Kargil War Thread - VI

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Anujan
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Anujan »

This ofcourse was one of the more satisfying developments.

Image

Apparently IAF waited to attack Muntho Dhalo till they had built it up, and accumulated enough personnel and material.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Commentators say it's a Fifty Day war.
In reality, the count should start from May 26 when the Indian Govt realized the type of attack that Kargil was.
And it ended by July 16th.
Usually recovering from a surprise attack takes about three to five days and IA did quite well once it was realized.
Some forces don't recover from the surprise like Egypt in the 1967 War.

We should reappraise IAF's role in mountain warfare. the recce flights enable the change in tactics for the IA to retrieve the situation.
The bombing and shelling kept the Pakis hunkered down.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

In the euphoria of the Kargil victory, Indian govt did not take remedial steps on the higher commanders and the pestilence still persists.
Try to find the actions of the IN chief.

All three should have been cashiered.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by vimal »

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49101016

Kargil: The forgotten victims of the world's highest war
The war began soon after Zainab Bibi was married in the spring of 1999.

"We were at home and it was night time, around 8pm. We saw shells exploding on the mountaintops, so we rushed to the cave bunkers."

Zainab's village, Ganokh, found itself in the firing line between India and Pakistan, high in the Himalayas. It's on the Pakistani side of a ceasefire line dividing Kashmir, which both countries claim.

Twenty years ago, a tactical operation ordered secretly by Pakistan's generals to occupy heights in Kargil on the Indian side flared into a war they hadn't expected. It led to defeat and embarrassment, and triggered events that culminated in the country's third military coup in 50 years.


Thousands of civilians from Zainab's village and others nearby lost their homes and livelihoods in the conflict. Similar numbers were displaced on the Indian side, but they were able to return after the war.



On the Pakistani side, however, official promises of help in the aftermath of the war never materialised, and many continue to struggle in refugee slums around the country.


As for those made homeless by the conflict, thousands remain displaced in Pakistan to this day, still waiting for help.

About 20,000 people from the Kharmang valley had to leave their villages. Twenty years on this displaced population has doubled - and 70% have not returned.

"This is mainly due to the absence of any government-led rehabilitation programme, or because their lands have been taken over by the army," says Wazir Farman, a Skardu-based lawyer and member of the independent Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP).

Three villages closest to the frontline - Gangani, Brolmo and Badigam Bresel - were completely destroyed during the fighting.

Bu-Ali Rizwani, an elder from Brolmo who lives in a refugee colony in Skardu, says the villages remain a no-go area for locals because the military has set up barracks and bunkers in them.

Protests by the villagers in Skardu in 2003 and 2004 forced the district administration to set up a team including military officials to carry out a survey of their losses. In 2010, a compensation package of 110m rupees (about $680k; £550k) was worked out for the three villages, but the money has not been paid.

"We held meetings with the army force commander in Skardu, with the chief minister in Gilgit, we travelled to Islamabad to discuss the issue with officials of the ministries of defence and Kashmir affairs," Mr Rizwani says.

"The army told us the government would pay. The Kashmir ministry said the Gilgit-Baltistan government would pay. It said the army would pay. We chased the matter until 2012, and then we gave up."

In Gultari region, the military has been delaying payment of a much smaller amount of about 1.9m rupees to residents whose land it acquired to build a jeep track to its forward posts in 1999. The delay has come despite a 2010 court ruling in favour of the landowners.

When contacted, a senior official in the Gilgit-Baltistan government said it was a matter for the military to answer.


The BBC contacted the Pakistani military, which said it would check the details of the cases. It did not provide a response in time for publication. It also provided no comment on the claim that the military's covert operation in Kargil was hidden from the civilian government.

It's no surprise to find that locals whose lives were changed forever by the Kargil war feel they have been abandoned.

About half a dozen families returned to Hargosel, but Ghulam Mohammad's is not among them.
So Pakis just being Paki
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

About the LGB integration on Mirages

Rapidly adapting to these constraints, on May 30, just four days after the start of
Operation Safed Sagar, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis decided to take action to help correct
the problem of inaccuracy. He chose to commit IAF Mirage 2000H fighters capable
of delivering laser-guided bombs to ground attack operations in the Kargil sector. "e
fighters first had to be configured to deliver the bombs, so Air Headquarters launched an
accelerated effort to do so at Air Force Station Gwalior, where the Mirage 2000Hs were
principally based.

India’s Aircraft System Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bangalore was well along in a
developmental program to integrate Israeli-made Litening electro-optical targeting pods
onto the Mirage 2000H and Jaguar fighters. To support the accelerated effort at Gwalior,
ASTE began a full-court press to prepare selected Mirage 2000Hs from 7 Squadron to
be fitted with Litening pods for use over Kargil. At the same time, ASTE helped modify
the Mirage 2000H’s centerline weapons station to carry 1,000-pound U.S.-made Paveway
II laser-guided bombs instead of the IAF’s French-produced Matra precision munitions,
which were prohibitively expensive. Concurrently, the IAF’s elite Tactics and Air Combat
Development Establishment located at Air Force Station Jamnagar took the lead in developing and validating best tactics, techniques, and procedures for delivering the Paveway
II.65 By June 12, the upgraded Mirage 2000Hs were ready to commence precision strike
operations in anger for the first time in IAF history.

...
Four days later, on June 17, another important breakthrough in the joint campaign was
achieved when a formation of 7 Squadron Mirage 2000Hs struck and destroyed the
20 | AIRPOWER AT 18,000’
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT for INTERNATIONAL PEACE
enemy’s main administrative and logistics encampment at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik
sector by means of accurately placed 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs delivered in
high-angle dive attacks using the aircraft’s computer-assisted weapons-aiming capability.
For this pivotal attack, the IAF waited until the encampment had grown to a size that rendered it strategically ripe for such targeting. !e AOC-in-C of Western Air Command at
the time, Air Marshal Patney, affirmed later that the essentially total destruction by the IAF
of the NLI’s rudimentary but absolutely life-sustaining infrastructure at Muntho Dhalo
“paralyzed the enemy war effort, as it was their major supply depot.”68 In characterizing the
attack as “perhaps the most spectacular of all the [campaign’s air] strikes,” a serving IAF air
commodore reported at the end of 1999 that it resulted in as many as 300 enemy casualties within just minutes.69

....
A week later, on June 24, a two-ship element of Mirage 2000Hs, in the first-ever combat
use of laser-guided bombs by the IAF, struck and destroyed the NLI’s command and control bunkers on Tiger Hill, the direction center for the forward-based artillery that had
been fired against the Indian Army’s brigade headquarters at Dras. They used two 1,000-
pound Paveway II laser-guided munitions, with other fighters striking additional targets
with unguided bombs.70 In these attacks, the target was acquired through the Litening
pod’s electro-optical imaging sensor at about 12 miles out, with weapon release occurring
at a slant range of about 5 miles and the aircraft then turning away while continuing to
mark the target with a laser spot for the weapon to guide on.71

....
Other than for an inconsequential brief delay due to weather, IAF combat operations
continued without interruption for seven weeks. At the height of Operation Safed Sagar,
the IAF was generating more than 40 fixed-wing combat sorties a day in both direct and
indirect support to 15 Corps. Western Air Command was not the sole provider of IAF
assets to conduct these daily missions. Because of its depth with respect to India’s western
border, the service’s Central Air Command headquartered at Allahabad in Uttar Pradesh
has traditionally been the repository of such major IAF strategic assets as the since-retired
Mach 3–capable MiG-25R high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and the Mirage 2000Hs.
It was under Central Air Command’s aegis that the MiG-25R was pressed into a unique
medium-altitude tactical reconnaissance role to meet the needs of Operation Safed Sagar.
The Mirage 2000Hs of the IAF’s 7 Squadron were also Central Air Command’s assets
and were seconded to the operational control of Western Air Command for their use in
the Kargil fighting. There was reluctance at first to employ the Mirage 2000Hs, as some
in the IAF’s leadership wanted to save the fighters in case the conflict escalated. For that
reason, the aircraft were never fully committed to the fight. If they had been, according
to the parent command’s AOC-in-C at the time, they might have yielded “even better
results than those achieved in Operation Safed Sagar.”
75

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

With regard to the maritime dimension of India’s response, in a determined anticipatory
move to help deter Pakistan from escalating the fighting into a larger war once India was fully
engaged against the NLI intruders, the Indian Navy went on full alert as early as May 20 and
readied itself to blockade Pakistan’s ports, principally Karachi, should an assessed need for such
action arise.
Toward that end, surface combatants configured for conducting missile firing and
antisubmarine and electronic warfare were deployed in the North Arabian Sea.
In the ensuing Operation Talwar (Hindi for “sword”), India’s eastern and western fleets joined assets and
blocked the Arabian Sea routes to Pakistan. Later, Pakistan’s former prime minister Nawaz Sharif
disclosed that Pakistan had been left with just six days of fuel to sustain combat operations had
a full-scale war broken out.
For a fuller treatment of this effective exercise in lateral escalation,
see Vice Admiral G. M. Hiranandi, Indian Navy (ret.), Transition to Guardianship: Indian Navy
1991‒2000 (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2009), 63‒71.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

Twitter thread on the aftermath of the Kargil episode, from a son of a retired Pak Army officer. Interesting insights...

https://twitter.com/7InfDivision/status ... PKROjM5I6w ---> Sooner after Kargil episode, my father was posted as DG Logistics in GHQ. There he was a part of the Logistics Reforms Committee that was set up after Kargil to assess the Army's failed logistics during the conflict. The study resulted in major....
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Gen Pervez Musharraf the main architect of Kargil died in Dubai yesterday.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Yayavar »

^^The prime downhill skier from the Kargil heights has rolled deeper into the ground Khel.khattam!
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Prem Kumar »

A couple of ex-IA officers on Twitter, in defending that rascal Musharraf, claimed that Capt Saurabh Kalia was not tortured, that it was his own patrol's fault & that he died immediately during the ambush

Gen Ved Malik had to step in and stop the bullshit, by saying that he had seen the post-mortem reports first hand

What's happening to some of our ex-officers these days (many from the Sikh community, I am sorry to say)? The Khalistani revival is bringing out the worst in people. Its one thing to hate the BJP or Modi. Its quite another to slight your own Services & martyrs.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by shaun »

Prem Kumar wrote:A couple of ex-IA officers on Twitter, in defending that rascal Musharraf, claimed that Capt Saurabh Kalia was not tortured, that it was his own patrol's fault & that he died immediately during the ambush

Gen Ved Malik had to step in and stop the bullshit, by saying that he had seen the post-mortem reports first hand

What's happening to some of our ex-officers these days (many from the Sikh community, I am sorry to say)? The Khalistani revival is bringing out the worst in people. Its one thing to hate the BJP or Modi. Its quite another to slight your own Services & martyrs.
Don't think it's a general trend but definitely with some people , who feed on BS and vomit the same in SM . They have the same TFTA superiority complex that affects our western neighbor.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Cyrano »

In these attacks, the target was acquired through the Litening pod’s electro-optical imaging sensor at about 12 miles out, with weapon release occurring at a slant range of about 5 miles and the aircraft then turning away while continuing to mark the target with a laser spot for the weapon to guide on.
How can this be achieved if the aircraft is turning away and direct line of sight for the laser is broken?
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Aditya_V »

The Camera can still point to the target while the Aircraft has turned.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Cyrano, The laser is on a gimbal controlled by a gyro to keep pointing to the target.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Cyrano »

Got it, thanks guru log.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by SidSoma »

ramana wrote:About the LGB integration on Mirages
Ramana Sir,

I think there are a few better sources on this topic than the Blue skies podcast of Air Marshal R Nambiar (episode 2 on the integration of LGB on M2K). He describes how the learnings and mindset gained from his stint as ASTE was instrumental in the integration of LGBs on M2K. He also talks about how the sorties were planned for the bombing of Muntho Dalo and Tiger Hill.

I have added the link here

Know what ... while we are at it, I might just give it another liste.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

https://forceindia.net/archives/archiva ... fed-sagar/

Operation Safed Sagar
In October 2006, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis wrote an exclusive first person account of Operation Safed Sagar for FORCE. Reproducing the insightful piece. Discerning readers will notice how after all these years, some lessons remain unlearnt
Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis (retd)

Operation Safed Sagar, whatever in the world would that be?,” is a possible reaction from some readers, including those that are regular followers of matters military.

Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis (retd)

Operation Safed Sagar, was the codename that the Indian Air Force had given to its role in Operation Vijay, the Kargil War of 1999. It is expected that most lay people will not be able to relate it to Kargil. That is how it ought to be. It was not meant for public usage, but for reference within the service, and for maintaining confidentiality. Therefore, its purpose is better served by making it as incongruous as possible to the nature of the operation it represents. But later the name does serve to perpetuate the operation’s legacy. When the name was first suggested, there were mild protests from within the air force ‘operational planning circle’ that it would not catch people’s imagination!

Not surprisingly, stronger voices from outside the air force, questioned the need for a separate code word, as Operation Vijay by itself was considered adequate to cover all facets of the operation!!


It is more than seven years since Pakistan’s surreptitious designs on the icy heights of Kargil fell apart and the rabid hostility of those days is giving way to saner peace-making processes of today. The Kargil Review Committee Report findings have been accepted by the government long ago and the report has been made public, barring some deletions. Over the years there has also been fairly wide coverage by the media. Several books have been published. Air and Army headquarters have undertaken studies/reviews, concluded their findings, drawn lessons and hopefully have taken actions to rectify shortcomings. Under these circumstances, would a re-look at IAF’s participation in the Kargil Operations generate public interest today?


Well, re-look is a common phenomenon and it is strange how re-looks get initiated. Whether a particular re-look generates public or professional interest is a moot point; its timing certainly has some influence in getting people to peruse more than its heading; possibly the author’s name draws some readership, particularly if his authenticity is assumed ab initio! The writer hopes in this instance it would be accepted, as he headed the IAF during Safed Sagar. Strictly speaking, it really is not a re-look, but a first ever public account by the man who held the ultimate responsibility for Safed Sagar.


