International Military Discussion

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Austin
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by Austin »

^^ SA-18 in plenty dissapeared from Libya when the rebels took over and there was news in BBC that they are even selling those stuff online , even Iraq has SA-18 in its inventory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K38_Igla

Libya: Photo evidence of the truck mounted twin version in service with the Libyan Army emerged during the 2011 Libyan Revolution starting from March 2011. 482 Igla-S missiles were imported from Russia in 2004. Some of them were unaccounted at the end of the war and they could have ended up in Iranian inventory.[42][43][44] Israeli officials say that Igla-S were looted from Libyan warehouses in 2011 and transported by Iranians through Sudan and turned over to militants in Gaza and Lebanon


When I heard the news of SA-18 disappearance my worst fear was they might end up getting used in taking down civil airlines , very scarry
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

Karan M wrote:Brar the one I was referring to was a 300 km shot with a MiG-31 launching a R37 with a Su30 taking the handover and guiding it in. I suspect it was a classified check by the Russians of how to network MiG31 and su30 together. Later they introduced the Zaslon upgrade which moved it into full 300km class. It can guide missiles upto 280km. Refurbed r37 most likely with upgrades. Don't know if RVV latest for the long rangeis in production.
I was referring to the kills cited in the CSBA study, based on what has been killed at range during conflict. The 114km kill was during the Iran-Iraq war. I am sure the Russians and perhaps even the USN has had longer drone kills than that and Austin just shared some information on that. Had the cold war not ended, the US would also be looking at a few weapons to take down large AEW aircraft. It was a need defined thing, and I believe their was one being developed under program Senior blue. At the moment, they have already done the preliminary design reviews for the ALHTK, a modified version would be a perfect weapon that they can field fast without having to modify an existing system. Otherwise, just put a big fat booster on the next variant AMRAAM. I don't think the Chinese AEW threat is that urgent but it could change.

One thing a long range interceptor threat to an AWACS will do eventually is force adoption of short-range defenses to enhance survivability. They'll probably come, initially from support units but could eventually be organic. Things like the NCADE, CUDA/SACM/MSDM etc open up a lot of interesting possibilities when it comes to those missions given the magazine depth they enable. Although concepts have been developed with the F-22 and F-35 in mind, the F-15E could pack in an insane amount of these weapons (same amount I would assume as the SDB) in a support role for large aircraft.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... rs-423185/

Raytheon was awarded the government contract for these systems but needless to say both Lockheed and Boeing are very much still in the game given they keep working at these things using company funds with a larger phase 2 contract a few years away -

From Jane's:
Raytheon Missile Systems has secured a contract to research and advance the development of 'increased capabilities' for the next generation of US Air Force air-to-air tactical missiles.A USD14 million research and development (R&D) contract, awarded by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Munitions Directorate on 20 January, requires Raytheon to increase the number of missiles carried on [an air platform in] a single sortie, increase the effectiveness of each missile, and enhance the platform's survivability against all threats in an anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment.

Specifically, the contract provides for two lines of R&D work to deliver solutions for a Small Advanced Capability Missile (SACM) and a Miniature Self-Defense Munition (MSDM).

The SACM concept is intended to deliver an affordable, highly lethal, small size and weight air-to-air munition, enabling a "high air-to-air load out", for air dominance and increased sortie effectiveness. Envisioned to complement the radar-guided AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) in the weapons load out on US fifth-generation air platforms such as the F-35 Lightning II and F-22 Raptor, SACM is intended as an air-to-air weapons enhancement to counter fourth-/fifth-generation aircraft threats and cruise missiles. AFRL requirements for SACM include a flexible hyper-agile airframe and synergistic control capabilities, high-impulse propulsion, an affordable wide field-of-view seeker, anti-jam guidance, integrated fuze and "aim-able kinetic and non-kinetic effects", to deliver kinematic advantage and enhanced lethality.

SACM is being touted as a potential high-load out alternative for Raytheon's AIM-9X Sidewinder infrared-tracking short-range air-to-air missile for US fifth-generation aircraft. The F-35 is designed to carry two AIM-9X missiles externally and four AIM-120s in its internal weapons bay.

In the interim, on 12 January an F-35 from the US Air Force's (USAF's) 461st Flight Test Squadron launched an AIM-9X for the first time over the Pacific Sea Test Range, Point Mugu, California. According to a statement from USAF's Edwards Air Force Base, the missile shot, launched at 6,000 ft from Flight Sciences aircraft AF-1 of the Joint Strike Fighter Integrated Test Force, "paves the way for the F-35 to utilise the weapon's high off-boresight and targeting capabilities, increasing lethality in the visual arena". Integration of AIM-9X on the F-35 is anticipated in the Block 3F upgrade in the 2017 time frame.

The MSDM, according to the contract notice, "will support miniaturised weapon capabilities for air superiority by enabling close-in platform self-defence and penetration into contested A2AD environments with little to no impact to payload capacity". This essentially provides for a survivability enhancement concept for the platforms such as the F-35 and F-22 - stealth characteristics notwithstanding - which will deliver an enhanced kinetic countermeasure capability against incoming missile threats, replacing/or enhancing conventional non-kinetic countermeasures such as chaff, flares, and directional infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) with miniaturised munitions released from the platform's weapons bay.

The AFRL has already made a number of awards to progress the MSDM programme. In July 2015 Lockheed Martin Missiles & Fire Control was awarded USD220,944 for an MSDM concept study and in the same month Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control was awarded USD143,470 and Northrop Grumman Guidance and Electronics USD162,766 for an MSDM Seeker Conceptual Design - with the latter objective to develop a conceptual design of an "affordable air-to-air seeker front end (optics/algorithms) for the aircraft self-defence role".

Specific detail of both SACM and MSDM requirements - including required range, weight, engagement envelope and other missile characteristics - and of Raytheon's proposed concept solution has not been made publicly available. IHS Jane's approached Raytheon and the AFRL Munitions Directorate but both parties declined to comment.

The SACM/MSDM contract announcement noted that five contractors competed for the contract. Of these, Lockheed Martin, whose platforms these new tactical missiles will equip, had, mainly with internal research and development (IRAD) funding, made the most discernable progress correlating to both requirements [This was probably why Raytheon was given CRAD, to have 2 credible players move forward with Lockheed naturally benefiting from their PAC-3 investment given the goals there were similar - anti-saturation, high magazine load on AMD missions as opposed to - Largest size, longest range, biggest seeker etc that is traditionally associated with SAM evolution (PAC-2, Standard Missile and various SXXX missile path].

CUDA, a miniature radar-guided multirole hit-to-kill missile, designed to increase the air-to-air weapons load out on platforms such as the F-35 and F-22, corresponds directly to the SACM programme. KICM, a miniature hit-to-kill interceptor that leverages the millimetric wave sensor technology used in the PAC-3 MSE, was designed as an MSDM solution. Again, specific details of both Lockheed Martin solutions - CUDA and KICM - have not been made public, and the status and/or future of both IRAD-funded remains unclear. A Lockheed Martin spokesperson told IHS Jane's that, "Both CUDA and KICM are alive and well. We are looking forward to responding to future RfPs [requests for proposals]."

