The Macedonian Invasion
Prior to the Macedonian-led invasion of India, the Persians under Cyrus II
(c. 585–c. 529 bc) and Darius I (522–486 bc) subdued western India’s border
regions. Cyrus II subjugated the Indian tribes of the Paropanisus (Gandhara/
Hindu Kush) and the Kabul River valley, while Darius I advanced up to
the Indus River. According to Herodotus, this part of India formed the twentieth
satrapy (the jurisdiction of a satrap, or governor) of the Persian Empire.
It was also the richest, providing Darius I’s tax collectors with no fewer than
350 talents of gold dust.30 Darius I’s successor, Xerxes I (ruled 486–465 bc),
used Indian soldiers in his wars against the Greeks, giving the latter their
first glimpse of Indian soldiers. Herodotus noted, ‘‘The Indians clad in garments
made of cotton carried bows of cane, the latter tipped with iron. . . .
[The Indian cavalry were] . . . armed with the same equipment as in the case
of the Infantry, but they brought riding horses and chariots, the latter being
drawn by wild asses.’’31
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Warfare in Prehistoric and Classical India
In Herodotus’s account we see confirmation of the information in the
Mahabharata and the Vedas, namely, that the primary weapon was still the
bow and arrow and that chariots still played a central role in Indian armies.
Darius III also used Indian troops against Alexander the Great in 330 bc.The
chronicler Arrian notes that ‘‘Darius’s army had been reinforced by the Sogdians,
the Bactrians, and Indian tribes on the Bactrian border. . . . Darius’
total force . . . [included] a few elephants. . . . [T]he Indian troops from the
hither side of the Indus had about fifteen of them.’’32
AfterdefeatingDarius’s army Alexander began his invasion of India during
the spring of 327 bc. He directed his first attacks against the fortified local
cities of the Aspasians, Assakenians, and Gouriains. Alexander also took the
cities of Massaga, Bazira, and Aornus.33 It is ironic that the descendants of
the Aryan invaders found themselves being overrun in the same manner that
their ancestors had once overcome the original inhabitants of northern India.
It was only on the banks of the Hydapses (Jhelum) that an Indian ruler, Porus
(Paurava), dared to confront Alexander in the open field.
The battle of the Hydapses is the first military action in ancient India documented
by contemporary observers, all of whom were Greek or Macedonian.
In sharp contrast, no equivalent Indian account of this famous battle exists.
By the end of June 327 bc, Alexander’s army was camped near the town of
Jhelum on the west bank of the river.34 Porus and his army stood on the
east bank ready to oppose any crossing. The precise number of troops deployed
by both sides continues to be a mystery, with differing accounts from
Arrian, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Curtius. The general consensus is that Alexander
commanded about 11,000–15,000 men.35 Porus led at least 20,000 infantry,
fewer than 4,000 cavalry, approximately 100 elephants, and some 300
chariots.36
After Alexander’s initial deployment a brief period of movement and countermovement
followed during which Alexander moved his troops up and
down the riverbank, looking for a suitable place to cross, while Porus countered
his every move. Alexander then split his army, and, under the cover of
darkness and rain, the Macedonian main force effected a crossing using a
wooded midriver island to further shield them from the Indians.37 Unsure if
this was the main attack or a feint, Porus dispatched a small contingent to
confront the Macedonian bridgehead, but Alexander made quick work of this
small force.38 Porus then moved most of his army to meet Alexander after
leaving a small contingent to guard the Haranpur ford, where he had been
standing vigil. According to the Greek observers, the two forces confronted
each other on the Karrai plain.The Macedonians deployed in their traditional
formations, with their heavy infantry drawn up in phalanxes in the center
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Warfare in Prehistoric and Classical India
and the cavalry on the flanks. Porus’s army lined up in a similar fashion, with
the added presence of chariots and elephants. Each commander placed his
elephants in front of the infantry in the center of the army and deployed the
chariots on the flanks with the cavalry.39
Alexander maintained the initiative by attacking the Indian forces with his
cavalry. He first unleashed his mounted archers on the Indian cavalry’s right
flank. While coping with this barrage, he ordered his lieutenant, Coenus, to
strike the Indian cavalry with his cavalry squadrons. Alexander led the remainder
of his cavalry to crush the Indian cavalry on the other flank on the
inland side.40 With Porus’s cavalry and chariots routed, Alexander ordered
his heavy infantry to advance upon the Indian center. The mighty Macedonian
phalanxes advanced but soon recoiled when they confronted the Indian
elephants.41 Porus seized this opportunity and ordered his forces to attack
the Macedonian cavalry and infantry. However, the Macedonians recovered
quickly and began to engage the pachyderms, soon driving them from the
battlefield. Without the support of the elephants, the disorganized Indian
militia were helpless against the Macedonian phalanx. A Macedonian cavalry
attack to the Indians’ rear compounded their problems. Alexander’s forces
encircled and captured the remnants of Porus’s army after hours of bloody
conflict.
