Newbie Corner & Military Miscellaneous

anirban_aim · Post by **anirban_aim** » 04 Jun 2010 12:30

Rahul M wrote:jet engine I think.

And when the teacher asks how does a Jet engine starts??

We'll say: Shooo....zzzzz....whaaaa..... like that.

eh Rahul da good one that "jet engine"

kash · Post by **kash** » 04 Jun 2010 13:23

anirban_aim..

i knew that that the GE F 404 is being used at present.. since there is a need for more dry thrust.. we were looking to import 100 GE F 414 or the Eurojet EJ200 which provide more thrust and also the LCA wont be needing a major airframe design change.... so i was actually wonder whether these new engines are being used now.. any ways i shall post in the LCA forum..

Thank you

Tanaji · Post by **Tanaji** » 04 Jun 2010 21:33

I had asked this question on the helicopters thread before:

If the LCH is supposed to come in soon, why is India floating a tender for attack helicopters.

someone replied that it is because the contenders for the tender (Mi28 and Ah-64) belong to a different class. I have been looking at

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ah-64
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HAL_Light_ ... Helicopter

I am dumb and stupid so the "different class" is not readily apparent to me. Both seem to have comparable parameters?

Can any expert clarify?

vardhank · Post by **vardhank** » 04 Jun 2010 22:22

^^I could be completely wrong (hey, look at the 'trainee' tag

) but I believe the main point of the LCH is that it can fight at very high altitudes, which I don't think any of the other major attack choppers can. It appears the parameter-setters were all right with giving away a little in terms of pure firepower (the Apache for example is larger and thus, I expect, can carry more and larger weapons), for the ability to be able to fight in Ladakh at all. Different horses for different courses.
One other possibility is bet-hedging: the IAF weren't certain the LCH would make it, or make it soon enough, and wanted to keep its armoury full. Or, heck, it could be just what some people think the MMRCA tender is: a chance to lift the skirts of the best equipment for a certain task, and get our boys to match it. Zimple onlee!

Venkarl · Post by **Venkarl** » 04 Jun 2010 22:36

Venkarl wrote:India expanding military nuclear site: US think tank

Saw this in BRF news section..I want to know if there is any discussion going on this subject.

TIA
Venkat

Is it forbidden to talk about this subject on BRF? I tried skimming through BRF threads...found none discussing this...please post the thread which discusses this subject..its a humble request...please.

TIA
Venkat

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Jun 2010 22:39

tanaji ji, if the LCH was ready for induction today I don't think we would have had a attack chopper competition. this competition was intended as a replacement for the Mi-25/35 which are currently used to add punch to the strike corps. sure, the LCH is not as hi-end as the larger apache for instance(it lacks the radar for example) but it would probably have been able to get the job done almost as well.

however, I think there is some hedging involved in this decision as vardhank says, the hinds are getting long in the tooth and our attack helo assets are anyway on the lower side. hence the need to get some ASAP till the LCH comes into service, which could be 3-4 years. personally, I don't think it is that bad an idea to get some heavy cavalry in the form of apache or Mi-28.

________________________________
no venkarl, it's not forbidden.

Venkarl · Post by **Venkarl** » 04 Jun 2010 23:15

Rahul M wrote:no venkarl, it's not forbidden.

can I expect more from you on this Master?? ....anyways...thanks.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 05 Jun 2010 07:00

Venkarl wrote:
Venkarl wrote:India expanding military nuclear site: US think tank

Saw this in BRF news section..I want to know if there is any discussion going on this subject.

TIA
Venkat
Is it forbidden to talk about this subject on BRF? I tried skimming through BRF threads...found none discussing this...please post the thread which discusses this subject..its a humble request...please.

TIA
Venkat

What did you want to discuss about it? Is there anything new or significant to discuss?

Venkarl · Post by **Venkarl** » 05 Jun 2010 18:53

rama rama...Shiv garu... me still an infant here on BRF....I wanted to read what the reigning kings of BRF talk on this subject....request was for self educational purpose...should I have been more humble in asking?

I checked Indian nuclear, Disruptive tech, Indo-US etc threads for such discussions....so far found none...and invisible to my eye..

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 06 Jun 2010 01:53

PratikDas wrote:
Misraji wrote:^^^
....
Furthemore, if you want to protect the cities, why again would we be looking at ship-based ABM?? Wouldn't
fixed sites serve the purpose. And then its no longer boost phase interception is it?
The ideas that have been expressed above are nothing fancy.
These things might actually be better explained in books rather than online forums.
....
The point of being off the coast is to be hundreds of kilometers closer to the possible point of launch - somewhere in the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal. Since the area wouldn't be within India's territorial waters, you wouldn't be able to station something there permanently - you'd need to have the ABM on a ship. This would increase your chances of a boost phase intercept.

