India's R&D in Defence DRDO, PSUs and Private Sector

[RayC]

So prove yourself that you(Army) have that scientific temper. Whos asking not to ?

Heard of Lt Col Gurdial Singh?

He designed the Gurdial Mountain Gun in the 50s which became the backbone of the IA.

Now, he did not have scientific temper? I agree he was a Sardar and so you would attribute some other temper to him.

I knew him personally and yes, he had a temper, scientific and otherwise!

T 90 is no replacement for the Arjun when it comes. It is an interim measure and if you had read by post you would have realised the necessity for interim measures.

One cannot be Little Bo Peep and expect the sheep to come home with their tails behind them and in the meantime, the Big Bad Wolf of REd Riding Hood devouring us!!

[Kanson]

If Operational requirement of Army is reflected in GSQR, then a big question, does the T-90S which Army purchased satisfied the GSQR of Arjun.

One fact is that, the GSQR for Arjun stipulated a first shot hit probability of 90% and above. Does T-90S tank has this accuracy ?

This clearly proves that Army's GSQR is more likely a copy paste from jane's than reflecting their need for Operational requirement.

[chackojoseph]

So prove yourself that you(Army) have that scientific temper. Whos asking not to ?

Heard of Lt Col Gurdial Singh?

He designed the Gurdial Mountain Gun in the 50s which became the backbone of the IA.

Now, he did not have scientific temper? I agree he was a Sardar and so you would attribute some other temper to him.

I knew him personally and yes, he had a temper, scientific and otherwise!

T 90 is no replacement for the Arjun when it comes. It is an interim measure and if you had read by post you would have realised the necessity for interim measures.

One cannot be Little Bo Peep and expect the sheep to come home with their tails behind them and in the meantime, the Big Bad Wolf of REd Riding Hood devouring us!!

Just one? terrific scientific temper.

[Kanson]

So prove yourself that you(Army) have that scientific temper. Whos asking not to ?

Heard of Lt Col Gurdial Singh?

He designed the Gurdial Mountain Gun in the 50s which became the backbone of the IA.

Now, he did not have scientific temper? I agree he was a Sardar and so you would attribute some other temper to him.

I knew him personally and yes, he had a temper, scientific and otherwise!

T 90 is no replacement for the Arjun when it comes. It is an interim measure and if you had read by post you would have realised the necessity for interim measures.

One cannot be Little Bo Peep and expect the sheep to come home with their tails behind them and in the meantime, the Big Bad Wolf of REd Riding Hood devouring us!!

So for the Army's existence of 60 yrs there is only one example to quote that happene in 1950s. Is not actually reflecting the exact "scientifc temper" of ARmy, isnt it?

[RayC]

RayC sir,

I don't know if you saw my post earlier in previous page, i am posting this again for your benefit.

Rayc,

I read again to understand. You said nothing wrong.

You cannot visualize. You are bang on target with that. So, what does Indian Army do? Wring its hands and give up?

If you look at other relevant armies, they have scrambled up and brought out newer and newer weapons. US never visualised 9/11. It happened, it changed its weapons and tactics. It is ahead of Indian Army in both in my opinion and mind you, a part of their army learn't from the Indian Army.

No, the IA should do the best it can given their competence or otherwise.

[RayC]

Heard of Lt Col Gurdial Singh?

He designed the Gurdial Mountain Gun in the 50s which became the backbone of the IA.

Now, he did not have scientific temper? I agree he was a Sardar and so you would attribute some other temper to him.

I knew him personally and yes, he had a temper, scientific and otherwise!

T 90 is no replacement for the Arjun when it comes. It is an interim measure and if you had read by post you would have realised the necessity for interim measures.

One cannot be Little Bo Peep and expect the sheep to come home with their tails behind them and in the meantime, the Big Bad Wolf of REd Riding Hood devouring us!!

So for the Army's existence of 60 yrs there is only one example to quote that happene in 1950s. Is not actually reflecting the exact "scientifc temper" of ARmy, isnt it?

Look, the IA is serious business and it does not include noting down by all and sundry as to who had scientific temper or otherwise.

Please understand, next you will ask me to give you the Army List as if I was an Army List gazer!

We are going OT.

If you feel that the GSQR is copy and paste so be it and the DRDO accepts this copy and paste! OK, the Army and the DRDO do not know their job!

A total let down, both of these organisation. Happy?

[Kanson]

T 90 is no replacement for the Arjun when it comes. It is an interim measure and if you had read by post you would have realised the necessity for interim measures

If the Army could accept the T-90 as interim, what stopped them from accepting the Arjun as it is as interim at that time. By 2000, production for Arjun Okayed. Why Army went for 1000 more ? as you say T-90s purchase is interim.

[chackojoseph]

No, the IA should do the best it can given their competence or otherwise.

1 more fact before i close my computer. IA's GSQR's have been " the catalogs."

Mame any requirement, they are written tailor made to suit the existing products from foreign markets. It s a far cry from JLTV's and other latest US requirements to meet future battle field.

And after donkey years, IA's new GSQR will be "JLTV."

[Kanson]

Look, the IA is serious business and it does not include noting down by all and sundry as to who had scientific temper or otherwise.

Please understand, next you will ask me to give you the Army List as if I was an Army List gazer!

We are going OT.

Even if you are the list gazer, there is nothing to provide..the jar is almost empty. You are right, if, IA considerd scientifc temper as serious business, probably it would have taken that list...it hasnt that temper so no list...

[Sanku]

Changing gun barrel from 105 to 155mm is a big design change. Having reactive armor is another big change.

155mm? I think you wanted to say 120 mm (from 105) and that change was made between 1974 and 1976 so I can very well be charitable and give 2 more years (although I should not because parallel development means that the gun change should only be affected not the whole tank)

Fine.

How often should a GSQR change? Should it change in 5-6 years when the project development phase itself is around 8-10 years?

First GSQR 1972-1974
Second 1974-1976
Third 1994-96

That does not seem terribly drastic to me?

Further Arjun was not in shape to meet even 76 GSQRs in 94? And wanted more time, so a change in GSQRs does get forced does it not.

As I said the cause and effect between GSQR change and delay is actually the other way around.

-------------

And Oh lets use Chacko's page only
http://frontierindia.net/history-of-arj ... evelopment

The design and development of MBT based on GSQR No. 326 was taken up by the Combat Vehicle Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE). The initial outlay of Rs. 15.50 Crore was sanctioned vide the Government of India (GOI) letter dated 02 May, 1974. Project Development Certification (PDC) of the project was 10 years from the date of sanction.

In April 1978, the Indian Army called DRDO for a meeting for mutual discussions. The aim was to change the GSQR No. 326. A series of meetings between DRDO and Indian Army, chaired by VCOAS resulted in change in GSQR. The new GSQR bearing the number 431 was issued in August 1982.