In many ways, Alexander’s military genius and the effectiveness of his veterans
made the battle’s end result a foregone conclusion. But this need not
necessarily have been the case. This engagement was the most difficult of all
of Alexander’s battles. The Greek chroniclers vividly describe the fierceness
of the fighting. Their estimate of a thousand Macedonian dead and several
thousand wounded is one of the highest casualty rates that any of Alexander’s
armies suffered, especially in proportion to the number of troops engaged
(11,000–12,000). Although Porus is not known as a great military captain, he
was an adequate commander. Never letting Alexander’s reputation overawe
him, he maneuvered his army with a firm hand prior to the battle, matching
all of Alexander’s moves on the west bank of the Hydapses. When the
Macedonians destroyed his son’s small force, he did not panic but instead
quickly moved to meet what he correctly perceived to be Alexander’s main
force. Porus’s deployment prior to the battle (the infantry and elephants in
the center flanked by the chariots and the cavalry) was the best under the
circumstances. Even when the Macedonian cavalry swept away his cavalry
and chariots, Porus not only maintained his formation but also managed to
launch a quick attack when he saw the vaunted Macedonian phalanx waver.
In this phase of the battle Porus experienced his best chance to claim a victory
and inflict the heaviest casualties upon the Macedonians. According to
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Warfare in Prehistoric and Classical India
Arrian, Alexander remarked, ‘‘I see at last a danger that matches my courage.
It is at once with wild beasts [elephants] and men of uncommon mettle that
the contest now lies.’’42
Thus, Porus’s defeat cannot be blamed on his poor leadership. He did
make some serious tactical errors: his decision to oppose Alexander’s river
crossing, which gave the initiative to the Macedonians, and his decision to
fight on the rain-soaked and muddy riverbanks, which robbed his chariots of
their limited mobility. But it is also clear that Porus’s fate was sealed long before
he faced Alexander’s veterans. The roots of his army’s demise lay in the
centuries of military stagnation prior to the Macedonian invasion. The organization,
equipment, and battle tactics that constituted Porus’s armyensured
its destruction on that fateful day.
