Kargil War Thread - VI

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Pratyush
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Pratyush »

WRT gas masks. IIRC, news reports during that time were also showing gas masks at certain positions in the intrusion.

One thought I had arround that time was that they were expecting Indian army to use tear gas in order to flush out the intruders. Because of the fog of war.

Remember, it was before the full scope of the intrusion became clear. That it was the Pakistani army and not cashmeri militants.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ParGha »

Pratyush wrote:WRT gas masks. IIRC, news reports during that time were also showing gas masks at certain positions in the intrusion. One thought I had around that time was that they were expecting Indian army to use tear gas in order to flush out the intruders. Because of the fog of war. Remember, it was before the full scope of the intrusion became clear. That it was the Pakistani army and not cashmeri militants.
Doesn't make sense: They were heavily-armed men fighting the Indian Army in unpopulated high-altitude areas, not stone-throwers fighting the CRPF or terrorists battling the NSG in civilian/sensitive areas. Whether uniformed or un-uniformed jihadis, Indian Army would be "flushing them out" with artillery, thermobaric rockets and high-fragmentation grenades.

Either: (1) Pakistanis have a secretive chemical weapons program no one knows publicly (general understanding is they don't have a chemical weapons program; their biological and nuclear weapons programs are better known), or (2) Pakistanis felt that Indians would use their chemical weapons (India did have a CWP, and it was fully discarded only by 2009). Either way, jamwal has opened up a whole series of questions that I had never thought about.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ArjunPandit »

ParGha wrote:Jamwal, that is a very good question. I must have seen that photo dozens of times, but I never thought to ask that question. In the mountains, every ounce matters — you don’t carry anything that you think isn’t going to be used. Something is really fishy.
I very clearly remember reports during that time on aajtak where bakis claimed that India used chemical weapons.... in my opinion on hindsight (musharraf moving his nuke missiles only to realize they fail) they planned to use that as a pretext to bring nukes into action or actually use it too...the news item didnt find much traction and was buried in the other things that caught everyone
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by jamwal »

Tear gas at an altitude of 4000 m or higher will disperse in a few seconds due to strong winds which blow there for most part of day. Why'd army use tear gas to flush out pakis and shoot them when they can just kill them with regular grenades in an instant?
India signed Chemical Weapons Convention on 02 September 1996 with a time period of 10 years to destroy all stockpiles. India had also declared that it had no chemical weapons a few years before that. AFAIK, we had only some shells left over from WW-II in stockpiles.

The fact that Pakis were carrying gas masks means that they either expected Indians to use chemical weapons or planned to use them themselves. Breathing at the altitude is hard by itself. Putting on such a mask will make it even more difficult.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Vidur »

The Corps Commander 15 Corps Lt Gen Krishan Pal was '' a disaster'' I heard some years later. If blame has to be pinned, he would the one with maximum liability. I don't know but I would think that its his staff who would have been the ''control staff'' as it was his Corps. But they could also be from another formation deputed for this purpose. However the command influence shaping their thinking would certainly be from Krishan Pal.
ramana wrote:I found an account by Lt Gen Mohinder Puri who was commander of the 8th Divison during Kargil.
He wrote a book titled Kargil Turning the tide.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... -the-tide/


Image

A few paras caught my eye.
1) 8th Division was oriented to do counter-insurgency in Valley and was turned around to fight enemy intrusion. So change of mission.
2) Immense schedule pressure due to public opinion
3) Despite being in Valley the troops needed 10 days to acclimatize to fight in the high altitudes. So delay even if troops are available.
It was indeed my professional privilege to command the ‘Forever in Operations’ 8 Mountain Division during Operation Vijay, our response to Pakistan’s Operation Badr. I had been in command of the Division in the Kashmir Valley for over a year, where it had been deployed since 1989 for Operation Rakshak to fight militancy, when Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil started unfolding in May 1999. The task was daunting as it came with the challenge of reorienting the Division operationally from counter-insurgency to conventional operations virtually in no time and to deliver success almost instantly in view of the tremendous pressure of public opinion at home to ‘taste victory’, and a strategic imperative to complete the operations well before the onset of winter. Since the operations had to be conducted at extreme high altitudes averaging 15,000 ft, troops had to undergo three stages of acclimatisation lasting 10 days or more to be able to give off their best.
4) In April 1999 there was Corps wargame where this officer planned the exact same maneuver that the Pakis did later and it was dismissed as unviable by the 'control staff' or umpires. Yet one month later these very heights were occupied by Pak troops and lots of resources spent and soldiers were killed.
In early April 1999, the Corps war game was to be conducted for which I had been nominated as the commander of the enemy forces. I had completed my reconnaissance of the Ladakh sector and had interacted at length with the local commanders. In the Kargil sector my plan in essence was to launch a pre-emptive attack at selected places with the aim of securing tactical features which would improve the defensive posture and draw adequate reserves and a reaction from the Valley. Ironically, the plan envisaged capturing areas like Tiger Hill and Tololing, which a month later were in possession of the Pakistani forces and had become household names in India. War games are meant to validate our defensive or offensive plans and should take into consideration enemy actions that appear tactically feasible. Unfortunately, in the war game not much attention was given to this manoeuvre, with the ‘control staff’ opining that the operation was not tactically sustainable or viable. I was quite surprised that no serious thought was given to the “enemy” plan and the control staff disposed it off for its unviability, an action we were to regret a month later.

Yet Gen V.K. Malik titled his book from Surprise to Victory! I don't think the KRC report brought out this fact.

Looks like a collective failure of higher command. And let the young soldiers die to retrieve their inaction.
Those umpires should have been cashiered out after Kargil.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

The heights of folly: A critical look at the Kargil Operation
https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398650
28 Aug 2018
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

DCS World - MiG-21 vs Atlantique Incident (India-Pakistan 1999)

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by MeshaVishwas »

A good presentation worth your time. The gent who is presenting this, shares the last name of the legendary Col Tarapore, PVC.

Wonder if they are related.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Rakesh wrote:The heights of folly: A critical look at the Kargil Operation
https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398650
28 Aug 2018
Yet they did the Operation!
And no one says why?
All say it was foolish.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

MeshaVishwas wrote:A good presentation worth your time. The gent who is presenting this, shares the last name of the legendary Col Tarapore, PVC.

Wonder if they are related.
Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore was a legend. The gent has a similar name - Arzan Tarapore.

Could be related or just could be a common Zoroastrian name.

Arzan Tarapore's Biography ---> https://www.arzantarapore.com/

Image Source: https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/people/arzan-tarapore

Image
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

He is a Stanford faculty.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by NRao »

ramana
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

A few things are still not clear about Kargil War.
1) Why did Pakistan do Operation Badr? We here facile and glib expalanations.
2) How is this related to the 1971 War which left things unsettled on the maps?
3) Between 1971 and 1999 there were many operations that are not dealt with in detail like Meghdhoot. How was Kargil realted?
4) The extent of occupation was ~200 sq km. And took 43 days to clear. All this could not have happened in those two winter months. So what is the real sequence of events?
5) KRC report by KS garu goes into the command and control and led to many reform recommendations, but most are not implemented.
We hopefully will see the formation of theater command this August 15th on the 75th Anniversary of Independence.

So the current reforms directly flow from the Kargil war.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ShivS »

Ramana

Interesting post, but the most likely explanation is that Badr began as a low level tactical incursion that took on a life of its own. The operation as envisaged, and then as executed were probably different.

Do not read too much into unclear maps - incursions and land grabs have happened even when the maps were fairly clear.

We took 43 days to clear the peaks that provided Pakistan with an extended view of the Kargil highway and enabled artillery fire to be directed on supply lines. Once these points were cleared, the Pakistanis walked away via the US.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

https://www.gunnersshot.com/2022/07/ukr ... ge-of.html


Comparing Kargil and Ukraine from artillery perspective
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Anujan »

This quote from the above article should be on the first post on this thread and the artillery thread :)

Pak misadventure in Kargil has not only been defeated, but crushed militarily, diplomatically and politically; singularly on account of accurate and timely delivery of TNT and lead on his head by the Artillery
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Without knowing this I tweeted in response to Shiv that Kargil ended nuclear blackmail.
Shiv was arguing with a veteran who thought Kargil didn't qualify as War for there was no declaration!

https://twitter.com/ramana_brf/status/1 ... Se5Y4eNwWw
Kargil was a war involving active Army and Airforce actively and the Navy was deployed off Makaran coast.
Poor guy has some cognitive dissonance
Kargil was decisive for it ended nuke blackmail. Only terror after that.
.....
#Balakot ended mass casualty terrorism.
So look at progression wrt Pakistan.
1947 Kashmir->1965Punjab->1971 Bangla desh-> 1999Kargil->2019 Balakot.
....
Wrt PRC it's
1962 Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh -> 1967 Nathu La-> 1986 Sumdrong Chu-> 2019 Galwan.
Khel khatam.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Sri »

Anujan wrote:This quote from the above article should be on the first post on this thread and the artillery thread :)

Pak misadventure in Kargil has not only been defeated, but crushed militarily, diplomatically and politically; singularly on account of accurate and timely delivery of TNT and lead on his head by the Artillery
With an addition of the another gem of a one liner. :)
But it is a good innovation to adopt whenever possible to save valuable lives of one’s troops while making the enemy cry out “Uncle”.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

I think the Pak Army plan in Kargil was a limited copy of the Egyptian Army plan in Yom Kippur.
For starters, both were called Operation Badr.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Pratyush »

And yet the Egyptians were defeated when the Israelis took the initiative from the Egyptians bin crossing the Suez compelling the Egyptians to conduct a reactionary action.

