiers needed to guard the LoC to rear positions when both intelligence warnings and field commanders believed threat levels were escalating.

General Malik also pointed out that the headquarters of 70 Infantry Brigade was inducted into the Dras area in October 1998, suggesting that the Army was indeed taking the warnings it received seriously. However, he omitted to mention the critical fact that only its headquarters' staff, not the fighting force, had been deployed when fighting broke out in May 1999.

With a dissolved parliament confrontation in the border is usaully avoided.



May 1999


May 1999 - Chinese moves in LAC Ladhak
"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book. He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.

"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan. Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India. The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights. He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.

This may be one of the reason for not sending aggressive rescue missions to bring back captured Indian battalions. With only a caretaker government in India running the show there was a serious situation of China and Pakistan together attacking India.

May 4 - Lt. Gen. Kishen Pal was on leave in Delhi on May 3 to attend to his wife's surgery. When he got word of the sighting of the intruders at Banju, he ordered 3 Inf Div. to reinforce 121 (I) Bde and returned to Srinagar. Patrols were sent out starting from May 4, but due to weather conditions, they sighted the enemy only on May 7 and made contact on May 8 and came under heavy fire. By this time, all operational commanders were at their HQ, including the much reviled (in the press) Maj. Gen. Budhwar.


May 7 - Chinese Embassy Bombing in Kosovo - China US relationship problem. This bombing and an escalation is unexplainable. This event may have kept Chinese from entering the war in Kargil looking at the international publicity given to Chinese reaction.

May 11 - By May 11, the extent of intrusions were becoming clear even in the Dras sector further south. By May 12, the number of battalions in contact with the enemy were more than 5 and casualties were already taken. Lt. Kalia's patrol went out on 14 May in the Kaksar subsector and was captured on May 15.

May 16 - 6 choopers discovered in Kargil sector

May 24 - First report of infilterators.At a meeting of the Unified Headquarters in Srinagar on May 24, 1999, General Pal insisted that there "were no concentration of troops on the Pakistani side and no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes."

May 26 - India unleashes two waves of air strikes to flush out guerrillas on its side of a Kashmir ceasefire line, sharply raising temperatures in the region. The next day India confirms it has lost two fighter jets which Pakistan says they shot down.

May 28 - In Kashmir, a stinger missile brings down an Indian helicopter killing all on board. Lt. Gen. Kishan Pal, GOC 15 Corps, had accomplished the task of inducting 3 Bde HQ, 19 Inf. Battalions, 4 Regts of Field Arty, 2 Regts of Medium Arty into the sectors within a span of 26 days.


June 1999


June 12 - India and Pakistan hold "businesslike" talks over their Kashmir dispute but fail to resolve it; India says Pakistan tried to infiltrate the Turtuk Sector and puts the death toll at 267 Pakistanis and 86 Indians.

June 16, 1999 -The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.


July 1999


July 4 - India says it has recaptured the strategic Tiger Hill on its side of a military line of control in Kashmir.

July 9 - In Kashmir, the Indian army reports that it has all but ousted the infiltrators from the Batalik zone on India's side of the ceasefire line.

July 17 - India signals the end of the flare-up with Pakistan by announcing that all infiltrators have withdrawn from Indian-held Kashmir.

July 26 - India says its troops have cleared all infiltrators from their side of the Line of Control that divides Kashmir.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Virupaksha » 07 Feb 2009 14:07

andy B wrote:Some time back on BRF I read about the interview with the Paki general that said he would gladly press the nuke button on India.


Can I anybody give me the link to that particular interview. I too remember reading that article and tried to search for it again around 2-3 months ago but couldnt find it.

Thanks in advance

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 27 Feb 2009 01:25

Anyway in Kargil did the Indian Army ever find any irregular/civilians among the intruders? I thought they were all NLI troops. The irregulars were at most porters for the Paki soldiers.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Baljeet » 27 Feb 2009 07:31

here is a good movie with education on how to honor your fallen soldiers. Wish we had something like this in India for Kargil Martyrs...

Fallen Soldiers

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby SSridhar » 01 Mar 2009 16:24

Book Review on 'Witness to Blunder'

Witness to Blunder is Colonel (retd) Ashfaq Hussain’s account of the Kargil war, but it goes farther than merely dissecting the Kargil crisis. Published in September 2008, it coincides with the passing of a decade since the military operation was initiated on snow-tipped mountains in the winter of 1998-1999.

