Kargil War Thread - VI

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 22 Sep 2012 21:04

They are using Kargil to talk about China border

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2012 21:06

Same idiots don want India to prepare for Cold Start but are pretending to claim India is unprepared for a double Cold Start from TSP-PRC.

Cant have it both ways for it shows the mendacity of the opinion writers,

skher · Post by **skher** » 22 Sep 2012 23:32

Kargil war secret: IAF used 'jugaad'

..

Pilots flew real-time missions with hand-held GPS sets to home in on high-altitude targets, usually tiny contingents of Pakistanis occupying Indian positions. And its aces used hand-held video cameras to record bombing runs for post-op analysis back at the base.

The IAF's "innovative use of airpower (was) one of the excellent features of the Kargil operations", says a new study of the war by Benjamin Lambeth, an airpower historian, released on Thursday.
..

A serving IAF pilot, who did not want to be identified, said, "We did use hand-held commercial GPS units, except they were not really hand-held…They were fixed in front, in a bracket."
..

Shooting up an avalanche, says Lambeth.

Pilots knew if you couldn't bomb dispersed enemy soldiers, you could hit them with something they least expected: shooting on a mountain side triggered an avalanche. Snow came tumbling down, in a rushing sweep.

There is more. Kargil was just the start. Or was it?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Sep 2012 06:09

Vice Adm William Raborn was the commander of a recce flight squadron before Pearl Harbor. He built improvised bomb racks for the planes and used them in attack role during the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Was that jugaad? Or was it fighting with what you have?

Jaybhatt · Post by **Jaybhatt** » 23 Sep 2012 12:05

ramana wrote:Thats dumb when you consider Kargil was mainly a ground war in the high mountains!

Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War
By Benjamin Lambeth

Again an article to dissect Indian capabilites in the absence of Indian analysis.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Here is the full report :

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/20 ... l-war/dvc4#

It is a perceptive analysis and deserves to be read in its entirety.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Sep 2012 02:59

wil read it.

BRF used to have ring side comments from those directing them at that time.

satya · Post by **satya** » 24 Sep 2012 17:05

Three issues as per this carnegie report :

1) IA's top leadership was talking apples & that of IAF's oranges. Neither knew how to communicate in a way the other can understand the problem they were facing . IA's VCOAS with his 3 junior officers seemed to be doing a constant jap of 108

for armed helo support & unwilling or not understanding the threat perception on use of armed helos as seen by IAF till arrival of COAS ,IA.
On other hand IAF could not understand one machine gun post here & there as seen from 18000 ft + view as problem big enough requiring IAF's bombing runs . IA wanted direct fire support that IAF was not willing to commit in initial stages of Kargil War.

2) IA's top leadership initial reaction in meetings with their IAF counterparts was more on terms like help us in cover up & let's not tell the teacher / PMO / politicians about this .Something to do with ego , i guess.
IAF knew the true extent of problem but was ambiguous in its own internal communication & IA top leadership was looking at it as a localized anti-terror operation with terrorists holed up to be smoked out .

3) PAF had up to date intelligence on IAF's plans used & modifications carried on them to carry out the mission ( use of GPS as per report PAF director of operations knew as soon as that happened or so is my understanding ) .
IAF bought off shelf & PAF knew = Unkil's hand for the speed of information reaching PAF .

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Sep 2012 21:47

Anyway Bharat Karnad (bless his heart) puts things in prespective:

Ravi Karumanchiri wrote:School of hard knocks
Sep 27, 2012

Bharat Karnad

"The lessons of Operation Vijay other than the value of self-reliance are that no foreign country will pass on professional secrets"

http://www.asianage.com/columnists/scho ... knocks-632

George Tanham’s scathing 1995 RAND report on the Indian Air Force excoriated the service leadership for much of the service’s ills....

<snip>

It is only after the report was published that Air Headquarters (AHQ) woke up to air war in the modern age and began contemplating tanker aircraft and airborne warning and control systems.

Last week, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released a monograph by a former RAND staffer, Benjamin S. Lambeth, assessing IAF’s performance in the 1999 Kargil border conflict. It is a straightforward rendition of what happened and how the missions were carried out, coming to what are by now stock conclusions in any study on the Indian military in wars.... because “traditionally Indians do little formal thinking”.