Raytheon is expected to complete work on both the SACM and MSDM solutions by 19 January 2021. New missile technologies are evolving to deliver increasingly compact electronics, guidance packages, control mechanisms, and warhead solutions. The result is smaller and lighter missiles, but with a potential trade-off in speed/range. In the case of SACM, for example, a specific replacement of AIM-9X could potentially impact the optimisation of the aircraft's weapons engagement parameters, and so there might still be a requirement for a faster medium-range air-to-air missile as part of the future US fifth-gen aircraft weapons load out.
Very interesting time for air-superiority systems in Ths US with them now being collectivly addressed under the direct supervison of the ACC boss and the DARPA boss. Most of these are concurrent so they are definitely breaking down requirements and looking to develop complementary systems. Larger leaps are being g sought in the EW domain with the first sign of post cold war resurgence in spending to develop the next generation of EW.
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

Some pictures (some firsts) from the 2016 Sea Air Space conference -

JDAM-ER (Australian configuration)

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Boeing High Altitude Air-Launched Glide HAAWC Torpedo

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Scaled Boeing Next-Generation Cruise Missile

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Lockheed CUDA - SACM contender

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Last edited by brar_w on 17 May 2016 06:23, edited 2 times in total.
NRao
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by NRao »

Mishaps!!!

member_28640
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by member_28640 »

Not sure if it's kosher but here is an anon guy calling himself a Lockheed Exec: He answered the following question on quora -"What went wrong with the F-35?"
His answer:
"I am writing as anonymous because I was a Lockheed Martin employee and executive for over 30-years and I was also intimately involved with the F-22 and the F-35 program. My anonymity is because I’ve witnessed other former Lockheed employees who have criticized the company and the program experience certain “issues”. I don’t need to suddenly have my pension stop, or get audited for multiple years by the IRS. I am writing a book on the financial and criminal misconduct of the Military-Industrial- Congressional complex and I am doing so under a pen name. This is a short sample of some of the information in that book.

First, the Joint Strike Fighter(F-35) requirements came from 11 different countries and 3 US military services. It was advertised as a clean sheet of paper design for a true fifth gen fighter. The old adage about using a committee to design a horse and you wind up with a camel is true. Only this time it’s a turd, not a camel. The pilots who fly it call it the Turd. It is more than a turd - it is an accident waiting to happen and one day it will take the life of a brave American pilot just like the F-22 has. For example, I was there the day they had to use a chain saw to cut open the canopy of the first test jet to get the pilot out because it wouldn’t open. He was sitting there in the Ft Worth 100+ degree sun literally baking alive. They towed the jet into a hangar but he was still cooking. He had to be lifted out through the hole and rushed to the medical center to be re hydrated using IV. Never saw that on the evening news, did you? The AC system on the jet quit working during the test flight because of a faulty part from one of the way too many subcontractors who sold crappy parts to Lockheed so, with cockpit temps soaring above 100 degrees, he aborted the test flight and RTB’d only to find that the canopy wouldn’t open. Not an easy day. Why did Lockheed buy crappy parts you ask? Another old adage applies here: Follow the money. Congressional pressure/influence coupled with poor processes and procedures and a cost cutting mentality because of a Firm, Fixed Price contract well over $200B for an unproven aircraft using high risk immature technologies. Gee, what could possibly go wrong?

Let’s follow the money: You see; the program is one of the largest political pork programs in the history of the US. That’s why it will never be cancelled. It has lined the pockets of Republicans and Democrats, ensured their re-elections and made $MM’s for their contractor cronies and is probably the best example of bipartisan politics in recent history. Boondoggle is a kind term. This has to be considered criminal. People are afraid that if Donald Trump becomes president, he’ll start investigating things like this because he’s not an insider and he will make them pay – a novel concept.

The 11 countries were there just for show and as potential buyers for the trumped up business cases. We (the US government and Lockheed) gave them the illusion of importance. The early meetings I was involved in never ever took the clean sheet of paper approach - NFW. Everyone was overwhelmed by the steaming pile of requirements and so basically just ignored them and used the 3 US military services. We were at the Paris Airshow one year and I remember one exec saying something like “those assholes (foreign countries) will buy anything we make and if they don’t like it, then they can go buy some piece of shit MIG or Dassault”. The US Air Force and Lockheed already had the design. Remember that Boeing was in the competition with their version - called Miss Piggy by some and Monica by others because of the gaping air intake and big nose (yes, it was around that time when Ole Bill and Monica got caught exchanging DNA samples in the Oval Orifice). The program was being run by the USAF, who has dictated fighter design for years. The 11 countries and Navy and USMC? Well, the USAF was just being nice and inclusive but at the end of the day, GEN Jumper and the fly boys went with what they knew, and that was the F-22 heritage. Lockheed execs did a masterful job of convincing them that they could re-use much of the F-22 design. Look at a picture of a Raptor and a Turd flying together. Tell the difference? Subtle details but most obviously the Raptor has 2 engines and the Turd has one.

Background: In 2006, congress and the DOD, in a rare moment of intelligent clarity and bipartisanship concern for the tax payer, cancelled the F-22,whose costs were spiraling out of control. The Raptor also had known problems and issues; most notably the pilot oxygen system, which has never been totally fixed and cost at least one pilot his life. I was in the company of some Raptor pilots about a year ago and they still have the infamous “Raptor cough”, a dry hacking sound. Ask yourself why the Raptor has never been used in combat. The real answer is that it takes so much time, effort and money to keep the jets flying and so it can’t sustain the sortie rates required for major combat ops.Back then Lockheed and the USAF were deeply invested in the F-22; financially and emotionally. We knew that it was on the chopping block, so the USAF and Lockheed did a full court press. Lockheed wanted to sell more jets and the USAF wanted to buy more jets. It was a classic example of the self-licking ice cream cone. We jointly performed huge multi million dollar warfare modeling and simulation studies using worst case scenarios of what would happen if a peer competitor country that may start with the letter C were to launch a major all-out attack against the US. We needed to build the case for more F-22’s and so we started with the answer and backed into the analysis results to say “See, we need 200 more jets or we’re all gonna f#*king die!” Congress and the DOD amazingly saw through the ruse and so it got cancelled. That may have been that last intelligent thing congress and the DOD ever did before the liberal crazies took over and now spend more time worrying about legislating transgender bathrooms, having women in Special Forces and registering our guns instead of enforcing the laws that are already in place.

So Lockheed had a huge amount of sunk costs in jigs, tooling and components for the F-22. Reusing the F-22 design would leverage those sunk costs, saving millions in startup and production costs – or so went the line of reasoning. Good idea, bad assumption, very poorly executed. Remember: Firm, fixed price.Which translates to: save money every which way you can and be the low bidder.Use less people and short cut processes was where it hit the fan. Who needs to pay a group of engineers to create a test plans? We don’t need no stinking test plans! Processes and documentation take a hit and quality goes down the toilet. A huge rift developed between Lockheed and the USAF/government and continues to this day. Budgets and schedules ran amok. People were fired or quit when they complained. Technical debt piled up on the I&T side of the V model. Agile processes were introduced on top of an already abbreviated the V model. The leaner we tried to run, the slower we got. Confusion and paranoia settled in at Ft Worth. Then corporate wide layoffs started due to Sequestration. Key technical people were laid off and replaced with new hires. The top execs were so out of touch with what was happening in the trenches it was pathetic. Mismanagement at all levels. They brought in some new execs during a major house cleaning back in 2012 but it still hasn’t helped much. Too little, too late. The F-35 is still a Turd and always will be. It has not nor ever will perform as claimed. Most likely it will suffer even more from maintenance issues than the F-22. And I fear that someday soon, that piss poor excuse for a fighter jet will cost the life of another brave American pilot. During this time, that peer competitor country that starts with C(hina) and Russia have developed their 5th gen fighters and some analysts say they perform better than the F-35 ever will in many aspects. I sort of chuckle when I see the Chinese fighter obviously patterned after the F-22 but with forward canards. Asian countries love to pattern their stuff after the West but with their own twists. Ok, China, go ahead ansd steal our technology - the jokes on you this time. Canards? So cold war.