The Pakistanis after the surprise, completely ceded the initiative to the Indian army. The Indian army did the rest.

Both examples show the value of gaining and retaining of initiative.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

That's not the point. They used a template already developed.
And in fact, it was based on Rommel's Afrika Korps strategy.
The fact that Israel and India reacted and prevailed is another matter.
The victory was not just on the ground but due to ABV refusing to go to Clinton talks.
The objective of Yom Kippur was to get Israel to the bargaining table and the Camp David talks showed that Egypt won in a strategic manner.
By refusing to go to US for the talks ABV ensured the win on the ground is not lost.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Atmavik »

^^^ ABV's leadership ensured that the US/world for the first time supported India instead of Pakis. some say that it was bound to happen but kargil accelerated it.

on the Yom Kippur war i think the Israelis won a strategic victory by making it look like the Egyptians won and took back Saini but Israel got rid of its biggest enemy/threat.

i have often wondered if Paki jernails would follow the Egyptians but our case is very different.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Atmavik »

Coupta released a video of paki point of view of Kargil. not linking it here as its a bunch of lies ...
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ks_sachin »

Atmavik wrote:Coupta released a video of paki point of view of Kargil. not linking it here as its a bunch of lies ...
Common man, what is wrong with that? It is Paki point of view.
EVery data point we analyse gives us more data points for the future.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Also, the press overall especially the on-ground reporters tried to portray India as losing.
That's an evil not yet addressed.
Yes, India was surprised but they won on the field and at the table.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Anujan »

I still remember that outlook magazine was fear mongering over Pakistan's tactical nukes and how that reduced India's options.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

Anujan wrote:I still remember that outlook magazine was fear mongering over Pakistan's tactical nukes and how that reduced India's options.
Pakistan will not launch a single nuke against India. No gernail in Pakistan is remotely interested in seeing his luxurious lifestyle and his corner plot bungalow in Islamabad turn into radioactive dust. There is no viable path for Pakistan to survive as a nation, after a nuclear retaliation by India. The Pakistani citizenry are high on opium (Grade AAA Quality which is grown in Pakistan in huge quantities) if they believe their nuclear weapons give them any military advantage (or even parity) over India. Pakistan has adopted the path of nuclear deterrence by bluffing India, but in reality they are fooling their own citizens.

Jihad (and the gift of 72 virgins) is only meant for the illiterate & malnourished Pakistani and disenfranchised Kashmiri youth. Which Pak Army officer is going threaten this lifestyle, that you see in the pictures below?

https://twitter.com/TheLegateIN/status/ ... 18437?s=20 ---> Pakistan Army to spend over Rs. 800 crores to upgrade all major army officers messes, similar to that of the officers mess at Multan Corps HQ (upgraded in 2020). Project to upgrade rest had stalled due to pandemic and will resume now.

Image

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Rakesh »

How an Indian Brigadier helped a Pakistani Captain win the highest military honour after Kargil 1999

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

We missed this early article written in 1999 on why Pak did Kargil

https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/sa/sa_99chb05.html

Pakistan’s Compulsions for the Kargil Misadventure
By Bidanda M. Chengappa

Concluding Observations

In India-Pakistan relations, the asymmetry of power is an inherent feature which fuels insecurity and results in tensions along the border from time to time. In such a situation, a smaller and, therefore, weaker state, is likely to attempt to correct the imbalance of power through force of arms at an appropriate time. Accordingly, Pakistan Army brass hats at the Rawalpindi-based General Headquarters (GHQ) believed that this was the most opportune moment to strike the enemy as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government was politically weakened and would, therefore, be incapable of taking hard decisions. For instance, India had never used airpower to strike the Pakistani intruders till now but the political decision to do so for the first time in such a situation helped to achieve military victory. The IAF was spectacularly successful in the aerial bombardment of the Pakistani supply dumps in the Muntho Dhalo sector which had the twin benefits of physically affecting their logistics, besides demoralising the enemy forces. 15

Pakistan’s intrusions into Kargil, could, therefore, be perceived as an act of desperation since the insurgency in Kashmir may not have been progressing according to their plans. At a macro-level, the Pakistani military initiative could be attributed to three objectives : military, political and diplomatic. And Islamabad’s Kashmir-centric national security and foreign policy makes the Kashmir issue a common theme for these three objectives.

For Pakistani military planners, the compelling reason to initiate hostilities against India was aimed at cutting off the logistics route— the National Highway 1 Alpha to the Siachen Glacier—in order to eventually capture the area from India. The other objectives were to alter the status of the LoC and provide a stimulus to the weakening insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir. The Pakistanis possibly did not expect Indian troops to recapture the occupied area as they were at an immense advantage due to their position on the heights. Moreover, the intruders had entrenched themselves so strongly into well-built bunkers that dislodging them would prove costly in terms of heavy casualties. The Pakistani planners, given these advantages, coupled with the element of surprise to begin with, had envisaged their military presence on Indian territory to remain unhindered till the onset of the approaching winter. Thereafter, under adverse climatic conditions their military objective would stand a greater chance of success against the Indian defending force. To that extent, the Pakistani planners had formulated an innovative military operation which faltered due to an unanticipated and hard-hitting Indian response.

For Islamabad apparently the Kargil intrusions served as a means to distract the people from the gross misgovernance at home and buy more time to survive in power. The national economy was already in shambles with the debt repayment burden being a major issue, and proved to be a serious problem for the government. This was further compounded by its decision to freeze foreign currency accounts in the post-nuclear test phase in May 1998 which only added to the unpopularity of the government, besides several other acts of omission and commission. Probably in the light of this background, for the political leadership, the intrusions into Kargil served the purpose of internal cohesion through external aggression.

Pakistan, as a nuclear weapon state locked in a conventional conflict with India, also a nuclear weapon state, would only heighten the fears of a nuclear flashpoint on the subcontinent and serve to internationalise the Kashmir issue. Such a situation would expectedly draw US attention to the problem which Pakistan thought could be made to work to its advantage provided the military situation was shaping favourably. This could be interpreted as the diplomatic objective for the Pakistani move into Kargil.

The Pakistani gameplan as it unfolded, during May and June 1999 appears to have had a limited agenda without earning any wider strategic gains. Evidently, the army leadership alone, without consulting the Foreign Office, appears to have planned the attack by infiltration for reasons of ensuring operational secrecy as is evident from Islamabad’s diplomatic debacle. Perhaps the GHQ at Rawalpindi planned the military move in isolation without factoring in the potential for a negative diplomatic fallout.

