War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

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Singha
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War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 11 Jun 2008 09:25

61 years after independence and 47 after the 1st Indo-PRC war, it is increasingly evident
from Govt circles that Indian threat perceptions are no more pakcentric but focussed on
the multi faceted threat posed by the PRC.

other threads have discussed and are discussing the missile and nuclear proliferation,
economic issues, alliances with tyrants, naval string-of-pearls strategies in use.

this thread will be meant to discuss how best to deal with the PRC on our long land
frontier and include the Nepal factor as well because Nepal is a thin country controlled
by Maoists who can pretend to play dead if and when the PRC desires to move through
its territory.

the indian public and Govt has mostly operated on a defensive mentality wrt to PRC,
never thinking about taking back what was ours (aksai chin) and always tied up in
how best to "defend" the ladakh, sikkim or arunachal - very difficult terrain and with
paltry logistics so far.

PRC are experts in mental games and subjugating the thought process of their
opponent - they broke the will of dear Nehruji with the 62 episode and reaped the
leadership benefits of that. they also proved that when push came to shove, they
would even fight the USSR(border) and USA(korea) no matter what the cost.

Coming to the present scenario, the sichuan earthquake has exposed gaping
holes in the chinese propaganda about the PLAs logistical abilities. two weeks
after the quake took down roads, they had not even reached many areas.
helicopter airlift is very weak and is only now being addressed with licensed
Mi-17V production deal signed. their strategic airlift is weak for such a large
country and the order of 35 IL76 can only fix part of the problem. They do have
around 600 commercial jets of western origin.

In the next round, what should be our goal ? defend the line and inflict casualties
only to have them decide where to hit us next ? sit on a 1962 style dharna in
isolated outposts to show the flag ? pathetic and sits up a like a tired dog
asking for a kick in the ribs.

I am suggesting that the natural boundary between this expantionist nation
and India is not the himalayan watershed but further north, much further north....

terrain on tibet side being much flatter and accomodative of logistics (albeit
at high altitude weak payloads), we sit at a permanent disadvantage at present
with a steep climb up from river valleys to the roof of the world. we look up,
they look down and have ample spaces to accumulate combat power while
our routes are very limited.

refer to the map : http://www.maps-of-china.net/tourism_ma ... 0tibet.jpg

the prime GOAL of the next war over Tibet must be to create a new LOC.

this new LOC
(a) include all of Aksai chin - which is ours, even if "not a blade of grass grows there"

(b) engulf all the area south of the Yarluk Zangpo river (brahmaputra in India) stretching
from area of Bangong lake (see map) on the west to the point where it enters India.
we can also advance in places north of the river and give that away in "concessions"
post hostilities but not one inch of land south of the river is to be bartered

(c) all "concessions" are to be based on tangible assets , not PRC xeroxing a
"recognition" of "Indias right to exist" - something they have no control over

(d) a loud fart is to be directed at various vested interests who try to fish
in this bilateral matter - P4, japan et al . they can piss off and sit in their
corner if they cannot help us.

(e) himalayas are still rising, so its likely the tsangpo will shift further north
if it shifts, we will creep forward with the river's flow.

(f) probably Mt kailash and Manasarovar would fall within our new LOC. all
the better taking back this stretch of ancient pride lands from its shabby
current occupiers.



being a river and relatively placid and stable in Tibet it is clearly demarcated and leaves
no room for cartographic error.

the benefits are:

(a) that we can also accumulate sufficient logistics in Tibet using the open
spaces between himalayas and tsangpo

(b) the maoist influence in nepal is permanently nipped in bud. cut off by land
from their mentors, they will have no option but to allow us free passage.
or we will make them do so.

(c) Lhasa and all major routes to the east would be within striking distance
for armour forces and tactical airpower , keeping a permanent "eye" on
chinese activities on the entire plateau. would make their da qaidam missiles
launch region vulnerable forcing a retreat further up north.

(d) a resounding slap would make them lose tremendous face and leadership
among the east asian region. nobody wants to back a loser, least of
a pressure cooker tyrant regime who cant even win their military contests.

(e) karakoram highway broken and a dagger pointed at sinkiang which would
no doubt encourage the uighur separatists.

there would be no exchange of territory after peace talks because we'd be
the territorial grabbers this time and whoever is the dalai lama will be
brought forward to reign over the free part of Tibet we liberated.

the PRC can bankrupt itself running around and deploying 90% resources
in Tibet if it so desires while taiwan and other eastern goals slip ever farther
away. a second escalation by them would probably collapse their economy
and psyops "face". so far they have had a free ride playing mindgames, time
for them to really work.

our lines of supply would be short and tight once we establish on the plateau.

with this goal in mind, let the thread move forward. IA is already formating
mountain strike divs and looking out for enormous number of artillery &
rockets.

maybe our generation be the one which turns back the expansion of the tyrant
regime in beijing since nobody else has the location and muscle for it. unkil
can do little more than stage a hit and run type raid in the east - paper tiger.