As a colonel serving the Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) at the time, the author recounts his experiences and observations, and relates his perception of the entire debacle as it unfolded. He expresses his findings based on personal interaction with senior commanders, leaders, as well as middle-level and junior officers of the Pakistan Army directly involved in the fierce battles.

Particulars of senior commanders, their appointments and level of involvement is narrated in detail down to the time and location of briefings, including the March 28, 1999 visit by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and his key officers to the Zakaria post held by the 12 Northern Light Infantry (NLI) regiment ‘11 kms ahead of the LoC’.

The author has very fittingly paid tribute to some of the many warriors of the Pakistan Army who remained oblivious to the politics, while serving their country with exemplary valour. The story of Captain Karnal Sher Khan Shaheed that has been narrated in detail for the first time by an established military biographer is a valuable read.

Readers will find certain portions of the book to be particularly interesting. Such as the strange yet brave case of Major Tariq Mahmood’s sudden nap while faced with direct intense firing from the enemy who were only a few hundred yards away. Meanwhile the reproduction of a letter from an Indian lieutenant colonel handed over to Pakistan,, along with the body of Captain Imtiaz Malik Shaheed, raises goosebumps and is a tribute to the bond that men in uniform share regardless of the side they are fighting on.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby RayC » 01 Mar 2009 16:29

Such as the strange yet brave case of Major Tariq Mahmood’s sudden nap while faced with direct intense firing from the enemy who were only a few hundred yards away


That is no bravery. It is dereliction of duty.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Jagan » 27 May 2009 03:46

http://sify.com/news/imagegallery/galle ... vsv=TopHP1

'A Few Intruders'
Air Marshal Narayan Menon (Retd), PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, was the Air Officer Commanding, J&K, during the Kargil Conflict.

two Mig-27 aircraft armed with rockets attacked a target just two kilometers south of the LoC. The No 2's aircraft flamed out immediately after weapon release and the pilot had to eject prior to his aircraft impacting with a mountain side. During parachute descent he drifted across the LoC, was taken as POW by the Pakistani forces and was returned to India on June 3, 1999.
Is this the reason that the Pakistanis never displayed the MiG-27 wreckage?

a Mi-17 mission of four helicopters attacked a target from where our Army units were being engaged. During the attack a large number of SAMs were fired at the mission as reported by the aircrew and confirmed later by the gun cameras. The No 3 in the mission was turning away after the attack when a missile hit its engine and the helicopter went down with the loss of all the four aircrew


The fighter aircraft in the Valley flew more than 2,000 sorties including 250 by night. Mirages and Jaguars flew 150 sorties. Helicopters flew 23 strike sorties and 2,100 sorties for other tasks. Our aircraft targeted enemy positions with approximately 330 tonnes of bombs, 4,000 rockets and many thousands of gun ammunition.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Jagan » 27 May 2009 03:54

http://sify.com/news/imagegallery/galle ... gside_View

The Fog of War

Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, PVSM, UYSM, Former GOC, 8 Mtn Div -which played a key role in the Kargil war-argues that not crossing the LoC and accepting a cease fire when the enemy was on the run were strategic blunders which continue to haunt useven a decade later..The Fog of War

Later, my Div buried 140 Pak soldiers belonging to the Northern Light Infantry (NLI). These were the gallant men who had laid down their lives for their motherland, but in return were not even accepted by their country and were denied the honour of being given the last rites by their nation. By

Linked to this is our accepting the cease-fire when we were in a commanding position. By the time the cease-fire came we had the enemy on the run, but by accepting it we offered them the easy route to withdraw to their country.

As expected the enemy did not respect the terms of the cease-fire and planted anti-personnel mines along their route of withdrawal; a route along which we had to move to clear the area upto the LoC. We suffered a large number of casualties, which reflects on the unsoldierly qualities of the Pak Army.


of air per se was a morale raising factor for our troops and conversely it had an adverse effect on the enemy. But its effectiveness was questionable.

Like us, the pilots were not acclimatized to fight in this type of terrain and did not have the right ordnance to deliver on the target. When they did use the laser guided bombs, their effectiveness improved marginally , but not enough to have an impact on our ground operations or the enemy.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby arun » 27 May 2009 15:19

ravi_ku wrote:
andy B wrote:Some time back on BRF I read about the interview with the Paki general that said he would gladly press the nuke button on India.


Can I anybody give me the link to that particular interview. I too remember reading that article and tried to search for it again around 2-3 months ago but couldnt find it.

Thanks in advance


In the intervening months since that post you may have likely found the sought after article.

