War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

[Singha]

there was some talk after kargil of build a parallel road to NH1 in kargil
about 20km east of current one for better secrecy and artillery safety.
going by lack of any noises one could assume this proj and the tunnel
below rohtang pass have not been funded?

[Victor]

Since tanks and armored vehicles are not going to be practical in Tibet

Take a look at Tibet from North Sikkim!

Billiard Table!!

Yes, of course. That is why I speculated that low level supersonic attacks by Jaguars would be effective. The Chinese have nothing to match that. Emphasis on supersonic and at 50 feet above ground level. I don't believe there is an effective counter to that either. For one, they would literally be flying under the radar.

About the tanks and other heavy stuff, their engines will have a tough time breathing in those altitudes unless they are modified in some radical way. And getting them to the plateau in numbers is not practical. But we will still need tank-like firepower, hence armed light vehicles--essentially, firepower without the armor. I have not been able to find anything about high altitude tank warfare but then again, Tibet is probably the only place at altitude that is suitable tank terrain.

[Singha]

oldies will recall the IAF silver jubilee magazine back around 1984 had 4 jaguars launching a
cluster bomb attack on a truck convoy in Tibet on its front and back cover. the lead pair had
already released a shower of cluster bomblets and in the distance the second pair had already
struck the rear of the convoy. they were flying fast and low down a dry sandy valley.

superb painting it was.

[sunilUpa]

Analysis: Controlling Tibet -- Part 1 By ANDREI CHANG

HONG KONG, July 2 (UPI) -- The eruption of riots in Tibet in March reflected an increasingly complicated political situation there, involving both internal and external factors.

Internally, the peaceful and non-violent approach of the Dalai Lama toward China has encountered greater resistance from the young generation of Tibetans, and the Dalai Lama's political relevance has been gradually marginalized as a result.
Externally, India's China policy is now at a critical point, and India-China relations are likely to slip backward if they fail to quickly progress. India is adjusting the deployment of its armed forces along its border with China to guard against a Chinese intrusion.

Meanwhile, as the Beijing Olympic Games approach, the faction in Tibet that favors a showdown with the Chinese leadership views the present time as the best opportunity to put greater pressure on Beijing.

Under these circumstances, the Tibet issue is likely to remain the focus of attention by various parties before the Olympic Games, and constant protests by the Tibetans can be expected.

China's handling of the Tibet riots was very similar to the way it dealt with the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. In the early phase, a large number of regular troops from the People's Liberation Army were sent to the scene to deter the protesters.

Within 48 hours of the start of the riots in Lhasa, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets as the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Region was dispatched to Lhasa.

This rapid troop deployment indicates that with the completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad in 2006, the rapid reaction capability of the Chinese armed forces in the Tibet region, particularly the ability to quickly maneuver heavy equipment, has been greatly enhanced.

This is indicated by the fact that the People's Liberation Army soldiers on the T-90/89 vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were all wearing the "leopard" camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operations. These uniforms have appeared in video footage of the 149th Division during exercises.

When unrest occurred in Tibet in 1989 and a curfew was imposed in Lhasa, the 149th Division was also the first People's Liberation Army combat unit to arrive on the scene. At that time, the Chinese People's Liberation Army troops entered Tibet via the Sichuan-Tibet highway.

The 149th Division of the People's Liberation Army is based at Leshan in Sichuan province. As for the T-92 armored vehicles that appeared in Lhasa, the No. 52 Mountain Brigade of the Tibet Military Region received the vehicles around 2000.

The military value of the Qinghai-Tibet railway has thus been demonstrated in the rapid reaction of the People's Liberation Army armed forces to the Lhasa riots.

Should China-India relations deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and the riots in Tibet spread extensively, the first combat units of the PLA to be called to action would be the No. 52 and No. 53 Mountain Brigades under the Tibet Military Region.

[sunilUpa]

Analysis: Controlling Tibet -- Part 2 By ANDREI CHANG

HONG KONG, July 2 (UPI) -- Should China-India relations deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and the riots in Tibet spread extensively, the first combat units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army to be called to action would be the No. 52 and No. 53 Mountain Brigades under the Tibet Military Region.

The No. 52 Brigade, stationed at Linzhi, is highly mechanized and armed with T-92 wheeled armored vehicles and HJ-8/9 anti-tank missiles. National highway 318 directly connects Linzhi and Lhasa; thus it is logical to conclude that the T-92 wheeled armored vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were from this brigade. The No. 52 Mountain Brigade is stationed at Milin and is also the PLA's combat unit stationed closest to the city of Lhasa.

National highway 318 is in fact the southern route of the Sichuan-Tibet highway. In the event of war or future large-scale riots in Tibet, the highway will be the key passageway for combat troops from the Chengdu Military Region to enter Tibet.

However, this key highway runs across the Minjiang and Daduhe rivers in a region with an average altitude of 14,000 feet above sea level, and thus is very susceptible to attack by the Indian air force or assault by organized rioters. Most of the highways within the Tibet region will be within striking range of the Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters soon to be deployed in the No. 30 Squadron of the Indian air force at Tezpur.