Lambeth refers to the “jugaad” mentality, which all Indian organisations live (and die) by. Had the IAF planners kept abreast of technology developments, such as GPS integrated into the avionics of all fighter aircraft as standard equipment, and if the Tactical Development (TacD) cell, then in Jamnagar (since shifted to Gwalior), had been tasked by AHQ to develop fighter tactics for use in mountains before, rather than after receiving the hard knocks of three aircraft downed in the first three days.... <snip>

But jugaad has limitations, as improvisation by its very nature is a sub-optimal solution..... <snip>

{As I gave example in US before Pearl harbor, improvisation is the ahll mark of a progressive fighting force. Only West gives credit to its implementers and in India folks get derided by scalawags.}

Lambeth, however, exaggerates the role of the US-sourced laser-guided bomb — the Paveway-II. Only nine of these LGBs were dropped during the entire conflict, eight of them by Mirage 2000 and one from a Jaguar and successfully took out the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI) battalion headquarters atop Tiger Hill. But destruction, especially of the Muntho Dhalo supply depot and base camp that made sustaining the intrusion impossible, resulted from an innovative use of dumb bombs — the 250 pound bombs left over from when the Ajeet (the licence-production version of the Folland Gnat) air defence fighter carried them in the 1970s. He also does not mention the fact that the LGB kits purchased from the United States by IAF prior to the 1998 nuclear tests had a grievous flaw in one of the internal circuits, which prevented integration of the Paveway with the Mirage 2000 fire control system. Americans refused to help correct the flaw because India was then under US sanctions owing to its nuclear tests the year before. None of these aspects find mention in the Lambeth study.

The innovation worked out by the ASTE (Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment) staff and IAF pilots even as the battle raged was to first correct the circuit and then to drop the bombs in precision-mode using the bracket-mounted bazaar-bought GPS units in the Mirage cockpit with its onboard computer. Lambeth does not relate the story behind this innovation either. IAF asked the French for advice on how to use the dumb bombs on low-value targets. True to their mercenary reputation, the French refused to part with any free advice, even though they had previously used dumb bombs successfully in precisely the manner ASTE-IAF had worked out, and suggested instead that they be given a contract for upgrading the avionics mid-operations!

The Lambeth study states that the initial series of dumb bomb attacks by MiG-23s and MiG-27s were wide off target because of inaccurate target coordinates supplied by the Army. What he does not reveal — perhaps because the senior IAF officers he talked with did not apprise him of this — is how the Army’s 15 Corps spotters risked their lives to close in on the entrenched NLI encampments and dugouts on the ridge line and mountain slopes to get an accurate fix on these targets. This more precise data led to the dumb bombs hitting their marks dead-on in the latter phase of the conflict.

The main lessons of Operation Vijay in Kargil other than the value of self-reliance and preparing for unforeseen tactical missions are that no foreign country will pass on professional secrets. And, as regards the French suppliers, their money-grubbing attitude and their propensity to default on contracts on technology transfer, the Indian government has to ensure that on the Rafale Multi-role Medium-Range Combat Aircraft deal, as I have iterated in this column, the payments be timed with every technology package actually transferred, including not just the source codes and flight control laws, but manufacturing technology for every last sub-assembly and component, and that there are no technology “black boxes”... <snip>

The defence ministry’s Price Negotiation Committees, in past deals, have invariably ended up favouring the foreign supplier because they have not conditioned payouts on suppliers meeting stringent and time-bound technology transfer criteria for the smallest bit connected with the aircraft, and provisions be inserted for cancellation of the deal if technology is not transferred in toto. These sorts of boondoggles cannot be tolerated anymore..... <snip>

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

READ THE FULL ARTICLE HERE http://www.asianage.com/columnists/scho ... knocks-632

Also IAF was saving its precious few LGBs for escalation control.

Thre were then current news reports of Israelis also involved in adapting the LGBs (Dont know if its Paveway at all?)

IAF to my limited knowldege never revealed what make of LGBs were used.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Sep 2012 22:02

BTW in 1971 ops the IAF used low level Mig-21 sorties to crater runways in East Paksitan. The accuracy was such that the West claimed Soviet LGBs were used!!!

IAF used tu-124 Moss to provide fighter direction in West Pakistan and again the West claimed the Soviets helped in the ops with AWACS!!!

Usually inspired stories come from British writers in Jane's and Flight International. They are fishing for information type articles when a breakthrough is achieved.

Anyway for new members here is the BRF archive on Kargil Air ops written in July 22, 1999

Understanding Air Ops in Kargil written in 1999 almost contemperanously. It was later published in BR Monitor.

WHy Harriers were not used in Kargil?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Sep 2012 22:11

Dont know why Lambeth and his interlocutors say that there was no study of the air ops in Kargil when BRM has in its second issue right after Kargil War was over the paper by Ved Shenag on

Operation Safed Sagar

I guess BRM doesnt count among these expertatti!

