War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby PaulJI » 03 Sep 2008 02:04

Storm Shadow is combat proven (Iraq, 2003). :D Bought by the UK, France (as Scalp EG - the only difference is the interface to the aircraft), Italy, Greece (Scalp EG) & in a range-limited version ("Black Shaheen") the UAE.

Or there's the Taurus KEPD-350, probably longer range than Storm Shadow, & is being developed into a longer-range version akin to the JASSM-ER. Bought by Gemany & Spain.

Both have similar two-stage warheads, which can do clever tricks such as blowing a hole in an outer wall, then penetrating through a pre-set (but selectable) number of interior walls before the second stage explodes. The BROACH warhead of Storm Shadow has been bought by the USA for the AGM-154C JSOW-C. JASSM has a simpler unitary warhead.

JASSM has had a high failure rate in tests: it was running at 42% in 2007. I can't remember if Storm Shadow had a 100% or 96% success rate when used in combat in 2003, which mirrored its test performance. KEPD-350 is reported to be similarly reliable.

BTW, the USA refused to sell JASSM to Finland.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Paul » 19 Sep 2008 02:50

Is it feasible to deploy MIG29s in the NE???

Should limited war break out over Tibet, seeing them in the NE would be a nasty surprise for PRC....considering that most deployments are in the Punjab, J&K, Ladakh, Ayni or Jamnagar.

PLAAF would be logically training to face in western Tibet.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Singha » 19 Sep 2008 07:46

Sure. nothing prevents a deployment but base infra for first line repair and damage control has
to be built up else it will be a very short mission before every plane is unflyable.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 19 Sep 2008 13:16

it can be deployed but for two factors -- the small numbers, only 3 sqdns, and the fact that with their short legs they would need considerable AAR support to be in the air for any meaningful period of time.
unfortunately, NE is comparatively weak when it comes to basing infra for such large craft and again, given the geography you have to commit large assets to the NE sector without much chance of redeploying them westwards at a short notice. IAF/GoI may not be that comfortable with a midas passing over BD.
anyway, the chances of GoI actually giving permission for BD overflight is << 0.

translated that means once such an asset is transferred to NE it is practically ensuring it is not used in the other sectors for the duration of the conflict. with the handful of midas available IAF will be reluctant to do that.
IAF is much better off deploying longer ranged aircraft that can operate on its own to this theater.
aircrafts like the mki and the MRCA, with point defence fighters like bisons and LCA for air defence.
I expect out of the 16-17 mki+MRCA sqdns, as many as 6-7 will be based in the NE.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Anshul » 19 Sep 2008 15:26

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0b/Historic_Tibet_Map.png

If you look at this map.We may well have a lot of insertions of SFF from passes in bhutan.We do have a military presence in Bhutan and a de facto understanding with Bhutan on their defence.Overflying Bhutan should be a piece of cake.How about upgrading the DRUK airports with the latest ACK ACK and SAMs..capable of hosting MIG-29 and Jags.The Jags in Gorakhpur can also move in at a short notice.

Its much closer to the border and provides direct access to the mainland.AFAIK Bhutan is a peace loving country and so is India.Also having a RBuAF equipped with a SQN of loaned AN-32s and Mig-29s for self defence is going to be a neat TIT for TAT.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby sum » 19 Sep 2008 19:08

Also having a RBuAF equipped with a SQN of loaned AN-32s and Mig-29s for self defence is going to be a neat TIT for TAT.

That would ensure a few noisy old Chinese subs loaned to BD with a few J-10s and few advanced SAMs thrown in at friendship prices for BD,i guess......

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby skher » 19 Sep 2008 21:03

War inside Tibet-now here's a challenge worth the mettle of the world's best infantry.

Removing a neighbouring country's border completely (India wouldn't have China as a neighbour anymore IF we're successful) and replacing with a UN mandate. OT....What do we do abt Kashmir then?

As is clear from the previous posts on this thread.....We would need for such an operation:

0.Think Tank-We need a new dedicated think tank which can suggest new tech,strategies and white papers to tackle the Middleman Kingdom aka the Yellow Peril of China.

1.Huge airborne force-

a.Our very own version of a Electrically Charged NERA BMD-4/Vickers 6-ton family of vehicles with hydro-pnuematic suspension.
Abhay ICV to weigh less than 20 tons...preferably 12 tonnes...having completely new armor tech.Armed with an AA 88 mm smoothbore gun/cannon.A new ER multi-target version of LAHAT and Astra would need to be made.VLS station for armed UAVs.
There...I..a mere untrained citizen beat a flummoxed DGMF in coming up with basic FICV/FMBT specifications.

b.Massive Tactical Transport-We need to re-activate/re-engineer the HS-748 into a good 21st century strafer-transport.MTA is a long story like gorshkov and FGFA...we can't wait that long....even Fokker could set up shop here by that time.

c.CA family-IAF needs to accept LCA in large numbers..."safety in numbers"....have combat strength of 8 instead of 4...the more the more wings of fire....mass production will take of costs...indians are master of cost cutting.Have 75+ squadrons....25 specially for northern friend.MCA should be followed by an XHCA project.....world's smallest large combat airframe having paratroop support.We have the money and the brains...we just need the will.

2.Unmanned Systems- If Tibet has to liberated by India...it can be speeded up by using special forces,Unmanned Air/Ground Support Systems and missile strikes....not necessarily air-launched....Tomahawks have range enough to make Peking duck.
There's a doctrine in US mil that advocates sole use of special forces & elite troops and unmned systems to win wars.Perhaps this doctrine is custom made for Tibet.

3.Defense Production/R&D- An apt name since we are defending Tibetans from tyranny of China.Otherwise shld be war production.
Our production facilities are quite behind the times...DPSUs and OFBs..the major reasons why the Armed Forces don't like indian made arms.They need to meet all modern quality methods..the Six Sigma,JIT and ISO production standards(something the DRDO's directorate wing can fix).
The JIT standard of special interest...as it enables us to produce asymmetrically by outsourcing and subcontracting...something local industry is good at.The naval and airforce assets of ordnance need to be hived into separate PSUs.DRDO/OFB need to be corporatized and allowed to process export orders to NAM countries through a single arm like ISRO's Antrix and Russia's Oberonexport.

Also labor unions shld be banned in defence sector...they are to be dealt with the way the indian airlines strike was handled(after that handling.. the company posted profits).

4.Strategic Sphere-Pakistan,Nepal and Bhutan(PNB) need to be naturally pro-India and stringently Anti-China.The domestic population need to see India as a friend who will fight with their armies(it's an H&D issue as well) to defeat an oppressive regime which would be replaced by a non-threatening Lama regime(having with china a modern indo-bhutan agreement)...this is needed.
Pakistan is really fed up of being flooded with cheap sab China goods and wants economic independence/compete with India.
Somehow P.K.Dahal needs to do a Vietnam(border dispute?Dam?freedom from puppet rule?) on China and join us in the struggle.UN support would help as well....at least in spirit.Bangladesh and Russia need to be non-aligned on the issue...beef up their borders.