Of course you can have everything hovering in the air all the time, but I think having it floating on the sea would not only bring your radar closer to the incoming missile, it would also give you the opportunity to take it out - as the first line of defence.

1. Why the fascination with Boost-phase? Even Aegis + RIM-161 is not a boost-phase system.
2. Why would we not be able to station something permanently in some area of the sea?
3. How big are Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal? Where would you put this ship-based BMD?
4. If its near the submarine launching the missile, it implies that you could track the submarine.
Then why not kill the submarine first rather than let it launch the missile and then try and take out
the missile?
5. Whats the difference between placing the ABM system in Mumbai versus the coast of Mumbai?

~Ashish.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 06 Jun 2010 02:04

Misraji wrote: ...
1. Why the fascination with Boost-phase? Even Aegis + RIM-161 is not a boost-phase system.
2. Why would we not be able to station something permanently in some area of the sea?
3. How big are Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal? Where would you put this ship-based BMD?
4. If its near the submarine launching the missile, it implies that you could track the submarine.
Then why not kill the submarine first rather than let it launch the missile and then try and take out
the missile?
5. Whats the difference between placing the ABM system in Mumbai versus the coast of Mumbai?

~Ashish.

1. I don't care what Aegis does. I'm interested in probabilities of intercept. Boost-phase intercepts get the missile before it can possibly deploy MIRVs.
2. As far as I understand, India doesn't own the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, but is allowed to pass through the international waters
3. Off the coast of the valuable targets, to detect the incoming missile sooner and to react with ABM sooner
4. Boost phase intercept is not compulsory! But getting the radar out in the waters, detecting the SLBM sooner, getting a lock sooner, and then utilising the lock to react immediately from the nearest platform - i.e. the ship with the radar certainly helps!
5. Radar range is extended, ABM range is extended.

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 06 Jun 2010 02:29

PratikDas wrote: 1. I don't care what Aegis does. I'm interested in probabilities of intercept. Boost-phase intercepts get the missile before it can possibly deploy MIRVs.
2. As far as I understand, India doesn't own the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, but is allowed to pass through the international waters
3. Off the coast of the valuable targets, to detect the incoming missile sooner and to react with ABM sooner
4. Boost phase intercept is not compulsory! But getting the radar out in the waters, detecting the SLBM sooner, getting a lock sooner, and then utilising the lock to react immediately from the nearest platform - i.e. the ship with the radar certainly helps!
5. Radar range is extended, ABM range is extended.

1. Unfortunately we would need to care about Aegis for the purposes of this discussion, wouldn't we? It is the only ship-based ABM deployed today. So it serves as a good model what is realistically achievable.

2. No. India doesn't own Arabian Sea. Neither does USN own atlantic or pacific. But try enforcing your actions on their carrier group. The idea is that we have enough power projection for Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. We maintain UAV, MRP, ship-based patrols in these waters. Its just not trivial to slip past them.

For eg: When the PLAN deployed warships to Somalian waters, they were tracked for the entire duration of passage in the Indian Ocean. We do have that capability.

3. Why does shooting down an SLBM make more sense than trailing the SSBN and killing it?
Both of them are apparently difficult tasks but the Navy is better equipped right now for protecting Indian waters.

4. a. Our ABM's LRTR is to have its range extended to 1500KM. There is not exactly any need to have it placed into the sea.
b. And how do we make sure that the ABM ship is near the launch point of the SLBM?
Bay of Bengal has an area of 2172000 km^2. How many ships do we need to protect the entire area?

5. Extending the radar's range does not imply ABM's range extending? You still have to kill it.
While detecting the missile as soon as possible is a good point, you still have the question of how to kill it.

The point being made is that fixed ABM makes more sense than ship-based ABM for the points listed above.

~Ashish.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 06 Jun 2010 02:52

Misraji wrote: ....
1. Unfortunately we would need to care about Aegis for the purposes of this discussion, wouldn't we? It is the only ship-based ABM deployed today. So it serves as a good model what is realistically achievable.
[Pratik] It is one model - and an old model. It doesn't constrain what IN chooses to do.
2. No. India doesn't own Arabian Sea. Neither does USN own atlantic or pacific. But try enforcing your actions on their carrier group. The idea is that we have enough power projection for Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. We maintain UAV, MRP, ship-based patrols in these waters. Its just not trivial to slip past them.

