War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

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ChandraS

Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ChandraS » 14 Jun 2008 19:47

Ok..here goes the my first pass at estimating teeth and tail for IA. By no means is it complete and/or authoritative, but gives a fair idea.

From the Global security website per Rahul M, this is what I get:
The Army has in its Order of Battle, mountain divisions, infantry divisions, armoured divisions (in which tank units predominate) and mechanized divisions (in which mechanized infantry units predominate). An Infantry Division typically has about 15,500 combat troops, with 8,000 support elements (artillery, engineers, etc). It consists of 3 to 5 Infantry Brigades, an Armoured Regiment and an Artillery Brigade. A Brigade is commanded by a Brigadier, and an Infantary Brigade consists of three Infantry Battalions. A regiment can be a type of battalion (eg. in the Artillery/Engineers) or a grouping of a number of battalions of the same type (eg. The Rajput Regiment). The approximate strength of an infantry battalion, commanded by a Colonel, may be taken as 900-1,000 personnel. A battalion may consist of three to four companies, and may be commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel or a Colonel. A company normally consists of 100-120 men and is commanded by a Major


I am unable (as yet) to find out if the 8000 support elements quoted above includes some of tail elements as well. From our own BR site on the IA orbat, I get the make-up of the armoured regiment as follows:
Active Main Battle Tanks - 62 Armoured Regiments

* T-90S: 5 regiments @ 62 tanks each, (310) plus a further 1330 tanks being locally assembled.
* T-72M1: 35 regiments @ 55 tanks each, (1950) upgrade program in progress - moving very slowly.
* T-55: 10 regiments @ 55 tanks each, (550) with L7/105mm gun + the Vijayanta standard upgrade.
* Vijayanta: 11 regiments @ 72 tanks each, (800+) upgraded with FCS and night fighting equipment.

Reserve/Store MBTs

* T-55: 200 - To be phased out by 2008
* Vijayanta: 1000 - To be phased out by 2008


I need to find out more about the artillery brigade composition. Will post more as I find out.

Totally agree with Singha on needing to increase the count of our teeth. A second set of 32 is preferable/advisable/necessary to overworking the current set for our increasing appetite.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Paul » 14 Jun 2008 21:29

What is the possibility of a airborne assault unit airdrop on Tawang or other major chokepoints and taking adavantage of the shock factor to push across the major passes.

Of the three sectors, they may target one for offensive and fight a holding action in the other two. Since AP is closer to their heartland (and farthest from ours), they may target this area for offensive action.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby NRao » 14 Jun 2008 21:35

wrt teeth:tail every country's situation is different. for India to fight inside deserts and
in mountains a strong tail is a must. its not a question of converting tail to teeth, we need more teeth from new raisings.


Tathaastu:

June, 2008 :: Indian Army to raise two new divisions

NEW DELHI, June 13: In a move that could raise the hackles of neighbours Pakistan and China, India will soon raise two new divisions to give more teeth to its mountain warfare machinery.

The defence ministry's proposal for raising of two mountain divisions was approved recently by the Cabinet Committee on Security, ministry sources said today. The proposed units will further enhance the tactical strength of the Indian Army in its strategically important areas along the borders facing its traditional rivals.

The two new formations - with a strength of 10,000 to 13,000 troops each - will be raised in a two-phased plan in about five years. n PTI


Next time please wish for some thing better!! Tibet it self?
Last edited by NRao on 14 Jun 2008 21:40, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 14 Jun 2008 21:38

in the recent BR-BLR meet someone of great knowledge was saying we need around 10 new
divisions.

2 is nowhere near enough. minimum another 3 more infantry need raising and 2 new
independent artillery divisions.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby NRao » 14 Jun 2008 21:43

You wished for "raising" they gave you 2. Now that you have upgraded it to 10, let us see what happens.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 14 Jun 2008 21:48

note the 10 covers infantry & armour divs, plains and mountain.
it is confirmed they are forming 2 mountain divs. the absence of evidence
on the other genres should not be construed as evidence of absense or intent :rotfl:

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 14 Jun 2008 22:27

x-posted from VinodTK's post in china mil watch thread

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF14Df02.html

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 14 Jun 2008 23:20

The Hindu around August 15 every year has an annual survey issue. Usually it has articles on the services. The survey article has the teeth to tail ratio. till then use stds for other armies tailored for Indian milieu.
Thanks, ramana

While at it has the OFB started a factory to make Goretex type of fabric for cold climate/weather fighting gear and clothes? And body armor- kevlar type?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby sanjaykumar » 15 Jun 2008 00:19

