War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

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Neshant
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Neshant » 01 Jul 2008 06:04

That's what Nehru thought prior to 1962.

In any case, India must do all it can to defend its borders and if that leads to war, then that eventuality must be faced.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby sevoke » 01 Jul 2008 07:49

Bade:
"Since PRC would only be interested in a low level conflict if and when it happens in the North East, the best counter strategy for India would be show readiness and willingness to escalate the conflict. Simple defensive posture to protect the borders will not help with the general Chinese psyche. If you threaten to escalate the conflict they will back down. It is not in their interest to escalate, but a Kargil like level of conflict they will wager and take their chances to push India around. A failure to push India in border skirmishes will not result in a loss of face anyway, since India will be happy to keep the status quo without any further border gains when the conflict ends from past experience."

Completely agree with you. Its normal for chinese people to be aggressive and overwhelm...its the way they act, but if you stand up to it and back it up they will stand down in a blink of an eye. Yes, Nehru might have thought so too but his analysis of the situation was half baked and naive. For once, instead of showing over tolerance and indulging in theatrics like forming human chains at the border, try letting them in as usual without suspicion and capture/eliminate them and make news out of it. I am sure they will rouse a rabble but they will never take IA for granted. The Army chiefs and the govt. will have to be unflinching and unyielding while dealing with the fallout. The more stubborn you are in dealing with the Chinese the better results you get.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby surinder » 01 Jul 2008 09:42

rajrang wrote:Another news article about the barbarians who have occupied Tibet:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF27Df01.html

Should a conflict break out, the PLA's [People's Liberation Army] contingency plans emphasize a "short and swift localized" conflict


This then automatically suggests to India its strategy: Escalate, prolong, delay and widen the conflict.

The problem itelf is suggesting the solution to it.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Karan Dixit » 01 Jul 2008 11:26

First of all my apology to Singha. I meant to quote Ramana's post but ended up quoting Singha's post by mistake.

I do not really have any insider information on India's specific war aims during 1971. I was basing my views based on statements and views expressed by key figures. Indira Gandhi herself stated that it was her aim to make sure that at the end of the war, Pakistan will not be in a position to attack India ever again. This meant total destruction of war making capacity of West Pakistan. Indian troops were being moved from Eastern front to Western front after the fall of Dhakka. Things were moving in that direction. It was assumed that China will interfere on behalf of West Pakistan. As a result, it was planned to launch a counter offensive against China to liberate Tibet if they were to try anything fancy.

During 1971, Indian army was better armed and trained than Chinese army. After the defeat in 1962, Manekshaw was sent by Nehru to overhaul the deficiency of the army. Systematic efforts were taken by India from 1962 and onward that saw India in an advantageous situation in 1971.

It was only after Americans started propping up China that the China started to gain clear edge over India in economy and military. After that infamous meeting, China received lots of boost from USA including technology transfers. But the thing that made the real difference was US decision to build China as a supplier of consumer goods for American market. This financed Chinese military buildup that we see today.

But even today China does not have clear advantage if the conflicts were to remain purely conventional. However China's nuclear threat to India is similar to that of Pakistan. They say, they will use nuclear weapons against India if the hostilities were to break out. Chinese conventional forces have nuclear umbrella. During 80s confrontation with China, Indian forces operated against Chinese forces without credible nuclear umbrella.

Once we have a cover of counter nuclear weapons, we can start testing the water. What will be China's reaction when their next intrusion team goes missing? Will they mobilize? Or, Will they stop sending intrusion team?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby sevoke » 01 Jul 2008 11:34

Karan Dixit wrote:
Once we have a cover of counter nuclear weapons, we can start testing the water. What will be China's reaction when their next intrusion team goes missing? Will they mobilize? Or, Will they stop sending intrusion team?


But for the lack of political will, those intrusion teams should have gone missing long ago.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 01 Jul 2008 12:19

Okay guys,

The following are the comparison charts for High Altitude airlift capabilities of the Mi-17 and the Mi-26. This is in response to a discussion held several days ago on this thread regarding the viability of the Mi-26 versus the Mi-17 in the Laddakh and Arunachal regions in the Airlift capacities.

The charts are created based on results obtained from a computer program called AHAPS (Aircraft High Altitude Performance Simulator) written by yours truly for use for such analysis of both rotary wing and fixed wing aircrafts. The fixed wing aircraft stuff was already presented in the China Military watch thread in the previous avatar of BRF. The software is in the beta version right now but hopefully will try to make it user friendly enough to hand out to the guys on these threads to put numbers in their analysis rather than just abstract statements and DDM based information sources.

