Artillery Discussion Thread

[pankajs]

Per wiki

"The L118 light gun is a 105 mm towed howitzer. It was originally produced for the British Army in the 1970s and has been widely exported since, including to the United States, where a modified version is known as the M119 howitzer."

Must have seen the amriki version only

[ramana]

RahulM, The US had standardised on metric caliber after license producing the French 75mm during WWI. In WWII the US standard was the 105mm just as the Germans. The UK had the 25 pounder. So as part of arty rationalization the RO developed the 105mm. OFB based their design on the UK 105mm. This was very heavy and not liked at all. Then a lightweight version was developed which is seeing service even now.


Rohitvats, Can you give us insight on the arty fuzes and who makes them for the Indian Army?

[Lalmohan]

germans were 88mm no?
US 75mm?

[ramana]

germans were 88mm no?
US 75mm?

German 88mm were AA guns also used as Anti Tank.

105mm was their battalion support.

[Rupak]

Until WW2 the basic infantry support gun was in the 3-inch range - 75mm (French/German/American/Japanese/Italian), 76.2mm (Soviet), 84 mm (UK

It was found during WW2 that a) the widespread development of new fortifications materials such as reinforced concrete required greater weight of shell, and b) greater mechanization allowed for bigger calibers to be more easily deployed.

The Indian Army's experience in Bangladesh in 1971 convinced it that the 25-pounder and assorted 75/76m Mountain guns had outlived their utility. The Battle for Hilli being a case in point.

[Karan M]

ramana"

Rohitvats, Can you give us insight on the arty fuzes and who makes them for the Indian Army?
--------------


ECIL.
http://www.ecil.co.in/defence.html

HBL Nife
http://www.hbl.in/brochures%20pdf/Corpo ... ochure.pdf

A few other small pvt firms as well.

[ramana]

KaranM thanks. So its more than OFB. Good to hear.

[Karan M]

My pleasure.. HBL Nife is one of the good success stories of Indian defence. They have been pretty cut up though that despite their fuses (reportedly) being 70% indigenous, ECIL gets the bulk of contracts thanks to its MOD links. ECIL used to mainly put together fuses CKD/SKD from South Africa.

Its not that ECIL is a run of the mill DPSU...its actually pretty good, and run by DAE, ECIL did a lot of the Brahmos C3I work, and also provide the Akash C3I stuff (command and control posts) plus LCA radar gimbal assembly etc. From a loss making firm, they turned into a profitable one thanks to hard work.

Its just that in fuzes, the CKD/SKD stuff worked for them, so they were per reports, lazy and sitting on a nice cash flow.

HBL Nife also makes EW components, AESA modules for DRDO and even export. There are several other SMEs also doing electronics work for DRDO, BEL etc. So the industrial capability is there to make fuses, if the MOD actually did something serious as versus merely releasing an updated DPP every now and then, and sleeping on it.

Then again, there are many private firms who can manufacture what OFB does, but OFB has a lockdown on several sectors thanks to MOD heritage.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>Rohitvats, Can you give us insight on the arty fuzes and who makes them for the Indian Army?

ramana, Karan M has already answered the question; frankly, I've never put any thoughts on it.

[rohitvats]

Nothing beats talking to people who have practical experience as compared to us keyboard ninjas. One gets a point-of-view derived from having first-hand experience of topic under discussion. So, I spoke to an ex-artillery officer on deployment of guns in the mountains and his opinion of M-777.

Here is what I gathered:

1.Mountains place serious limitations on deployment and movement of guns – especially heavier ones like Bofors.

2.During peacetime, engineering efforts can be made to create infrastructure to allow movement and deployment of such guns. Infrastructure would include main communication roads as well as gun positions. And minor roads to these gun positions from main roads.

3.Guns need to have sufficient elevation to clear the mountain crests.

4.Main limitation of 105mm caliber is in terms of shell weight and velocity.