PRC is anyway getting ready to show a far harsher side of itself after the
olympics.

let us refer to this war plan as the "Tsangpo Plan"

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 11 Jun 2008 09:41

any admins pls keep a careful watch on this thread, since I expect this will
generate a all-corners bulletin over the panda jungle telegraph and attract
many "honoured guests" here.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Paul » 11 Jun 2008 10:16

A very timely thread, so to speak...if even the somnolent and incompetent leadership of the UPA is talking of raising the defence expenditure, something is seriously afoot. It will take forever to raise additional units of MRCA, SU30s as they have to go through the tardy tendering process. Best to spend the money on expanding BDL capacity to produce 100+ Agnis-II mijjiles every year.


Aksai Chin

It would be one hell of a mountain war. We would need everyone of those 10,000 SFF and draft every Khampa, Ladakhi, Bhutia, Gurkha and other mountain people we can get our hand on.

Kargil will be like a walk in the park compared to this forthcoming opportunity to avenge our 1962 losses.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby nkumar » 11 Jun 2008 10:30

Could someone provide gyan about our submarine capabilities as compared to PRC's?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby satyarthi » 11 Jun 2008 10:48

The long stretch of unprotected Indian border with Nepal, necessitates that Nepal be liberated from the Maoists prior to that.

some possible developments in not so remote future:

1. Nepal army develops severe disaffection due to Maoist attempts to control it.
2. Madhesis become totally disillusioned with Nepal.
3. Civil war in Nepal.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 11 Jun 2008 11:09

there will be a civil war between tibetans and han if a Indo-PRC war starts and we play
our cards right. we have millions of patriotic citizens close by in our river valley and arunachal rear areas, they have millions of resentful and hostile tibetans who they have subjugated. ample opportunity for rear area sabotage units (including SFF) to melt in and do their work. the vast expanses and sparsely populated nature of the place means nobody has enough manpower to flood to the area and do the punish/control thing on isolated hamlets and nomadic peoples.

think about a region around 5 times afghanistan. with bone dry plains, dry brown mountains,
pristine sources of fresh water, occasional strands of green fields where rivers flow...

please let us focus on land war and not get diverted into submarines, unless you propose
sailing a 8" gun cruiser up the tsangpo or assembling it on the shores and pounding the hell
out of enemy fortifications.

wrt Nepal one good thing about Maoists being in power is they cant lay the blame for
failure on "rebels" - they are the rebels who are now overground. soon they will develop
rich business interests and forget all about reform. in short, a taste of real power will
bind them into the Indo-Nepal trade framework. this will be their soft underbelly because
now we know where they sit , who they sit with and losing what will hurt them most.

we move in from east and west of nepal in wide pincer movements, then cordially ask
kathmandu regime to use Nepal for resupply - they can make millions just sourcing the
good local produce for our Tibet garrisons - stuff like rice, fruits, meat, butter, wood
will uplift the local economy and enrich whoever has hooks into this supply chain.

we will however not pay them any transit fees for stuff moving out from mainland India.
in exchange we will waive transit fees of equal value for their imports / exports via
Kolkata port.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby nkumar » 11 Jun 2008 12:01

I asked about the submarines because any conflict with PRC (in any theatre) will defnitely have repurcussions in IOR. Both India and PRC will look to secure their sea lines. Our surface fleet of navy is in much better shape, not sure about our sub-surface capabilities, Scorpenes will take some time to be inducted.

I also believe that we need to secure the northern part of BD for supply lines for NE, the part north of Saidpur is vital to us (link). This will help in reducing our supply lines to NE. Note that the terrain is not mountainous in this region. Otherwise, we will have to rely on just one supply line via Jalpaiguri.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Paul » 11 Jun 2008 12:09

Need to make sure PRC does not pull off a Schliffen plan on us by opening the attack from Bhutan and cut off the NE....hence ensure reserves of at least 2 divisions + additional brigades around Siliguri and Tawang to move into Bhutan from either side and secure our lines of communication to NE, and ensure the security of Bhutan. XXXIII corps is in Siliguri and should have at least 4 divisions.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 11 Jun 2008 12:20

let us read up on what mountain divs are based where and which are assets they control.

however pls be careful not post any inside knowledge not in public domain - like knowing
where your relative is posted or what he informally talked of.

I have a spider feeling BD is shopping itself around as a "pakistan of the east" to both
PRC and USA taking advantage of its strategic location at junction of many countries - PRC,
India, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and oil-gas reserves. for now USA is not willing to offend
India by setting up shop on our doorstep and we have common cause with US in seeing
BD out of PRC orbit and Myanmar retaining its independence.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby sum » 11 Jun 2008 12:41

Other than the SFF, do we have any credible "sabotage" force??
IIRC, the SSB which was raised for this purpose is now a "normal" paramil force...

