War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

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Rahul M
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Rahul M »

OK OK ! don't train your guns on me !! :D
no disrespect meant !!
Today, owing to the pressures of the socio economic environment, things are so weird that I am astounded1
has that change been institutional in its prevalence ? could you kindly mention one or two examples ?
if you find the army culture as a whole to have changed to an extent that you are forced to comment upon it, then it must be a very serious issue.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by RayC »

It is serious.

I am fighting it from within!

But if you have a politicised Army worried about being PC and pleasing the powers that be what can one do?

It is time to kick the politicians and the bureaucrats to tell them where the bread and butter lies!
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Rahul M »

RayC wrote:It is serious.

I am fighting it from within!

But if you have a politicised Army worried about being PC and pleasing the powers that be what can one do?

It is time to kick the politicians and the bureaucrats to tell them where the bread and butter lies!
If I understand you correctly, the question of the army's standing in the governmental set up ?? and by extension the izzat of a forces man ?
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by ramana »

RahulM, Please take it off line. RayC saab is right and no need to discuss it here. Once you get the full facts you can post a synopsis with this concurrence.

Thanks, ramana
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Surya »

Err RayC - back to the question about Puri and CO of 18 Grenadier.

You have left us hanging with the tantalising bit

Please.......
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by ramana »

Surya, Same thing applies as to Rahul.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Rahul M »

ramana wrote:RahulM, Please take it off line. RayC saab is right and no need to discuss it here. Once you get the full facts you can post a synopsis with this concurrence.

Thanks, ramana
as you wish it ramana ji. although I think this would be relevant to the army thread.
regards.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Surya »

From RayC
Puriji is slowly opening up!


Did you hear him on TV about CO, 18 Grenadiers?


Ramana - I think RayC was referring to a public TV program which we missed. I think that should go here instead of private correspondence for benefit of all BRites. If it was not public then agreed that we need not discuss it here.

RayCs personal conversation with General Puri - I agree need nto be here.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by vishwakarmaa »

RayC wrote:
I am not saying that the British are perfect, but the system and ethos they gave us if applied correctly, does hold us in good stead.

Take the Army for instance. The more ''Indianised'' we are getting, the more warts are surfacing. Some of which are totally disgraceful.
People don't know much about Maratha Kings we have had. Their army brass was as good as British or maybe better, in terms of discipline and integrity. Marathas had their own guidelines, their own ethos they followed. But, there is not much reading material on it from authoritative sources in english, most of it in marathi language only and whatever exists is hold to chest by GoI.

I heard all this from my friend, who is avid reader of Maratha sahitya. So, we did have our indiagenious administrative science but it lapsed with time or maybe I don't know if some part is still followed in some regiment.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Victor »

The farther we come from Aug 15, 1947, the more “Indianised” we get. Compare the quality of the people who are running the country today with those of even 30 years ago. This is serious regression no matter how you cut it. It is effecting everyone, specially the young and it has to change, no if's and but's.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by RayC »

Surya wrote:Err RayC - back to the question about Puri and CO of 18 Grenadier.

You have left us hanging with the tantalising bit

Please.......
It was on TV.

I don't recall his exact words, but it was not very charitable to CO 18 GRENADIERS!
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by RayC »

I would like to proffer a correction.

"Indianised" was not the appropriate word for me to use. My unqualified apologies to all.

I would say ''rootless'' or ''********'' since we have forgotten our Indian value system and are still to acquire the qualities/ value system of others which we are hankering for. In fact, one wonders if the qualities of the others is good for us!
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by ramana »

Up. Don't get lost/ignored in Olympics hype.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by ramana »

Shankar posted in the scenarios thread...
just using the break to explain the rationale of some of the strikes -to start with the attack on tibet railways
Posted on Friday, June 27, 2008 11:54:56 PM by sukhoi-30mki

PLA's rapid reaction capability in Tibet

By Andrei Chang

Published: June 27, 2008

Hong Kong, China — The eruption of riots in Tibet in March reflected an increasingly complicated political situation there, involving both internal and external factors.

Internally, the peaceful and nonviolent approach of the Dalai Lama toward China has encountered greater resistance from the young generation of Tibetans, and the Dalai Lama’s political relevance has been gradually marginalized as a result.