If the T-90/89 armored personnel carriers used in Lhasa were indeed from the PLA's 149th Mechanized Rapid Reaction Division of the Chengdu Military Region, they were most likely transported first from Chongqing to Xining, then to Golmud to connect to the Qinghai-Tibet railway and continue on to Lhasa. The whole journey would take about 48 hours.

Such troop movements would be much faster and cheaper than before. Calculated on the basis of being able to transport most of the heavy equipment of a whole mechanized division within 48 hours -- it is unlikely that all the division's equipment would be moved -- the People's Liberation Army would be able to transport approximately 10 light mechanized divisions and some heavy mechanized divisions through the railroad to Tibet from the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions within 30 days.
Of course, should there be a military conflict between China and India, the Qinghai-Tibet railway would be a prime target for airstrikes by the Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters of the Indian air force's No. 30 Fighter Squadron, the MiG-27 fighters of the No. 22 Squadron at Hashimara and the "Jaguar" attackers of the Indian air force's No. 5 Squadron at Ambala.

The only obstacle to this mass movement of regular armed troops and equipment would be the capacity of the Qinghai-Tibet railway and the number of available trains. China once claimed that the annual transport capacity of the railway was 5 million tons, an average of 13,888 tons per day.

Interesting series by A Chang.

[RayC]

China eyeing Sikkim again


India, like others, follows a 'One China' policy but deals with two Chinas. The "peacefully rising China", which "understands and supports India's aspirations to play a greater role in international affairs" but merely lip services it, actually regulates a relationship on its own terms. This is the China which Indian leaders want to emulate economically and frequently make believe there is space for both to rise and prosper. This China will soon overtake the US as India's largest trading partner.

The other China is the one that inflicted a humiliating defeat over the boundary dispute in 1962 and has kept bullying and needling India without diplomatic grace and sophistication. It is opposed to India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council, entry into the Asian economic and security structures and recognition as a state with nuclear weapons. Its blatant use of Pakistan and other negative strategies ensures India is kept confined to South Asia courtesy its strategic encirclement: 'String of Pearls', a chain of naval bases designed to undermine India's pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region.

China's military modernisation is moving at a frenetic pace. Defence spending has registered an annual increase of 17 per cent, officially amounting to $ 70 billion, though Western analysts say it is double that amount. The upgrade in military infrastructure in Tibet has trebled the operational and logistics capabilities of the PLA. Its strategic programmes are on the rise too.

The boundary dispute, which hurts India, has for all intents and purposes remained on the back burner, periodically subjected to the charade of political and cartographic mechanisms for its resolution. It is a zero sum game. Cleverly, the Chinese have raised the political cost of any settlement to unacceptably high levels even raking up boundary dispute on the settled Sikkim border.

Dealing with the two Chinas are officials in foreign office who believe relations with Beijing have never been better and military commanders who assert that there is a serious disconnect between our perception of Chinese intent and capabilities. But they are being advised to underplay, even underreport, border incidents.

The Chief of Army Staff, Gen Deepak Kapoor's recent television interview on the frequency of alleged intrusions by the PLA was unprecedented for its candour and content. He emphasised that both Armies were patrolling up to the Line of Actual Control of their perception and transgressing each other's imagined red lines. He dismissed the aggressive behaviour of the PLA in dismantling military structures on the Dolam Plateau near the trijunction of Bhutan as a matter for Bhutan to sort out with China. It is no secret that India is committed to the defence of Bhutan and coordinates its border talks with China.

Article III of the 1996 CBM Treaty, which outlines several de-escalating measures, cannot be implemented as a mutually acceptable LAC has defied definition and demarcation.

The most recent and sustained fingering by PLA on the border has been in North Sikkim is Gyangyong area. The border with Sikkim was settled in 1890 as per Anglo-Chinese convention along the watershed between the Sikkim Teesta and the Tibetan Mochu rivers. The boundary though has not been jointly demarcated. In 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China, Sikkim was recognised as a State of the Indian Union after India parroted for the nth time that Tibet was an Autonomous Region of China.

On June 16, a vehicle-mounted PLA patrol came one kilometre into the Finger Area making it the 65th intrusion this year in the same area. On one occasion, Indian soldiers formed a human chain to block the entry of the PLA. In 1967, similar Indian tactics at Nathu La blew up into a major border skirmish.

Sikkim's geo-strategic importance is recognised beyond doubt. Its eastern shoulder descends into the Chumbi valley to the point near the trijunction with Bhutan which is disputed. North Sikkim is the only area in the East from where any meaningful ground offensive into Tibet can be mounted. During Operation Falcon, following the Sumdorong Chu standoff in Wangdung, heavy tanks, artillery and mechanised vehicles were inducted into North Sikkim in 1987. As matching infrastructure lagged behind and slowed down to zero after the 1993 and 1996 peace accords, the military deterrent capability also withered away. So twice, once after 1962 and again in 1987, infrastructure development plans were aborted.