BTW one of the early writers for BRM is now a respected US analyst teaching the US armed forces!
---
BTW in the listof people that were contacted for Air Ops in karigl, onevery crucial people were not there.

The Air Officer planning the campaign.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 27 Sep 2012 22:45

Thanks for the link ramana.

As a mango man, i think the introduction of armed UAVs will prevent such problems in the future. The obvious advantage of it being unmanned allows it to be used in dangerous situations. The other advantages such as low speed, low signature, small size and being directly under army control would help as well. Its not an emotive issue but a capability one. The SU used to direct helicopter gunfire at the Mujahideen from the mouths of caves. We did not have the luxury due to SAMs. However, as tech improves, we would use guided munition in ever greater quantities for similar situations. The situation demanded that we do not cross the LoC which is not going to be true always. Anyway the LCH will take care of the problem of intercepting abduls in higher altitudes. It was never a plane situation anyway.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Sep 2012 23:29

nakul, unobtanium is very good and solves all problems.

What IAF did was with available resources and adapted to battle situations very quickly.

The Lambeth report clearly states that the turning point Munthao Dalo bombing was by a dumb bomb. He says it was 1000 lb GP and Karnad says it was the 250 lb versions procured for Ajeeth/Gnat. Lambeth reports grouse by IAF that they didn't have target coordinates and hence were not very effective. However the MD was wiped out by dumb bomb strike which needs accurate coordinates which were got by Ind Army as Karnad points out.

BTW if one reads all the notes and refs in the Lambeth report gives a very significant insights on the conflict.

One big problem is the penchant for Indian officers to pour their heart and inner most thoughts to Westerners but not to the Kargil Review Committee!!!

They should not have made those inter service accusations to outsiders directly.

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 27 Sep 2012 23:45

There is no option but to do it on the ground in some situations. Air power has its limitations as seen in Afghanistan by both superpowers. The attitude that IAF could have done something is ridiculous when the larger powers have failed in much less hilly terrain. It is the same US that made mincemeat of Iraqi armor on the plains.

The problem with the attitude could probably the absence of colloquial vs formal situations. Although the western bias might be present, it would also be a good idea to have independent think tanks that are not linked to govt directly. With regard to IA grudging the IAF, the thread you linked to shows the army was thinking that the IAF could magically solve the situation that is inherent to mountainous warfare and cannot be solved easily.

The presence of technology can only take you so far and the constant support of the air force is something we can't take for granted. Even the SU had to curtail air missions in the presence of MANPADs. I find it difficult to see how the IAF could have magically solved the problem. With air assets under army control, the army will be able to use them better.

Bharat Karnad was kind to give us a low down about how things happened. Its perhaps a good thing that these articles come out that helps the more knowledgeable folks in clearing the air. Like how some trolls here provoke the more knowledgable members to share their gyaan with us. Without such things happening, there is a general feeling that everything is under control. I never take these reports seriously because the real details would not be revealed by the men who make the decisions. This is all a part of psy ops.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Sep 2012 01:49

Ben Lambeth is aware of Bharat Rakshak:

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Magazi ... argil.aspx

Note the pics acknowledgement

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Sep 2012 01:59

NAL presentation by Wg Cdr Nambiar and his 'regret'

http://www.nal.res.in/pdf/airwarkargil.pdf

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 28 Sep 2012 02:44

a small but crucial mistake there in that article. that canberra was hit by a stinger, not an anza. none of the anza's hit anything; other than ground that is -- a fact that caused much hand wringing in pakistan subsequently.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Sep 2012 02:46

IDSA article on
1962 China war and Kargil 1999;Restrictions of air power

It has fascinating details on 1962 and IB assessments of Chiona and how it lead to increasing the magnitude of the debacle.

RahulM, Did you see teh notes for it might have a ref? I too was surprised at that suggestion.

-------------
Its note 47:

Singh, Himalayan Eagles: History of the Indian Air Force, Volume III: World Air Power, 111,
and “Kargil—Daily Progress of Op Safed Sagar,” at http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/kargil-summary1.html

It says hit by MANPADS not by Anza.

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 28 Sep 2012 03:49

Is there any attempt done to find out how Stingers, a personal portable infrared homing surface-to-air missile (SAM), which can be adapted to fire from ground vehicles and helicopters (as an AAM), developed in the United States per Wiki, reached tribals and irregulars, yahoos or whatever bunch of ghuspethyas launched from across the border.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Sep 2012 03:56

Firstly in Kargil there were no irregulars. They were regular troops of the NLI which was later disbanded. If any irregular were there it was as porters to the NLI troops.

