War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 24 Jun 2008 07:03

just adding up the strengths of the combat formations alone will
bring the number close to 15000.

and mtn divisons have around 5 btns as against 3 of the infantry divs.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby sunilUpa » 24 Jun 2008 07:12

Rohitvats, I checked the personnel numbers from BR and elsewhere from my old collection.
Seems like you were wrong in this instant. there are additional 8000 support troops.

Now, this is the teeth to tail ratio I'm talking about.
around a third are support troops !!



As far as I can recall, the 'ideal' teeth to tail ratio is 6.5:10, i.e 65 combatants supported by 100 non-combatant. No one in the world have managed to achieve this.

Teeth to Tail Ratio: An Archaic Concept

One should read the above article to get an idea about the ratio.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rupak » 24 Jun 2008 08:10

rohivats

i believe the 121 (i) bde is now an integral part of 8 div.
also believe that both 40 and 41 div are assigned to the western theatre.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rohitvats » 24 Jun 2008 09:56

Lalmohan: Flanking movement can occur only if we have the control over the territory. We’ll have to first take the NA from the Pakistan. Interestingly, this was exactly the objective of exercise Brass-tacks. The final component of the exercise was called Operation Trident and envisaged assault on the Northern Areas using a Division+ worth of troops. The 6th Mountain Division was airlifted to Leh and would have either itself been responsible for the task or relieved 3rd Division for the task. It of course, did not materialize for a number of reasons.

Rahul M – A division is a self contained fighting formation which will have offensive and support elements for it to carry out its assigned task. As for the teeth to tail ratio within a Infantry Division, I can give you this ball park figure:
Infantry Battalions * 9 @ 800 men each – 5600
Artillery Brigade * 5 regiments @ 600 men each (this is guess estimate) – 3000
Total – 8600 – round off to 9000 men.
Rest of the troop strength, assuming another 6000 men will be with the support elements.
Also, a mountain division does not by any established TOE (Table of Equipment) guidelines have 5 Infantry battalions. You may come across formations having extra infantry battalions by virtue of the nature of threat and geography but not as a rule. The standard size is 3 Infantry Battalions per brigade. The main difference is in terms of the engineering equipment with the Engineers regiment plus necessary modifications at battalion level for each component for operations in mountains.

Rupak – Thanks for the info wrt 121 brigade. That means that either 8 mountain division operates with 4 brigades with may be one as reserve or it left one of the brigades for operations in the valley when it gained 121 brigade. Or still, it gave one of the brigade for the Corps reserve.
As for the 40th and 41st Artillery Division, nothing stops it from being assigned to the new areas.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rupak » 24 Jun 2008 10:35

rohitvats
afaik, 56/79/121 are part of 8 div.
do you recall if it was elements from 10 corps arty bde that formed the nucleus of 40 div raising?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rohitvats » 24 Jun 2008 11:02

rupak: my ORBAT knowledge at brigade level is very shaky. I had made some notes ealrier from Ravi Rikhye's book but have lost them. As for the 10th Corps artillery brigade forming nucleus for the 40th Arty Div..no clue. But my guess is, 40 and 41st are AHQ held formations and not permanently assigned to a corps. Also, the 10th corps arty brigade would have been replaced. Any additional comments from you on the subject are welcome

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby RayC » 24 Jun 2008 16:32

Rahul M wrote:just adding up the strengths of the combat formations alone will
bring the number close to 15000.

and mtn divisons have around 5 btns as against 3 of the infantry divs.


Mtn Divs have three bdes, each having three bns.

Depending on the Threat Analysis, the number of fmns or units can beefed up.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 24 Jun 2008 19:59

Is ti OK to discuss composition of divisions? I mean which brigade forms part of which divisions? In the old days that was treasure.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 24 Jun 2008 20:06

may be we should just mention the composition and refrain from mentioning the number.

composition is public info anyway.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 25 Jun 2008 00:40

X-Posted...
Ashok Mehta in Pioneer, 25 June 2008

China eyeing Sikkim again

Ashok K Mehta

India, like others, follows a 'One China' policy but deals with two Chinas. The "peacefully rising China", which "understands and supports India's aspirations to play a greater role in international affairs" but merely lip services it, actually regulates a relationship on its own terms. This is the China which Indian leaders want to emulate economically and frequently make believe there is space for both to rise and prosper. This China will soon overtake the US as India's largest trading partner.

The other China is the one that inflicted a humiliating defeat over the boundary dispute in 1962 and has kept bullying and needling India without diplomatic grace and sophistication. It is opposed to India's permanent membership of the UN Security Council, entry into the Asian economic and security structures and recognition as a state with nuclear weapons. Its blatant use of Pakistan and other negative strategies ensures India is kept confined to South Asia courtesy its strategic encirclement: 'String of Pearls', a chain of naval bases designed to undermine India's pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region.

China's military modernisation is moving at a frenetic pace. Defence spending has registered an annual increase of 17 per cent, officially amounting to $ 70 billion, though Western analysts say it is double that amount. The upgrade in military infrastructure in Tibet has trebled the operational and logistics capabilities of the PLA. Its strategic programmes are on the rise too.