Even if we win,and all for this is achieved we'd still have to address the k problem and hold a plebsicite for the state....China has always believed that it has similar legal rights over Tibet as we do over Kashmir...we both are armed with an instrument of accession.
So it will ask India ''the self styled liberator'' to show the same kind of leniency and hold a UN mandated plebiscite.This can be feasible only after trifurcation of J&K with Jammu and Ladakh well connected by all weather road,broad gauge rail and airports,well-integrated to rest of India.Kashmir being a trivial amt of land which would return to us as UN is pi**ed at china.

Only then,China's game's up and would be forced to free Tibet,and sign a treaty of Good Neighbourliness with it.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vila » 20 Sep 2008 08:55

And what is the time line for this Arhnem type operation ?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 20 Sep 2008 10:27

rajrang wrote: can India's airforce push back Chinese forces once they have occupied Indian territory? You will need a ground forces for that.

Advancing or occupying troops need a steady flow of material--ammo, food, medicines, shelter etc--to survive and IAF can easily disrupt or eliminate that flow. Even hidden jungle trails can be attacked accurately in all weather conditions by arty, aircraft or Prithvis. So AP in general will be a death trap for Chinese troops and they will not try to occupy it entirely.

However, they have huge incentive to try and take Tawang because it is politically important for their Tibet strategy and it is a tactically doable scenario. A massive paradrop (why do they have that looong airstrip so near the border?) or concentrated attack with overwhelming force could occupy Tawang and then it would be difficult to dislodge them without reducing the town to rubble which would defeat the purpose of defending it and really hurt India. In fact, if we cut off and surround the invaders, they would still be in a position to reduce the town to rubble just to remove that chess piece from the Tibet board and blame the destruction of the important monastery on India. They will have no hesitation or moral hangups about doing this. So at all costs we need to prevent them from even advancing on Tawang. Powerful radars (Phalcon) to pick up any aircraft activity for hundreds of miles, humint, carpet of anti aircraft defenses including manpads, attack choppers and all approaches zeroed in by arty and Prithvis in addition to dug-in mountain divisions that can be easily reinforced at short notice.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby RayC » 20 Sep 2008 11:59

However, they have huge incentive to try and take Tawang because it is politically important for their Tibet strategy and it is a tactically doable scenario.


Really?

I will leave it that India is aware of it.

Do you really feel that India has no plans to counter it?

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 20 Sep 2008 12:53

Victor wrote:Advancing or occupying troops need a steady flow of material--ammo, food, medicines, shelter etc--to survive and IAF can easily disrupt or eliminate that flow.


That one highlighted word above does not fit in the above statement. There is nothing easy about such an aerial interdiction campaign within the mountains. Not with the skies challenged by the PLAAF, the PLA air defenses etc. The size of a tactical Air Force needed for this job to be done "easily" is way beyond what India has right now or will have in the near future.

Even hidden jungle trails can be attacked accurately in all weather conditions by arty, aircraft or Prithvis. So AP in general will be a death trap for Chinese troops and they will not try to occupy it entirely.


That is a one sided view. What about the PLA's own arty and cruise missiles? If they attempt such a attack, don't you think the Indian Arty etc is the first thing they might attack on a large scale?

However, they have huge incentive to try and take Tawang because it is politically important for their Tibet strategy and it is a tactically doable scenario. A massive paradrop (why do they have that looong airstrip so near the border?)


I will agree with RayC on the above statements, but I just wanted to add an extra point: That looong airstrip near the border is meaningless. Not only are there no hard parking space etc for such an operation, they also are far too close to the border and very very vulnerable to an early attack. If they want to attempt an airborne invasion, that will be launched from airbases much further back. Even then, for such a scenario to happen, the IAF would have to simply roll over and die first, the IA's satellite Intel guys would have to be blind, the ground based air defenses would have to shut down their equipment and the IA Divisions in the region would have to turn their backs on the invading troops. In all, difficult to visualize...

-Vivek

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Fragmented Sentences

Postby skher » 20 Sep 2008 17:50

The size of a tactical Air Force needed for this job to be done "easily" is way beyond what India has right now or will have in the near future.


Since we don't have that amt of resources for a conventional strike,it'd have to be the world's largest Unmanned/Remotely Operated War wherein traditional force multipliers including SFs and missiles would be the main attacking force till troops follow to defend occupied posts.

This plan is currently unfeasible as we lack the manufacturing skills/production facilities that China has....we have brains and software and they only have the war factories.

Vila,timeline is around 5 years from now...2011-2013.

Even then, for such a scenario to happen, the IAF would have to simply roll over and die first, the IA's satellite Intel guys would have to be blind, the ground based air defenses would have to shut down their equipment and the IA Divisions in the region would have to turn their backs on the invading troops. In all, difficult to visualize...


Sadly,some of this really happened in 1962....the administration just flatly refused to respond to the military's calls.......the top brass asked many field COs to abandon posts.....they defied the order and fought tooth and nail.All along IAF was not activated till the very end....similarily again in Kargil.So long as there's democracy and pacifism,the Chinese have nothing to fear,they trembled only when IG was there.

These border incursions are just tests to check the political climate and shiny new equipment. And every time our politicians reward them with a peek....and if they insist a peak(till the next winter....we only want our men to freeze to death).

So thus,a pre-emptive strike in 2011 on a very imperialistic China (laying claims on all of Korea and Siberia,which was snatched by Japs in 1910 and Russia in the 1800s respectively),would end this "fear psychosis".Period.

Till that time,we compete economically. And prepare for "the lesson'' to given to us during 2010 CW games; because riots still broke out in Tibet back in 2008...and it had to be our fault.


But this time, we will answer by air first,and they would retreat 2010 sq miles from both Aksai and Lhasa.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 20 Sep 2008 18:03

skher wrote:Sadly,some of this really happened in 1962....


Actually, I was talking about the threat of an airborne invasion, not ground invasion. There is a difference between the two. You cannot pull off an airborne invasion while the other side's air force is still alive and kicking or when his ground defence systems are still active. A ground invasion is relatively less dependent on air power (though that is not to say that the latter is unimportant). The effect of an air campaign on the fate of the 1962 war is still highly debatable for various very valid reasons. Having said that, I can assure you that it does not take much to dismiss any talk of airborne invasion so long as the IAF is alive.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 20 Sep 2008 18:22

Guys, why do you insist that a war with China in Tibet will have to be offensive?

Do you not get the logistical difficulty? It is impossible to mass enough men and weapons over that land to fight a decisive war.

It is more optimistic to detach Tibet from China if China undergoes a civil war.

Also, have you considered the possibility of an Indian assault on South China and not in Tibet?

The attack can be done across Myanmar, if needed.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 20 Sep 2008 18:35

abhischekcc wrote:Guys, why do you insist that a war with China in Tibet will have to be offensive?

Do you not get the logistical difficulty? It is impossible to mass enough men and weapons over that land to fight a decisive war.