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 11 Jun 2008 13:28

Ah, good. I was going to start a similar thread, but I see Singha beat me to it.

The scope of my thread would have been smaller - I want to discuss the potential for a limited war on the Indo-China border - possibly an air war.

I will post some pictures and analysis later.

-----------

Nepal is a negative wild card for us, while the straits of Malacca are a negative wild card for the PLAN.

Nepal we can always handle by threatening to cut off their food supply, and blocking all tanker traffic in the Straits.

But China cannot retaliate in kind - because they will have to enter the Indian Ocean to block India's tanker traffic. :rotfl:


There is another wild card we can throw at the Chinese - declare Tibet independent.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 11 Jun 2008 14:39

some things to think about:

1. Logistics over the Himalayas for us is a HUGE problem, not so for the Chinese - but their rail line is vulnerable to interdiction. That said, they will have huge dumps of materiel on the plateau, again - given the level of natural cover, vulnerable to air. What will be our required threshold of air overmatch?

2. we will find it difficult to move heavy weapons and armour over the mountains - they will find it very easy coming from the plateau. Our infantry on the open plateau without huge supplies or heavy weapons with only air cover will be highly vulnerable

3. escalation, red lines - with imminent loss of H&D, when will the tactical nukes make an appearance?

4. resentful Tibetan population will rise against their oppressors - but they will be brutally crushed if we do not have the resolve to see it through

5. schlieffen plan: pakistan and bangladesh - both will seize the opportunity for mischeif

6. strategic distraction - across the taiwan strait or the amur river... what will stop the PRC from focusing its attention on this theatre?

7. escalation part II: what about Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, US? all neighbours of China - rapid path to WW3?

I conclude that the 'cost' of a conventional war over the himalayas remains forbidding (for both sides) - the answer lies in proxy wars, in which the Chinese are well ahead - and we are not even close to hurting them. And more so - Sea Lane Control, energy security makes the politburo wake up at night in a cold sweat. We HAVE to have the upper hand in the Indian and West Pacific Oceans, only playing second fiddle to Unkil (since we don't have a choice)

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 11 Jun 2008 15:04

wrt [2] - logistics. the issue is being fixed at the moment after GOI woke up to the
issue a couple of years back. it is indeed a bit costly to move mountains of gear
upto Ladakh, north Sikkim and AP but once there, funneling that into the Tibet
plateau should post no issues in Ladakh atleast - dont think there are any passes
to constrict lines of advance between India and occupied regions like aksai chin
& further afield.

for them also the factories and major depots must be far into interior and east.
if we can locate and destroy their existing stockpile, they will have more of
an issue in resupply. its impossible to hide these things from satellites so I
think routes to such places are well mapped for IAF pilots.

keys for us:
[1] have supplies on hand at jump off points
[2] new / improved good roads to plains
[3] some air cover
[4] <will come to this later> heli/airborne invasion behind the first line to
collapse their chokepoints from behind.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby shiv » 11 Jun 2008 17:06

Singha wrote:any admins pls keep a careful watch on this thread, since I expect this will
generate a all-corners bulletin over the panda jungle telegraph and attract
many "honoured guests" here.


GD please keep an eye on the thread and hit the report post button if needed.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 11 Jun 2008 17:33

sure...many good members are always on CAP 24x7 due to the global nature of our
operation. we can deal with intrusions.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 11 Jun 2008 19:46

from BR IA section, I am going to divvy up into 4 groups here (1 is reserve to deal with the
pakis should they make a move while we are engaged). Let us see whats can be made
available.

Army Group North - 6 Corps

from Northern Command HQ in Udhampur,

* XIV {14} Corps - Leh, Ladakh
* XV {15} Corps - Srinagar, Kashmir
* XVI {16} Corps - Nagrota, Jammu

from Western Command HQ in Chandimandir,

* X {10} Corps - Bhatinda, Punjab
* XI {11} Corps - Jalandhar, Punjab


from Central Command HQ in Lucknow,
I {1} Corps - Mathura, Uttar Pradesh (Strike Corps)

Independent artillery division

Army Group reserve - 2 Corps (for pakis and to help other fronts as needed)

from Western command - II Corps (Strike corps minus much artillery and heli assets)
from South Western Command HQ in Jaipur,
* IX {9} Corps - Mamun (Pathankot), Punjab

Army Group Center - 2 Corps for Nepal front (more on this later)

from Southern Command HQ in Pune,
* XII {12} Corps - Jodhpur, Rajasthan
* XXI {21} Corps - Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh (Strike Corps)
* one additional division worth newly raised or pulled together

Army group East

from Eastern Command HQ in Kolkota,

* III {3} Corps - Rangapahar (Dimapur), Nagaland
* IV {4} Corps - Tezpur, Assam
* XXXIII {33} Corps - Siliguri, West Bengal
* newly forming mountain strike corps - Sikkim/Arunachal
* independent artillery division
* some units detached from XXI corps