5.Fixed defenses in mountains are permanent defenses which are difficult to dislodge and destroy. Further, nature offers protection by way of gradient and slopes.

6.Heavier shells required to neutralize such defenses – for tackling targets in open areas, 105mm as good as 155mm.

7.Longer range required from two perspectives –

(a) while one can create positions in mountains for heavier guns in peace-time, doing so in war is difficult. Limited mobility of guns means that longer range will allow the gun to provide cover w/o much displacement and attendant issues.

(b) firing at high elevations affects the maximum range – higher original range ensures that shell fired at high elevation also reach respectable distance.

8.On M-777:

a. Not very- enthused by the heli-portability aspect. Considers it OK for movement in plains or flat areas like Ladakh.

b.As per him, unless you’re moving the gun through wide enough valleys, movement through narrow valleys will be affected by wind drafts and up-currents. Very dangerous for helicopters. Elevation of mountain ridges will be an important factor.

c.While the chopper may well be able to carry X kgs under-slung, doing so while clearing mountain ridges and crests is very challenging and difficult.

d.Possible travel route from one valley to another would be flight path along road alignment - helicopter will not need to fly high (will be flying below ridge line) and speed of redeployment would be much-much faster as compared to road movement.

e.Says will believe it (air-transport part in mountains) when he sees it.

f.Gun-for-gun, merit lies in 155/39 caliber. Every kilogram of weight counts in the mountains. Engineering support is limited and not always available. A 3.5 ton M-777 with same performance as Bofors is a huge advantage.

Let the games begin!!!

[Pratyush]

Let me take the first short at your report.

Nothing beats talking to people who have practical experience as compared to us keyboard ninjas. One gets a point-of-view derived from having first-hand experience of topic under discussion. So, I spoke to an ex-artillery officer on deployment of guns in the mountains and his opinion of M-777.

Here is what I gathered:

1.Mountains place serious limitations on deployment and movement of guns – especially heavier ones like Bofors.

OK........... the solution is provide in the below point.

2.During peacetime, engineering efforts can be made to create infrastructure to allow movement and deployment of such guns. Infrastructure would include main communication roads as well as gun positions. And minor roads to these gun positions from main roads.


3.Guns need to have sufficient elevation to clear the mountain crests.

OK...... But can a weapon such as the Israeli Jumper or the abandoned US NLOS M be used to hit fixed positions, thereby overcoming the elevation related issues.

4.Main limitation of 105mm caliber is in terms of shell weight and velocity.

Only in case of fixed locations.

5.Fixed defenses in mountains are permanent defenses which are difficult to dislodge and destroy. Further, nature offers protection by way of gradient and slopes.

These can be overcome by the use of Air delivered PGM's. The point being any thing that can be seen will be hit. If it can be hit, it will be destroyed. On a modern battle field.

6.Heavier shells required to neutralize such defenses – for tackling targets in open areas, 105mm as good as 155mm.

OK....

7.Longer range required from two perspectives –

(a) while one can create positions in mountains for heavier guns in peace-time, doing so in war is difficult. Limited mobility of guns means that longer range will allow the gun to provide cover w/o much displacement and attendant issues.

(b) firing at high elevations affects the maximum range – higher original range ensures that shell fired at high elevation also reach respectable distance.

OK......

8.On M-777:

a. Not very- enthused by the heli-portability aspect. Considers it OK for movement in plains or flat areas like Ladakh.

Ok....... Niether am I.

b.As per him, unless you’re moving the gun through wide enough valleys, movement through narrow valleys will be affected by wind drafts and up-currents. Very dangerous for helicopters. Elevation of mountain ridges will be an important factor.

Ok.......

c.While the chopper may well be able to carry X kgs under-slung, doing so while clearing mountain ridges and crests is very challenging and difficult.
OK..........

d.Possible travel route from one valley to another would be flight path along road alignment - helicopter will not need to fly high (will be flying below ridge line) and speed of redeployment would be much-much faster as compared to road movement.
Ok...

e.Says will believe it (air-transport part in mountains) when he sees it.