The boundary dispute, which hurts India, has for all intents and purposes remained on the back burner, periodically subjected to the charade of political and cartographic mechanisms for its resolution. It is a zero sum game. Cleverly, the Chinese have raised the political cost of any settlement to unacceptably high levels even raking up boundary dispute on the settled Sikkim border.

Dealing with the two Chinas are officials in foreign office who believe relations with Beijing have never been better and military commanders who assert that there is a serious disconnect between our perception of Chinese intent and capabilities. But they are being advised to underplay, even underreport, border incidents.

The Chief of Army Staff, Gen Deepak Kapoor's recent television interview on the frequency of alleged intrusions by the PLA was unprecedented for its candour and content. He emphasised that both Armies were patrolling up to the Line of Actual Control of their perception and transgressing each other's imagined red lines. He dismissed the aggressive behaviour of the PLA in dismantling military structures on the Dolam Plateau near the trijunction of Bhutan as a matter for Bhutan to sort out with China. It is no secret that India is committed to the defence of Bhutan and coordinates its border talks with China.

Article III of the 1996 CBM Treaty, which outlines several de-escalating measures, cannot be implemented as a mutually acceptable LAC has defied definition and demarcation.

The most recent and sustained fingering by PLA on the border has been in North Sikkim is Gyangyong area. The border with Sikkim was settled in 1890 as per Anglo-Chinese convention along the watershed between the Sikkim Teesta and the Tibetan Mochu rivers. The boundary though has not been jointly demarcated. In 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China, Sikkim was recognised as a State of the Indian Union after India parroted for the nth time that Tibet was an Autonomous Region of China.

On June 16, a vehicle-mounted PLA patrol came one kilometre into the Finger Area making it the 65th intrusion this year in the same area. On one occasion, Indian soldiers formed a human chain to block the entry of the PLA. In 1967, similar Indian tactics at Nathu La blew up into a major border skirmish.

Sikkim's geo-strategic importance is recognised beyond doubt. Its eastern shoulder descends into the Chumbi valley to the point near the trijunction with Bhutan which is disputed. North Sikkim is the only area in the East from where any meaningful ground offensive into Tibet can be mounted. During Operation Falcon, following the Sumdorong Chu standoff in Wangdung, heavy tanks, artillery and mechanised vehicles were inducted into North Sikkim in 1987. As matching infrastructure lagged behind and slowed down to zero after the 1993 and 1996 peace accords, the military deterrent capability also withered away. So twice, once after 1962 and again in 1987, infrastructure development plans were aborted.

Only this year, singed by Chinese accusations of a prime ministerial trespass of Arunachal Pradesh was a retired Army Chief despatched as Governor of the State and a development package funded. No Indian Prime Minister has ever visited Tawang which, the Chinese say, has an inalienable connection with Tibet.

The intrusions in Sikkim have provoked the standard official response: From "not yielding an inch of ground" to "integral part of India" to "the matter will be taken up at the appropriate highest level". For at least three days after the June 16 trespass in Sikkim, the media went berserk, painting the incident as a serious breach of faith by the Chinese. Mr Mao Swe, the Chinese Consul General in Kolkata, defused the crisis by publicly reaffirming Beijing's recognition of Sikkim as part of India. He added that these were not incursions but differences of perception. For good measure, he said, "The border dispute between India and China won't be settled soon."

The message is loud and clear. Regardless of the method and level of negotiation, the boundary dispute will not be resolved anytime soon. Vice-Foreign Minister Wu Dawei has injected a strategic dimension to the India-China relationship, whatever that means for conflict resolution.

Why has the PLA become proactive? Why the needling in north Sikkim and why now? Until this year, the Sikkim boundary was a settled issue. Only the status of Arunachal Pradesh was periodically questioned. China, raising the ante on the boundary issue and thus India's discomfiture, has in part to do with India's strategic partnership with the US, improving its bargaining position on the boundary question and delaying its full and final settlement.

The PLA's posturing on the border is risk laden. Indian Army and Air Force do not have an adequate deterrent capability in the East. A counter offensive Corps has remained on paper since 1987. Belatedly two new Mountain Divisions have been sanctioned for the East. We are 20 years behind the Chinese in operational capability and infrastructure.

The Chinese have raised not just the political, but also the military cost by undisguisedly dragging the border dispute. Two companies of the PLA will shortly arrive in Punjab for counter-terrorism exercises with 11 Corps, ostensibly augmenting strategic ties! For soldiers in north Sikkim and elsewhere on the LAC, the contradictions in policy and statement are not easy to comprehend. Managing differences on the LAC is easier in South Block than in Finger Area, especially when China intends to prolong the war of nerves.



So North Sikkim is a key area.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 25 Jun 2008 00:58

The article by Ashok K Mehta clarified some of my thoughts on 'why' the Chinese are acting up.

Namely, there is an internal power struggle going on in China, and the boundary issue is a fallout of that.

Members should note that as the market oriented group (marketists - my word) within CCP gained power (especially with the success of the market), it sidelined the socialists within the party. It also sidelined the PLA generals, but they were happy as long as the money kept buying new weapon for them. Also, the PLA itself took to the market in a big way, opening hotels, factories, whatnot.