Notes:
Army Group East is kept a bit smaller than Army Group North because the
scope of our territorial ambition is smaller in east and strictly bounded
by the Tsangpo. this river while being placid in Tibet does a 180' turn
in a very short space in eastern tibet before it enters India and disappears
into a wall of impassable ravines. the british tried to match this torrent
with rivers appearing from the hills in Assam by sending teams of explorers
(many failed expeditions) and by floating marked rafts from the tibet side
and alerting their people in assam. onree problem was the river has Class-6
rapids in arunachal and no man or beast could make it through. finally
one or two intrepid surveyors managed to solve the riddle and make the
1:1 match.

So let is say we will not aim to expand in the eastern half of A.P. but western
half Tawang region is one jumping off point.

the 4 Corps though HQ'ed in Tezpur has huge motor pool near guwahati
and camp at Rangiya right near the Bhutan border on the assam-bengal NH.
Its been said this units task is to drive through Bhutan and protect the
western flank of the Tawang formation in the event of war.

so the territorial integrity of Bhutan shall be suspended for the duration.
there is not much they can do and they are very friendly with delhi (only
one among SAARC ingrates) , they are not unaware of current plans and
there must be tacit "understanding" on many counts.

Army group North will be heavy in armour, artillery, airlift - they have larger
areas to conquer and heavier engagements to plan for.

Army group Center will make its way upto the passes on the Nepal-Tibet
border through Nepal and pour through after initial phase of war to link
up right and left with North and East groups.

IN will post a SAG and SSK patrol outside Karachi and a cleartext message
to pakis that they can kiss all their industrial infra goodbye if any hostile
moves are detected.

most of IN will heavily patrol the areas near andamans, malacca and indonesia
to keep an eye on PLAN. a SAG will destroy all the PRC posts in myanmar in
a unprovoked fashion as such exist. IN will keep open option of stopping
all tankers bound for China (info culled from that filed with shipping registers
and detain them).

there are rumours that apart from mountain strike corps, more armour and
infantry formations are under raising. in that case if we assume one extra
corps is available, then 2 Corps in its entirety can join Army group north
inventory to make 7 Corps worth.

IAF to be divided into 2 theater commands for duration. due to speed of
redeployment nothing needs to be kept dedicated for Pakis. IRS and others
will keep a daily eye on them.

Indian railway passenger services in northern India to be suspended for
some duration and all trains/rakes dedicated to IA people and goods movement
only. Selective pulling out of trains from other sectors and cancellation of
passenger trains to accord highest priority to war materials movement.

similarly 80% of IA & pvt airlines to be comandeered and use for the war
effort.

aircraft carrier to embark heavy ASW component and ASW FFGs to patrol
India-Gulf and India-Aden oil tanker routes to ensure no slippage in supply.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 11 Jun 2008 20:25

GD a bigger goal should be to liberate East Turkestan. With such high goal other requirements are easily achieved. In the IA thread I had posted links on mtn divs the world over. Will try to post them here.
I am on this thread as I think this is the next challenge. Also need to understand the IAF requirment for long range air strike munitons and the Space cell in the CIDS office. It could be related to this thread.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 11 Jun 2008 20:53

X-Posted from the IA discussion thread...

ramana wrote:I would like more discussion on the new mountain strike corps rising and the associated arms for it. Also can the existing ten mtn divs be converted to attack formations or are they holding type?


rohitvats wrote:ramana: The main reason we have the strike & holding corp concept is because of scarce resources which need to be concentrated in some of the formations. Therefore, these formations have their operational area inside Pakistan and will spearhead the assault. Such a concept does not exist in foreign armies (at least not on the scale as us).Given an ideal scenario, the 10th, 11th & 12 corp each should have an armored div and associated mechanized coloumns.
As for the the present mountain div and their holding corps becoming mountain strike corps, yes, there is nothing that stops it. In our case, the equipment and doctrine of employment will determine the nature of operations. But another pertinent question is, do we need additional troops/divisons? I think we do. That might explain the need to raise new formations. An ideal situation would be to equip all the present mountain divisons with offensive capability plus additional(2) mountain strike corps. Since we can't go ahead and equip forces on large scale at one go(all of our 10 mountina divisions), we might raise 4-6 new mountain division gradually under 2 mountain strike corps. These corps then can be switched between the eastern and western sectors as the need may be. We can't move entire corps wih dedicated AORs (33 for example) from one sector to another. We do move the divisons but it would not be good idea to move divs during wartime and sticth them together into an offensive formations.


ramana wrote:Rohitvats, So what would be the equipment profile of an offensive mtn div and a defensive mtn div? And give examples from abroad too.