As will I.

f.Gun-for-gun, merit lies in 155/39 caliber. Every kilogram of weight counts in the mountains. Engineering support is limited and not always available. A 3.5 ton M-777 with same performance as Bofors is a huge advantage.

This may apply in terms of poor infra, during the war time. However, the major issue will not only be the weight of the gun, but the weight & volume of the shells as well. Along with the resupply. Unless the IA is planning to make sure that every shell it fires from 155 mm gun is a PGM, the weight issue will remain regardless of the gun being used. Even if it is the 3.5 ton M 777. Or the Fh 77.

That being the case, if the M 777 can be towed to the firing position in the mountain. So can the the FH 77. Thereby, negating any weight advantage the M 777 will have over the FH77.

Let the games begin!!!

[ramana]

Rohit, Thanks for the 'expert' opinion.

What does he think about the Krasnopol M and why was it not adopted in large numbers seeing the logistics issue?

[abhik]

So has the "air transport" bubble has burst?

7.Longer range required from two perspectives –

(a) while one can create positions in mountains for heavier guns in peace-time, doing so in war is difficult. Limited mobility of guns means that longer range will allow the gun to provide cover w/o much displacement and attendant issues.

(b) firing at high elevations affects the maximum range – higher original range ensures that shell fired at high elevation also reach respectable distance.

M777 has the advantage if you're looking at it from a 105mm vs 155mm. But look at it from the 39 vs 52 cal angle. The M777 has a ~ 10km range disadvantage.

f.Gun-for-gun, merit lies in 155/39 caliber. Every kilogram of weight counts in the mountains. Engineering support is limited and not always available. A 3.5 tonM-777 with same performance as Bofors is a huge advantage.

In reality M-777's performance in many parameters less than that of a conventional gun with APU and the works even if it were only 39 cal.
-With manual everything the sustained rate of fire of the M777 will be far lower than say the FH77. IIRC the newer FH77 gun demonstrated something like 75 rounds in under 25 min i.e >3 rounds/min. The M777 will probably at best be able to do half that. Which might mean in the field 1 FH77 = 2 M777.
-The APU might be a critical advantage in the "last mile" deployment in some cases where a FAT may not be able to maneuver.
So in sheer performance FH 77 > M 777.
All in all, the M777 is really worse than even an OFB FH77. It's only(overlooking electronics) trumps the FH77 in weight which is useful you are air transporting them. But in the Indian context this is really unlikely and a doubus use case, as suggested. Plus it phenomenally expensive, cost 3-5 times a regular gun. So it's a case of less for more. For every Rupee we spend we will be getting far less capability compared to guns from OFB, Bharat Forge etc. Its one thing to buy 145 of them for say a niche role but buying 900, which would make it IA's mainstay, is inexplicable. Or more likely a scam, a la Bofors. At least those guns turned out to be good.

[Karan M]

Where are the FH77s though.. Agree that the M777 isn't as capable, though lighter.. The OFB one is easily a year plus out provided it makes it through trials...if the MOD had any sense they would have asked Bharat Forge, Kalyani etc to accelerate their DandD, instead of putting all their eggs in the OFB basket.

[vic]

"Dukhi Atma" - for once, why don't you pen down a 'HONEST' account on why a 21 km round from 105mm gun will do the trick? All we have are these one liner goat droppings without any form or logic.

Import loving firangi stooge, why don't you start by specifing that M777 weighs 4.2 tons in combat and non-automated 155/39 caliber howitzer will weigh around 6 tons and not 11 tons.

[ramana]

vic and anyone else willing to work on this.

How about a table that clearly shows the stated facts for all the guns being considered"

M-777, Bofors/OFB version, Bharat Forge etc?