When is the right time for the then Chief of the Air Force Staff to give his account of the air operations? Difficult to have a specific answer; opinions will vary from immediately after the cessation of operations to never. I have accepted an invitation to write an article now. I can offer reasons, which I think have some validity: earlier this year General Ved Malik, who was the Chief of the Army Staff during Operation Vijay, released his book, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory; this was followed by the publication of Shri Jaswant Singh’s (who played a crucial role as a member of the Cabinet Committee on Security during Kargil) book A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India; and now the book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, by the ‘villain of Kargil’, General Pervez Musharraf. All the three authors held centre-stage to a varying degree of importance during Kargil and cover in their books the events of the time from their individual perspectives.

As the then Chief of Air Staff, my perspective, I reckon, should also carry interest.

However, my own story, Up and Away into the Blue Yonder, which will certainly cover Safed Sagar, is still in its nascent form to allow it to fall in quick enough succession to the litanies of these august persona. Yet, this is an opportune moment to get across the then air force chief’s point of view. By one of those amazing co-incidents, editor of FORCE, Pravin Sawhney, expressed his keeness to have an article on Safed Sagar for the release of his magazine on the Air Force Day, October 8. I felt I should accept, and offer the treatise as a tribute to a valiant service on the dawn of its platinum year.



Army Needs Air Force’s Help

If memory serves me right, it was probably on the 9th or 10th of May 1999 that the Air Force Vice Chief (VCAS), Air Marshal ‘Ben’ Brar, walked into my office for a cup of tea and a chat, just as we often did whenever we both happened to be in-station together, to talk-over issues informally. There was an uncharacteristic frown on his brow as he took a chair. “Sir,” he began without a preamble, “Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Intelligence) tells me that the army may be in some sort of difficulties in the Kargil area.” On querying what sort of difficulties, he explained he was not sure but there was reportedly unusual artillery firing.

I enquired whether he had any inputs from AOC-in-C Western Air Command (WAC) and the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS), who was also holding the army ‘fort’ as his Chief was away on a foreign tour. I asked my vice to find out if either of them had anything to say on the subject. AOC-in-C, WAC had later informed VCAS that Northern (Army) Command had not divulged anything to him and that his counter-part, GOC-in-C Northern


Command was away in Pune; possibly to emphasise further that all seemed well. He had informed that both Northern (Army) Command and Western (Army) Command were greatly pre-occupied with preparation for the forthcoming tri-service, very complex, brain-storming exercise, ‘Brahma Astra’. If Northern Command was facing difficulties it was hardly expected that Army Headquarters and these two command headquarters would wish to conduct the exercise in May, and a request for postponement would have been made to Air and Naval Headquarters. VCOAS was non-committal to VCAS.

A day later, because disturbing inputs continued to be brought to his notice by his staff, VCAS again approached the VCOAS to enquire whether all was well; the Army Vice Chief indicated that the army could handle the situation. The VCAS, however, also informed me that the ACAS (Operations) had received an input from Air Officer Commanding HQ Jammu and Kashmir (AOC J&K is collocated with HQ Northern Command and functions as a forward element of HQ WAC for day-to-day interaction with HQ Northern Command. He releases air effort to meet Northern Command’s demands, from within the AF units placed in J&K to the extent possible and within the authority he is delegated), that HQ Northern Command had requested fire-support from Mi-25/35 helicopter gunships and armed Mi-17 helicopters to evict a few ‘intruders’ who had stepped across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector.

AOC J&K had responded that the terrain over which the support was required was beyond the operating envelop of the gunships; for getting fire-support in the existing operating conditions HQ Northern Command needed to approach HQ WAC.





In light of ACA S (Op)’s input, this time I called up AOC-in-C WAC personally and enquired why he had not briefed Air HQ on what was happening. His response was that GOC-in-C Northern Command had still not approached him for any help and WAC had nothing to brief; I was also informed that the GOC-in-C was in fact not available at HQ Northern Command. I directed Air Marshal Vinod Patney (the AOC-in-C) to get ‘hold’ of his counter-part and get to the bottom of what was afoot.

Meanwhile, Air Marshal Brar (VCAS) had again enquired from VCOAS whether they needed help; VCOAS had expressed army’s ability to manage, but was upset that AOC J&K had not acceded to HQ Northern Command’s fire-support demand. VCAS explained that AOC J&K did not have the authority to do so and suggested that both of them discuss the issue with me. VCOAS did not consider it necessary at that juncture, but divulged that Northern Command was putting into action Army Aviation’s Cheetahs mounted with a 7.56mm gun. ‘Ben’ Brar was a ‘hands-on’ VCAS who liked to take action fastest. He suggested that we offer armed Mi-17 helicopters to Northern Command immediately.


Now there was no doubt in my mind that the situation was desperate; using an egg-shell-strong Cheetah in offensive action against certain hostile fire was like presenting a chicken for ‘sacrificial appeasement’! And my vice recommending use of Mi-17 in an environment where it would be under hostile observation and fire for several minutes before and after its attempt (I say attempt because I knew it would have been impossible to put in a successful helicopter attack without creating the necessary conditions for such an attack) at engagement.

I directed VCAS to request VCOAS for a meeting with me and advised VCAS that to enable air force to provide fire-support we needed political clearance. Also, the manner and type of fire-support will be determined by the air force. I think at this stage Lt General Chandrashekhar (VCOAS) gave me a telephonic call. I communicated to him that I appreciated his predicament and was anxious that the air force does its bit soonest.

But I was not successful in persuading him to accept the essentiality of government clearance. Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar said the army will continue on its own.

I may be permitted a diversion at this stage, to give inputs that formed a relevant back-drop to my professional thinking and decision-making ways as chief of air staff and the ultimate professional authority of that time, on how air power should be used. Note the accent is on ‘how’, quite separately and differently from ‘whether or not’; that indisputably, in India’s civil supremacy tradition, I am proud to say, lies with the head of the government, duly assisted by the cabinet committee on security.


No head of an organisation is a ‘know-all’ fountain-head of that institution. He can not possibly have deep enough knowledge of everything within the outfit. The number of disciplines to which he has been exposed to and the extent of that exposure have a profound impact on how well he is able to evaluate experts’ knowledge and advice, and over-ride it with conviction, when necessary. The most difficult challenge to a top man is to hold his ground when there is intense pressure from the top man, who is liked and respected, of a sister service, who is under even greater stress to get the former to do the opposite of what he thinks is right. A philosophical adage, I have tried to emulate through 60 years of ‘greying’ is, ‘treat yourself with your head; treat others with your heart.’ But at various strata of command, I have also realised that one’s head must not allow the heart to let one get carried away emotionally.

I am a product of the National Defence Academy, with a poor academic record and a passable field performance. But I consider that I have imbibed well the central theme of NDA training: developing a strong espirit de corps and a fierce sense of loyalty. I hate friends to think I have let them down. NDA also taught me to respect capability, irrespective of rank. Most importantly, NDA exposure allowed me many opportunities to realise that if one gets over the initial bone-chilling dread of danger, the wrath of overpowering wrongful authority or the fear of being wrong-footed, one can stand his ground in the severest of challenges. It is satisfying to claim that my 41 years of air force service did not require me to modify the Academy’s teachings.

After the humiliating fiasco of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, a practice had been initiated to send fighter pilots as Forward Air Controllers to Ladakh, to be attached to HQs of the two brigades, 70 and 114 under 3 Division for a period of four weeks. In mid-1963, as a flying officer, I was attached to 70 Brigade, where the stated four weeks got extended to 12. Instead of working in the Brigade HQ and staying in its mess, a tradition of sorts had been set, by the young, ‘unhappy-to-be-away-from-the-cockpit’ pilots attached to 70 Brigade, of allowing themselves to be hijacked by 9 Dogras for both occupation and sustenance/ shelter. Within days, the initial unhappiness gave way to the joy of camaraderie that develops in a field area. It was wonderful to be a part of the army routine and experience its challenges, even if to a limited degree. I knew I was ‘accepted’ as a part of the battalion, when CO 9 Dogras made me his assistant adjutant! Required to be a part of the brigade HQ, even as a ‘blue’ subaltern I realised, that I could not ignore the other battalion. I went on a seven day reconnaissance patrol with 3/4 Gurkhas to assess the negotiability of passes ranging in altitude from a base-line of 13,000ft to over 15,000ft. It was a point of honour to lead the sturdy Gurkhas, even though my flying boots failed to withstand the rigour of marching. When I visited the bunker defences, I was shocked to see their smallness.


Later, when I got the odd opportunity to direct practice fighter attacks on them, it was frustrating that the pilots were spotting the ‘target’ just around their firing range.

Yet, the crystal-clear azure-blue skies ensured that I never lost sight of the aircraft during its circular attack pattern.

Throughout my fighter squadron service of more than 15 years, I loved participating in army-air force exercises, searching, spotting and attacking targets, whether it was in the plains of Punjab, the desert of Rajasthan or the high mountains of the North. And so it was with most other pilots. The tougher the assignment, the stronger the professional intent to succeed.

I was most fortunate to be assigned the post of AOC HQ J&K. Immediately after taking over I got myself qualified as a pilot on both the Mi-17 and the Chetak/ Cheetah. I flew extensively and familiarised myself with the terrain in the areas of responsibility of both 15 and 16 Corps. Besides both the Corps HQs, I visited the HQ of every division. I visited many brigade and group HQs, landed at tens of helipads, did heli-drops at several locations. I was lucky to be able to visit many forward posts. As the 102 Siachen Brigade offered the toughest tasks to the air force, I may have been partial to it with my time and concern. But I did have a couple of opportunitiesto visit 121 Kargil Brigade. I had covered the length of the brigade area several times by air and once by road. In short, I can claim I had developed a personal ‘feel’ of the area. This was reinforced later during my tenure of 26 months at HQ, WAC, first as Senior Air Staff Officer and then as AOC-in-C. I am deeply conscious that all this sounds too much like brazen blowing of one’s own trumpet. But I consider it necessary to convince that my credentials for giving definitive judgement in the use of air power in the Kargil area, may not be doubted.

To come back to the narrative of the emerging situation in Kargil, on the 14th of May, Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar called on me at Vayu Bhavan. He came to the point immediately: army wanted fire-support by Mi-17 helicopters. Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar observed that the army was capable of throwing back the intruders on its own but it would take time; air support will hasten the process. He felt that political go-ahead was necessary only in case fire-support was being provided by fighters; use of helicopters, even in a fire-support role,

was an in-house services’ headquarters’ decision. I was anxious to put him at ease; I attempted to extend my empathy and expressed my keenness to give support; for the moment he was my counterpart of the army (albeit acting) and an NDA course-mate. To be honest, I did not think I had succeeded in generating any confidence in him. Yet, I managed to convey to him my firm decision that government authorisation was mandatory; we needed to approach the raksha mantri together; I will support his demand for aerial fire-support.

But it needed to be understood that the air force reserved the prerogative to give the fire support in the manner it considered most suitable. I explained that with the conditions obtaining in the problem area, helicopters will be sitting ducks. The VCOAS left soon after,

without I having a clear indication whether he intended to approach the government.

On the next day, 15th of May, I called the VCAS and his two senior assistants, ACAS(Ops) and ACAS(Int) for a situation appraisal meeting. AOC-in-C also participated.

The two ACsAS gave a resume of developments over the previous five days. Reportedly, around 150 intruders had occupied some high points along the LoC ridgeline in the general area of Kargil sector.

Director General Military Operations and ACAS(Ops) had conferred and reconnaissance missions by Jaguars and Canberras were launched. Air defence fighters were kept on ground-alert at Srinagar and Avantipur. Radars in Srinagar Valley were on 24 hours-vigil. Mobile Observation Posts were deployed. An additional direction and control centre was established at Leh. Mi-17 helicopters based at Srinagar were tasked to carry out air-to-ground firing practices with guns and rockets at the high-altitude firing range. I was satisfied with the initiatives taken. I gave my assessment of the situation, followed by directions of what was required to be done immediately:

(a) I observed that the ground situation was grave. Army required air force help to evict the intruders. Army Headquarters was reluctant, possibly because it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop, to reveal the full gravity of the situation to MoD. Thus it was not amenable to Air Headquarters’ position to seek government approval for use of air power offensively.

(b) Consideration of the use of helicopters in offensive role was denied as they would be vulnerable to the extreme. This was to be projected at all levels of army-air force confabulations. The helicopters would, however, continue to carry out high altitude firing practices.

(c) Fighters deployed in the Valley were to intensify their high altitude air-to-ground firing practices. Fighter pilots manning the squadrons located/deployed in the Valley are to be given terrainfamiliarisation sorties in helicopters, preferably accompanied by army officers familiar with the area.

(d) AOC-in-C, WAC was to activate HQ AOC J&K and all units in the Valley as per plans stipulated in HQ WAC Operational Instructions.

(e) AOC-in-C WAC to formulate contingency plans. 16th of May was a Sunday. Soon after my game of golf, my Air Assistant told me that the VCOAS desired a meeting with me. I directed the AA to organise the meeting in my office and request the VCAS and AOC-in-C WAC to be in attendance. After we had assembled in my office, had given VCOAS a brief resume of the situation obtaining in Kargil, Lt Gen. Chandrashekhar reiterated his request for offensive air support by Mi-17 helicopters. Air Marshal Patney recommended that I call a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting immediately; Chandrashekhar was amenable to the suggestion.

Without further ado, I telephoned Admiral Sushil Kumar, the Chief of Naval Staff, requesting an immediate COSC meeting; in the absence of Chairman COSC, Gen. Malik, Adm. Kumar would have to chair the meeting. Adm. Kumar, understandably, was mildly irritated that an impromptu meeting was being called on a Sunday. When I explained the situation, a time was set to meet in the Army Operations Room (AOR).

At the AOR, after a situation report, VCOAS expounded on the need for fire-support by helicopters. I tabled my reasons for considering authorisation by government a pre-requisite for releasing offensive air support: Unlike the practice of the army routinely resorting to firing when a situation demanded it, the air force fire power was not being used operationally in peace conditions; aerial action had far greater ‘visibility’; response of the adversary to own air attacks was indeterminate, undoubtedly at this stage; there was a high possibility of the adversary raising the ante and we had to be prepared for it. (The reader might be interested to know that the rocket fire-power of the Mi-17 can be three times more than can be brought to bear by the MiG-21). The gathering generally expressed that it did not realise/consider the consequences of air action as outlined by me. Acting Chairman COSC enquired whether the army could continue on its own. As the given answer was in the affirmative, he ruled we maintain status quo for the present.