Goretex has insignificant thermal insulation properties.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 15 Jun 2008 04:18

If not Goretex, then what ever high altitude/mtn troops wear. The question is have adequate steps been taken by OFB to provide for mfg of such clothing, webbin whatnot that troops in high altitude conditions require?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby svinayak » 15 Jun 2008 07:11

Image



The rapid-fire consolidation of the buffer regions gave Mao what all Chinese emperors sought, a China secure from invasion. Controlling Tibet meant that India could not move across the Himalayas and establish a secure base of operations on the Tibetan Plateau. There could be skirmishes in the Himalayas, but no one could push a multi-divisional force across those mountains and keep it supplied. So long as Tibet was in Chinese hands, the Indians could live on the other side of the moon.
Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria buffered China from the Soviet Union. Mao was more of a geopolitician than an ideologue. He did not trust the Soviets. With the buffer states in hand, they would not invade China. The distances, the poor transportation and the lack of resources meant that any Soviet invasion would run into massive logistical problems well before it reached Han China's populated regions, and become bogged down -- just as the Japanese had.



This is the kind of long term strategic advantage which China got because it was supported by UK to go and occupy Tibet.

Soviet Union was prevented from entering Turkemistan in the 19th century by funding imperial china.
It was again prevented from entering Tibet in the 20th century by the anglo power supporting Communist Mao
Last edited by svinayak on 15 Jun 2008 09:04, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 15 Jun 2008 07:33

I hadnt realized east turkestan was so large and edible. combining with tibet, it is around 30% of
the PRC's current holdings. No other country in the 20th century has expanded its holdings so
much through war and retained it.

it was a strategic mistake by the Soviets in 1950 to let their chinese all-lies walk into east
turkestan. of all major powers they had the location and resources to kick the PRC out of
east turkestan and bring it into USSR if need be.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby NRao » 15 Jun 2008 08:31

Acharya,

That map is very revealing.

Here is a dated article on the impact of sea level rising due to global warming:

2002 :: Global Warming Accelerates China's Sea Level Rise

Something to consider.

(And, the impact of global warming on BD!!!! :

Image
Loss of land due to future sea level rise in Bangladesh (1m (darker shade) and 3m (lighter shade)).

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby p_saggu » 15 Jun 2008 17:48

Hey whassup with Don. Is he a Han Chinese? :((

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 15 Jun 2008 19:07

Uttaranchal - Tibet

http://flickr.com/photos/33097132@N00/2 ... 7/sizes/l/

Kashmir - Tibet
(I have marked DBG, khardung La, the manali leh road, kargil,
chushul and the panda east turkestan-Lhasa highway thru aksai chin)

http://flickr.com/photos/33097132@N00/2 ... 8/sizes/l/

Sikkim - Tibet
(you can see Natu La and Jelep La marked near bottom, kalimpong,
siliguri, bagdogra and some passes in bhutan which may offer a
route to trap and encircle the panda. Yumithang in north is also marked.
its near where we put an end to the incursion way back in ~1988. Sundarji
sahib is said to have airlifted a brigade there)

http://flickr.com/photos/33097132@N00/2 ... 8/sizes/l/

west AP - Tibet

tawang, Bum La (must be where the Thag La massif is or it that the unmarked
western pass?), bomdila , tezpur and rangiya are marked

http://flickr.com/photos/33097132@N00/2 ... 4/sizes/l/

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby p_saggu » 15 Jun 2008 19:42

Could you mark out Rezang La (Kashmir LAC)
Is Demchock under Indian / Chinese /Joint control???
As per the maps it seems to fall on the chinese side, Google Earth seems to suggest something else (especially when you turn on Earth Community from the various markings put on by people)

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 15 Jun 2008 20:23

rezang La is not marked in my atlas. no idea about demchok. if you look at
whats up in wikipedia, would indicate its in indian hands.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... ir_map.jpg

also the Karakoram highway enters POK from the top left and goes via Gilgit, you can see it
labelled.

the Karakoram pass next to DBO seems to be a chord road of the main turkestan-Lhasa highway that
goes through the pass and aksai chin before rejoining the main road. as such its a miltary road only
and not used to resupply pak with anything. there is no road to POK from karakoram pass marked,
to reach skardu the saltoro ridge has to be crossed and we sit there.

but karakoram highway is safe from our immediate grasp.

also outlook traveller mag had a story on the road Leh-Khardung La-siachen. it is a totally army owned
road and nobody goes on that road without a written permission which is not granted as a rule unless
you are a guest of the army. the writer who is british got an invite to attend a riverbank party on zanskar
river by a gurkha regiment who had completed the siachen tour..mingled with the men and managed to
get one such permit for a taxi ride (jeep) upto khardung La. I really ought to scan it now. has a
good photo of the road also.