Macedonian and Indian Military Organization
Porus’s army was organized along the cahturanga concept, dating back to the
days of the Mahabharata. This arrangement involved the army’s fourfold division
into elephants, chariots, cavalry, and infantry. The only change that had
taken place since that time was that the elephant had displaced the chariot
as the choice mount of the king and his elite officers. The militia infantry
continued to be the least significant element in this organization. The Macedonians
approached battle in a completely different manner. For them, the
heavy infantry phalanx was an important offensive weapon. The Macedonians
drew their heavily armored infantry into a modified version of the Greek
phalanx in a tighter and more cohesive formation bristling with the dreaded
24-foot-long sarissa to present an almost impenetrable and unstoppable mass
of men and spears on the move. The Macedonian infantry elite, the famous
Hypaspists, were less heavily armored and as a result more mobile. They
formed a link between the slower phalanx and the more mobile cavalry on
the flanks.43
In contrast, the Indian infantry simply did not deploy in such a compact
mass or move with such precision. Its main role was to serve as a moppingup
force for a successful elephant and/or chariot attack. Indeed, the Indian
infantry’s poor equipage seems to support this follow-up role. The Indian
infantryman carried a sword and spear approximately 9 feet in length. With
the exception of senior commanders, no one wore any metal armor.44 An infantryman
probably had some cloth protection (a wadded turban or some
sort of leather corselet and guard), but this was far inferior to the armor of
even the Macedonian light infantry, the Hypaspists. Such a force could and
did melt away in the face of the advancing Macedonian phalanx. The lack
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Warfare in Prehistoric and Classical India
of armor and the absence of swords and heavy spears among the Indian infantrymen
were not the result of an ignorance ofmetallurgy in India. Indeed,
India was well known in the classical world for its skills in iron making.45
The main difference between the Macedonian and Indian infantries lay
in their social composition and training. Indian infantry forces consisted
mostly of peasant levies constituted hurriedly to meet the invader. These
forces lacked the Macedonian heavy infantry’s cohesiveness, training, and
discipline. The latter had been a professional military force since Philip II
(Alexander the Great’s father) replaced his tribal militia with standing infantry
units composed of peasant conscripts. After the Peloponnesian War
(431–404 bc), a large number of impoverished and landless farmers were
readily absorbed into the army, which lessened the financial burden of maintaining
such a large force; presumably, they did not cost as much as peasant
conscripts. Later, successive wars of conquest continued to support the
army.46 The constant training and campaigning enabled it to function as a
well-disciplined, unified force ‘‘with a cohesiveness and weight of armament
that was unmatched in the contemporary world.’’47
The Indian infantry’s only saving grace was its archers, who fought with
a very powerful long bow. According to the Greek historian Megasthenes
(c. 350–c. 290 bc), the Seleucid ambassador to Chandragupta’s court, the
Indian infantryman carried a bow approximately as long as himself. The arrow
is described as being little shorter than 3 yards, ‘‘and there is nothing
which can resist an Indian archer[’]s shot,–neither shield nor breastplate.’’48
As in Vedic times, the bow and arrow continued to be the personal weapon
of choice with Porus’s soldiers. He even armed his chariot- and elephantmounted
warriors with bows. A significant number of the Macedonian dead
was among their cavalry.49 Since the Indian cavalry or chariots could not have
caused these casualties, the bowmen must have inflicted this damage. The
Macedonian death rate might have been far greater if the soggy, rain-soaked
ground had not prevented many Indian bowmen from notching their powerful
weapons.50
Thus, the Macedonians hopelessly outclassed the Indians in cavalry, infantry,
and battle tactics. The only offensive weapons at Porus’s disposal were
his war elephants. Not even the vaunted Macedonian phalanx could stand
up to the charge of these martial pachyderms. But by themselves, the elephants
could not decide the battle’s outcome, for, like the tanks of today,
they too needed infantry support to protect their flanks and rear. In this
regard the Indian infantry failed miserably. The Greco-Macedonians, after
recovering from their initial shock, quickly surrounded the elephants and
assailed them from all sides, stabbing, hacking, and even burning them. Al-
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Warfare in Prehistoric and Classical India
though the elephants were well armored and trained to meet frontal attacks,
the attacks from the rear, sides, and below must have panicked them. In the
final analysis, the Indian infantry’s inability to follow through and support
the elephants’ initial assault doomed any hopes Porus had of reinforcing his
counterattack.
Chandragupta Maurya
For reasons still not entirely clear, Alexander ended his campaign in India
and left the subcontinent in 325 bc. By doing so he avoided an inevitable confrontation
with the most powerful kingdom in northern India, that of the
Nandas. The Nanda dynasty were initially rulers of Magadha but had gradually
expanded their power from the central Gangetic Plain to the entire valley
in addition to substantial territories in the south up to the Godavari River.
Soon after Alexander’s departure, Chandragupta Maurya (died c. 297 bc),
the founder of the Mauryan dynasty, overthrew theNanda dynasty. According
to Plutarch, a youthful Chandragupta had actually met Alexander between
326 and 325 bc.51 Considerable confusion exists as to how exactly Chandragupta
ascended the throne in Magadha about 320 bc. According to Plutarch,
he first overthrewAlexander’s prefects in northwestern India and then seized
power in Magadha. However,when and how Chandragupta seized the throne
and defeated Alexander’s prefects is still a mystery.