RayC wrote:The holding and strike formations are based on the principle of one foot on the ground and one manoeuvring.

The ''foot'' on the ground acts as a firm base i.e. to halt the enemy in case the attack is foiled and the enemy wrests the initiative as also to give support to the attack/ offensive.

This is applicable right from the section level upwards.

It is also what is known as the hammer and anvil.

To hammer, you require an anvil.

Even in advance to contact, one moves from bound to bound.


PaulJI wrote:
rohitvats wrote:ramana: The main reason we have the strike & holding corp concept is because of scarce resources which need to be concentrated in some of the formations. .... Such a concept does not exist in foreign armies (at least not on the scale as us).....


It's a long-established idea, and as you say, related to scarcity of resources. Or rather, scarcity of material resources in relation to manpower. The Wehrmacht in WW2 had many "bodenständige" ("ground-standing") divisions, lacking transport, used for holding static positions. The operational concept called for them to work in conjunction with mobile units, which sounds like the Indian concept.

Modern western armies tend to be more short of men than transport, so the concept isn't appropriate for them.


RayC wrote:
Lalmohan wrote:
RayC wrote:The holding and strike formations are based on the principle of one foot on the ground and one manoeuvring.



excuse my ignorance, but does this concept allow for both feet moving simultaneously, e.g. pincer

it reads like one unit is dug in and static and the other moves, i assume then the moving one stops and entrenches and the static one moves forward


It is known as Double Envelopment.

Unless there is a base or firm base, the enemy can just strike though if own forces merely move out to either flank to attack the oncoming enemy forces.

The concept of hammer and anvil continues to hold, except that it is from two sides that own forces engage the oncoming enemy. It will turn the enemy's flanks and he becomes vulnerable from three sides and as the combat progresses, there is a good possibility of the enemy being encircled if the noose can be tightened.

Please also see the diagrams here:

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/doc ... 05/C5I.htm


ramana wrote:My sudden interest in offensive mtn divs etc is I think that PRC needs to be shown the iron fist is available so that they become more friendly.

I am thinking of a rapid reaction ala Cold Start force (90K troops) with accompanying air assets that can liberate East Turkestan if needed.

I would like folks to look at POK, Aksai Chin, Ladakh/Tibet terrain and see using Google Earth after the initial hurdles if it provides a way to fracture Sinkiang off.

I think a strong conventional armed force is also a deterrent.


ramana wrote:OK here are some links on Mtn Warfare. Looks like India is the world leader. What I found interesting is that of the ten mtn divs, two are strike divisions. So we need to create or convert more of them. And looks like uncle teaches survival while India works on combat.

So all in all India does have a lead in this area and needs to be increased.


Wiki article gives an idea of whats happening elsewhere in the world:

Mountain Warfare- Wiki

Leads to a BR article : High School


A Paki Major writes in a US Journal:
Mtn warfare- need for specialized training


I have this spider sense that POK is a key and thats why its being kept out of Indian each for stability in Asia.


Where is Yogi Patel when you need him?


ramana wrote:US Army Combined Arms Center like India's College of Combat at MHOW

Journal:

Military Review

-----------------------

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Arunkumar » 11 Jun 2008 21:36

IN will post a SAG and SSK patrol outside Karachi and a cleartext message to pakis that they can kiss all their industrial infra goodbye if any hostile moves are detected.


dangladesh needs this more than pureland.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby sanjaykumar » 11 Jun 2008 23:18

Interesting topic, I will read it in detail later but please also include Northern Areas currently under Pakistani occupation-especially along Shaksgam-population, demographics, religion, disafection, accessability, military utility (proximal to Chinese lines of communication). Is it useful in the extending the arc of Indian postions along Tibet and into East Turkesat?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Paul » 11 Jun 2008 23:30

Layman thinks tactics - Armyman thinks Logistics.

Key is to hit the supply dumps, restrict vehicle convoys, disrupt railroad traffic...Khampas will handle that.

PRC will also dump huge amts of war material in the vicinity (100 - 150 km) of the mcmohan line and Aksai Chin to ensure enough supplies incase of disruptions in the rear by the Khamps.

The enough Prithvis and Agnis need be stockpiled in Ladakh and AP to ensure these supply dumps receive 5 star treatment. We have shorter lines of communication to the border and this must be exploited to the hilt.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 11 Jun 2008 23:44

Using Tibetan irregulars to attack materiel dumps is a good strategy because it gives us the abiity to restrict Chinese power in the plateau without officially escalating the conflict - IOW, deniability.

But, it is important that any holding of actual positions should be done by the IA, otherwise we might find ourselves in a position like pakiland. :eek:

-----------

Guys, think about the implications of using the IAF or SSMs - it is a very high level of escalation.

Remember, the war has the potential to be a limited war. Neither Russia not US want to see a China that is too big for its boots.

Even in 1962, China initiated a limited war, due to US and USSR pressure.