It is more optimistic to detach Tibet from China if China undergoes a civil war.

Also, have you considered the possibility of an Indian assault on South China and not in Tibet?

The attack can be done across Myanmar, if needed.


Who's talking about offensives? :shock:

Note that the logistics issue is not the same on either side of the border. I think we had discussed this in decent amount of detail in the first few pages of this thread. In essence, the idea was that there were significant advantages with regard to logistics for the Chinese assuming sufficient preparation time was provided. So while it might be possible for the Chinese to at least think about an attack southwards, it is nearly impossible to do the same northwards for our side.

On a side-note, if you notice, the thread's name and its original purpose at the time of inception was indeed to discuss the possibility of an Indian offensive into Tibet etc etc. At that time I had said that we should first discuss whether we can hold on to our own land before making such claims of large scale offensives. As you can now see, we are still trying to answer the latter question to the point that the thread is called "war in tibet" but the discussion is entirely focused on Indian defensive Ops against Chinese attacks.

I would love to discuss Indian offensives elsewhere (or anywhere for that matter) as well if only someone could satisfy my questions on our defensive capabilities.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby abhischekcc » 20 Sep 2008 18:49

Vivek,
I still think that the attitude is too aggressive :)

I think one also needs to ponder the China scenario under two conditions.
1. Pakistan exists as a threat to India (present condition).
2. Pakistan is rendered militarily impotent - so we can spare maximum amount of men and materials for China. Ah Yessss. :)

--------------------------

As a side note, I want to mention that some months (or an year back), I had mentioned that the biggest threat to China comes internally.

I had specifically mentioned that the hard-core socialists, who had been sidelined since the market reforms began, are likely to form the core of the 'other' group.

This is happening now.

Remember that local governments are the strongest proponents of market reforms - because it helps line their coffers. As long as the CCP thought its position was safe, it allowed reforms to continue.

But recently, in an ever worsening battle between Beijing and local governments, the centre has asked its lapdog - the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (the only union allowed in china) to force large companies including multinationals to allow union formation. (so the threat of civil war in China is not a pipedream :) ).

More on this later in another thread.


http://business.scotsman.com/economics/ ... 4489681.jp

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2 ... 044067.htm

http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100263

----------------

http://www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/100293

A Turning Point for China's Trade Unions

We may have reached a crucial turning point in the history of China's trade union movement. For the first time since 1949, trade union officials are openly stating that the union should represent the workers and no one else, while new legislation in Shenzhen places collective bargaining – previously a no-go area – at the core of the union's work.

"The trade union is a matter for the workers themselves," Chen Weiguang, chairman of the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions told a conference on 15 July 2008, adding that the role of enterprise unions must change from "persuading the boss" to "mobilizing the workers."

Shenzhen's Implementing Regulations (Shishi Banfa) for the Trade Union Law, enacted on 1 August, further define the union's new role, creating a "responsible, empowered and battle-ready union" that can protect workers' rights, according to Zhang Youquan, head of the Shenzhen Federation's legal department. Zhang told a press conference to announce the new regulations that this was the first time the term "collective bargaining" (jiti tanpan), as opposed to the previously-used but much weaker concept of "collective consultations" (jiti xieshang) had been applied in China's local legislation.

As the experience of the labour movement in many other countries has shown, collective bargaining is the most effective way to protect workers' rights and bolster the role of the trade union. Above all, it is a means of resolving labour disputes through peaceful social dialogue. Such an approach is sorely needed in China today, and China Labour Bulletin Director Han Dongfang congratulated the Shenzhen authorities on this important new initiative:

"After three decades of economic reform, we've reached the point when something had to be done. Today in Shenzhen we can see the worst excesses of capitalism, but also the desire of the people for social justice and – with these new regulations – the willingness of the government to move towards capitalism with a human face."

Han pointed out that although the new legislation was "state-directed" reform, it would still have a positive effect if it enabled workers to engage in genuine collective bargaining. "At present, the most pressing need for the official union is independence from the bosses," he said.

Significantly, the whole of chapter three of the Implementing Regulations (The Rights and Obligations of Trade Unions) does not contain a single reference to the traditional tasks outlined in the 2001 Trade Union Law, such as helping the enterprise to restore normal production in the event of a work stoppage or slowdown. Rather the regulations make it very clear that during a labour dispute the role of the trade union is to represent workers in negotiations with management. Moreover, for the first time in China, the regulations (Article 36) stipulate that grassroots trade union officials should receive a small monthly subsidy from the municipal federation that will go some way toward lessening union officials' dependence on the enterprise for their operating funds.

Article 18 (Paragraph 3), Articles 27 to 31 inclusive, Article 44 and Article 45 all stress that collective bargaining is the core responsibility of trade unions and provide clear guidelines on how the process should work. These provisions effectively transform collective bargaining in China from a vague concept into, potentially, a genuine right that can be utilized by ordinary workers to improve their terms and conditions of employment.

Of course, the regulations are far from perfect; they still emphasize the supervision or control (jiandu) of grassroots unions by higher-level unions, rather than a system of mutual supervision. Article 11, for example, specifies that workplace union officials will be elected by the union committee only after a list of candidates drawn up by the committee has been approved by the higher-level union. Also, grassroots unions still need the approval of higher-level unions before they can officially register, and there is no mechanism by which lower-level officials can supervise or control irresponsible higher-level union officials.

However, the Implementing Regulations – together with the Shenzhen Labour Relations Regulations, due to go into force at the end of September – have effectively opened the door for the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions to transform itself into a much more effective representative of workers' rights and interests.

Han Dongfang said: "We hope the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions can take practical steps to create a successful bargaining model that others can follow, thereby making collective bargaining a key part of China's emerging civil society."

Han stressed that change will not happen overnight but, step by step, progress is already being made. And in retrospect, 2008 may well turn out to be one of the most important years in the history of China's trade union movement.

"Earlier this year, we saw the implementation of three new national labour laws, and now we have the introduction of collective bargaining in Shenzhen. This has all come from two factors: the growing determination of Chinese workers to stand up for their rights, and the government's willingness to respond in a practical and positive manner,” he said.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby NRao » 21 Sep 2008 06:15

why do you insist that a war with China in Tibet will have to be offensive?


Only as a FYI, and, not really meant to address the above question.

I have a friend who retired from the IA long back - as a Captain. He used to say, and I am not sure if he holds this position today, that the IA can open a 2nd front any where it pleases. And, that they would "land with tooth picks" when they start a 2nd front.

So, IF the IA starts an offense in Tibet, it may not come from the Indian border with Tibet.

I recall talk or discussions of a "front" from northern China - though clearly it would not be a surprise.

JMTs.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 21 Sep 2008 09:38

RayC wrote:I will leave it that India is aware of it.

Do you really feel that India has no plans to counter it?