I will refrain from posting observations from the charts right now as BR members are fully capable of doing just that, but I will post the full report of the analysis of the Indian and Chinese high altitude Rotary Wing CONOPs here on BR later on. Right now I am working on other helicopter types available to both India and China so you might have to wait a little while for other such charts and that report.

Image

Image

Image

Please feel free to comment on the above and I can reply on how the charts were developed in case there is a need for it.

Just some notes:

a) Payload does not include crew weight which constitutes a good percentage of total capacity at high altitudes. Hence actual cpacity is payload minus crew average weight
b) All fuel capacities used are Primary fuel cells, no auxiliary and external storage cells. This might be taken into consideration for Special Operations insertions and extractions for which the charts change for Helicopters like the Mi-17. The Mi-26 is not expected to act in this role

Thanks

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 01 Jul 2008 13:05

very impressive work...so if I read the tea leaves correctly the Mi26 manages 4 tons
to DBG - i.e. a platoon of 40 troops and their light arms with some food. not very impressive
if a AN32 can be landed there at less cost. or only two wheeled Sumo type vehicles.

since neither An32 or Mi26 can land at DBG under war conditions....

it could be useful where there's no runway though like north sikkim.

good roads and runways are tough to beat with any amt of airlift.

we only have ourself to blame for current situation. PRC has made no secret of its
infrastructure moves, and even helpfully leaves behind debris to let us know
of their intrusions.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 01 Jul 2008 13:08

is there a good orbat of the PLA somewhere? bear in mind they are masters at psyops and
even HQ formations or shells are likely to be passed off as "shock armies". for PLAAF they use
the soviet style norm of "regiments" rather than squadrons and wings. sounds more impressive.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby hnair » 02 Jul 2008 01:08

PaulJI wrote:
Google Earth relies mostly on data bought off the shelf. It has [b]not gone round the streets of every city in the USA, but only a small proportion[/b]. Note that the street-level images from the USA are commercially valuable (like many of the high resolution overhead images), & may pay for themselves by subscriptions to Google Earths premium services. 1 metre resolution worldwide images are expensive, & unlikely to be recoverable by subscriptions. Its budget is large, but not unlimited.

Yes, Google does quirky things. Someone there may like the Muppandal windmills. Maybe someone there comes from that area. Why not ask them?


1) My original post states their "intention of going around every city". An intention for which they assigned a substantial budget. Not their current status as you imply I said.
2) Bade has answered that aspect about expenses of metre resolution mapping. A company that subsidizes for each employee, 75,000 USDollars (calculating per employee annual costs at 300K for Google) for "private projects" has such money.
3) "Why not ask them?". Read my original posting on "white papers". I did more than ask.

I got no good answers from "them" and no answer from you on this particular topic. My last post on this topic.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 02 Jul 2008 08:50

NYT

Quake Revealed Deficiencies of China’s Military

By JAKE HOOKER
Published: July 2, 2008

BEIJING — They were 19-year-old farm boys wearing cloth shoes and carrying rucksacks, soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army, responding to a national emergency.

They marched into the mountains, with shovels tied to their backs. They cleared rocks the size of houses from blocked roads, with ropes and brute force. They crawled over piles of bricks and concrete, listening for human sounds.

“In order to save people buried under rubble, many soldiers’ hands were cut and bloodied, and they kept their hands moving,” Hu Changming, a Defense Ministry spokesman, said at news conference in May.

After the May earthquake in southwestern Sichuan Province, China sent about 130,000 troops from the army, navy, air force and the Second Artillery Corps scrambling into the mountains in China’s broadest deployment of its armed forces since it fought a border war with Vietnam in 1979.

It was a gritty, hands-on effort, unfolding under the clear view of the public and the news media, and it offered analysts the best chance to assess the performance of the People’s Liberation Army in a crisis since the nation’s rising economy started pumping tens of billions of dollars into the military. It got good marks for public relations domestically, but the effort left some veteran P.L.A.-watchers underwhelmed.

James C. Mulvenon, a specialist on the Chinese military at the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, a government contractor in Washington that performs classified analyses on overseas military programs, said the earthquake showed the army’s best and worst sides. It mobilized quickly, but the troops were unprepared to save lives in the first 72 hours, when thousands were buried under toppled masonry and every minute mattered.

“You basically had a bunch of guys humping through the mountains on foot and digging out people with their hands,” Mr. Mulvenon said. “It was not a stellar example of a modern military.”

In an online forum hosted by the state-run People’s Daily, Zhang Zhaozhong, a prominent defense analyst, said that specialized units like the Marine Corps and the 38th Army Corps of Engineers, the engineering division of the Second Artillery Corps, understood how to rescue survivors from beneath collapsed buildings. But he acknowledged that the overwhelming majority of the deployed forces, ordinary combat troops, had little if any rescue training.