Also, keep in mind that both in 1962 and 1999, China attacked India while the superpowers were busy sluggin each other in a third party dispute (Cuba and Yugoslavia, respectively).

So, to determine when or if China will initiate hostilities, just keep an eye on US-Russia relations. If they deteriorate, we have a possible conflict on our hands.

China may provoke them to get a conflict, or it may just wait for the right moment. In either circumstance - the period after the Olympics is a crucial time for Indo-China relations.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Chandi Prasaad » 12 Jun 2008 00:26

Great topic to spend the valuable juice.

IMHO one needs to add in this discussion:
1.) a politico, social and economic carrot for ordinary Tibitians and East Turkestanians, so that they can see their interests are better served with Indian interests and Indian Power. {This needs proof of credible Indian backing for a very long time as against a one night stand}

2.) fastest way to expand ranks of covert base (while eliminating double crossing moles)

3.) a script/gameplan to set the frame for widespread insurrection, that has merging of overt and covert forces.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 12 Jun 2008 00:32

Just to clarify from the posters on this thread, but also to focus the discussion and allow me to understand what is expected here, let me ask this bluntly:

What is the aim of this thread?
Is it to initiate a war game to simulate a possible land war between India and China?

In other words, what kind of inputs is required from a poster here and what is the underline idea behind it:

If the idea is to speculate whether or not the war would or could take place, then we have other threads for that.
If the idea is to discuss weapons specs and compare them and so forth, we have a thread for that too.
If the idea is to simply speculate how the war would take place, we might as well move to the scenarios thread.
If, however, the idea is to war-game this mountain war professionally and with as limited a use of speculation as possible, then IMO the thread can work constructively, right?

But to do the last point means that what is required from posters (including myself) is small bits and pieces of analysis to help build the big picture. Is this assumption not correct?

Finally, to do the above, we need to step back from speculations and gut feelings, take a deep look at the history of whatever elements we think might be used in the war and conduct a thorough analysis of what, for example, was missing in 1962 and what steps have been taken to improve it and how it might fare in a given situation in the near future. If, for example the analysis revolves around a given tactical air situation, then proper graphs and charts must be developed to present the data and the results and so forth. Only then this thread can fare above the scenarios thread while avoiding the Military specs thread and avoid degenerating into pages and pages of speculations of each individual poster.

I would sincerely like to contribute things along the above lines to such a thread. The question is, is that the expectation here?

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby PaulJI » 12 Jun 2008 01:29

What about the Tibetans? Are they expected to welcome Indian troops as liberators? If so, what about the majority of Tibetans, who under this plan would remain under Chinese rule, & cut off from their brethren?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Paul » 12 Jun 2008 01:34

I think I echo the sentiment of this forum that this thread be restricted to the military aspects of the rivalry and leave the administrative/cultural dimension out for the moment.

BRF as I see it is making a tectonic shift in moving it's focus from Pakistan to PRC....this thread( amongst many others) is a step in that direction.

Paulji: Your question is more suited for the Tibet thread in the strat affairs section of this forum.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 12 Jun 2008 01:39

PaulJI wrote:What about the Tibetans? Are they expected to welcome Indian troops as liberators?


PaulJI, to get to the issue highlighted above requires taking in a hell of a lot of assumptions, does it not? This is part of the issue I was talking about earlier when I referred to the aim of this thread and asked what it was.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby shyamd » 12 Jun 2008 02:13

Good question, it is my firm belief that India should make it clear it is a liberation and not a colony. Maybe we can negotiate this with his highness the Dalai Lama.

But what about after the war? The Dalai always said that we can't choose our neighbours, the chincs are always going to try and re-take Tibet.

Aside from all that:

I think there should be a Al Quds type force (what iran is doing in Iraq) initially, SFF sent in with trained TYC personell, to create links with the Tibetan community, then when liberation takes place, help take out some infrastructure of the chinese military, to prepare for IA entrance. Launch a suprise take over, take and secure the Hindu/Buddhist religious sights. This needs to be done swiftly, or else Chinese may do the Taliban and destroy these sights.

Maybe at the same time airdrop leaflets to say that Indians are coming to liberate Tibet, urging the people to fight the oppressors in everyway they can.

JMT's

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 12 Jun 2008 02:27

shyamd wrote:It is my firm belief that India should make it clear it is a liberation and not a colony. Maybe we can negotiate this with his highness the Dalai Lama.


Are you kidding me? Liberating Tibet?!!!

I suppose the PLA and the politburo will just turn over and die while the Indian Army walk all over Tibet.

Guys, let's be realistic here. We should not superimpose our wishes on the reality of the situation by ignoring the enemy and his abilities.

But what about after the war? The Dalai always said that we can't choose our neighbours, the chincs are always going to try and re-take Tibet.


Assuming that thanks to some divine intervention we do manage to take it in the first place.