RayC sir, we are mostly chairmarshalls in BR and we indulge in speculation and timepass in order to feel useful. If we were to assume that our soldiers and netas had all fields covered and we need not worry about anything, where would the fun be in visting BR and shooting the breeze? Have pity on us and allow us the speculation that maybe, just maybe, the IA could be caught unawares.

Of course we know that India is "aware of it" and certainly has plans to "counter it" where "it" is occupation of Tawang town by:

* massive airdrops, either heliborne or by transports.

* overwhelming ground attack.

* decimation of Tawang Gompa that can be blamed on India.

However, at least this observer has seen nothing on the ground in or near Tawang town that could stop a massive air or helibourne assault. It is entirely possible that these assets are hidden perhaps.

vivek_ahuja wrote:There is nothing easy about such an aerial interdiction campaign within the mountains.
OK, vivek, it is not "easy" but the IAF in the NE is certainly capable of disrupting, if not pulverizing, Chinese logistics in a specific theater (Tawang), specially in the mountains where there are only a limited number of known access points that are presumably already zeroed in for quick treatment. ie. a large attack will likely come (or build) from the passes and the existing Chinese road (note singular).

What about the PLA's own arty and cruise missiles? If they attempt such a attack, don't you think the Indian Arty etc is the first thing they might attack on a large scale?
Exactly the point. Are we prepared? If not, what do we need to do? (BR timepass-speculation wise of course).

That looong airstrip near the border is meaningless.
This answer doesn't give me any comfort because it simply isn't the Chinese thing to build a long airstrip "just because". What does make sense is that it is designed for fully loaded heavy transports to build up enough power to take off at that altitude. Let's say that many large transports fly in and congregate at the strip, are quickly refuelled and take off heading for Tawang for a surprise drop. Will all be shot down? How many will it take to do the damage? This is just my line of paranoia as you can see but it makes sense to me. Our duty as chairmarshalls is to make sure not a single bloody chopper makes it through.

Even then, for such a scenario to happen, the IAF would have to simply roll over and die first, the IA's satellite Intel guys would have to be blind, the ground based air defenses would have to shut down their equipment and the IA Divisions in the region would have to turn their backs on the invading troops. In all, difficult to visualize...
Aah, now we're talking. I hope so too.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 21 Sep 2008 13:28

Victor wrote:This answer doesn't give me any comfort because it simply isn't the Chinese thing to build a long airstrip "just because". What does make sense is that it is designed for fully loaded heavy transports to build up enough power to take off at that altitude. Let's say that many large transports fly in and congregate at the strip, are quickly refuelled and take off heading for Tawang for a surprise drop. Will all be shot down? How many will it take to do the damage? This is just my line of paranoia as you can see but it makes sense to me. Our duty as chairmarshalls is to make sure not a single bloody chopper makes it through.


That airstrip you are referring to can indeed allow a fully loaded IL-76 to take off at high altitudes. But see, that's the point: the IL-76 has enough range to not need to be deployed so close to the border for this job. That was what I was trying to say. It can easily take off from low altitude bases far to the north, fly down, drop troops and fly back without needing to be refueled. The airstrip in Tibet is meant for peacetime resupply operations only.

As far as the numbers required, the PLAAF does not have the capability at the present time to deploy significant numbers of soldiers in a single go. You see, for the element of surprise to be there, they would have to get the majority of their stuff in in the first round. This includes men, supplies and equipment. They would have to scrounge every available transport for the job and even then it wouldn't be possible to airlift maybe a brigade or so. And this Op would be visible from satellites for days before it is mounted (if you know what you are looking for). Which is why the element of surprise is difficult to achieve. Finally, a massive fleet of transports bearing down towards the border is going to be like a magnet for every available IAF fighter in the region. If at best they can lift a brigade of men in one go, and the IAF destroys even half of them before they get there, and then the IA ground systems take over, the number of chinese soldiers that make it to the ground will be insignificant and disorganized to say the least. It will be a massacre.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby neerajb » 21 Sep 2008 14:23

RaviBg wrote:
Singha wrote:Alistair's macleans novels are great in learning about ships, and running repairs on damaged ships :twisted:
he had a genius for that line of craft. being scottish he usually had a gruff and capable scottish bosun in
each of his navals...and a couple of wet behind the years 3rd or 4th officer to add youth and inexperience
into the equation.

HMS Ulysses and South by Java Head have a good nautical content. growing up with such
books is what brought me eventually to BR...


Santorini and The golden rendevouz are pretty good naval books too. In fact, I have the full collection of McLean :D


Sometimes I really wonder how old are you people? :rotfl:

Cheers....

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 21 Sep 2008 19:21

vivek_ahuja wrote:
Victor wrote:This answer doesn't give me any comfort because it simply isn't the Chinese thing to build a long airstrip "just because". What does make sense is that it is designed for fully loaded heavy transports to build up enough power to take off at that altitude. Let's say that many large transports fly in and congregate at the strip, are quickly refuelled and take off heading for Tawang for a surprise drop. Will all be shot down? How many will it take to do the damage? This is just my line of paranoia as you can see but it makes sense to me. Our duty as chairmarshalls is to make sure not a single bloody chopper makes it through.


That airstrip you are referring to can indeed allow a fully loaded IL-76 to take off at high altitudes. But see, that's the point: the IL-76 has enough range to not need to be deployed so close to the border for this job. That was what I was trying to say. It can easily take off from low altitude bases far to the north, fly down, drop troops and fly back without needing to be refueled. The airstrip in Tibet is meant for peacetime resupply operations only.

As far as the numbers required, the PLAAF does not have the capability at the present time to deploy significant numbers of soldiers in a single go. You see, for the element of surprise to be there, they would have to get the majority of their stuff in in the first round. This includes men, supplies and equipment. They would have to scrounge every available transport for the job and even then it wouldn't be possible to airlift maybe a brigade or so. And this Op would be visible from satellites for days before it is mounted (if you know what you are looking for). Which is why the element of surprise is difficult to achieve. Finally, a massive fleet of transports bearing down towards the border is going to be like a magnet for every available IAF fighter in the region. If at best they can lift a brigade of men in one go, and the IAF destroys even half of them before they get there, and then the IA ground systems take over, the number of chinese soldiers that make it to the ground will be insignificant and disorganized to say the least. It will be a massacre.

-Vivek



Let me try a two-step scenario.

In the first step about 2/3 brigades of troops are airlfted to the above base within 2/3 days from North/South China. These augment the (let me asusme) a brigade or so of forces already present in that theatre. India becomes nervous, makes headline news and troops and aircraft are placed on alert.

Immediately after the above is completed, a squadron of transports take off - late at night to avoid Indian detection - to avoid Indian detection - from South /North China carrying about 2000 men bearing towards Tawang. Shortly before that a squadron of fighters are already on their way to the above air base. The fighters are refueled, maybe fresh pilots stationed there take over and become airborne just as the transports reach the Indian border. Now the transports have fighter protection. Before dawn, the air drop is completed - and simultaneously the main Chinese force - now 3/4 brigades strong - crosses the border and engages Indian forces and tries to meet up with the paratroopers.