Externally, India’s China policy is now at a critical point, and India-China relations are likely to slip backward if they fail to quickly progress. India is adjusting the deployment of its armed forces along its border with China to guard against a Chinese intrusion.

Meanwhile, as the Beijing Olympic Games approach, the faction in Tibet that favors a showdown with the Chinese leadership views the present time as the best opportunity to put greater pressure on Beijing.

Under these circumstances, the Tibet issue is likely to remain the focus of attention by various parties before the Olympic Games, and constant protests by the Tibetans can be expected.

China’s handling of the Tibet riots was very similar to the way it dealt with the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. In the early phase, a large number of regular troops from the People’s Liberation Army were sent to the scene to deter the protesters.

Within 48 hours of the start of the riots in Lhasa, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets as the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Region was dispatched to Lhasa.

This rapid troop deployment indicates that with the completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad in 2006, the rapid reaction capability of the Chinese armed forces in the Tibet region, particularly the ability to quickly maneuver heavy equipment, has been greatly enhanced.

This is indicated by the fact that the PLA soldiers on the T-90/89 vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were all wearing the “leopard” camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operations. These uniforms have appeared in video footage of the 149th Division during exercises.

When unrest occurred in Tibet in 1989 and a curfew was imposed in Lhasa, the 149th Division was also the first PLA combat unit to arrive on the scene. At that time, the army troops entered Tibet via the Sichuan-Tibet highway.

The 149th Division is based at Leshan in Sichuan province. As for the T-92 armored vehicles that appeared in Lhasa, the No. 52 Mountain Brigade of the Tibet Military Region received the vehicles around 2000.

The military value of the Qinghai-Tibet railway has thus been demonstrated in the rapid reaction of the PLA armed forces to the Lhasa riots.

Should China-India relations deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and the riots in Tibet spread extensively, the first combat units of the PLA to be called to action would be the No. 52 and No. 53 Mountain Brigades under the Tibet Military Region.

The No. 52 Brigade, stationed at Linzhi, is highly mechanized and armed with T-92 wheeled armored vehicles and HJ-8/9 anti-tank missiles. National highway 318 directly connects Linzhi and Lhasa; thus it is logical to conclude that the T-92 wheeled armored vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were from this brigade. The No. 52 Mountain Brigade is stationed at Milin and is also the PLA combat unit stationed closest to the city of Lhasa.

National highway 318 is in fact the southern route of the Sichuan-Tibet highway. In the event of war or future large-scale riots in Tibet, the highway will be the key passageway for combat troops from the Chengdu Military Region to enter Tibet.

However, this key highway runs across the Minjiang River and the Daduhe River in a region with an average altitude of 4,250 meters (around 14,000 feet) above sea level, and thus is very susceptible to attack by the Indian Air Force or assault by organized rioters. Most of the highways within the Tibet region will be within striking range of the Su-30MKI fighters soon to be deployed in the No. 30 Squadron of the Indian Air Force at Tezpur.

If the T-90/89 armored personnel carriers used in Lhasa were indeed from the 149th Mechanized Rapid Reaction Division of the Chengdu Military Region, they were most likely transported first from Chongqing to Xining, then to Golmud to connect to the Qinghai-Tibet railway and continue on to Lhasa. The whole journey would take about 48 hours.

Such troop movements would be much faster and cheaper than before. Calculated on the basis of being able to transport most of the heavy equipment of a whole mechanized division within 48 hours – it is unlikely that all the division’s equipment would be moved – the PLA would be able to transport approximately 10 light mechanized divisions and some heavy mechanized divisions through the railroad to Tibet from the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions within 30 days.

Of course, should there be a military conflict between China and India, the Qinghai-Tibet railway would be a prime target for air strikes by the Su-30MKI fighters of the Indian Air Force’s No. 30 Fighter Squadron, the MiG-27 fighters of the No. 22 Squadron at Hashimara and the “Jaguar” attackers of the No. 5 Squadron at Ambala.

The only obstacle to this mass movement of regular armed troops and equipment would be the capacity of Qinghai-Tibet railway and the number of available trains. China once claimed that the annual transport capacity of the railway was 5 million tons, an average of 13,888 tons per day.