The PLA is probably trying to reassert itself within the ruling hierarchy. By flaring up the border with India, this group is limiting the option for the othre group or groups.

A PLA-led group, possibly in alliance with the displaced socialists, may be trying to force the issue upon marketists.

This issue needs more watching to clarify.

I promise all BRFites that your friendly neighbourhood China-basher will do the needful.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby NRao » 25 Jun 2008 02:12

there is an internal power struggle going on in China,


That has been there for some time now ..... nothing new. Since the Man in the Chair died.

So too the border dramas. I recall that both sides used to use PA systems to blare music/propaganda as early as the 70s. And, of course, "cross over".

The timing of the release of such news is also part of phyops and at times an indicator to each others intent.

I think things along the northern border will increase because of Indian relationship with Myanmar.....I feel that India is gaining in influence out there and obviously Chicom will not like that.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 25 Jun 2008 03:03

The central problem is pakistan.

(Dis)solve that country and we have ample infrastructure to take on China on any terms.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby yogi » 25 Jun 2008 03:44

abhischekcc wrote:The central problem is pakistan.

(Dis)solve that country and we have ample infrastructure to take on China on any terms.


That is exactly my thinking. But I think more from the perspective of unification. Has the scenario of unification of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh been discussed in this forum before? Just imagine the power of a unified India. When you think of Pakistan, don't think of it as a different country. Think of it as Baluchistan, Sindh, Punjab, and NWFP. Its a whole different feeling, when you think of it in that way.

Then imagine how much Indian resources will get freed and available to counter any Chinese adventures.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 25 Jun 2008 04:04

abhischekcc wrote:The central problem is pakistan.


Actually, the central problem is China.

(Dis)solve that country and we have ample infrastructure to take on China on any terms.


I suppose this was the kind of thinking the dominated the Indian side in the late 1950s. We still underestimate China and overestimate our own capability to our ultimate detriment. Even so, I am interested in seeing what kind of assessment leads you to suggest such a blanket statement.

I had a very interesting talk with a person from China yesterday, and to my delight the talk wandered over the issue of Tibet out of nowhere. Even though he was telling me about the beautiful regions of Tibet, it was an interesting position to see what the other side thinks of the Tibet issue, and sure enough, he talked about Tibet as simply as talking of any other province within China. The word autonomous did not come up, and neither did the Tibetan people. It was (and is) all China now. Nevertheless, one interesting side-note from the talk was a statement that the Chinese had put in over 6 Billion USD in developing roads a few dozen kilometers and other associated transportation infrastructure in just one sector of the border northeast of Sikkim. That's 6 Billion for one sector, and other sectors must be assumed to have the same input from Beijing.

I am interested in hearing how much the Indian side has put into the border infrastructure or has plans for in the future.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ShauryaT » 25 Jun 2008 08:29

abhischekcc wrote:The central problem is pakistan.

(Dis)solve that country and we have ample infrastructure to take on China on any terms.
Do not need to even do that. Just take back what is ours, POK and NA and TSP ceases to be of use to the west and the china link is broken. That is the strategic end of TSP, without "dissolving" them. Probably can be done even under a nuclear umbrella.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Avarachan » 25 Jun 2008 09:19

vivek_ahuja wrote:
I had a very interesting talk with a person from China yesterday, and to my delight the talk wandered over the issue of Tibet out of nowhere. Even though he was telling me about the beautiful regions of Tibet, it was an interesting position to see what the other side thinks of the Tibet issue, and sure enough, he talked about Tibet as simply as talking of any other province within China. The word autonomous did not come up, and neither did the Tibetan people. It was (and is) all China now. Nevertheless, one interesting side-note from the talk was a statement that the Chinese had put in over 6 Billion USD in developing roads a few dozen kilometers and other associated transportation infrastructure in just one sector of the border northeast of Sikkim. That's 6 Billion for one sector, and other sectors must be assumed to have the same input from Beijing.

I am interested in hearing how much the Indian side has put into the border infrastructure or has plans for in the future.


Vivek, even assuming that number is correct, is that 6 Billion USD in infrastructure designed to improve the daily lives of the Tibetan people, or is it primarily intended for use by the Chinese military? Was the infrastructure constructed in a way that respected the cultural and environmental concerns of Tibetans?

Moreover, even if the infrastructure were intended to improve the lives of Tibetans, I'm sure most Tibetans would eagerly take their freedom and independence over any amount of Chinese money.

Does India need to do more? Absolutely. However, despite all of India's problems, India is a far better place in which to live than Communist China. Let's not forget that: India has a lot to offer its citizens, especially compared to its neighbors.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 25 Jun 2008 10:56

does google earth have hires imagery of the tsangpo valley ? or have they
fuzzed that as a mark of deference to the dragon?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 25 Jun 2008 17:26

Vivek,
That $6B number is typical Chinese bullshit- no way such an amount could have been spent on roads unless it was used to hide the budget for military bases.

-----------

Pakistan has tied up most of our military resources in Kashmir and/or in posturing on the western border. Dissolving pakiland will free them up for deployment against the east. - That's why we can stare them down.

I am not talking from 50s hubris. Indian Army was 200,000 strong in 1962, and IIRC China had 4 million.