Only this year, singed by Chinese accusations of a prime ministerial trespass of Arunachal Pradesh was a retired Army Chief despatched as Governor of the State and a development package funded. No Indian Prime Minister has ever visited Tawang which, the Chinese say, has an inalienable connection with Tibet.

The intrusions in Sikkim have provoked the standard official response: From "not yielding an inch of ground" to "integral part of India" to "the matter will be taken up at the appropriate highest level". For at least three days after the June 16 trespass in Sikkim, the media went berserk, painting the incident as a serious breach of faith by the Chinese. Mr Mao Swe, the Chinese Consul General in Kolkata, defused the crisis by publicly reaffirming Beijing's recognition of Sikkim as part of India. He added that these were not incursions but differences of perception. For good measure, he said, "The border dispute between India and China won't be settled soon."

The message is loud and clear. Regardless of the method and level of negotiation, the boundary dispute will not be resolved anytime soon. Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei has injected a strategic dimension to the India-China relationship, whatever that means for conflict resolution.

Why has the PLA become proactive? Why the needling in north Sikkim and why now? Until this year, the Sikkim boundary was a settled issue. Only the status of Arunachal Pradesh was periodically questioned. China, raising the ante on the boundary issue and thus India's discomfiture, has in part to do with India's strategic partnership with the US, improving its bargaining position on the boundary question and delaying its full and final settlement.

The PLA's posturing on the border is risk laden. Indian Army and Air Force do not have an adequate deterrent capability in the East. A counter offensive Corps has remained on paper since 1987. Belatedly two new Mountain Divisions have been sanctioned for the East. We are 20 years behind the Chinese in operational capability and infrastructure.

The Chinese have raised not just the political, but also the military cost by undisguisedly dragging the border dispute. Two companies of the PLA will shortly arrive in Punjab for counter-terrorism exercises with 11 Corps, ostensibly augmenting strategic ties! For soldiers in north Sikkim and elsewhere on the LAC, the contradictions in policy and statement are not easy to comprehend. Managing differences on the LAC is easier in South Block than in Finger Area, especially when China intends to prolong the war of nerves.

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnist1. ... iter=mehta

This article by Maj Gen Mehta should help further discussion.

[Lalmohan]

oldies will recall the IAF silver jubilee magazine back around 1984 had 4 jaguars launching a
cluster bomb attack on a truck convoy in Tibet on its front and back cover. the lead pair had
already released a shower of cluster bomblets and in the distance the second pair had already
struck the rear of the convoy. they were flying fast and low down a dry sandy valley.

superb painting it was.

you betcha!

[Singha]

AoA...scan the back too if you can...has the other jaguar

[Victor]

Always thought that cover was a cunning British sales job depicting Skardu environs which of course is little different from Tibet. It also shows tanks at altitude.

RayC, got yr msg tks.

[Jagan]

nope guys, it aint tibet. more of pakistani convoys in 'occupied' kashmir. or stuff like that.. the artist probably meant gilgit/skardu area

[Surya]

while the IAF needs to havea lot of capacity to rip the supply lines, can the Brahmos do that?

assuming range is appropriately taken care.


The supply lines need to be hit with
1. Tibetan irregulars
2. IAF
3. Brahmos\prithvi etc

The trucks should never have to be hit - they should come to the point where they just sit there having run out of fuel and lube. and then can be picked apart

and while they are degraded we need to be able to grit out the hundreds of missiles they will lob at us.

Can our political setup be able to deal with it? Civilians? we panicked the last time on the basis of threats and rumours.

[Singha]

parts of tibet near the border should be no different. and if there are no hills, all the better, less
holes for them to crawl into.

[rohitvats]

This appeared on the ORBAT dot com website maintained by Ravi Rikhye:

Is This What China Wants?

By defeating India in 1962, China established its claim lines on the Sino-Indian border as the reality. For 35 years, India adopted a strong defensive posture on the border, with no intent of attacking China to recover lost territory, or even to do more than simply throw back a Chinese offensive should that take place. In the 1990s India agreed to substantially reduce forces on its side of the border to show it considered a peaceful solution to the border issue the only way to go.

China's reaction to the winning hand it held for 35 years and the even bigger hand it managed by making complete idiots of the Indians in the 1990s - in fairness it takes little to make complete idiots of the Indians was - you've guessed it: to push the Indians harder than it has done before, with hundreds of intrusions and a massive infrastructure buildup in Tibet's remote regions including roads in areas India has controlled since before the coming of the British Raj.

We are being neither cynical, bitter, or angry when we make the above comments. China sees itself as the eventual world superpower, this attitude is written into Chinese genes, and the country cannot help itself in taking every opportunity to push its neighbors as much as it can. Peaceful coexistence to the Chinese means accepting China as the suzerain, and that mans everyone else must accept vassal status. What China is doing is absolutely natural.

But is it the right way to advance China's interests?

Consider the following. India has already raised two mountain divisions in 2008, the very first divisions it has raised since 1984. One is clearly a strike reserve against China, the other, while it has a role against Pakistan, has been created very much with China in mind. It is a strike reserve primarily for Ladakh.