The changes in the GSQR No. 431 were

a)Increase in width and weight
b)110/115mm gun was to be replaced with a 120mm gun.
c)Improved Sighting and Fire Control system.

The PDC of the project was revised. The first prototype was to be built by October 1980 and subsequently 12 prototypes were to be developed, one in every 6 months.

Now did we have the prototypes working to IAs GSQRs in 1985?

Okay so Chako says

This prompted Indian Army to change its GSQR and in November 1985, third GSQR No. 467 was issued. The changes in GSQR were:

However Chacko seems to have missed this part
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... un-dev.htm

The automotive trials of two prototypes carried out by Army during 1988-89 revealed major deficiencies. The Army, therefore, on 26 July 1989 wanted these deficiencies to be sorted out before commencement of production of pre-production series (PPS). However, on 31 July 1989 Ministry decided to place orders for the production of PPS tanks. Two fully integrated prototypes were given to the Army for full fledged evaluation only in March 1990 after the commencement of production of PPS tanks. The evaluation trials of the prototypes also revealed major deficiencies. Subsequent trials were conducted on PPS tanks.

Note the above has NOTHING to do with GSQR changes in 1985!!

The Arjun was not meeting the 1974 GSQRs.

Then there were no GSQR changes even as per Chacko; only minor improvements.

And then --

Till July 1997, 15 pre-production series tanks which were subjected to extensive user and troop trials failed to meet fully even the bottom line parameters of the user. The Army accordingly indicated in July 1997 that in its present form, the overall reliability of MBT Arjun was far from satisfactory. The Army further indicated that periodic failures of equipment and subsystems tend to reduce the confidence level of troops. The Army also observed that the aspect of armour protection had not been tried out.Army recommended in June 1997 that Limited Series Production should commence only after all the observations and shortcomings noticed were rectified and shown to them.

[Sanku]

No, the IA should do the best it can given their competence or otherwise.

1 more fact before i close my computer. IA's GSQR's have been " the catalogs."

Mame any requirement, they are written tailor made to suit the existing products from foreign markets. It s a far cry from JLTV's and other latest US requirements to meet future battle field.

And after donkey years, IA's new GSQR will be "JLTV."

But isnt it obvious, IA would be happy if it could be even given comprabale product, while US Army already has the best in class and is looking ahead.

If our Mil-Ind complex gives the state of the art today after 25 years in future, should IA be asking for future requirements?

Then everyone would be saying "look at IA, they want even over US, such stuck up folks they are".

Hey folks, if the Mil-Ind complex does not deliver what it promises the IA on the basics, that issues can not be mitigated by cursing the IA for its requirements.

If they dont like IAs requirement or think it foolish -- let them complain to the MoD, who will decide the Army is being foolish and force down the equipment, just like T 72s were to an extent forced down.

[chetak]

{the promotion bit was not my argument and my point actually says the points suggest otherwise. the award was given because his work was appreciated by DRDO, nothing more nothing less}

Rahul M ji,

Sometimes the hand is forced by circumstances much beyond one's control. Powerful sources would doubtless have made some gentle suggestions to the powers that be and presto, the award!

It is a fact that DRDO oldtimers did not hold Paulraj in high regard. He threatened them by his very existence and unexpected success.
Had Paulraj continued his sonar development work it could have put a lot of small minded fellows in grief. They maintain to this day that his contribution was over hyped. You will not find this in any website!!! I have heard this in many bitter discussions which took place where they said that a guy without a degree could not produce original work. They said that his MTech and PhD was political.

Boy! did they ever get that one wrong.

That Paulraj was diplomatic and magnanimous under such circumstances, shows that he was situationally aware and did not want to jeopardize his future by petty mudslinging. Just because he did not abuse anyone and did not mouth off in public does not mean that all was hunky dory as you claim.

Today and from many years past, the Military Officer and the DRDO scientist have gotten their MTechs from the same sources. There is nothing extraordinary about the scientist. They also put on their trousers one leg at a time!

The Service Officer has oftentimes gotten better grades because otherwise his ass would be grass! He is more disciplined and hunkers down to produce results because otherwise his career would be toast.
There are also some foreign returned Service Officer MTechs and PhDs who have been sent to DRDO at their repeated requests.

[Picklu]

When the new capabilities are aimed for then it becomes a new product and its a new project.

Kanson; sorry for asking this, have you ever worked in any engineering company (which does R&D) outside a PSU?

Because the above is hilarious, to say the least. Any engineering company worth its salt takes a fair number of change requests while still adhering to the old time lines.

sorry, could not resist .. what to do, I DO work for an engineering company and I guess I am a ghost and died long back due to overwork while delivering change requests and still adhering to the old time lines

[Rahul M]

chetak ji, you are more or less saying what you said yesterday, right ?

unfortunately, whatever info we have from
public sources :
> paulraj gets an award from DRDO, not just any old award, DRDO scientist of the year award,
> he himself speaks highly of his time at NPOL
> he is allowed to go to stanford for 2 years by DRDO (he had left navy by that time) a place later went back to
> he comes back and heads a DRDO lab as its founding director working in his chosen area of study

all backed up by a pvt source I consider VERY reliable, doesn't lend AT ALL to the story that DRDO in general acted against him in any way. you may have heard a couple of bitter jealous folk from DRDO but I daresay there will be similar people in navy too.

there is no damn place on this planet where petty politics is absent, if you are telling me it only exists in DRDO but not in IN, well..... the howrah bridge is on sale.

[Sanku]

sorry, could not resist .. what to do, I DO work for an engineering company and I guess I am a ghost and died long back due to overwork while delivering change requests and still adhering to the old time lines

Welcome to the club of dead men then from a very old member. We salute you.

(There is no shortage of us btw)

Meanwhile note the context that the statement was made in and clarifications to Putnaja. Yes, some change requests take minor slips, some are incorporated in the planning buffer; some are made up by a competent experienced team pulling up its socks; and some are big ticket changes which result in a joint decision between the customer and the product developer.

However what does not happen is the developer claiming that the delay was users fault since they wanted features after the first specification AFTER about 20 years of having jointly agreed to do this with the user.

(And note, CVRDE is NOT saying that, GoI/MoD/IA/CVRDE accepts the delays and their causes and as moved on -- It is only the some folks on BRF who claim that on CVRDEs behalf -- DRDO as such has fully signed on to all the events -- as is to be expected)

[Avik]

Kanson et al : In case the forum at large is unaware of the Army's scientific temperament or lack threof, let me humbly submit a few examples:

IA Corps of Signals : Plan AREN, ASCON, Mobile communication net used by mechanized formations

IA Corps of Engineers: Mine laying and breaching : Automated mine laying equipment, SLUFAE Charge Line Mine Clearance.

Civil Structures : High Altitude Airfields in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, Pre Cast High Altitude Housing, Pressure Controlled High Altitude Hospitals and Aid Post, Kerosene Pipeline in Siachen (there are in fact full fledged plans for a cable car for troop movement in parts of the glacier), Khardung La Road etc.