On 17th of May, without a fore-intimation of what was in offing by Army Headquarters or Chiefs of Staff Committee secretariat, a meeting was called at AOR, which, along with CNS, CAS and acting COAS, was attended by the raksha mantri Shri George Fernandes, the principal secretary to the Prime Minister, Shri Brajesh Mishra; secretaries defence, home and external affairs were also present. The army briefed, in greater detail than before, on the situation obtaining across the Kargil sector. In a briefing which I gave personally, I covered the following aspects:

(a) If air power were used offensively, the escalation could be very rapid to any level and anywhere. The IAF needed to be prepared for every contingency.

(b) In the area under consideration and the air operating conditions obtaining there, the accuracy of air attacks would be comparable to that of the artillery.

(c) There was the possibility of own aircraft crossing the LoC during their attacks.

(d) There was possibility of fratricide if own troops were in close vicinity of targets.

(e) Helicopter survivability in an offence role would be very low.

(f ) The IAF pilots have commenced air-to-ground firing practices at high altitude.

Shri Mishra said status quo be maintained. On 18th of May, the VCOAS and the DGMO briefed Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee and members of the CCS. Present were home minister Shri L.K. Advani, raksha mantri Shri George Fernandes, external affairs minister Shri Jaswant Singh and principal secretary to the Prime Minister Shri Brajesh Mishra. Also in attendance were CNS, CAS, directors of Research & Analysis Wing and Intelligence Bureau. It was an exhaustive briefing. The VCOAS summed-up that the army was capable of bringing the situation under control, but required time. He assessed that offensive air support by helicopters will hasten the process of eliminating/pushing back the intruders.

I covered all the implications, as stated hitherto, and added the following:

(a) The IAF must have the freedom to use the fighters.

(b) Escalation, inclusive of pre-emptive hostile strikes, could take place suddenly anywhere across the Indo-Pak border/Line of Control.

(c) The IAF needed to take precautionary measures to enable appropriate response to any contingency.

(d) The IAF sought 24 hours to implement (c); if inescapable the time factor could be cut down by half.

The EAM desired to know what the army’s assessment in respect of the enemy’s intentions was. A satisfactory answer did not emerge. It was apparent the army had not applied its mind to this aspect; they were engaged in getting out the intruders without having quite established the nature of the intrusions or the identity of intruders. I felt strong sympathy for the Army Headquarters staff.

Having been caught off guard in the field, they were unable to make up for their initial lapse, due to inadequate intelligence and possibly indifferent involvement from the command headquarters.

The EAM went on to observe that bringing in the air force would internationalise the issue and it would be preferable not to let that happen. He was scheduled to leave for international visits, these he felt should not be disturbed. While he was away, Army Headquarters could get on with the job of establishing enemy’s intent. His recommendation:

do not involve the Air Force yet. PS to PM made the final recommendations:

(a) For the present, air power not to be used.

(b) Hot pursuit by ground forces to be permitted in the area of present operation, no-where else in J&K.

The Prime Minister nodded his approval. Earlier to the CCS meeting, on the same day, a contingency planning meeting had been held in my office with operations and maintenance staff of Air HQ and WAC. The state of IAF’s armament holdings, self-protection devices was reviewed. Directions had been given for actions required to be taken to improve the modification states of aircraft for carriage of armament, EW and specialised equipment.

Operational staff was required to tailor operating procedures specifically for the conditions under which we would have to support the army; training had to be intensified and suitably modified to enable pilots to operate at high altitudes, in restricted areas and engage ground targets much smaller than they were normally assigned. Maintenance staff was directed to accelerate activity to substantially improve availability of aircraft, radars, equipment and spares.

The most debated issue was in respect of strategy and tactics. The air force has long contended that use of air power in direct support of ground battle is its most inefficient utilisation; it should be used sparingly in this fashion, unless the ground troops are under intense pressure and the integral artillery fire power is limited, ineffective or not in position. Spot targets obtaining within the ground battlefield are small, not easily sighted and vulnerability of aircraft is high. Air power has a more devastating effect when applied against logistics dumps and their lines of supply to forward posts/areas. In this case, it was pointed out that if there were restrictions on not being allowed to cross the LoC, toss/stand-off bombing was possible. My directions were: be ready to operate under the worst conditions, our attempt would be to get freedom of action to the extent possible. The final word was to prepare for a bigger conflagration.

Over the next few days, the air force, besides continuing with logistical support to the army in the form of air/heli-lifting troops and supplies, carried out photoreconnaissance over operational area, undertook electronic reconnaissance missions to establish the deployment of Pakistan’s ground radars in the POK and else-where. The air force was also on the look-out for unusual air activity. By now we had realised that, if and when the air force was given the go-ahead, our bombing techniques, the bombs, fuses and the aiming computers/sights would all require to be adapted for the ultra-high altitude air-to-ground work. Both operations and maintenance staff had put on their ‘thinking-caps’ and rolled up their sleeves for finding ingenious solutions, and fast, very fast! Air Forces’ think tanks at ‘Tactics and Combat Development and Training Establishment’ and ‘Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment’ were tasked for over-coming specific problems.

On May 21, a Canberra on a photo-mission was hit by an air-to ground infra-red homing missile, later identified as a Stinger. The pilot did a commendable job by recovering the crippled aircraft.

Realising that Canberra reconnaissance missions were vulnerable to ‘shoulder-fired’ AGMs, due to their heights of operation being well within the kill-envelop of these missiles, we discontinued them. Later, we brought in the MiG-25 strategic photo-reconnaissance aircraft to do the job of the Canberra. It was not a question of just bringing in a different aircraft. Its operating parameters and photo equipment had to be modified to enable it to do what was considered not possible, in fact dangerous, by the experts on the aircraft. The credit goes to Air Marshal ‘Jimmy’ Bhatia, then AOCin-C Central Air Command, for encouraging the unit and ‘leading the way’ by flying in the aircraft during trials.

I had to proceed to the Naval Academy to attend the valedictory function and review the passing-out-parade on May 21-22. As the COAS, Gen. Ved Malik, had returned from his foreign tour just the day before, I could not meet him before the 23rd.

The manner in which developments had taken place, from the time ‘Ben’ Brar gave me information of the army being in difficulty, troubled me. There had been total lack of army-air force joint staff work. When the army found itself in difficulties, information/ intelligence had not been communicated by Army HQ, in any systematic manner to the Air HQ. There had been no call for a joint briefing, leave alone joint planning, both at the service and command headquarters; just repeated requests for armed helicopter support. Air HQ seemed to have more information than WAC. How were the helicopters expected to be used? What was the threat? What were the objectives?

There are a number of issues that have to be considered by the army and air force, so that both sides appreciate the strengths/limitations of each other. Proper joint staff-work brings them out, allowing the decision-makers to give well-considered directions. There had been no joint deliberations at any level. As Ved Malik was not in Delhi, I put down my concerns in a letter to him on probably May 19.

After explaining what caused me to write the letter, I made the following observations:

(a) Use of combat air power, inclusive that by helicopters is an escalation in the existing operations.

(b) Before/after political clearance, concerned army/air force command HQs to be directed to present joint plan. The same to be done by Joint Planning Committee at service HQs level. Both plans to be presented to COSC.

(c) The air force to have freedom in application of air power.

(d) To avoid ‘being surprised’, COSC to be briefed on J&K situation regularly.

On May 23 afternoon, Ved Malik requested Sushil Kumar and myself to join him in his office. Ved was very cordial and warm through the meeting. I was happy that he did not look perturbed, particularly as he had reason enough to be, given the developments in his absence. His main thrust was that we needed to put up a united front to the CCS. Sushil and I had no difficulty in endorsing that. Ved said air force had to join in as the army was in a difficult position. I told him that there was no doubt of that and the air force was very keen to join in, my only reservation was in respect of the use of helicopters, they would be too vulnerable. Ved appeared to get agitated on my reluctance to use helicopters. I did not press the issue at that moment, it could wait till later.

On May 24, before proceeding for the CCS meeting, the three chiefs got together in the office of the CNS. I picked up the discussion about the use of helicopters with Ved Malik once again. I explained to him that in the Ladakh region, because of the pollution-free atmosphere the visibility is enormously better than what it is west of Zoji La. As the helicopters would have to approach enemy locations on the LoC ridge-line from the Kargil Valley, they would not be able to mask their approach and will be visibly picked-up by the enemy well before they come into firing range.

The effective range of the Stinger missiles is much greater than that of the rockets being fired by the helicopter. Ved was in no mood for any explanations. He shot back a question:

did I think that in his 40 years of service he had not learnt about helicopter operations?

Hoping to pacify him, I said even I do not think that I know all about helicopter flying.

The effect was just the opposite of what I was hoping. Saying, “If that’s the way you want it, I will go it alone,” he stormed out of CNS’ office. I caught up with him in the corridor and told him to cool off, he would get his helicopters. Wanting to save army-air force relations, I had given in against my better judgement!

At the CCS meeting, Ved Malik explained at length the difficulty of the situation and how essential it was for the air force to step in without delay. I stated as matter-of-fact as possible, that the air force was ready. We needed 24 hours to get going; we could cut down to 12 hours the time for first attack. The Prime Minister said we could meet again the next morning. Back at Air HQ, VCAS, ACsAS (Ops&Int) were briefed that the army was on shaky grounds and needed air force support without further delay.

We needed to ensure we will be ready to move in within 12 hours.

Early on May 25, the CCS convened again. The preliminaries were much shorter this time. The COAS was emphatic on getting air force support. I told the Prime Minister the army had to have air force support.

We could commence operations within 12 hours, 6, if inescapable. All eyes were on the Prime Minister. In his characteristically laconic manner, he said, ‘Theek hai, kal subah se shuru karo’ (Alright, start tomorrow morning). I asked for permission to cross the LoC while attacking targets on our side of the LoC. The PM straightened up in his chair and said firmly, ‘Please don’t cross the LoC. No, no crossing the LoC.’ ‘Sir!’ was all that was required of me.

The PM and others stepped out of the conference room silently, in a pensive mood.

Operation Safed Sagar is Launched

On return to my office I shot out the following directions:

(a) The IAF will commence offensive air action after first light the next morning.

(b) Air Defence in the area of WAC to be activated as per HQ, WAC Operational Instructions.

(c) HQ WAC to be given freedom of action, with the following proviso:

(i) Aircraft not to cross LoC during attack patterns.

(ii) Air Defence aircraft escorting strike aircraft or ‘freepatrolling’ parallel to LoC, if engaged in aerial combat with enemy aircraft, may cross LoC in ‘hot’ pursuit. (At the CCS meeting I had not specifically got this contingency authorised, it was not the right moment to do so. But I considered the ‘liberty’ an essential element for the success of the aerial air defence measures. In view of the PM’s earlier ‘nod’ to the ground forces’ hot pursuit, my conscience was not unduly burdened).

(iii) No sudden or mass movement of aircraft.

(iv) To the extent possible all fighters and helicopters employed in combat role to be fitted with infra-red self-protection chaff-dispensers.

(v) Chaff-dispensing operating procedures to be re-briefed to all aircrew.

(vi) It is to be assumed that all enemy positions have infra-red air-to-ground shoulder-fired missiles.

(d) Air HQ’s Operational Order for Operation Safed Sagar be issued under my signature.

It would be close to 30 years since the IAF had fired a shot in anger. ‘Real Combat’ (too limited a skirmish to call it a war), as I said the words to myself, caused goose pimples to rise on my fore-arms. If this can happen to a grand-father, what would be the effect on young pilots, who still wondered whether the ‘wings’ that they wore on their uniform with an outward swagger, really belonged to them? Majority experience an adrenalinpumping euphoria, some brace themselves with a professional ‘let’s get-on-with-thejob’ attitude, some get sombre, a few might feel numbing fear. Both the extreme reactions need watching and counselling. There was a sudden, powerful urge to be with the guys, no, ‘my boys’. But would it be wise? Confidentiality was essential for what was to happen on the morrow. Go, I had to, it would be good for the field to know their chief was with them. I summoned my air assistant, Air Commodore Ajit Bhavnani. He was to get an AN-32 to carry a ‘special’ load to Srinagar immediately. The nature of ‘load’ would be disclosed later; he could come to the ‘Air House’ when the aircraft was positioned at Palam.

Later, when Ajit Bhavnani came to the ‘Air House’, his jaw dropped to see me beaming broadly in my blue flying overalls, with wing commanders’ tapes on my shoulders. “Lets go”, I said to him.

My wife, Molina, who had long taken in her stride my sudden ‘comings and goings’, was probably disappointed that I had not told her to pack a carry-on bag and come along, had not noticed anything unusual. The driver did not blink an eye-lid, he was looking straight ahead. He was possibly used to my some-time weird ways.

His face was dead-pan when I told him I would be taking the stand-by ‘Ambassador’, and not the trade-mark ‘Tata Estate’ of the CAS. No flag, no plates. None of my cars were embellished with a red roof-top light. Ajit was told at the last second not to come with

Staff officer was absent. Normally, the CAS boards his aircraft at the ‘VIP’ Squadron dispersal and is received by AOC Air Force Station, Palam. The captain of an AN-32 would be waiting at the ramp. My instructions were to have engines’ start-up commence as I approached the aircraft. As I strapped in to the captain’s seat, the pilot would brief me, while the co-pilot and engineer continued with the start-up. The navigator managed the radio. I would be taxiing out within five minutes.
As a prior take-off block was normally obtained, five minutes later we would be airborne. When a take-off time had not been ‘blocked’, the navigator would try to get priority for CAS, referred euphemistically as ‘IAF VIP’.

Well, this time an AN-32 for the ‘special load’ would be waiting somewhere on Palam’s large transit-aircraft parking apron.

Fortunately, there was only one AN-32 aircraft; no need for a try-tohit-the-right-aircraft-first-time anxiety. The driver was told to stop at the regulation point. I walked alone the distance to the aircraft.

The captain was slouchingly resting against the aircraft. He eyed me casually as I walked up. As I caught his eye, recognition suddenly dawned upon him and he sprang to attention, fumbling with his cap. I sign-indicated to him to relax, but it was not easy for him.

As I came within normal talking distance, with a broad and easy smile I told him to relax. Putting my arm casually around his shoulders, as friends do, I told him to act normal and continue at the normal pace, following normal procedures meticulously. He was not one of the several pilots who had flown with me often.

But I expected that he was aware his Chief, as a rule, liked to have his hands on the controls.