I would imagine nobody is allowed north of khardung la. one road goes into siachen base camp probably
and te other forks over Saser La pass to DBO which is end of the road...
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 15 Jun 2008 20:37

here is the article...I will scan one photo.

http://outlooktraveller.com/issueconten ... =issuehome

SKY DRIVING
Alexander Frater recalls a taxi ride to the top of the world


Visitors to Ladakh may note, rising from the snow desert—a landscape so vast the eye can only deal with it sequentially—a squiggly black line, like a needle trace on icing, that eventually vanishes among a jumble of icy razorback ridges miles up in the Karakoram. Some years ago, while staying at the Ladakh Serai, I asked its manager, Ramesh Nambiar, what I was looking at.

“The world’s highest road,” he said.
“You’re kidding!” I stared at him. “So how do I get onto that?”

He laughed. “You don’t. It’s military, it leads to the Khardung La pass and, beyond, the Siachen Glacier. They’re fighting a war there, us versus Pakistan, so it’s off-limits. But it happens the man in charge of army roads is a friend; if I invite him to dinner you could at least learn something about it.”

Though the Serai, a collection of yurts set 11,500 feet up in the village of Stok, was famed for its cuisine, Colonel Patel, a lean, rangy man with the swank of an ageing 1930s movie star, ate nothing at all. “I don’t take food,” he said, opting for rum instead. He was actually an army doctor who built and maintained roads because he loved the outdoor life. When I mentioned the one that interested me, however, he looked bleak. “Last week I lost a bridge at Khardung La—the world’s highest, knocked down by a glacier. In the process I also lost three officers and five men. Their bodies are still in the ice.”
It was obvious I would be allowed nowhere near it but, next day, Ramesh said,

“On Sunday the 58th Gurkha Regiment are having a picnic to celebrate their return from the glacier. Colonel Patel has wangled invitations for us.”
In perfect picnic weather we set off through those astonishing landscapes for some vaguely specified spot on the Zanskar river. Gurkhas kept stepping from behind rocks and issuing directions. We edged along an escarpment incorporating a dizzying drop to the Indus (a rushing rural stream giving no indication it had travelled all the way from Tibet), passed a junction of the rivers, transited a giant gorge, finally arriving at a stretch of the Zanskar noisy with tumbling snowmelt and, beside it, a broad riverine beach.

On it cookhouses, mess tents, latrines and a bandstand had been erected, while open parachutes suspended from poles provided shade. Colonel Patel, rum in hand, introduced us to the 58th’s debonair Indian CO—another colonel—and two beautiful women who turned out to be the colonels’ ladies. As young Indian officers, plainly shattered after six months on the glacier, wandered by swigging bottles of Rosy Pelican, the CO said, “They are all fluent in Nepali, you know. So are their wives.” He added, “You can only acclimatise the human body up to 18,000 feet so, on foot patrol at 25,000 feet, with crampons and ice axes, you must move very, very slowly.”

A boy doctor, qualified only two years, said, “In winter the temperature is 60 degrees below zero—unless you fall into a crevasse. Then it drops a further 40 degrees.”
Snow leopards are not uncommon,” a lieutenant told me. “One became so tame we put it in a cage, but HQ made us release it. Respect the environment, they said.” :roll:

I noted people throwing empty bottles into the Zanskar. That did not strike me as respecting the environment, but the CO shrugged. “It flows into Pakistan,” he said.

After a fabulous Nepali meal the six-man Gurkha band struck up. The CO’s wife, at the mike, sang Nepali pop songs as the Gurkhas danced beside the cold grey river and Colonel Patel’s wife, questioning me closely about my life, offered much thoughtful advice. As I rose to go she commanded, “Be happy!”

Next day I almost jumped for joy. A permit granting me access to the Khardung La—signed by her husband and copied to the Indo-Tibetan Border Force—arrived at the Serai. My guidebook said the world’s highest road was strictly off-limits and, due to frequent avalanches, dangerous.

“How do I get there?” I asked Ramesh.
“By taxi.”

I smiled. “I’m not joking,” he said. “The Ladakh Taxi Union wields great power. The reason I do not keep a car for my guests is because they forbid it.”