The average load capacity of one Chinese train car is normally 60 tons, with about 20 cars in each cargo train. This would mean that each train could transport 1,200 tons, and thus 11 trains traveling both ways would be enough for each day. In time of war, the actual number of trains running on the railroad could double to roughly 20 trains both ways each day.

Suppose the total weight of the equipment and combat material needed for one rapid reaction division of the Chinese army was around 15,000 tons, the Qinghai-Tibet railway could transport a whole rapid reaction division on one average day. In other words, within every one-and-a-half to two days, China could move one rapid reaction division from the Chengdu Military Region or one rapid reaction division from the Lanzhou Military Region to Tibet.

China’s air transport capability also needs to be taken into consideration. Additional airborne troops, rapid reaction troops and armed police could be directly delivered to Lhasa from the air. Since airdrop operations would take place in the Tibet region, there would be no need for ground-based air defense firepower. Thus, the No. 15 Airborne Division could be airdropped to Tibet, and equipment such as airborne fighting vehicles could be put to use.

In recent years, China has made great effort to revamp the Qinghai-Tibet highway and the Sichuan-Tibet highway. National highways 214, 317 and 109 – the shortest routes into Tibet by land – are now all asphalted. If China were to have a military confrontation with India, highway transport could be more reliable should the Qinghai-Tibet railway be damaged.

The railway would allow the 61st Plateau Rapid Reaction Motorized Division of No. 21 Group Army under the Lanzhou Military Region and the 149th Rapid Reaction Motorized Division of the Chengdu Military Region to quickly enter Tibet.

Because of the presence of U.S. military troops in Afghanistan and the escalating independence activities in the southern part of Xinjiang – northwest China’s primarily Muslim Uyghur ethnic region – the Xinjiang Military Region and the Lanzhou Military Region are now the key forces to guard against internal riots in that part of the country. This is why the forces of the Chengdu Military Region were the first to be deployed in Tibet.

In addition, the riots in Tibet quickly spread to Gansu province, which borders Xinjiang; therefore the Xinjiang and Lanzhou Military Regions may face the new mission of cracking down on Tibetan independence movements as well as Muslim riots and the traditional Uyghur independence activities.

Once the Uyghur separatist movement in Xinjiang and the independence activities in Gansu and Tibet intensify, the 61st Rapid Reaction Division stationed at Tianshui in Gansu province will be the first one to be called upon in the crackdown. In addition, the No. 12 Armored Division stationed at Zhangye in Gansu province may also be mobilized.

The 4th Motorized Infantry Division of Xinjiang Military Region was the first local combat unit to receive new equipment in the region, including the T-92 100-mm wheeled assault cannons. Obviously, this division is now transforming into a rapid reaction unit and will probably be used to deal with any riots in southern Xinjiang. Besides, this division is also quite close to the Afghanistan border.

The 6th Motorized Infantry Division stationed at Kashi is the only mechanized combat unit in the Xinjiang Military Region. It is also close to Afghanistan and is located right in the heart of southern Xinjiang. Should Uyghur independence activities break out of control, the above two divisions would be the first to be dispatched.

As for the Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, it is covered by the 11th Brigade. As is widely known, the 63rd Division of the original No. 21 Group Army and the 7th Division of the Xinjiang Military Region have been restructured into the Armed Police No. 63 and No. 7 Divisions, and are stationed at the cities of Pingliang and Ili, respectively.

--
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by ramana »