Too many guesses and apparentlys!
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-B ... -doctrine/

Realignment and Indian Airpower Doctrine

Published Jan. 2, 2020
By Christina Goulter & Harsh V. Pant



With a shift in the balance of power in the Far East, as well as multiple challenges in the wider international security environment, several nations in the Indo-Pacific region have undergone significant changes in their defense postures. This is particularly the case with India, which has gone from a regional, largely Pakistan-focused, perspective to one involving global influence and power projection. This has presented ramifications for all the Indian armed services, but especially the Indian Air Force (IAF). Over the last decade, the IAF has been transforming itself from a principally army-support instrument to a broad spectrum air force, and this prompted a radical revision of Indian air power doctrine in 2012. It is akin to Western airpower thought, but much of the latest doctrine is indigenous and demonstrates some unique conceptual work, not least in the way maritime airpower is used to protect Indian territories in the Indian Ocean and safeguard sea lines of communication. Because of this, it is starting to have traction in Anglo-American defense circles.1 The current Indian emphases on strategic reach and conventional deterrence have been prompted by other events as well, not least the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, which demonstrated that India lacked a balanced defense apparatus. This article examines the evolving doctrinal thinking of the IAF and argues that the service is transformational in the way it situates the use of airpower in addressing India’s security environment.2



The IAF is currently the fourth-largest air service in the world, with nearly 1,500 aircraft, and, for this reason alone, it merits far greater attention than has been the case to date.3 But it is also one of the oldest independent air forces, having been established in 1932. Since that time, it has been involved in a variety of conflicts, including high-end, regular conventional warfare during WWII through to what can be categorized as counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism operations, including action against tribal groups in Waziristan. However, in spite of this extensive experience, the IAF has lacked a comprehensive doctrine and balanced force structure and has primarily served two masters since its inception: the Indian Army and nuclear deterrence. This has had a variety of consequences, not least a defensive and reactive posture. Since independence, India has done its utmost to prevent escalation of conflict with Pakistan and, in spite of numerous incursions into its territory, has managed to contain the violence.4 These engagements between India and Pakistan, and, in one case, with China, should not be seen merely as border skirmishes; China and Pakistan have compelled India to fight five separate high-intensity conflicts, in addition to numerous low-intensity clashes.5 What is particularly significant about all the major conflicts waged by India is that the 1962 war with China was the only one they lost, and it is the only conflict during which Indian airpower was not employed. In all other instances, the Indian forces managed to turn the tide with the assistance of airpower. But what is also notable about all the conflicts up to the end of the 1990s is that lessons over and above the tactical level were not taken on board, and a myopic focus on Pakistan as a threat reinforced this tactical focus. As a result, most bases and air assets were positioned close to the Pakistani border.6



In other words, until the last decade, India has lacked a conventional deterrent capability and the type of reach that would allow New Delhi to engage in power projection, should the need arise. In view of the observation that half a century’s worth of experience seemed not to influence Indian airpower thinking much beyond tactical effect, it is interesting to note that the last serious exchange between India and Pakistan during the Kargil War in 1999 appears to have galvanized Indian thinking about the role of airpower. Events since 9/11 and the rise of China have also compelled India to rethink conventional deterrence and redefine security well beyond India’s borders and territorial waters. This can be seen as a response to Chinese behaviors, in particular. For the last decade, China’s air strategy defines strategic frontiers well beyond its own borders.7 However, the major step change in India’s defense posture occurred most markedly after the Kargil War, and one of the most striking features of this change is the way in which airpower is viewed—both as a strategic instrument and as a decisive instrument in its own right. It is, therefore, worth examining the Kargil conflict briefly in order to understand why it exercised such influence over Indian thinking.



For more than two months during 1999, Indian and Pakistani forces waged an intense conflict on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LOC) separating the two nations in Kashmir.8 Outside of the Indian subcontinent, it was a little known war, mainly because the West’s attention was focused on the Kosovo conflict, which occurred at the same time. During March and April 1999, units of the Pakistani Army infiltrated the Indian region of Kashmir by stealth. Almost all of the lead elements comprised Pakistan’s Special Services Group and the locally-recruited Northern Light Infantry, disguised in tribal clothing.9 Because of harsh winter conditions during the preceding months, many of the Indian Army’s outposts and observation points at altitudes of 16,000-18,000 feet had been abandoned, and reconnaissance of the region was reduced in scale. The withdrawal of Indian troops seemed to the Pakistanis too good an opportunity to miss, and although never officially stated at the time, the Pakistani aim was to seize control of India’s only land line of communication to the Siachen Glacier, at the top end of the LOC, adjacent to the Chinese border.10 By the beginning of May, Pakistani forces occupied some 130 outposts, along a front of 112 miles, to a depth of 5–6 miles on the Indian side of the LOC. Conservative estimates at the time suggested that this involved an occupation force of between 1,500–2,000 Pakistani troops.11



The Pakistani invasion became apparent only during the first week of May, when the Indian Army units that had withdrawn from their outposts and observation points a few months earlier started to return. At first, the initial assessment was that Pakistani troops had occupied only a handful of posts and that the incursions could be dealt with by a local unit response within a few days.12 However, following artillery and small arms exchanges with Pakistani units, it became apparent that repelling the invaders would require a coherent response, and the IAF was called upon to support Indian Army battalions in the Kargil zone. As attack helicopters were unable to operate at the high altitudes involved, the IAF had to employ jet aircraft for reconnaissance and attack. During the third week of May, five infantry divisions, five brigades, and 44 battalions were dispatched to the Kargil sector, totaling more than 200,000 troops, and an Indian counteroffensive was planned for 26 May.13



The time elapsed between the first official acknowledgment of the Pakistani incursion and the counteroffensive was characterized by vacillation by senior Indian military leadership as to the nature of the threat posed, dogmatism on the part of Army commanders as to how they were going to meet the challenge (specifically, the type of air support they wanted), and fears over escalation of the conflict.14 There can be little doubt that the scale of the Pakistani incursion caused a strategic shock. Although artillery exchanges in the Kargil sector had increased in frequency over the preceding two years, the region was considered a quiet zone in comparison with others along the LOC. For the first two weeks of May, many senior commanders refused to believe that the incursion was performed by anyone other than militant insurgents, and briefings continued to refer to mujahedeen. The Indian Army persisted in its belief that it was markedly stronger and more capable than the Pakistanis, so the realization, when it finally came, that India had suffered a major incursion caused considerable psychological dislocation—not just at local unit level but, most significantly, among the senior military leadership.15 This dislocation manifested itself in a number of ways, not least in a lack of a joint response from the Indian armed forces. The initial reports were kept within Army circles, and as late as the morning of 10 May, the IAF’s Western Air Command still knew nothing about the incursion. The only air support that was requested in the early stages was at a local level, when calls were made for helicopter gunships. When it was pointed out by the local air commander that attack helicopters would be extremely vulnerable to ground fire, especially Pakistani surface-to-air missiles (SAM), the Army vice-chief insisted that fast jet aviation would be inappropriate and potentially escalatory. At this point, the chief of the IAF, Air Chief Marshal Anil Tipnis, sought political approval for the use of fixed-wing offensive airpower.16 Permission was granted, as long as strikes were made inside Indian territory, and not across the LOC.



Offensive air operations began at first light on 26 May, two weeks after the first indications of a Pakistani incursion.17 The initial missions proved to be unusually taxing for the IAF; most of the targets were located on or near mountain ridgelines at altitudes between 16,000 and 18,000 feet.18 The rock-and-snow terrain made visual target identification very problematic, and the fast jet pilots found it very difficult to aim their weapons within the confines of narrow valleys.19 The threat of Pakistani anti-aircraft artillery and SAMs was always present, and three IAF aircraft were lost within the first three days of the campaign. Although no Indian aircraft were lost to enemy fire after this point, the SAM threat remained high, and the Pakistanis fired more than 100 SAMs in the course of the conflict. Exacerbating the problems facing the aircrews was the paucity of intelligence. Not only had there been a lack of joint air-land planning but the Army had also failed to pass on the latest intelligence assessments of Pakistani strengths and dispositions. Much of the intelligence being used by the IAF during the first weeks of the campaign was derived from its own aerial reconnaissance. In contrast to the Army’s own organic aviation reconnaissance, which failed to detect any Pakistani activity in the previous months, the IAF’s imagery analysis had at least shown where most of the Pakistani dispositions were, and electronic surveillance of the area provided useful signals intelligence (SIGINT), in spite of the Pakistani’s increased signals security.20



The most significant aerial action in support of the Indian 3rd and 8th Mountain Divisions occurred during the first two weeks of June. In order to prevent the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) from interfering with the fighting on the ground and Indian air support, the IAF maintained combat air patrols along the full length of the LOC and the Indo-Pakistani border, more widely.21 This was done as a precaution in case of a rapid escalation of the conflict. By this point, there was close coordination between the IAF and the Indian Army, and almost all the actions on the ground were preceded by air strikes. To begin with, the IAF was employing unguided weapons, but because of the problems with targeting in the mountainous terrain, the IAF quickly employed Mirage 2000H aircraft, which were capable of delivering laser-guided weapons. The change to precision weapons played a significant role in swinging the campaign in India’s favor, and by mid-June, the Indian mountain divisions had recaptured the high ground that gave direct line of sight onto the national highway to the north. Another significant aerial action occurred on 17 June, when IAF Mirages hit the Pakistanis’ main administrative and logistics hub at Muntho Dhalo, causing not just physical destruction but also dealing a major blow to Pakistani morale. Pakistani reports show that this attack marked the turning point in their campaign, as they were unable to sustain their operations after this point. As the weeks passed, the Indian mountain divisions recaptured one post after another, and the only occasions on which air support was not provided was when the weather precluded flying operations. Some strike operations were done at night, which also added to the psychological pressure being applied to the Pakistanis, who had not anticipated round-the-clock air attacks. Air strikes ended in mid-July, but other air support continued. This included several thousand helicopter sorties engaged in troop movement, air resupply, casualty evacuation, and heavy lift provided by Antinov-32 transport aircraft, which brought 6,650 tons of materiel and 27,000 troops into the Kargil sector. The Pakistanis were unable to match this level of sustainment and reinforcement, and, by 26 July, Indian forces had recaptured most of the posts, and almost all Pakistani units had withdrawn to their side of the LOC. The Indian counteroffensive had cost the Army 471 killed and a further 1,060 wounded. 22 The Pakistani casualties were substantially more: over 700 killed and an estimated 1,000 wounded. Some sources suggest that these official Pakistani figures underplay the total losses by several hundred.23 It is worth noting that, in spite of the difficulties the IAF experienced in targeting, there were no “blue-on-blue” incidents during the campaign, and the application of airpower had been both precise and proportionate.