Thanks, ramana

[pankajs]

Import loving firangi stooge, why don't you start by specifing that M777 weighs 4.2 tons in combat and non-automated 155/39 caliber howitzer will weigh around 6 tons and not 11 tons.

Any reference on weight of the actual or proposed non-automated 155/39 cal gun?

[member_23455]

With manual everything the sustained rate of fire of the M777 will be far lower than say the FH77. IIRC the newer FH77 gun demonstrated something like 75 rounds in under 25 min i.e >3 rounds/min. The M777 will probably at best be able to do half that. Which might mean in the field 1 FH77 = 2 M777.

Wrong in theory, wrong on fact...and that pretty much sums up the approach of most posters on this and others thread of never letting facts come in the way of an opinion.

What professional resources have people accessed on the Internet (yes, they are out there) on the M777 before making such claims?

[Viv S]

With regard to the source quoted by Rohitvats, with all due respect to the gentleman, as an ex-artilleryman he's presumably (?) from an era when the army aviation was restricted to Cheetahs and Chetaks and the only serious airlifter in the IAF's inventory was the notoriously unreliable Mi-26. In contrast today, with the Mi-17V5 and Chinooks on their way the IA will soon have a different class of airlift available.

[Viv S]

vic and anyone else willing to work on this.

How about a table that clearly shows the stated facts for all the guns being considered"

M-777, Bofors/OFB version, Bharat Forge etc?

Thanks, ramana

What's wrong with the figures on Wikipedia?

M777A2 - 4,400kg, Sustained RoF - 2 RPM, Range - 24 km

FH-77 (39 cal) - 11,500kg, Sustained RoF - 3 RPM, Range - 21 km


The closest competitor to the FH-77 was the Denel G5.

G5 - 13,500kg, Sustained RoF - 3 RPM, Range - 30km


Its a fair assumption that the range of the 45 cal OFB variant would be around 30km as well, with a corresponding weight increase.



Edit:

M777 Brochure - http://www.baesystems.com/cs/groups/pub ... 052252.pdf

Max range unassisted 24.7km

[rohitvats]

As I had expected, posters are selectively choosing only those parts which support their POV. No one is looking at complete picture. Further, the said officer had reservation only about ability to clear ridges and not on heli-transport part per se. He had already suggested one possible way to tackle issue of ridge crossing; but I guess talking about them will negate peoples positions.

Further, only those who have never seen movement of heavy stuff in mountains will talk about one ton here or there not making a difference. Will add further later on.

[Viv S]

As I had expected, posters are selectively choosing only those parts which support their POV. No one is looking at complete picture. Further, the said officer had reservation only about ability to clear ridges and not on heli-transport part per se. He had already suggested one possible way to tackle issue of ridge crossing; but I guess talking about them will negate peoples positions.

Further, only those who have never seen movement of heavy stuff in mountains will talk about one ton here or there not making a difference. Will add further later on.

The officer from what I could make out was neither for nor against it, while adopting a wait-and-see position. I'm suggesting that he'd have been less skeptical about the capability of newer platforms being inducted right now, to tackle the same task.


The context in which I was posting was -

So has the "air transport" bubble has burst?

[abhik]

With manual everything the sustained rate of fire of the M777 will be far lower than say the FH77. IIRC the newer FH77 gun demonstrated something like 75 rounds in under 25 min i.e >3 rounds/min. The M777 will probably at best be able to do half that. Which might mean in the field 1 FH77 = 2 M777.

Wrong in theory, wrong on fact...and that pretty much sums up the approach of most posters on this and others thread of never letting facts come in the way of an opinion.

What professional resources have people accessed on the Internet (yes, they are out there) on the M777 before making such claims?

What I have said is very logical. If you have sources which make claims to the contrary please do post them, so that we can all learn.

[abhik]

Import loving firangi stooge, why don't you start by specifing that M777 weighs 4.2 tons in combat and non-automated 155/39 caliber howitzer will weigh around 6 tons and not 11 tons.