The mountains were still bathed in moonlight when my driver arrived. A friendly, mild-mannered man in a small blue jeep (which he handled with great skill), he was far removed from the bombastic Marxist militant I’d anticipated. At South Pulu, the 15,000-foot-high security checkpoint where two sleepy soldiers in heavy greatcoats demanded to see our papers, the road turned into a skiddy yak track cratered by fallen boulders. At 16,000 feet melting snow and ice released so much water I worried about being washed over the edge—mile-long drops now occurred, vertiginously, only inches from our wheels—while worrying also about blind corners and military vehicles rounding them at speed.

Then, quite suddenly, we were there. “Khardung La,” murmured the driver, switching off.

I climbed out. Beyond rows of faded prayer flags the Karakoram’s early morning dazzle seemed to light up Asia. A sign said, ‘Project Himank World’s Highest Motorable Road Altitude 18,380 ft.’ Another advised: ‘You Are Nearest to Heaven And Can Have a Dialogue With God.’ But for a distant generator misfiring in the thin air it was very quiet. I spotted a tiny breeze-block temple, inside it examined a religious picture presented ‘by the Dozer Operators’. Rotting carpets covered the floor, tiny brass bells dangled from the tin roof. The place smelled of stale incense.

With a roar a lorry drew up outside. A young, nervy soldier appeared, bent to touch the lintel, rang the bells on his way into the shrine, rang a heavy Garhwal Rifles regimental bell suspended over it, rang the lesser ones again on his way out. I asked, “Have you been to the front?” He nodded.

“Taking them what?”
“Apple juice,” he said.

Strolling, I found the remains of ‘the World’s Highest Motorable Bridge’, lost by Colonel Patel. (A secondary plaque saying it had been erected ‘near Khardung La on Ice Body’ failed to mention that, with mortal consequences, the ice body then moved.) I looked across the Nubra valley towards the frozen battlefield, chatted to the handful of people I came across. One, a lanky Delhi man having his hair cut, found it hard to believe I was in Khardung La of my own free will. He kept insisting it was an awful place and, when I said I found it exhilarating and beautiful, suggested I try staying for six months. “Instead,” he added waspishly, “of returning to hotel for lunch.”

Early in 2007 those memories returned with a rush when the London Observer invited me to challenge the claim (made by one of its correspondents) that the magic had gone out of travel. I placed, at the heart of my case, this small Ladakhi adventure, and the way a mere taxi ride could lift the spirits, quicken the senses and keep one alive to a world which—despite the mess we’ve made of it—remains a place of infinite wonder. And I concluded by expressing amazement that absolutely everyone wasn’t consumed by an unquenchable urge to get out there and see every last bit of it.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 15 Jun 2008 20:53

here is the photo from preceding article. he is in the ladakh range going to khardung la from Leh.
the range in distance is karakorum (which contains siachen)
http://www.flickr.com/photos/33097132@N ... 6/sizes/l/

the flat valley in between is where nubra and shyok rivers join together and flow west into
POK and Skardu.

btw the distance from Kargil or Drass to Skardu as crow flies is 90km. so outside smerch
range too. only prithvi SS150+ will make the journey. one of the small rivers merging near
kargil and flowing north into Indus is probably the "Shingo". the pakis are said to have sited
their artillery on its banks and fired away merrily because we didnt have WLR or visual
LOS.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 15 Jun 2008 21:11

you will note that headwaters of chenab, kishan ganga, Indus , Nubra and Shyok are totally in
our control. I think kishan ganga already has a dam. we could dam the last three rivers
if we so desired. ravi and jhelum could similarly be checked.

jhelum is what feeds the mangla dam and chenab falls into the wazirabad barrage. take out
a few of these rivers from equation and agriculture in pakpunjab will take a mortal hit.


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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ShauryaT » 16 Jun 2008 07:20

Paul wrote:What is the possibility of a airborne assault unit airdrop on Tawang or other major chokepoints and taking adavantage of the shock factor to push across the major passes.

Of the three sectors, they may target one for offensive and fight a holding action in the other two. Since AP is closer to their heartland (and farthest from ours), they may target this area for offensive action.
Lift, Lift, Lift. Strategic lift capabilities is limited to about a brigade strength, is my understanding. Our military want this to be expanded to division strength and that does not factor such offensive operations, which would need more.

Also, why airdrop on Tawang, it should be behind enemy lines. Also, you are right, the NE is the most likley place, where China will choose to show its strength. Its supply lines will be way too stretched for the middle or northern sectors.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 16 Jun 2008 10:47

Indian OFB Link to Troop Comfort Gear.