In the decade that followed the Kargil War, the conflict became the subject for extensive study in both India and Pakistan and was seen as a watershed.24 It was recognized as a unique conflict, not least because the two antagonists were nuclear-armed nations. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 had made the country bolder in its dealings with India, but both nations came away from the conflict impressed (and relieved) that they had succeeded in preventing a nuclear escalation. Up to that point, the accepted orthodoxy within Western political and military circles was that nuclear-armed adversaries would avoid conflict at all costs for fear of escalation to a nuclear level.25 The Kargil War defied that orthodoxy. The failure of the nuclear deterrent in this case prompted a rethinking of nuclear doctrine, but the conflict also spawned a new limited war concept, especially as far as India was concerned.26 For India, Kargil demonstrated that it was possible to engage in a limited conventional conflict without escalation to the nuclear level, and this hurriedly prompted India to pursue the build-up of conventional forces in order to maintain its military-strategic advantage over Pakistan. As part of that desire to dominate escalation in a conflict, India looked to airpower to provide the principal strategic advantage, and this posture was very clear from a number of actions and pronouncements made by IAF seniors.27 Interestingly, the Pakistani analysis of the consequences of Kargil also drew a clear connection between the conflict and the IAF’s modernization program. One PAF senior officer asserted that the Kargil review report provided the basis for the IAF receiving the preponderance of the 15-year defense spending plan (i.e. about $30 billion) for new multirole aircraft, including the Sukhoi Su-30MKI and French Rafale, as well as new transport aircraft and an enhanced airborne early warning capability.28



Doctrinal Evolution



India’s intent to dominate conflict escalation is also reflected in its 2012 airpower doctrine. What differentiates this doctrine from its predecessor (published in 1995) is that it goes beyond outlining merely what airpower is, in terms of its roles, and explains to a far greater extent what airpower is for.29 In contrast to the previous IAF doctrine, and, indeed, most Western airpower doctrine, the 2012 version makes a much clearer connection between airpower and national security. Airpower is viewed as an indicator of national power and is defined as comprising the “sum total of a nation’s aviation and related capabilities,” including civilian assets.30 The inclusion of civilian assets is unusual in doctrinal terms, but it demonstrates that the IAF is now thinking in a holistic way about national capability. Airpower is seen as serving Indian national interests across the full spectrum of conflict as well as taking a leading role in nation building and military diplomacy.



However, perhaps the most unique conceptual work is displayed in the areas of control of the air and strategic effect.31 Control of the air is seen not merely as the most fundamental role of airpower (to protect the nation-state from attack) and a vital prerequisite for all other operations but also as the capability to defend a nation and provide freedom of maneuver as a deterrent in itself. This is a very important point overlooked in most other airpower doctrine. The IAF doctrine does not go as far as some previous British airpower doctrine, which suggests that control of the air is “an end in itself”; the argument the IAF puts forward is far more nuanced.32 It sees deterrence and control of the air as inextricably intertwined; the credibility of the air force is dependent upon the ability of that air force to maintain control of the air, but the ability to control the airspace means little if the deterrent value of the air force is limited. The phrase deterrent air defense encapsulates what is intended.



It is also interesting to note that the IAF has retained the old doctrinal nomenclature of degrees of control of the air.33 This has been dispensed with in most Western air doctrine over the last decade and a half, coinciding with COIN campaigning, during which time there has been little threat from the air. However, it is under consideration again now that state threats have come back into focus and the West is having to operate in parts of the world where air defense is well developed and deconfliction among various national air contingents may not be thoroughly worked out. The 2011 air campaign over Libya and recent operations against the Islamic State in Syria are good examples of this.34 During the Kargil operation, the IAF maintained air superiority adjacent to most of the LOC, but a persistent threat posed by SAMs meant that the IAF did not have air supremacy. The IAF’s control of the air was not absolute, but it possessed sufficient control in order to prosecute the campaign it wished in order to dislodge the invaders.



There are several other aspects of control of the air that have been downplayed or omitted in Western doctrine since the end of the Cold War but feature in the latest IAF doctrine. One of these is protection of airfields. The IAF doctrine notes that airfields are “densely packed, high-value targets. Aircraft on the ground at airfields are more concentrated and vulnerable than they are in flight.”35 With considerable prescience, these lines were written just prior to the major Taliban attack on Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, in September 2012, which resulted in the loss of two US servicemen and several aircraft, prompting the US and Britain to re-examine existing tactics and resuscitate old Cold War survival-to-operate procedures.36 However, the point is that it should not have taken the attack on Camp Bastion to draw attention to force protection issues. Since the end of the Cold War, several NATO nations have had experiences of bases being attacked. During the closing stages of the conflict in Iraq, for example, British Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft came increasingly under attack in Basra, causing the larger assets (such as the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft) to be withdrawn further back in theatre, and during 2007, the RAF lost a C-130 Hercules after an improvised explosive device detonated on the airfield at Al-Amarah. In both of these cases, the lesson supposedly learned was that no freedom of maneuver meant no airpower effect, or, at least, delayed airpower effect. One of the reasons why such incidents seem not to have had much impact in the United Kingdom may be because force protection is not addressed directly in the latest British airpower doctrine but is dealt with in subordinate operations manuals written by the RAF Regiment. These manuals convey the importance of force protection in a manner that should appear, at least briefly, in the main airpower doctrine. For instance, the RAF Force Protection for Air Operations manual refers to the way in which force protection “is recognized, along with Air Logistics, as a key enabler for Air and Space Power’s four fundamental roles.”37 This is one of several areas where the IAF airpower doctrine is superior because it acknowledges that control of the air includes protection of aircraft on the ground in the face of surface-to-surface threats.



However, the main reason the IAF doctrine has attracted attention in the West, particularly in the United States, is its treatment of strategic effect and conventional deterrence. The US interest stems from the fact that it is seeking to partner with nations that it regards as counterbalances to China, but it is also related to a new US focus on tailored deterrence using nuclear and conventional means.38 In India, discussions of strategic effect preceded the Kargil conflict, and, indeed, the subject appeared briefly in the previous IAF doctrine, but the conflict in 1999 prompted far greater consideration of airpower’s strategic role, not least because it helped to defuse a potential nuclear escalation. During the early to mid-2000s, many writers, several of whom were recently retired senior officers, underscored the importance of airpower in turning the tide during the Kargil conflict and how airpower provided the best means of ensuring that India attains its place as a global player economically.39 As far as India is concerned, the principal threat to this aspiration comes from China. Although Indo-Chinese relations improved for a time during the late 1990s, military competition and distrust remain. China engaged in what were considered to be several provocative actions during the following decade, including the building of SIGINT installations in the southern portion of the Tibetan plateau and in Aksai Chin, a disputed border area between the two countries. Chinese rapid reaction forces were also deployed close to the border. As a result, the IAF strengthened its Eastern Air Command, deploying Su30 Flankers there from 2008 onward. The commander of the Eastern Air Force at the time, Air Marshal Pranab Kumar Barbora, made the point that this reinforcement was designed to thwart any “misadventure” by the Chinese and a repeat of the 1962 conflict. While it was admitted that India could not match China’s numerical strength, it was felt that the IAF would provide a sufficiently strong “deterrent force” because of its force multiplying potential.40



So, while India sees Pakistan as a constant drain on its defense resources because of the ongoing territorial claims, the rise of China has eclipsed most other security concerns. Whereas India’s concept of defense used to focus purely on its borders, it now envisages “strategic reach” to protect national interests, particularly economic, trade, and energy security.41 Implicit in this strategic reach is deterrence; India is no longer content to fight purely within its own borders when threatened and now talks in terms of protecting its security interests at a continental level and extending its range also in the maritime sphere from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca.42