Now Mandeep Singh Bajwa tells us that the next step in a decade-long buildup against China is being prepared.

A third new division, specifically for offensive operations in Ladakh, will be raised. Mr. Bajwa naturally cannot give any details as the information is classified. India at this time has 7 regular army battalions and perhaps 2 Scouts battalions oriented to covering the Ladakh border. The existing division is to get a third brigade, additional corps artillery is to be inducted; armored battlegroups - withdrawn under the reduction agreements with China - are to be reinducted; three long-closed airfields have been reactivated, and several Scouts battalions of specialized high mountain troops for offensive operations are to be added.

In other words, not only does Indian Northern Command now have a mountain strike division that is not committed to the Pakistan front, Indian forces in Ladakh are to more than double. As important, nowhere in this buildup is the word "defense" mentioned.

Ladakh has four sectors. One faces Pakistan, and it already has five brigades. Ladakh has three sectors. Even at it the height of its 1960s buildup against China, India's offensive component was a single, limited division attack in the southern sector, intended purely to throw off a Chinese offensive.

But now India is building the capability to launch three simultaneous offensives, one of a brigade in the north, very high and very rugged terrain, a brigade in the center, and a full division in the south.

BUT please consider this. These five brigades are the first wave of the offensive. Behind them will be five other brigades, and behind these will be at least that many more drawn partly from reserves committed primarily to Pakistan front and only secondarily to the China front.

In other words, where India before the buildup essentially had 4-5 brigades for Ladakh, it will soon have 15+, or a tripling of strength. and again, we need to emphasize, no one at Army HQ is talking about defense. These forces are being planned and will train for a straight, heavy-duty, combined air-ground offensive aimed at regaining Ladakh, and completely disrupting China's links with Sinkiang and Central Tibet.

China meanwhile has been steadily reducing its formation and upgrading them. But you see, the upgraded Chinese formations actually still have less capability than the Indians formations of today, unit for unit, because the Indians have steadily continued upgrading their army in general. And a new round of modernization/reequipment is in the works so that the capability gap will be even larger, unit for unit. India is going for mass AND quality, whereas China is going for the discredited American doctrine of quality without mass.

You see, India now has a trillion dollar economy and it spends just a bit over 2% of it on defense. The economy is expected to grow by 50% in the next five years - that is the reduced target given the recent distortions caused by oil and food. And India has decided it needs to going back to spending 4% of GDP on defense - all thanks to China. India's defense budget looks set to triple in the period 2007-2012 - and the irony of it, people are beating up China for its defense expenditure, which - believe it or not - is actually about China says. In other words, China is NOT lying about its expenditures, sorry to disappoint everyone.

So, back to our original question. Does China really think the Indian buildup is in its interest. India did not want to undertake the buildup, it wanted to normalize relations and to demilitarize the border, and it agreed to the latter. So what exactly has China gained by not keeping its end of the deal?

Tomorrow we will talk about the political calculations China is making in the face of this massive Indian buildup, which has just begun, by the way. There are many more divisions on the way. And we will show that those political calculations, while entirely appropriate for the past, are now hopelessly outmoded.

[Singha]

In other words, where India before the buildup essentially had 4-5 brigades for Ladakh, it will soon have 15+, or a tripling of strength. and again, we need to emphasize, no one at Army HQ is talking about defense. These forces are being planned and will train for a straight, heavy-duty, combined air-ground offensive aimed at regaining Ladakh, and completely disrupting China's links with Sinkiang and Central Tibet.

OMG - another case of BR being ahead of the curve... made my day and boosted morale
in my foxhole here by 301.24% saar. thank you thank you for posting the article and looking fwd to
the part2.

"army group north" - on to kaliningrad, riga , talinn, ladoga and sankt pandaburg!!

it is to be noted the PLA has got its business wings and funding clipped in last 15 yrs and money
has poured into long range missiles (2nd arty), PLAAF and esp PLAN for their US-Taiwan focussed
Green water buildup. case in point the PLAs tank programs halted at couple of regiments onree like
Type98, ZTZ99 afair.

[Prem]

Chicom's fear of Sikh policmen in Shangahi keep tormenting them . The real game will start by 2020 .

[Sanjay M]

China Pursues More 'Talks' on Tibet

Bah, everybody knows they're just stalling until they can get the Olympics out of the way. Hopefully the activists will still know to act up.

[Nayak]

Go easy on me folks.

Does IAF have FAE's ?

Looking at how the Chicoms plan on massing their infantry, a nice little gift from above would help even out the odds a bit.

Or does the atmosphere in the Eastern sector, not support the logistics ?

One more question.

Does the IA have enough qty of shells filled with fletchette rounds ?

Nothing like a mass of arty shells with air burst capability raining down ball bearings and sharpened blades on the mooks.

I always feel better when I imagine that scenario.

[ramana]

Good questions. Look up DRDO techfocus and past IAF exercises. FAE is there.
Next look at OFB and see if they have proximity fuses for shells. There was supposed to be a 155mm shell factory to be set up post Kargil. Dont know status.

I asked for Krasnopol status in the Arty thread for same reason.