------------

I can't understand why you say we have weaker infrastructure against China when our supply lines at best are a few hundred kms from the industrial heartland (North India) to the border,whereas China's are several times longer.

We have a few dozen (at least) full length airports within 100-200 kms from the border. China has only got 13. I can't understand why all the breast beating about China's Infrastructure being stronger than ours.

----------------

It reminds of the argument being peddled an year ago in global media, indian media, online and even on BRF that China is building 4000(?) kms of highway every year and India is not even building a few hundred kms.

The argument fell flat when I pointed out that:
1. Until 1988, China did not have a single km of highway.
2. India's density of road per square km is many times higher than CHina.
3. And China would need AT LEAST 25 years to come up to India's level in road density, and that too if India does not build any highways in those 25 years. :P

In fact, one of the reasons why China's prosperity is limited to the coastal areas is the lack of infrastructure makes the interior economically unviable as export zones. :eek:

Some panda-porkers participating felt offended when I said these things. :mrgreen:

Bottom line: India already has infrastructure in place.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 25 Jun 2008 18:03

Vivek,
That $6B number is typical Chinese bullshit- no way such an amount could have been spent on roads unless it was used to hide the budget for military bases.


No, not just roads, but permanent bases and stuff as well. To be sure, the number is high, but the word used in the statement was road and infrastructure, not roads alone. I suppose a lot of other things besides roads come into the picture within the word infrastructure.

Maybe I will initiate the talk again and see if we can clarify things. :wink:

Pakistan has tied up most of our military resources in Kashmir and/or in posturing on the western border. Dissolving pakiland will free them up for deployment against the east. - That's why we can stare them down.


Yes, but the dissolution will be faster if the Chinese support for their military fails. How that can be achieved is a difficult question, but so is the concept of dissolving Pakistan. JMT.

I can't understand why you say we have weaker infrastructure against China when our supply lines at best are a few hundred kms from the industrial heartland (North India) to the border,whereas China's are several times longer.


I have spoken on this earlier in the thread. It has lot to do with the gradients involved. The Indian side has much quicker access from the air to the Himalayan regions from the plains to the south as compared to China, but the ground infrastructure cannot make use of that advantage very much because the foothills are at sea level, and yet within a few hundred kilometers the altitude reaches for the sky. This is very difficult terrain for ground infrastructure to follow on.

On the Chinese side the Tibet plateau allows for much more shallow gradients mainly because they are spread over much larger distances, allowing for easier building of roads and ground transportation, even if at much larger distances. It is also easier to create permanent basing facilities on this kind of terrain closer to the border than on the Indian side. It also allows for large stocks of supplies very close to the border in a much shorter time than that is possible on the Indian side.

This is the advantage at the strategic level that Tibet gives China. It is what they have been fighting for all these years.

We have a few dozen (at least) full length airports within 100-200 kms from the border. China has only got 13. I can't understand why all the breast beating about China's Infrastructure being stronger than ours.


I suppose you mean Air supply Ops? If so, like I said, the Air Supply Ops are definitely easier for India, but at the same time you have to play the numbers game and calculate what would be the size of the force that can be maintained from the air with the current and projected airlift capacity we have and for how long we can maintain them from the air. With such a large border as with China and a powerful adversary such as China, what would be the intensity of equipment and ammo usage as opposed to say in 1962 or something. Bottom line is that our airlift fleet will be hard pressed.

As regards air strikes against Chinese road and rail choke points: I never said that the Chinese infrastructure is not vulnerable, just that it is currently better than ours. We have that option and personally speaking I have a lot of hopes for our Jaguar fleets if the war begins. :twisted:

Bottom line: India already has infrastructure in place.


One which at the moment can only support the forces already there, but not a heavy influx during a full scale war, and certainly not one which is very robust. As one officer told me a year ago: In some regions along the border it hangs by a thread.

If the situation has changed in the time till now, all the better. But I am waiting to hear such news.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Raj Malhotra » 25 Jun 2008 19:56

All the off the record ground reports from people who have returned from stint from Indo-China border is that we are very heavily lagging in infrastructure and disaster is waiting to happen as China has pulled way ahead ahead.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 25 Jun 2008 20:15

as a native assamese I can support that contention. even something basic like 4 laning of roads is only
now ongoing under NSEW and spurs to state capitals. Arunachal has no railway like and no BG rails,
there is a lonesome MG railhead somewhere in a flood prone region.

Arunachal should by now been criss-crossed with EW road network to permit easy and flexible
buildup of forces. EWNS should have been completed in early 90s. BG rail road from Rangiya to
Pasighat(east) on north bank of river.....the list goes on.
Assam has some abandoned WW2 era airbases that need reactivation urgently as satellite
bases. the main bases can certainly expect SRBM salvos. there ain't no hardened infra to speak of.
the local Govts are busy in their official guest houses cum brothels - drinking, womanizing and
gambling and generally heads up posteriors on a strategic scale.