For eg: When the PLAN deployed warships to Somalian waters, they were tracked for the entire duration of passage in the Indian Ocean. We do have that capability.
[Pratik]Can you track every submarine? I'm talking about SLBM defence.
3. Why does shooting down an SLBM make more sense than trailing the SSBN and killing it?
Both of them are apparently difficult tasks but the Navy is better equipped right now for protecting Indian waters.
[Pratik]Major coastal cities are fewer in number than the number of submarines IN would have to follow, assuming IN knows about all Pak and PRC sub locations in the Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal
4. a. Our ABM's LRTR is to have its range extended to 1500KM. There is not exactly any need to have it placed into the sea.
[Pratik]Would we then be able to fire the ABM from 1500 km away? No the ABM missile doesn't have the range! We'd have to wait and watch the incoming missile get closer and faster, and possibly multiply into MIRVs. You keep ignoring this point.
b. And how do we make sure that the ABM ship is near the launch point of the SLBM?
Bay of Bengal has an area of 2172000 km^2. How many ships do we need to protect the entire area?
[Pratik]Stay on track. I said the ABM needs to be put offshore. When did I say the ABM needs to be all over the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal? There are a few coastal cities. The ABM range from these cities can be extended by 3 ABM platforms per city, to a distance determined by the ABM system range - which would be the minimum of the radar or missile.
5. Extending the radar's range does not imply ABM's range extending? You still have to kill it.
While detecting the missile as soon as possible is a good point, you still have the question of how to kill it.
[Pratik]Exactly why the ABM missile needs to be taken offshore to create a buffer between the incoming missile and the city being defended.
The point being made is that fixed ABM makes more sense than ship-based ABM for the points listed above.
[Pratik]Sorry. When India gets a 1500km PAD or AAD missile, you would have a point, but until then land-only ABM is the minimum requirement, not the exclusive requirement.
~Ashish.

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 06 Jun 2010 03:47

PratikDas wrote:
Misraji wrote: ....
1. Unfortunately we would need to care about Aegis for the purposes of this discussion, wouldn't we? It is the only ship-based ABM deployed today. So it serves as a good model what is realistically achievable.
[Pratik] It is one model - and an old model. It doesn't constrain what IN chooses to do.
2. No. India doesn't own Arabian Sea. Neither does USN own atlantic or pacific. But try enforcing your actions on their carrier group. The idea is that we have enough power projection for Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. We maintain UAV, MRP, ship-based patrols in these waters. Its just not trivial to slip past them.

For eg: When the PLAN deployed warships to Somalian waters, they were tracked for the entire duration of passage in the Indian Ocean. We do have that capability.
[Pratik]Can you track every submarine? I'm talking about SLBM defence.
3. Why does shooting down an SLBM make more sense than trailing the SSBN and killing it?
Both of them are apparently difficult tasks but the Navy is better equipped right now for protecting Indian waters.
[Pratik]Major coastal cities are fewer in number than the number of submarines IN would have to follow, assuming IN knows about all Pak and PRC sub locations in the Arabian Sea or Bay of Bengal
4. a. Our ABM's LRTR is to have its range extended to 1500KM. There is not exactly any need to have it placed into the sea.
[Pratik]Would we then be able to fire the ABM from 1500 km away? No the ABM missile doesn't have the range! We'd have to wait and watch the incoming missile get closer and faster, and possibly multiply into MIRVs. You keep ignoring this point.
b. And how do we make sure that the ABM ship is near the launch point of the SLBM?
Bay of Bengal has an area of 2172000 km^2. How many ships do we need to protect the entire area?
[Pratik]Stay on track. I said the ABM needs to be put offshore. When did I say the ABM needs to be all over the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal? There are a few coastal cities. The ABM range from these cities can be extended by 3 ABM platforms per city, to a distance determined by the ABM system range - which would be the minimum of the radar or missile.
5. Extending the radar's range does not imply ABM's range extending? You still have to kill it.
While detecting the missile as soon as possible is a good point, you still have the question of how to kill it.
[Pratik]Exactly why the ABM missile needs to be taken offshore to create a buffer between the incoming missile and the city being defended.
The point being made is that fixed ABM makes more sense than ship-based ABM for the points listed above.
[Pratik]Sorry. When India gets a 1500km PAD or AAD missile, you would have a point, but until then land-only ABM is the minimum requirement, not the exclusive requirement.
~Ashish.

1. Of-course it does. We don't even have technology for Aegis-like capability yet. Something that they have had from late
1980s. How are we supposed to conjure up something that you propose and in what time frame?

2. Yes. We can track every SSBN. That is what is attempted in real life. Sovient navy maintained a maximum of 13-14 SSBNs on
patrol. Britain and France maintain one each at any given time. China. Lets leave China out of this. A grand total of less than 10
patrols per year in their coastal waters. Plus their subs are so noisy that you could probably hear them out of water. And
how many do they have any way?? One Type-094 sub and two being outfitted. And the range of their missile is 8000km.
So they don't have that many SSBNs and those that are, will stay in Chinese controlled waters because they don't need to
venture out.