In the event you have not, see the below article by Peter Landesman appearing in the March 2002 “The Atlantic” which I think is what you were looking for:

A Modest Proposal From the Brigadier

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 27 May 2009 21:43

Jagan wrote:http://sify.com/news/imagegallery/galleryDetail.php?id=jf0xr4fhidb&title=Kargil_10_Years_After_A_Ringside_View

The Fog of War

Lt Gen Mohinder Puri, PVSM, UYSM, Former GOC, 8 Mtn Div -which played a key role in the Kargil war-argues that not crossing the LoC and accepting a cease fire when the enemy was on the run were strategic blunders which continue to haunt useven a decade later..The Fog of War

of air per se was a morale raising factor for our troops and conversely it had an adverse effect on the enemy. But its effectiveness was questionable.

Like us, the pilots were not acclimatized to fight in this type of terrain and did not have the right ordnance to deliver on the target. When they did use the laser guided bombs, their effectiveness improved marginally , but not enough to have an impact on our ground operations or the enemy.



What steps have been taken since ten years of Kargil to improve IAF effectiveness in the high mountains?

If even LGBs were ineffective and the AOC writes:
The fighter aircraft in the Valley flew more than 2,000 sorties including 250 by night. Mirages and Jaguars flew 150 sorties. Helicopters flew 23 strike sorties and 2,100 sorties for other tasks. Our aircraft targeted enemy positions with approximately 330 tonnes of bombs, 4,000 rockets and many thousands of gun ammunition.


Was this all ineffective? What co-ordination is in place now to improve the effectiveness? Has IAF trg been upped to deal with this type of operations?

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Gaur » 27 May 2009 22:19

^^ I guess there are limits to what we can do about it. We all know about the problems faced by a/cs at such high altitude due to low air density and temperature. Also laser guided bombs lose much of their effectiveness under tough environmental conditions like dense fog, clouds and smoke. I guess the relative lack of IAF's effectiveness had much more to do with harsh conditions of Kargil than any other reason. Then again these are just my 2 paise and I am no expert. I eagerly wait to know if we can do anything more to increase our effectiveness in such terrains.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby kobe » 28 May 2009 02:27

Parijat Gaur wrote:^^ I guess there are limits to what we can do about it. We all know about the problems faced by ......... I guess the relative lack of IAF's effectiveness had much more to do with harsh conditions of Kargil than any other reason. Then again these are just my 2 paise and I am no expert. I eagerly wait to know if we can do anything more to increase our effectiveness in such terrains.


you guys are thinking small again.
rather than putting a LGB on a certain mountain top, it is better to strike deep inside paki territory with 200 brahmos, 55 MKIs, and 100 MiG-29s. It was stupid to not cross LOC last time and it will be stupid to not do so next time. Incidents like Kargil are going to happen with 400% certainty. The amputation of 1971 have given the pakjabi's a permanent itch that will never heal unless they are amputated again.

For every mountain top they occupy if we don't take out 2 karachi's the snakes won't learn.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby HariC » 28 May 2009 18:32

kobe wrote:
Parijat Gaur wrote:^^ I guess there are limits to what we can do about it. We all know about the problems faced by ......... I guess the relative lack of IAF's effectiveness had much more to do with harsh conditions of Kargil than any other reason. Then again these are just my 2 paise and I am no expert. I eagerly wait to know if we can do anything more to increase our effectiveness in such terrains.


you guys are thinking small again.
rather than putting a LGB on a certain mountain top, it is better to strike deep inside paki territory with 200 brahmos, 55 MKIs, and 100 MiG-29s. It was stupid to not cross LOC last time and it will be stupid to not do so next time. Incidents like Kargil are going to happen with 400% certainty. The amputation of 1971 have given the pakjabi's a permanent itch that will never heal unless they are amputated again.

For every mountain top they occupy if we don't take out 2 karachi's the snakes won't learn.


yeah except we didnt have 200 brahmos in 1999

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Gaur » 28 May 2009 18:55

kobe wrote:
Parijat Gaur wrote:^^ I guess there are limits to what we can do about it. We all know about the problems faced by ......... I guess the relative lack of IAF's effectiveness had much more to do with harsh conditions of Kargil than any other reason. Then again these are just my 2 paise and I am no expert. I eagerly wait to know if we can do anything more to increase our effectiveness in such terrains.


you guys are thinking small again.
rather than putting a LGB on a certain mountain top, it is better to strike deep inside paki territory with 200 brahmos, 55 MKIs, and 100 MiG-29s. It was stupid to not cross LOC last time and it will be stupid to not do so next time. Incidents like Kargil are going to happen with 400% certainty. The amputation of 1971 have given the pakjabi's a permanent itch that will never heal unless they are amputated again.