[Singha]

IAF has plenty of FAE, Napalm, clusters. I posted in another thread about a new
israeli bomb Su30 tested in 2007 , around 150kg of HE core spreading 15000 steel
ball bearings in a cloud of 75m radius. quite deadly on exposed infantry and thin
skinned vehicles.

iirc the russians call it the FAB-xxx family. they tested a tsar bomb version of
that from a Tu160 Blackjack last yr...I believe it was a 30,000lb weapon
the shockwave must have sent people off their chairs miles away.

[sanjaykumar]

The real war will be in logistics, fuel, water, food, transport and popular support. All parameters in India's favour. With the vast exposed Tibetan plateau, marauding MiG 27s and Establishment 22 troops who will be indistinguishable from local Tibetans, a civilian hostile population and very likely qualitatively superior Indian formations, China should not be eager for a fight. Their strategy will be to fight on Indian soil which should be permitted, if everything goes right Arunachal would no longer share borders with China at least in the fighting zones.The valleys from the Tibetan plateau into Tawang (the drainage pattern is north=south) should be deadly for troops channeling between defenders on ridges.

Expect major sabotage in the North east, Tibetan saboteurs and Pakistani/Indian Muslim agent provocateurs. The big question will be if Pakistan would keep out of what will be a two-front war-Aksai Chin and western and eastern borders of Bhutan. The key to Buddhist Tibet lies in Islamic lands-Eastern Turkestan and Pakistan. I don't think Pakistan will stay out unless India lauches a decapitating strike to take out every Pakistani general above the rank of shoe-shine boy- should be achievable in a 3 am strike against oh lets say GT road near the Soan river, Islamabad. Preemptive decimation of Sargodha with Brahmos would be de rigeur.

[Singha]

well the last thing paki genrails want is a war with India which will
stop whatever little money making opportunities they have.
dawn raids on westridge and rawalpindi cantonment tauba tauba
who wants such violence.

pakis will leave the chinese to their own just as the chinese
abandoned their friend in kargil - unless we complicate the matter
by attacking them.

as I said before, dont complicate the issue but making all enemies
gang up on you, dont _initiate_ multi front wars - hitler should
have learnt that.

[rohitvats]

A small analysis of the news posted earlier:
1. 3rd Div (Leh) will get another brigade which will be the Div strike reserve. the existing two will form the firm base
2. With one dedicated strike division (the about to be raised 3rd div referred to in the report) plus one which will be pulled from Pakistan front (I'm talking about new raisings only here), we've two division worth of Strike force available. That makes it 1+3+3 = 10 brigades worth of troops. And we've not even touched the 1st or 2nd Strike Corps.
3. My guess is the work on the Rohtang Tunnel (9kms if I remember correctly), which has been stalled, will also be paced up and brought up to speed. With this tunnel, we'll have an all weather road access to the Leh region and this will allow faster induction of troops.
4.Though it is premature and speculative, my gut feeling is that India is developing a strategy to hit Chineses where it will hurt them most. While Chinese may be in position to quickly induct troops in the tawang and sikkim sector, we will hit back in the Aksai Chin Sector. This will serve the twin purpose of taking back territory and severing the Xinjiang anf Tibel link.
As my Chinese freinds would've said, " We live in interesting times".

[Nayak]

as I said before, dont complicate the issue but making all enemies
gang up on you, dont _initiate_ multi front wars - hitler should
have learnt that.

That's where having a full fledged base with Su's and an airborne assault element based in Tajikistan or Afghanistan will come in handy.

Pukes will be terrified and will think twice before making any attempt.

However the jernails and corpse kamandus are too well fed and fattened on the morsels thrown by Amreekhans.

A lean mean hungry and fit hunting dog is more dangerous than a well-fed mongrel.

So sayeth a maulana in a torn lungi.

[Nayak]

We sharpened our teeth on CAS during Kargil. What are the capabilities of Chicom air farce ?

I hope their definition of 'close' air support is similar to the 'wang wei' incident ?

The superb world-war 2 tactics of the tag team action of Wehrmacht and luftwaffe still holds good on giving a good a$$ whooping to these 3rd world peasants.

When was the last time Chinese guns misfired in anger ?

From wiki

# 1967: Border skirmishes with India.
# 1969 to 1978: Sino-Soviet border conflict.
# 1974: Battle of Hoang Sa.
# 1979: Sino-Vietnamese War.
# 1986 and 1988: Border and naval skirmishes with Vietnam.
# 1989: Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.
# 1995 to 1996: Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.

Their experience in real time conflicts does not inspire confidence. Other than Paki-lund which are the other countries who exercise with the PLA ?

[Rahul M]

nayak ji, chinese are counting on their missiles i.e 2nd arty to do the CAS role (ya ya, I know that sounds oxymoronic), not the PLAAF.

think of the issue from that perspective. BMs, especially if accurate enough would be hard to defend against.

[Singha]

if the PLAAF cannot/will not do CAS, they wont be able to defend their BM launch areas either.
the paltry J6, J7, the A5 and the obese J8 and FBC1 for CAS - IAF Bisons will shoot these
down like flies on a wall. I doubt the A5,J6 and J7 even have the range and payload to
fly in tibet and make an impact.