Once you realize they are TSP regulars, then you also realize the Stingers were from US.

vishvak · Post by **vishvak** » 28 Sep 2012 04:04

ramana wrote:Firstly in Kargil there were no irregulars. They were regular troops of the NLI which was later disbanded. If any irregular were there it was as porters to the NLI troops.

Once you realize they are TSP regulars, then you also realize the Stingers were from US.

I don't want to derail this but how come USA has no restrictions on ghuspethya NLI barbarians raining missiles on IAF defending Indian borders? Makes role of USA suspect perhaps. Is there no mention/regret by USA when the barbarians used their advanced weapons after invading?

Or is it that USA is not answerable for weapons it sells to enemies of India?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Sep 2012 04:20

Even the Indian press kept quiet about the Stingers and came up with excuses like Anza/Red Top(as if they work) and anything but US made.

So ask the MUTUs why they don't see the perfidy.

Even Lambeth paper/study is fake pretending that US supplied Paveways were game changers.

Read BK's article on the lame duck/incompatible Paveways they supplied.
After Kargil so many questions were raised but how come none was raised about the Paveways not working with the Mirages without fixing by the ASTE? Who bought them and what was the idea to use them from which plane?

Were they for the cyclops Jaguar?

nakul · Post by **nakul** » 28 Sep 2012 21:08

I don't want to derail this but how come USA has no restrictions on ghuspethya NLI barbarians raining missiles on IAF defending Indian borders? Makes role of USA suspect perhaps. Is there no mention/regret by USA when the barbarians used their advanced weapons after invading

They sold F 16s that provided air cover over PoK. What is a stinger in comparison?

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 28 Sep 2012 22:03

You know, in all this analysis and lamenting about air-warfare aspect of the Kargil 99 people forget that there was no way IAF could have prepared for such a situation. The application of air-power was in a very restrictive environment with severely constrained rules of engagement. IAF was being used in mud-moving role and IMO, it was the most sub-optimal utilization of its potential. Which air force prepares for such a scenario?

Tomorrow, if India decides to attack across LoC into Northern Areas, will IAF be used to take out random pickets here and there? No. It will be tasked to hit out at supply dumps and artillery batteries and rear areas to cripple the PA war fighting effort. Remember the painting of Jaguars hitting a convoy of enemy trucks in what clearly looks like northern area setting? Those same dumb bombs would have been used to attack POL points/ammunition storage areas/marshaling yards if India had decided to cross the LOC.

I think people are being critical for the sake of being critical - what the IAF did in 99 with the resources available to it was a stupendous job. The very presence of IAF in the Kargil arena clearly unnerved the enemy. If Air Commodore Tufail is to be believed, PAF did not have assets to commit to Northern Areas - Had India decided to cross the LOC, the entire NA would have been at the mercy of IAF.

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 28 Sep 2012 22:27

^^^^^rohitvats,

IMO, what you've written above is largely fair.

However, is it not advisable for all services to consider the defense of every inch of border in its planning/preparation and deployment?

Given the propensity of India's adversaries to resort to low-intensity and unconventional-type attacks; are incursions rare, instantaneous events that have no warning? (Was any determination made as to how long PA was in Kargil?)

Given the *institutionally-ingrained* thinking in the Indian establishment to de-escalate every confrontation; are restrictive RoE really so unusual? What sort of restrictions might be considered in advance planning?

Anyways, I think many of these issues are now mute on account of technological advances. There are now ground-based sensors and aircrafts and even remote-sensing and spy satellites that are tasked with watching for incursions.

Next time, just send in a BrahMos with a FAE warhead. With that thin air up there, it'll blow them right-off the ridge!

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 28 Sep 2012 22:36

^^^RK, defense of every inch of motherland does not require defending every inch of motherland. Under normal circumstances, it means going into enemy territory and attacking his jugular. He'll forget about attacking you and will run for his life. Extra-ordinary situations call for extra-ordinary response and that is what happened in 99 - both by the IA and IAF. There is a learning curve involved everywhere.

In next Sino-Indian shooting match, the objective should be to hit the rear areas and blow every thing that moves to smithereens. And not attack along the thin mountain ridge lines.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 28 Sep 2012 23:49

rohitvats wrote:...