But that’s just one program and there is more and it keeps getting worse but wait for the book. It’ll really piss you off."
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

Upgrades Keep Navy Air-to-Air Weapons on the Cutting Edge
One of the missiles is 8 years old, the other is pushing 30. But steady technology upgrades have kept these two Navy air-to-air weapons on the cutting edge.

The younger one is the AIM-9X Block II. The older is the AIM-120D AMRAAM — advanced medium-range air-to-air missile.

The 9X Block II was introduced in 2008, but did not go into full rate production until 2015. It’s the latest member of the Sidewinder missile family that dates back to the mid-1970s.

The 9X Block II can do things its predecessors could hardly have imagined. For example, it is equipped with a 360-degree engagement capability and a data link, said Capt. Jim Stoneman, chief of the Navy’s Air-to-Air Missiles Program Office. That enables a pilot to fire the missile first and then aim it at a target.

“The pilot can shoot and then pass more information to the missile” via the data link to vector the missile to a target, Stoneman said during a briefing May 16 at the 2016 Sea-Air-Space Exposition. The missile’s 360-degree capability enables it to engage targets — even those behind the aircraft, he said.

On some planes, such as the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, pilots will be able to aim the missiles using sights built into their helmets.

Although the Sidewinder was developed as a short-range missile meant for close-in kills, the Block II’s range has been “about doubled,” Stoneman said, making it into a “beyond-visual-range” weapon.

A Block III version of the 9X is on the drawing board, but for now remains unfunded, Stoneman said.


The AIM-120D is the latest version of the AMRAAM, which the Navy and Air Force have used since 1987. The D model also features a data link that enables a pilot to fire the missile and then send it targeting information, Stoneman said.

It has an improved Global Positioning System guidance system and enhanced anti-jamming capabilities to shield in the midst of enemy electronic warfare. After several years of testing, the 120D is now making its way to the fleet, Stoneman said.

Software upgrades are under way, and those should further increase the capability of the “Delta” model, he said. For now, there are no plans for a follow-on missile, he said.
USN set to test extended range JSOW variant
The US Navy (USN) has disclosed plans to move forward with testing of a powered, extended range variant of Raytheon's air-launched AGM-154C-1 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW).

In a pre-solicitation notice posted on 11 May, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) said that the Precision Strike Weapons Program Office (PMA-201) intended to enter into sole-source negotiations with Raytheon Missile System to provide technical support for the JSOW Extended Range (JSOW ER) all-up-round (AUR) test programme. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract award is planned for the fourth quarter of 2016.

JSOW is a medium-range air-to-surface precision-guided glide weapon employing a GPS/inertial navigation system and a terminal imaging infrared seeker. The JSOW C-1 variant adds a two-way Link 16 Strike Weapon Data Link and upgraded seeker software to meet the navy's requirements for a network-enabled weapon able to precisely strike moving maritime targets at ranges up to and beyond 100 km (54 n miles).

The turbojet-powered, extended range JSOW has been the subject of technology maturation and demonstration for almost a decade. Leveraging the JSOW C-1 datalink and seeker, but additionally incorporating a Hamilton Sundstrand TJ150 turbojet, JSOW ER has been conceived as a low-cost precision-guided stand-off weapon with a maximum range in the order of 300 n miles.

A free-flight demonstration test of JSOW ER was conducted from a Super Hornet off California in November 2009. The weapon flew over 260 n miles and, according to Raytheon, met all test objectives.

In late 2011 Raytheon completed a first test of the JSOW ER warhead and fuze. The company said that testing "met all objectives and validated a Raytheon-funded analysis that showed the JSOW-ER's proposed warhead and fuze are interoperable".

According to NAVAIR's 11 May pre-solicitation notice, Raytheon will provide technical support to PMA-201 for JSOW ER AUR testing over a 28-month period. "The scope of work includes hardware modifications to add a production-representative engine/fuel/inlet system to the AGM-154C-1 variant, as well as software modifications to optimise mid-course and endgame performance for the powered JSOW," it said.
Austin
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by Austin »

NASA to pay Russia $88 mln to deliver astronauts to world’s sole orbiter in 2018-2019

http://tass.ru/en/science/875995
TSJones
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

darpa planning for a new space plane.....

http://spacenews.com/why-darpa-is-pursu ... paceplane/
ORLANDO, Fla. – Here’s a phrase that’s not repeated everyday in the space community:

“You’ve heard Elon’s comments … we want to go beyond that,” Brad Tousley, the head of the tactical technology office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, said May 15.

Elon, of course, is Elon Musk, the optimistic, and some say visionary, founder of SpaceX with plans of eventually colonizing Mars. After landing three first-stage rockets, Musk has said SpaceX would inspect the rockets with plans to later re-fly most of them.

Tousley oversees DARPA’s space programs, which often handles the Defense Department’s most difficult development challenges. He described the landing of first stage rockets by SpaceX and Blue Origin as “very, very impressive accomplishments.”

But during a speech at the GEOINT 2016 conference here, Tousley said the agency’s experimental spaceplane, known as XS-1, also has ambitious plans.

“We want to launch again in 24 hours,” he said.

Ideally, DARPA’s XS-1 spaceplane would launch 10 times in 10 days and carry payloads weighing as much as 1,360 kilograms into low earth orbit for $5 million.

DARPA is finalizing a request for proposals for the second phase of the XS-1 development program. The agency could release that acquisition document as early as this month, DARPA officials have said. A contract award, as part of a public-private partnership, could come as early as 2017 with the first flight tests in 2020.

Tousley said DARPA would contribute “a healthy fraction” to the development of the spaceplane. XS-1 has been the agency’s top-funded space program the last two years. The White House asked for $50 million for the program in its budget request for fiscal year 2017.

Three industry teams have worked on the first phase of the program: Boeing and Blue Origin; Masten Space Systems and XCOR Aerospace; and Northrop Grumman and Virgin Galactic.

But during his speech here Tousley emphasized the importance of the quick turnaround for the spaceplane.

“One of the critical parameters that’s coming out of the Phase 2 solicitation for XS-1 is the requirement that before we launch this asset for the first time, the vendors are going to prove to DARPA through a ground test of their propulsion system 10 times in 10 days,” he said. “We’re gojng to burn a lot of risk down”

Tousley said XS-1 may also act as a deterrent for the Defense Department as threats to national security satellites have emerged in recent years.

“If you have the ability to launch an asset in 24 hours, essentially on a moment’s notice, then it may cause an adversary to think twice about exactly what it is they want to do from a threatening standpoint,” he said. “We think just having that capability as being of a deterrent value.”
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

Possible B-52 Crash @ Guam :

https://twitter.com/Mark_Duarte/status/ ... 8652661761

edit:

Image
TSJones
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

China's new spaceport and rocket........

http://spaceflightnow.com/2016/05/18/ch ... ext-month/
China plans to launch its first Long March 7 rocket, a new kerosene-fueled booster capable of carrying supplies to the country’s planned space station, by the end of June on a test flight that will reportedly loft an unpiloted prototype of a future crew capsule.

The Long March 7’s maiden flight will not only test the new rocket and a next-generation human-rated spacecraft. It will also mark the first use of a new island spaceport in the South China Sea.