3. Same as above.
BTW, is your point to have the missiles on ships to protect the coastal city irrespective of the launch point of the SLBM? \
Then how is it boost-phase?

4.a. I am not ignoring any point. The idea is to drop the idea of being able to protect the entire country and protect the vital
installations and cities. That is what the current technology is capable off. Even US does that with its Alaska based
interceptors. Its ship-based interceptors are supposed to work when the ship is near the missile's launch point (for NK,
Iran etc thats a land-based weapon). And we cannot put our capital ships near Chinese backwaters.

4.b. Yes I recognize the fact there is no 1500km BMD missile. I thought you were the one suggesting ship-based
ABM for boost-phase defense while recognizing the fact that the missile is gonna be short-ranged.
Hence the question. If its boost-phase, then it needs to be near the launch point of the slbm and not the coastal city
being protected. Hence the question. How many such ships are we gonna need?

5. ----

Location of the tracking radar vs interceptor position vs boost-phase interception is all getting very
confusing.
Can you recap exactly what you propose of where the radar should be, the interceptors position, boost-phase vs
non boost-phase , and current technology ?

~Ashish.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 06 Jun 2010 04:23

^^^^^
Before you get a centralise your critique around the boost phase idea, read what I have said:

...you'd need to have the ABM on a ship. This would increase your chances of a boost phase intercept.

The point is that you're not going to guarantee boost-phase intercept, but you can increase the chances of doing that.

4. Boost phase intercept is not compulsory! But getting the radar out in the waters, detecting the SLBM sooner, getting a lock sooner, and then utilising the lock to react immediately from the nearest platform - i.e. the ship with the radar certainly helps!

Did you even read this? No matter what the range of the radar in the near future, having the ABM on the ship will bring it closer to the incoming missile. Without an on-ship radar, coordinating a land-based radar with a ship-based ABM missile is definitely possible but having an additional on-ship radar will help and make the task easier.

5. Radar range is extended, ABM range is extended.

This is undeniable, no matter what the range of the radar or the ABM missile.

My central point of view is that no ABM system gives 100% guarantees and launching ABMs from land only leaves too less time for a 2nd or 3rd attempt if the first fails. Getting the ABM offshore, in addition to land-based ABM, gives an extra buffer of protection determined by the range of the ABM.

I haven't claimed anywhere that offshore ABM will guarantee nationwide security. I'm not sure how you inferred that.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 06 Jun 2010 06:30

>>...you'd need to have the ABM on a ship. This would increase your chances of a boost phase intercept.
>>>>The point is that you're not going to guarantee boost-phase intercept, but you can increase the chances of doing that.

no Pratik, it won't. you are only going to increase the chances of your ABM equipped ships being taken out if you deploy in that way. what is the range of PLAN SLBMs ? what is the distance of mumbai(say) from south china sea ? why do you have this idea that PLAN SSBNs are going to launch off the coast of mumbai, kolkata etc ? PLAN anyway employs something called the bastion strategy, the SSBN will stay inside waters sanitised by PLAN. to deploy an ABM ship there we will have to take out the whole PLAN surface fleet and subs, an impossible thing to do in their backyard. even in that case we won't know where to look and aim with our ABM systems. for argument's sake, even if we successfully deploy a shipbased ABM system in s.china sea, PLAN SSBN can easily relocate to somewhere else, with no one the wiser.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 06 Jun 2010 06:52

^^^^ Alright. I assume that you are convinced the "string of pearls" are for commerce and humanitarian purposes?

Added later: I don't mean this as a knock. I just thought the "encirclement" was supposed to amount to something.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 06 Jun 2010 06:57

let's assume I know nothing about SoP. you tell me what SoP strategy means for us with specifics, what platforms, deployed where and how would IN counter it.

you also need to explain why PLAN would want to deploy their SSBN in our backyard where they are much more vulnerable rather than in their own backyard where PLAN surface fleet, PLANAF and even PLAAF can help protect them.

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 06 Jun 2010 07:29

PratikDas wrote:^^^^^
Before you get a centralise your critique around the boost phase idea, read what I have said:
...you'd need to have the ABM on a ship. This would increase your chances of a boost phase intercept.
The point is that you're not going to guarantee boost-phase intercept, but you can increase the chances of doing that.
4. Boost phase intercept is not compulsory! But getting the radar out in the waters, detecting the SLBM sooner, getting a lock sooner, and then utilising the lock to react immediately from the nearest platform - i.e. the ship with the radar certainly helps!
Did you even read this? No matter what the range of the radar in the near future, having the ABM on the ship will bring it closer to the incoming missile. Without an on-ship radar, coordinating a land-based radar with a ship-based ABM missile is definitely possible but having an additional on-ship radar will help and make the task easier.
5. Radar range is extended, ABM range is extended.
This is undeniable, no matter what the range of the radar or the ABM missile.