Regiment of Arty : 105 mm IFG (Gurdial Gun), Catapult SPG, Moifications to the para droppable pack howitzers and the IMG

In fact one should also consider the operational enhancements made to deploy the 155 mm Bofors in the Kargil and Siachen mountains

Armoured Corps : Project Gulmohar (modification of the T-55 and its upgunning), Project Rhino, Upgunning of the Vijayanta tank at the Pune Base Wkshp

Air Defence Arty : Inhouse modifications and service life extension of both the Schilka Gun and the Kvadrat System which was carried out by the Meerut Base Workshop

Mech Infantry : Modification and overhaul of the Skot and Topaz APCs, Accuracy enhancement of the Malyutka and Konkross missile; Adaptation of the missiles for launch in high altitude and cross-loc bunker busting modes when the radar signature from the target is minimal.

Infantry : Modification of the standard 7.62 mm SLR for use as sniper rifle by mating with indigenous scope and utilising a very "desi" technique for flash suppression; modifications to the initial Sterling SMC (arguably, the actual product mods were carried out by the Ishapore factory after f/b from the Army);

The above are only a few of the technical modifications and enhancements that were carried out by the Army. So, hopefully the above small sample puts to rest the asinine comments about lack of scientific and technical competence within the Army.
I think it would help if people were to take a deep breath and realise that the Army is a user and as user it can at best carry out certain modifications and adaptations in the field after drawing from operational experience. It is not programmed/ set up/ structured to be a research organisation. It can at best support these initiatives especially when it feels that the DRDO has the capability to deliver. That realisation has begun to emerge only post 2000 once the DRDO has actually started delivering at least some 'ready to use' equipment. The IA is not different from any other Army in this attitude. Lets leave aside the US Army for the time being. Countries like UK and France also have organisations that are similar in charter to the DRDO ; but where those countries have a significant edge compared to DRDO is that their organisations have recourse to a significantly advanced mil-ind base which does not exist in India..yet. Hence, the transfer of technology from "pilot batch" to full scale production batches is that much easier in those countries. We still dont have this..it will probably take us 7-8 years to get there and till that time the friction between the DRDO and the user will persist. The DRDO thinks it suffices to develop a 80% proof product. The Army thinks that it should get a reliable , ready -to-go product from the factory. There is thus a significant gap between developing a product to mass-productionising it whether in defence equipment or automobiles or pharmaceuticals. Therin lies the rub for the gulf between the Army and DRDO.

There are other 'softer" issues between Army and DRDO , but that will be OT here.

Also, finally, respected Sirs, the Army drawn from its experience usually manages to modify tactics and in some cases equipment to suit the environment. It is for this reason that the Army was confidently able to deploy Bofors guns to Kargil even though the manufacturer specified a far more limited range!! There are a multitude of other examples in all kinds of theaters to prove the deep ingenuity of the IA. So, while the IA is not an all knowing, omniscient prima donna, lets give the user credit , because after all experience trumps cyber know-alls, especially those making off the cuff remarks about tactics.

[Kanson]

Dear Avik,

Thanks for participating in the discussion. Are you saying drdo didnt worked in automated mine laying equipment, or the Mine laying and breaching vehicle..

Project Gulmohar (modification of the T-55 and its upgunning), Project Rhino, Upgunning of the Vijayanta tank

Are you projecting this as complete in-house Army project ?

Anyway, before going into this, the argument about scientific temper started with the framing of GSQR Vs Operational Requirement. I shared the view expressed by Col. Kaul that most of the time GSQR is a copy paste of Jane's. Pls go throu the discussion here on this page about Arjun and T-90S. We have the view, that every GSQR is considered as new project. Do you like to share your views on this...

[Avik]

Dear Kanson,
Thank You ! I greatly respect the contributions made by esteemed forumites like you and I am much the luckier for being able to tap into this storehouse of knowledge.

Now let me first answer the questions on automated mine laying and CLMC. I am quite sure that the automated mine laying was developed by the Army on its own. It is a fairly practical, simple and dare I say ingenious system. The CLMC on the other hand had been in development in the 70's and it finally culminated in a major tragedy in Pune during a demonstration , when a Bombay Sapper JCO sacrificed himself to save the lives of India's scientific and military top brass. If I remember, the JCO earned a posthumous Shaurya chakra for his troubles for saving the nation's crown jewels. Anyhow, what is germane is that this system which was pursued quite vigorously by the Corps of Engineers was not inducted for large scale use and remained a tech demonstartor.

Now, about the Arjun, I am told that orders for new Arjuns will be included in the next plan period wef 2012. I am not sure whether these will be for Arjuns - Mk 1, 2 or 10. I think the point that needs to be made here is that capital expenditure of the scale that would be required to induct Arjuns are typically included in the 5 year plans. To that respect, Arjun, since it is expected to meet the GSQRs may (will) get a fresh batch of large orders. The Army's induction plan for major weapon systems is really laid down to a large extent by the five year plan. Hence, you have situations, whereby the Army is seen to induct only a couple of regiments of Pinakas. Now that these rockets are proven, they are expected to receive larger volumes in the plan period starting 2012. The same has been the case with INSAS, Prithvis etc. Lets not blame the Army for this..this really is the nature of our system.

To illustrate, let me take the example of lets say, Hanuman tank. Lets say the Army accepts it in 2010. HVF Avadi may provide a couple of dozen units of Hanuman tanks till 2012 March. Once the new plan period comes into effect from April 2012, the Army places an order for (lets say) ~ 550 tanks ( 372 for the Armoured Regiments of lets say 4 Armoured Div + 50 tanks for the integral ER of the 4'th AD + 124 tanks for the Indep Armd Brig + 12 tanks for the Engr Support Sqn). The IA would expect to receive the tanks by 2014. But the "nature" of our system is such that the MoD will approve funds for expansion of capacity in HVF only by 2012 (after the approval in the 5 yr plan). HVF will take at least 1 year to order, receive and set up the new tooling. The pilot batches will then take at least 3-4 months. And only then will production start to go up following the step function. The big if really, is that HVF has not (to the best of my rather limited knowledge) manufactured more than 50-60 fully built units per annum. So, to manufacture 550 + tanks from 2014 onwards within 2-3 years is a big..big ask. Hence, we should realistically expect HVF to manufacture the initial order for ~ 550 tanks only by around 2020 or thereabouts. Hence, the big question about what to do in the interim. Hence, the utility of the much reviled T-90, which is available from Mother Russia.
Now, at this stage, one could ask why T-90 and not Leo-2 or Chally-2? The answer is a combination of finances and the need to set up a huge infra for something that can at best be a gap filler ( Chally's and Leos). In any case, the T-90's are not much of a change from t-72's and hence, units can be trained and type qualification provided rapidly.
Now, in the midst of all this verbiage, if I have lost out the original question on GSQR', pls forgive me! Suffice to say that the Arjun is being considered a viable proposition only post 2000 after all the basic defects have been ironed out. Because Arjun has only in the last couple of years emerged as a viable proposition, it will receive its mass production orders hopefully in the upcoming 5 yr cycle. BTW, I would assume it realistic to consider changes to GSQRs in a 30 year period especially if the first prototype was sought to be a heavily modified Vijayant..the second revised prototype was based on some aspects of the Leo-1 and the latest version is expected to be somewhat close to contemporary designs like Leo-2. So, really, from a Chieftain-I to a Leo-II is quite a bit to travel!! Hence, the time required by CVRDE to develop the Arjun. OTOH if CVRDE had thought of developing on the existing Russian platforms like T-54/55s , a-la the Chinese, possibly the development cycle could have been far shorter and possibly..possibly instead of the T-90, we would be inducting the Bharatiya Tank-100. But this is OT. The main fact is that it is unrealistic to expect the IA to wait, when in all likelihood, mass manufacture of Arjuns will begin only by the mid of this decade.