I think people are being critical for the sake of being critical - what the IAF did in 99 with the resources available to it was a stupendous job. The very presence of IAF in the Kargil arena clearly unnerved the enemy. If Air Commodore Tufail is to be believed, PAF did not have assets to commit to Northern Areas - Had India decided to cross the LOC, the entire NA would have been at the mercy of IAF.

Good post Rohit. Tufail's blogpost clearly lays out the problems which the PAF was facing even without the IAF crossing the LOC. F-16 patrols had to be reduced after a while because of the precarious spares situation. And he dismisses their other fighters as being incapable of seriously challenging the IAF especially because of the BVR capability of the Mig-29s and M2k's that the IAF had deployed in Kashmir. If the IAF had been allowed to cross into pakistani airspace to attack their rear, the PAF would have been in a soup.

pentaiah · Post by **pentaiah** » 28 Sep 2012 23:59

When ever asked to do I think they IAF performed far superior to IA with all due respect.
The IA doctrine is still Second World War modeled, not at all modern with quick and rapid mobilization.
Stationary positioning in order to over come slow logistics is no panacea.

Our Kargil response of sending young officers up the peaks a la guns of navarone is as good as Stalin and Khrushchev sending Russian infantry into German positions with rifle with one and bullets with other
Well seen in the movies Enemy at the gates

Using bofors gun in an innovative way is again providential ( the mysterious hand that protects India)

Using AN 12 as bombers in 1971 over Karachi, using midget Gnat/Ajeet against far superior F86 in 1965
Using Alouette in high altitudes and aircraft like AN 12, Fair Child packet in Ladakh is a testimony to IAF

In future unless air head quarters bans use of iPhone GPS apps use IAF will innovatively use it as we'll?
Of course no texting please

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 29 Sep 2012 00:16

^^^^^
I'm glad cooler heads prevailed.

Yes, it is a travesty that so many IA officers and jawans were killed at Kargil.

However, your counsel about "going for the jugular" in what you term "normal circumstances" is a recipe for; 1) total war with the TSP, 2) at great expense to India in terms of lives, treasure, equipment, strategic options, etc.; 3) exactly as the TSP's supporters have always intended.

If we follow your war plan through to it's logical conclusion, the total collapse of the TSP; how many refugees from the TSP do you think will eventually try to "escape" to India?

IMO, any thinking person, given enough time and space to consider everything; will realize that the way to handle the TSP is to 'thaw' it; and in the meantime, to avoid too much of it spilling-out across TSP borders.

Pakistan was designed (by the Brits) to contain India.
China and the US are simply the latest players of that old game.

If India 'plays along' with too much gusto, she will certainly be swept-along as per someone else's intentions.
I for one, am very satisfied with how the Kargil incursion was handled -- in decidedly limited fashion -- not because it made India look weak (because it didn't).

On the contrary, anyone who has ever been in a position of power, even absolute power, will tell you that the greatest exercise of strength is restraint in the face of intollerable provocation.

India demonstrated that strength at Kargil.
Don't lose sight of that.

JMT

member_22906 · Post by **member_22906** » 29 Sep 2012 01:12

^^
Restraint should not equal to weakness

This self righteous dharmic philosophy is fine with rational humans.... Here you are dealing with irrational pigs.

Waging a war for the sake of it is not what I am proposing, but not waging one since "anyone who has ever been in a position of power, even absolute power, will tell you that the greatest exercise of strength is restraint in the face of intollerable provocation" is delusional. With right intellegence and media leverage we could have inflicted more humiliation and damage to Porkis - and this also meant having quick and decisive strikes in NA

pentaiah · Post by **pentaiah** » 29 Sep 2012 01:44

India demonstrated that strength at Kargil

.
At very high cost and unnecessary if we had leadership collectively assessing the gravity of the situation.

COAS was in Eastern Europe or in alps, some of his deputies were golfing the MoD said some misguided elements occupied the peaks and will be cleared in due corse till, the body counts started mounting for 1 and half months (third week of June from May1999)

While as usual IB and RAW were busy doing something else instead of monitoring TSP army buying large scale high altitude equipment.....

Chalo again the divine hand just in time heaped blessings

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 29 Sep 2012 04:25

Ajay Sharma wrote:........Here you are dealing with irrational pigs........

Wrong. Those "irrational pigs" are merely the tool used against India, by some very cold-calculating folks. Focus on the tool in the fire, and you'll be burned when you handle it too much. More importantly, you'll lose sight of the real conflict. India didn't play along, wisely.