Rocket components slated for the Long March 7’s inaugural flight left port at Tianjin, China, on May 8, heading to the launch base on Hainan Island off China’s southern coast, the official state-run Xinhua news agency reported.
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

A few months ago, a few folks here had asked if I could do a series of posts or articles that covered Tactics, procedures, and the various capabilities when it came to Electronic Warfare/Attack, Cyber-Electronic Warfare and where the traditional EW intersects with more modern CEW domain.

I never really got around it then but to start things off, I’d like to cover a few concepts, and articles that really go to the heart of what is ELECTRONIC WARFARE, how it is performed, how each type differs from another and what has led to the enormous changes in scope, and capability over time and how these systems stress even the toughest IADS. A few will also describe some of the changes over the last few decades that has blurred the line of EW, EA and how it is utilized organically and for support.

Part I is a more recent article from JED from the Old Crows, an international organization that founded by the EW community in the US (has many international members and contributors) that not only helps spread the message of EW but also acts as a custodian and documenter of EW combat, tactics and developments around the world. Being a long time member and a subscriber to their Journal I have had the opportunities to attend some of their events over the years and treat them as a highly informed group about not only the historic value of EW, but also where it is going globally. You will be hard pressed to find a better organized, informed, and resources EW advocacy group out there and in the US many of their members have been members of the prestigious Defense Science Board that is by n large the brain behind most of the cutting edge stuff the Pentagon does.

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Author : Jeff "Seed" Kassebaum, is the USAF Weapons School
 ElectronicWarfare Officer and Chief of Joint Force Integration at Nellis AEB, NV. Previously, he was the Weapons Officer of the 390th Electronic Combat Squadron and assigned to the US Navy's Electronic Attack Weapons School, where he fiew EA-6B Prowlers and EA-18G Growlers at NAS Whidbey Island, WA. Before his exchange tour with the Navy, he served as an EC-130H Electronic Warfare Officer and Weapons Officer at the 55th Electronic Combat Group at Davis-Monthan APB, AZ. He has fought in Operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom, Willing Spirit, Enduring Freedom, New Dawn and Unified Protector

FIGHTING THE KILL CHAIN: Concepts and Methods
THIRTEEN YEARS OF REPRIEVE:
A WARNING



For nearly the last 13 years of fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the majority of tactical air missions have lacked an air threat and a radar surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat. From the airborne electronic attack (EA)/suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) perspective, combat operations in CENTCOM have atrophied our respect for the radar SAM threat. We have had 13 years of reprieve because we have not had to fight against an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) actively trying to shoot us out of the sky at medium and high altitudes.' We have focused much of our weight and energy on CENTCOM threats while non-CENTCQM radar threat capability has increased.
The aviators in today's Combat Air Force (CAF) and Fleet have flown in fewer Large Force Exercises (LFE) than their predecessors just over a decade ago. This directly results in fewer aircrews training against a robust IADS threat, and fewer of us being punished for our mistakes in non- permissive environments. As the EA and SEAD Leads in the CAF and Fleet, it is our job to ensure that strike-package commanders have an appropriate level of respect for the IADS threat. We must emphasize that the threat is not only the end of the kill chain - the threat is the kill chain.

FOR CONTEXT: DELIBERATE STRIKE NIGHT, MAY2013

Deliberate Strike Night (DSN) is a US Air Force Weapons School student's first high-fidelity Large Force Exercise (LFE). DSN takes place during Weapons Integration Phase ordinarily the second to-last phase before graduation phase. Mission Employment (ME). However, due to sequestration. Weapons School class 13A did not have the luxury of DSN as a "walk before the run" of ME. Instead, DSN was the only high-fidelity LFE the Weapons School students of 13A saw. However, from an EA/SEAD standpoint, that year's DSN was serendipitous for the CAF because it gave us the opportunity to employ new EA capabilities for the first time. The objective of DSN is a long-range SAM take-down in a high-threat environment. This iteration of DSN had no U.S. Navy EA-18G Growler squadrons able to support the USAF Weapons School, as they have in the past. This highlights a distinct limitation in joint tactical execution: When sister Services have competing operational objectives, we have gaps in tactical execution. In the case of EA and SEAD, when the Navy could not support DSN, the CAF was left to solve a long-range SAM take-down problem on its own without being able to "rent" a modified escort EA platform for the SEAD package.

However, the Growler's absence became a critical EA opportunity for the CAF. This provided an occasion to integrate a new stand-in jammer, the ADM-160C Miniature Air Launched De- coy-Jammer (MALD-J), into DSN for its very first LFE, and the EC-130H Compass Call featured its newly fielded Radar EA capability called the Counter Radar Sys- tem (CRS), or "Jam Cube." The purpose of this article is not to discuss the tactical specifics of the weapons systems involved in DSN - that is for a different forum. The purpose of this article is to dis- cuss conceptually how we must think about the threat and how the Department of Defense should employ EA from an offensive EA and a defensive EA perspective, as well as concepts for integrating stand-off and stand-in offensive EA.

CONCEPTS OF ELECTRONIC ATTACK


To start, it is important to discuss the concepts of EA (lethal and non-lethal) against the threat's kill chain in general theory. I use the typical Blue Force dynamic targeting kill chain terminology intentionally. The threat is doing against us (Blue Force) what we are doing to the threat (Red Force). The threat needs to find inbound aircraft, generate tracks, engage tracks, and assess engagements. By using the Blue dynamic targeting kill chain terms (which are frankly more familiar to most of the CAF than the traditional threat Air Surveillance, Battle Management, and Weapons Control terms) the process of what an IADS is doing while we attack it is more clear and concise. To avoid the wrath of my intel brethren, the IADS Kill Chain is doctrinally: 1) Detect and initiate tracks, 2) Identify, 3) Correlate and maintain track, 4) Battle manage- ment, 5) Acquire, 6) Track, 7) Guide and 8) Kill.

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In Figure 1, the horizontal axis in red shows the threat's kill chain The left vertical axis (in black) shows non-lethal EA (i.e., radar and communications jamming) effectiveness from offensive jammers. The purple arrow above the vertical axes shows where anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) engage the threat kill chain. The right vertical axis shows non-lethal EA effectiveness from defensive jammers. The blue container in the middle shows where burn-through and alignment become significant considerations in targeting a threat kill chain.

OFFENSIVE ELECTRONIC ATTACK


Offensive jammers have a generally higher effectiveness earlier in the threat's kill chain. When the threat is primarily using early warning, ground- controlled intercept (GCI), and height finder components (radar and communications) of the IADS to start the kill chain, it is easier and more effective to stop initiation of the kill chain. If we prevent or delay the enemy from finding a Blue aircraft, it does not matter how proficient the SAM operators are to complete the engagement (significantly easier said than done). As the threat moves from early warning to Target Acquisition (TA) and Battle Management (BM) to Target Track (TT) to finally Target Illuminator/Missile Guidance (TI/MG) radar, jamming effectiveness begins to decrease from an offensive jammer.

We must not make the assumption that the only assets that should conduct offensive EA are assets supporting a strike package. That is merely the current construct. Given Moore's Law, we should question why offensive EA is not part of the arsenal of air-to- air escort and strike aircraft. (More on this below.)

The downward black arrow turns from a solid line to a dashed line to highlight the diminishing effectiveness of offensive jammers as they attack later in the threat kill chain. There are three primary reasons for diminishing offensive EA effectiveness. First, the threat kill chain is nearing completion, and once a SAM operator with a firing button has the required situational awareness (SA), there is not much that can stop the but- ton from being pressed. More simply, the later it is in the kill chain, the harder it is to sever the threat's targeting process.