For every mountain top they occupy if we don't take out 2 karachi's the snakes won't learn.

While your intentions are noble, your comments have nothing to do with the discussion itself. The discussion is to determine what steps can be taken to increase the effectiveness of IAF in such terrains. You say "rather than putting a LGB on a certain mountain top, it is better to strike deep inside paki territory". Tell me this, executing deep strikes inside Pakistan is all very well, but how do you propose to retake Kargil peaks without bombing them? If a situation similar to Kargil arises in future, we may or may not decide to execute deep strikes, but we surely would need to perform bombing runs on enemy occupied peaks. The question is how can IAF ensure increase in its effectiveness (from 1999) in such difficult terrains.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby sum » 28 May 2009 21:57

If a situation similar to Kargil arises in future, we may or may not decide to execute deep strikes, but we surely would need to perform bombing runs on enemy occupied peaks. The question is how can IAF ensure increase in its effectiveness (from 1999) in such difficult terrains.

IMHO, the effort can be reduced if the staging areas and logistics camps in in Paki land are bombed first......
That would reduce the amount of bombs to be dropped on enemy occupied Indian peaks. In Kargil, we kept bombing the peaks and the intruders were able to stay put as they were continuously being fed from PoK til the last stages of the war.....

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby sudeepj » 28 May 2009 23:23

Parijat Gaur wrote:^^ I guess there are limits to what we can do about it. We all know about the problems faced by a/cs at such high altitude due to low air density and temperature. Also laser guided bombs lose much of their effectiveness under tough environmental conditions like dense fog, clouds and smoke. I guess the relative lack of IAF's effectiveness had much more to do with harsh conditions of Kargil than any other reason. Then again these are just my 2 paise and I am no expert. I eagerly wait to know if we can do anything more to increase our effectiveness in such terrains.


IRNSS+INS guided JDAM kumars will completely solve this problem.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 29 May 2009 04:06

sudeepj wrote:
Parijat Gaur wrote:^^ I guess there are limits to what we can do about it. We all know about the problems faced by a/cs at such high altitude due to low air density and temperature. Also laser guided bombs lose much of their effectiveness under tough environmental conditions like dense fog, clouds and smoke. I guess the relative lack of IAF's effectiveness had much more to do with harsh conditions of Kargil than any other reason. Then again these are just my 2 paise and I am no expert. I eagerly wait to know if we can do anything more to increase our effectiveness in such terrains.


IRNSS+INS guided JDAM kumars will completely solve this problem.



SudeepJ, Muhe me ghee shakkar. My thoughts too and make them inexpensive and in plenty.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby andy B » 29 May 2009 05:28

A humble request to the all powerful "Bradminullahs" :twisted: The latest AFM has a nice article on Kargil War written by that PAF guy whose blog was being discussed some time back. Anyhow I am able to scan and post it on ifile will be alrite with you guys if I post the link here should be able to do ova the wkend...

Cheers,
Anand.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Gaur » 29 May 2009 12:26

sudeepj wrote:
Parijat Gaur wrote:^^ I guess there are limits to what we can do about it. ...... I eagerly wait to know if we can do anything more to increase our effectiveness in such terrains.


IRNSS+INS guided JDAM kumars will completely solve this problem.

Yes, that is a good solution. It will at least solve the problems faced by lgbs.
However, even with that, it is always very difficult to fly in such terrain. There is high performance depreciation at such high altitudes.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby tsarkar » 29 May 2009 13:02

Kargil & the Mumbai attacks reflect our strategic myopia. Our military decision makers let political considerations overrule sound military judgment.

Via Kargil, Pakistan has forced India to invest huge sums of money on men and material for border patrolling. The initial and recurring expense is huge. The men and money could have been better used elsewhere. The material has a single role – for example, the EO sensors & BFSR are useless during an offensive maneuver. The men cannot be used for strategic offensives without comprehensive re-training.

The best way to deal with Kargil was to cross the LoC and bargain from a position of strength. Instead of targeting obscure sangars, we should have targeted the logistic axis at Skardu and Gilgit.

When Pakistan tried to infiltrate in 1965, Indians riposted by capturing Haji Pir pass. This upset their strategic gameplan.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/dec/21haji.htm

Similarly the Mumbai attacks forced India to invest hugely in costal patrolling. The hundreds of RIB’s being purchased are single role – we cannot use them to bomb Karachi, hunt submarines or shoot aircraft.