Even if India detects the transports heading toward AP, India will hesitate to enter Chinese air space and shoot them down (filled with thousands of men and risk a certain war) especially if a war has not yet broken out. Note, "formally" the war only breaks out when the transports and their fighter escorts cross into Indian air space - at that instant there is only two or three minutes to Tawang. Offcourse paradrop itself can take quite a bit of time and there could be a massacre if IAF fighters overwhelm the Chinese escorts.

Once the paradrop has been completed the Chinese fighters return to where ever they came from - because the IAF / Brahmos / Prithvis would have rendered the base in-operational.

Then the length of the base then serves to rapidly inject forces into the theatre in the days prior to an attack.

Now either the Chinese succeed or they do not. If they succeed, then Tawang is gone for ever. If they fail, then, the Chinese immediately ask for cease fire and order their forces to withdraw and request India for negotiations.

Definitely, a large air base very close to Tawang is significant - it is obviously not to promote tourism.

The above is very speculative - it is the approximate thinking that may provide clues and motives.

One Solution: Maybe India needs a division strong rapid deployment mountain force stationed in north/central India (Agra?) to respond within hours to a rapid build-up in any mountain theatre prior to outbreak of war. (Akin to India's response in the Maldives many years ago.)

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 21 Sep 2008 20:11

rajrang wrote:Even if India detects the transports heading toward AP, India will hesitate to enter Chinese air space and shoot them down (filled with thousands of men and risk a certain war) especially if a war has not yet broken out. Note, "formally" the war only breaks out when the transports and their fighter escorts cross into Indian air space - at that instant there is only two or three minutes to Tawang. Offcourse paradrop itself can take quite a bit of time and there could be a massacre if IAF fighters overwhelm the Chinese escorts.


The above paragraph is what got me irritated. Do you honestly believe the Indian Armed forces to be that stupid? Do you think they will allow the PLAAF transports (even with fighter protection) to come that close to the border without having the entire eastern air command stacked up just north of Tawang themselves to prevent the direct path south?

Its that simple isn't it? If you say that war is not declared till the moment the Chinese transports cross the border then it works for the other side too. I can then say the IAF will be flying a massive line formation just inside our border and north of Tawang. Now if the Chinese transports want to push through, they have to go through the line of fighters to get to their destination.

Another thing: The concept of PLAAF fighter Ops in Tibet region is limited at best thanks to a variety of reasons. As a result, at this point it is even doubtful that they could beat the IAF comprehensively within weeks of the war let alone the first few hours assuming a clear cut OCA Campaign. If they are in their right minds, they won't even be thinking of transport escorts until much later in the game.

Also, suggest a better look at the topography and vegetation of the Tawang region. There are no decent areas for a paradrop anyway. Just hills and massive forests. Try paradropping into that and see what happens...

Finally, that airbase you refer to (correct me if I am referring to something else by mistake) has little infrastructure to handle more than a couple of IL-76 transports at a time. Attempting 2/3 Brigade stuff in as many days is impossible without a massive chain of inbound flights going back and forth. And you don't need to do that. The Il-76 is completely capable of launching from northern airbases with better infrastructure and less vulnerability assuming of course that the PLA Command has gone raving mad and has neglected all of the above points.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Rahul M » 21 Sep 2008 20:31

vivek, plz check your gmail a/c.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby malushahi » 21 Sep 2008 21:53

vivek_ahuja wrote:Also, suggest a better look at the topography and vegetation of the Tawang region. There are no decent areas for a paradrop anyway. Just hills and massive forests. Try paradropping into that and see what happens...


100% in agreement with you there.

vivek_ahuja wrote:Finally, that airbase you refer to (correct me if I am referring to something else by mistake) has little infrastructure to handle more than a couple of IL-76 transports at a time. Attempting 2/3 Brigade stuff in as many days is impossible without a massive chain of inbound flights going back and forth. And you don't need to do that. The Il-76 is completely capable of launching from northern airbases with better infrastructure and less vulnerability assuming of course that the PLA Command has gone raving mad and has neglected all of the above points.


That "airbase" currently hosts at least one round-trip Air China 757 everyday - recommend you do the math about how long it will take to build a brigade level strength at this frequency. Tourism-pitch apart, how many people would be really interested in trekking to the deepest gorge in the world? What would the satellites tell you about a silent buildup (in case it was happening)? Even if the flight frequency was increased to 2-3 757 flights a day what would that tell you over a period of 5-6 months?

Linzhi is the base for the 52 Mountain Brigade, specifically tasked for NEFA. And that "airbase" adds redundancy to their logistical chain - Highway 318 and QTR being the other route. The war in Arunachal will still be a war on boots, because as you have pointed out there is no incentive for the PLA to engage in air-war over Tibet. So one of the only hopes for IAF's long-legged birds would be to knock out the permafrost sections of QTR in the hopes that they cannot be built quickly enough.

While positioning for an imminent conflict, contrast the respective postures: the IAF Il-76s and Mi-26 working overtime (one would hope concurrently from Tejpur, Lilabari, Chabua, DoomDooma and Teju), long-hauling men and materiel; while the Chinese put finishing touches to their build-up (far lesser spikes in their buildup, may I point out). Kneejerk reaction along the lines of Op. Chequerboard - and then the Chinese machinery begins moving overtly.

If Linzhi is indeed such a freakish investment for PLAAF, do you mind sharing the raison d'etre for a belated awakening at DBO and Fuchke? Air campaign is just a small part of the realities in Arunachal sector, and if the men-in-know are indeed serious about the threat from the north, they must seriously consider upgrading at least Machuchka and Tuting, if not Along.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 21 Sep 2008 22:42

vivek_ahuja wrote:a massive fleet of transports bearing down towards the border is going to be like a magnet for every available IAF fighter in the region.

Agreed. Precisely because of this, would it not make more sense for them to head for and build up at that airport instead of heading straight for the Indian border from a thousand miles away? And then a few days later suddenly take off en masse for Tawang? That would not give the IAF enough time to make a difference, even with 24/7 patrolling and specially if the Chinese also have a swarm of Su-30s for escort.

Any assault on Tawang would be an all-out, brass-knuckled effort and they will throw everything at us, including an order to the pakis to take J&K and activate sleepers all over India. For India, it could be a multi-front war: Tawang, other parts of AP, Ladakh/Akshai Chin, J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan, jihadi sleepers etc, not to mention Bombay High and Trombay. So our response to any moves on Tawang needs to take this into consideration--make it a Lakshman Rekha, make sure the Chinese and pakis know that a joint attack will invite unacceptable damage to them and make it public in international fora. A mere tactical defence of Tawang, however robust, is not the answer.

Whether we are prepared or not, it is our raisin deiter on BR to shoot the breeze about these things. None of us have the power to more than tickle the top Indian brass with our paper soldiering.