BMs can never replace the combat power of a squadron of a/c flying 200 sorties a week with
3 tons of bombs each. thats 600 tons of power delivered where and when you want it with
human targeting and mid course change possible. nobody has 10,000 SRBMs and IRBMs
are very costly - dont think anyone keeps 1000s of IRBMs.

just as a huge SAM screen doesnt replace having a good AF.

its the old adage of static defence vs mobility.

proposed strategy:
- Bisons for point defence of airbases, logistics nodes
- Mig27 for CAS
- Jaguars and M2K for deeper interdiction sorties and precision strikes
- Mig29 for feba air cover
- Su30 for area air denial/deterrence patrols over tibet
- Su30 for selective strikes on high value targets
- An32 for dropping bombs once the plaaf is chased away

to my knowledge the plaaf only trains with paf and north korea.
the chinese mentality lacks independence and initiative - the inborn
qualities of top fighter jocks. put 10 of them in a formation and they
will feel secure, isolate 2 and they will run and fly into the ground
in a panic.

a few hard blows and they will break

[Nayak]

And all that mao's/confuscian/tao's sayings counts to jack-schidt.

Looking at the territory, tactics favour stormtroopers style.

Fast moving, air borne infantry, combined with good intelligence and aircover will sow seeds of disarray and confusion among the Cheeni mooks.

Slash and hack, turn and burn tactics will be effective.

Our SIGINT dept is world class. All their reverse-engineered radio com $hit can be jammed effectively.

Hit them hard, publicly show the chinki loss of face to the world.

[Nayak]

The mooks may have the largest airforce but how many sorties and packages can they carry out effectively ?

Can somebody come up with the configuration layout of a intended sortie by the mook airforce ?

How many and types of aircraft can the airbases support ?

Airbases + types of aircraft + range + package details + serviceability rates gives a good idea about their response.

[vivek_ahuja]

Singha,

The use of BMs by the Chinese is a solution to the problem of Indian air superiority over the potential battlefields based not on technical capability of the aircrafts themselves but the supporting infrastructure behind them. Put it simply, the IAF has airbases as sea levels and within easy range of the battlefields while the PLAAF airbases in Tibet are not designed for holding large number of fighters (not that their main CAS fleet can take off from there anyway with any reasonable load to begin with). The Chinese use of BMs against our airbases then brings the skies over the battlefield to neutral densities in terms of both side's aircrafts. That is, both air forces are relegated to far off airbases and this reduces their respective presence over the ground areas. For the PLAAF it will never be about taking the skies from the IAF, but rather driving them away to the south to allow the numerical superiority of the PLA to come into play on the ground.

Besides, CAS in the mountains is restricted at best. I guess I can post some analysis or something pertaining to that when I get some time. But generally speaking, the main objectives for the IAF has to be strategic, not tactical. If they want to put their fleet to good use, they would do better at taking out the logistics behind the PLA forces, and for the PLAAF it is going to be a defensive campaign in as much as they have to prevent the IAF from doing the same. But they cannot do it conventionally, so expect BMs...

-Vivek

[Nayak]

Fighter Aircraft

Shenyang J-8
Range: 2,800 km (1,740 mi)
There are currently over 300 J-8
The aircraft was originally armed with cannons and seven hardpoints for missiles, bombs, rockets or fuel tanks. Weapons carried include The PL-2, PL-5, and PL-8 short-range air-to-air missiles as well as the PL-11 medium-range radar-guided air-to-air missile. Unguided bombs and rockets can also be carried.

Chengdu J-7
It is an upgraded version of the original MiG-21 with more modern avionics and weaponry. It serves mostly as an interceptor in the air forces that operate it.

The role of the J-7 in the People's Liberation Army is to provide local air defence and tactical air superiority. Large numbers are to be employed to deter enemy air operations.

Combat range: 850 km (528 miles)
# of airframes :500+

Sukhoi Su-30
Range: 1,620 nm (3,000 km)
# of airframes :100

Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker
# of airframes :76

Bomber Aircraft
Xian JH-7 Flounder
Combat radius: 1,759 km (890 nm, 1,093 mi)
# Bombs:

* 6.5 tonnes of free-fall bombs
* 6.5 tonnes of laser-guided bombs

# of airframes :80+

Xian H-6
A Chinese bomber. The design is based on the Tupolev Tu-16 Badger [6]
Combat radius: 1,800 km (970 nm, 1,100 mi)
Bombs: 9,000 kg (20,000 lb) of free-fall weapons
# of airframes :120

Nanchang Q-5
The Nanchang Q-5 (NATO reporting name 'Fantan'), also known as the A-5 in its export versions, is a Chinese-built jet ground-attack aircraft based on the Soviet MiG-19. Its main role is close air support.
Range: 2,000 km (1,100 NM, 1,200 mi)
# Combat radius:

* On lo-lo-lo mission: 400 km (220 NM, 250 mi) with maximum payload
* On hi-lo-hi mission: 600 km (320 NM, 370 mi)

# Bombs:

* Chinese-built 50 kg, 150 kg, 250 kg, or 500 kg bombs
* Chinese-built LJ-500 laser-guided bomb
* British-built BL.755 cluster bomb
* French Durandal anti-runway weaponFuel tanks: 105 gal, 200 gal, or 300 gal

# of airframes :500

[vivek_ahuja]

Fast moving, air borne infantry, combined with good intelligence and aircover will sow seeds of disarray and confusion among the Cheeni mooks.