Any reference on weight of the actual or proposed non-automated 155/39 cal gun?

For comparison, the American M198 which is a 35+ year old design weighs about 7.1t.

[pankajs]

Thanks .. Yes M198

Do you propose that we import M198 from the US? How long will an indigenous effort to build a similar gun take in your estimate?

[Victor]

AFAIK, M777 ULH was chosen ONLY for the mountain strike corps, NOT for general arty use in IA to replace FH77.

Mountain strike corps will first be based in North Bengal so the intended theater of operations is Northeast (Sikkim, Arunachal, Tibet) and this itself may provide a clue as to why the M777 may be the only 155mm class of gun that can operate there effectively.



This is a typical *good* road in Arunachal, this one being near Tawang. It has been in this condition since the 60s and 70s, we are told intentionally. Even the most optimistic jingo should not expect this condition to change in the next 10 years if he is realistic, no matter what we are told by netas. In the rainy season and winter time, this road becomes almost impassable. Further, regular rock falls block these roads for days sometimes. The roads in the Northeast theater are very different from the comparitively touristy roads in J&K/Ladakh.

In these conditions, easily moving around heavy artillery is wishful thinking. Even the ULH would be extremely difficult to transport by road here. Whatever guns are already there have been transported with great trouble over decades and are going to stay put.

The other thing to notice is the typical terrain. Since heavy artillery can only be located near roads, the available field of fire is extremely limited. However, placing guns nearer the top of the mountains opens up the field of fire tremendously. At present, the only way to get them up and back down is by helicopter.

Here are the specs of the Bofors and F777 from wiki:

FH77 Bofors weight 11,500 kg. Rate of fire 3 rpm/max 6 rpm with automated feed. 10-14 crew. Max elevation 50 degrees.

F777A2 weight 4,400 kg. Rate of fire 2 rpm/max 5 rpm (manual). 7-8 crew. Max elevation 71 degrees. Excalibur precision rounds capable.

The ultralight M777 weighs less than half of the Bofors and has the same range of about 17-18 miles while needing only half the crew. It has a higher firing angle and can also fire the Excalibur precision round with a range of 25 miles. In practice, the Bofors would be limited to roadside deployment with the attendant limited range and field of fire while the M777 with pinpoint Excalibur shells can play havoc over a far wider area if placed higher up. One M777 can do more damage than several FH77 Bofors in this kind of terrain.

Imagine what placing even a single 155mm howitzer on a mountain top would have meant in Kargil. All the surrounding peaks and even the interior enemy gun emplacements would be toast. While staying out of 7-8 mile Manpad range, it could literally hop from one peak to another to avoid return fire.

We can rest assured that the M777 was chosen for very good reason and only the pakis and chinese should be upset about their induction, not BRFites.

[Singha]

good point about the field of fire thing. but being on top of mountain wouldnt WLRs like the pakis / cheen have be able to pinpoint the location and respond with guns or rockets? the M777 cannot move away and nobody is going to risk or able to manage a constant peak hopping using chinook airlift.
it will be a fat target if located on a mountain top with no mobility.

that mode might work in afghanistan where the longest weapons of taliban are the RPGs, easily dealt with using HMGs, SAW, snipers and NVGs. even then sneak attacks by mortars caused problems leading to development of mortar WLRs to sound a audible warning for everyone to take cover.

[member_23455]

What I have said is very logical. If you have sources which make claims to the contrary please do post them, so that we can all learn.

And that my friend is what is known as a fool's errand. You can keep posting thoughts that seem logical to you and then asking people to keep rebutting each post with facts, moving the goal posts with every such post. No, thank you.

For the record, I have posted a link by a professional on this very thread, which had you bothered to read in the spirit of "learning", would have given you a much greater insight into the use of artillery as a whole and not just an obsession with specific numbers taken out of context.