Second, burn-through becomes more significant the closer our aircraft get to the jammed radar. That is, when the reflected energy return off the skin of a Blue aircraft is greater in relative power intensity than the energy from the jammer, the threat radar will be able to discern the actual aircraft from jamming interference. This is a factor for jamming that is attempting to raise the ambient noise threshold of the victim receiver (threat radar), not for deceptive jamming that introduces false targets into the victim receiver in an effort to prevent real target identification from false targets - so long as those false tar- gets appear credible and convincing.

The third reason for diminishing offensive jammer effectiveness is alignment of the offensive jammer through the supported/protected aircraft to the victim receiver. As alignment deteriorates, offensive jamming effective- ness reduces. This applies to stand-off/ modified escort offensive jammers using noise as well as sophisticated deceptive techniques like Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM), except that DRFM does not require alignment through the protected aircraft, only line-of-sight to the victim radar. DRFM jamming involves receiving and retransmitting threat signals back to the victim radar with a power modulation to deceive radar cross section, frequency shift to deceive velocity, and a time delay to deceive range. While DRFM alignment is not as critical as noise jamming alignment - since the DRFM jammer is introducing false returns to hide an actual return - the victim radar's antenna still needs to be pointed in the direction of the DRFM source (or vice versa). That is, if the victim radar does not detect energy from the DRFM jammer, there will be no false targets processed by the victim radar's receiver, defeating the purpose of the DRFM jammer. Burn-through and alignment limitations are indicated by the dashed blue container spanning TA/BM to TI/MG.

ANTI-RAOIATION MISSILES


In addition to non-lethal EA, lethal EA is critical to suppressing an IADS. Lethal EA (i.e., anti-radiation missiles or ARMs) must be integrated with non- lethal EA to achieve greater effective- ness in suppressing an IADS than either can achieve alone. IADS that lack an actionable air picture from early-warn- ing/GCI/height-finder/T A/BM radar will be forced to use organic SAM radar for the entire kill chain from "find" to "engage." To do this, SAMs must radiate longer than normal, making cooperative targets for Blue Forces to perform emitter geo-location and to attack the SAM radar with ARMs. ARMs engage the threat kill chain from TA to TI/MG and is indicated by the purple horizontal arrow above the vertical axes so as not to confuse ARM effectiveness with non- lethal EA effectiveness.

DEFENSIVE ELECTRONIC ATTACK


Finally, the right vertical axis in green shows the effectiveness of non- lethal EA from a defensive jammer. While both a stand-off jammer and a "self-protect" jammer perform EA, their roles are significantly different, which is why it is important to differentiate between offensive a n d defensive E A . Offensive EA is attacking an IADS; defensive EA is preventing completion of the threat kill chain against a single Blue aircraft. Differentiating offensive EA and defensive EA distinguishes not only where in the threat kill chain an EA asset is targeting, but also how the
EA asset is tactically employed. From a jamming perspective, large beamwidths provide the best defense against a ra- dar threat in the endgame, but this also provides a significantly poor offense due to the low-power density resulting from a large beamwidth. The advantage of using defensive EA with offensive EA is that it mitigates the degradation of losing alignment from a stand-off/modified escort jammer.

A defensive EA sys- tem on an aircraft always has alignment with the protected entity. A defensive jammer's strength is the ability to sever the kill chain in the end-game scenario (while always coupled with threat reactions and expendables). The green line in Figure 1 shows a curved increase in defensive EA effectiveness from “target” to “engage” to illustrate the limited effectiveness of defensive EA to prevent a threat from targeting the asset and a higher effectiveness against an engagement by the threat in the end game.

The dashed portion of the green line indicates the limitations of defensive jammers. Two factors drive the limited effectiveness of defensive jammers in the target/engage phase of the kill chain: power and jamming resources. A defensive jamming pod/capability is only able to generate so much power, and given that power dissipates through free space inversely proportional to the square of t h e range (inverse-square law), the ability for the defensive jammer to "reach" out very far is limited. This limitation is acceptable since a defensive jammer does not have to reach out farther than it needs to defeat the factor threat in the end game. This is why defensive jammers are not generating an offensive EA effect across the IADS; they are protecting only the jet that is carrying the defensive jammer.

The second factor for the dashed green line is a jamming resource limitation. A defensive jammer only has so many resources available to counter so many threats. Just because a defensive jammer is effective lvl against SA-X, does not mean it is equally effective Iv5 against SA-X - it does not even mean it will be 20 percent as effective against five threats compared to one due to dwell time and revisit rates required for effective jamming.

ATTACKING THE SYSTEM


Last, we must always think about at- tacking an IADS as a whole (a system!), not as a collection of individual threats - especially when we are being offensive. That is, the ability to jam a SAM's Target Track radar is not attacking the IADS of which it is a part; it is a part-task attack on a portion of the IADS. And further, for SAMs that exist as complexes with multiple types of radar dedicated to pro- vide the Target Track radar with a track to engage; if only the Target Track radar is jammed then the remainder of the complex could still be able to share track
data with another part of the IADS. Conversely, when we are being defensive, it is natural to focus on the SAM directly engaging your aircraft, because clearly that threat is the closest alligator to your canoe.

However, defeating an engagement in an IADS is unlikely to be a single event from a single axis, which is why it is so critical to layer offensive EA with defensive EA. Defensive EA alone is unlikely to be effective for very long against a threat kill chain that has been allowed unencumbered use of their command and control and radar picture. Figure 1 illustrates the concept that attacking an IADS must be multi-lay- ered in order to attack, suppress, deny or delay all parts of the kill chain. We must integrate offensive and defensive non-lethal EA along with lethal EA to be effective in attacking an IADS.

We fail when we allow the dichotomy of an "either or" discussion about EA. We would certainly not choose to focus only on offense at the expense of defense in a BFM (basic fighter maneuvers) sortie, and for the same reason we must not employ EA against the threat either offensively or defensively; we must use both.

TWO METHODS OF OFFENSIVE EA: STAND-OFF AND STAND-IN


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In a military with diminishing live- fly training resources in robust simu- lated IADS, we cannot afford to think about partially fighting an IADS. Just as offensive and defensive EA are not mutually exclusive, neither are stand-off and stand-in jamming. In the context of this article, stand-off and stand-in EA are types of offensive EA. The divide be- tween the two is how far into the SAM Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ) an offensive EA asset will go. In Figure 2, stand-off and stand-in offensive EA, the red line delineates a generic MEZ and the shaded red rectangle indicates the buffer area where an asset would MEZ PEN (penetrate the MEZ). Stand-Off EA assets have been the EB-65C, EA-6A, EF-lOB, EA-6B, EC-130H, and EA-18G. (I include modified escort EA-6B and EA-18G in the stand-off category because I am defining the boundary between the two as MEZ penetration in a modern IADS.

I did not include the EF-lllA in the Stand- Off list because it was also capable of stand-in and escort mission roles, albeit in a pre-2OOOs IADS.) All are manned assets reaching into the IADS from the midcourt and backcourt to maintain EA on the strike package(s) and suppress from a distance. A stand-off asset's self-defense capability and the threat's home-on-jam capability drive standoff distance. In turn, distance often drives higher power jamming requirements and can result in larger burn-through ranges and slower re-alignment rates (as indicated in blue, in Figure 1).