[Kavu]

^^That did open my eyes quite a bit. Thanks,Awesome post.

[putnanja]

Now, in the midst of all this verbiage, if I have lost out the original question on GSQR', pls forgive me! Suffice to say that the Arjun is being considered a viable proposition only post 2000 after all the basic defects have been ironed out. Because Arjun has only in the last couple of years emerged as a viable proposition, it will receive its mass production orders hopefully in the upcoming 5 yr cycle. BTW, I would assume it realistic to consider changes to GSQRs in a 30 year period especially if the first prototype was sought to be a heavily modified Vijayant..the second revised prototype was based on some aspects of the Leo-1 and the latest version is expected to be somewhat close to contemporary designs like Leo-2. So, really, from a Chieftain-I to a Leo-II is quite a bit to travel!! Hence, the time required by CVRDE to develop the Arjun. OTOH if CVRDE had thought of developing on the existing Russian platforms like T-54/55s , a-la the Chinese, possibly the development cycle could have been far shorter and possibly..possibly instead of the T-90, we would be inducting the Bharatiya Tank-100. But this is OT. The main fact is that it is unrealistic to expect the IA to wait, when in all likelihood, mass manufacture of Arjuns will begin only by the mid of this decade.

Avik, if Arjun was found to be viable in 2000, why wasn't more orders placed then? Why did it stop at 124? For a successfull production run, the army needs to say how many it will order, and the production will be scaled up for that order size. Like others have said earlier, if army orders 124 tanks, no company in the world will install production machinery to manufacture 124 tanks in one or two years. What will they do with the production line and workers after 2 years? Why did the Army continue ordering T-90s in batches since 2000, and didn't do the same for arjun? The T-90 is as much if not more obsolete than Arjun.

[Rahul M]

avik, the 5 year plan idea is very nice to know. now, is it something that applies to only made in India systems ? one seriously wonders why these problems don't crop up with ordering the T-90 in thousands but only in case of the lowly pinaka or the arjun ?

secondly, the arjun was ready to be inducted at the end of the 90's itself, there was no need to wait till the middle of 2000's for that. the logic becomes even more laughable when to make-up for the slow production rate at HVF you order T-90's to be made at HVF !

btw, IIRC HVF's theoretical installed capacity for T-72's was around 200/year, it produced at the rate of ~100/yr (even higher for some years but my memory goes weak) quite regularly in the 90's, so that point is quashed too ?

oh and btw, a number of those projects you mentioned had more than significant DRDO/DPSU involvement.

BTW, I would assume it realistic to consider changes to GSQRs in a 30 year period especially if the first prototype was sought to be a heavily modified Vijayant..the second revised prototype was based on some aspects of the Leo-1 and the latest version is expected to be somewhat close to contemporary designs like Leo-2. So, really, from a Chieftain-I to a Leo-II is quite a bit to travel!! Hence, the time required by CVRDE to develop the Arjun. OTOH if CVRDE had thought of developing on the existing Russian platforms like T-54/55s , a-la the Chinese, possibly the development cycle could have been far shorter and possibly..possibly instead of the T-90, we would be inducting the Bharatiya Tank-100.

it was not CVRDE's decision to make. it was army's decision. if you have to blame someone blame the one who took that decision, not the one who executed it.

personally, I think the decision by IA to go for the western model was 100% correct.

The main fact is that it is unrealistic to expect the IA to wait, when in all likelihood, mass manufacture of Arjuns will begin only by the mid of this decade.

not quite. the main fact is that the production began in 2007 precisely because of dragging of feet by the army.

[Rahul M]

Avik, if Arjun was found to be viable in 2000, why wasn't more orders placed then? Why did it stop at 124?

forget more orders, even the 124 originally ordered were not acceptable to the army by that time, citing different song and dance routines. production started only after the govt force-fed the 124 tanks in 2007.

[Rahul M]

****A Blast From the Past****

I'll add more snippets over the next few days.

For those who continue to peddle the falsehood that
a) the arjun was CVRDE's idea, army had nothing to do with it
b) arjun trials were complete failures till 2007 etc

I'm appending some quotes, only from IA officers and I've avoided comments from DRDO officials since quite clearly, some people will argue they are not unbiased. anyway :

India-Today Nov 15, 1985

"the tank prototype weighs around 50 tonne, can do up to 70kmph, has a 120mm rifled gun and is said to be as good as any MBT in the world"

"The tank should be ready within the decade. It will be among the best in the world"
-- Gen AS Vaidya, COAS

".....three prototypes are already under trials : one at the laboratory, second in the
sands of rajasthan, third in the army's firing ranges at Balasore .... "

"..it incorporates everything the army's GSQR asked for, including night vision and the
ability to fire while on the move. it is comparable to the XM-1 abrams and the west german
leopard-II" -- Maj Gen RS Chawla, Director, Combat Vehicles Research.

Speaking of Gurdial Singh :

India-Today July 15, 1993

......the new army Chief, Gen BC Joshi, feels the criticism against the tank is a hangover from the past. "The tank is a winner. The major problems have been surmounted and others
that remain are lickable"

"...rank with US XM-1 in the bracket of top tanks in the world"
-- Lt Gen Ajai Singh Director-General, Combat Vehicles.

"What is indigenous about the tank is its design, which is tailored to meet our operational
requirements. Only those items which are restricted need to be indigenised"
-- Gen BC Joshi, COAS.