My central point of view is that no ABM system gives 100% guarantees and launching ABMs from land only leaves too less time for a 2nd or 3rd attempt if the first fails. Getting the ABM offshore, in addition to land-based ABM, gives an extra buffer of protection determined by the range of the ABM.

I haven't claimed anywhere that offshore ABM will guarantee nationwide security. I'm not sure how you inferred that.

Fine. Lets assume that we are not looking at boost-phase interception.
But we do have to agree about the following things:
1. Chinese SSBNs wont leave their backwaters(because they don't need to).
2. If they do leave chinese bastions, the real-life strategy is to trail them and kill them.
3. Aegis+RIM serve as a model for what can be achieved by ship-based ABM.
4. Aegis-equipped ships are positioned near hostile countries.

If the above 4 things are not in contention, then we have two reasons why we cannot have ship-based ABM.

1. Now, if chinese SSBNs do not leave their backwaters, why are our coastal cities specifically in danger.
They are not.
There are more important inland installations to be safeguarded and a land-based ABM will do the job.
Ship-based ABM is not needed.

2. We cannot operate our principle combatants in chinese backwaters for the explicit role of missile defense.
China is not Iran or NK.
Even US will have a tough time doing this kind of thing.
Again ship-based ABM is not exactly the most pressing need.

The idea about ship-based ABM getting closer to anything is valid only if the incoming missile is travelling
over water. Its still a suspect idea because their altitude limitations on interceptors and the missile might
be out of altitude for the interceptor.

For eg: RIM has an altitude limitation of 150 miles. Googling shows that ICBMs can reach a maximum altitude
of 500-750 miles. Interception is not guaranteed.

However that ICBM has to eventually come down towards its target and thus such a limitation won't exist
for a land-based ABM protecting a specific location.

~Ashish

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 06 Jun 2010 07:35

PratikDas wrote:^^^^ Alright. I assume that you are convinced the "string of pearls" are for commerce and humanitarian purposes?

Added later: I don't mean this as a knock. I just thought the "encirclement" was supposed to amount to something.

that's ok, just that there is some misconception about what the SoP attempts to achieve and in what timeframe. right now they don't have much use beyond listening posts and intel stations.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 06 Jun 2010 18:12

I admit I hadn't taken into account the fact that the farther the ABM system from the area being defended, the higher the incoming BM is likely to be and therefore out of range. Seems simple now - but didn't dawn on me.

Thanks Ashish and Rahul

Misraji · Post by **Misraji** » 07 Jun 2010 01:15

^^^
You are welcome, saar...

~Ashish

Gyle_S · Post by **Gyle_S** » 07 Jun 2010 11:07

I have a question as a newbie. I have read several accounts of 1971 war where INS Vikrant was taken to an unknown location near ANC when PNS Ghazi was on prowl.

Did IN not have efficient anti-sub force in 1971? Could we have used Foxtrot class in ASW role? How about any air-based ASW or ASW Corvettes?

If 1 PNS Ghazi can force us to send our AC off, how will IN manage the new gen PNS Agostas? Is my question relevant?

Hiten · Post by **Hiten** » 07 Jun 2010 12:23

Google did not turn up any result point towards BRF, so posting this

DRDO has put up up its Popular Science & Technology Series series of booklets for free download. Many years ago they'd be available for sale -my folks bought me a couple

Should be a good starting point to understand Defence Technology or just plain Technology.

Popular Science & Technology Series

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 07 Jun 2010 21:42

sgyl wrote:I have a question as a newbie. I have read several accounts of 1971 war where INS Vikrant was taken to an unknown location near ANC when PNS Ghazi was on prowl.

Did IN not have efficient anti-sub force in 1971? Could we have used Foxtrot class in ASW role? How about any air-based ASW or ASW Corvettes?

If 1 PNS Ghazi can force us to send our AC off, how will IN manage the new gen PNS Agostas? Is my question relevant?

I think this is a question that you can answer yourself, using comon sense. If you have an aircraft carrier:
1) You want to use it effectively
2) You don't want to lose it

Your enemy desires:
1) to kill your aircraft carrier so you cannot use it.

If you lose your carrier, you cannot use it. That means that you can only use your carrier in circumstances where you will not lose it. If the enemy has a submarine on the prowl and you don't know where that sub is, do you indulge in foolhardy bravado, or do you do whatever it takes to protect your carrier?

In wartime the choice lies with the Navy brass. They can do either. They can use it and lose it. Or they can use it, get away and keep using it. he decision has to be made depending on how high the risk to benefit ratio is thought to be.