Conversely, stand-in jamming as- sets are (against a modern adversary IADS) typically unmanned, dispensable offensive EA assets designed to attack an IADS inside the MEZ - requiring lower power - and operate in a higher threat environment. The strengths of a stand-off jammer are high power and thinking aircrew able to respond to unplanned/unpredicted threat actions. The weakness of a stand-off jammer is its dependence on another asset to provide protection against an air threat while conducting its EA/SEAD mission. The strengths of a stand-in jammer are that it is dispensable, it can be put into harm's way without affecting the Commander's acceptable level of risk for the mission, and it is a low-cost asset. This means that many stand-in assets can be employed to provide a greater saturation effect from multiple axes than from a single stand-off jammer.

Importantly, stand-in jammers add an additional tool to the SEAD Lead's game plan. As a current Growler EWO, former Prowler ECMO, and a former EC- 130H EWO, I want stand-in jammers out there helping the SEAD package to sup- press an IADS. Often, it is the human condition (or perhaps Western?) that attempts to solve complicated problems by focusing on efficiency (but not always effectiveness), which in the modern age often involves automated capabilities and often-expensive single solution "platinum bullets." How- ever, we have to be careful to smartly use new capabilities. To start, we must acknowledge that technology and gadgetry do not solve our problems in and of themselves. They exist to help the decision-maker gain more information, make decisions faster or attack a threat more lethally.

The strength of stand-in jammers is that the SEAD Lead can send these robots into the IADS to engage closer to the threat, in more dangerous locations than a manned jammer can fly, and they are cheap enough to allow the Commander to use a lot of them to help saturate and overwhelm an IADS. We should 1) employ stand-in jammers against threats that will have difficulty defeating jamming; 2) use them against threats where stand-off jammers have Line-of-sight gaps; 3) use them to engage radar that, if targeted by stand-off jammers, induce severe self-generated Electromagnetic Interference on aircrews.

Inherent in identifying strengths, we also have to identify weaknesses when we use stand-in jammers in the SEAD game plan. We must be aware that we are using a non-thinking, non- dynamic automaton against a thinking threat operator who will make decisions that include not only attacking his attackers, but also that will enable him to see his kids tonight - this last visceral decision-making piece is wholly absent from training scenarios. I would argue that there are two typical approaches when considering automaton use against a thinking threat: datalink the information to the automaton or employ the automaton where a real-time execution flex is not required. At the risk of using a "straw man" argument, let us presume a datalink capability on stand- in jammers.

We cannot honestly think that using a delicate and severable (in a localized environment) datalink will necessarily be an asset - we will be lengthening and delaying our own kill chain. Better to use a stand-in jammer against the low-hanging fruit of an IADS where real-time decision making is not required, than hubristically presume that our enemies will allow us use of our datalink (by not trying to jam it). This approach turns a potential weakness of a stand-in jammer into a strength. An additional advantage of a manned stand-off jammer is the "smell test" of realizing that something does not seem quite right based on experience or instinct.

For example, EA aircrew/ humans, when presented with multiple parametrically similar threat emitters in the same general geographic area, could recognize that multiple similar emitters imply decoy employment, and make a radio call to an EW Support asset for in- depth analysis to help distinguish the actual emitter from decoy emitters, resulting in refined targeting. Therefore, we should use stand-in jamming against threat capabilities where we do not expect significant deceptive tactics, and task stand-off jamming against threats that require a thinking, problem-solving human.

Last, let us expand on the concept of stand-in jamming while challenging the archaic idea that only supporting assets employ offensive EA. After air- to-air escort cleans up the air picture and establishes air superiority, while the strike train is inbound, air-to-air assets pin down threat airfields. While doing so they should further target the component of the IADS feeding the air fight: GCI radar. An air-to-air asset pinning down an airfield is optimally positioned to electronically attack a GCI radar since it has the gas, line-of-sight and a shorter range to provide an offensive effect on an IADS if it had the EA capability to do so.

By attacking the GCI radar, the IADS is deprived of part of the air picture and the likelihood of further air-to-air engagements is decreased if that asset has an EA capability designed not for defense, but for offense. The air- to-air asset need not jam as much of the kill chain as a supporting EA asset, but by contributing to the offensive EA fight it will help the entire package by layering effects. The same concept goes for a strike asset electronically attacking non-organic TA and BM radar that feed the SAMs the strike aircraft are fighting through to get to the target area. To compare effective radiated power, from the inverse-square law above, if an air-to-air asset were to use the same transmit antennas - optimized for offense as a supporting offensive EA asset, an air-to-air asset 20 nautical miles from a GCI radar and with 1/9"^ the power would have the same effective radiated power as a supporting offensive EA asset 60 nautical miles away (three times farther). This is an example of an effective attack, not necessarily an efficient one. If the IADS has to contend with offensive EA from supporting and supported assets, the IADS is attacked from multiple axes using multiple methods, which increases saturation and slows the threat kill chain.

A THOUGHT SHIFT


How should we think about how to use stand-off and stand-in? The debate is not a parochial one to keep machines from taking aircrew jobs. We cannot ap- proach how we think about suppressing an IADS by first identifying who will do
that job. We fail if we do not first con- sider what effects we want to achieve on the threat's ability to use his IADS. To achieve commander's intent and support the strike package commander, we must:
1. Mask and deceive blue force movements as much as possible; 

2. Delay the IADS ability to build a coherent air picture for as long as possible; 

3. Deny, degrade or delay information flow through the IADS; 

4. Deny/degrade the ground-controlled intercept radar picture, forcing Red Air into autonomous operation; Deny/degrade/disrupt Red Flight Lead inter flight communications, isolating Red Wingmen from Red Flight Lead;
5. Isolate decision makers from weapons controllers, and vice versa; Force an IADS into as nearly autonomous as possible air defense "cells"; Attack non-organic Target Acquisition and Battle Management radar to isolate them from SAM operators, degrading decentralized execution; Exploit isolated air defense cells by geo-locating cooperative threat emitters;
6. Suppress threat emitters with lethal and non-lethal electronic attack; and
Employ our Blue Kill Chain faster than Red's Kill Chain - make decisions faster and our kill chain shorter!

We accomplish the above with a combination of offensive and defensive EA, as well as stand-off and stand-in. By employing EA as layered offense and de- fense, stand-off and stand-in, we attack the threat decision makers from mul- tiple axes, combining the strengths of each asset and mitigating the inherent weaknesses of each.

A tactical aviator should never (have to) think about the monetary cost involved in effective mission execution. However, these a r e trying fiscal times. We must break from the reflex that when a tactician asks for several capabilities to achieve multiple effects, it does not equate to increased cost. As an analogy, we cannot forget the lessons we learned as newly qualified package leads or the lessons we in- still in our Weapons School graduates: know when 60-80 percent of the plan is good enough, and step to the jet knowing 20-40 percent will change while airborne anyway.

We must not demand of our military industrial complex that they provide a 100 percent solution; we must not delay our capabilities against the threat for a perfect product. From an historical perspective, when our goal was to militarily outspend the USSR by forcing them to keep up, and economically bleeding them dry, we succeeded. We cannot afford (literally and figuratively) to fall for our own trick by other global competitors today. A robust IADS is the context, but we are still fighting human decision makers. It matters far less how sophisticated a threat missile system is if the decision maker employing the kill chain is slowed down, saturated and overwhelmed…even confused!

Better to think about cheaply saturating the ability of IADS decision makers repeatedly, than a massively ex- pensive single-solution upon which our entire development and procurement process is based. I am being simplistic ...to fight an IADS while running out of cash we should focus on many cheap solutions, not fewer expensive ones. An IADS will eventually be able to de- feat the few expensive solutions in the unending cat-and-mouse game of IADS development and IADS suppression. But multiple cheap solutions allow multi- axis attacks with inherent flexibility and variability.