"Apart from the french leclerc Arjun is the only MBT in the world to have the
hydro-pneumatic suspension, which was insisted upon by the former army chief Gen K Sundarji.
The HSU gives the tank a speed of upto 70 Km per hourand a stable platform for firing as the
gun's tilt is reduced "

....In february the tank recorded 33 out of 36 hits on an average, including some while the
tank was moving. In june, firing from a stationary tank the average improved to 19 out of
20 hits with APFSDS ammunition. Maj. Gen Gurdial Singh, who is now with DRDO {I'm sure that makes him a traitor in chetak's book }, said :
" With Arjun achieving a hit probability of 95 %, its survivability is very high".
He also pointed out that the separation of the ammunition from the crew made the arjun very
safe. Last year, the entire crew of a T-72 tank was burnt alive when it caught fire during
an exercise.

My comment : The article also mentions that russia was offering the T-80 and if we fell for
it the arjun project will be thrown back by at least a decade. which is precisely what
happened.

[Avik]

Putnanja : IA did place an order for 124 tanks which was suppossed to be delivered a while back. But that order is being fulfilled only now. The IA typically places an initial order for a smller lot size to test out the equipment and reframe/validate/modify tactics. Hence, the IA orders not just 124 tanks but also only 145 howitzers from BAe when the requirement is clearly for many more units. The next higher lot size order follows once the initial lot is found to be acceptable. The same logic was followed for Tunguska AAA Guns, Pinaka Rocket Launchers, Counter Battery Radars and also the INSAS system. Hence, it is the norm which is applied across all systems and not just indian or indigenous ones!

RahulM: The production rate of equipment made from CKD/SKD kits is usually much higher compared to those that are manufactured completely ab-initio. Hence, the higher output rate for T-90s (and T-72s)
That besides, the more important question is whether, the OEM supply programme has been fully established for mass manufacturing Arjuns. Given that a lot of the sub-systems for Arjun will be procured from vendors that would be manufacturing these products for the first time, the issue really is whether enough manufacturing has been developed to ensure that the indigenous vendors are able to supply the parts necessary for mass manufacturing Arjuns? Also, given that some Arjun components are sourced from abroad, has the manufacturer/MoD had the foresight to seek import waivers/licenses to import these products in bulk? It is these operational and manufacturing related issues that will lead to an initial slow build up of Arjun's output rate. Once these kinks are worked out , and this would take some time, Arjun's output rate will increase. So what does the IA do in the meantime? Hence, it sought T-90s which could be assembled relatively quickly from SKD/CKD

[putnanja]

Putnanja : IA did place an order for 124 tanks which was suppossed to be delivered a while back. But that order is being fulfilled only now. The IA typically places an initial order for a smller lot size to test out the equipment and reframe/validate/modify tactics. Hence, the IA orders not just 124 tanks but also only 145 howitzers from BAe when the requirement is clearly for many more units. The next higher lot size order follows once the initial lot is found to be acceptable. The same logic was followed for Tunguska AAA Guns, Pinaka Rocket Launchers, Counter Battery Radars and also the INSAS system. Hence, it is the norm which is applied across all systems and not just indian or indigenous ones!

RahulM: The production rate of equipment made from CKD/SKD kits is usually much higher compared to those that are manufactured completely ab-initio. Hence, the higher output rate for T-90s (and T-72s)
That besides, the more important question is whether, the OEM supply programme has been fully established for mass manufacturing Arjuns. Given that a lot of the sub-systems for Arjun will be procured from vendors that would be manufacturing these products for the first time, the issue really is whether enough manufacturing has been developed to ensure that the indigenous vendors are able to supply the parts necessary for mass manufacturing Arjuns? Also, given that some Arjun components are sourced from abroad, has the manufacturer/MoD had the foresight to seek import waivers/licenses to import these products in bulk? It is these operational and manufacturing related issues that will lead to an initial slow build up of Arjun's output rate. Once these kinks are worked out , and this would take some time, Arjun's output rate will increase. So what does the IA do in the meantime? Hence, it sought T-90s which could be assembled relatively quickly from SKD/CKD

Avik, the tanks and Howitzers comparision you have made is not valid. We are looking at around 145 guns for the light artillery tender, with no additional options. However, we are looking out for around 2000 pieces of towed and self-propelled artillery, which is different from the ultra-light MH777 artillery.

Avik, you are again missing the point. You don't do license production of imported items till the number of orders are in a viable range. If you need 100-200 parts, then local production will make it more expensive. You just import those items. But if you want 1000-2000 items, then you start producing them locally.

Like Rahul pointed out earlier, the MoD had to force feed 124 arjuns to the army. Unless the army states that it intends to order 1000 tanks in say 5-8 years, who will start planning for their production?

[Avik]

Putnanja : The 145 howitzer contract is just part of the contract for equipping the mountain arty regiments. More orders for this type will follow. The orders and numbers for the SP howitzers and the towed guns is separate. But anyhow, this was just an illustrative example. Pls check how many Tunguska AAA systems were ordered by the IA in the first lot. The initial lot size was small followed by a larger order. This is not a new precedent; it is the norm being followed for many years. It was the same when the IA ordered BM-21s and Schilka guns or Armoured Engineer tractors and other equipments from abroad. Hence, the point, that this norm is not restricted to indigenous equipment alone.

About the numbers in the first lot of Arjuns : 124- Its turning out to be a circular argument. The IA is simply following what it usually does for most equipment. Orders a small lot size..if it meets requirements..then, orders a next larger lot. Hence, the order for 124 tanks. If these can be supplied in the agreed time frame and they meet the performance requirements, then the IA places orders for more Arjuns.

Frankly, I dont see a deep-seated conspiracy by the IA here. Organisations are used to specific operating procedures and templates and IA is just following its usual norm!

[ramana]

Anyway what parts of Arjun Tank are imported and from where?

[putnanja]

Putnanja : The 145 howitzer contract is just part of the contract for equipping the mountain arty regiments. More orders for this type will follow. The orders and numbers for the SP howitzers and the towed guns is separate. But anyhow, this was just an illustrative example. Pls check how many Tunguska AAA systems were ordered by the IA in the first lot. The initial lot size was small followed by a larger order. This is not a new precedent; it is the norm being followed for many years. It was the same when the IA ordered BM-21s and Schilka guns or Armoured Engineer tractors and other equipments from abroad. Hence, the point, that this norm is not restricted to indigenous equipment alone.

About the numbers in the first lot of Arjuns : 124- Its turning out to be a circular argument. The IA is simply following what it usually does for most equipment. Orders a small lot size..if it meets requirements..then, orders a next larger lot. Hence, the order for 124 tanks. If these can be supplied in the agreed time frame and they meet the performance requirements, then the IA places orders for more Arjuns.

Frankly, I dont see a deep-seated conspiracy by the IA here. Organisations are used to specific operating procedures and templates and IA is just following its usual norm!

Avik, there has been no mention of follow up order on light artillery. However, let us not get distracted on that.

The bolded part, where the army says it doesn't meet requirement and hence doesnt' want to order more is the point of contention. The army has never said so far that it is not ordering more due to lack of production capacity or production issues. That is an argument made here by some postors, thats all. the army initially said it didn't meet requirement, and then said that even though it meets requirement now, it is an obsolete design and they want a futuristic tank.