A few cross posts:
chandrabhan wrote:Shankar sir,
I understand the basis of your scenario. I used to work for a Fortune Top 10 MNC and was a part of high potential programme. We used to have a 6 monthly exercise called scenario building. There are basically 4 parameters to build such scenario - Geo political, Geography, Geo economic and Geo startegy.
There are some set rules, which i would refrain putting here and i am sure Gurus will overlook my insolence. We landed up predicting couple of very interesting things- in year 2001
1. Indian economy will reach 1 trillion dollar by 2009(that time it was around $290 billion). people laughed but it happened in 2007 itself.
2. Chinese forex reserves will cross $1trillion by 2007 - they did and we predicted the chinese military build up and hardening of stance(High end R&D desperation). Possible siezing of assets or leaks by chinese nationals of crucial technology.
3. Demand for priavate sector reservation in India
4. Saving rate of more than 25% for India
5. NDA loosing power
6. We also predicted an eventual war between India/china with US involvement - chain leading up to western flank of India to exercising of Samson option by....
As a result, the company stopped their R&D lab in Shanghai and brought it to Bangalore. I got fed up of all this future building and came to US and finally became a vagabond. The core of the matter is there is money behind everything. No doubt chinese assets will feel a meltdown in the event of they dumping their dollor reserves for Euro or other currency but the impact on US will be catastrophic with huge budget deficit of $390 bln...
So any war between India and china will bring lot of pressure on India from the world and ceasefire will come very quickly. so any ground/land lost will be difficult to get back as the war will be short - Money talks sire..
and
Baljeet wrote:chandrabhan ji
I am shocked :eek: your analysis will say if we lose ground to chinese it will be difficult to regain. There is a historical evidence suggesting, it is not just difficult but impossible ala 1962 war. Secondly, as long as we have the current political elite ruining this nation there is no hope. Have you ever heard of Gandhigiri by trained professional soldiers, happens only in India. Our forces are quick to retaliate against pakis but form a human chain against chinese aggression, forgive bangladeshi's for killing 25 (not sure of #s) of our BSF troops when we wanted to retialiate, Vajpayee gov't refused permission because that will be embarrassing internationally. This forum has already debated, discussed and put to rest this issue, there is no way we can win a war against china, we don't have the infrastructure, resources, military might, equipment or weapons to fight dragon. We don't even have enough planes to deliver knock out blow in tibet. Pakis will gladly tie us down on western front, chinese are encircling us via Coco island, Gwadar port, and nepal.
and
Vivek K wrote:Baljeet, your analysis is really depressing but the truth. ABV's refusal to retaliate for the 16 BSF troops or for the Parliament and the Kaluchak attacks really make us look weak. The current crop of politicians are all weak and do not seem to understand geo-politics. Though no great fan of his, we may need a Narendra Modi style person to lead India.

Look at the latest we see around the world - Ossetia attacked by Russia to protect/furhter its interests, Iraq attacked by US to protect/further its interests, Tibet - use of extreme force by China against protests.

India needs to follow the above examples and be proactive against Pakistan, China and if necessary Bangladesh.
chandrabhan could you lead some such exercise offline?
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by svinayak »

chandrabhan wrote:
6. We also predicted an eventual war between India/china with US involvement - chain leading up to western flank of India to exercising of Samson option by....

The core of the matter is there is money behind everything. No doubt chinese assets will feel a meltdown in the event of they dumping their dollor reserves for Euro or other currency but the impact on US will be catastrophic with huge budget deficit of $390 bln...
So any war between India and china will bring lot of pressure on India from the world and ceasefire will come very quickly. so any ground/land lost will be difficult to get back as the war will be short - Money talks sire..
China and US are in a symbiotic relationship on the economic front. With US economy under pressure they need China more than the other way round for atleast 5-10 years.
China's rapid modernization in defence will help in projecting power over a large area. Its alignment with Russia is a gerat setback for US. China has not shown its cards yet but US will have to build a coalition rapidly if it wants to contain China.
Large corporation and money is riding on China being an economic partner and will keep it that way for as long as possible. China will try to keep the situation under control for this reason but will create only small conflict around its regions.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by pankaj »

Bordering on strategy?

The government’s in-principle approval of a rail link to Leh in Jammu and Kashmir through the Rohtang pass in Himachal Pradesh, reported by this newspaper yesterday, is welcome; but it does not necessarily confirm that the government is all set to match the rapid expansion and modernisation of Chinese transport infrastructure across the border. To be sure, the Leh railroad proposal follows a series of other announcements by the UPA government over the last few years on promoting greater road and rail connectivity between India’s sensitive border regions and the heartland. When he travelled earlier this year to Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed in its entirety by China, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced an ambitious plan to connect the state to itself and the rest of the country. Similar plans have also been approved for the north-eastern region as a whole. The Indian armed forces too have decided to refurbish a range of facilities that have been lying unused for decades all along the Sino-Indian border.