I asked him if he would mind if I flew, I was a qualified AN-32 first pilot. He was hugely relieved; he must have been wondering in which bucket-seat he was going to place the chief. I requested the pilot to brief me on the flight profile, procedures and emergencies. I wanted the captain of the aircraft to be at ease with the full confidence that he was in command of the aircraft.

My only direction to him at this stage was to ensure that nobody got an inkling that I was on board.

As we approached Srinagar, I told the captain to inform the Air Traffic Controller that AOC Srinagar may kindly personally collect a special packet from the captain of the aircraft, as he himself was not able to leave the aircraft. There were the expected queries and re-queries. But as we taxied in, I could see the AOC standing akimbo, with his dog on a leash, a picture of local top authority. When I walked down the ramp of the aircraft, the AOC had walked around to the back of the aircraft, doing nothing to mask his impatience. If the situation were not what it was, I would have burst out laughing to see a figure of authority instantly transform into that of a subordinate.

Senior air warriors are tough customers and the AOC recovered in seconds. As we walked to the waiting lounge, his dog had disappeared without my noticing.

Although it was evident to me that he had not received the ‘balloon-up’ communication yet, I had him confirm it. When I informed him that he was ‘On’ the next morning, he wanted to get on with his actions immediately. I told him to await the formal communication from his Command HQs. I could not possibly allow myself to give any conflicting information, leave alone direction.

But I was happy I had beat the ‘signal’. I knew Vinod Patney was a thorough AOC-in-C. His preliminary orders were already with his stations; he would ensure that the ‘begin operations’ operational order would be comprehensively drafted before issue.

I met the squadron commanders and some of the aircrew, not to give a pep talk, but to express my confidence that when the time came, they would do more than the expectations of the higher-ups.

They were straining at the leash to get going. Wishing them well and success, I returned. It was going to be a long night.



The Indian Air Force Strikes!

Came the 26th of May 1999 and the Indian Air Force launched its offensive solidly, attacking heavily with rockets fired from MiG-21s and Mi-17s going in waves. Imagine salvos and ripples of 192 rockets coming out of the ‘blue’ from one helicopter alone and they were four of them! Reports received from the Director General Military Operations (army) indicated that Tiger Hill and Tololing were engaged effectively. ‘Saddle’ attack did not appear to be as successful. There were ecstatic calls for more of the same. The initial euphoria is heady. Calmness is needed to avoid over-confidence. I was aching to send a word of caution not to get carried away. When the going is too good, my antenna tends to go into hyper-sweep. But I had to stay away, it was not my job to run the operation; I must give only broad directions.

The people who were running the show knew their jobs well. If there are lessons to be learnt they will do that.



The First Air Casualties

The excessive rejoicing after the first day’s successes turned out to be premature. Two waves of two MiG-27 aircraft each, with the necessary time interval between them were to engage the same target northeast of Batalik. The first section was successful in its mission and so reported it on their radios. The leader of the second section was unable to position himself for the attack and aborted it. Both attempted for the second time, but were again unsuccessful; however, the No 2 felt he had made a sighting of the target and made a third attempt, absolutely against the stipulated direction; such is young blood enthused with the determination to ‘press-on’ that they throw caution and the briefing to the wind! Apparently, he fired his rockets well outside the speed/‘g’ envelop stipulated for the weapon; as it is the aircraft were firing the rockets above the height to which they were cleared to be released. Wrongs do not add, they multiply.

The engine could not withstand the abuse and flamed-out. There was not a chance to relight. But the ejection seat did its job well and saved the life of the pilot, Flt Lt K. Nachiketa. His capture and later release had been so widely and extensively reported by the media that it need not be covered here. Despite his over-enthusiastic stupidity, he is a brave air warrior. After giving him a rap on the knuckle, his courage needs to be recognised; of-course the excess flow adrenaline needs to be controlled!

Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja was tasked to do a post-attack target-damage photo-assessment. He had monitored Nachiketa’s ejection call and knew his general location. Such is the bonding in combat that one instinctively wants to help a comrade in distress, unmindful of his own predicament. Sending back his wing-man to safety, Ahuja attempted to locate Nachiketa’s place of landing.

Heavy with fuel and tanks a MiG-21 Type 96 requires careful handling at altitude and low indicated air speed. Loss of height is guaranteed to maintain speed. Enemy on the ground had plenty of time and chances to succeed once the aircraft had dropped to within the Stinger’s altitude envelop. ‘It’s good to treat others with your heart, but the head must not allow one to get carried away.’

Courageous Ahuja paid with his life for the folly of his misplaced kindness. Or is it a folly? Arjun needs the wisdom of Lord Krishna in the former’s struggle with life and duty. I love Ahuja-the-man; I want to shake the bones of Ahuja-the-professional warrior. A stinger got this brave Indian; the ejection seat gave Ahuja a second life, but he needed a third to survive the butchery of the enemy. May his soul rest in peace.

At the CCS meeting at the end of the day, while reporting to the Prime Minister and his colleagues, that the IAF had lost two aircraft (the fate of the two pilots was not known at that time), I assured the eminent gathering that while I was sorry to lose two fighters, I was not overly worried. The air force knew what had gone wrong, and knew what was required to be done to ensure we did not repeat the mistakes. But I expressed very clearly my anxiety in respect of the vulnerability of the helicopters.



Sadly The Anticipated Happens

The Nubra River is one of the most beautiful carriers of water, although it carries more sand than water. Flying through its short valley from the snout of the Siachen Glacier, to its confluence with the Shyok River, its sheer-high-cliffed banks within the confines of the Karakoram Mountains on the east and the Soltoro Range on the west, one experiences a strange mixture of serenity with hypnotic eeriness. I have flown number of times through it, and the feeling has only intensified. I am somewhat embarrassed to disclose that I felt many times, that this is how it will be after one takes leave of Mother Earth.

On May 28, I got a call from MoD enquiring whether we had lost a helicopter. Nobody had even mentioned that a helicopter was missing. There was no information with Air Headquarters, HQ, WAC or AFS Srinagar. However, Srinagar reported that a four-helicopter-formation, with call-sign NUBRA was on a mission; it was yet to return. As radio silence is maintained by the helicopters from start-up to shut-down, the station would have the mission report only after NUBRA formation returned. In my mind’s eye the Nubra River kept popping up as I awaited the fate of the formation named after it. Later Srinagar reported that Nubra 4 had been brought down by a Stinger. Four gallant men, Squadron Leader Pundir (copilot),

Flight Lieutenant Mohilan (captain), Flight Sergeant Prasad (flight gunner) and Sergeant Sahu (flight engineer) lost their young lives. Nubra 3 flight gunner had witnessed the downing. Such was the presence of the media in the battle area that one perhaps, more so the channels, was reporting an air force casualty even before anyone in the air force had authentic information.

Nubra 4’s helicopter had taken not been equipped with flare-dispensers. As the unit had not been able to bring on line four suitably equipped helicopters, they had assigned for the mission one helicopter without the dispenser.

At the beginning of 1999, the smart bomb was a rare commodity with the IAF. Every one of the ‘heavies’ in this category had a specific assignment, inclusive of the reserves, in the plans for the ‘real’ thing.

There was no question of diverting it for any other purpose. The adaptation of the smartkits’ for the lighter bombs was under-way and required a lot of ‘tweaking’. But even in this category, despite adequacy of reserves, the air force philosophy was to use them only if the ‘dumbs’ could not do it within a given probability. We were confident that we had developed an effective dropping pattern, adjusted sights/computers/GPS to suit our purpose. We would use the ‘smarts’ sparingly, having the confidence of knowing we could always fall back on them. We were realising that the bigger problems were about intelligence on the location of the targets and converting army map grids into air force map references. If we had them right, we hit them straight. If you had the wrong intelligence or reference, even the ‘smarts’ were not smart enough to put that right!

Tiger Hill has become famously synonymous both as the challenge of Operation Vijay and the dominance of Operation Safed Sagar. The photograph of the laser designator’s cross on Tiger Hill and the laser bomb hitting the hill-top gives a very vivid impression what Operation Safed Sagar entailed: Peak of IAF’s professional elan. Personally, I do not need the photograph. The real thing is indelibly imprinted on my mind. I had witnessed it firsthand.

The Mirage 2000 mission tasked with engaging the enemy camp by a laser bomb, was accompanied by another Mirage 2000, a twin-seater, piloted by Wing Commander Sandeep Chhabra, to visually and photographically witness/ record the event. I used the opportunity to occupy the rear seat and get a feel of the attack. It would be a gross under-statement to say the experience was unforgettable!

The time of flight of the bomb is quite long, and the target has to be kept illuminated until the bomb hits the target. The attack pilot gave call of ‘tallyho’ when he had acquired the target.

There is some time lapse between ‘tallyho’ to ‘splash’, indicating bomb release; it seems much longer than it actually is, and one starts to wonder whether the attack pilot has lost the target. There is sense of relief when ‘tallyho’ call finally comes through. The relief is short-lived, for the suspenseful wait for the visual of target-hit gets you to grip something hard. You begin to wonder whether the bomb has missed the target. A hugely bright flash has your eyes transfixed on it. But you still wonder whether it’s a bull-eye or just a very close thing. What a joy to get the report, ‘bulls-eye’! Well done, mission accomplished!!

While Tiger Hill made the headlines, the mission that broke the enemy’s back, was the demolition of its major supply dump at Muntho Dalo. Over a 100 casualties are estimated, total destruction of the shelters and a huge loss of supplies. Here ‘smart’ bombs were not used, but smart ideas were used with smart equipment. The very highly magnifying telescopic capability of the laser-designating pod was utilised to locate the dump and dumb iron bombs were dropped accurately with some superlative piece of flying.

Locating a target being a big problem has been said again and again. The IAF certainly demonstrated that necessity is the mother of invention. An off-the-shelf Sony handheld movie camera was brilliantly used to study the terrain and locate the target. It remained a simple, but practical ‘tool’ throughout the Operation.

The innovation I consider as the biggest contribution to ingeniousness from Western Air Command was the use of the GPS for bombing under conditions that prevented use of normal equipment. With this technique, bombing was possible in poor visibility conditions, with an under-cast of clouds, even at night. Simply brilliant!



Conclusion

In the final analyses, it was brilliant leadership at all levels that brought about success. The air-officers-commanding-in-chief set the pace and their subordinates rallied to the call. No difficulty was a problem, it was a challenge to be overcome; and over-come they did, and in the process had enormous fun. I salute them all. We must not forget those that sacrificed their lives for our security. We have a duty to take care of their families and let them know they belong.

Many awards were dispensed, but by no measure were they enough. Many deeds may have gone unsung. The awards represent recognition of not only the air warriors that got them, but of people who were associated with them. Air Marshal Vinod Patney, Air-Officer-Commanding-in Chief Western Air Command, was outstanding in bearing the IAF Ensign for all of the Air Force. Recognition of his service as that of the very highest order does the IAF proud; his Sarvottam Yudh Sena Medals are deserved many times over.

This article is essentially about the IAF. I seek forgiveness for not having the space or time (the deadline was over yesterday) to write about the Army. It was the army’s leadership in this operation, we were only in support. Back to the Air Force then. Happy anniversary and welcome to the Platinum Year.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

I haven't read this Air Chief's perspective.
Need to think about.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

For balance Lt Gen Chandrashekar on Kargil

Link: http://generalchandrashekhar.blogspot.c ... rview.html
Wednesday, 25 July 2012
KARGIL WAR – AN OVERVIEW by Lt Gen Chandra Shekhar (PVSM AVSM)

The Kargil ingress by Pakistan occurred in the first week of May 1999, shortly after the February 1999 Lahore-Agreement between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif. This happened at a time when the tensions between the two neighbours were believed to have de-escalated and mutual relations were on the upswing. Imagine the surprise and sense of dismay in India, when the intrusions were detected during the second week of May 1999. The overall political environment, the nuclear capability demonstrated in 1998 and the improved military situation in Jammu & Kashmir did not justify the development. There is no doubt that the nation was taken by total surprise and the Army and civilian intelligence agencies did not anticipate it.

Much has been written on the Kargil War by experts on both sides– its political and strategic objectives, the conduct of military operations, the nuclear angle, the excessive number of casualties, and the diplomatic and media efforts. However the difficulties in handling the conflict, the ground realities and the higher direction of war, have not been sufficiently examined. Without going into the specific ground operations, which have already been covered in a number of books published on the subject, I believe it is necessary to explain the actual situation as it was in the area of Kargil at that time, and the larger context of the regional environment. Having been closely associated in the entire operational planning of the Kargil conflict, as the then Vice-Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) of the Army, I believe it is also useful to share my knowledge and perception of the follow-up measures undertaken during and after the Kargil War, and our response to restore the situation.

Most of the public coverage during that time focused on the government’s alleged complacency, the criticism of the Lahore venture in hindsight, and a limited understanding of the Kargil intrusion purely as a huge intelligence failure. I believe that the widespread acceptance of such a one-sided perception led to not just national embarrassment, but also contributed to the continuance of avoidable conflict and to our ultimate loss of 527 killed and 1363 soldiers wounded in the battle.

The True Scenario
It is correct to an extent, that the Army had in a certain measure failed to read the events correctly. The absence of the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on a foreign visit in the initial period also added to the perception that the Army and Government were taking matters lightly. I can state unequivocally that this was not so. As the VCOAS during this period, I was well aware that it was the overall geo-political environment and lack of intelligence that took everyone by surprise - rather than any lack of effort or planning. We in the Army HQ, once the initial assessment of the situation was made, were totally involved day and night in planning the operations to evict the infiltrators.

The criticism that the Army was slow to react was also unreasonable, and very far from the truth. I have corrected this perception repeatedly in public fora, as in the HT Report attached at the end of this paper. There were even absurd allegations made in some quarters that the Army had kept the Ministry in the dark. The fact that such allegations came forth - despite the regular personal interactions with the MoD at the senior level and despite the Army reporting the situation on a daily basis, as is the practice, and also declaring in-the-situation reports that some of its soldiers were wounded in the patrol clash in the sector - was not just surprising to us but also very disheartening. It must be understood that the Army has to depend on the other Intelligence Agencies for information other than tactical information, and it does not have any resources or authority to deploy the other Intelligence Agencies. In the initial days of the incursions, in the absence of any information from any of the agencies who have the responsibility and the duty to provide such intelligence, the Army itself had no clear picture of the situation. It therefore assessed such information as it did obtain through its own observation, as a case of routine infiltration. It was not, either at that time or later, appreciated by most of our nation that the Armed Forces, particularly the Army was responding as best as they could in a situation that was not a planned military operation but a reactive response to the ingress in the unoccupied gaps of our territory.