Don't forget, Pakistan was designed (by the Brits) to contain/constrain India.
China and the US are merely the new players of that old game.
India can play that game, and lose in the process -- that is the point of the game.
Not playing along -- conserving strength and resources and the moral high ground -- was the smart thing to do.

Ajay Sharma wrote:.............. not waging (war)... is delusional

????

Anyone who would say that total war with the TSP was the only option for a Kargil response; clearly has been proven wrong by history. There was another option, and it worked-out pretty well, IMHO.

Ajay Sharma wrote:......................we could have inflicted more humiliation and damage to Porkis.........

Seriously?
Grow up.
The infliction of humiliation is not a valid war aim, and is certainly not worth even a single drop of a nube-jawan's blood. Moreover, too much humiliation dealt out often leads to 'blow back'. It is strategically and tactically preferable to leave the enemy demoralized and utterly vanquished; then to sow too many seeds of humiliation which can sprout into vengeance.

There are many historical examples that illustrate this truth of human conflict:

In victory, know not to go too far.

WRT Kargil, India went only so far as she needed to, which was far enough.

It is a shame the conflict was so costly; and there is no way to mitigate it now.
The best thing was really to contain the situation, which was accomplished.

All we can do after the fact, is bereave the dead, and be more vigilant moving forward. (M777s would be nice to have also.)

JMT

ADDED LATER: The fact that one piece of brass or another was placed here or there at the time is irrelevant. It's nothing more than inflamatory nonsense that the press loves to 'lead with'. For crying out loud: If the preparedness of the IA is dependent on the top man being on-station 24/7/365..... Well you'd better build him (or her) a cage and keep them locked-up, somewhere in nigh dilli, no doubt.

As for those winter alpine boots and the high-altitude kits; do you know how often big tenders for tens of thousands of pieces of kit go out, from armies from all over the world? Even still, it's only one data point, and it's not exactly like a place and a time. All it might imply is "mountain". Well, there's no shortage of that to watch-over.

Again, JTM

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 29 Sep 2012 06:55

Going through the Harrier/Kargil debate thread once more,the aircraft proved itself a decade+ later by its huge operations in Afghanistan,where recently,the US lost 6 Harriers in a Talib attack.The RN's carriers and Harriers also were extensively involved in GW-2. At Kargil,I think that the IA was mentally off balance when the enormity of Gen.Bandicoot's surprise gambit was realised.Not possessing sufficient integrated inter-service tasking,which is better these days, led each service to also think within its own "box".The aircraft could've been easily stationed close to the battle zone,out of range of Paki artillery and picked off the Pakis on the peaks at will using rocket attacks or bombs.Of course one unanswered Q is where they were during the crisis,as our lone carrier was in refit.Some reports say that they were being used on merchantmen ,as the IN had moved the principal warships and subs of the eastern fleet to the west in a publicised move to pressurise the Pakis to withdraw.According to senior IN officers,the IN had the Pakis in a vice and even after the conflict started,had been kept out of the loop by the bandicoot and taken equally by surprise by the war,was able to make seaworthy only a few of its principal assets.The IN's IT/MRP aircraft had also done yeoman service in monitoring the location of the Paki fleet.We had if I remember right about 16-20 Harriers at the time and perhaps could've spared about 4 for the task.Another factor that remains a Q is how long it would've taken the IN to establish an operational base for the same.However,the conflict dragged on for a few months and I am sure that it would've been possible to have experimented with the idea.

At a function during the war where a V.Adm/FOC-in-C was present,and the discussion was all about the on-going war,I put forward the idea of using the Harriers to take out the Pakis on the peaks.His eyes lit up,and he seemed excited at the prospect ,but the reaction of those of the senior IAF officers present was disappointing,they just clammed up and looked away,as at that stage of the conflict ,their attempts had been unsuccessful.They obviously did not want the IN to show them up if the Harrier had succeeded in doing the business.The IA brigade of top brass seemed unaware of the aircraft's capabilities ,appeared indifferent and never asked the IN what was possible.I was surprised and disappointed at the lack of enthusiasm of at least debating the idea.There are other detailed reports about how the IAF eventually got involved ,as the IA was trying to downplay the situ initially ,its early losses, and how it solved the "equation" and had the Pakis on the run.Full credit to it!

It is ironic that those who pooh-poohed the Harrier's capabilities watch them today operating in Afghanistan with the USMC snapping up all 70+ early retired RN Harriers.Going through a not too old issue of a def. journal,I also came across our IN Harrier pilots claiming that they held their own against other frontline aircraft like Flankers,US aircraft,etc.,in naval exercises.It is a tribute to the designers of the Harrier that it is still relevant today,esp. when armed with PGMs and BVR missiles.