The army had about 100 helicopters ferrying food, supplies and medical teams into the remote mountain areas and rescuing the injured, said Dennis J. Blasko, a former American Army attaché in Beijing. “The management of aircraft and helicopters operating in the area is probably the largest extended operation of its kind the P.L.A. has ever conducted,” he said.

But Mr. Blasko and other experts said that because the military did not have heavy-lift helicopters, vital equipment like excavators and cranes had to be brought in on roads obstructed by landslides, slowing the pace of the rescue operations.

Shen Dingli, a leading security expert at Fudan University in Shanghai, said the military’s response did not reflect well on the military’s preparedness for a potential war with, say, Taiwan, the independently governed island that China claims as its sovereign territory. China’s air force deployed 6,500 paratroopers to Sichuan, but only 15 ended up dropping into the disaster zone, military officials said, because of bad weather and forbidding mountain terrain. Mr. Shen called the effort too little and too late.

“The air force should have been able to get troops into Wenchuan in two hours,” he said, referring to a county near the quake’s epicenter. “It took 44 hours. If it took them 10 hours, that’s understandable. But 44 hours is shameful.”

Allan Behm, a former official in Australia’s Defense Ministry, said the Chinese military was evidently still focused on conventional warfare rather than engineering skills. In spite of its efforts to modernize, Mr. Behm said, “the P.L.A. is still built on the idea of bringing hundreds of thousands of troops into the battle area.”

China has often deployed the P.L.A., along with a separate paramilitary force, the People’s Armed Police, to respond to natural disasters, social unrest and other domestic security issues. Tai Ming Cheung, a senior fellow at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California at San Diego, said that in addition to preparing for a possible conflict with Taiwan, China was “focused on projecting power inside its borders, to ensure social stability.”

In January, P.L.A. units from southwestern China’s Chengdu Military Region were deployed to southern areas hit by heavy snowstorms. In March, they were transferred to Tibetan regions of western Sichuan to pacify antigovernment protesters. Then, in May, the earthquake hit, and they came down from the Tibetan plateau to rescue people buried under collapsed buildings.

The range of the military’s recent missions, and its stated mission to support national construction, national defense and disaster relief, experts say, suggests that the military is still searching for its role.

Some Western analysts say that Beijing’s willingness to accept aid and rescue teams from several foreign militaries reflects a new openness in a military that has historically operated behind a heavy cloak of secrecy. The military’s top commanders held news briefings in Beijing to discuss the work of the troops in the quake’s aftermath, and many analysts said they thought it was the military’s first such event.

Beijing asked the Pentagon’s National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, which operates spy satellites, for high-resolution images of regions affected by the earthquake. China also used 15 of its own satellites to gather information, according to Eric Hagt, director of the China program for the World Security Institute in Washington. It may have asked for satellite images expressly to demonstrate its willingness to work with the international community, Mr. Hagt said.

It all stands in sharp contrast to the military’s performance after the last major earthquake, in Tangshan in 1976, when it refused all foreign aid in an effort to keep the scale of the disaster secret.

Chinese and Western analysts agree that the military’s lack of heavy-lift helicopters and transport aircraft created the most serious bottleneck in the early days after the May earthquake. Troops had poor communications, they said, and did not have immediate access to surveillance imagery to help them make decisions.

“They were visible everywhere,” Mr. Hagt said of the soldiers, “but the actual achievements of the mission were far less admirable. How many more people they could have saved with the proper equipment, technology, know-how and training is hard to know.”

So far, the official death toll is almost 70,000. One Chinese reporter, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals, gave an indication of how many more might have been saved.

He said he traveled overland with a group of P.L.A. soldiers to the town of Yingxiu, near the earthquake’s epicenter. He said that they got there at dusk, about 48 hours after the quake had hit, and that thousands of victims remained buried under collapsed buildings, including more than 200 students at the local elementary school.

Eight hundred injured people had been brought to a clearing, waiting to be evacuated by helicopter. But by noon the next day, only about 10 had been evacuated by air, the reporter said. Many died there in the clearing, waiting to be rescued.

The town had only one electrical generator, and the troops had no power tools. At the Yingxiu Primary School, the soldiers dug with their hands. Some children could be heard singing under the rubble, the reporter said, presumably to keep their spirits up.

A day later, he said, the singing stopped.
Last edited by Singha on 02 Jul 2008 08:53, edited 1 time in total.