As soon as we became aware of the nature of the infiltration, we at Army HQ, along with HQ Northern Command, were simultaneously engaged in doing the best possible to obtain detailed information about the enemy, and in speedily building up additional resources from other sectors. This was notwithstanding the handicaps that the Army faced due to the surprise-factor achieved by the enemy, and the fact that logistics in the mountains are complex and take considerable time and effort. The issues were many, ranging from a total lack of intelligence about the enemy, to the slow progress in launching operations due to poor infrastructure and the difficult terrain, problems in mobilization of forces, and the disinformation due to the Pakistani war propaganda.

The reasons that the Army could not itself detect the specific extent of the infiltration initially, was primarily due to the extremely inhospitable terrain along the LoC (at an average height of 12000 feet) and the extreme weather conditions. The enemy had planned its move well, and made good use of adverse weather conditions and the winter months for the intrusion. The area is large with very wide gaps in the Mashko-Dras and the Batalik–Kargil sectors, many of which have been traditionally un-held. The effective patrolling of such a terrain was, and is, difficult. Patrolling was therefore, selectively carried-out and limited during the sub-zero temperatures in winter. Since the gaps were large, there was inadequate ground observation or contact. The monthly Army Aviation helicopter sorties flew only when the weather was clear and followed predictable routes, operating more as communication flights, and did not locate any unusual activities.

The air-photographs of the ingress could be obtained only by 14 May 1999 through the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) as the IAF aircraft earmarked for such missions had developed some technical problems. The satellite imagery provided did not have the requisite resolution to pick up any details of enemy positions. The Army thus lacked support of technical intelligence, such as satellite-imagery, night–vision devices or even air photographs taken periodically to detect any deployment or additional infrastructure development. Some would question the Army’s wisdom in keeping such large gaps as blind spots without any means for their surveillance and creating any military capability for any intervention or reactive response in this area in all the years since 1948.

I will only say that the Armed Forces of India perform the best that they can with the means that they have at hand; there are certain decisions that the civilian leadership takes on behalf of, and sometimes despite the advice of the Armed Forces. That the Armed Forces continue to discharge their duties within these constraints should be seen as even greater proof of their ability and restraint rather than otherwise. The Kargil conflict, notwithstanding the initial surprise, demonstrated the traditional Indian national resolve to hold onto and fight for what is rightfully ours, whatever the cost. This was also demonstrated in the earlier Indo-Pak wars. It seems to me that as a nation we still do not sufficiently appreciate the conditions under which the Armed Forces operate, or the fact that they are human beings operating for the most part under extremely adverse conditions, or that we should be aiding their efforts through timely and prompt access to such technology as can help them in such adverse conditions.

I have a fairly intimate understanding of the terrain and deployments, and first-hand knowledge of the challenges that deployment in such a terrain entails. I spent a number of years in this sector, at different stages of my long service in the Indian Army. My very first posting after being commissioned as a young officer was with my battalion (2/4 GR) in the Kargil sector, and then as a sub-unit commander in an adjoining sector in Ladakh. From my experience in dealing with the manifold issues in surveying and defending the LoC in J &K as a Brigade Commander in 1984-5, and later as the Chief of Staff of the HQ 15 Corps in 1991-93, I was more than aware of the larger constraints of the defence of this region. I had also been in the area during the actual conflict in May 1999 and discussed the situation on the ground with the concerned formation commanders, Major Generals V. S. Budhwar and Mohinder Puri.

The Impact of Political Decisions
The Indian political leadership has of course always displayed total confidence in its Armed Forces and institutions. Even when the international opinion was not favourable during the initial stages of the Kargil War, it gave directions to the Armed Forces to evict the intruders without enlarging the conflict elsewhere. This policy of restraint to keep the conflict localized may have been appreciated by international powers, but has been a major disadvantage in the actual conduct of operations. India has adopted a similar policy of restraint even in the earlier wars, and during the recent Mumbai attacks. In fact, the restriction of not crossing the LoC has no military logic, when the adversary has already violated the borders.

What is also little appreciated is that we had no troops to react with in the area of intrusion, or any reserves with the local Brigade, the reason being that all its Units were already deployed on other parts of the LoC. The only troops available in J&K were already committed in the ongoing Counter Insurgency (CI) operations down below in the Valley, across the Zojila pass. The pass is snowbound and closed from October to May for any movement. All the available troops in J&K had to be dis-engaged, moved over a distance of 150 kilometers, and had to undergo a minimum acclimatization period of seven days, before being launched for the operations in the high-altitude sector. The Artillery units had to move from the plains sector along with ammunition. The logistics support needed, had to be built-up.

It must be conceded that the Army also failed to read the few isolated indicators that did come. There were unconfirmed reports from some sources of fresh-road construction across the LoC on the Gultari–Shakma axis, opposite the Kargil Sector. This information was interpreted as routine improvement works. There were reports of induction of long-range artillery guns, apart from the ongoing medium artillery shelling of the Kargil-Dras road. The artillery fire was seen by us as reactive retaliatory fire to our interdiction of the road in the Neelam valley which we had undertaken to disrupt the winter stocking convoys in the POK.

However, these reports came in piecemeal, as isolated events, and at different times. As the VCOAS, I would have been apprised by the DGMI, of any unusual activity and of any important developments or reports, if these had been noticed. Infiltration in J&K has been occurring for a long time. After the initial ingress was detected, the ground commanders read the infiltration as routine, having seen it regularly for the past decade. The Army formations thus, at first considered this too as a case of the periodic infiltration regularly encountered over the past ten years and hence not a matter that could not be handled in the normal course. The IB and the RAW inputs also failed to project the likely Pakistan designs or ingress, notwithstanding some reports of improvement of tracks and defence-works.

One of the other reasons for the lack of an independent analysis in the Army and its dependence on a conditioned response may perhaps have been due to its total focus and long-term engagement on the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley. The Kargil sector on the other hand was considered comparatively a low threat area due to the majority of friendly Shia Muslims, who did not support the separatists. The extremely difficult terrain and friendly population were considered as a sufficient safeguard and the entire focus remained in the Valley and on the Siachin-Glacier. In fact even the reserve formations had been de-inducted earlier on for employment in the Valley. This lack of deployment, the fact that the Indian Army was stretched thin on internal CI responsibilities, and the large gaps traditionally un-held by us, were well exploited by the adversary to infiltrate forces in small groups throughout the winter to achieve total surprise. As a nation, we had also under-estimated Pakistan’s obsession with and its deep resentment against the success of the Indian Armed Forces in previous Wars. General Musharraf publicly accepted in his book In the Line of Fire that the Kargil operations were planned to take revenge for the 1971 War and the 1984 Indian action in the Siachin Glacier.

The Strategy Adopted
After the initial apparently slow response, the nation forcefully went about exposing Pakistan’s complicity in the Kargil ingress, and the involvement of its regular troops in the garb of irregulars. The correctness of the Indian stand was thereafter understood, nearly one month after the ingress. Armed forces were instructed to make all the necessary preparations for various contingencies but were to restrict operations within the Kargil sector. The IAF was directed to mount operations without crossing the Indian airspace. In fact, even the general mobilization for war was not ordered and severe tactical restrictions were placed on the Armed Forces by not crossing the border or developing operations elsewhere due to strategic considerations. The operations were not enlarged to the other sectors and limited to the area of ingress as per the Government’s directions, notwithstanding the severe tactical disadvantages and tremendous costs in men and material. I have outlined these clearly on earlier occasions, both in the print media as well as in discussions and seminars at various levels, as in the article I wrote in 2011 on the need for inter-service understanding and a higher defence management: http://www.forceindia.net/Lesson_for_the_Future.aspx

It is with sadness and regret that I recollect the energy and time spent by the political leadership in debates for and against enlarging the conflict, the discussion on defense purchase scandals and scams in the procurement of military equipment, and the questions asked on the Government’s inability to combat insurgency in J&K and on Pakistan’s ability to internationalize the Kashmir issue - all at a time when so many of our soldiers were battling not just the enemy and adverse conditions but also a lack of adequate equipment, stores and battle gear. The emphasis on the part of the media and our political leaders should have been on ensuring that the urgent and desperate needs of our soldiers in conditions of War were met, by speeding up bureaucratic hurdles. Unfortunately this was not the case.

To make up the shortages, procurement of defence equipment was on paper put on fast track, but the fact that defence equipment takes time to procure was not realized by the successive governments. There were large-scale shortages of weapons and equipment with the units, as also in the artillery ammunition, night fighting capabilities and communications systems. Our procurement system failed to make up the shortages despite concluding 129 procurement contracts for stores worth Rupees 2175 crore, on emergent basis. It needs to be understood that defence equipment is not available off the-counter, from a grocery store or a market. It needs time for assembly, testing and training by troops. Defense preparedness has to be done over a period of time as a regular process and has to be given adequate funding. The Indian defence budget at 2.5% is not only low but remains under-utilized due to procedural delays. The Mumbai attacks have again highlighted the institutional and intelligence weaknesses that continue to exist in our system.

Long Term Implications
Such recurrent reluctance in important matters of national security bring into question our political resolve and our lack of decisive capability. The Kargil Committee Report, after the operations were concluded became an issue of ‘mud-slinging’ and politics, rather than correcting the inadequacies in the planning and direction of war. Although a number of recommendations were implemented, a few key important ones, such as the creation of the CDS, integration of the Armed Forces HQ with the MoD and greater delegation of the defence budget to the users have still been held back, more than a decade after Kargil. Even today, the modernization programme continues to suffer due to lack of political resolve and institutional weaknesses. The funds earmarked remain unutilized due to lack of decision making and are surrendered, thus adversely affecting our military capability. We still do not have an institution to render single point advice and military assessment to the Government.

Military strategy cannot be planned in a political vacuum. A clear directive regarding political intentions and objectives must be given by the national leadership. In our system the Service HQs formulate their individual operational plans; these are factored for joint-ness by the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), discussed with the Raksha-Mantri (RM) and thereafter presented to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for approval. We do not have a Chief of Defence Staff [CDS] to render full-time military advice to the National Security Agency or to the CCS. The COSC is an ex-officio Committee, which operates when required in addition to their other primary tasks and cannot devote exclusive attention to the higher defence management, or to coordinate and monitor military operations on a regular basis. The three Service Chiefs meet in the COSC as equal partners and attempt consensus for agreement, which many times may not happen. The chairmanship goes to one of the Chiefs on protocol seniority, without any authority to decide on contentious issues or override dissent.

In the Kargil Conflict, as we know, the initial assessment was not correctly made due to lack of intelligence inputs since we did not – and still do not - have an integrated intelligence agency. We lost valuable time since a reasonable tactical picture emerged only after the Air photographs/ radio intercepts of the sector were made available to the Army. These were obtained by 14 May, whereas the patrol–clashes had occurred on the 5th May. The ingress had reportedly commenced in small groups, as early as January 1999, as revealed from the captured diary of a Pakistani officer after the war. There was no information of the enemy or the ground situation, to any of the intelligence agencies – military or civil. It is to the credit of the field formations, who were inducted hurriedly from all over the country, that once the gravity of the situation was discerned, they threw themselves in preparations to evict the enemy, with great effort and courage against great odds. Had there been timely information through technical sources or an independent intelligence coordination agency with an objective analysis at the highest level by the NSA/ CDS, we would not have had to react with such little preparation time, and we would not have had to lose so many fine Indian soldiers.

At the time of the Kargil War, the COSC did meet, and handled most of the issues with understanding and total cooperation and maturity but it functioned more as a briefing and information sharing meeting. The requests of the Army for employment of attack helicopters for quick retaliation on the enemy infiltrators in the initial detection were not agreed to by the IAF due to differing perceptions on their employment and the threat of shoulder-fired missiles of the intruders. The basic fact that we need quick reaction capability and information advantage over our adversary to respond appropriately was indeed realized - but was not exercised due to considerations of safety of the helicopters. Had we obtained the latest satellite-imagery, deployed unattended electronic sensors and night-vision devices in the area, we would have been forewarned and perhaps avoided the pain of loss of many gallant lives at Kargil.

The eviction of the intruders often entailed mounting frontal attacks through narrow ridges dominated by the enemy. In such a landscape, the neutralization of the enemy defence-works by our artillery achieved limited results due to the nature of the ground in the mountains. The employment of the IAF aircrafts with laser-guided munitions for ground–attacks, and the Bofors medium-caliber artillery contributed significantly in weakening the enemy’s resolve, and assisted the valiant attacks of the ground forces on these formidable heights. Although mountainous terrain does not lend to effective neutralization, nonetheless, as regularly reported in the media, there were a number of gallant attacks by our infantry units led by highly motivated young officers while evicting the enemy from their dominating position. There were many acts of heroism against great odds by the infantry units which are not being described here. The importance of physical fitness and the need for younger profile of the commanding officers in the infantry was felt for combat in battle. As always all the Indian Army units deployed for battle irrespective of their Arm or Service delivered their might fully and displayed acts of highest gallantry while re-taking or supporting the attacks on these formidable heights.

The Larger Picture
The Kargil war was significant for the impact and influence of international opinion to both sides. Kargil news–stories and war-footage were often telecast live on Indian TV and many web-sites provided in depth analysis of the conflict. It was important to project the correctness of the Indian point of view, due to Pakistani attempts of denying involvement of its forces and linking the ingress to the Kashmiri freedom-fighters and even disputing the very alignment of the LoC. This was successfully done by releasing the original maps, officially delineated at the Shimla-Agreement, the details of the signal-intercepts implicating Pakistani senior commanders, exposing the captured Pakistani soldiers and the weaponry used by the so-called irregulars. This was achieved by the dynamic diplomatic efforts of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and by our efforts to highlight Indian restraint of limiting the conflict to the international community so effectively that even China, the all-weather ally of Pakistan, did not support or intervene in this conflict. Regular briefings of foreign diplomats in India jointly by the spoke-persons of the Army, IAF and MEA as also of the Media, which acted as a force-multiplier, contributed in clearly communicating the Indian stand.