OUR ELECTRONIC ATTACK WAY FORWARD

We cannot allow ourselves to think that today we are fighting a better version of yesterday's SA-2B. That kind of thinking results in going down an expensive and poorly focused path to acquire a better jammer, a better ARM, a better expend- able, a smaller radar cross section, a quieter engine, a colder heat signature...ad infinitum. The real threat we face today and tomorrow is the capacity of the decision makers to employ an IADS effectively. From the EA arena, we must attack the IADS at every part of the kill chain from "find" to "engage." We must saturate decision-making capacity and shift our focus from single-solution platinum bullets to multi-solution copper buckshot. We must layer offense and defense, and attack from outside and inside the MEZ to support the strike package commander to achieve Commander's intent.
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

Lets keep this civil and enhance the understanding of the various capabilities fielded by various nations when it comes to fighting in the EM Spectrum.
Brar, you are just posting a ton of text without any corroborating information or making a case that somehow France is behind the rest of the world or the US.
I am not making that case. I am making the case that based on what is known in the public, based on fielded operational capability, and near-mid term R&D projects with an operational focus there is little to support the claim that france fields an EW capability or has near term plans to field an EW capability that will match the best of them. Again, if there is evidence out there, I'd love to see it.
For all your statements of US supremacy in radars etc, there are tieups Thales has with US firms to market its radars. Not every segment has the US as the only answer. Selex is busy selling compact AESAs to the Coast Guard or some such force. Point is the world is not merely the US and only the US does not lead everything, merelly because it pumps a lot of resources.
US Firms are free to tie up with umpteen number of firms based out of allied nations if the alliance makes business sense. Some have technology, others the market, some funding source, and ultimate goal being to get a good product out to the market at the lowest possible cost, with benefits that would cater to the largest possible market for those products. I don't really see how any of that though is relevant to some sort of capability in the EW domain between these two armed forces.
Selex is busy selling compact AESAs to the Coast Guard or some such force. Point is the world is not merely the US and only the US does not lead everything, merely because it pumps a lot of resources.
Sure. But to claim france is a leader or near the top of the EW domain has to be corroborated by capability currently operational, the ability to wage an effective EMS suppression campaign and of course do so better than the others. What supplying radars to the coast guards has to do with that? Again, my argument isn't that the US has more resources but that the US has invested in more products, more dedicated EW training, and invested to build a certain level of capability aimed at a future threat. Whether that is providing defensive-offensive capability to its legacy fighters (Falcon Edge, DEWS, EPAWSS), developing passive EW (STEALTH), Proliferating EW throughout its tactical and increasingly strategic fleets, and of course working through the entire spectrum of the EW mission from long range high power (and now both stand off and escort) EA/EW platforms in the Growler (multiple mission system upgrades, Passive suite upgrades, and now a very extensive and cutting edge active suite upgrade through the 3 Increment Next Generation Jammer), to upgrading the EC-130 and now moving it to a new more available platform (Gulfstream), to taking the mission into the tactical stand-in domain through not only operationalizing higher performance (high subsonic, with range, loiter and maneuvering capability) MALD, to the stand-in MALD-J (and on to even larger stand-in systems in the UTAP-22 and soon payloads for it and the Gremlins).

On the defensive side they have hedged a network attack, by diversifying their waveforms (which NATO hasn't really done) and developing multiple redundancies into its SA communication nodes - something pivotal to waging effective Net Centric combat under a high stress/threat environment, where the enemy has a vote in which parts of the EMS you can operate in. Its called the ability to pivot within a domain and not sustain a severe reduction in capability as a result. My claim is based on these and other fielded, and near-term capabilities and investments and not a mere argument of MORE RESOURCES = HIGHER CAPABILITY.
Then seeing the amount of cooperation (answer, eons ahead of most countries because they dont compete with each other except in relatively niche areas like thermal imagers and even the detectors for those come from a central french agency). Then see the amount of revenue these firms pull in together & realize that they are not exactly struggling for financing on their own - and on top of it, they work for the French Govt, together.
All good, so which systems in the EA/EW domain does it result in and where is the cross spectrum capability as a result of all this? I never said France isn't capable or highly capable but to put them at the top requires some corroborating evidence of investments into operational capability or near-mid term capability..NO?
Not the pork barrel and pie US set up, where multiple firms compete for the same program but end up replicating efforts. The Rafale program management versus that on the JSF for instance, without the USAF, USN and USMC all setting all sorts of differing program goals and objectives for their respective programs and ending up with a hodge podge of a fighter which will be redeemed by its stealth and advanced avionics and which could have been so much more. The fact that you won't accept this as well, is also a given. But 99.9% of the world who have tracked the JSF program would.
Track the Rafale program, what resources it consumed, what time it consumed and what capability elsewhere was let go to pay for it and how and when it was expected to field increment capability, and how it tracked to that original established timeline. The US services could ask higher capability at higher cost because they had volume to justify that. Even the smallest US JSF operator will end up operating considerably more F-35's than the entire French Air Force's Rafale fleet. The JSF was a hodge...could it have been better? That depends on better for who.
This cooperation is because Sagem will happily sit & share data about its avionics to Thales which will work with Dassault to design the overall system and MBDA will develop missiles uniquely tailored to the Rafale or tweak them & the setup proceeds with full data transfer within all three orgs.
And that doesn't occur on the US systems? So BaE won't share their entire spectrum of expertise with their lead-integrator? Raytheon won't share the secrets of the AMRAAM or the Sidewinder with a Lockheed that is designing the fighter? That is a fairly weird assertion to make.
This is the standard practise with French programs since their basic product lines don't overlap for the most part, this does not require specific input or programs launched with strict French Govt oversight.
And the US programs don't have a government PEO controlling the design teams? Silos don't exist within an integrated design team irrespective of who the supplier is. I'd suggest you read into how the F-22 was designed and Developed. The AIAA book on it is a jewel. Each and every supplier was a part of the original F-22 design team post narrow-down. This includes the Electronics, and airframe component level suppliers. They were empowered and had full decision authority. Its not like Lockheed doesn't know the inner workings of the Northrop Supplied JSF Radar Antenna (Back end is Lockheed) - they build it to Lockheed's specifications and for Lockheed's Mission Computers to operate.
MBDA is not concerned that its seeker information is "lost" to Sagem or Thales when they work on Spectra. The French Govt works together to keep all three on track & its much easier because the three firms don't compete with each other on critical RF tech. Unlike NG vs Raytheon and so forth.
And Raytheon is concerned that its AMRAAM seeker information will be lost to someone else? You do realize that passing on the capability for the purposes of integrating the system is the prerogative of the PEO and not the OEM?
The fact that you didnt't understand how ITAR and other regulations even affect how advanced features cannot be shared with prospective customers who then suggest improvements, or would even be willing to fund those efforts, speaks volumes. The UAE and the Block 60 improvements for instance. India & Moog actuators for Rustom-2 for instance.
I am familiar with ITAR restrictions but what does that have to do with the capability of the US in the EA/EW domain? Would the US all of a sudden become a better EA/EW force if it relaxed ITAR?
All you are telling me is that US is great because US spends resources and you have not posted anything about how France is behind in EA or EW.
On the contrary I am asking for specifics in terms of fielded capability, in the pipeline capability that can be used to genuinely claim they are amongst the leading forces in the practice of it. For the US we can talk about multiple currently fielded, on the verge of being fielded, near term, mid-term and far term capability that will establish that it has a very high degree of capability currently fielded, to be fielded in the near and far term.
All the stuff you are posting about R&D budgets, S&T is funny because its nearly always classified and any analyst would know that its a common practice across the world that they are redacted even in company Annual Reports & even sectoral profits & revenues are not reported because it gives an indication of the order book, and hence its up to the company's discretion as to what they choose to report (and don't). See a few analyst calls sometimes and see the the hilarity that goes on as folks try to guessestimate these details.
Therefore, we must look at what is KNOWN and this is where I stick to. I don't claim that the US has some exceptional capability based on classified EW elements. Heck the entire F-22 and F-35 EW/EA suites are largely classified (beyond the marketing brochure). I'm sticking to what is known and I'd assume you would stick to that too unless you something that is in the classified realm when it comes to French capability. Again, if there is capability out there, in the various stages (Operationalized -- developed -- short-term R&D, long-term S&T) that will establish their status, then by all means do share.
France makes state of the art radars, ESM suites, datalinks, software defined radios with proprietary waveforms, has the entire end to end foundry to embedded software bit within Europe via state owned firms or partnerships, strategic to tactical missiles with all subsystems, naval, land based EW suites... in each case equivalent to or even leading the rest of the world in specific attributes.. something few if any countries could manage at even a fraction of the sophistication French firms do at the depth and range... and somehow, their EW aids portion is where they are behind, because you believe it to be & not because the French deliberately don't advertise certain niche capabilities such as the capabilities of their fighter EW suites for custom makes (unless somebody is willing to pay for it & keep it quiet).