BTW, Tawang is not mountainous and thick jungle. It is at an altitude where the vegetation is not "thick" and the terrain is a gentle valley. Eminently suitable for para drops. The surroundings are a different story--thick jungle to the south, bare mountains

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby malushahi » 21 Sep 2008 22:59

Victor wrote:BTW, Tawang is not mountainous and thick jungle. It is at an altitude where the vegetation is not "thick" and the terrain is a gentle valley. Eminently suitable for para drops. The surroundings are a different story--thick jungle to the south, bare mountains


I hope you understand that the context here is Tawang as a "sector" and not as a "town".

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 22 Sep 2008 02:00

Victor wrote:Precisely because of this, would it not make more sense for them to head for and build up at that airport instead of heading straight for the Indian border from a thousand miles away?


The thing is, building up at the airport (as in setting it up as a jump off point) means that since it is so close to the border, it is near to impossible to assemble a large enough fleet of transport aircraft in the air in a short enough time to maintain the surprise element. It will take hours to get them all assembled into the air and that will give the IAF time to prepare. Now if they launch from the north then they can use multiple airbases for simultaneous launch to allow for much shorter forming up times. And then because they would be far beyond IAF detection rradar ranges, their assembling in the air will not be detected, only their ingress would be detected. I repeat, it makes no sense whatsoever to assemble an airborne strike force at that forward airfield. Having said that, the base is being used for daily resupply operations just like DBO etc on our side.

Victor wrote:BTW, Tawang is not mountainous and thick jungle. It is at an altitude where the vegetation is not "thick" and the terrain is a gentle valley. Eminently suitable for para drops. The surroundings are a different story--thick jungle to the south, bare mountains


But para-dropping an entire airborne force at once cannot be done on those small patches. You need extremely large relatively flat areas of land for such a job unless it is a piecemeal insertion process, which would be impossible. I think Malushahi has already said this: think of the sector, not the town perimeter.

malushahi wrote:If Linzhi is indeed such a freakish investment for PLAAF, do you mind sharing the raison d'etre for a belated awakening at DBO and Fuchke? Air campaign is just a small part of the realities in Arunachal sector, and if the men-in-know are indeed serious about the threat from the north, they must seriously consider upgrading at least Machuchka and Tuting, if not Along.


Like I said above, you and I are talking two different things with regard to that airbase. Of course it is used for logistics, just like our DBO etc, but it is not nearly an ideal location for a jump-off point for an airborne assualt. These two are very different things!

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 22 Sep 2008 02:28

vivek_ahuja wrote:
rajrang wrote:Even if India detects the transports heading toward AP, India will hesitate to enter Chinese air space and shoot them down (filled with thousands of men and risk a certain war) especially if a war has not yet broken out. Note, "formally" the war only breaks out when the transports and their fighter escorts cross into Indian air space - at that instant there is only two or three minutes to Tawang. Offcourse paradrop itself can take quite a bit of time and there could be a massacre if IAF fighters overwhelm the Chinese escorts.


The above paragraph is what got me irritated. Do you honestly believe the Indian Armed forces to be that stupid? Do you think they will allow the PLAAF transports (even with fighter protection) to come that close to the border without having the entire eastern air command stacked up just north of Tawang themselves to prevent the direct path south?

Its that simple isn't it? If you say that war is not declared till the moment the Chinese transports cross the border then it works for the other side too. I can then say the IAF will be flying a massive line formation just inside our border and north of Tawang. Now if the Chinese transports want to push through, they have to go through the line of fighters to get to their destination.

Another thing: The concept of PLAAF fighter Ops in Tibet region is limited at best thanks to a variety of reasons. As a result, at this point it is even doubtful that they could beat the IAF comprehensively within weeks of the war let alone the first few hours assuming a clear cut OCA Campaign. If they are in their right minds, they won't even be thinking of transport escorts until much later in the game.

Also, suggest a better look at the topography and vegetation of the Tawang region. There are no decent areas for a paradrop anyway. Just hills and massive forests. Try paradropping into that and see what happens...

Finally, that airbase you refer to (correct me if I am referring to something else by mistake) has little infrastructure to handle more than a couple of IL-76 transports at a time. Attempting 2/3 Brigade stuff in as many days is impossible without a massive chain of inbound flights going back and forth. And you don't need to do that. The Il-76 is completely capable of launching from northern airbases with better infrastructure and less vulnerability assuming of course that the PLA Command has gone raving mad and has neglected all of the above points.

-Vivek



I was not suggesting that the Indian Armed Forces are stupid - has to do with detection. Are your sure that an airborne forces of 1000 - 2000 SF men in about a dozen transports taking off from - let us say - two locations in N and S China and converging toward AP will be detected with 100% certainty? If the answer is YES, then, surely the IAF will be able to disrupt the para drop. Otherwise, you cannot dismiss the spirit behind this scenario as nonsense.

I had painted a strawman scenario - maybe someone with more military experience in this forum can modify it and make it closer to reality. The pimary thought is a swift Chinese strike at Tawang.

By the way, throughout history, pivotal battles / wars have been won or lost through errors of judgement. History is also full of surprise attacks. To give examples - not connected with moutain warfare though - in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, within hours the Arabs lost much of their air force. Could that have been prevented? Even the 1962 war involved mistakes. King Porus allowed Alexander to cross the Jhelum river. Coudl he have stopped Alexander? Indian rulers did not build a "Great Wall of Afghanistan" to stop thousands of years of invasions. Maybe we could write a book about Indian (and every other country's) military errors. It will be a voluminous book.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 22 Sep 2008 02:41

rajrang wrote:I was not suggesting that the Indian Armed Forces are stupid - has to do with detection. Are your sure that an airborne forces of 1000 - 2000 SF men in about a dozen transports taking off from - let us say - two locations in N and S China and converging toward AP will be detected with 100% certainty? If the answer is YES, then, surely the IAF will be able to disrupt the para drop. Otherwise, you cannot dismiss the spirit behind this scenario as nonsense.


I apologize for the strong words I might have used or the tone in which it might have portrayed. There is no dismissal of the scenario, just the parameters that you had used. Simply put, they had been applied for one side only and that is certainly not the case.

On a side-note, the possibility of missing out such a fleet of very large transport aircraft approaching the border with possible fighter escort would involve a very very severe failure from multiple independent sources on the Indian side. Difficult to see how that could happen.

The pimary thought is a swift Chinese strike at Tawang.


Now that is certainly possible, but by other means. Also, I should admit that just because it is doomed to fail does not necessarily mean that the Chinese won't try, right? It depends on how they look at things from their perspective.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 22 Sep 2008 04:17

One of the problems in mountainous areas is the difficulty of detecting aircraft, particularly choppers, if they approach in the radar shadows (ie. valleys, gorges etc) over their own territory. Using these shadows, it might be possible for the Chinese to get close enough to Tawang to spring a surprise. An AWACS would have the best chance of detecting such a sneak attack since it can see better into these valleys and gorges from high above.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby vivek_ahuja » 22 Sep 2008 04:26

Victor wrote:One of the problems in mountainous areas is the difficulty of detecting aircraft, particularly choppers, if they approach in the radar shadows (ie. valleys, gorges etc) over their own territory. Using these shadows, it might be possible for the Chinese to get close enough to Tawang to spring a surprise. An AWACS would have the best chance of detecting such a sneak attack since it can see better into these valleys and gorges from high above.