Finally, the Indian position was accepted by major international powers, the G-8 nations, the European Union and the ASEAN, but the success came at a great cost and after initial frustrations of lack of credible evidence, the slow progress of ground operations, substantiated only later by the capture of enemy held heights and the Pakistani soldiers. Two months into the conflict, the Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges, but it was the American pressure on Pakistan which hastened the pull-out from the remaining locations. At the end of the war Pakistan, looked isolated and the Indian stand stood vindicated. The media both the electronic and the print-media played a very positive role to shape the international opinion in our favour.

Since both countries were nuclear armed, many in the international community were concerned that if the conflict intensified, it could lead to a nuclear war. Pakistan reportedly threatened on May 31 that any escalation of conflict could lead to use of all arsenal at her disposal. Pakistan also accused India of using Chemical Warfare against the Kashmiri fighters. The nuclear factor was considered in-depth by the COSC and the CCS. The USA, it is understood, persuaded Pakistan to desist from deploying nuclear weapons and assured them that India had not deployed any nuclear weapons although, both sides, reportedly took some preparatory steps. The American diplomacy played an important role in the nuclear restraint by the two sides. India successfully campaigned against Pakistani nuclear brinkmanship and showcased a cache of gas masks to indicate Pakistan’s preparations of a NBC war. This was a major restraining factor in not enlarging the area of engagement beyond Kargil. Notwithstanding such public posturing, the lack of a nuclear war fighting capability was obvious on both sides. The nuclear doctrine of India itself perhaps needs a relook.

Follow-up Measures
The Kargil War has a number of lessons both for the military and for various civil institutions. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the government took a number of steps to rectify the shortcomings in the defence preparedness, following widespread media reportage about military procurement irregularities and criticism of intelligence agencies like RAW, which failed to predict the intrusions or the identity of the infiltrators. The Central Bureau of Investigations (CBI) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) have now closed the cases of procurement irregularities due to lack of credible evidence, but the nation has lost valuable time and resources to modernize the Armed Forces. On the diplomatic front, it is interesting that relations with the USA, Russia, South Africa, Israel and France, which discreetly aided India with defence procurements, improved.

The recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee Report were on the whole addressed in a professional manner to enhance defence capability. Our political leadership then, did show considerable maturity and wisdom in carrying out institutional reforms. The needs of the Armed Forces were re-examined with particular requirement of improving their pay and allowance, looking after the battle casualties, medical and housing facilities. Some of the steps initiated to enhance defence capability are indicated below:-
(1) The MoD and the other players involved have commenced work on evolving a nuclear strategy and on integrated command and control structure. The Defence Forces have streamlined their mobilization & deployment plans. Some of the areas/sectors which were thinly held have been reinforced by raising additional forces and formations. The road network and logistics structure in the border region is being enhanced.
(2) An integrated joint staff under a new HQ has been established for greater joint-ness; however it does not enjoy any independent authority in the absence of CDS. A separate Defence Intelligence Agency for the three services and a joint procurement planning wing has been created under the integrated defence staff (IDS).
(3) A Defence Acquisition Cell and a separate defence procurement board have been created to streamline defence modernization and fast-track induction of weapon systems. However on the ground there are delays due to indecisions and fixed mind sets.
(4) Strategic forces command and amphibious forces Headquarters have been created and placed under the HQ IDS. Border surveillance and the communications systems are being upgraded. The counter-terrorism mechanism and the Intelligence Services are being re-vitalized to improve our response to security threats.

However, a few anomalies still continue in the pay and allowance and the pension entitlements of the defence forces. These, needless to say, must be settled speedily. And while, on the one hand, defence procurement procedures have been streamlined and financial powers of services enhanced, the actual defence procurements and modernization programmes have got stuck in corrupt practices and political controversies. Thus, though the Kargil conflict has made the nation aware of many shortcomings and given an impetus to security preparedness, our institutional weaknesses and political indecisions have not allowed the Armed-Forces the desired levels of modernization. The political leaders have not been able to overcome the institutional delays and implement much needed reforms.


This paper is primarily based on my personal recollections of the Kargil War as the VCOAS, and supplemented by information from A Soldier's diary: Kargil, the Inside Story, by Harinder Baweja, 2000, Books Today; and Kargil War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kargil_War accessed on 6 May 2009



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ramana
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Reason, why I want to look at the higher direction of Kargil, is it is being raised as a prelude to Theater commands being setup.

If these TC don't solve the old problem it is no use.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Re-posting for archives;
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 2009
Kargil Conflict and Pakistan Air Force
Pakistani writings on Kargil conflict have been few and, those that have come out were largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the PAF has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is an airman’s perspective, focusing on the IAF’s air operations and the PAF’s position.

Operational Planning in the PAF

Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF’s appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on PAF’s hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at the Air Headquarters.

The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four-tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, PAF’s ‘corporate’ decision-making body which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.

The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peace-time, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of PAF’s operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.

In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot’s career after repatriation and rose to command PAF’s premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.

The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders’ School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was the AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at the Air Headquarters. He had done his Air War Course at the PAF’s Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in UK.

The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done his War Course from the French War College.

The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.

There is no gainsaying the fact that PAF’s hierarchy was highly qualified and that each one of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.

First Rumblings

As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army’s Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when had the PAF last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army’s interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day, Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right, in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked up with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured that it was just part of routine contingency planning.

After hearing Gp Capt Tariq’s report, Air Marshal Zahid again got in touch with Maj Gen Tauqir and, in a roundabout way, told him that if the Army’s ongoing ‘review of contingency plans’ required the PAF to be factored in, an Operations & Plans team would be available for discussion. Nothing was heard from the GHQ till 12 May, when Air Marshal Zahid was told to send a team for a briefing at HQ 10 Corps with regard to the ‘Kashmir Contingency’.

Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the ‘latest situation in Kashmir’ at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a ‘protective manoeuvre’, he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. “Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen – to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold,” he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of ‘providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir’ was never mentioned.)

When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. “I have Stingers on every peak,” he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmud’s reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road link’s vulnerability to our offensive elements.

It seemed from the Corps Commander’s smug appreciation of the situation that the Indians had been tightly straitjacketed in Dras-Kargil Sector and had no option but to submit to our operational design. More significantly, an alternate action like a strategic riposte by the Indians in another sector had been rendered out of question, given the nuclear environment. Whether resort to an exterior manoeuvre (diplomatic offensive) by the beleaguered Indians had crossed the planners’ minds, it was not discernable in the Corps Commander’s elucidation.

Perhaps it was the incredulousness of the whole thing that led Air Cdre Abid Rao to famously quip, “After this operation, it’s going to be either a Court Martial or Martial Law!” as we walked out of the briefing room.

Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing. His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Army’s planning, though we were given to believe that it was a ‘limited tactical action’ in which the PAF would not be required – an issue that none of us agreed with. Presented with a fait accompli, we decided not to lose any more time and, while the DCAS (Ops) went to brief the CAS about the situation, we set about gearing up for a hectic routine. The operations room was quickly updated with the latest large-scale maps and air recce photos of the area; communications links with concerned agencies were also revamped in a short time. Deployment orders were issued and, within the next 48 hours, the bulk of combat elements were in-situ at their war locations.

IAF – By Fits & Starts

The IAF deployments in Kashmir, for what came to be known as ‘Operation Safedsagar’, commenced on 15 May with the bulk of operational assets positioned by 18 May. 150 combat aircraft were deployed as follows:
> Srinagar - 34 (MiG-21, MiG23, MiG-27)
> Awantipur - 28 (MiG-21, MiG29, Jaguar)
> Udhampur - 12 (MiG-21)
> Pathankot - 30 (MiG-21, MiG-23)
> Adampur - 46 (Mir-2000, MiG-29, Jaguar)
One-third of the aircraft were modern, ‘high-threat’ fighters equipped with Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. During the preparatory stage, air defence alert status (5 minutes to scramble from ground) was maintained while Mirage-2000s and Jaguars carried out photo-reconnaissance along the Line of Control (LOC) and aging Canberras carried out electronic intelligence (ELINT) to ferret out locations of PAF air defence sensors. Last minute honing of strafing and rocketing skills was carried out by pilots at an air-to-ground firing range near Leh.

Operations by IAF started in earnest on 26 May, a full 16 days after commencement of Pakistani infiltration across the LOC. The salient feature of this initial phase was strafing and rocketing of the intruders’ positions by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27. All operations (except air defence) came to a sudden standstill on 28 May, after two IAF fighters and a helicopter were lost – a MiG-21 and a Mi-17 to Pak Army surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), while a MiG-27 went down due to engine trouble caused by gun gas ingestion during high altitude strafing. (Incidentally, the pilot of the MiG-27 Flt Lt Nachiketa, who ejected and was apprehended, had a tête-à-tête with this author during an interesting ‘interrogation’ session.)

The results achieved by the IAF in the first two days were dismal. Serious restraints seem to have been imposed on the freedom of action of IAF fighters in what was basically a search-and-destroy mission. Lt Gen Mehmud’s rant about a ‘Stinger on every peak’ seemed true. It was obvious that the IAF had under-estimated the SAM threat. The mood in Pak Army circles was that of undiluted elation, and the PAF was expected to sit it out while sharing the khakis’ glee.

The IAF immediately went into a reappraisal mode and came out with GPS-assisted high altitude bombing by MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27 as a makeshift solution. In the meantime, quick modification on the Mirage-2000 for day/night laser bombing kits (Litening pods) was initiated with the help of Israelis. Conventional bombing that started incessantly after a two-day operational hiatus, was aimed at harassment and denial of respite to the infiltrators, with consequent adverse effects on morale. The results of this part of the campaign were largely insignificant, mainly because the target coordinates were not known accurately; the nature of the terrain too, precluded precision. A few cases of fratricide by IAF led it to be even more cautious.

By 16 June, IAF was able to open up the laser-guided bombing campaign with the help of Jaguars and Mirage-2000. Daily photo-recce along the LOC by Jaguars escorted by Mirage-2000s, which had continued from the beginning of operations, proved crucial to both the aerial bombing campaign as well as the Indian artillery, helping the latter in accurately shelling Pakistani positions in the Dras-Kargil and Gultari Sectors. While the photo-recce missions typically did not involve deliberate border violations, there were a total of 37 ‘technical violations’ (which emanate as a consequence of kinks and bends in the geographical boundaries). Typically, these averaged to a depth of five nautical miles, except on one occasion when the IAF fighters apparently cocked-a-snoot at the PAF and came in 13 miles deep.

The Mirage-2000s scored at least five successful laser-guided bomb hits on forward dumping sites and posts. During the last days of operations which ended on 12 July, it was clear that delivery accuracy had improved considerably. Even though night bombing accuracy was suspect, round-the-clock attacks had made retention of posts untenable for Pakistani infiltrators. Photo-recce of Pakistani artillery gun positions also made them vulnerable to Indian artillery.

The IAF flew a total of 550 strike missions against infiltrator positions including bunkers and supply depots. The coordinates of these locations were mostly picked up from about 150 reconnaissance and communications intelligence missions. In addition, 500 missions were flown for air defence and for escorting strike and recce missions.

While the Indians had been surprised by the infiltration in Kargil, the IAF mobilised and reacted rapidly as the Indian Army took time to position itself. Later, when the Indian Army had entrenched itself, the IAF supplemented and filled in where the artillery could not be positioned in force. Clearly, Army-Air joint operations had a synergistic effect in evicting the intruders.

PAF in a Bind

From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAF’s intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.

Short of starting an all-out war, PAF looked at some saner options that could put some wind in the sails after doldrums had been hit. Air Marshal Najib Akhtar, the Air Officer Commanding of Air Defence Command was co-opted by the Air Staff to sift the possibilities. Audacious and innovative in equal parts, Air Marshal Najib had an excellent knowledge about our own and the enemy’s Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE). He had conceived and overseen the unprecedented heli-lift of a low-looking radar to a 14,000-ft mountain top on the forbidding Deosai Plateau. The highly risky operation became possible with the help of some courageous flying by Army Aviation pilots. With good low level radar cover now available up to the LOC, Air Marshal Najib along with the Air Staff focused on fighter sweep (a mission flown to destroy patrolling enemy fighters) as a possible option.

To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF wisening up in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.

While the PAF looked at some offensive options, it had a more pressing defensive issue at hand. The IAF’s minor border violations during recce missions were not of grave consequence in so far as no bombing had taken place in our territory; however, the fact that these missions helped the enemy refine its air and artillery targeting, was, to say the least, disconcerting. There were constant reports of our troops on the LOC disturbed to see (or hear) IAF fighters operating with apparent impunity. The GHQ took the matter up with the AHQ and it was resolved that Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) would be flown by the F-16s operating out of Minhas (Kamra) and Sargodha. This arrangement resulted in less on-station time but was safer than operating out of vulnerable Skardu, which had inadequate early warning in the mountainous terrain; its status as a turn-around facility was, however, considered acceptable for its location. A flight of F-7s was, nonetheless, deployed primarily for point defence of the important garrison town of Skardu as well as the air base.

F-16 CAPs could not have been flown all day long as spares support was limited under the prevailing US sanctions. Random CAPs were resorted to, with a noticeable drop in border violations only as long as the F-16s were on station. There were a few cases of F-16s and Mirage-2000s locking their adversaries with the on-board radars but caution usually prevailed and no close encounters took place. After one week of CAPs, the F-16 maintenance personnel indicated that war reserve spares were being eaten into and that the activity had to be ‘rationalised’, a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether. That an impending war occupied the Air Staff’s minds was evident in the decision by the DCAS (Ops) for F-16 CAPs to be discontinued, unless IAF activity became unbearably provocative or threatening.

Those not aware of the gravity of the F-16 operability problem under sanctions have complained of the PAF’s lack of cooperation. Suffice it to say that if the PAF had been included in the initial planning, this anomaly (along with many others) would have emerged as a mitigating factor against the Kargil adventure. It is another matter that the Army high command did not envisage operations ever coming to such a pass. Now, it was almost as if the PAF was to blame for the Kargil venture spiralling out of control.

It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.

In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to ‘equal the match’. Might it strike to some that PAF’s restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?

Aftermath

It has emerged that the principal protagonists of the Kargil adventure were the Chief of Army Staff (COAS): General Pervez Musharraf, Commander 10 Corps: Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmed and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA): Maj Gen Javed Hasan. The trio, in previous ranks and appointments, had been associated with planning during paper exercises on how to wrest control of lost territory in Siachen. The plans were not acceptable to the then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, to whom the options had been put up for review more than once. She was well-versed in international affairs and, all too intelligent to be taken in by the chicanery. It fell to the wisdom of her successor, Mr Nawaz Sharif, to approve the Army trio’s self-serving presentation.