Singha
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 02 Jul 2008 08:52

as per web reports the 2nd Artillery corps is almost like a army inside the army and
consists of static elements who prepare and maintain missile launch sites and the
mobile element consisting of missile handling, engineers and security details. I read
somewhere headcount is around 150,000 - a lot bigger than a normal corps.

from the evidence presented above it looks like for all the posturing, fanboy magic
and "fist unit" huha, their level of competence is below the IA at the moment when
dealing with large scale issues of this nature.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby KiranM » 02 Jul 2008 14:42

These same Western analysts made similar comments about India's capabilities for its Bhuj earthquake rescue operations. So let us not view Chinese abilities through their prism but through our own. One convenient fact the Western world forgets is the number of people affected by such calamities in India/ China is way higher than what it would be in US/ Europe. Inspite of comparatively lower density of affected people and having high technology/ engineering capabilities, dedicated disaster response organizations and monetary resources, the US response to Katrina sticks out as a sore thumb.

My 2 cents of ramble.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 02 Jul 2008 15:05

KiranM wrote:These same Western analysts made similar comments about India's capabilities for its Bhuj earthquake rescue operations. So let us not view Chinese abilities through their prism but through our own. One convenient fact the Western world forgets is the number of people affected by such calamities in India/ China is way higher than what it would be in US/ Europe. Inspite of comparatively lower density of affected people and having high technology/ engineering capabilities, dedicated disaster response organizations and monetary resources, the US response to Katrina sticks out as a sore thumb.

My 2 cents of ramble.

kiran, both blasko and mulvenon (two of the experts quoted here) are very respected PLA watchers with many ground breaking works to their credit. I, for one won't be so eager to dismiss their assertions.

BTW, I'm surprised the PAP and the PLA reserves didn't play a larger part in the rescue effort. this kind of work falls squarely in their territory.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 02 Jul 2008 15:19

KiranM - I don't recall anything armed forces specific re Bhuj reporting, but anyway... note that after the tsunami, Indian armed forces were credited by the media with having the situation under control quickly. we need to think about the way the media works - they need sensation, outcry, something to get the crowd excited - disaster is bad, disaster mismanagement is worse - and therefore more news worthy. they have avoided criticising the PLA this time - either they were taken in by the media management, or didn't want to risk their olympics reporting rights... need to look below the surface

this article was interesting, it says a lot about the PLA - in comparison to the IA for sure. We can ignore the direct comparison to western militaries a little. C^3 seems weak, tail seems sparse in equipment, but if they can get 100,000 armed men into battle quickly and are willing to lose 50,000 of them in order to gain their objectives... that is something to be wary of

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 02 Jul 2008 15:25

btw, I've found a number of references on BRF about new chinese strategy of replacing battle worn units in the frontline with fresh ones.
unfortunately, google didn't help. can anyone point me to a source ?
TIA.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 02 Jul 2008 15:36

isnt that exactly what the warsaw pact european attack strategy was about? the pith
seems to be that units are told to fight until they can and keep advancing. only units
that have enforced or are near a breakthrough will be resupplied and made stronger.
once the shattered remnants of the first echelon have broken a few holes, the reserve
second echelon is supposed to drive through and speed off into the rear while
third echelon takes over from 1st, mops up, does rear area security.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 02 Jul 2008 15:40

singha, I admit, my knowledge of warsaw pact's tactical doctrine is sketchy.

btw, are you aware of the PLA's new combined arms battalions ?
seems tailor made for mountain warfare.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby KiranM » 02 Jul 2008 16:08

Lalmohan wrote:KiranM - I don't recall anything armed forces specific re Bhuj reporting, but anyway... note that after the tsunami, Indian armed forces were credited by the media with having the situation under control quickly.



Lalmohan, I clearly remember watching BBC when the comment was made by the newsreader that Indian Army or relief teams have not reached rescue sites even after 24 hours and that locals have to fend for themselves. And the opinion of an expert (dont remember who) was solicited, who gave the 'West highly capable, third world not that capable' comment.

Rahul, I am not disputing the credentials of Blasko or Mulvenon. But their expert analyses withstanding, their premise will be on the belief if something of that magnitude happened in US/ Europe, the response would have been much better. This premise is what I dispute. The population density will be way higher in India/ China than in the West. The requirements for high tech equipment will also vary on an exponential scale. Besides, there will be circumstances where it will be needed to dig out using bare 'blood covered' hands than use high tech equipment. Using this to mark negative is not correct in my perspective.
On another note, if the position of China/ India and the West were interchanged, the opinion of a Chinese/ Indian expert will be similarly biased. :)

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 02 Jul 2008 17:28

kiran, blasko is one who tends to think from the chinese viewpoint and you can't brush him with the general "western expert" tag. I'm saying this because I'm aware of his work which, for a change is much closer to the chinese thought process than anyone else from outside the PRC.

the ground of their criticism is the mismatch b/w what the PLA itself has declared as its aims/ capability claims and the reality of those aims/claims.
I don't think the bhuj incident has much relevance to this particular report.

regards,
Rahul.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby kancha » 02 Jul 2008 17:35

ramana wrote:What is the combat potential of the para-military forces? Can they be used for defensive ops in the border areas to free up regulars from TSP fronts?