Will you ask your 2 year old son to cross a busy road alone?
Will you ask your 18 year old son to cross a busy road alone?
What are the risks in each case?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 07 Jun 2010 21:55

aircraft from Vikrant did pound ports and harbour in east pak IIRC.

negi · Post by **negi** » 07 Jun 2010 22:31

Dr. Paulraj's page and his work on Sonar will give one an idea about Indian sonar capabilities (specially ASW) during the time of 1971 conflict.

http://indiannavy.nic.in/t2t2e/trans2em ... _sonar.htm

In the end 1960s, the Navy evaluated at sea the panoramic sonars fitted in the Russian Petya class submarine chasers. Concurrently, it was evaluating the European panoramic sonars being offered for the Leander class frigates to be built at Mazagon Docks. To achieve self-reliance in shipborne sonars, the Navy projected to the NPOLits requirement for a state-of-the-art, medium range, panoramic sonar, designed specifically for Indian tropical and hydrological conditions.

The sinking of the frigate Khukri during the December 1971 Indo-Pakistan War led to intense efforts to remedy the inability of the subsequent Hunter-Killer operation to destroy the Pakistan Navy submarine.

The successful design, development, production and testing, between 1976 and 1983, of the Navy's first indigenous hull-mounted sonar, which in Indian waters performed better than all other sonars of that time, was the finale of a combination of unique circumstances. The derivatives of that outstanding sonar continue to be fitted in the Navy's latest ships.

Gyle_S · Post by **Gyle_S** » 08 Jun 2010 03:39

@ Shiv Saar
Saar i understand the profit/risk analysis but if 1 PNS Ghazi can increase the risk so much as to make us banish our AC to ANC, then how about 30-40 chink subs if they start operating in IOC during war time.

shiv wrote: If you lose your carrier, you cannot use it. That means that you can only use your carrier in circumstances where you will not lose it. If the enemy has a submarine on the prowl and you don't know where that sub is, do you indulge in foolhardy bravado, or do you do whatever it takes to protect your carrier?

Well almost correct. But given that nothing (well almost nothing) is absolute, it needs a profit/risk analysis. You try to protect your AC but does it mean that you pack it up in a war scenario. Definitely you have other means such as hunter killers, ASW aircrafts and surface combatants to protect the AC in a way that it can still operate. My question was along these lines.
Were IN's Foxtrot class subs,ASW aircrafts & surface ships deemed not enough for ASW role against 1 PNS Ghazi? We definitely needed Vikrant for blockading East TSP as evident by its role after 4th Dec.
I am just concerned about 60+ subs from chinks and AIP Agostas from TSP forcing our ACs to be futile in future wars.

@ Rahum M Saar
From my limited reading I understand that the first raid from Vikrant was on 4th Dec after PNS Ghazi was sunk. Maybe they did not want to give out Vikrant's coordinates before Ghazi sank.

Gyle_S · Post by **Gyle_S** » 08 Jun 2010 03:41

negi wrote:Dr. Paulraj's page and his work on Sonar will give one an idea about Indian sonar capabilities (specially ASW) during the time of 1971 conflict.

http://indiannavy.nic.in/t2t2e/trans2em ... _sonar.htm

Thanks Negi Saar for this information. It answers my questions.

Srivastav · Post by **Srivastav** » 08 Jun 2010 04:01

sgyl wrote:@ Shiv Saar
Were IN's Foxtrot class subs,ASW aircrafts & surface ships deemed not enough for ASW role against 1 PNS Ghazi? We definitely needed Vikrant for blockading East TSP as evident by its role after 4th Dec.
I am just concerned about 60+ subs from chinks and AIP Agostas from TSP forcing our ACs to be futile in future wars.

Lets think about it....how long was IN using an AC at the time of '71(also it was our sole carrier)....what kind of CBG it had and what was IN's situation viz a viz submarine warfare at that time.
Now lets look at for how long the IN has been using and learning Carrier operations (its 2010 now)and what kind of anti-submarine assets we have now. Also do you really think 60+ submarines will make alive to IOC....that will be like shooting fishes in a barrel for IN.
Also we are not spending all those rupees on p-28 class just to be hanger(yard) queens... among other things.