I wish I was a d-billi reporter for NDTV or CNN-IBN to present TV reports on the infra
in NE

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 27 Jun 2008 02:36

I wonder whether this was posted earlier:

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i= ... =ASI&s=LAN

The following text I copied from another forum:
By vivek raghuvanshi
Published: 23 Apr 10:50 EDT (06:50 GMT)
Print Print | Print Email

NEW DELHI - The Indian Defence Ministry is drawing up a list of additional equipment and weapons to support a proposed buildup of Army and Air Force forces along its border with China.

Senior Defence Ministry planners are working on building infrastructure, increasing troops, building additional airfields and upgrading roads and infrastructure along the China border, Defence Ministry sources said.

Special troops also will be raised for deployment.

The additional weaponry to be bought includes light 155mm guns, a variety of helicopters, rotary unmanned aerial vehicles, air defense systems, C-130J aircraft for swift deployment of troops, and C3I equipment.

The buildup will take place along the Ladakh sector in the north Uttarkhand region, and along the eastern border in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

The Army also has decided to raise two new mountain divisions numbering about 15,000 troops to be deployed along the 4,057-kilometer Line of Actual Control (LAC), between India and China. The 1.1 million-strong Army has 10 mountain formations in about 34 divisions.

The Indian government also plans to develop more than 600 kilometers of road along the LAC, which will further link to additional road networks in the hinterland.


Note the heavy number of air components to the expansion plans.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby PaulJI » 27 Jun 2008 22:43

Singha wrote:does google earth have hires imagery of the tsangpo valley ? or have they
fuzzed that as a mark of deference to the dragon?


Google Earth has sharp pictures only where it's been able to buy images from aerial surveys. The world is large, not all of it has been photographed from the air at high definition, not all such surveys are for sale, & Google Earth doesn't have an unlimited budget, & concentrates on areas which are both well populated & rich, & therefore likely to have many people who want to look on Google Earth, or of touristic interest.

It has pretty hi-res pictures of Lhasa.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby hnair » 27 Jun 2008 23:24

PaulJI wrote:Google Earth has sharp pictures only where it's been able to buy images from aerial surveys. The world is large, not all of it has been photographed from the air at high definition, not all such surveys are for sale, & Google Earth doesn't have an unlimited budget, & concentrates on areas which are both well populated & rich, & therefore likely to have many people who want to look on Google Earth, or of touristic interest.

It has pretty hi-res pictures of Lhasa.


Some points:
1) If Google has enough money to go around every street of US with a fleet of camera crews, vehicles etc, I am sure they have the budget to lease a 1-metre resolution satellite for a year or two. Different markets, I know, but still my point is there might not be budget issues for a company that has been "throwing away" money on quirky stuff. And this "spontaneous quirkiness" can get rather selective.
2) Does that mean those rather lonely stretches of Southern Tamilnadu* and almost all of the Gujarat coast are "well populated & rich" according to Google's Shoreline Blvd-walas?
3) Of course, there will be pretty hi-res pics of Lhasa and maybe other selected areas too. How does that help India? That I suspect is Singha's original question.

*Last I traveled the Muppandal wind-mills area, it was not bustling with Louis Vuitton and Lamborghini dealerships. But yeah, it is close to "interesting spots". I am sure those who write whitepapers on GIS systems at google takes their inputs *only* from wall street analyst reports :)

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 28 Jun 2008 14:36

guys, I've cleaned up this thread and moved the political
discussions to the indian interests thread in the strat fora.
plz continue there.
as it is, we have enough threads that discuss political implications of JLN rule and such.
let's restrict discussions here to the military aspects of a possible tibet war.

However, there was one relevant snippet from
sanjaychoudhry wrote:Meanwhile:

PLA's rapid reaction capability in Tibet
http://upiasiaonline.com/Security/2008/ ... ibet/6507/

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 28 Jun 2008 16:44

btw, excellent find sanjay !
very informative article !

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby PaulJI » 28 Jun 2008 18:33

hnair wrote:
PaulJI wrote:Google Earth has sharp pictures only where it's been able to buy images from aerial surveys. The world is large, not all of it has been photographed from the air at high definition, not all such surveys are for sale, & Google Earth doesn't have an unlimited budget, & concentrates on areas which are both well populated & rich, & therefore likely to have many people who want to look on Google Earth, or of touristic interest.

It has pretty hi-res pictures of Lhasa.


Some points:
1) If Google has enough money to go around every street of US with a fleet of camera crews, vehicles etc, I am sure they have the budget to lease a 1-metre resolution satellite for a year or two. Different markets, I know, but still my point is there might not be budget issues for a company that has been "throwing away" money on quirky stuff. And this "spontaneous quirkiness" can get rather selective.
2) Does that mean those rather lonely stretches of Southern Tamilnadu* and almost all of the Gujarat coast are "well populated & rich" according to Google's Shoreline Blvd-walas?
3) Of course, there will be pretty hi-res pics of Lhasa and maybe other selected areas too. How does that help India? That I suspect is Singha's original question.

*Last I traveled the Muppandal wind-mills area, it was not bustling with Louis Vuitton and Lamborghini dealerships. But yeah, it is close to "interesting spots". I am sure those who write whitepapers on GIS systems at google takes their inputs *only* from wall street analyst reports :)


Google Earth relies mostly on data bought off the shelf. It has not gone round the streets of every city in the USA, but only a small proportion. Note that the street-level images from the USA are commercially valuable (like many of the high resolution overhead images), & may pay for themselves by subscriptions to Google Earths premium services. 1 metre resolution worldwide images are expensive, & unlikely to be recoverable by subscriptions. Its budget is large, but not unlimited.