And regarding production, it is not a circular argument. If the army had been satisified with the initial order and expressed its willingness to order more, production would be ramped up. The army has never ever said so far that it intends to order more than 124, and hence there has been no production ramp up.

[a_kumar]

The story so far seems to be..

Lets say "DRDO delays"/"IA GSQR-changes" pretty much went hand in hand initially. Then it seems like DRDO-IA ended up in a cycle of delay-GSQR.

Note that both IA/DRDO were new to setting GSQR and building tanks
IA -----> Changes GSQR.
DRDO --> Delays the program not necessarily due to GSQR
IA -----> Changes GSQR again because of delays
DRDO --> More delays because of GSQR
IA -----> Changes GSQR again because of delays
DRDO --> More delays because of further changes.

But, can't we get over this chicken-egg argument, which can go on forever.

IA : Ofcourse GSQR has to change with times, even though it could be minimized by employing creative minds early on.
DRDO : Building from ground up will result in delays and GSQR changes will mean more delays. They could be minimized (not prevented) by possibly modular concepts or scalable processes, but only to some extent.

Are either of them reasons to throwaway the now fully developed product that is contemporary and instead create Russian jobs? In the end, the system has to accommodate GSQR-changes as well as program-delays and we are way past that issue.

The issue now is, once the tank became acceptable, what was the reason to persist with more and more orders of T-90S. This seems even more incredible when one learns that T-90 is lacking in several essential components because powers-be thought it was best way to get the foot in the door. Lets say, there were good reasons for it in 2000, but why persist even in face a viable domestic alternative?

[Avik]

Putnanja : In a lot of ways, the 124 tanks being provided to the IA is the "pilot production batch" or LSP or whatever you may term it. Hence, one would expect these tanks to have some problems. So, Tank #1 would meet about (say) 60% of performance requirements while Tank # 62 should ideally meet about 90% of performance requirements. So, if the IA says that on the basis of performance of Tanks # 1 to # 40, we are still not fully satisfied, then the IA does have a point. Typically, in the first lot, there would be performance shortfalls which should get rectified by the time the full scale production batch arrives.

Now, we are faced with two questions : Does the IA on the basis of performance of Tanks # 1 to # 40 proclaim that it is not satisfied with the Arjun ? Or should it say, Ok ,we know this is part of a larger national endeavour and hence, we will accept Lot 1 , but we would require improvements in Lot 2. But to make the second statement, there should be enough convergence and agreement between IA, DRDO and MoD on the second lot. I am not sure/aware whether, this convergence has been reached. The IA therefore, is not being disingenuous or involving itslef in conspiracy theories while stating its opinion about Arjun!

Light Howitzers: I agree its OT here, but just a small point. The M777 is going into the mountain div arty regts. Given that there are 10 such brigades at least, it does provide some inkling...

[Craig Alpert]

Ordnance Unit Develops High Speed Anti-Submarine RGB

The Heavy Alloys Penetrator Project (HAPP) here has developed a high speed indigenous version of Russian anti-submarine Rocket Guided Bomb (RGB-60) for the Navy.

The missile, with enhanced capabilities, had been developed within a short duration of less than a year, HAPP General Manager M Ravi told reporters.

HAPP, an ordnance factory, would shortly hand over a few numbers of RGB-60 to the Navy for field tests, after which it would go in for bulk production as per the requirement, he said.

RGB-60 carrying a war head mass of 25 kg was meant for firing from rocket depth bomb launcher mounted on Naval war ships and could be used as an effective and reliable anti-submarine ammunition, he said.

HAPP had last year developed RGB-12, a small range version.

The factory was also in the process of developing the outer shell and tail piece for 84 mm Carl Gustaf, an infantry ammunition popularly used by the Army, Police and other security forces, Ravi said.

He said the plant would step up its production capacity to meet the Army's enhanced requirement of pre-fragmented ammunition pieces for Binaca Rockets. The Army required the ammunition pieces for 5,000 rockets while the existing capacity could meet only 700-800 rockets annually.

[a_kumar]

Putnanja : In a lot of ways, the 124 tanks being provided to the IA is the "pilot production batch" or LSP or whatever you may term it. Hence, one would expect these tanks to have some problems. So, Tank #1 would meet about (say) 60% of performance requirements while Tank # 62 should ideally meet about 90% of performance requirements. So, if the IA says that on the basis of performance of Tanks # 1 to # 40, we are still not fully satisfied, then the IA does have a point. Typically, in the first lot, there would be performance shortfalls which should get rectified by the time the full scale production batch arrives.

Now, we are faced with two questions : Does the IA on the basis of performance of Tanks # 1 to # 40 proclaim that it is not satisfied with the Arjun ? Or should it say, Ok ,we know this is part of a larger national endeavour and hence, we will accept Lot 1 , but we would require improvements in Lot 2. But to make the second statement, there should be enough convergence and agreement between IA, DRDO and MoD on the second lot. I am not sure/aware whether, this convergence has been reached. The IA therefore, is not being disingenuous or involving itslef in conspiracy theories while stating its opinion about Arjun!

Beautifully put.

Looked in isolation, I think very few would criticize the IA's statement that first lot of Arjuns have issues. What get everybody's goat is that IA uses the statement not for constructive purposes (like providing constructive feedback with an aim to improve the system) but for seemingly-malicious intent of keeping Arjun out, no matter what. If you leave the rationale behind IA's actions aside for a moment, I am sure you will agree with that perception.

On your comment on Lot2: Simply put, there needs to be synergy. While egos and hype from DRDO scientists could be a factor for current state of affairs, there is also factor of IA treating Arjun as an alien entity that it has no stake in. In the end, neither of them are really technical factors, thats the tragedy.

[SSridhar]

Ordnance Unit Develops High Speed Anti-Submarine RGB

Here is a picture of that. Courtesey The Hindu


Some more details.

The 110-kg RGB 60, developed through in-house Research and Development process within a year, has been designed to fire a warhead mass of 25 kg to a range of 5.8 km within ten seconds. The rocket is fired in formations from the RBU 6000 Rocket Depth Bomb Launcher mounted on ship.

The first batch of 20 RGB 60 rockets will shortly be despatched for trial with support from officers and staff of the NAI (Naval Armament Inspectorate) detachment of CINA (Chief Inspectorate of Naval Armaments),

The HAPP was one among the 12 ordnance factories where facilities would be expanded for scaling up manufacture of Pinaka rockets

[chackojoseph]

Kanson et al : In case the forum at large is unaware of the Army's scientific temperament or lack threof, let me humbly submit a few examples:

IA Corps of Signals : Plan AREN, ASCON, Mobile communication net used by mechanized formations

IA Corps of Engineers: Mine laying and breaching : Automated mine laying equipment, SLUFAE Charge Line Mine Clearance.