Yes i agree the strongest asset PN has its agustas but seriously Indian Navy has'nt been sitting on its A$$ over these years. We have had a lot of practice with our carriers and we are getting stronger day by day with the new inductions as well as refits.

naird · Post by **naird** » 08 Jun 2010 04:14

Hey Folks --------

I am in search of a book from Mukul Deva, Book's Name is Lashkar !!! I was trying to buy it in US but the damn thing is too expensive (its costing almost $47, whereas in India its cost Rs 166

) ...Anyways if anybody has a pdf version please let me know

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 08 Jun 2010 07:18

sgyl wrote:
Well almost correct. But given that nothing (well almost nothing) is absolute, it needs a profit/risk analysis. You try to protect your AC but does it mean that you pack it up in a war scenario. Definitely you have other means such as hunter killers, ASW aircrafts and surface combatants to protect the AC in a way that it can still operate. My question was along these lines.
Were IN's Foxtrot class subs,ASW aircrafts & surface ships deemed not enough for ASW role against 1 PNS Ghazi? We definitely needed Vikrant for blockading East TSP as evident by its role after 4th Dec.
I am just concerned about 60+ subs from chinks and AIP Agostas from TSP forcing our ACs to be futile in future wars.

I think you are asking for an absolute answer when no absolute answer is available. Ultimately it will have to be a matter of judgement of people in place during a war scenario. In 1971 clearly it was judged that the single Ghazi was dangerous enough to move the Vikrant to safety. We have no access to teh particular bits of information that the Naval high comand may have had when they made that decision.

If you go further down the route of micro-analyzing this you find that the Ghazi was not the only Paki sub at that time. Another Paki sub, the Hangor actually sank an Indian ship. But after the confirmation of sinking of the Ghazi, the Vikrant was freed up to attack targets in BDesh. Now why was the Indian navy not afraid of the other subs that Pakistan had? The sinking of the Ghazi was not the end of the Pakistani submarine threat.

The most likely explanation is that the Ghazi was considered as the most serious threat. How the heck did India know the Ghazi ws in the Bay of Bengal? Surely it was either humint or surveillance. Why was the IN particularly worried? Perhaps the Ghazi had given them the slip and nobody knew exactly where it was.

Without access to the little details it is difficult to either draw conclusions abut the past or learn lessons for the future.

There is at least one recent example of "judgement of people on the scene". The IAF initially sent MiG 27s and Mi 17s into Kargil and started losing them. It was then that the threat of manpads at those altitudes became apparent. So the IAF changed tactics.

The problem with the tactics that an aircraft carrier group may use against subs is that they are mostly classified. And what subs do is also classified. So I guess we are allowed to speculate.

Gyle_S · Post by **Gyle_S** » 08 Jun 2010 11:48

shiv wrote: But after the confirmation of sinking of the Ghazi, the Vikrant was freed up to attack targets in BDesh. Now why was the Indian navy not afraid of the other subs that Pakistan had? The sinking of the Ghazi was not the end of the Pakistani submarine threat.

The most likely explanation is that the Ghazi was considered as the most serious threat. How the heck did India know the Ghazi ws in the Bay of Bengal? Surely it was either humint or surveillance. Why was the IN particularly worried? Perhaps the Ghazi had given them the slip and nobody knew exactly where it was.

Shiv Saar,
From some text that I have read on 1971 war, I believe that Ghazi was the only sub in TSP navy that could reach the Bay of Bengal at that time so after Ghazi was down, Vikrant was almost safe from sub-surface threat in the Bay of Bengal.
Life always seems relatively simpler in the rear view mirror. I can believe that the IN had its reasons.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 08 Jun 2010 21:08

The cynical, rhetorical question is "If an aircraft carrier is so vulnerable to one sub in the neighborhood, what are we going to do with 60 subs in the area"

Apart from the fact that putting 60 subs in the area would leave a submarine operator without subs anywhere else we could extend the logic of this question to other things like:

"What's the point dropping bombs from and An 32 when it would get shot out of the sky the minute it tries to enter hostile airspace". In fact one person had argued in the Military Aviation thread that within minutes of war breaking out all Indian air bases would be put out of action, so what's the point of an Air Force?

In actual fact of course oceans are huge and ships can sail much faster than submerged submarines - so with some care there will be areas where an aircraft carrier can make all the difference. There will similarly be areas where there is local air dominance for some reason where and An 32 can be used, and all air bases are unlikely to be taken out in the first minutes of war, and even if they are they can be repaired in hours and will need to be re-attacked repeatedly.

In every case the local military professionals must be trusted to make the right decision. I am reminded of patients who say "I have have diabetes, a damaged heart, I have had a bypass and I need this operation. Won't it kill me?" The only answer is that you have to leave it to the professionals to make the right decisions to get you through this as they are trained and accustomed to doing. If they think it will kill you they will say so and try and avoid surgery. If the Navy people think the carrier has a good chance of being sunk they will keep it away. If not, they will send it into battle.