Taken together, these decisions do indicate that New Delhi is waking up to India’s greatest national security challenge — the rise of China. This is largely due to a persistent initiative from a small section of the bureaucracy and unrelenting pressures from the state governments of the border-states that were more sensitive to the local demands for connectivity. China’s emergence as a great power, show-cased last weekend by the spectacular opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, should never have been an abstract proposition for India. New Delhi should have been quicker in seeing the more immediate implications of China’s rise from the in-your-face transformation of its borderlands over the last two decades.
New Delhi’s delayed response involved overcoming two entrenched national security assumptions. One was the belief that keeping the border regions underdeveloped would deny them to China in a future conflict. The other was a conscious choice to limit the integration of the border regions with the nation by constraining citizens’ access through an outdated system of inner-line permits. If the former reflected military timidity, the latter underlined the home ministry’s colonial mindset. The UPA deserves two cheers for forcing a rethink of these assumptions. We would offer a third when it delivers on implementation and begins a debate on scrapping inner-line permits for Indian citizens. Waking up to China’s rise, after all, is not the same as gearing up.

http://www.indianexpress.com/story/347528.html
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Lalmohan »

I don't think the US is actually that economically wedded to china. they will shift immediately if they get cheaper prices elsewhere. right now china offers a good deal, the free flow of capital takes care of the rest
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by satya »

I don't think the US is actually that economically wedded to china. they will shift immediately if they get cheaper prices elsewhere. right now china offers a good deal, the free flow of capital takes care of the rest
Lalmohanjee

which other country has the geographical borders with other two other non- Anglo- american powers other than PRC .

Also there's the billiion lantern/toothbrush/shoes syndrome in brains of most US CEOs since 20th century if not earlier .Other than Japan and in future India , no other country can help US in its financing requirements , for moment its PRC & Japan & petro dollars .
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by ramana »

Satya, The English also saw such market dreams when they launched the first Anglo-China war or AKA Opium war in 1840s. The results of the Nanking treaty are to be seen now. After the English its the US that sees them as consumers.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by malushahi »

ramana wrote:After the English its the US that sees them as consumers.
Not quite - rather as saviors. Check this out for one of the many viewpoints. The analogy to the Suez crisis is interesting.

"Told that numerous economists downplayed the likelihood that China would execute the "nuclear option" and dump Treasury securities, Mr. Peterson recalled the 1956 Suez crisis. In order to force Britain to end its military occupation of the Suez Canal, which Britain, France and Israel had seized after Egypt nationalized it, President Eisenhower threatened to dump U.S. reserves of the British pound on the world market - a move intended to trigger a collapse of the British currency. With the pound under pressure, the British government was forced to resign and withdraw.

Confident that he had made his point on the pivotal role currency reserves can play in a geopolitical crisis, Mr. Peterson saw no need to draw an analogy between the Suez spat involving America and Britain and a potential crisis pitting America against China in the Taiwan Strait.

At that point, Mr. Summers' "balance of financial terror" could be joined by a balance of military terror."
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Adrija »

Satya, The English also saw such market dreams when they launched the first Anglo-China war or AKA Opium war in 1840s. The results of the Nanking treaty are to be seen now. After the English its the US that sees them as consumers
Read "The China Dream" by someone called Studwell (sp?), he documents this enduring fantasy of "a billion consumers" and how it has consistently failed to materialize till now...
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Nayak »

http://upiasiaonline.com/Security/2008/ ... rder/8337/


India boosting air force at China border
By Andrei Chang
Column: Military Might
Published: August 15, 2008
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Hong Kong, China — Within the next four months, a first batch of eight Su-30MKI multi-role fighters will be positioned at the Tezpur Airp Base in the Indian state of Assam, near the border with China, an Indian Navy source has revealed. This is almost six months ahead of the timeline reported some time ago in the Indian media.

This will be the first time for Su-30MKI fighters to be deployed so close to the China-India border. The deployment of two squadrons of Su-30MKI fighters at the Tezpur Air Base in the eastern part of the country will greatly enhance India’s capability to launch aerial precision attacks on China.

Not taking into consideration the aerial refueling capability of the fighters, the Su-30MKI’s 1,500-kilometer (932-mile) combat radius is enough to cover all the major cities in southwest China, including Kunming, Chengdu and Chongqing. India plans to outfit the fighters with the latest BrahMos air-to-ground supersonic missiles, which have a 290-kilometer (180-mile) range.