The moves today to create new joint operational commands/entities ,with better integration of the assets of the 3 services,has no doubt been one of the effects of the Kargil war and the recent Himalayan and maritime aggro by the Hans.With NCW also progressively being inducted into the services,in any future conflict one is confident that the capabilities of tri-service assets will be extensively used wherever the spat occurs.

Coming to the Himalayan threat today and the creation of an offensive mountain corps,unless we possess a large dedicated Himalayan "army",equipped with hundreds of tactical missiles located from Ladakh to Ar.P,airborne assault forces,special force teams,armoured brigades/divisions ,supporting air power assets aircraft,UCAVs,including strategic bombers-at least SU-34s,that have the capability to conduct offensive operations in Tibet to
"liberate it",destroy PLA bases and key and cut off the PLA forces from the rest of China by destroying the Tibetan railway,which now is about to reach Nepal,the PRC will not back off from its Himalayan aggro.Once it realises that the Indian armed forces opposing it in the mountains,are sufficiently large enough and armed to the teeth to burn its backside if it tries to invade,it will keep on the aggro.True it can also increase the number of troops,etc. on its side,but this will seriously divert its attention from the rapidly growing potential maritime conflict in the Far East with Japan,which could also suck in ASEAN nations and involve the US too.The current situ is an excellent opportunity-while the PRC looks eastwards, for the IA/IAF to rapidly augment their numbers,assets,infrastructure and missile forces in the Himalayan region to blunt the PLAs ambitions.

member_22906 · Post by **member_22906** » 29 Sep 2012 11:53

RK

Clauswitz and other jazz apart, I see your position flawed. Inspite of acting with restraint and demonstrating greater statesmanship in Kargil, what did we achieve? What did we strive to achieve and did we achieve it?

Has Pakistan stopped its war against India? Has it been declared a terrorist state? Have the hawks taken a backseat there?

We gave back over 90000 Paki soldiers and tracts of territory in West Pakistan in '71, then signed the Shimla agreement feeling elated that "we exercised restraint..." and did we get anything substantial to hold on to?

It pushed Pakistan's determination to make it nastier for India with even stronger resolve.

Its a nice arm chair IM for us to sit and do... But lets also reflect has anything changed

member_22906 · Post by **member_22906** » 29 Sep 2012 12:35

Ravi Karumanchiri wrote:playing along -- conserving strength and resources and the moral high ground -- was the smart thing to do.

Ajay Sharma wrote:.............. not waging (war)... is delusional
????
Anyone who would say that total war with the TSP was the only option for a Kargil response; clearly has been proven wrong by history. There was another option, and it worked-out pretty well, IMHO.

Ajay Sharma wrote:......................we could have inflicted more humiliation and damage to Porkis.........
Seriously?
Grow up.

On a side note, pls don't pick and delete parts of my post to suit your viewpoint w/o understanding what I stated and then express shock

This is what I posted:

Ajay Sharma wrote: Waging a war for the sake of it is not what I am proposing, but not waging one since "anyone who has ever been in a position of power, even absolute power, will tell you that the greatest exercise of strength is restraint in the face of intollerable provocation" is delusional. With right intellegence and media leverage we could have inflicted more humiliation and damage to Porkis - and this also meant having quick and decisive strikes in NA

I think its self explanatory

There was another option, and it worked-out pretty well, IMHO

Pls explain since (as per you) I still need to grow up

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 29 Sep 2012 14:07

^^^^^Ajay Sharma,

I am not trying to take anything that you've written out of context. My editing of your post was for the sake of clarity. Indeed, most of what I've excised were my own words which you've (mis)quoted, and capped with your judgement that it "is delusional".

I expressed shock because you seem to have expressed your opinion that Kargil warranted "total war" (my term), or what you've described as "going for the jugular"; which is the same thing. That's what I've found shocking about that particular sentence. I'm sorry, but I just found it shockingly irresponsible and wantonly bloodthirsty. It shocked me. I wasn't trying to be melodramatic (perhaps you were?).

If you think your post is "self explanatory" but you also think I don't understand it; either you're calling me an idiot or you don't know what "self explanatory" means (which would imply the inverse). I would hazard a guess on the latter, though perhaps you have the former in mind. Perhaps we'll agree to disagree?

As for my explaining the historical fact to you that Kargil did not degenerate into total war, which was a good thing (i.e. the "other option" that did actually come about)..... hopefully that's a lesson you'll be ready for some day in the future, because I am getting the impression that you're not ready to hear about that now. That's regretable.