Maybe at the same time airdrop leaflets to say that Indians are coming to liberate Tibet, urging the people to fight the oppressors in everyway they can.


This is something that can and should be done regardless of the above expectations. The reason being that the only way you can expect the Tibetans to help India is by holding down large formations of the PLA on internal security duties. This is not to say that the Indians will actually liberate Tibet, but that hope will serve as a motivator for the Tibetans to do something. If you think that is being callous, it is. The best possible outcome of the above is that the load on the Indian Army at the borders gets lower while facing the PLA.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby satyarthi » 12 Jun 2008 02:47

X-post:

The Karakoram highway is much to the west of Karakoram Pass. It goes through Gilgit, Hunza, Khujerab pass in POK. At Khunjerab Pass it turns almost northwards into China. Then it goes through Tashkurgan (Xinjiang) etc. Direct distance between Khunjerab pass and Karakoram pass is about 160 miles.

The Chinese highway No. 219 (Xinjiang-Tibet highway) goes through Aksai Chin into Tibet and then till Kathmandu. Connectivity of Xinjiang with western Tibet is the reason China covets Aksai chin.

This is the highway which is accessible through the Karakoram pass.

The following site describes in quite detail this highway. Check their high res map.
http://raize.ch/Reisen/velo-eurasien/pr ... hmandu.htm

Note that Kailash-Mansarovar also falls on this highway.

P.S. Karakoram Pass Coordinate 35° 30′ 48″ N, 77° 49′ 23″ E
http://toolserver.org/~magnus/geo/geoha ... 77_49_23_E
map: http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=35.51333 ... ,77.823056
Last edited by satyarthi on 12 Jun 2008 06:21, edited 3 times in total.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby NRao » 12 Jun 2008 02:49

(b) engulf all the area south of the Yarluk Zangpo river (brahmaputra in India) stretching
from area of Bangong lake (see map) on the west to the point where it enters India.
we can also advance in places north of the river and give that away in "concessions"
post hostilities but not one inch of land south of the river is to be bartered


I think the order needs to be Chittagong Tracts, the above and Kashmir. But, this topic may side track this thread.... so. let it slide.

Furthermore, the P4, etc will be compelled to side with India. The lizard is growing too big and is awakening too.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 12 Jun 2008 02:56

The Chinese highway No. 219 (Xinjiang-Tibet highway) goes through Aksai Chin into Tibet and then till Kathmandu. Connectivity of Xinjiang with western Tibet is the reason China covets Aksai chin.


Yeah. You can see the highway quite nicely on Google-Earth. The terrain is nice and flat for the road to go through and its difficult to see how the ground link to southwestern Tibet could have been maintained in those early days after the Tibetan occupation by the Chinese, without it. If you go north from the Highway you can see the mountainous terrain unsuitable for a continuous road link. The Chinese had their eyes on Tibet and nothing else and were channeled southwards onto Indian soil to enable the road link to take shape.

Our failure to predict and preempt that development just after Tibet fell and in the early 1950s has to be the biggest Intelligence failure for this country after independence, all arguments pertaining to lack of transportation to allow Border Security troops to get there in those days, notwithstanding.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Aryavarta » 12 Jun 2008 03:04

As Vivek puts it, we should avoid all guesswork and speculations. Any concept should be either accepted or rejected based on sound analysis and not gut feeling.

Primary Question
-----------------------
Cold start doctrine or Sundarji doctrine? From Ladwig's paper on Cold start, the question is essentially between the current armed forces structure of Pivot corps and Strike corps on one hand, and the Integrated Battle Groups on the other. Although, in earlier discussions on BRF it was speculated that the IBG's are for the Western Front and not along Chinese border. What doctrine would have more possibility of attaining the objectives of Tsangpo plan? Why?

Entry Points and Actual war effort
----------------------------------
We will need to identify, the regions on the border conducive for fast entry into Tibet, as well as good enough to be able to maintain the logistics chain. This will need a lot of painstaking analysis of high resolution border maps. What are other topics to be evaluated?

Pakistan Question
------------------------
Regardless of any sane reason that Pakistan has to not enter the conflict, it will prove prudent to assume that Pakistan is going to create mischief. Unless we carry out punitive strikes against Pakistan prior to the China conflict. These strikes give us a worthy opponent to test our battle plans, doctrine, equipments, network centric warfare techniques, synergy between Airforce and Army, as well as it will give real battle experience to Indian troops. When was the last big conflict Chinese troops were involved in? Against that Indian troops have seen Kargil, Parakram, Insurgency in NE and Kashmir (Chinese troops will have similar internal conflict resolution experience), and the planned punitive strike against Pakistan. Effectively speaking we will reverse the situation of 1962 where Chinese troops had considerable war experience and Indians none after world wars and Kashmir war. If indeed this is an option, what will be the objectives of this attack?