This emphasis on strategic reach and strategic effect, more broadly, is a fundamental revolution in how India views airpower and is reflected in both the 2012 IAF doctrine and procurement. After half a century of viewing the IAF as a tactical support instrument, the 2012 doctrine seems to go almost to the opposite extreme. It states “air power is inherently strategic in nature and its tactical application would only fritter away its prime advantage of creating strategic effects.”43 Interestingly, the doctrine makes a point of quoting some of Marshal of the RAF Lord Hugh Trenchard’s pronouncements from the 1920s, “It is not necessary for an air force, in order to defeat an enemy nation, to defeat its armed forces first. Air power can dispense with that intermediate step, can pass over the enemy navies and armies, penetrate the air defences and attack direct the centres of production, transportation and communication from which the enemy war effort is maintained.”44



But just when the new doctrine could appear to be a throwback to the extreme positions of the interwar theorists, it then offers some unique insights about the nature of strategic effect and serves to demonstrate where Western airpower doctrine is conceptually weak. One of these areas is the definition of strategic air effect. The IAF document makes the point that “the classification of an offensive air operation as ‘strategic’ is not determined by range, platform type or the weaponry used, but is determined by the objective or the purpose served.”45 Much of Western airpower doctrine continues to conflate range or depth of penetration with “strategic.” For example, the latest British airpower doctrine talks about strategic being the effect sought, yet it also refers to operations against targets in the “heart of enemy territory.”46



However, one of the most important observations made by the IAF doctrine about the nature of strategic effect can be found in a section on subconventional operations. One of the fallacies in Western discourse, especially since 2001, is that air power is a purely supporting instrument in irregular warfare, and that airpower cannot have strategic effect in this setting.47 Although the 2012 IAF doctrine could have expanded on this area a little more, it makes the point that key leadership targeting has a strategic effect.48 It uses the US operation to kill Osama bin Laden in May 2011 to illustrate airpower’s role in subconventional warfare, but a better example might have been the targeting of the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, which included airborne tracking of al-Zarqawi and the final act performed by F-16s.



Reflecting India’s new interest in protecting its global interests and defending forward, the 2012 doctrine also devotes space to strategic lift. The doctrine and senior IAF commentators make the point that a strategic strike capability without strategic airlift risks a gap in India’s ability to project power.49 Doubtless, the Kargil experience was informative here, as airlift was used to bring several divisions into the zone prior to the Indian counteroffensive, but airlift has been viewed as a lifeline to Indian forces in the border zones for over 50 years.50 However, it is also apparent that the IAF sees strategic airlift as important for soft power, including humanitarian aid and disaster relief in the region. Reference is made in several places throughout the doctrine to airpower’s role in nonkinetic activity, and a whole chapter is devoted to “Nation Building, Aerial Diplomacy and Perception Management.”51 Western airpower doctrine, in contrast, has tended to emphasize kinetic effect when addressing strategic airpower. This is particularly the case with US doctrine.52



India’s aspiration to achieve power projection and an expeditionary capability is not yet a reality, and some writers cast doubt on the idea that India can achieve a true expeditionary footing, even in the midterm.53 The IAF has many legacy assets, with a preponderance of short-range interceptor aircraft, such as the MiG-21, which were given multirole functions during the 1980s and 1990s. The short range of the aircraft concerned meant that the IAF could only perform air defense and Army-support functions.54 However, the IAF’s modernization program is making steady progress toward a strength of 42 squadrons by 2022, and the types of aircraft being procured indicate a serious intent to develop a balanced air force and a true strategic capability.55 Three combat aircraft acquisition programs aim to provide a new light combat aircraft (an indigenous design, the Tejas) to replace the aging MiG-21s, a multirole combat fighter (the French Rafale), and a fifth-generation fighter (the Su-T50 being developed in collaboration with the Russians). Although the introduction of the Tejas has been slower than desired, the IAF expressed satisfaction with its performance as a light multirole strike aircraft during recent exercises.56 In addition, the IAF is acquiring a fleet of 272 Su-30 fighter-bombers, Israeli airborne early warning aircraft, and air transport aircraft from the United States (including six C-130J Hercules, air-to-air refueling aircraft, and an unspecified number of C-17 Globemasters).57 These acquisitions will have not just force multiplier effects but synergies that will add to the deterrent value of the IAF. Early warning aircraft will not only enhance India’s air defense radius but will also play a key role in any expeditionary context. Similarly, refueling tanker aircraft will increase the range and weapon loads of strike aircraft, thereby adding to India’s air deterrent.



Challenges Facing Indian Airpower



While greater thought is being applied as to how these aircraft are being acquired, one of the key weaknesses of the IAF has been the multiplicity of aircraft types in service. During the 1980s, for example, the IAF had no fewer than 11 different fighter aircraft, and this placed an unnecessary training and maintenance burden on the service.58 There may still be problems if the current modernization program persists with multinational procurement, not least because the United States’ increasingly strained relations with Russia may affect India’s relationship with those two countries. After decades of deliberately pursuing a non-aligned posture, India has cultivated much closer ties with the United States, including several high-profile joint exercises since 2004.59 But closer interaction with the United States may imperil India’s collaborative fifth-generation fighter aircraft project with Russia.






Figure 1: SME exchange. Lt Col Casey Eaton, USAF, explains the capabilities of the C-17 Globemaster III to Indian air force wing commanders Anup Kumar Dutta, K.V.Surendran Nair, and S.K. Vidhate during their visit to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. As part of their visit, Indian air force officers learned how theUnited States commands and controls airpower in the Pacific through the 613th Air and Space Operations Center (AOC). Five 613th AOC memberslater visited India for a similar orientation, as part of a subject-matter expert exchange with the Indian air force. US Air Force photo by Oscar Hernandez.



In spite of the hurdles inherent in the IAF’s modernization program, the service has at least received international recognition as a balanced, full-spectrum air force. However, there remains one serious impediment to India’s desire for global reach and power projection—a flawed intelligence apparatus. Sharing of intelligence between the military and intelligence agencies remains suboptimal, and India currently lacks a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4I2SR) system suitable for network-centric warfare.60 While India made a variety of important observations about the Kargil conflict, chief of which was the deficiencies in the Indian intelligence apparatus, not all the lessons identified were acted upon or received further attention.61 This is evident in several places, not least the 2012 IAF doctrine, which pays scant attention to the subject of intelligence, either in terms of intelligence supporting operations or airpower as a source of intelligence. Although a doctrinal precepts section talks about how targets need to be “carefully chosen” and “must have a direct link with the enemy’s strategy or his decision-making process,” intelligence is not considered one of the main precepts and is accorded fewer than a dozen lines in the doctrine.62 There is no real discussion about the role of intelligence in target selection, target prioritization, the importance of timely and precise intelligence, and so forth. This is in contrast to most Western airpower doctrine, which treats intelligence acquisition as one of the four main roles of airpower and how strategic effect, in particular, is dependent upon all-source analysis.63 Even allowing for Indian sensitivities over releasing too much information about their intelligence machinery, to accord the subject just a few lines is a serious weakness in the doctrine. Other nations’ airpower doctrine manages to address intelligence in generic terms, without compromising national security, and the IAF should be able to do the same.



In the past, when countries have suffered strategic shock as a result of perceived or actual intelligence failure, not only is the intelligence apparatus overhauled but also the significance of accurate and timely intelligence is usually impressed upon all organs of state, especially the military.64 For the IAF doctrine to downplay the role of intelligence is not just dangerous, it is an oddity, because one of the conclusions drawn in the Kargil report was that India’s national surveillance capability was “grossly inadequate,” particularly satellite and other imagery acquisition.65 The report states that had India possessed high-definition satellite imagery capability, unmanned aerial vehicles, and better human intelligence, the Pakistani incursion would have been spotted at a much earlier point. The report recommended that every effort be made and adequate funds provided to ensure that a capability of world standards was developed “indigenously and put in place in the shortest possible time.”66 Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect the 2012 doctrine to, at least, treat intelligence acquisition as a core role for airpower in a similar way to Western airpower doctrine. One of the possible reasons why the doctrine devotes so little attention to the subject is that airpower, itself, is accorded surprisingly little attention in the Kargil report. The report tends to focus on the failures by the Indian defense-and-security apparatus, rather than addressing any success stories. As airpower was considered the principal factor explaining Indian success, it may have been sidelined as a topic not demanding further investigation.67 If airpower had been found wanting, then it and air-derived intelligence may have been addressed in more detail.