As for 'making change in somone else'; I should say, this is an entirely overrated prospect, never to be considered as a first resort, because it puts all the power in 'the other'. India did not try to play this game either -- it too is a loosing game.

India 'won' by staying true to herself, by staying on course, by not becoming reactionary, by not engaging others on their terms. It's just too bad that this is not enough to satisfy you.

What would you rather? That India were more like the US? That a terrorist outrage should provoke India into all manner of ill-conceived military responses and the enactment of whole hosts of Orwellian laws that curtail the rights and protections of citizens?

Imagine for a moment, that "your" war plan was carried-out as a response to Kargil........... What then? Do you think that's a recipe for peace and security for India? Not likely -- it would devolve into a humanitarian disaster, and all and sundry would be spilling-across that border, looking for refuge...... But, I suppose you'd be satisfied to just shoot them all at the border.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 29 Sep 2012 14:34

pentaiah wrote:When ever asked to do I think they IAF performed far superior to IA with all due respect.The IA doctrine is still Second World War modeled, not at all modern with quick and rapid mobilization. Stationary positioning in order to over come slow logistics is no panacea.

Our Kargil response of sending young officers up the peaks a la guns of navarone is as good as Stalin and Khrushchev sending Russian infantry into German positions with rifle with one and bullets with other. Well seen in the movies Enemy at the gates. Using bofors gun in an innovative way is again providential ( the mysterious hand that protects India) <SNIP>

Well, we do need our entertainment quotient from time to time....

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 29 Sep 2012 15:33

^^^^^^
Consider.....

If India's enemies have from the very start, sought to cut India up "into a thousand pieces"..........

....and....

If India's enemies are even today, seeking her destruction "by a thousand cuts"..........

Why can some only be satisfied if these enemies are destroyed outright, in one fell swoop?

There is a strategic gambit known as "the mirror", wherein you simply adopt the same measures used against you, and use them against your enemies. (Similarly known as "fighting fire with fire".) Even this gambit does not call for escallation, but rather a very measured and calculated response. However, this too, is a reactive strategy.

India has instead, in her magnificence, in her assurance of her eternal place in history and exaulted destiny; has instead, chosen PROACTIVELY, to view things differently altogether (as beneath her dignity) -- and this is her STRENGTH -- and a large reason why the future is India's.

Don't make-out like India lost the Kargil heights, because she didn't. She didn't back down. She didn't appeal to outside powers to settle the dispute. She responded with fire -- but only as much fire as was necessary, and not a flame more. That is restraint. It is not weakness. It is demonstrated power. It is a fight fought and won with one hand kept in your pocket, while dancing around on a single foot. (If you'll pardon the analogy, but it's late and if I don't go to sleep soon, I may as well not bother.)

BTW: Anyone who would dismiss my reasoning and Carl von Clausewitz in the same phrase, is not 'up' to making such an assessment.

"Living well is the best revenge."

If you cannot accept this, then you must ask yourself if maybe you are a jihadi, and don't even know it.

member_22906 · Post by **member_22906** » 29 Sep 2012 16:53

^^
My last post on this and will try to keep it simple and short...

What I didn't say or mean:
a) India lost the Kargil War
b) Kargil warranted "total war" (as what the aam admi understands as total war - not your understanding)
c) You are an idiot (We can agree to disagree and that is fine - so lets try to not further go down the alley)

What I said/implied and maintain:
a) We could have localized the conflict to NA and not rest of Pakistan - short, quick and decisive and for this better control of the situation including having better intelligence and (world) media management would have been required

I would agree to most of the points you stated provided the GoI had actually intended to do so... The fact of the matter is that many a times it is indecision and pure weakness that has resulted in either cold feet or procrastination on our part. It sometimes reminds me of a small child later justifying that his inability to face the bully was actually a well thought out approach of not downgrading himself to the level of the bully...

As Mr. Spock used to say in Star Trek... "Live long and prosper"

PS: Realized it wasn't as short as I intended it to be

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 30 Sep 2012 00:21

"Peace. And long life."

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 30 Sep 2012 01:04

philip, The odd think at Kargil was the constant refrain from the IA for armed helicopters when all they had to ask was for air support. Leave the means to the IAF. Why the dogmatic request for a particular delivery vehicle only? A week was lost in that useless debate.

Was there a cognitive dissonance in the serices over the many decades against air power in the conflicts? May be a political red-line and hence helis were not thought to be aircraft and hence acceptable?