Nuclear Red-Lines and Endgame
---------------------------------
Loss (by China) of the extent of territory aimed by Tsangpo plan, would make China to take the war nuclear (is that an assumption, if so what would be the red-lines?), unless it faces a politically more challenging situation. What would that be? Taiwan? Or decimation of CPC who have lost face in the war along with rise of democratic protests among Chinese. What are our assets here? Also, with southern (outer?) Tibet under Indian control, and rest of Tibet and Xinjiang fighting for Independence, can we make China adequately involved in these internal conflicts, such that it will not be able to focus on recapturing southern Tibet, at least in short-term (which may be as long as 50+ years as we see in the subcontinent)

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby satyarthi » 12 Jun 2008 03:09

IMHO this thread shouldn't be about "whether" war is likely to happen. But "what" can be done if the war actually happens for whatever reasons. As far as hypotheticals are concerned even a WWIII is possible.

So, just imagine that war is upon us, for whatever ungodly reason. Then what can be done by Indian army to win a buffer between India and China?

This thread will end up educating a whole lot of us about the geography, military posture, capability etc of China in India's immediate neighborhood, along with Indian options. That is the primary deliverable of this thread IMHO.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 12 Jun 2008 03:10

Well PRC nuke doctrine is that they will use nukes on what they consider their own territory. At same time they agree Tibet is an autonomous region of PRCwhich means it not their own territory. And the experts on the Future of testing have shown that Indian deterrent is viable.

So no need to confuse the issues with nukes. Keep it conventional.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 12 Jun 2008 03:18

satyarthi wrote:IMHO this thread shouldn't be about "whether" war is likely to happen. But "what" can be done if the war actually happens for whatever reasons. As far as hypotheticals are concerned even a WWIII is possible.

So, just imagine that war is upon us, for whatever ungodly reason. Then what can be done by Indian army to win a buffer between India and China?

This thread will end up educating a whole lot of us about the geography, military posture, capability etc of China in India's immediate neighborhood, along with Indian options. That is the primary deliverable of this thread IMHO.


Which is exactly why the thread should be devoid of groundbreaking claims such as "Liberate Tibet!" and so forth when the first question should be to ask ourselves if we even have the resources and infrastructure to hold on to our own border and avoid a 1962 like situation. If the answer to that after careful analysis is "Yes", then the next question should be to discuss limited offensives northwards. If even that is considered feasible in the given timeframe limits that will need to be put on the simulation, then and only then should we consider other options. IMO that would be the way to go forward, but everybody here has to be on board for that to happen.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby satyarthi » 12 Jun 2008 03:24

vivek_ahuja wrote:the first question should be to ask ourselves if we even have the resources and infrastructure to hold on to our own border and avoid a 1962 like situation. If the answer to that after careful analysis is "Yes", then the next question should be to discuss limited offensives northwards. If even that is considered feasible in the given timeframe limits that will need to be put on the simulation, then and only then should we consider other options. IMO that would be the way to go forward, but everybody here has to be on board for that to happen.

Excellent suggestions! Seems like the ideal plan to guide this discussions in steps. Otherwise we may start seeing too much speculation.

But we shouldn't restrict ourselves to our present capabilities. But also elucidiate what capabilities might be needed to eventually win a buffer.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 12 Jun 2008 03:28

ramana wrote:Well PRC nuke doctrine is that they will use nukes on what they consider their own territory. At same time they agree Tibet is an autonomous region of PRCwhich means it not their own territory. And the experts on the Future of testing have shown that Indian deterrent is viable.

So no need to confuse the issues with nukes. Keep it conventional.


Ramana,

Any discussion whereby it might be construed from the analysis that the Indian Armed Forces are in a position of superiority compared to the Chinese will have to involve some discussion of the use of Chinese Nukes in the tactical sense. At the very least it would be necessary to use it to put a cap or an outer limit on how far the simulation involving conventional weapons can be pushed forward in a timeframe.

Between those limits, however, the simulation can be kept conventional.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 12 Jun 2008 03:32

But we shouldn't restrict ourselves to our present capabilities. But also elucidiate what capabilities might be needed to eventually win a buffer.


Absolutely. But those speculations would then be built up on a solid analysis base, as opposed to what it is now. I am highly interested to see the above war-game happen professionally because the results from those analysis would be highly illuminating to say the least given the highly qualified set of members on BR .

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby PaulJI » 12 Jun 2008 03:35

Paul wrote:I think I echo the sentiment of this forum that this thread be restricted to the military aspects of the rivalry ...

Paulji: Your question is more suited for the Tibet thread in the strat affairs section of this forum.


Then perhaps the thread should be retitled "War inside Tibet - military goals, strategies, & equipment". The goal of every war is political change, & without qualification to limit it to military matters, the current title invites discussion of those political goals.

But, since the intent has now been clarified, I will refrain from any further political comment or questions in this thread.


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