Paramilitary Forces will remain just that ... They cannot be a substitute for the Armed Forces by the virtue of their equipment profile and the fact that many things which are taken for granted in an Army formation - AD, Logistics and other supporting arms and services (armour, signals etc) just do not exist in case of Paramilitaries ... Not worth taking the chance.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby RayC » 02 Jul 2008 18:48

vivek_ahuja

Are you factoring in height of the airfield from where these helicopters will operate when looking at the the lift, payload and range? What about the hovering aspect?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Babui » 02 Jul 2008 19:14

isnt that exactly what the warsaw pact european attack strategy was about? the pith
seems to be that units are told to fight until they can and keep advancing. only units
that have enforced or are near a breakthrough will be resupplied and made stronger.
once the shattered remnants of the first echelon have broken a few holes, the reserve
second echelon is supposed to drive through and speed off into the rear while
third echelon takes over from 1st, mops up, does rear area security.


This is a strategy that worked well for the Russians in the late stages of WWII when the Germans did not have the manpower/arms to counter-attack on the first echelon forces that had weakened in the initial attack. Western writers have fondly attributed this strategy to the Russians well into the 80s. Whether this strategy would have actually been followed by the Russians or whether it would be successful in the post WWII era has never been seriously studied (to my limited knowledge). Armies tend to follow strategies that have worked in the past. For the Chinese - it may mean a combined arms attack on isolated Indian posts (similar to our Kargil strategy) to humiliate us (like 1962) as well as capture border areas (a la China Vietnam war). They would then probably declare a ceasefire and withdraw. For them to continue would be to have them come deeper into India and expose their supply lines. Now they risk being defeated and their strategy becomes increasingly higher risk. For us to win - we must not accept any ceasefire and continue to inflict losses on attacking Chinese forces. Given our current level of roadwork, I seriously doubt whether we can make any more than token gains in Tibet.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 02 Jul 2008 19:23

afair, Hitler repeatedly overruled the recos from his field generals in Russia to shorten, adjust
and tighten lines of defence in tune with the seasons and russian moves in favour of not ceding a yard of land captured during the initial success of barbarossa. 6th army could have retreated
from stalingrad in good order if he listed to the generals.

Stavka realized this lack of flexibility and shifted between 100-150 divisions up and down the
front wherever a big attack was needed or defence in depth like Zitadelle was reqd(Kursk).

with such a idiot in charge its a wonder the wehrmacht got as far and as long as they did
- right into the mountains of chechnya a short distance from Baku. a tribute to the pre-war
training system for soldiers and officers.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby HariC » 02 Jul 2008 21:50

In this wargame - has anyone made the "lines of advance" map for Tibet? I keep staring at the Tibet map on google earth but I am not sure what the objectives are. Can we start drawing maps with our proposed lines of movement - and the amount of supply needed to support that line of movement?

I somehow suspect that going beyond a 100 miles in that terrain and supporting that thrust will be quite an accomplishment.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 02 Jul 2008 22:20

in my original post I had marked out an area ripe for conquest north of bhutan. pls see that
link.

in ladakh region , ofcourse aksai chin taken back would prove a point and push their tibet
highway further north as well threaten their road link into Pak via khunjerab pass.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 02 Jul 2008 22:32

RayC wrote:vivek_ahuja

Are you factoring in height of the airfield from where these helicopters will operate when looking at the the lift, payload and range? What about the hovering aspect?


RayC,

Yes, I am including the above in my analysis. In fact, the idea is that for a typical take-off, the helicopter airbase information is needed (altitude, pressure, temperature data etc) for which I set up an atmospheric model. The typical profile would include a vertical lift off within ground effect ( < 0.5*Main Rotor Diameter AGL) and then remain at this altitude for a short distance as cyclic control is brought into play to tip the nose forward (calculations involved for this as well) and then the build up in forward velocity for which the equations modify (including power and fuel flow etc)

Secondly, I dug up data for the engines used on these birds and was able for example to insert equations that limited the fuel flow and TGT rating to their known values and put in a governor control for main rotor RPM. For example, fuel flow might reach full limits but the TGT (Turbine Gas Temperature) would still remain below Max and so forth. At the same time the RPM feature allows engine feedback and hence a more realistic model.