In an effort to keep the plan secret, which was thought to be the key to its successful initiation, the Army trio took no one into confidence, neither its operational commanders nor the heads of the other services. This, regrettably, resulted in a closed-loop thought process which engendered a string of oversights and failures:
• Failure to grasp the wider military and diplomatic ramifications of a limited tactical operation that had the potential of creating strategic effects.
• Failure to correctly visualise the response of a powerful enemy to what was, in effect, a major blow in a disputed sector.
• Failure to spell out the specific aim to field commanders, who acted on their own to needlessly ‘capture’ territory and expand the scope of the operation to unmanageable levels.
• Failure to appreciate the inability of the Army officers to evaluate the capabilities and limitations of an Air Force.
• Failure to coordinate contingency plans at the tri-services level.
The flaws in the Kargil Plan that led to these failures were almost palpable and, could not have escaped even a layman’s attention during a cursory examination. The question arises as to why all the planners got blinded to the obvious? Could it be that some of the sub-ordinates had the sight but not the nerve in the face of a powerful superior? In hierarchical organisations, there is precious little room for dissent, but in autocratic ones like the military, it takes more than a spine to disagree, for there are very few commanders who are large enough to allow such liberties. It is out of fear of annoying the superior – which also carries with it manifold penalties and loss of promotion and perks – that the majority decide to go along with the wind.
In a country where democratic traditions have never been deep-rooted, it is no big exposé to point out that the military is steeped in an authoritarian, rather than a consensual approach. To my mind, there is an urgent need to inculcate a more liberal culture that accommodates different points of view – a more lateral approach, so to speak. Disagreement during planning should be systemically tolerated and, not taken as a personal affront. Unfortunately, many in higher ranks seem to think that rank alone confers wisdom and, anyone displaying signs of intelligence at an earlier stage is, somehow, an alien in their ‘star-spangled’ universe.
Kargil, I suspect, like the ‘65 and ‘71 Wars, was a case of not having enough dissenters (‘devil’s advocates’, if you will) during planning, because everyone wanted to agree with the boss. That single reason, I think, was the root cause of most of the failures that were apparent right from the beginning. If this point is understood well, remedial measures towards tolerance and liberalism can follow as a matter of course. Such an organisational milieu, based on honest appraisal and fearless appeal, would be conducive to sound and sensible planning. It would also go a long way in precluding Kargil-like disasters.
Tailpiece
Come change-over time of the Chief of Air Staff in 2001, President Musharraf struck at PAF’s top leadership in what can only be described as implacable action: he passed over all five Air Marshals and appointed the sixth-in-line who was practically an Air Vice Marshal till a few weeks before. While disregarding of seniority in the appointment of service chiefs has historically been endemic in the country, the practice has been seen as breeding nepotism and partiality, besides leaving a trail of conjecture and gossip in the ranks. Given Air Chief Marshal Mehdi’s rather straight-faced and forthright dealings with a somewhat junior General Musharraf particularly during Kargil conflict, there is good reason to believe that the latter decided to appoint a not-very-senior Air Chief whom he could order around like one of his Corps Commanders. (As it turned out, Air Chief Marshal Mus’haf was as solid as his predecessor and gave no quarter when it came to PAF’s interests.) Whatever the reason of bypassing seniority, it was unfortunate that PAF’s precious corporate experience was thrown out so crassly and several careers destroyed. Lives and honour lost in Kargil is another matter.
© M KAISER TUFAIL
Rakesh
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

I have seen this picture so many times. But after reading this tweet, it really hurts.

https://twitter.com/col_chaubey/status/ ... 17984?s=20 ---> This is a pic of a platoon of 2 RAJ RIF taken on the evening of 12 June 1999. Just two out of the whole number of people who you see here, survived to see the sunlight of 13 June 1999. Each one of them gave up their lives to win back Tololing from PakistanArmy infiltrators on this very day. A battle which was the turning point in the Kargil War. The left most person in this pic is Captain Vijayant Thapar, who has been enjoying the company of angels since June 1999, while the rest of us slog it out on planet earth. He was awarded the VrC, posthumously.

Each one of these men knew at this very moment when the pic was taken that their chances of survival was less than 10%. Yet they did what they did for the organisation they belonged to, for the country they belonged to. Question is what makes people in the Army take a shot at winning even at the peril of their lives?

- Sense of a greater purpose and the knowledge that fuliment of that purpose immortalises them.

- Regiment ki Izzat Meri Izzat : Sense of belonging to a unit to the extent that the unit's esteem is tied with own respect.

- The comfort in the fact that the unit and the larger organisation will take care of their loved ones, once they are gone.

Image
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Pratyush »

https://swarajyamag.com/defence/kargil ... -have-us-3

Kargil: How Much ‘By The Throat’ Did The Pakistan Army Have Us?

By Lt. Gen Syed Ata Husnain
nachiket
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by nachiket »

X-posted from J&K thread. Lots of information in here
g.sarkar wrote: 05 Aug 2023 02:20 कारगिल युद्ध की अनसुनी कहानी | Sensational Podcast With Vikram Jit Singh, Journalist
In this episode of Mor Talks, Watch Mr. Vikram Jit Singh, a Kargil War correspondent who witnessed the war firsthand. Vikram shares his experiences of the war, from the planning and execution of the Indian military's operations to the personal stories of the soldiers who fought and died. He also talks about the challenges of being a war correspondent and the importance of telling the stories of these forgotten heroes.
Vikram Jit Singh served two postings in Srinagar as a journalist: 1997-1999 with The Indian Express and 2004 with India TV.
This is a must-listen episode for anyone who wants to learn more about the Kargil War. Vikram's insights and stories are both harrowing and inspiring, and they offer a unique perspective on one of the most important events in Indian history.

Gautam
rahulm wrote: 05 Aug 2023 12:22
I produced a transcript of the key points in this superb vdo for the ex NDA group I am a member and posting it here. I have not proof read it due to time constraints and is surely full of errors. :D

[I have edited some obvious errors and cleaned up and although many errors remain and the English grammar and construction is all over the place. I think its fit enough for purpose and will leave it there]

15 Corps standing orders were to hold Bajrang post (Pt 5299) during winter which, against orders was vacated in April.

14/15 May 4 JAT is missing “no radio contact”, after which 32 man platoon under Capt Amit Bharadwaj ordered to investigate.

While climbing to Pt 5299, Capt Bharadwaj’s 4 JAT comes under heavy fire. Capt Bharadwaj and his (Havildar?) Rajbir KIA. Many are wounded. Balance of Capt Bharadwaj’s party retreated

Capt Bharadwaj and his (Havildar?) Rajbir could only be retrieved on 13 July . ~ 2 months later - such was enemy fire control of the area.

Army informed Sunita, Capt Bharadwaj’s sister in Jaipur that Army is not able to recover Capt Bharajwaj body fearing additional losses during recovery. Sunita agreed no additional men should lose their lives in attempting to recover her brothers body and did not inform her parents. Capt Haneefuddin’s single mother responded similarly when she lost her son. What women!


Ladakh is a large area facing 2 antagonists - Pak and China post successful Op Meghdoot (Siachen) in 1984.

In 1985/86 under Maj Gen R K Kaul 28 Inf Div which was raised in Kupwara and then moved to western Ladakh (currently 8 Mountain Div AOR). Eastern Ladakh had 3 Inf Div already stationed. Thus, Ladakh had 2 Inf Div’s (3 and 28) post Op Meghdoot and this was the status unit 1991.

When Kashmir terrorism started in early 90’s. 28 Inf Division was pulled out from Ladakh and stationed in Kupwara assigned to CI ops. Now entire Ladakh (western and Eastern) was fronted by 3 Inf Div. This meant from Zoji-La to Turtuk/Chor batla which was previously addressed by an Inf Div, was now AOR of 1 Independent Inf Brigade. After these redeployments and thinning out, Ladakh had no reserves. In 1997 70 Brigade (@ Khalsi) which was a reserve Brigade for Eastern Ladakh was moved by 15 Corps Commander Lt Gen G S Dhillon from Ladakh to Kashmir.

Consequently when Kargil war started there were no reserves in Ladakh. This meant 56 Mountain Brigade HQ Wusan deployed for CI was re-deployed overnight to Drass.

70 Inf Brigade, a brigade HQ with no combat units was tasked to take Batalik without combat units. The first combat ready equipped battalions to attach to 70 Inf Brigade were 1/11 GR (Col Lalit Rai, VC, Capt Manoj Pandey PVC posthumous, Hav Bhim Bahadur Dewan and Lance Naik Gyanendra Rai VC. The battalion also entered the exclusive club of those rarest of the rare units of the Indian Army to have won both the ‘Param Vir Chakra’ and the ‘Ashok Chakra 'The Bravest of the Brave' ) and 12 JKLI (being de-inducted from Siachen at 1/3 strength )

IA posts in the Kargil, Batalik, Drass, Mushkosh are spaced far apart (40 kms).

There were deficiencies in winter patrolling.

*From Pakistan side:*

Post India- Pak nuclear tests, Pakistan thought a full blown war is not possible but limited conflicts are possible.

Gen Musharraf become COAS in 1998

FCNA Commander Maj Gen Javed Hassan was an aggressive, ambitious Commander. He had been the Defence attaché in the US for 4 years and got along well with the Americans. He favoured crossing the LC.

Maj Gen Javed Hassan’s boss, GOC 10 Corps (Rawalpindi) Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed had similar aims like Maj Gen Javed Hassan.

Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed’s boss, Chief of General Staff , Lt Gen Aziz Khan was similar.

Gen Jehangir Karmat (Musharraf’s predecessor was against violating the LC having learnt his lesson in failed Op Gibraltar (1965).

Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed’s predecessor, GOC 10 Corps Lt Gen Salim Haider was also against crossing the LC.

By October 1998 Maj Gen Javed Hassan had commenced recce including personally. (Violations of LOC which went unchallenged by IA).

By December 1998 teams of 6 NLI and 12 NLI had already infiltrated.

In a rwist of fate, snow melted earlier that year opening up Zoji-La for IA movement - an event Pak had not anticipated.

FCNA Commander Maj Gen Javed Hassan visited 12 NLI posts on 13 March 1999 by helicopter.

26 March 1999 FCNA Commander Maj Gen Javed Hassan visited their Brig Arty Commander 80 Brigade Mahmud Aslam with 3-4 officers.

CO Col A S Cheema, 12 MAHAR fighting in Mushkoh found a diary belonging to 12 NLI officer Capt Hussain Ahmed with an entry “on 28 March 1999 Gen Musharraf visited his post 11 kms inside Indian territory and stayed the night” @ Pt 125 Zakaria post)

29 March 1999 Chief of General Staff Gen, Aziz Khan visits 80 Brigade Mahmud Aslam.

When eventually the Pakis started retreating, 12 MAHAR found 83 cans of aviation fuel.

All of this went unchallenged by the IA.

Paki POW, Inayat Ali (Batalik) of 5 NLI captured at Pt 4812 by 12 JKLI

Op Safed Sagar launched on 26 May 1999.

Until then there had been no orientation/training for IA + IAF for high altitude offensive operations.

1/11 GR redeployed from Siachen to Kokarthan in May 1999 to vacate a “rag tag motley group of intruders”. 1/11 GR was under strength and under equipped with no infantry support weapons and no arty support.

15 Corps HQ had ordered an attack on night of 17/18 May 1999. Major Manoj Pandey and his CO (officiating) Lt Col Amul Asthana create a tizzy by telling CO 70 Brigade, Brigade Major Indra Balan who had forward deployed into the battle field at Yaldor on 17/05/1999 that the order to attack was suicidal and all 30 men would be picked out as sitting ducks ascending the cliff face.

Major Manoj Pandey and his CO (officiating) Lt Col Amul Asthana didn’t refuse to carry out orders, just pointed out the one way nature of the mission with a zero % chance of success. They recommend waiting for arty support and equipment. 1/11 GR at the time of 15 Corps order to attack on night of 17/18 May 1999 had only 3 mortar shells.

Senior officers were upset at the feedback from Major Manoj Pandey and his CO (officiating) Lt Col Amul Asthana. The former couldn’t understand the reluctance of 1/11 GR to vacate a “rag tag motley group of intruders”

CO 17 Inf Brigade, Brig Devinder Singh takes responsibility to call off 1/11 GR attack on night of 17/18 May 1999 and to inform Corps HQ and GOC 3 Inf Div Gen Budhwar accordingly. Shows moral courage to do the right thing under pressure. But there were repercussions for this :-(

*This showed the disconnect between the Senior officers (Corps Commander, Army Commander, Gen Khanna) sitting away from the battle and the men in facing fire contact with the enemy who said this is not a “rag tag motley group of intruders: but a “company defended location complete with machine gun, arty and logistics support). We are facing targeted fire.*

80% of IA casualties were due to Arty fire.

IA did not have high altitude firing tables. In Batalik sector, IA arty shells had a possibility of blue on blue casualties.

IA was never trained for Kargil type of conflict. No battle field manual existed.

13 JKLI had already reached their peace station when they were immediately recalled and deployed. Rifleman Sanjay Kumar 13 JKLI VC recounts they had no maps and no routes to climb. They were simply ordered to attack. After climbing under cover of darkness, when they looked down at what they had climbed in the dark they were horrified.

Vikram Jit Singh went with 18 Gharwal rifles up Tololing to Kala Pathar on 01/07/1999 with Major Sharma, Regimental Commissioned Officer, with 15 men. He saw the Mi26 wreckage that was downed by a Stinger missile. They came under fire from air burst arty for 45 mins. They were on their way to meet up with the CO Col S K Charavorthy. Vikram Jit Singh comes down - unable to continue due to mountain sickness.

0n 7/07/1999 BGS, Brig Chopra invites Vikram Jit Singh to Batalik in a helicopter and then climb to Pt 4812 to witness the burial of bodies of Pak men that Pak was refusing to claim. He witnessed the burial of 5 NLI men with full Islamic rites conducted buy the regimental Maulvi. Ironically, 5 NLI tools were used to dig their graves.