Along the India-China border air power has been shifting in favor of India. First of all, India has quite a number of airports in Assam and the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh, making troop maneuvers easier. In the Tibet region, China has only the Kang-ko Airport in eastern Tibet, the Gongka Airport in Lhasa and one more known as the Hidden Airport. Fighter aircraft are not normally stationed at any of these airports.

China has sent Su-27SK fighters to this area for airport transfer training on the plateau. Troops that took part in this training reportedly faced difficulties in logistic support and supply. In the nearby Chengdu Military Region, the only air force units with decent combat strength are one J-10A regiment under the PLA Air Force’s No. 44 Division and one Su-27 regiment under the No. 33 Division. The Diqing and Zhongdian airports in Yunnan province could be used for operations against India, but these are small civilian airports.

India has built a number of airports in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, including seven military airports. The small Teju New Airport located close to the border with China has only one runway and is mainly used for rapid transport by helicopter. It could be used as a runway for MiG-21 fighters to take off and land. There is another similar airport in Machuka, again close to the border. A small airport at Sookerating has one runway, while the Along Airport is also available for fast landing and takeoff of helicopters, indicating that the Indian Air Force attaches great importance to fast reaction capability.

Other small frontline airport facilities include the Jorhat Airport and Lilabari Airport. The Chabua Airport can field not only An-32 light transport aircraft but also Mi-8/17 helicopters, and is the pivotal airport for the Indian Air Force to quickly deliver troops in the region. Two runways have been built at this airport.

To the south of Arunachal Pradesh is Assam, where Tezpur is the largest military airport. Tezpur Airport, now preparing to receive the Su-30MKI fighters, is no more than 500 kilometers (310 miles) from the practical line of control at the China-India border. The Indian Air Defense Force No. 30 Squadron is stationed there, armed with 16 MiG-21FL fighters, all of which are now anchored in mound-structured hangars.

Two other small airports have been built in Assam, the Dimapir and Kumbhirgram dual-use airports. The Indian Air Force also has the Lengpui, Barapani and Guwahati airports in the area.

In the strategic direction of Bhutan and central Nepal, the Indian Air Force has built three major military airports, sufficient to provide deterrence over the central part of Tibet. These airports include the Baghdogra (Avantipur) Air Base, where at least 16 MiG-21FL fighters and An-32 transport aircraft are based. The airport is equipped with mound-structured hangars, each accommodating two MiG-21 fighters. The Baghdogra Airport is also only 500 kilometers (310 miles) from the border with China, and is the home base of the Indian Air Force No. 8 Squadron.

In this region, the Hashimara Air Base is one of the better-equipped military airports with large, full-fledged facilities. There are 18 MiG-27ML attackers based here, and during a confrontation with China, these could hit targets deep in Tibet through the Bhutan-Nepal corridor. The No. 22 Squadron of the Indian Air Force Is stationed at this airport. In addition, a simple runway has also been built at Cooch Behar.

India and China have been following very similar paths in the construction of airport facilities and SAM-2 ground-to-air missile positions, as they are the students of the same Soviet Union professor. Nonetheless, the Chinese Air Force is ahead of the Indian Air Force in the construction of underground airport facilities.

--

(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto, Canada.)
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by sum »

Good to hear its not all gloom and doom in the NE sector(atleast on the airforce front) except for the underground airport thingie...
Wonder how we stack up on the land forces front?
Lalmohan
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Lalmohan »

Nayak wrote:
http://upiasiaonline.com/Security/2008/ ... rder/8337/


India boosting air force at China border
By Andrei Chang
Column: Military Might

India and China have been following very similar paths in the construction of airport facilities and SAM-2 ground-to-air missile positions, as they are the students of the same Soviet Union professor. Nonetheless, the Chinese Air Force is ahead of the Indian Air Force in the construction of underground airport facilities.