Pakistan has succeeded in its strategic objective of diverting precious resources into non-strategic purposes and our political – and military – leadership fails to realize or act upon.

Even the Israelis are letting international opinion and political considerations overrule sound military judgment. Whenever there were attacks from Lebanon, they made an armored pincer and captured the Litani River cutting off Southern Lebanon.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Leban ... litani.jpg

When militants lost logistic support from the north, the Israelis leisurely mopped up the place. Implementing this option cost only 20 casualties in 1978. In 2006 they did a frontal assault for multiple irrelevant political and diplomatic considerations and ended up losing resources achieving nothing.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Airavat » 07 Jun 2009 08:35

Army celebrated 'Battle Honour's Day' June 4-6 to mark the entry of 13th Battalion Jammu and Kashmir Rifles from Zojila Pass on 05 June 1999 to join the battle at Drass Sector. Defence Spokesperson Jammu Lt Col Biplabh Nath said three day long celebration comprised of traditional regimental events of special Sainik Sammelan, Barakhana and social get togethers.

"A spectacular lights and sounds show depicting the battles fought by the unit left the visiting guests spell bound and revived the memories of those who were part of the battles", he added. Ex 13th Battalion and the present officials of the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers, Other Ranks and their families which included parents of late Captain Vikram Batra, Param Vir Chakra; the first Commanding Officer of the Battalion Lieutenant Colonel Ashoka Kak and Colonel YK Joshi, Vir Chakra the Commanding Officer of the battalion during Kargil war were also present during the celebrations.

During the `Operation Vijay’ which the Indian Army fought from 26 May 1999 to 26 July 1999 against the Pakistanis, the battalion launched four successful attacks and captured four important features viz. Rocky Knob and Hump in Dras Sub Sector; Point 5140 on Tololing Ridge and Point 4875 and Ledge in Mushkoh valley.

It was at the area 'Ledge' in Mushkoh valley where the brave Captain Vikram Batra laid down his life, after defeating the enemy. It was the heroism and selfless love for the mother land that gave this unit an exceptional recognition in the Annals of Indian Army. The battalion won numerous honours and awards for its bravery, which included Chief of Army Staff Unit Citation, Title of `Bravest of the Brave’, Theatre Honour- Kargil, Battle Honour -Dras and Mushkoh, Param Vir Chakra -02; Vir Chakra-08, Sena Medal -14, Mentioned-in-Despatches - 04, COAS Commendation Card-02 and GOC-in-C Commendation Card -04.

"The battalion is now commanded by Colonel Gurpreet Singh, Sena Medal who also took part in the war and in his address expressed his gratitude and heart felt thanks to all visiting Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers, Other Ranks and their families for their presence during the celebrations and wished them best in their lives," said the Defence Spokesperson.

Early Times

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Avinash R » 12 Jun 2009 11:00

Pak commander blows the lid on Islamabad's Kargil plot

Manu Pubby
http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... ot/475330/
Posted: Jun 12, 2009 at 1017 hrs IST

New Delhi In the first account by a Pakistani military officer that nails Islamabad’s lie on Kargil, a former pilot who was Director of Operations of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) during the 1999 conflict has given a blow-by-blow account of the preparations undertaken by his country’s Army that led to operations inside the Indian side of the Line of Control.

Published in India in the latest issue of the 'Vayu Aerospace and Defence Review' magazine, PAF Air Commodore (retd) Kaiser Tufail, the man who “interrogated” IAF Flight Lieutenant K Nachiketa after his MiG-27 crashed in PoK during a bombing run in the initial days of the war, has laid bare the detailed Kargil plan by the Pakistan Army. He says that the “Army trio” of General Pervez Musharraf, 10 Corps Commander Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad and Force Command Northern Areas commander Maj Gen Javed Hasan “took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders, nor the heads of the other services”.

Tufail, a decorated fighter pilot who was in charge of air operations during the war, has revealed that the Pak Army placed Stinger shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles on hill tops, moved artillery guns and ammunitions to posts that India had vacated during winter and drew plans to cut off the strategic Drass-Kargil road to choke supplies to the Siachen glacier.

Now based in Lahore, Tufail says the entire operation was planned by Musharraf but had the tacit approval of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who, after a presentation, said “‘General sahib, Bismillah karein’... not withstanding the denials we hear from him every new moon.”