Thirdly, the anti-torque (tail) rotor calculations are included to account for tail wind additions to the power requirements, but this is essentially a localized analysis, in the sense that the AHAPS program will allow you to select a single airbase and then provide the average meteorological data for winds and other parameters that must then be accounted for in the engine power requirements. But the graphs above obviously cannot take that into account when talking about performance as a whole. To be quite honest the tail wind corrections can take away a good proportion of the payload at those high altitudes.

Also, all range and endurance calculations then follow from Breguet equations (Originally for fixed wing aircraft but modified for use with turboshaft engined helicopters)

Finally, when using the single airbase analysis on the main program, a rolling takeoff can be provided for some of the Helicopters with the input data of runway length available.

To put it simply, the above charts are a simplification of what the actual program data looks like, but I put them there so that even with the simplifications they allow a decent comparison. As soon as I can finish the debugging, I can distribute the main code for use to BR members that will probably better explain what I have stated above.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 03 Jul 2008 07:47

Here is a link from another BR thread - reflects the strategic greatness of Gen Jacob:

Some Quotes:

In the event of [hopefully unlikely] hostilities between China and India , China is unlikely to respect Bhutanese neutrality. The defence of Bhutan therefore is irrevocably linked with the defence of India.


India has guaranteed the defence of Bhutan by an unilateral declaration. China claims to have ‘suzerainty’ over Bhutan and also claims some 300 sq miles of Bhutanese territory mainly in the Chumbi valley, the Torsa Nala , and some areas opposite Ha. The Chinese also claim some grazing areas in the north.


In 1971, one Indian division was earmarked for the defence of Bhutan. This quantum of force is totally inadequate. The defence of Bhutan and the Tawang tract are interlinked.


With the improved rail, road and air communications in Tibet, the Chinese can build up to 30 divisions in Tibet in a matter of weeks.


We propose to raise two more Mountain Divisions in the next five years. In order to counter these emerging threats, we need to accelerate our efforts to develop the infrastructure, build roads, airfields, enhance rail capacity and throw more bridges across the Brahmaputra.


There is a pressing requirement for raising and deploying more Mountain Divisions , armoured brigades and air force squadrons. The existing Mountain Divisions lack firepower and mobility. We also need to induct effective artillery [155mm], helicopters (both lift and attack), and surveillance instruments, both ground and UAV.


Finally, we must take all measures to keep the Chinese on the other side of the great Himalayas. The defence of Bhutan is thus integral and interlinked to the defence of India.

END OF QUOTE

Link:

http://sify.com/news/fullstory.php?id=14706725


Can some one on the forum inidcate how many Indian divs are really earmarked for the defense of Bhutan? One seems too little. Also what is the form and nature of India's guarantees to the defense of Bhutan - is this a statement from the Indian Gov or PM? Or is it in the treaty?


Gen Jacob has confirmed my worst fears about India's military weakness in the face of China's 30 divisions -that could be rushed to Tibet within weeks. Quote - "There is a pressing requirement for raising and deploying more Mountain Divisions , armoured brigades and air force squadrons. "

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby RayC » 03 Jul 2008 07:56

vivek_ahuja wrote:
RayC wrote:vivek_ahuja

Are you factoring in height of the airfield from where these helicopters will operate when looking at the the lift, payload and range? What about the hovering aspect?


RayC,

Yes, I am including the above in my analysis. In fact, the idea is that for a typical take-off, the helicopter airbase information is needed (altitude, pressure, temperature data etc) for which I set up an atmospheric model. The typical profile would include a vertical lift off within ground effect ( < 0.5*Main Rotor Diameter AGL) and then remain at this altitude for a short distance as cyclic control is brought into play to tip the nose forward (calculations involved for this as well) and then the build up in forward velocity for which the equations modify (including power and fuel flow etc)

Secondly, I dug up data for the engines used on these birds and was able for example to insert equations that limited the fuel flow and TGT rating to their known values and put in a governor control for main rotor RPM. For example, fuel flow might reach full limits but the TGT (Turbine Gas Temperature) would still remain below Max and so forth. At the same time the RPM feature allows engine feedback and hence a more realistic model.

Thirdly, the anti-torque (tail) rotor calculations are included to account for tail wind additions to the power requirements, but this is essentially a localized analysis, in the sense that the AHAPS program will allow you to select a single airbase and then provide the average meteorological data for winds and other parameters that must then be accounted for in the engine power requirements. But the graphs above obviously cannot take that into account when talking about performance as a whole. To be quite honest the tail wind corrections can take away a good proportion of the payload at those high altitudes.