Airborne Infantry you say? Airborne with what? Fixed wing Transports? The current fleet of IAF transports are hard pressed to maintain the daily logistical requirements of the IA as of today. During war time its going to get worse. Then what would be the availability of aircrafts for a mass drop? How will they be supplied? These are questions whose answers prevent all such hopes and dreams of shock-troops being inserted behind enemy lines from being a reality for the near future. If the MTA is brought on line in large numbers or we go on a rampage to buy more multi-engines transports, then the above idea becomes feasible. Otherwise it remains a paper concept.

Our SIGINT dept is world class. All their reverse-engineered radio com $hit can be jammed effectively.

Its a mistake to make such sweeping assumptions. Given the current Indian EW setup, I would hold back such sweeping claims.

-Vivek

[Nayak]

What is IA's plan on SAM cover if there is a gap in providing cover by IAF due to terrain/logistics/weather conditions ?

Enough manpads and a good SAM cover is a nice insurance to have.

[vivek_ahuja]

Nayak,

Most of these numbers are on the optimistic side from a performance point of view and that counteracts their operational numbers severely, if you know what I mean.

For example, the Q-5 being one of the main types designated for ground attack, can lift off from Tibetan airbases with only a gun load. For them to be of any use whatsoever, they need to take off from lower altitude airbases. Unless they fly over Myanmar airbase from the east, you can see for yourself how restricted their capabilities are.

Same goes for other aircrafts to various degrees. Check the China- Military watch thread in its previous avatar or somewhere there: I have posted PLAAF High Altitude performance graphs for payload capability and range versus airbase altitudes and runway lengths.

Also, you need to see how many tankers the Chinese have since that is the one choke point that can limit the presence of these fighters over the battlefield. If the tankers are all being used up, having 500 aircrafts waiting at airbases fully loaded doesn't mean squat. I had posted an analysis for that as well with the J-8II as an example.

-Vivek

[Nayak]

If the MTA is brought on line in large numbers or we go on a rampage to buy more multi-engines transports, then the above idea becomes feasible. Otherwise it remains a paper concept.

MTA is key in making up for numbers and cost. All the while back there was a general feeling that Pakis deserved more attention, I am glad to see that finally Chicoms are getting the preferred treatement. I can only hope that the planners will keep that in mind and green light crucial projects like MTA.

Our SIGINT dept is world class. All their reverse-engineered radio com $hit can be jammed effectively.

Its a mistake to make such sweeping assumptions. Given the current Indian EW setup, I would hold back such sweeping claims.

-Vivek[/quote]

I dont think so. Come on, during Kargil we managed to eavesdrop and record conversation of kamandu bragging. Sometimes we tend to underestimate ourselves.

[Nayak]

Nayak,

Most of these numbers are on the optimistic side from a performance point of view and that counteracts their operational numbers severely, if you know what I mean.



-Vivek

Thanks vivek, refer to my previous post above on the strike package.

That was just the snapshot of assets the mooks have.

Just trying to come up with the optimum strike package to calculate how much damage will IA/IAF suffer.

[Rahul M]

nayak ji, chinese are counting on their missiles i.e 2nd arty to do the CAS role (ya ya, I know that sounds oxymoronic), not the PLAAF.

I would like to modify that to : .....chinese are counting on their missiles i.e 2nd arty and normal arty.....
Let me clarify that I meant the above in case of a chinese aggression, that is when fighting starts in India's territories. PLAAF bases would be really hard pressed to put up enough numbers for both roles, given the range and altitude induced performance losses.(see vivek ahuja's work in the last china mil thread for the later)
they would have to choose whether to use their trump cards in CAS role or air superiority role.
My guesstimate :
they would keep their ground forces under the protection of their own simple but massive AA assets. I'm not talking about LR/MR-SAMs. MANPADS, AA guns, even small arms are notoriously effective against low flying a/c in a mountainous terrain. they would use their real high performance aircraft(flankers/flanker copies/J-10) to give some kind of air cover against our high flying a/c. we could see some counter value attacks against high value targets but that would be the extent of it. no CAS ability to speak of if the conflict is in India.

But the BMs/CMs would get used against high value targets in India, like FABs, field HQs, ammo and fuel dumps, rail yards etc.

if the PLAAF cannot/will not do CAS, they wont be able to defend their BM launch areas either.

singha, I don't see how they are related. for CAS, the target areas would require a much longer range commitment from the aircrafts. but defending BM/CM sites against IAF strike a/c, reasonably deep inside tibet would only require a/c in point defence role, since the PLAAF FAB would be closer to the border than the missile sites.

the paltry J6, J7, the A5 and the obese J8 and FBC1 for CAS - IAF Bisons will shoot these
down like flies on a wall. I doubt the A5,J6 and J7 even have the range and payload to
fly in tibet and make an impact.