They had to cross a vertical cliff face with enough space for 1 shoe at a time to camp for the night. Subedar Karan Singh, 12 JKLI Signal Subedar of CO 12 JKLI Col Balotia was assigned to Vikram Jit Singh had a wicked sense of humour. The Subedar said, when we are fired upon while crossing, save your head. If you lose a limb we can still save you and give you a new limb but if you lose your head, we cant do anything.

Durg Narayan Shrestha of 1/11/ GR was tasked with carrying the MMG tripod was wounded and fell climbing in the dark. Next day his paltan couldn’t find hi, After the war, they went back looking for him but couldn’t find the body. The GOI game his widow (Nepali) Rs 60 lakh in Nepali currency as compensation. She refused saying she cant believe that Durg Narayan Shrestha was dead. By now Col Amul Asthana was CO of 1/11 GR and he visited the widow and her 2 kids 2001 in Nepal with his wife and kids. She still refused the money. In 2001 1 BIHAR located a skeleton with boots on. The issue number on the boots matched the issue to Durg Narayan Shrestha, his pistol and MMG tripod also matched. The widow was contacted and she asked for the last rites to be performed where he was found. She then accepted the compensation after 2 years.

The families of the men are also equally brave and courageous as well as how the whole country stood with the forces.

He speaks about the wonderful work by the RMO’s.

It is unfair to only name certain units and people. Many more units and names should have received awards, Young officers and jawan’s had the passion against impossible odds to win a high altitude battle unprecedented in the history of war. It’s a singular example of courage against all odds at those heights, at such a long frontier, in such a sustained manner, against a well entrenched enemy with well planned defences.

The role and support of the locals in supporting the IA and in the absence of maps, using locals for route finding to the heights was critical. Role of porters ti supply and maintain the posts was also critical. Local mules (NuNu’s) were also worth their weight in gold for supply.

In an instance, in Batalik sector a complete village reached Brig HQ to offer porter services gratis. These included Bank managers, teachers etc.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by NRao »

Indian Army had war gamed the Kargil situation.

A great amount of detail. For Kargil geeks.

2 hrs 14 min long.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by bala »

^^ I watched this YT quite fascinating and interesting to watch. Kargil war has a lot of lessons for India to learn. I recall during this time the US tied Vajpayee's hand - thou shalt not cross the LAC and brought up the nuclear flashpoint as a threat. What nonsense, the Pukes are violating UN resolution by occupying Indian territory.

The Batalik sector had no coverage in the media. I appreciate the brave defence and success of this sector. They must be recognized and given their due honors and Brigadier Devinder Singh for his enormous contributions to the success of Batalik sector. Fighting in the heights is no joke. I am hoping this internecine rivalry within Army, which is counter to the defence of the nation, is solved when we get theatre commands. It is quite surprising that Gen Malik was in Poland initially (don't know what was so pressing with Poland in those days) and after he returned a little later, things were sorted out in the Army.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Y I Patel »

Don't know if this has been seen previously, but it's the first time I am seeing the location of Point 5353 indicated on a map instead of having to infer it. Very helpful because one can use the location of Tiger Hill in Google Maps to orient oneself to 5353:

And a link to the original tweet:

https://twitter.com/Mukambo1987/status/ ... 5121987587

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Live fist publishes IAF account of LGB integration.

https://www.livefistdefence.com/iaf-rev ... iger-hill/


IAF Reveals What It Took To Bomb Tiger Hill
December 25, 2023 / By Team Livefist

In 2024, the Kargil War fought between India and Pakistan will be a quarter century old. One of the most contentious modern skirmishes continues to be the subject of debate and renewed interest, since it took place on the cusp of multifarious transformations in warfare, the way the Indian Air Force in particular approached battle, and precluded the existence of several technologies taken for granted today. In 2022, the IAF’s Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) published a Golden Jubilee volume containing several accounts of the Bengaluru-based institution’s contribution to warfare. The air campaign to precision bomb Pakistan Army positions on the Kargil heights is one such. With permission from the Indian Air Force, we publish here in full an account of the improvisation and skill that was brought to bear by the Indian Air Force in order to execute a capability that it previously didn’t possess. Here is that account in full:

On 24 Jun 1999, the Indian public were mesmerised by the images of the precision attack by the IAF on Tiger Hill being played out on national television. Already, the dynamics of the military operations, being beamed into living rooms by a proactive media, was keeping viewers glued to their television sets like never before. This detail and clear images of precision guided air strikes became a defining moment of the Kargil war. But, unbeknown to many, the work to make it all happen started much before and many miles away from Kargil; in Bangalore and in Gwalior.

Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) is a premier organisation of the IAF, entrusted with testing and acceptance of new weapons and systems for the IAF. It is based in Bangalore, the centre of aerospace activity in India, and is also home to the IAF Test Pilots’ School (the only one in Asia and one of the six recognised such schools in the world). In 1996, it was entrusted with the task of integrating the M-2000 and Jaguar aircraft with laser guided bomb (LGB) kits on general purpose 1000 lb Mk 83 bombs. Over the course of a year, it was successfully integrated on the M-2000 and Jaguar aircraft. The M-2000 aircraft was already cleared for carrying the 2200 lb (1000 kg) Matra LGB. For guidance of the bomb, it used the Patric laser designation pod (LDP).

During the integration, two issues of concern came up. One was the fuse (used to trigger the detonation of the bomb) was an electrical one (already in use by the IAF but available only in limited quantity). The other pertained to extending the laser illumination time on the Patric pod, since that was essential to ensure guidance of the new 1000 lb with LGB kits till impact. Since proprietary software to modify the laser illumination time was not available to the IAF, additional modifications were done to make it happen. Around the same time (1996-97), the IAF contracted to integrate the Litening LDP on the M-2000 and Jaguar aircraft.

Litening LDP, manufactured by Rafael Industries of Israel, was a highly capable LDP that provided a great many obvious advantages. Firstly, it provided for commonality between the M-2000 and Jaguar aircraft. Essentially, it meant that it could be flown without any modification on both the aircraft. It also provided a much needed night precision bombing capability, since the pod was equipped with an infrared seeker, capable of picking up targets by night. Lastly, the pod software could be modified to designate different kinds of laser guided bombs. These capabilities greatly improved the flexibility of employment of both the pod as well as laser guided bombs.

Over, the course of the next one and a half years, the team from ASTE, carried out much of the ground work and the flight trials to successfully integrate this pod on the M-2000. Sqn Ldr N Tiwari (Tiwi), a test pilot with ASTE at that time, was one of the key players in the integration team. It culminated in successful release of modified LGBs with the Litening LDP in Mar 1999. However, a new fuse, integrated on the modified bombs, failed to function as designed. So this issue was left open for the next phase of trials. The software was also not frozen, as integration work on Jaguar aircraft was still not completed.

On 26 May 1999, the decision to employ the IAF in the Kargil war was formally approved. On 27 May, Sqn Ldr N Tiwari, who at that time was an instructor at the Test Pilots’ School, was augmented to Air Force Station, Gwalior. Landing at 0200 h on 28 May, he soon got down to work to ensure the availability of the Litening pod for use by the M-2000, should the need arise. Under the aegis of the then AOC of Gwalior, Air Cmde PS Ahluwalia, a quick plan was drawn to operationalise the pod. While a couple of pods were available in Gwalior, the rest were airlifted from ASTE, Bangalore. The team was strengthened with the presence of Sqn Ldr J Mishra and Sqn Ldr VR Mantha, a test pilot and a flight test engineer respectively.

Since the pods were still in trial configurations, it was essential to freeze it to the last tested configuration, so that it could be released to the squadron for operational use. This required the availability of the manufacturer’s engineers. Early morning of 28 May, the programme manager of Rafael was contacted for help. To the credit of the programme manager of Rafael, he immediately understood the gravity of the situation and assigned his most competent engineers to the job. They were available on site within two days, something of a record in any test programme. With the availability of the team, quickly all the pods were configured with a standardised software and tested. The trial flights were conducted by Tiwi, most of them along with Air Cmde Ahluwalia in the back seat. These flights also served as a medium to demonstrate the capability of the pod by both day and night. Representative target sets were created around Gwalior airfield to check if they could be picked up using the pod by both day and night. Since little was known about the pod at that time, it was important to showcase the capability of this pod to the powers that be. Even the AOC-in-C of Central Air Command, Air Mshl Bhatia, came to Gwalior to fly a sortie to see for himself the capability that this pod provided.

While the pod provided a good capability for reconnaissance by both day and night, its strength lay in its ability to successfully guide laser guided bombs. Accordingly, integration of laser guided bomb along with this pod became a critical requirement. The team worked day in and day out to come up with a workable solution. The primary issue was the integration of a new fuse, since the fuse in the previous trials had failed. Having searched far and wide, the team was able to successfully integrate an old fuse lying in one of the bomb dumps. Along with some mechanical modifications on the bomb kits and the carriage pylons, these were successfully demonstrated for use by the operational squadron. A quick set of trials were undertaken to prove the end to end integration of the entire modification, in order to clear it for operational use. This included a release of a laser guided bomb at an air force range. It was to the credit of the entire team that worked in Gwalior, the pods and LGBs were ready to be deployed on 4th Jun 99.

Tiwi landed up on 5th morning at the base where M-2000s were forward deployed. He quickly went about training a small team from 7 Sqn on the new pod. Within days it was deployed for reconnaissance missions to locate enemy targets on the icy heights of the Himalayas. The first real success came on 16 Jun, when the logistics camp on Muntho Dhalo was located using the pod’s reconnaissance capabilities. While earlier intelligence photographs showed the camp to be much smaller, its location at the base of a cliff made it difficult to spot visually and thus target it with accuracy. However, with the pod, not only was the camp visually located (it had grown substantially in size) but the pilots were able to plan optimum directions of attack to inflict maximum damage. The go ahead to target the camps was given on 16th Jun itself. The morning of 17th Jun saw a wave of attacks on the target, led by four M-2000s carrying 250 kg bombs. The attack was quickly followed by a bomb damage assessment (BDA) sortie using the Litening LDP, which confirmed the extensive damage to the camp. It was a major success for the Indian armed forces, as not only did the Pakistani forces suffer heavy casualties, it also dented their capabilities for reinforcing their forces in the Batalik sector. The use of the Litening pod for target acquisition and BDA proved its utility in the ongoing operations. Similar template was used in many other subsequent attacks in other places, most notably in the Mushko valley.

On 24th Jun, the first use of LGBs was made against enemy targets on Tiger Hill. Located north of Drass, Tiger Hill was an imposing feature that dominated the Srinagar-Leh road. Because of the presence of Pakistani soldiers on Tiger Hill, accurate artillery fire was being directed on our military positions around Drass. It also rendered the highway unusable. Intelligence available had indicated the accurate position of enemy bunkers and tents. Considering its height of over 16000 ft, its importance as a target and difficulty in putting a conventional attack, it was decided to target the enemy positions using LGBs. Accordingly a two ship formation with Tiwi and Sqn Ldr Mohan Rao in one two seater and Wg Cdr Nambiar with Sqn Ldr Yadav in another two seater went for a planned attack on 23rd Jun. However, they had to return because of drifting low clouds that covered the target, making deployment of laser guided bombs risky (our troops were in close proximity). Therefore, the attack was planned for early morning of 24th Jun. In the meantime, the CAS, ACM Tipnis landed up at the base on the evening of 23rd and was keen to fly a mission with the Litening pod. Tiwi flew a sortie at night with the CAS. The sortie was flown overhead as the target area was covered with clouds. After the sortie, the CAS expressed his desire to fly in the Tiger Hill mission next morning. Considering the risk involved, it was decided to put him in another two seater with the CO, Wg Cdr Chabra. He was following the main formation and maintaining a higher height. As usual, the escorts for the mission was provided by 1 Sqn. The mission went as planned, with the same team as the previous day. Tiger Hill was clearly visible from more than 50 miles. The army troops had also provided markers at the base of the hill (for easy identification). Since our own troops were in close proximity, this was always important to avoid fratricide. Both aircraft were able to acquire the targets easily through the pods. Both the aircraft launched near simultaneous attack from two different directions. The LGBs were being dropped at altitudes beyond the limit of their envelope. The targets were hit accurately and resulted in significant casualties. It also paved the way for an easier assault by our own ground troops subsequently.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Sad litany of LGB integration.
M2K OEM pod was good only for French bomb.
Litening was the solution, but needed software changes to make them work.

Then the old IAF bugbear of fuzes struck.
Note they had to find one in bomb dump.

And note the effort to get approvals.
And higher management demanding flights. Eg ACM Tipnis twice. Maybe he never should have been the chief as all he wants to do is pull rank and fly the planes.

Lots of heroic work.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

The LGB refers to French Matra BGL which were reserved for special use.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombe_Guid%C3%A9e_Laser
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

From Lt Gen YK Joshi (retd) - a Kargil veteran himself.

https://x.com/YkJoshi5/status/1757716360585794007?s=20 ---> With a heavy heart I inform that the Brave mother of Captain Vikram Batra, PVC (P) left for her heavenly abode today. Heartfelt condolences to Shri GL Batra and Vishal Batra. Om Shanti.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by AkshaySG »

Been re-reading Lt Gen Mohinder Puri's book Kargil: Turning the tide. A few observations below ( Apologies if all this has been discussed previously in this thread)

1.The bit about 9 PARA SF not being able to really seize the initiative on some of the tasks assigned to it seems interesting, The Lt Gen says their CO was hesitant to use the SF for such missions. Another interesting tidbit about teams from HAWS also struggling to mount a successful climb on Tiger Hill feature in the early days of the war.

2. The 18 GARH didn't exactly cover themselves in glory in the early parts of the war especially during Tololing and 5140 battles.

3. The CO of 13 JAK RIF wasn't up for the task and got medical leave and Lt Col YK Joshi was promoted to CO of the unit ( I'll admit this tidbit seems to have slipped my mind even though there is so much talked about and discussed on 13 JAK RIF's exploits, Wonder what that CO feels now after missing what is probably a once in a lifetime chance to lead a unit into war)

4. Very little to no mention of the Northern Army Commander HM Khanna, Which is also the case in many other Kargil stories.

5. Although the Lt general didn't directly say it was clear that enemy arty recked havoc on not just our infantry but also our supply bases, HQs, depos and convoys. A large number of injuries and fatalities were from arty fire. Looking at India's current arty procurement fiascos i wonder what lessons we even learned from it
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