Nevertheless, the Kargil report does point to failings in service intelligence and sharing of intelligence among the services and intelligence agencies. Among the observations made is that Indian air intelligence was lulled into a false sense of security. When Pakistani aircraft were located near to the border just prior to the incursion, both army and air force intelligence assessed this activity as “normal.”68 Equally, reports of construction of helicopter bases were dismissed, as it was reasoned that the bases were required to support Pakistani positions near the LOC. However, both the air force and the army were criticized for shortcomings in order-of-battle analysis, especially their failure to keep track of five Pakistani light infantry battalions as they crossed the LOC.69 In several cases, tactical intelligence was not shared beyond one-star headquarters, either within the same service or with other services so that a holistic view of Pakistani activity impossible.70 However, the failings did not just exist at unit level. The operational level intelligence apparatus also came in for criticism when it became apparent that there was some tactical intelligence suggesting that an invasion was imminent, but that the analytical staffs compiling an overall assessment for the Director General of Military Intelligence overlooked this intelligence.71 Part of the problem seems to have stemmed from a classic intelligence pitfall: mirror imaging. Because the Indian Army lacked the means to sustain operations in winter weather at altitude, the assumption was made that the Pakistanis would not attempt major military operations in that type of environment.72



Many writers consider Kargil to have been a systemic intelligence failure,73 but this may be doing a disservice to parts of the intelligence machinery that functioned reasonably well. It is worth noting on which occasions and at what levels the intelligence apparatus made the correct assessments. There is a suggestion in the Kargil report that the Indian Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which is responsible for pan-government strategic assessments, did raise the possibility of a Pakistani campaign in the Kargil zone in November 1998, some five months before the incursion.74 The JIC also repeatedly pointed to an emboldened Pakistani government that was likely to initiate a move in the Jammu and Kashmir region. The Kargil report made the point that JIC assessments did not receive the attention “they deserved at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. . . . The JIC was not accorded the importance it deserved either by the intelligence agencies or the Government.”75 The question can be raised as to why the JIC’s assessments did not gain traction especially within the Indian government. The problem may have been the type of language used; assessments done by committee tend to reflect the lowest-common-denominator positions within the committee, leading to anodyne language. It is, therefore, possible that the strategic indicators of an incursion by Pakistan were not conveyed robustly enough. But writers who suggest that no strategic assessments had been made are wrong.76 Equally, after the incursion became apparent, the IAF did perform well in reconnaissance and imagery analysis. One of the IAF’s strengths is its adaptability, and as early as 10 May, the IAF’s reconnaissance-and-surveillance assets were swung into action, including Jaguar fighters employed in a reconnaissance role.77 Air-derived intelligence helped to bring clarity to the situation during the critical days after the incursion was first reported, and on 14 May, the Air HQ established an air operations center for the Jammu–Kashmir region in anticipation of a counteroffensive.



The responsiveness that the IAF demonstrated was in spite of a lack of effective joint machinery. There was surprisingly little communication between the Land and Air HQs, and during the first week after the incursion was detected, the Indian Army attempted to respond alone. The Air Chief Marshal Tipnis recalled how the Army’s Northern Command was reluctant to share reports on its initial artillery and small arms exchanges with the Pakistani forces. When the Army did engage with the local air officer commanding, the request was for helicopter gunships to assist with the “eviction” of the “intruders.”78 It was pointed out that the altitudes at which air support would have to operate precluded the use of helicopters, and fast jet aviation was suggested as the only option, not least because if the situation escalated, airpower was going to provide the best means of dealing with the situation quickly. This was eventually agreed upon, after discussions between the service chiefs, but valuable time was lost due to there being no formal process for air-land integration. Air Chief Marshal Tipnis commented that there was a total lack of Army-IAF joint staff work and no joint planning, not even joint deliberations at any command level, and this persisted for several weeks.79 However, once the gravity of the Pakistani incursion became known at the governmental level and approval for the use of fast jet aviation was received, with the caveat that the IAF operated on the Indian side of the LOC, jointery characterized India’s conduct of the conflict.80



The IAF’s senior leadership was clearly scarred by the initial lack of service integration during the Kargil conflict, and jointery is one of the areas that does receive close attention in the 2012 doctrine (in contrast to intelligence). A whole chapter is devoted to “Joint Operations,” and it provides almost unique clarity on the subject.81 Western airpower doctrine would do well to emulate it. One of the particular strengths of the chapter is the way in which ideas are articulated; the language used is direct and very clear. The doctrine uses the word “jointmanship,” making it a function of leadership. This is a vitally important point and a considerable advance on most other doctrine. Second, it emphasizes that jointery is about true partnership and genuine respect for each service’s capabilities. The issue of respect is so often omitted in Western doctrine. It underscores mutual trust and confidence, as well as each service taking the time to learn and understand the strengths and weaknesses of other partners. The doctrine also emphasizes the importance of using the appropriate tools at the right time. The issue of appropriateness is rarely discussed in Western doctrine. It is suggested that if all these factors are taken account of, then joint action will have synergistic and force multiplying effects, but the point is also made that jointmanship needs to be exercised regularly, because this is the only way to refine operating concepts. In short, this chapter articulates the essential tenets of jointery in a way that is yet to be done properly in the West.



Although some of the most unique conceptual work found in the IAF doctrine relates to control of the air and strategic effect, the way in which air-surface integration is treated is also noteworthy.82 A number of important observations are made, including the psychological effect of air attacks on enemy troops and the fact that air interdiction of enemy supply lines can create strategic effect (the example cited in the latter case is Wehrmacht General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Corps being unable to exercise any real impact on Mediterranean strategy after 1942 due to the aerial interdiction of his supply lines). During the Kargil conflict, the attack on the Pakistani logistics hub at Muntho Dhalo dealt a fatal blow to both Pakistani morale and their ability to sustain their campaign, and these effects were highlighted in the Kargil report.83 Clearly, this experience had a major impact on IAF thinking about the psychological effect of airpower and the significance of aerial interdiction.



However, perhaps most interesting is the IAF doctrine’s treatment of air-maritime operations. Unusually, India employs its navy for maritime reconnaissance, but the strike function has been given to the air force. Of particular note is the way in which a distinction is drawn between anti-shipping strike and maritime strike.84 The former is aimed at the enemy’s naval assets in proximity to Indian forces, while the latter is aimed at enemy targets that are not in contact with friendly forces, and included in this category are enemy naval facilities in harbor and maritime patrol aircraft on the ground. This distinction between anti-shipping strike and maritime strike is unique and is akin to the distinction made in Western airpower doctrine between close air support (the targeting of enemy troops in contact with friendly forces) and air interdiction (the targeting of enemy supply lines, reserves, and troops not in the immediate battlespace). The main point, however, is that the IAF doctrine dedicates far more space to this subject than most Western airpower doctrine, certainly the British equivalents since the 1990s, which have steadily decreased the attention given to anti-shipping (or maritime strike) roles.85



What the authors of the Indian airpower doctrine appreciate, while their counterparts in the West seem not to, is that one of the roles of air doctrine is to highlight how airpower should be used or could be used, if the nation possesses all the resources it requires. One of the traps into which British doctrine, in particular, has fallen is to downplay or disregard certain functions of airpower when the country has lacked particular assets. This is certainly the case with maritime aviation. In the late 1990s, after the RAF dispensed with its two Tornado squadrons devoted to an anti-shipping role, no mention was made of a maritime-strike function in RAF doctrine.86 Similarly, the axing of the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft after the Strategic Defence Review of 2010 led to the maritime reconnaissance-and-surveillance function being dropped from the 2013 doctrine, just as strategic effect disappeared from British air doctrine in the fourth edition simply because the operational context was, apparently, all about COIN warfare at the time. In other words, doctrine of any service type needs to deal in some universal constants and should not be overly swayed by either operational contexts or available capabilities. A certain proportion of any doctrine also has aspirational elements to it, and some of the IAF doctrine falls into this category. The IAF doctrine optimistically predicts that air force and carrier aviation will be able to meet both regional and out-of-area defense requirements, so long as operations are properly coordinated and planned.87



Conclusion



It is clear from the 2012 doctrine that the IAF sees itself as an instrument of power projection and underpinning expeditionary capability, but it also recognizes that it is the principal tool in India’s armory if deterrence fails.88 It is also clear that the Kargil experience was extremely important in crystalizing Indian thinking about the utility of airpower. For India, the overriding lessons from 1999 were that the nation had paid a heavy price for its failure to invest properly in conventional deterrence, a balanced force structure and intelligence, but that airpower had been the chief factor in turning the tide in its favor. Since then, Pakistan has been reluctant to engage in major adventurism (even if border skirmishes continue). Therefore, it is difficult to agree with some writers who suggest that the IAF’s expanded capability is causing more, not less, instability in South Asia.89 The IAF’s modernization program has been transformative, not merely in material and training terms but also in the conceptual realm. While some flaws in the airpower doctrine remain, not least in how intelligence is treated, the 2012 doctrine is revolutionary on many levels. This transformation has ensured new, strong international partnerships that have, in turn, added to the deterrent value of the IAF.