Also, all range and endurance calculations then follow from Breguet equations (Originally for fixed wing aircraft but modified for use with turboshaft engined helicopters)

Finally, when using the single airbase analysis on the main program, a rolling takeoff can be provided for some of the Helicopters with the input data of runway length available.

To put it simply, the above charts are a simplification of what the actual program data looks like, but I put them there so that even with the simplifications they allow a decent comparison. As soon as I can finish the debugging, I can distribute the main code for use to BR members that will probably better explain what I have stated above.

-Vivek


Send it to the Air Chief.

He is a helicopter pilot.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ShauryaT » 03 Jul 2008 08:38

HariC wrote:I somehow suspect that going beyond a 100 miles in that terrain and supporting that thrust will be quite an accomplishment.
Remember my mantra. We need lift, lift, lift!

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby svinayak » 03 Jul 2008 08:41

vivek_ahuja wrote:
Image

Please feel free to comment on the above and I can reply on how the charts were developed in case there is a need for it.

Can you make the similar altitude chart for Northern areas - Skardu, Chitral and K2 region.
It is critical that those area are also covered under the strategy

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 03 Jul 2008 09:16

afaik only 1 div is still earmarked for bhutan, based in rangiya assam and under 4 corps(tezpur).
it can barely manage to cover eastern third of bhutan and prevent a outflanking of tawang via
bhutan.

central bhutan is high mountains and not very passable but the chicoms can still grab any grazing
areas in or north of the mountains without us being able to contest it.

western bhutan has several passes feeding out into the funnel area near nathu la and could be
very useful to trap the chicoms if they make a move on nathu la area ... no idea if anyone is
earmarked to enter bhutan in west and get into these passes.

imo a pincer movement from north sikkim and bhutan should be feasible to trap 3-4 chicom
divisions into the inverted triangle with apex at nathu la. but we seriously need airlift and a couple
of airmobile brigades, plus lot of tactical airpower to make that happen and hold the trap shut
while artillery and tacair smashes the trapped pocket.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 03 Jul 2008 10:28

Since tanks and armored vehicles are not going to be practical in Tibet, we probably need to have a large number of light jeep-type vehicles and trucks that can be armed with Nishant UAVs, manpads, recoilless rifles, mortars and other bunker/tank busting weapons. These jeeps, along with troops, could be dropped/landed over a sanitized area fairly quickly in the numbers required.

I somehow get the feeling that the Jaguars will come into their own in a place like Tibet. There can be few attacks quite as effective as a low level supersonic strike and the relatively flat Tibet geography is perfect for that. I don't believe this has been properly done in anger yet. In Iraq, AFAIK, they (and the Tornados) were used merely as medium altitude bomb trucks for dumb bombs and PGMs after the Iraqi AF was neutralized.

Also, our Nishant and other UAVs could be adapted to carry anti-personnel bomblets that are small enough to cause grievious injury. A few UAVs could saturate a large area of massed enemy troops, the idea being not to finish them off but to injure them enough to put them out of action. That way, they will suck up valuable resources that dead soldiers would not. Even for the Chinese, Tibet is a tough place to maintain logistically.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby RayC » 03 Jul 2008 11:07

Singha wrote:afaik only 1 div is still earmarked for bhutan, based in rangiya assam and under 4 corps(tezpur).
it can barely manage to cover eastern third of bhutan and prevent a outflanking of tawang via
bhutan.

central bhutan is high mountains and not very passable but the chicoms can still grab any grazing
areas in or north of the mountains without us being able to contest it.

western bhutan has several passes feeding out into the funnel area near nathu la and could be
very useful to trap the chicoms if they make a move on nathu la area ... no idea if anyone is
earmarked to enter bhutan in west and get into these passes.

imo a pincer movement from north sikkim and bhutan should be feasible to trap 3-4 chicom
divisions into the inverted triangle with apex at nathu la. but we seriously need airlift and a couple
of airmobile brigades, plus lot of tactical airpower to make that happen and hold the trap shut
while artillery and tacair smashes the trapped pocket.


As I see it, one Div for the defence of Bhutan would not make military sense. Further, why should China attack Bhutan in isolation?

If China is to attack, then it will be India which would be the priority and would attempt more than one thrust so that the reaction is divided.

One must also look at the Chumbi Valley, its terrain, the communication, logistics, gun areas, concentration areas etc in a little more details and then calculate the force levels icapable of induction in that area that can be brought to bear by the Chinese or India.

Whenever one thinks of airlift in any form, one must also see the feasibility of where they can be dropped/ landed and the hostile environment there as also. if dropped in safe areas, the capability of such a force to thereafter regain poise and move to contact and defeat the enemy.