--

(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto, Canada.)
:roll:
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Rahul M »

X-posting.
Rahul M wrote:Thanks Hari Sud, for the article.
Hari Sud wrote: While waiting for Shankar; please read a Hongkong based Chinese analysts view on IAF capability opposite China in Tibet
http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Security/2 ... rder/8337/
some comments.
The deployment of two squadrons of Su-30MKI fighters at the Tezpur Air Base in the eastern part of the country will greatly enhance India’s capability to launch aerial precision attacks on China.
which two ? the confirmed mki sqdns are : 24,20,30,8.
BR lists 20 and 30 at pune and the other two as NYD. both of these will go to NE if no new sqdn comes up in the interim.
In the strategic direction of Bhutan and central Nepal, the Indian Air Force has built three major military airports, sufficient to provide deterrence over the central part of Tibet. These airports include the Baghdogra (Avantipur) Air Base, where at least 16 MiG-21FL fighters and An-32 transport aircraft are based. The airport is equipped with mound-structured hangars, each accommodating two MiG-21 fighters.
:roll:
anyway, baghdogra is primarily a civilian airport catering to siliguri.
In this region, the Hashimara Air Base is one of the better-equipped military airports with large, full-fledged facilities. There are 18 MiG-27ML attackers based here, and during a confrontation with China, these could hit targets deep in Tibet through the Bhutan-Nepal corridor. The No. 22 Squadron of the Indian Air Force Is stationed at this airport. In addition, a simple runway has also been built at Cooch Behar.
22nd at hashimara ? BR lists it at halwara. the 222 is at hashimara.
cooch behar airport is not a new one, it has been there all these years, though it was in a pretty bad shape. may be somebody like sevoke could elucidate us on its current condition.
India and China have been following very similar paths in the construction of airport facilities and SAM-2 ground-to-air missile positions, as they are the students of the same Soviet Union professor. Nonetheless, the Chinese Air Force is ahead of the Indian Air Force in the construction of underground airport facilities.
Does IAF operate any u/g facilities at all ? I don't think so.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Anantz »

Rahul M wrote:X-posting.

In the strategic direction of Bhutan and central Nepal, the Indian Air Force has built three major military airports, sufficient to provide deterrence over the central part of Tibet. These airports include the Baghdogra (Avantipur) Air Base, where at least 16 MiG-21FL fighters and An-32 transport aircraft are based. The airport is equipped with mound-structured hangars, each accommodating two MiG-21 fighters.
:roll:
anyway, baghdogra is primarily a civilian airport catering to siliguri.

Bagdogra is primarily an Airforce station with a civilian air terminal. Till a couple of years ago it had a small rudimentary civil terminal, but recently a modern state of the art terminal has been created. However it still is an Airforce station. We can see Mig 21s flying around Bagdogra on an almost daily basis. Not sure which model or which sqn these are, however Mig 21s continue to fly from here.
In this region, the Hashimara Air Base is one of the better-equipped military airports with large, full-fledged facilities. There are 18 MiG-27ML attackers based here, and during a confrontation with China, these could hit targets deep in Tibet through the Bhutan-Nepal corridor. The No. 22 Squadron of the Indian Air Force Is stationed at this airport. In addition, a simple runway has also been built at Cooch Behar.
22nd at hashimara ? BR lists it at halwara. the 222 is at hashimara.

From a friend whom I had met couple of years back, Hashimara had the 22 and 222 sqns of Mig 27 and Mig 23 trainers. Donno if these sqn are still around, though we can regularly find Mig 27 flying in and around Sikkim (In winters) and Bagdogra as well.
cooch behar airport is not a new one, it has been there all these years, though it was in a pretty bad shape. may be somebody like sevoke could elucidate us on its current condition.

India and China have been following very similar paths in the construction of airport facilities and SAM-2 ground-to-air missile positions, as they are the students of the same Soviet Union professor. Nonetheless, the Chinese Air Force is ahead of the Indian Air Force in the construction of underground airport facilities.
Does IAF operate any u/g facilities at all ? I don't think so.

Cooch Behar has a small rudimentary airstrip which the Bengal government wants to upgrade to an airfield. It was earlier used by Vayudoot, and Bengal government wants to start Air Deccan flights to the airfield. However it isn't an Airforce base.