Ironically, it would have also given you some negatives about the M777 which you could have then used to embark on a next series of logical criticisms, while as usual missing the big picture altogether.

Such is life

[rohitvats]

The deployment and employment of artillery in mountains is a pretty interesting thing.

Courtesy the current debate, we've come across some good material on the topic. However, as is always the case, more material is available from western perspective than India. The challenges of deploying artillery in the mountains is something which Americans have faced in Afghanistan - and USSR faced earlier during their sojourn there. There are numerous articles from US servicemen on philosophy of using artillery in mountains and they have studied the USSR experience as well. Mention of employment of artillery by India and Pakistan has received lot of focus with Kargil War being a favorite case study. However, US exploration on the topic is with respect to their CI Ops in Afghanistan - Our requirements are with respect to full blown war in mountains. That is why while UK and USA have rediscovered the merits of their 105mm gun - some even suggesting bringing back 75mm pack howitzers - we're looking at phasing out 105mm caliber.

On the topic of M-777 and suitability for our case - from heli-lift perspective - it turns out that it is not a cut-and-dried case. There are many ifs and buts. And since IA does not share anything with us lesser mortals, we need to do the investigation on our own.

So, for starters, I was revisiting this slung-under-Chinook mobility argument from our geography perspective - and it turns out that Chinook might well not have carte-blanche in terms of operating with a gun slung under it. But that does not mean artillery cannot be moved in mountains with Chinook.

Let me put here two GE snapshots of potential routes to transport a gun-slung-under-a-Chinook from one valley to another. The lower part of the pics show the elevation profile for each route. These valleys are same which were considered in my earlier post covering areas north of Tawang and close to LAC - which can be seen as a red line on the map.

(a) First picture shows a lateral route from one valley to another going over the mountain ridge line.

(b)Second shows the movement between valley through interconnecting valleys.

Please be advised that since route on GE hugs the ground, these elevations are for land route. Flying in both cases will happen at some delta feet above these figures.





People can draw their conclusions. I'll add mine later.

[Victor]

.. wouldnt WLRs like the pakis / cheen have be able to pinpoint the location

wlrs hounded the bofors in Kargil but that did'nt stop them from pounding Tiger Hill while constantly moving. The M777 would be far more mobile and nimble. There's less risk and more gain in moving 1 ulh around than a battery of bofors.

[member_23455]

.. wouldnt WLRs like the pakis / cheen have be able to pinpoint the location

wlrs hounded the bofors in Kargil but that did'nt stop them from pounding Tiger Hill while constantly moving. The M777 would be far more mobile and nimble. There's less risk and more gain in moving 1 ulh around than a battery of bofors.

WLR performance degrades in mountainous terrain. The FH77B and its APU makes it easier to relocate from a counter-battery perspective than a M777.

The "mobility" of the M777 being talked about is from a transportation perspective, and the logistical corollaries that flow from it.

[abhik]

Are we seriously talking about placing a 155mm gun on the "top" of a mountain? At 16,000+ ft?

[krishnan]

heavy rains and snow seems to also effect WLR

[abhik]

Re FH77 stats, the following is from the BR page:-
Crew: Six.
Calibre: 155mm/39 calibre.
Maximum Speed: 70 km/h; towed.
.......................8 km/h; self-propelled.
Gradient: 40%.
Rate of Fire: 10 rounds a minute (maximum).
Gun Elevation/Depression: -3º to +70º
Traverse: ±60º in total.
URL:- http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORC ... h-77b.html

So the FH77 at least matches if not beats the M777 esp WRT crew and elevation.

[vaibhav.n]

There has been a fair bit of progress on the infrastructure side now (Relative). The newly built (National Highways Development Project) East-West Corridor which is now about half of which has been four laned, this starts from Assam Border (NH-31C) at Srirampur and ends at Silchar (NH-54) and is being built by Punj Llyod IIRC.There is another axis of this road till Siliguri. These will aid in ease of deployment of men and materials from primary railheads till Upper Assam and Sikkim and allow cross-movement unavailable till now due to the poor State Highways in Bihar.