Which if these is suitable for high altitude warfare?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Venkarl » 16 Jun 2008 11:02

ramana wrote:Indian OFB Link to Troop Comfort Gear.

Which if these is suitable for high altitude warfare?


In snow kind of environment, suit yeti would help withstanding cold conditions and helps in camouflaging...me thinks so

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rohitvats » 16 Jun 2008 14:28

For the uninitiated, the ORBAT (Order of Battle) for an Infantry Division is something like this:

1. Infantry Brigades *3 @ 3 Infantry Battalions each. 9 Infantry battalions total.
2. Artillery Brigade * 1 @ 3 Field Regiments (each with 18 105mm IFG organised into 3 batteries of 6 guns each), 1 Medium Regiment(18*130/155 mm guns organized into 3 batteries) and 1 Light regiment (12*120mm mortars organized into 2 batteries)
3. 1* Engineer Regiment
4. 1 * Signal Battalion
5. 1* Ordance Unit
6. 1* ASC (Army Service Corp) battalion
7. 2* Field Ambulances (Medical Units)
8. 1* EME Battalion
9. 1* Provost(Military Police)
10. 1* Armored Regiment (not applicable for Mountain division)

The 15,000 number quoted is for entire division covering the teeth and tail both.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 16 Jun 2008 14:37

1 Light regiment (12*120mm mortars organized into 2 batteries)

what is the range and ability of this weapon? with only 12 in inventory isnt this a joke?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby bkumar » 16 Jun 2008 14:50

rohitvats wrote:For the uninitiated, the ORBAT (Order of Battle) for an Infantry Division is something like this:

1. Infantry Brigades *3 @ 3 Infantry Battalions each. 9 Infantry battalions total.
...
3. 1* Engineer Regiment
4. 1 * Signal Battalion
....


Each of the Inf Battalions has a sappers platoon & signals section. Are these soldiers integral to individual battalion or allocated from Divisional Engineer Regt & Signal Battalion respectively?

TIA

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 17 Jun 2008 06:37


The 15,000 number quoted is for entire division covering the teeth and tail both.


That brings back my earlier question. If each div is 15,000 = teeth + tail, then why does India have only 150,000 men (10 divs) out of 1.1 million earmarked for China? Are the remaining 950,000 meant for Pak. We do we not have a minimum of 50% of the IA or 500,000+ men facing China. Then India would not have any worry today.

Raj

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rohitvats » 17 Jun 2008 09:40

rajrang: As said in earlier post, absolute numbers do not mean anything. And by the way, the 10 Mountain divisions are not all along the Sino-India Border. 7 in the eastern sector and 1 in the Western Sector are presently committed to the Sino Indian border. Similarly, the western sector starting from Kargil all the way to Bhuj has 11 divisions in defensive formations. The key difference lies in the 9 Divisions held by the Strike Corps plus 2 divisions held by one of the holding corps. To this add 2 reserve divisions which can be moved as per the requirement. To use your logic, the Indo-Pak border has 11*15000=165000 soldiers as against the 8*15000=120000 soldiers. Not much of a difference considering the terrain. As I said, the key lies with the offensive formations. This is what we need to rectify with respect to China. Get at least 2 Mountain Strike Corps with 2 Mountain divisions each. The fact they will come handy in any Indo Pak conflict does not hurt either. I’m already dreaming of trekking on the Deosai plains.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 17 Jun 2008 20:14

Two thoughts come to mind today, one perhaps belongs in the other China thread

1. Chinese aggression of late is probably a calculated move to take the heat off Tibet. As the Tibet issue gains international press coverage, the desperate need to shut up the exiles, in particular the Dalai Lama is manifested in pressure on GOI to keep the lid on things. If diplomacy is not enough, keeping the fear factor alive with Delhi is another lever. We might even consider the Jaipur blasts in a similar light.