There is an Army Aviation airfield in Salugara (Near Siliguri) as well which has a sqn of Cheetah helicopters. The sqn is called "Teesta Falcons".
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Singha »

is avantipur the name of srinagar apt ? it is certainly not of bagdogra. bag is a very
active military base...everytime I was on ground there on hopping flight, have seen
mig21 activity.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Anantz »

AFAIK Avantipur is an Army airfield in J&K which was also used by the Airforce during Operation Safedsagar. I think I read that on BR sometimes back. Guess we can find that if we brush through the Op Safedsagar articles on BR.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Rahul M »

thanks for the details Anantz.

yep avantipur is srinagar AFB AFAIK. which is why I had the :roll:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... ntipur.htm
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by narayana »

i got disheartened After seeing the violent protests in kashmir and pics of hositing of pak like flag on lal chowk in srinagar on aug 15th,i was just wondering how china is able to quell the tibetean protest inside its borders,which are more vociferous than the kashmiri ones.and why we cant do the same,it really hurt to see the pics of paki flags all over kashmir,what pak can give to kashmir which india cannot?,is this a gift of so called secularism :(
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Lalmohan »

narayana wrote:i got disheartened After seeing the violent protests in kashmir and pics of hositing of pak like flag on lal chowk in srinagar on aug 15th,i was just wondering how china is able to quell the tibetean protest inside its borders,which are more vociferous than the kashmiri ones.and why we cant do the same,it really hurt to see the pics of paki flags all over kashmir,what pak can give to kashmir which india cannot?,is this a gift of so called secularism :(
China is a hard state. China imprisons, shoots, tortures anyone even spelling the d-i-s of dissent. The Tibetans have been bludgeoned and thrashed into submission and their institutions systematically ground down and the ethnic balance shifted to the favour of the Chinese. They have no religious, political or economic freedoms, the media is tightly controlled.

India is a soft state. India allows everyone freedom in all areas of human endeavour, Article 370, blah blah blah

Even if you compare what the kashmiri separatists complain of in their wildest venomous frothing with day to day life in China, or for that matter in Pakistan - and here I mean more than POK, then the idiocy of the situation just strikes you as shocking.

the time for appeasement and ambivalent ignorance from the rest of india has come to an end - and i mean genuine nationalism here, not the false ones for political gains that we see some espousing at present
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by HariC »

Rahul M wrote:thanks for the details Anantz.

yep avantipur is srinagar AFB AFAIK. which is why I had the :roll:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... ntipur.htm

Avantipura is not Srinagar AFB. it is a seperate airfield and active one in the IAF.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Rahul M »

HariC wrote:
Rahul M wrote:thanks for the details Anantz.

yep avantipur is srinagar AFB AFAIK. which is why I had the :roll:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... ntipur.htm

Avantipura is not Srinagar AFB. it is a seperate airfield and active one in the IAF.
thanks for the correction. it is near srinagar which got me confused.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by narayana »

Lalmohan wrote:
Even if you compare what the kashmiri separatists complain of in their wildest venomous frothing with day to day life in China, or for that matter in Pakistan - and here I mean more than POK, then the idiocy of the situation just strike you as shocking.
thanks lalmohanji,i cant understand the kashmiri psyche they are ready to sell themselves to pakistan rather than give 100 acres of land to a hindu religious board,it would help the kashmiri cause if they are flexible on this and would have won hearts of billions of indians.

i wonder where are lalu,mulayam and so called secular commies who would have jumped into arena if it was something from hindu side.

and to my surprise the center or any main stream political parties are much silent on this issue,i think our PM is following his guru and predecessor "moun muni" P.V. Narasimha rao who allowed the situation to deteriorate rather than take action,and its shocking that he is requesting to pakistan not to make harsh statements on J&K :shock:
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by Rahul M »

narayana, we are going off topic with this discussion.take this to the strat forum if you want but don't continue on this line here.
thanks.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by chandrabhan »

Hi Ramanasir,
Please let me know how to proceed on the scenario front offline. I will be back from UK in couple of weeks. I will be glad to learn from the knowledge of this forum and contribute wherever possible. My ID is tiwari dot chandrabhan at gmail.

Chandrabhan
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by yogi »

Am I the only one who see a parallel between Cuban missile crisis and now the Georgia and Poland crisis, between US and Russia? Everyone knows what happened during the Cuban crisis.
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Post by ramana »

I have a question. Is the IN going to be policing the Malacca Straits only or carry the war to South China sea? Can it lob a few Brahmos into Shenzhan? Or all those "escalating"?
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