Recalling his meeting with top Army officers, including Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad who was commanding the Rawalpindi Corps, Tufail writes that the Kargil plan was revealed on May 12, two weeks before India retaliated with air strikes, when Ahmad briefed him and others on the operation.

“Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen — to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” Ahmad is quoted as having said during the briefing, adding that “I have Stingers on every peak” to counter the threat of Indian air strikes against Pakistani intruders.

“The target was a vulnerable section of Drass-Kargil road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial lifeline which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter stocking in Leh-Siachen sector. He (Lt Gen Ahmad) was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which monsoons would prevent vehicular movements and also suspend airlift by IAF,” Tufail writes on details of the briefing.

Expressing surprise over the failure of Indian intelligence to detect Pakistani movements that led to the occupation of Indian Army posts on the heights of Kargil, Tufail says it was well known in Skardu, days before operations were launched, that “something big is imminent”.

“Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high as Army Aviation Mi 17s were busy moving artillery guns and ammunition to the posts that had been vacated by the Indians during the winter season. Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city. Interestingly, Army messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers. In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs many weeks before the operation unfolded,” Tufail writes.

Bringing out the disagreement between the Pak Army and Air Force on the operations, Tufail writes that many senior PAF officers tried to explain to the Army that Indian air strikes would wipe out bunkers occupied by ground forces but these were dismissed by the Army after Lt General Ahmad said “troops were well camouflaged and concealed and that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air”.

“Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Commodore Abid Rao (Assistant Chief of Air Staff Operations) to famously quip, ‘After this operation, it’s going the be either a Court Martial or Martial Law’ as we walked out of the briefing room.”

And for the first time, giving details of IAF success in bombing Pakistani positions during the war, Tufail writes that round the clock air attacks had made retention of posts by Pakistani infiltrators “untenable”.

“The Mirage 2000s scored at least five successful laser guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably,” he writes.

Contrary to the Indian view that he was shot down, Tufail claims that Flt Lt Nachiketa’s MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble “caused by gas ingestion during high altitude strafing.” He writes: “Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tete-a-tete with this writer during an interesting ‘interrogation’ session.”

He conceded that the PAF had trouble maintaining air patrols in the region to deter Indian fighters as its F-16 mainstay was facing shortage of supply parts due to American sanctions. “After one week of CAPs (combat air patrols), the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserves were being eaten into and the activity had the be ‘rationalized’, an euphemism for discontinuing it altogether,” Tufail writes.

According to him, F-16 was the only fighter available with Pakistan to counter India but it was decided to discontinue patrols in case its services were needed during a full-blown war. “Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the lack of cooperation by the PAF,” he writes.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Ashutosh Malik » 12 Jun 2009 11:28

Isn't this old hat!

Tufail's blog has had this thing posted there for a long time now. I read it through a link on Bharat Rakshak itself. Somebody needs to drill some sense into the reporters of mainstream media and get them to read stuff coming on Bharat Rakshak and other sites like www.orbat.com!

I wrote a comment on the above lines in Indian Express but they haven't posted it yet! So let us see.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Avinash R » 12 Jun 2009 11:38

^kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com is private blog and mainstream newspapers dont usually quote from such blogs.

Today's news report quotes another mainstream and reputed publication, so the credibility of the report can be checked by the editors of the newspapers.
Published in India in the latest issue of the 'Vayu Aerospace and Defence Review' magazine, PAF Air Commodore (retd) Kaiser Tufail...has laid bare the detailed Kargil plan by the Pakistan Army.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby Jagan » 12 Jun 2009 16:53

Not to mention that the Kargil article was published in Defence Journal in Pakistan, some Defence publication in India (Even before vayu) and the recent AFM issue.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby rajsunder » 12 Jun 2009 21:16

I have been always wondering about how much of the blame of intelligence failure to detect kargil (in planning stage) goes to the fact that GOI had provided the details of our intelligence assets to baki govt.
can anyone share some info on this aspect.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby ramana » 12 Jun 2009 21:31

Ten years ago BRM had this article
Operation Safed Sagar about air ops in Kargil. Please read and compare with the FizzleYa Air Cmd's account of TSP air ops.

Thanks, ramana

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Postby VinodTK » 18 Jun 2009 22:59

No Kargil Divas this year

"Sources told Sify.com that the decision was purportedly taken to avoid `rubbing salt into Pakistan`s wounds` at a time when the peace process was once again being re-initiated."

Height of A*s Kissing; wonder as to what GOI want's to say to the dead solders mothers, fathers, wife’s and children!!!


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