CalvinH · Post by **CalvinH** » 08 Jun 2010 22:06

IMO one of the reasons Vikrant was bought back to Vishkhapatnam was to lure Ghazi to get the prize catch. Ghazi took the bait and travelled far from its base making itself vulnerable to detection in the process. That strategy was successful.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 08 Jun 2010 22:25

CalvinH wrote:one of the reasons Vikrant was bought back to Vishkhapatnam was to lure Ghazi to get the prize catch

Other reasons - I think on of them was that despite all precautions and all, there was a chance of the fleet getting overwhelmed by a submarine force of the PN. From Vice Admiral Krishnan, then CinC ENC.

Secondly, in any war at sea, VIKRANT would obviously be the most worthwhile target for the enemy. The three Daphne class submarines, newly acquired by Pakistan from France and fully operational, posed a great potential threat to the carrier. The sophistication of their detection capability as well as the homing devices of their torpedoes were such that once the ship was picked up and the screen of escorts pierced, the VIKRANT would stand in mortal danger. Even as many as six escorts would not guarantee any complete immunity to the carrier.

The problem of VIKRANT's security was a serious one and brought forth several headaches. By very careful appreciation of the submarine threat, we had come to the definite conclusion that the enemy was bound to deploy the submarine GHAZI against us in the Bay of Bengal with the sole aim of destroying our aircraft carrier VIKRANT. The threat from the GHAZI was a considerable one. Apart from the lethal advantage at the pre-emptive stage, VIKRANT's approximate position would become known once she commenced operating aircraft in the vicinity of the East Bengal coast. Of the four surface ships available, one ( the KAVARATTI ) had no sonar and unless the other three were continually in close company with VIKRANT ( within a radius of 5 to 10 miles ), the carrier would be completely vulnerable to attack from the GHAZI, which could take up her position surreptitiously and, at leisure await her opportunity. Even assuming that no operational defects developed, it would still be necessary to withdraw ships from the area of operations for fuelling. The basic problem was that if reasonable anti submarine protection had to be provided to VIKRANT and the escort ships had be in close company for this purpose, then how were 18,000 square miles to be kept under surveillance? We had decided to commit the entire striking power of VIKRANT's aircraft to offensive operations against enemy ships and installations and could not, therefore, afford the luxury of aerial surveillance

Dmurphy · Post by **Dmurphy** » 08 Jun 2010 22:43

The other day, I spotted a sky blue SX4 with a red light and "Army" written on it and a number plate reading "NYA↑"

1) Do the Army staff cars have a sky blue colour code? Could it actually be the air force? Since i saw that car in Thane and I know they have presence here.

2) What odes the NYA↑ on the number plat mean?

naird · Post by **naird** » 08 Jun 2010 23:34

Folks,

Long time back i had read an article from a USAF pilot on a blog about training between F16 and Mig 29. How the pilot observed and compared Mig 29 characteristics..It was a great read. I believe it was a excercise between Luftwaffe and USAF ...

Can somebody please provide me the link for the article ?
Thanks

Gyle_S · Post by **Gyle_S** » 09 Jun 2010 01:55

shiv wrote: we could extend the logic of this question to other things like:

"What's the point dropping bombs from and An 32 when it would get shot out of the sky the minute it tries to enter hostile airspace". In fact one person had argued in the Military Aviation thread that within minutes of war breaking out all Indian air bases would be put out of action, so what's the point of an Air Force?

Shiv Saar,
AN32:IAF :: Vikrant(AC):IN (This ratio proportion equation does not work out)

An AC carrier is worth so much more to IN than AN32 to IAF. IAF can get away with AN-32 shot out of the sky and still carry on bombings. If I use this analogy then IA will have no T-72s lest they get damaged by anti-tank missiles. I caught your flight however.

shiv wrote: In actual fact of course oceans are huge and ships can sail much faster than submerged submarines - so with some care there will be areas where an aircraft carrier can make all the difference.

I read that Vikrant had a problem in one of its boilers that reduced its maneuverability and probably was one of the reasons it was moved out to Bay of Bengal.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 09 Jun 2010 05:55

sgyl wrote: Shiv Saar,
AN32:IAF :: Vikrant(AC):IN (This ratio proportion equation does not work out)

I believe you are missing the point, and with respect may I point out that you have applied madrassa math. I will explain. By madrassa math I mean "I have have 6 sons. It is OK if two of them die. If I had only one son, I want him alive"

Apply the same logic to Air Force and you are saying "The ratios of An 32s to other aircraft is higher so the Air Force can afford/will not mind the loss of An 32s but because the ratio is different the navy cannot afford to lose the Vikrant". In other words if the Navy had 5 aircraft carriers they might say "Hey OK we will let one be sunk cheaply"

This has nothing to do with ratios. You do not go about putting your assets at increased risk just because you have more assets or different proportions. Soon you will not have that many, that's all. Your enemy will adjust your ratios/proportions and open your eyes even as he chews off your backside.