Civil Structures : High Altitude Airfields in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, Pre Cast High Altitude Housing, Pressure Controlled High Altitude Hospitals and Aid Post, Kerosene Pipeline in Siachen (there are in fact full fledged plans for a cable car for troop movement in parts of the glacier), Khardung La Road etc.

Regiment of Arty : 105 mm IFG (Gurdial Gun), Catapult SPG, Moifications to the para droppable pack howitzers and the IMG

In fact one should also consider the operational enhancements made to deploy the 155 mm Bofors in the Kargil and Siachen mountains

Armoured Corps : Project Gulmohar (modification of the T-55 and its upgunning), Project Rhino, Upgunning of the Vijayanta tank at the Pune Base Wkshp

Air Defence Arty : Inhouse modifications and service life extension of both the Schilka Gun and the Kvadrat System which was carried out by the Meerut Base Workshop

Mech Infantry : Modification and overhaul of the Skot and Topaz APCs, Accuracy enhancement of the Malyutka and Konkross missile; Adaptation of the missiles for launch in high altitude and cross-loc bunker busting modes when the radar signature from the target is minimal.

Infantry : Modification of the standard 7.62 mm SLR for use as sniper rifle by mating with indigenous scope and utilising a very "desi" technique for flash suppression; modifications to the initial Sterling SMC (arguably, the actual product mods were carried out by the Ishapore factory after f/b from the Army);

The above are only a few of the technical modifications and enhancements that were carried out by the Army. So, hopefully the above small sample puts to rest the asinine comments about lack of scientific and technical competence within the Army.
I think it would help if people were to take a deep breath and realise that the Army is a user and as user it can at best carry out certain modifications and adaptations in the field after drawing from operational experience. It is not programmed/ set up/ structured to be a research organisation. It can at best support these initiatives especially when it feels that the DRDO has the capability to deliver. That realisation has begun to emerge only post 2000 once the DRDO has actually started delivering at least some 'ready to use' equipment. The IA is not different from any other Army in this attitude. Lets leave aside the US Army for the time being. Countries like UK and France also have organisations that are similar in charter to the DRDO ; but where those countries have a significant edge compared to DRDO is that their organisations have recourse to a significantly advanced mil-ind base which does not exist in India..yet. Hence, the transfer of technology from "pilot batch" to full scale production batches is that much easier in those countries. We still dont have this..it will probably take us 7-8 years to get there and till that time the friction between the DRDO and the user will persist. The DRDO thinks it suffices to develop a 80% proof product. The Army thinks that it should get a reliable , ready -to-go product from the factory. There is thus a significant gap between developing a product to mass-productionising it whether in defence equipment or automobiles or pharmaceuticals. Therin lies the rub for the gulf between the Army and DRDO.

There are other 'softer" issues between Army and DRDO , but that will be OT here.

Also, finally, respected Sirs, the Army drawn from its experience usually manages to modify tactics and in some cases equipment to suit the environment. It is for this reason that the Army was confidently able to deploy Bofors guns to Kargil even though the manufacturer specified a far more limited range!! There are a multitude of other examples in all kinds of theaters to prove the deep ingenuity of the IA. So, while the IA is not an all knowing, omniscient prima donna, lets give the user credit , because after all experience trumps cyber know-alls, especially those making off the cuff remarks about tactics.

I actually have a bigger list. But, as APusar has mentioned for DRDO, I will tell this for army that it is not enough.

I will proudly put up those achievements on my site once we have some "even decent' army leadership comes up. I don't want him to be ACM Fali major equivalent.

[Rahul M]

Putnanja : In a lot of ways, the 124 tanks being provided to the IA is the "pilot production batch" or LSP or whatever you may term it. Hence, one would expect these tanks to have some problems. So, Tank #1 would meet about (say) 60% of performance requirements while Tank # 62 should ideally meet about 90% of performance requirements. So, if the IA says that on the basis of performance of Tanks # 1 to # 40, we are still not fully satisfied, then the IA does have a point. Typically, in the first lot, there would be performance shortfalls which should get rectified by the time the full scale production batch arrives.

Now, we are faced with two questions : Does the IA on the basis of performance of Tanks # 1 to # 40 proclaim that it is not satisfied with the Arjun ? Or should it say, Ok ,we know this is part of a larger national endeavour and hence, we will accept Lot 1 , but we would require improvements in Lot 2. But to make the second statement, there should be enough convergence and agreement between IA, DRDO and MoD on the second lot. I am not sure/aware whether, this convergence has been reached. The IA therefore, is not being disingenuous or involving itslef in conspiracy theories while stating its opinion about Arjun!

only problem with this post is this is all hypothetical stuff in the future, it hasn't happened yet so let's not indulge in endless speculation of what can be and would be and people's reactions to those would be and can be incidents.
for around a decade IA refused to order even the so-called 'pilot batch' until it was forced down its unwilling throat. as of now the scenario you have painted has no connection to real life. let's wait for the time being shall we ?

[tsarkar]

Rahul,

The point Chetak and I are making was the top brass in DRDO felt their position threatened and left no stones unturned to get Paulraj out of any cutting edge projects or leadership position.

What the Navy could have done in this matter is limited, since its an operational organization with limited mandate for scientific/development work. Navy couldn’t push Paulraj into a leadership position in the scientific community, nor did it have a suitable billet for him.

He is a magnanimous person, and his capabilities were immense to carve himself a niche in the world, so he is being generous to his detractors.

What the use of the “Scientist of the Year” award after shoving him out? Would any BR member appreciate being demoted at work, followed by a paper certificate citing he’s “employee of the year”? Wouldn’t a promotion be a better appreciation of his work?

VSM is a services decoration, nothing to do with DRDO.

I rest my case here. My conviction remains that IA would not unnecessarily block Arjun, and I will wait for further information to emerge.

BTW, please illuminate us on –
1. Was DRDO honest in saying Trishul was ready and Barak purchase was unnecessary? BTW, IA bought Tunguska for the same reason.
2. Where is Trishul technology demonstrator today?
3. Why is DRDO going ahead with Maitri JV with MBDA if Trishul is such a great technology demonstrator?
4. Why is DRDO going ahead with Maitri JV with MBDA if DRDO ALREADY HAS THE KNOW HOW, as it claimed during Trishul fiasco, to make quick reaction missiles?

Incase anyone come up with the reason that IN killed Trishul because it looked ugly or IN brass had a personal dislike of DRDO brass, IN could gladly use Trishul in OPV/Corvettes/Missile boats, if it was available. Just like IAF will concurrently use Spyder & Akash, IN will use Maitri concurrently once it comes along.

I couldn’t be more happier, if the nation’s premier scientific establishment came up with a successful missile. But I am against falsehood and misrepresentation to cover failures.

I quote the Paulraj and Trishul examples, NOT TO GENERALIZE OR BELITTLE, but to indicate that DRDO is not above skullduggery and lying to protect its own interests AT THE COST OF NATIONAL INTEREST.