2. China seems very vulnerable to natural disasters in Sichuan - a problem potentially compounded were the dams in the foothills to fail... which they might if hit with something large. Bring on Barnes Wallis Mk 2...; such a strike would cause significant disruption in the Chinese logistics tail on one front to bring things to a halt

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby surinder » 17 Jun 2008 21:30

There is another factor in this situation we might consider: Even if India is not able to win whole of Tibet, even if it wins and frees a small part, it can be a disastrous event for PRC. Tibet is huge, almost the size of India, with a small population. If India is able to free a chunk of it, then it can establish an Independent Tibet. If it can sustain itself, or display the ability to remain free, countries around the world grant recognition. The mere existence of such a free (even if truncated) Tibet will be thorn on PRC undermining the entire basis of its occupation. That is bound to be on PRC leadership's mind. Hence PRC has to ensure complete 100% victory in any war with India. It cannot show even the slightest chink in the armor (pardon the pun).
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 17 Jun 2008 21:56

such an outcome will indeed be catastrophic for the PRC - and not one that will come easily. Similarly Turkestan. Perhaps even a resurgent Mongolia and Manchuria... there are many pressure points, but the will of the Emperor is strong, always has been strong.

rajrang
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 18 Jun 2008 05:34

Rohitvats: Thanks for your detailed information about div strengths. Seems like there are about 8 divs facing china, 11 facing pak plus 13 more divs (9+2+2). All this adds to 32 divs. Now 32 times 15 is about 500,000 and this includes teeth plus tail as you pointed out. This logic still does not account for the balance 500,000+ IA soldiers. Maybe the 15,000 soldiers /division does not include the "tail".

By the way I am dreaming of trekking on the Tibetan plateau - but I am afraid it will always remain only a dream.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby andy B » 18 Jun 2008 06:13

Apologies if this sounds bit immature. I have been reading this thread now for a while and I just researched on Tibet---its hugeeeee. I cant believe that the PRC has just walked in and we are doing nothing at all.

:x :x

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 18 Jun 2008 06:18

Anand Barve wrote:Apologies if this sounds bit immature. I have been reading this thread now for a while and I just researched on Tibet---its hugeeeee. I cant believe that the PRC has just walked in and we are doing nothing at all.

:x :x


A legacy of Nehru and his policy of appeasement. Of course on hindsight I wonder what the IA could have done anyway given the shape it was in.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 18 Jun 2008 08:53

Helicopter gunships would seem to be the perfect attack weapon for the mountainous, heavy jungles of Arunachal Pradesh but AFAIK, there are no gunships in that area. Choppers can pop up, attack and duck behind ridges and treelines in seconds while operating from well hidden lairs. Besides direct attacks, they could also lay down accurate markers for the jets when artillery is not an option (e.g. deep valleys in arty shadow areas). There is very little defence against an attacker that can appear and vanish at will and if Lancers and Hinds were to be seen zipping up and down the valleys of Arunachal daily, that intel itself would deter an invader.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Deans » 18 Jun 2008 09:59

To elaborate on Vivek's earlier point....
For the scenario building exercise to be credible, we will specifically have to address:

1. How many divisions can IA realistically deploy in each theatre (Ladakh, Arunachal, Sikkim).
This would have to start by considering the Corps already in place (how many of their
formations would actually be in position on the border to counter the PLA at the start
of hostilities). How fast can IA move in reserves to each theatre - how does the time
frame change if roads / rail links / bridges are interdicted.

2. Can all these formations be sustained logistically and for how long ? How does this change
if Divisions move from a defensive to an offensive posture (with a significantly higher
consumption of supplies carried over a longer distance) ? I would imagine that each
proposed axis of advance can sustain a finite number of troops.

3. Chinese ORBAT in each theatre - best and worst case scenario's.

4. Possibility of operations across Uttaranchal ? (where the Indian road network upto the
border is arguably better than in the North East & Ladakh).
Last edited by Deans on 18 Jun 2008 11:31, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul Shukla » 18 Jun 2008 10:58

^^^

Also need to extensively study the year around weather patterns in the North and North East as it will have a decisive impact on the Chinese/Indian deployments, the window of opportunity for possible conflict and the scale/duration of the conflict.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 18 Jun 2008 14:32

gentlemen - all comments/scenarios about choppers must consider one crucial factor - ALTITUDE

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 18 Jun 2008 19:28

Lalmohan wrote:gentlemen - all comments/scenarios about choppers must consider one crucial factor - ALTITUDE

Hence the Lancer which was designed as a high-altitude light attack helicopter (LAH). In fact, this variant of the Alouette/Lama/Cheetah holds the absolute altitude record.

Also, with the exception of the extreme northern areas, most of Arunachal/Bhutan, and certainly the deep valleys where a lot of movement will be concentrated, is within the altitude envelope of the Mi-24/25 and Mi-17.

The higher altitudes are above the treeline anyway where troop movement is exposed a la Kargil. The pakis did us a huge favor by giving us the opportunity to hone our high-altitude air attack skills. Nobody else has this experience.


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