I have been to Tawang twice once for vacations as a kid around 1995 and then around 2007-8. The road situation has never been that bad and Tawang has for most of the time had good all-weather connectivity, what happens after Tawang as the climb gets tougher is another matter.In 1995 I remember doing Missamari –Sapper in one day in a brand new Jonga if the TCP at Tenga did not catch you!!

While I do not intend to defend anybody or anyone a lot of this which has contributed was as usual in india a mix of both factors.

1. There has been an unprecedented increase in the duration and intensity of rainfall. Rivers are changing course more rapidly forcing villages to be simply abandoned.
Link:http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy ... 494523.ece

2. During the Infamous Road Widening Project from Bhalukpong to Tawang, the GREF & BRO (Road Construction Coy) RCC actually started on the whole project simultaneously instead of on a phased manned to allow better management. This actually made a bad situation worse. When they did the increased rains actually created saps in the blasted mountain structure and forced landslides and rockfalls which have been the norm ever since. Culverts regularly get washed away.

3. There has been a spurt in the number of the run of the river projects in Arunachal especially the Kameng District being built by HCC if i am correct.

[member_22906]

Placing M777 at very high altitude won't be a workable solution simply because of rarified air, the efficiency of gunners would be sub optimal.

The heli-portable movements surely make sense if the chinooks use the lay of the land and cross over to another valley through the appropriate passes rather than a straight line

I have been emphasiszing this earlier also that M777 gives us the flexibility to manouver much better than any other 155mm gun. For a MSC this could be decisive - almost like a trump card that could change the outcome of a battle or perhaps even a war

[pankajs]

On the Border road mess .. quite long and details .. a good read if one is interested in the issue .. very depressing though.

Border Logistics

Sub-header: As China builds on border, policy potholes block India

Inertia in inter-ministerial coordination, coupled with a sluggish pace of construction and challenges posed by the formidable Himalayas, is critically hindering India’s strategic plans to build a road and rail network along the 4,057-km frontier with China.

A majority of the strategic road projects are several years behind schedule, making a mockery of the 2012 deadline set by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the topmost security-related decision-making body at the Centre headed by the Prime Minister.

The realities of the lackadaisical approach cropped up at a meeting on May 20 this year. Defence Minister AK Antony was reportedly aghast at the slow progress on the 73 projects classified as India-China Border Roads (ICBR). He asked the road constructing authority, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), to expedite the work.

It was on June 29, 2006, that the CCS had directed the BRO to complete the task in six years (by 2012).

The BRO’s record provided to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) says as of March 31, 2013, only 16 of the planned 73 roads had been completed on the China frontier. Out of these, six had a length of less than 10 km, which means they are no more than a local connection. After spending huge sums, only 15 per cent of the work has been completed in seven years. In other words, only 527 km of roads, out of the mandated 3,505 km, have been completed.

So far, a sum of Rs 5,889 crore has been spent on the 73 roads, which includes formation works, labour cost, etc. Now, a more realistic deadline has been set for 2016 and “beyond-2016”.

The CCS decision was a far-reaching strategic policy as it approved the construction of a road network along the entire India-China frontier. It was a reversal of an unwritten code under which the Government of India had deliberately did not built a road network in the Himalayas, fearing a repeat of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. New Delhi feared that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China, which is much bigger than the Indian Army, could use India’s own road network to rapidly advance down the Himalayas.

Sub-header: Poor access undermines defence
Sub-header: No one knows how to fund rail lines
Sub-header: Confusion over crossroads within BRO

[member_23455]

This is a masterful strategy to slow down Chinese advance into India. It's those guys who have done us a favor.

[ramana]

Rohitvats, Thanks for the email. Got the big picture.

[Atri]

Didn't General VK Singh start production of Bofors guns?