Aircraft of sizes such as the IL-76 cannot unfortunately maneuver nimbly enough to fly in valleys. It is one of the reason as to why the landings and take-off from airbases such as Leh are carefully scripted and relatively dangerous. Smaller aircraft might be able to fly in valleys but lack endurance, range and payload capacity to be of use for anything bigger than a special forces team. Finally, in order to get into the valleys north of Tawang, the aircraft has to go through the Great Himalayan range and there it has to fly over the massive peaks, amply announcing its presence to any airborne radar nearby.

Choppers could go through, but again, the numbers required are enormous as also the IA is bound to have these paths covered by MANPADS and triple-A systems deployed in the hills. Some choppers might break through, but most others will not, defeating the overall purpose.

-Vivek

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 22 Sep 2008 05:36

vivek_ahuja wrote:
rajrang wrote:I was not suggesting that the Indian Armed Forces are stupid - has to do with detection. Are your sure that an airborne forces of 1000 - 2000 SF men in about a dozen transports taking off from - let us say - two locations in N and S China and converging toward AP will be detected with 100% certainty? If the answer is YES, then, surely the IAF will be able to disrupt the para drop. Otherwise, you cannot dismiss the spirit behind this scenario as nonsense.


On a side-note, the possibility of missing out such a fleet of very large transport aircraft approaching the border with possible fighter escort would involve a very very severe failure from multiple independent sources on the Indian side. Difficult to see how that could happen.

The pimary thought is a swift Chinese strike at Tawang.


Now that is certainly possible, but by other means. Also, I should admit that just because it is doomed to fail does not necessarily mean that the Chinese won't try, right? It depends on how they look at things from their perspective.

-Vivek


It is reassuring to hear your viewpoint that only a severe failure on the Indian side would result in missing the dozen or so transports (the escorts will join them only in the final minutes). Thanks.

In any case, I also wonder if India should have a rapid deployment brigade of mountain forces who can be rushed within hours to counter a sudden Chinese move into India.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby satya » 22 Sep 2008 11:31

In any case, I also wonder if India should have a rapid deployment brigade of mountain forces who can be rushed within hours to counter a sudden Chinese move into India.


You must be joking to get a quick reaction brigade within hrs to respond. Things dont work this way in Army . A brigade need atleast 3-4 days at min. after being given order .

Do check about the number of Quick Reaction force brigades NATO-US had in europe , it should give you an idea about how difficult it is to maintain a QRF round the clock logistically and manpower pov .

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby rajrang » 23 Sep 2008 05:51

satya wrote:
In any case, I also wonder if India should have a rapid deployment brigade of mountain forces who can be rushed within hours to counter a sudden Chinese move into India.


You must be joking to get a quick reaction brigade within hrs to respond. Things dont work this way in Army . A brigade need atleast 3-4 days at min. after being given order .

Do check about the number of Quick Reaction force brigades NATO-US had in europe , it should give you an idea about how difficult it is to maintain a QRF round the clock logistically and manpower pov .



How come India responded within hours in the Maldives? I do not mean an entire brigade, even several hundred special forces men could make a big difference until reinforcements arrive
.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby satya » 23 Sep 2008 15:24

How come India responded within hours in the Maldives?


IA had been provided intel b4hand and enemy forces in Maldives were lightly armed and very small in number to name a few things . Dont expect PLA to send lightly armed a few hundred numbers with no back up and no air cover . No more on this issue but pls dont compare IA's perfromance in Maldives as a bencmark , things are a lot different on Eastern front .
I do not mean an entire brigade, even several hundred special forces men could make a big difference until reinforcements arrive



Special forces are not some 'RAM- BAAN' or a specialised infantry ( as u r suggesting from the role they should play ) tht will do holding up operation till re-enforcements arrive , this goes against the very basic purpose of SFs . Also there are more than enough Indian forces in form of IA-ITBP-SSB to do a holding operation .

Again do a simple arithmetic ,on how many troops u need under a Quick-reaction force and for which sector and wht sort of logistics it will require and still how much time it will need to respond in a Mountain terrain.

In recent Tibet uprising , PLA was able to offer a brigade only and tht too in a week from its Quick Reaction Force to help control the situation in Tibet . Should give you an hint , how much time even a 'QRF' designated brigade needs , now imagine how many days a regular Army brigade may need to be battle ready .

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Anshul » 23 Sep 2008 17:52

In recent Tibet uprising , PLA was able to offer a brigade only and tht too in a week from its Quick Reaction Force to help control the situation in Tibet .


That too with great road and rail infra on the other side of the border.Our mules and mule tracks are going to take about a fortnight.So PLA can can actually afford to acclimatise the troops within AP while they dig in and wait for IA to respond.

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Lalmohan » 24 Sep 2008 14:35

rajrang - you also need to think about the weapons that your QRF will need to hold an advance. What will that advance consist of?

a very educational experience can be attained if you analyse the performance of British paratroopers at Arnhem against German SS Panzer Divisions. In short - the paras were required to rush quickly in and hold a key bridge against lightly armed opposition. unfortunately, the Panzer Division was in the locality (missed by intel) resting and refitting and were able to move quickly into counter attack. lacking heavy weapons and regular resupply, the lightly armed paratroopers were overcome after a few days of very gallant fighting with very high casualties - but it was obvious that LMG's, stens and light mortars was not going to hold back APC's and tanks for very long despite the advantages of urban combat and a large river in between

think about the NE border areas, the altitude, the supply lines on either side - and whom you'd like to send for martyrdom

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Anshul » 24 Sep 2008 16:56

Lalmohan wrote:rajrang - you also need to think about the weapons that your QRF will need to hold an advance. What will that advance consist of?

a very educational experience can be attained if you analyse the performance of British paratroopers at Arnhem against German SS Panzer Divisions. In short - the paras were required to rush quickly in and hold a key bridge against lightly armed opposition. unfortunately, the Panzer Division was in the locality (missed by intel) resting and refitting and were able to move quickly into counter attack. lacking heavy weapons and regular resupply, the lightly armed paratroopers were overcome after a few days of very gallant fighting with very high casualties - but it was obvious that LMG's, stens and light mortars was not going to hold back APC's and tanks for very long despite the advantages of urban combat and a large river in between

think about the NE border areas, the altitude, the supply lines on either side - and whom you'd like to send for martyrdom


A Bridge Too Far...would give everybody visual cues on this topic

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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby NRao » 24 Sep 2008 17:52

Not a Tibet related article, but perhaps the best place to post it.

NYTimes :: Land of Gandhi Asserts Itself as Global Military Power

By ANAND GIRIDHARADAS
Published: September 21, 2008
MUMBAI, India — The Mumbai, an Indian warship, was slicing through choppy monsoon seas one recent morning when a helicopter swooped in overhead. Commandos slithered down a rope, seizing control of the destroyer.