But only on Indian soil, situation would change in their favour if we try to move into tibet as they gain the defender's advantage. IMHO, that threat has to be there in order to unnerve the chinese.
OTOH, chinese nodal points and choke points(including missile areas) would be protected by HUGE amounts of AD assets manned by the gigantic PLA reserves . and to be fair, I think PLA AD units are some of their best trained and exercise with frightening regularity including against mock paratroopers.
most of the AD weapons they use are obviously technologically old, but they would have a hi-tech core to bolster the mass. also, quantity has its own quality.

BMs can never replace the combat power of a squadron of a/c flying 200 sorties a week with
3 tons of bombs each. thats 600 tons of power delivered where and when you want it with
human targeting and mid course change possible. nobody has 10,000 SRBMs and IRBMs
are very costly - dont think anyone keeps 1000s of IRBMs.

most certainly true. they can ill afford to use these against all and sundry. the need to rationalize targeting would be a major planning headache for them, IMO.
however, the absence of CAS by PLAAF would be compensated to some extent (or so the chinese hope) by a) huge volume of howitzers, LR MBRLS and smaller guns b) improved firepower per unit of PLA elite troops vis-a-vis IA c) new tactical doctrine and d)improved mobility on their side by virtue of (c) and some new equipments.

Rahul.

p.s sorry for being a party pooper. we do have some advantages, but it is still nowhere near to overwhelming.

[vivek_ahuja]

Its a mistake to make such sweeping assumptions. Given the current Indian EW setup, I would hold back such sweeping claims.

-Vivek

I dont think so. Come on, during Kargil we managed to eavesdrop and record conversation of kamandu bragging. Sometimes we tend to underestimate ourselves.

From what I understand, intercepting signals and jamming/interfering them are two very different things. IMO, that is what separates SIGINT from EW. Our SIGINT may be good, but not EW and vice versa or both. Especially in the mountainous terrain, I am not sure how either of these things would perform as compared to what they would on the plains. All I am saying is that until either of us can present that analysis to explain the above question, it is better to tread on the side of safety...even in our though processes

-Vivek

[vivek_ahuja]

Just trying to come up with the optimum strike package to calculate how much damage will IA/IAF suffer.

I understand. But you might be surprised on how little that damage can be for some of these aircraft types mainly on the basis of the degradtion in performance (ability to lift weapons) at high altitude airbases or flying from far off airbases. For sure the IAF will suffer from CMs and BMs heavily (IMO), but PLAAF aircraft are a lesser threat.

-Vivek

[Singha]

PLAs total holding of S300PMU alleged to be around 190 TELs each for 2-3 tubes.

Israel apparently managed to jam S300 defences in Syria when they took out the reactor
side and Cyprus also fields S300 which I am sure IDF have snooped on. we must try level
best to incorporate these countermeasures in our EW gear asap. perhaps "trial" some S300
systems in India also and learn their characteristics.

[Nayak]

I have a question, how 'accurate' are their cruise/ballistic missiles.

Will it be as effective as watching those saturday morning cartoons of watching a missile land smack in the middle of the are marked as 'x' ?

Isnt using missiles the final escalation. If they decide to use BMs, how will the SDREs know they are convention or not ?

From sinodefence

ICBM and IRBM
* DF-31/A (CSS-9)
Warhead: One single 1,000kT
Accuracy: 100~300m CEP

Range: 7,200~8,000km (DF-31); 11,200 (DF-31A)
* DF-5 (CSS-4)
Range: 12,000km (DF-5); >13,000km (DF-5A)
Warhead: Single 3,000~5,000kT
CEP: ~1,000m

* DF-4 (CSS-3)
Range: 4,750km
Payload: 2,200kg
Warhead: 1,000~3,000kT yield thermalnuclear
Accuracy: CEP 1,500m

MRBM
# DF-21 (CSS-5)
Range: 1,770km
Warhead: Single 500 yield kT nuclear
Accuracy: CEP 300~400m

# DF-3 (CSS-2)
Range: 2,500km (DF-3); 2,800km (DF-3A)
Warhead: Single 1,000~3,000kT
CEP: 2,000~3,000m (DF-3); 1,000m (DF-3A)

# DF-2 (CSS-1)
Range: 1,250km
Warhead: Single 15~20 yield kT nuclear
Accuracy: CEP 4,000m

SRBM
* DF-11/A (M-11) (CSS-7)
Range: 280~350km (DF-11); >500km (DF-11A)
Warhead: 500kg HE
Accuracy: CEP 500~600m (DF-11); <200m (DF-11A)

* DF-15 (M-9) (CSS-6)
Range: 600km (DF-15)
Warhead: 500kg HE, or 50-350 yield kT nuclear
Accuracy: CEP 150~500m; 30~50m on the later variants