Yes, Google does quirky things. Someone there may like the Muppandal windmills. Maybe someone there comes from that area. Why not ask them?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 28 Jun 2008 18:55

goog gubo'ed promptly to beijings demands on censorship of search results served to chinese users.
if same thing were asked by delhi we'd have lectures
and talks on freedom of expression co-sponsored by
the american think tanks

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 28 Jun 2008 22:52

I was talking to an ex-army walla. He said the right priority is to get TSP first and then the Tibet. The reason is India doesn't have the number of troops and strategic airlift capability to take up the task. Leaving the TSP around while tackling the PRC in Tibet will expose the flanks to them and their fifth cloumns and subject India to US proxy pressure.

These extra mtn divs will be a good idea to fix POK. Good idea to raise them for PRC and they are flexible in deployment.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Bade » 29 Jun 2008 02:38

1 metre resolution worldwide images are expensive, & unlikely to be recoverable by subscriptions.

Let's check some numbers. Assuming a swath width of only 1000m for a 1m resolution satellite, since 1km resolution low resolution sats have swath width of ~ 1000km we can go about making an estimate for what is needed. For a 360 degree coverage with each degree gives approximately 100 km footprint at the equator, so 1km swath width needs 36,000 half orbits to cover the entire earth. We can ignore the overlaps at the higher latitudes for this estimate ... so this gives the upper limit :)

Now, what does ISRO charge for imagery ? $1000 per orbit which means a measly $36 million dollars for cost of imagery. This is the worst case scenario. The real costs may be even less than one third of this, still around in the ~ $10-15 million range.

If we inflate the cost by a factor of ten to $10,000 per half orbit since it cannot be a factor of 100 which would be too much, it still is not more than $100 million or so.

Now that is peanuts for google. It would have cost them much more to pay those programmers in salaries and massages and free haircuts. :mrgreen: :mrgreen:

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajkhalsa » 29 Jun 2008 10:23

PLA's rapid reaction capability in Tibet
By Andrei Chang
Column: Military Might
Published: June 27, 2008

Hong Kong, China — The eruption of riots in Tibet in March reflected an increasingly complicated political situation there, involving both internal and external factors.

Internally, the peaceful and nonviolent approach of the Dalai Lama toward China has encountered greater resistance from the young generation of Tibetans, and the Dalai Lama’s political relevance has been gradually marginalized as a result.

Externally, India’s China policy is now at a critical point, and India-China relations are likely to slip backward if they fail to quickly progress. India is adjusting the deployment of its armed forces along its border with China to guard against a Chinese intrusion.

Meanwhile, as the Beijing Olympic Games approach, the faction in Tibet that favors a showdown with the Chinese leadership views the present time as the best opportunity to put greater pressure on Beijing.

Under these circumstances, the Tibet issue is likely to remain the focus of attention by various parties before the Olympic Games, and constant protests by the Tibetans can be expected.

China’s handling of the Tibet riots was very similar to the way it dealt with the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. In the early phase, a large number of regular troops from the People’s Liberation Army were sent to the scene to deter the protesters.

Within 48 hours of the start of the riots in Lhasa, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets as the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Region was dispatched to Lhasa.

This rapid troop deployment indicates that with the completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad in 2006, the rapid reaction capability of the Chinese armed forces in the Tibet region, particularly the ability to quickly maneuver heavy equipment, has been greatly enhanced.

This is indicated by the fact that the PLA soldiers on the T-90/89 vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were all wearing the “leopard” camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operations. These uniforms have appeared in video footage of the 149th Division during exercises.

When unrest occurred in Tibet in 1989 and a curfew was imposed in Lhasa, the 149th Division was also the first PLA combat unit to arrive on the scene. At that time, the army troops entered Tibet via the Sichuan-Tibet highway.

The 149th Division is based at Leshan in Sichuan province. As for the T-92 armored vehicles that appeared in Lhasa, the No. 52 Mountain Brigade of the Tibet Military Region received the vehicles around 2000.

The military value of the Qinghai-Tibet railway has thus been demonstrated in the rapid reaction of the PLA armed forces to the Lhasa riots.

Should China-India relations deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and the riots in Tibet spread extensively, the first combat units of the PLA to be called to action would be the No. 52 and No. 53 Mountain Brigades under the Tibet Military Region.

The No. 52 Brigade, stationed at Linzhi, is highly mechanized and armed with T-92 wheeled armored vehicles and HJ-8/9 anti-tank missiles. National highway 318 directly connects Linzhi and Lhasa; thus it is logical to conclude that the T-92 wheeled armored vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were from this brigade. The No. 52 Mountain Brigade is stationed at Milin and is also the PLA combat unit stationed closest to the city of Lhasa.

National highway 318 is in fact the southern route of the Sichuan-Tibet highway. In the event of war or future large-scale riots in Tibet, the highway will be the key passageway for combat troops from the Chengdu Military Region to enter Tibet.