It was a drill, Indian soldiers taking over an Indian ship. But the purpose was to train them to seize other countries’ ships in distant oceans, a sign of a new military assertiveness for the world’s second-most-populous nation.

India, which gave the world the idea of Gandhian nonviolence, has long derided the force-projecting ways of the great powers. It focused its own military on self-defense against two neighbors, Pakistan and China.

But in recent years, while world attention has focused on China’s military, India has begun to refashion itself as an armed power with global reach: a power willing and able to dispatch troops thousands of miles from the subcontinent to protect its oil shipments and trade routes, to defend its large expatriate population in the Middle East and to shoulder international peacekeeping duties.

“India sees itself in a different light — not looking so much inward and looking at Pakistan, but globally,” said William S. Cohen, a secretary of defense in the Clinton administration who in his new role as a lobbyist represents American firms seeking weapons contracts in India. “It’s sending a signal that it’s going to be a big player.”

India is buying armaments that major powers like the United States use to operate far from home: aircraft carriers, giant C-130J transport planes and airborne refueling tankers. Meanwhile, India has helped to build a small air base in Tajikistan that it will share with its host country. It is modern India’s first military outpost on foreign soil.

India also appears to be positioning itself as a caretaker and patroller of the Indian Ocean region, which stretches from Africa’s coast to Australia’s and from the subcontinent southward to Antarctica.

“Ten years from now, India could be a real provider of security to all the ocean islands in the Indian Ocean,” said Ashley J. Tellis, an Indian-born scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington who has also been an adviser to the Bush administration. “It could become a provider of security in the Persian Gulf in collaboration with the U.S. I would think of the same being true with the Central Asian states.”

“India,” he added, “is slowly maturing into a conventional great power.”

Middle-aged Indians remember a time when their country would watch thousands of Indians in jeopardy in a foreign land and know that there was nothing their military could do.

But in 2006, when conflict between Israel and Hezbollah threatened Indian expatriates in Lebanon, four Indian warships happened to be in the Mediterranean. The navy rushed the vessels to Lebanon and brought more than 2,000 people on board, not only Indians, but Sri Lankans, Nepalese and Lebanese eager to escape the fighting.

Two years earlier, when a tsunami throttled Asia, including this country’s own southern coast, the Indian Navy dispatched 16,000 troops, 32 warships, 41 planes and a floating hospital for rescue operations, according to news accounts.

Such changes bring pride to many Indians. But some also fear that India may become the kind of swaggering power it has opposed since it became independent from Britain in 1947.

“Immediately after independence, true, we had to engage ourselves for developing our country — economically, politically — because we were exploited under colonial rule for more than 200 years,” Pranab Mukherjee, India’s foreign minister, said in an interview.

Now, he said, things have changed: “Naturally, a country of this size, a population of this size — we will be required to strengthen our security forces, modernize them, update them, upgrade our technology.”

“We are ready to play a more responsible role,” he added, “but we don’t want to impose ourselves on others.”

Indian military planning is still heavily focused on China and Pakistan, against both of which the country has fought wars. China, whose own military expansion outstrips India’s, has not sounded public warnings about India’s military modernization. But Pakistan is more critical.

Pakistani officials “are paying attention to Indian plans to project India outside the South Asian region,” said Hasan Askari Rizvi, a leading Pakistani expert on that country’s military.

India’s buildup has several overlapping motivations. It now trades vigorously with the world, most critically in oil. It has bought oil fields or engaged in exploration in Iran, Iraq, Libya, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Vietnam and beyond. Not coincidentally, it has demonstrated a new interest in keeping the sea lanes through which that oil and other wares sail free of pirates and militants.

A more robust military is also vital for protecting millions of Indian workers in the Persian Gulf, who are from time to time threatened by political volatility. But the most pressing motivation may be the fast-moving Chinese.

China has sought to develop a powerful air force and navy that can extend far beyond its shores. It has been increasing its military budget rapidly and plans to spend $60 billion on its armed forces in 2008, according to the government budget. The Pentagon estimates that China’s actual military spending is much higher, perhaps twice the officially budgeted amount, as much as seven times India’s defense outlay.

Beijing has alarmed Indian commanders by courting allies in India’s neighborhood. Indians are particularly upset by what they say are Chinese-built military bases in Gwadar, Pakistan; Chittagong, Bangladesh; and Yangon, Myanmar.

“There seems to be an emerging long-term competition between India and China for pre-eminence in the region,” said Jacqueline Newmyer, president of the Long Term Strategy Group, a research institute in Cambridge, Mass., and a security consultant to the United States government. “India is preparing slowly to claim its place as a pre-eminent power, and in the meantime China is working to complicate that for India.”

India has worked to close the gap with China by spending heavily on modern arms. Analysts estimate that India could spend as much as $40 billion on military modernization in the next five years. What is most striking is how many of the weapons are designed for operations far from home.

Among the more notable purchases are six IL-78 airborne tankers, which can refuel three jets simultaneously and allow the air force to fly as far as Alaska.

Other armaments recently acquired or in the pipeline include naval destroyers, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers and the C-130J transport planes that are a staple of long-range conflicts.

You don’t need C-130s for Pakistan,” said Mr. Tellis, the Bush administration adviser.

A telling sign of India’s plans lies in Tajikistan, a nation between Afghanistan and China in Central Asia. Not far from Dushanbe, the capital, India has worked with Tajik authorities to build an air base and has stationed helicopters there.

Ms. Newmyer, of Long Term Strategy Group, called the arrangement “a big deal,” not least because of the change of mindset it reflects. “Having overseas bases is a marker of an imperial kind of capability,” she said. “India is thought of as a power that was colonized, not a power that puts its own boots on the ground in permanent bases in other countries.”

In a speech in India’s Parliament this summer, a rising political star spoke of a change in civilian thinking that helps explain the change in military strategy.

“What is important,” said Rahul Gandhi, 8) the heir to the family dynasty that controls the governing Congress Party, “is that we stop worrying about how the world will impact us, we stop being scared about how the world will impact us, and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.”

Victor
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Re: War inside Tibet - goals, strategies and equipment

Postby Victor » 24 Sep 2008 19:56

Methinks the question we need to answer wrt AP is: "can the Chinese occupy Tawang town for even a couple of days?"
If the answer is "yes", then it's game over--Tawang Gompa can be destroyed, its destruction will be blamed on India and they will then withdraw. ie. they can say "in order to resolve a minor territorial dispute, India has destroyed the Tibetan place of worship" etc, etc. Of course it will not be believed by anyone but that does not change the fact on the ground.

We need to be able to answer a confident "no" to the above question. Failing that, we need to have a counter move that will hurt them to an equally huge degree. Maybe we should start leaking stories to the press and the Tibetan diaspora right now speculationg that the Chinese intention is to destroy Tawang Gompa to take it out of the equation.


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