I am only speaking in hypothetical terms to further the discussion.


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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby RayC » 03 Jul 2008 11:15

Since tanks and armored vehicles are not going to be practical in Tibet


Take a look at Tibet from North Sikkim!

Billiard Table!!

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Anantz » 03 Jul 2008 11:36

rajrang wrote:

Can some one on the forum inidcate how many Indian divs are really earmarked for the defense of Bhutan? One seems too little. Also what is the form and nature of India's guarantees to the defense of Bhutan - is this a statement from the Indian Gov or PM? Or is it in the treaty?


"


AFAIK I think the 20 Mountain Division in Binnaguri could be used for the defence of the Western part of Bhutan, ie the Ha Valley of Bhutan which opens up to Chumbi valley. Binnaguri is in the doars and pretty close to Phuntsoling, The gateway to Bhutan. On the other hand, the 27th Div in Kalimpong is I guess meant for the Indo Bhutan China tri-junction. Regarding the use of tanks in North Sikkim, North Sikkim is where the Himalayas end and Tibetan plateau starts, its ideal for using tanks there, and i have personally seen tanks being transported to North Sikkim through the highway NH 31A. However the capability to transport the tanks there in times of emergency is still a suspect as the Highway closes down often during heavy rains. Especially in between East and North Sikkim, where the roads are terrible, especially in Monsoons. The gov really needs to upgrade the road infrastructure if it wants to defend that part, especially when you can see just on the other side of Nathu-la the roads and infrastructure is much much better.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 03 Jul 2008 13:47

RayC wrote:
Since tanks and armored vehicles are not going to be practical in Tibet


Take a look at Tibet from North Sikkim!

Billiard Table!!


nice one RayC :)

Tibet is very suitable for tanks, its just that us getting tanks up there is very very difficult. Quite the reverse for the Chinese - who will not be able to bring their tanks down into the Brahmaputra valley

I expect that any major Chinese attack will pay scant regard to Bhutan's sovereignty

Singha - if we take back Aksai Chin, the Chinese motorable road being 'pushed north' - as I understand it is not an option, or if it is a very costly option, i.e. there is NO suitable road terrain onto the Tibetan plateau from that side WITHOUT Aksai Chin. Therefore it is of extreme strategic importance to the Chinese, and it will therefore be very strongly defended - if we go for Aksai Chin, we basically go for Tibet, or the carving out of new boundaries for the Chinese empire all along Turkestan and Tibet - the implications of which are immense

I fear that there are no limited war aims possible here, only seismic ones!

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 03 Jul 2008 14:00

how do you eat a large steak ? kill yourself with one galactic bite or
cut it up into small manageable chunks.

panda is a huge problem - better solved by breaking in chunks.

if we can retake and hold aksai chin even half of it and place that highway
within rocket and artillery range it will be a dagger into panda's heart.
taking all of it and cutting the road still leaves them routes from quinghai
side (the railroad path) and from chengdu/yunnan side so that cannot
be a reason to go ballistic - not officially. northern tibet is a desert with
salty lakes and they are welcome to build a new road through that....
..
and since it belonged to India, they cannot claim we are holding their
land.

pakistans position in the wakhan corridor (if thats what northern rim of POK)
will become untenable due to our flanking movement and breaking up
that region of the rogue should become easier, cut off their escape routes
and their eagerness to sit in skardu will decrease by 50%.

the aksai recapture and trapping a couple of PLA divisions and decimating most
of them in the nathu la funnel, with the rest packed off to delhi by train
for a grand surrender and handover to Red Cross in IP stadium could be major
goals...food and drinks provided to international media.

and we keep the funnel land between north sikkim and bhutan to secure
forever the chicken neck region. old docs can always be dug up from
national archives that 2+10=14.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 03 Jul 2008 15:06

Full marks for vision and plan!

apparently, there are no mountain passes from the Chinese territories to the north of western Tibet onto the Tibetan plateau itself, hence their anxiety over aksai chin. fully agreed that artillery coverage of that road will be major takleef for PLA

with a restive Turkestan, that takleef can only sharpen

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby KiranM » 03 Jul 2008 15:38

Rahul M wrote:kiran, both blasko and mulvenon (two of the experts quoted here) are very respected PLA watchers with many ground breaking works to their credit. I, for one won't be so eager to dismiss their assertions.

BTW, I'm surprised the PAP and the PLA reserves didn't play a larger part in the rescue effort. this kind of work falls squarely in their territory.


Rahul, I skimmed through the net about Mulvenon and Blasko. I see your point and I stand corrected.

Regards,
Kiran


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