However, this key highway runs across the Minjiang River and the Daduhe River in a region with an average altitude of 4,250 meters (around 14,000 feet) above sea level, and thus is very susceptible to attack by the Indian Air Force or assault by organized rioters. Most of the highways within the Tibet region will be within striking range of the Su-30MKI fighters soon to be deployed in the No. 30 Squadron of the Indian Air Force at Tezpur.

If the T-90/89 armored personnel carriers used in Lhasa were indeed from the 149th Mechanized Rapid Reaction Division of the Chengdu Military Region, they were most likely transported first from Chongqing to Xining, then to Golmud to connect to the Qinghai-Tibet railway and continue on to Lhasa. The whole journey would take about 48 hours.

Such troop movements would be much faster and cheaper than before. Calculated on the basis of being able to transport most of the heavy equipment of a whole mechanized division within 48 hours – it is unlikely that all the division’s equipment would be moved – the PLA would be able to transport approximately 10 light mechanized divisions and some heavy mechanized divisions through the railroad to Tibet from the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions within 30 days.

Of course, should there be a military conflict between China and India, the Qinghai-Tibet railway would be a prime target for air strikes by the Su-30MKI fighters of the Indian Air Force’s No. 30 Fighter Squadron, the MiG-27 fighters of the No. 22 Squadron at Hashimara and the “Jaguar” attackers of the No. 5 Squadron at Ambala.

The only obstacle to this mass movement of regular armed troops and equipment would be the capacity of Qinghai-Tibet railway and the number of available trains. China once claimed that the annual transport capacity of the railway was 5 million tons, an average of 13,888 tons per day.

The average load capacity of one Chinese train car is normally 60 tons, with about 20 cars in each cargo train. This would mean that each train could transport 1,200 tons, and thus 11 trains traveling both ways would be enough for each day. In time of war, the actual number of trains running on the railroad could double to roughly 20 trains both ways each day.

Suppose the total weight of the equipment and combat material needed for one rapid reaction division of the Chinese army was around 15,000 tons, the Qinghai-Tibet railway could transport a whole rapid reaction division on one average day. In other words, within every one-and-a-half to two days, China could move one rapid reaction division from the Chengdu Military Region or one rapid reaction division from the Lanzhou Military Region to Tibet.

China’s air transport capability also needs to be taken into consideration. Additional airborne troops, rapid reaction troops and armed police could be directly delivered to Lhasa from the air. Since airdrop operations would take place in the Tibet region, there would be no need for ground-based air defense firepower. Thus, the No. 15 Airborne Division could be airdropped to Tibet, and equipment such as airborne fighting vehicles could be put to use.

In recent years, China has made great effort to revamp the Qinghai-Tibet highway and the Sichuan-Tibet highway. National highways 214, 317 and 109 – the shortest routes into Tibet by land – are now all asphalted. If China were to have a military confrontation with India, highway transport could be more reliable should the Qinghai-Tibet railway be damaged.

The railway would allow the 61st Plateau Rapid Reaction Motorized Division of No. 21 Group Army under the Lanzhou Military Region and the 149th Rapid Reaction Motorized Division of the Chengdu Military Region to quickly enter Tibet.

Because of the presence of U.S. military troops in Afghanistan and the escalating independence activities in the southern part of Xinjiang – northwest China’s primarily Muslim Uyghur ethnic region – the Xinjiang Military Region and the Lanzhou Military Region are now the key forces to guard against internal riots in that part of the country. This is why the forces of the Chengdu Military Region were the first to be deployed in Tibet.

In addition, the riots in Tibet quickly spread to Gansu province, which borders Xinjiang; therefore the Xinjiang and Lanzhou Military Regions may face the new mission of cracking down on Tibetan independence movements as well as Muslim riots and the traditional Uyghur independence activities.

Once the Uyghur separatist movement in Xinjiang and the independence activities in Gansu and Tibet intensify, the 61st Rapid Reaction Division stationed at Tianshui in Gansu province will be the first one to be called upon in the crackdown. In addition, the No. 12 Armored Division stationed at Zhangye in Gansu province may also be mobilized.

The 4th Motorized Infantry Division of Xinjiang Military Region was the first local combat unit to receive new equipment in the region, including the T-92 100-mm wheeled assault cannons. Obviously, this division is now transforming into a rapid reaction unit and will probably be used to deal with any riots in southern Xinjiang. Besides, this division is also quite close to the Afghanistan border.

The 6th Motorized Infantry Division stationed at Kashi is the only mechanized combat unit in the Xinjiang Military Region. It is also close to Afghanistan and is located right in the heart of southern Xinjiang. Should Uyghur independence activities break out of control, the above two divisions would be the first to be dispatched.

As for the Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, it is covered by the 11th Brigade. As is widely known, the 63rd Division of the original No. 21 Group Army and the 7th Division of the Xinjiang Military Region have been restructured into the Armed Police No. 63 and No. 7 Divisions, and are stationed at the cities of Pingliang and Ili, respectively.

--

(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto Canada.)