Dr. Christina Goulter

Dr. Goulter is a senior lecturer at King’s College London, and is co-director of the Sir Michael Howard Centre for the History of War and head of the King’s Air Power Studies Research Group. From 1994-1997, she was associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. She is also a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society, and is on the advisory boards of the Royal Air Force’s Centre for Air Power Studies and USAF Air University Press’s Strategic Studies Quarterly journal. Her publications include works on airpower history, including A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command’s Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940–1945, and other publications on current aerospace subjects, intelligence, the Special Operations Executive in World War II, and counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare. Her next book deals with British intervention in the second round of the Greek Civil War, with a particular focus on urban COIN, and her 2014 study “The Greek Civil War: A National Army’s Counter-insurgency Triumph” in the Journal of Military History was a Moncado Prize winner. She is co-author of a USAF/RAND study of Op Unified Protector/ Ellamy Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (RAND, 2015) and an Oxford University Press study, The Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya (2015).



Professor Harsh V. Pant

Professor Pant is director of research at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He holds a joint appointment as professor of international relations in the Defence Studies Department and the India Institute at King’s College London. He is also a nonresident fellow with the Wadhwani Chair in US-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. He has been a visiting professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore; a visiting professor at the O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonepat; a visiting professor at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi; a visiting fellow at the Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania; a visiting scholar at the Center for International Peace and Security Studies, McGill University; and emerging leaders fellow at the Australia-India Institute, University of Melbourne. His current research is focused on Asian security issues. His most recent books include The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy (Palgrave Macmillan), Handbook of Indian Defence Policy (Routledge), and The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process and Great Power Politics (Oxford University Press). Pant is a columnist for the Diplomat and writes regularly for various media outlets including the Japan Times, the Wall Street Journal, the National (UAE), and the Hindustan Times.

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Bala Vignesh »

This was a very enlightening article, to say the least!! Cleared up a lot of the thought process behind the recent procurements and the level of engagement with various air forces.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

India had three big wars 1965, 1971, and 1999.

Per Offical War records of 1965, 75% of all casualties of the Indian Army were from artillery.

I want to know if the IA artillery experts studied the campaigns in these wars to find out the effectiveness of artillery fire.

For instance, were any bunkers in the Ichoghil canal reduced with artillery fire?
That would be only in 1965 war as they did not get to attack these again in 1971

In 1999 Kargil what was the real effectiveness of artillery fire?
We know many rounds were fired and barrels worn out but what was the damage done to Pak sangars and bunkers?
Was it all to keep them under cover while the assault was in progress?
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

For example

Link: Kargil to Ukraine

Lt Gen PR Shankar(Ret)
...
Similarly in the period May-July in 1999, Artillery won the war for India by pulverising Pakistani defence to smithereens in Kargil. The Indian Artillery fired over 2,50,000 shells, bombs, and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Most of these were fired in an approximately 10-15 days period of intense fighting. 9,000 shells were fired on Tiger Hill alone when it was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously. The Pakistanis were simply and overwhelmingly OUTGUNNED!
...
In comparison to Ukraine, the enormity of what was achieved in Kargil is not even understood by many. Under hostile conditions, at high altitudes, on treacherous one-way roads and tracks, the Indian Army concentrated more than twenty Artillery regiments of 105mm Guns, 155mm Bofors, 120mm mortars and Grad BM21s. These were deployed in various sectors in the Kargil war theatre under direct enemy observation and fire.

This ‘in the face’ deployment was unconventional due to terrain and the limited gun areas available. Dummy gun positions were prepared. Ammunition stocks were steadily built up. In an era where there were no drones or satellites, young Forward Observation Officers, and battery commanders fought shoulder to shoulder with the Infantry in all assaults. They brought down sustained and accurately overwhelming Artillery fire on relatively small areas atop precipitous slopes to blast the Pakistanis into grave destruction.

Firing by guns in the steep Himalayan slopes was so accurate that the Infantry would at times call for artillery fire up to as close as 40m, far lesser than acceptable safety distances. Slight errors could have decimated own troops. 100-120 guns were, at times fired in concert. Direct shooting, particularly by the Bofors, spread terror amongst the Pakistanis and had a devastating effect on the destruction of enemy bunkers. It also meant a considerable saving of ammunition as compared to indirect firing of guns, since almost every round fired was a hit. This also contributed to significantly reducing the logistic load in mountains. Firing over a hundred guns on a restricted target was like ‘cracking a nut with a sledgehammer.’
In some other report, the actual shells fired with different guns is given. Will find that.

Role of Artillery in Kargi;

Not much details though written in 1999
Economic Times Regurgitates lots of known facts.

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... s?from=mdr


Late Gurmit Kanwal writes: https://www.dailyo.in/politics/kargil-d ... ners-31641
The first important ridgeline to fall was Tololing in the Drass sub-sector on June 13, 1999. Tololing was captured after several weeks of bitter fighting. The attacks were preceded by sustained fire assaults from over one hundred artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers firing in concert. Thousands of shells, bombs and rocket warheads wreaked havoc on the targets and prevented the enemy from interfering with the assault. The 155 mm Bofors medium guns and 105 mm Indian field guns firing in the direct firing role from gun positions on the national highway under the nose of the enemy destroyed all visible sangars and forced the enemy to abandon several positions....

The capture of Tololing and the adjoining features paved the way for successive assaults to be launched on the Tiger Hill complex from several directions. In India’s first televised battle, after a series of multi-directional assaults, preceded by accurate and sustained preparatory bombardment by the artillery, Tiger Hill was re-captured on July 5, 1999 — in some of the most bloody fighting ever in the annals of military history. Artillery FOOs led from the front, fought shoulder-to-shoulder with their infantry company commanders and brought down unbelievably accurate fire on the objectives. At Tiger Hill, the leading platoon closed in within 40 to 50 metres of the shelling before the company commander asked for artillery covering fire to be lifted.

Once again, more than one hundred guns delivered murderous fire assaults.

Over 1,200 rounds of high explosive (HE) rained down on Tiger Hill in the space of five minutes and caused large-scale death and devastation. Once again, the Gunners of the Indian artillery fired their guns audaciously in the direct firing role under the very nose of Pakistani artillery observation posts (OPs) — without regard for personal safety. Even 122 mm Grad multi-barreled rocket launchers (MBRLs) were employed in the direct firing role. Hundreds of shells and rocket warheads impacted on the pinnacle of Tiger Hill in full view of TV cameras — and the nation watched in rapt attention as the might of the regiment of artillery burst forth in magnificent glory.

Three valiant officers and 34 brave soldiers of the regiment of artillery laid down their lives during the Kargil conflict in the true spirit of Izzat O Iqbal. The COAS honoured three units of the Regiment of artillery (141 field regiment, 197 field regiment and 108 medium regiment) with the special award of COAS Unit Citation. The officers, JCOs and jawans who served the guns in Kargil not only lived up to the glorious traditions of the regiment of artillery, but have also pushed the envelope of the regiment’s perpetual pursuit of professional excellence so much outwards that theirs will be a hard act to emulate for the succeeding generations of Gunners.
So in direct fire mode the guns destroyed the bunkers and sangars. Even 122 mm Grad rockets were used in direct fire. I guess due to the small range the dispersion was not a factor.
An NCC booklet on Kargil War.

https://indiancc.mygov.in/wp-content/up ... 836068.pdf
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

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An October 1999 paper in IDSA journal on Kargil