[Aditya_V]

Indigenised version of rocket guided bomb developed

http://beta.thehindu.com/news/states/tamil-nadu/article257662.ece

The Heavy Alloy Penetrator Project (HAPP), Tiruchi, has developed an indigenised version of the Russian Anti-Submarine Rocket Guided Bomb 60 (RGB 60).

The 110-kg RGB 60, developed through in-house Research and Development process within a year, has been designed to fire a warhead mass of 25 kg to a range of 5.8 km within ten seconds. The rocket is fired in formations from the RBU 6000 Rocket Depth Bomb Launcher mounted on ship.

The HAPP was one among the 12 ordnance factories where facilities would be expanded for scaling up manufacture of Pinaka rockets, he said.

Yeah Yeah Yipe Yipe

[vina]

1. Was DRDO honest in saying Trishul was ready and Barak purchase was unnecessary? BTW, IA bought Tunguska for the same reason.

That particular bit was absolutely shameful to say the least and it basically is the Congress party's "dirty tricks department" trying to get back at George Fernandas for his past record of denouncing Rajiv Gandhi in the Bofor's case.

More shameful is the hounding of the then Chief of Naval Staff on the Barak purchase. WTF ?. The navy even launched the INS Brahmaputra without the missile fit , waiting for Trishul. How long could they have waited ?. It was a pressing and critical gap in capabilities and the Navy was absolutely right in ordering it.

The Congress should really find someother way to settle scores with George Frenandes or whoever and leave defence forces and decisions taken where prima facie there is no problem out of their shady dirty tricks business.

[RayC]

Vina,

Valid point has been raised by you. Yet, at the same time, there will be a lot of people vociferously stating that one could have waited for the DRDO product rather than buying ex import.

That takes me back to the GSQR controversy of the Arjun, which surprisingly was cleaned up but not merged with this thread. There were informed posts and there were those which were embarrassing to some, or I surmise, since it is the normal practice to merge posts in appropriate threads. One could state it could also be because of oversight.

There were these posts that stated:

1. The GSQR should cater for 20 to 25 years hence.
2. That the IA changed the GSQR four times and that is sinful (for the want of a better word that I could state).
Fine.

Indeed GSQR should be so formulated that it should face the test of time.

The Lee Enfield .303 was the British Army's standard rifle from its official adoption in 1895 until 1957. Imagine the period it stood the test of time.

In WWII, the Russians, German, Japanese et al, used horse drawn equipment and were successful.

Now why did they change from a successful model/ mode to a different untested mode?

The answer is simple.

1. The technology had changed.
2. The security environment had changed wherein bolt action was out and automatic and semi automatic in and there was motor transport which was more efficient.
Arjun took 25 years to be acceptable. To imagine 25 years is a miniscule in time and the world and warfare has stood still would be fantasy in being! Therefore, to grumble that the GSQR kept changing does not cut ice, no matter how patriotic one would like to project oneself!

In this 25 years,
1. Has the security environment not changed?
2. Has technology not changed?
3. Has our adversaries not got better equipment that we must be able to overcome?
4. Has the geopolitical and geostrategic environment not changed?

Therefore, should would it be fair to ask those who are directed and paid to save the sovereignty and integrity of this country to sit pretty on mere nationalistic fervour and come a cropper on the battlefield, in case a war is forced on us? Would the Nation forgive? Has the Nation forgiven our visionary Nehru for 1962 or Gen PN Tapar? If they have, then let us go back to the original GSQR and not grouse that it was being changed to keep pace with the changing environment.

For the critics of T 90s. Is the T 90 a wonder weapon? No. Abrahms is surely better. Have money, will give tanks! Have we the money? So, if we have no money we have to buy the next best so that the country is not ‘nude’ till the Arjun does come into the reckoning? Is it unfair to have an interim product, maybe not the best or wait for the will o’the wisp to appear and save us? What is there was a war in the interim? Will the Nation forgive? The way the Nation was riled in the beginning of the Kargil war is enough of a proof of the Nation’s wrath.

Now, there was an argument that the Defence accepts foreign equipment and not the Arjun. Valid. The foreign equipment is proved and the Arjun is not. So, what is the option? Wait and leave the Nation ‘nude’?

It is very easy to sit behind a computer without knowing the compulsions that are dictating the issue and pass value judgement!

One has to sit in the hot seat.

As far as technology changing, check how much it changed after the SDI. It is changing so fast that it is difficult to keep pace! But should be be in a timewrap given our scientific, IT and technological base?

Today, they are talking of nano technology and remote controlled stuff. Should be be ostriches burying our head in the sand?

As the saying goes – Uneasy lies the head that wear the Crown!

Do it you are damned. Don’t do it you are damned!

A very lonely seat!

[Sanku]

On your comment on Lot2: Simply put, there needs to be synergy. While egos and hype from DRDO scientists could be a factor for current state of affairs, there is also factor of IA treating Arjun as an alien entity that it has no stake in. In the end, neither of them are really technical factors, thats the tragedy.

As I keep saying time and again (and will do so once more) -- the issue is systematic, currently there is NO central Indian Arms Defence production body -- in short there is no OWNER for any product or project in a defined manner.

http://mod.nic.in/aboutus/welcome.html
Forces are the user - who provide the User specification and feedback. There job ends there. They are under Department of Defence which is ONE of the FOUR main sub divisions of MoD

Production is OFB etc -- these are just manufacturing units -- thats it -- they are under The Department of Defence Production -- which is YET ANOTHER of the FOUR main sub divisions of MoD

Research and product design is under DRDO -- which wonder of wonders is under -- YET ANOTHER of the FOUR main sub divisions of MoD -- The Department of Defence Research -- they think their mission is --- well as the name suggests -- Research

Now EACH of these have their own Babu head -- with own agenda merrily running his/her own show -- eachh of them have their own mission statements and visions and other high falutin BS which is happily in their own little world.

For get a single product -- even the concept of Indian products as a whole -- DOES not have a single OWNER -- whose job is to actually understand the requirement, get it Designed in time with technology as and where available (from DRDO or outside DRDO) and see through its manufacture.

What does any one expect?

All these statements on "IA should take leadership stand and yada yada" are frankly at best idealistic delusion and at worst plain ignorance masquerading as a PoV.

The Mil-Ind complex is completely crippled by its trifurcation at eh hands of the Babu's between Babu power, OFB lots, and DRDO missions -- forces can keep sending up reports of how dire the situation is how they need equipment. To be promptly sat over and done nothing with by others.

Short of creating a new bodies with A owner and putting those directly under RM -- as project owner XYZ reporting to RM, who has a team of enpowered officials from all the branches, including forces, OFB and DRDO reporting to the owner NOTHING is going to change. We will see same stories play out ed infitum. -- That along with a massive fix of OFBs