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Karan Dixit » 30 Jun 2008 08:51

Singha wrote:goog gubo'ed promptly to beijings demands on censorship of search results served to chinese users.
if same thing were asked by delhi we'd have lectures
and talks on freedom of expression co-sponsored by
the american think tanks


The plan in 1971 war was to:

1. Liberate East Pakistan (as Bangladesh)
2. Reduce West Pakistan military to nothing
3. Liberate Tibet

Conversation between Chau En Lai and Henry Kissinger were declassified few years ago. I was reading that document on US State Department's website. Chau En Lai told Henry Kissinger that China will only allow India to come as far as Sino - Tibet border.

This reveals two things:
1. Chinese were certain that India will go for Tibet's liberation
2. Chinese were certain that they will not be able to stop the liberation of Tibet

Then why did items 2 and 3 not take place? Answer is Richard Nixon.

China and Pakistan present a co-ordinated threat to India. I agree that we should finish the unfinished business and reduce Pakistan to nothing as soon as the opportunity comes knocking.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 30 Jun 2008 11:35

The plan in 1971 war was to:

1. Liberate East Pakistan (as Bangladesh)
2. Reduce West Pakistan military to nothing
3. Liberate Tibet


Where are you getting the last one from. Its the first time I am hearing that in the list of Indian war aims in 71.

Just because the other side expected that last option to happen does not mean the Indian side was prepared for it. There is a difference between the two!

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 30 Jun 2008 14:17

Karan, I echo Vivek's comments

1. liberate bangladesh = check, plenty of sources
2. reduce pak mil to nothing = ? the only evidence i have seen is 'contain' not 'eliminate'
3. liberate tibet = ?!?!???!??!?!?; only references i have seen are 'hope china doesn't enter the war'

there was a realisation in GOI that China and/or the US will intervene - hence need for winter timing, speed of getting decisive result and ofcourse the friendship treaty with the USSR - as insurance against active Chinese intervention. plenty of material on this in Indira's biogs and Kao's book as well as others

i would find it unlikely that after 62, anyone in GOI seriously harboured any thoughts of liberation for Tibet - which in effect is the Chinese war aim of 62

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby HariC » 30 Jun 2008 20:01

the third objective should have been 'liberate all of POK" not tibet.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 30 Jun 2008 21:03

ramana wrote:X-Posted...
Ashok Mehta in Pioneer, 25 June 2008

China eyeing Sikkim again

Ashok K Mehta
The Chief of Army Staff, Gen Deepak Kapoor's recent television interview on the frequency of alleged intrusions by the PLA was unprecedented for its candour and content. He emphasised that both Armies were patrolling up to the Line of Actual Control of their perception and transgressing each other's imagined red lines. He dismissed the aggressive behaviour of the PLA in dismantling military structures on the Dolam Plateau near the trijunction of Bhutan as a matter for Bhutan to sort out with China. It is no secret that India is committed to the defence of Bhutan and coordinates its border talks with China.


So


It is unfortunate that the Indian Chief of Army Staff displayed lack of Indian committment and resolve toward the defense of Bhutan "a matter for Bhutan to sort out with China." The remark seems weak for an General. Sad.

In contrast, see the recent warning issued by Admiral Tim Keating to China:

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gRq ... 3qh3MO07Yw

He underlined America's "firm intention" not to abandon its dominating military role in the Pacific and told Beijing it would face "sure defeat" if it took on the United States militarily.

Another statement from former Indian Chief of the Army Staff Gen. JJ Singh:

http://www.idrw.org/2007/09/21/army_pre ... singh.html

"I can assure you that a 1962-like situation will not be repeated. We are fully prepared to defend our borders," Singh said during a media interaction at Fort William, the Army's Eastern Command headquarters here.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 30 Jun 2008 23:55

X-posted from China Mil watch thread...
rajrang wrote:Another news article about the barbarians who have occupied Tibet:

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF27Df01.html

Here is a worrisome quote:

Will the Chinese go to war with India over Tawang? Mohan Malik, an expert on Sino-Indian relations and professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu writes:
Although the probability of an all-out conflict is extremely low, the prospect that some of India's road building projects in disputed areas could lead to tensions, clashes and skirmishes with Chinese border patrols cannot be completely ruled out. Should a conflict break out, the PLA's [People's Liberation Army] contingency plans emphasize a "short and swift localized" conflict (confined to the Tawang region, along the lines of the 1999 Kargil conflict) with the following objectives in mind: capture the Tawang tract; give India's military a bloody nose; and deliver a knockout punch that punctures India's ambitions to be China's equal or peer competitor once and for all.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby ramana » 30 Jun 2008 23:58

What is the combat potential of the para-military forces? Can they be used for defensive ops in the border areas to free up regulars from TSP fronts?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Bade » 01 Jul 2008 05:21

Since PRC would only be interested in a low level conflict if and when it happens in the North East, the best counter strategy for India would be show readiness and willingness to escalate the conflict. Simple defensive posture to protect the borders will not help with the general Chinese psyche. If you threaten to escalate the conflict they will back down. It is not in their interest to escalate, but a Kargil like level of conflict they will wager and take their chances to push India around. A failure to push India in border skirmishes will not result in a loss of face anyway, since India will be happy to keep the status quo without any further border gains when the conflict ends from past experience.


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