India’s Military Response to the Kargil Aggression

Published three months after the ceasefire.
The Learning Curve

Kargil has revealed many chinks in our armour. Do we intend to learn from history? Our history is replete with examples of our having failed to learn from our failures and debacles. Whether it was the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 or the Indo-Pak War of 1965 or even the intelligence failure in Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka in 1987, we ignored the lessons which were to be learnt from these episodes. George Bernard Shaw once stated, “Alas! Hegel was right when he said that we learn from history that men never learn from history.” Perhaps, the time is ripe for learning from our past mistakes and disproving the cynics. The need for evolving a national security doctrine was never stronger than it is now. The NSC (National Security Council) was formed on November 20, 1998, but it is yet to carry out a strategic defence review or evolve either a national security strategy or a doctrine. The first step towards evolving a doctrine and a strategy would be a clear and unambiguous statement of our national security objectives. The military strategy would be only a smaller but significant portion of our over-all national security strategy and will flow out from our national objectives. It seems that during the entire Kargil affair, the NSC was unable to perform adequately the expected role for which it has been tasked. The failure of our surveillance and intelligence machinery is so monumental that if we do not learn from it and do not revamp our intelligence structures, it will amount to committing treason. 17

The other flaw in our outlook on defence matters which, we have been attempting to rectify, is the integration of the MoD (Ministry of Defence) with our Services Headquarters. This is a situation unique to our country—the only one where this dysfunctional anomaly exists. The need to integrate the MoD with Services Headquarters has been widely accepted but attempts by our defence minister to achieve this integration are yet to succeed. He had imparted impetus to the exercise of integration with the MoD in the month of January 1999 but these efforts have petered out, largely because of bureaucratic obstacles. It is believed that the DGDPS (Director General of Defence Planning Staff) had presented a paper on this issue. There are any number of reports and recommendations already in existence, which could have formed the basis for restructuring and integration. The Arun Singh Committee Report of 1991 was one such model which could have been chosen for implementation. 18

So what happens in the absence of suitable higher defence organisations and structure? It reflects on the preparedness of our defence forces to meet any assault on our sovereignty. There is a lack of long-term perspective in building the capabilities of our armed forces. Even though we have five-year defence plans, our actual implementation of defence budgets is on an annual basis. The ninth five-year defence plan which was approved in principle last year, after having been successively downsized by the MoD and MoF (Ministry of Finance), is yet to be sanctioned. The earlier five-year plans met with varying fates.

In the era of the Nineties, the successive downsizing of the demands of the defence services by the MoD and MoF was to the tune of 20 to 22 per cent of the original demands. The cuts of such magnitudes were neither justified nor discussed by either the MoF or MoD with Services HQs. This resulted in the defence services losing out almost one defence budget every four to five years. This, in turn, resulted in deficiencies of ammunition, war-wastage reserves and stocks. The mission reliability of equipment and armaments was also affected. The lack of funds also restricted training for war. The programmes for modernisation and upgradation undertaken in the late Eighties were inexorably delayed.

As a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the defence expenditure has dwindled as of now to 2.31 per cent as compared to 3.59 per cent in 1987. This translated into a significant decline in the then favourable force ratio of 2:1 against Pakistan. This had a negative impact on our armed forces’ state of training and readiness. Gen. Pervez Musharraf had made a statement to the effect that the conventional edge of the Indian Army had eroded because of its pre-occupation with Pak-inspired insurgency and various other factors like constraints of the economy. That is, perhaps, why he was not deterred from marching into Kargil.

If we have to acquire war-prevention capabilities, we need to restore the conventional edge in favour of our defence forces. The nuclear factor in the subcontinent also dictates that we build up strong conventional defence capabilities so that the nuclear threshold is not crossed in an earlier time-frame. 19 The implementation of plans for modernisation and upgradation can no longer be delayed. There is also requirement to fill up the voids in our armaments, stores, and war-like materials, spares, equipment and ammunition that have been created over a number of years. This will require stepping up our defence expenditure to approximately 3.5 per cent over the next two five-year plans which would release adequate funds to fill up existing voids and for sustained development of our defence capabilities. 20

We also need to look at the methods and procedures of apportioning of the defence budget to the three services. The budget to each service is allotted based on past precedents and some historical and mathematical ratios without taking a holistic view. There is a complete absence of joint defence planning. There is no mechanism to decide whether procurement of a flight of Sukhois or purchase of a naval frigate or a squadron of armed attack helicopters or a squadron of tanks would give us the required military utility or combat value effectiveness in consonance with our overall military strategy. The post-Kargil purchases of equipment need to be tempered with our objectives of getting the maximum “rumble for the rupee”.

It is quite evident that we have to introduce the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) technologies to improve the cutting edge of our armed forces. Whether it is the state-of-the-art battlefield surveillance systems, ground and air based sensors or long-range precision weapons, night-vision devices, air-mounted radars or satellite surveillance and communication systems—all these armaments and equipment would give a tremendous force-multiplier effect to our forces. Some of these would be capital-intensive initially, but would pay back over a longer period because of requirement of lower manning-levels and the resultant savings on manpower costs. Further, these technologies would help us in reducing the “fog, friction and chance” in future wars.

In this era of information-age knowledge-based warfare, jointmanship between the three services is also becoming an essential factor for success in war. 21 The elements of jointmanship were seen in the joint army and air force effort in vacating the aggression in Kargil. However, we are yet to evolve a joint doctrine or joint structures for prosecution of wars and conflicts, which are becoming increasingly complex to handle. 22 The phenomenon of each service having its own singular perception on prosecution of war is not unique to India. Such differences in the perceptions of each service exist in countries like the USA and UK also. After its failures in the Vietnam War, Iran and Haiti, the USA introduced legislation, that is, the GNA (Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986) for unification of the armed forces of the USA. We already have some recommendations of the Arun Singh Committee, which deal with the concepts of joint and integrated structures in the armed forces. We need to introduce legislation on the lines of the GNA to force the issue.

Within the army itself greater attention needs to be paid to modernisation of the infantry on priority basis. The border manning and internal security duties need to be handed over to the paramilitary forces. This may require augmentation and modernisation of paramilitary forces. The long-range precision strike power of the artillery needs to be enhanced to give deterrent punishment to the enemy in case “many more Kargils” are launched. If future wars are going to be limited in scope, duration and depth, with inhibitions on escalation, then we also need to have a re-look at the structuring of our deep battle assets in terms of armoured and mechanised formations, without, in any way, diminishing their combat capabilities. 23 Also, the ratio of information assets to ordnance assets within the Indian Army is one of the lowest among the armed forces of the world. While in the USA this ratio is 1:4, and in the UK it is 1:8, in our armed forces it is less than 1:20. What it means is that we have a preponderance of weapon platforms but do not have matching capabilities in surveillance and target acquisition assets like satellites, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), gun locating radars. For instance, we have Prithvi missiles, long-range guns and multi-barrel rocket launchers but do not have information assets to exploit their full potential and combat capabilities. To optimise defence expenditure, a trade-off between the two, as an interim measure, is warranted.

It is also quite evident that the long-delayed modernisation and upgradation plans of the air force and navy need to be imparted an impetus. Both the strategic and tactical components of the air force need to be strengthened. The future wars would not only be fought on land, air, sea and in the electro-magnetic spectrum but also along information highways and information fronts. However, in the subcontinent, like in the past, the future wars would continue to be dominated by land warfare. Concepts of victory through air or sea a la the Gulf War of 1991 and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air strikes on Kosovo, do hold some lessons for us, but in the subcontinental context, it would be a joint air land campaign, possibly supported by the navy, which would win us the next Kargil-like war.
Not much has changed even 23 years later.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by vimal »

Kargil War में Pakistan ने क्या ग़लती की थी? तत्कालीन Information Minister ने बताया (BBC Hindi)
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by ramana »

Dr Prem Mahadevan in CLAWS
Perils of Prediction Indian Intelligence and the Kargil Crisis

https://www.claws.in/publication/the-pe ... il-crisis/

He uses a couple of references for BR Monitor.
Also buried deep in the paper is the ref to 150 sorties by IAF planes that mapped the occupied posts and changed the Kargil War outcome.
Not much is written about this even by Air Force.
From 26 May onwards, the counter-attack in Kargil took on the nature
of a limited war.
This dramatic escalation had not been foreseen by the
Pakistani officers who had planned the intrusion. Over the following weeks,
a combination of aerial reconnaissance and artillery bombardment turned the
military situation in India’s favour. Approximately 150 reconnaissance flights by
the Air Force produced several thousand photographs of Pakistani defences.69
Working with these, Indian infantrymen switched from high-visibility to low visibility
tactics, infiltrating past Pakistani defences at night and attacking from
the flank. The Army deployed 300 artillery pieces in the combat zone, firing
a total of 250,000 shells.
Wireless intercepts recorded the desperation which
set in among the intruders, with one telling his commanders in Pakistan, “Hell
has fallen on us.”70 Urgent requests for resupply and reinforcement were
overheard.
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Re: Kargil War Thread - VI

Post by Anujan »

Some of it is covered in this very fascinating read


https://carnegieendowment.org/files/kargil.pdf

Also includes tidbits like

Image
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