To then imply that somehow they are behind, doesn't pass the smell test.
So they have really competent fighter EW suites. Does that automatically translate to cross-spectrum EMS superiority?
Tell us the specific areas that France is behind the US or the rest of the world in those areas. Anyone reasonable though, would look at all the above areas and come to their own conclusions. As far as I am concerned the US, France and a couple of other countries lead the world in EW aids - Elettronica of Italy for instance & Indra of Spain have long maintained state of the art capabilities and programs like the EFA helped them. Where French firms differ is that they don't need to rely on the occasional EFA to sustain them. They have constant local programs like the Rafale & other ones plus a huge exports apparatus to make sure the engine keeps chugging. To deny this is to then engage in semantic quibbles about what shade of blue the sky is
A Few :

- Wide-band stand-off jamming (Growler currently can be configured to provide sustained stand-off jamming across 10 system specific sub bands (64-150 MHz, 150-270 MHz, 500MHz to 1 GHz, 1-2.5 GHz, 2.5-4 GHz, 4-7.75 GHz, and 7.75-11 GHz) with individual transmitters selected (Five different configurations) to deal with particular threats and ICANS enabling cooperative engagements (Even during Low Band Jamming of sensors or Communications) with differently configured Growlers for the Stand Off, or High Power escort missions.

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Not to mention the Jammer-AN/ALQ-227 synergy.

With Confirmed higher power (and significantly better narrow-beam escort jamming) order of magnitude increase in capability just a few years away - 10 times the effective radiated power compared to the current SO jammers along with much higher wide-band coverage (thanks to Higher power GaN and lots of spare power to provide it) from individual pods allowing for software defined re-configurable very high power stand-off aerial jamming)

(Increment 1 to be delivered and in LRIP starting late 2019, Increment 2 RFI goes out in the next couple of weeks despite the fact that a highly upgraded/modified LBT-AG is currently in production and with fresh units being delivered to the fleet - and still regarded very capable for the low-band threat) The Mid capability will cover even the most advanced and agile threats currently requiring work-arounds given some of the capability of the legacy system (this doesn't extend to the low band region where they have modernized and still maintain production).

- Persistent EW in support of ground troops akin to CAS (in high demand) - Multiple Payloads, Multiple Platforms, and Multiple options (For UAVs based on mission need - NERO, DAECON among other options fielded or demo'd) depending upon the threat and mission needs: For Example: This, This, and This

- Stand in Jamming - MALD and MALD-J Currently Operational and deployed, UTAP-22 demonstrations PUBLICLY disclosed ( Carries twice the overall weight of the MALD-J (including the flight vehicle and engine) in just payload, and does so to up to as much as 3 times MALD-J's range) , and MALD-X in early development along with additional demonstrations to bring reusability (and open up more sensitive and expensive payloads to expand mission scope) to stand in jamming.

- High performance ARM capability - Compared to the AARGM - AN/ALQ-218(V)2 combination already operational. (Look-Through capability on the (V)2 allows the Growler to execute simultaneous SEAD missions using the Jammer for one threat, and DEAD using AARGM with another without stopping the jamming)

Longer ranged systems for both already in development - AARGM-ER for the former, and the new *Staring sensor* for the latter (no need to go band by band, with staring systems you are constantly scanning across a huge swath of frequency - 500MHz to 110 GHz in the case of the recent products to be funded)

- Passive EW and aided Survivability (STEALTH that would change with FCAS) that impacts both the EW footprint, and what can be done within that footprint (Smaller RCS, less Jamming need, and more Jamming opportunity as a Joint Force/System)

- Multiple Agile (aerial) waveforms (defense against a competent opponent with robust EW/EA and Cyber capabilities) beyond the standard L16 network and its associated skins.

France operates mostly under the NATO umbrella, and against a credible threat (and in some cases against any threat) NATO would need all or most of these capabilities. How many can France provide ? We'll leave aside them having to fight the EMS battle alone for now. As I had mentioned earlier, each one of these capabilities requires first and foremost a dedicated R&D and S&T investment to fund it, allocation of procurement resources to acquire it, and sustained training to train with it. You put an ALQ-99 on an F-16 and give it to the USAF, and they'll wonder what to do with it. In the hands of the VAQ, and when combined with the systems onboard the Growler it is a totally different system for A) Its build around the mission (platform) and most importantly, it is operated by a community who's sole job is to develop capability, training, and tactics on just one mission - to fight the EMS battle and nothing else. They commit 100% of their resources, and training time to just that mission.

Thats in the operational domain however we can get to near term projects in the cognitive and cooperative domain as well and we can discuss whats on the horizon (say 5 years). Cognitive EW looks to solve some of the automated EW challenges highlighted in the article in the previous post. Highly advanced systems, machine learning and sensor to sensor connectivity (as opposed to platform to platform) will open up some very unique applications 10 or so years. Again, some information on going developments is public, and we can certainly look into who is doing what. Given them adaptability by fielding cognitive capacities, and you have a multi-fold increase in MALD-J capability (perhaps a MALD-X solution), give it even more capability and give it the ability to cooperatively approach a problem and you build it further. Link a dozen of these to a Human (or more) and you have a true exponential increase in distributed Electronic Attack/Warfare capability that is many times more than the sum of its parts...

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Cognitive EW Gets Brainy (excerpts)

Its important to recognize the difference between the terms software-defined and cognitive. A software-defined radio (SDR) is the classic example of digital components taking the place of their analog counterparts and this trend has been covered in the pages of JED before. Suffice it to say that when functions can be performed digital- ly they will be, eliminating components such as mixers, filters and other devices. The functions in an SDR are performed in software using digital components such as FPGAs, DSPs, high-speed memory and analog-to-digital and digital- to-analog converters. As standard-based waveforms are defined in software, and signal processing is performed digitally, an SDR can receive, transmit and switch between a large number of waveforms. One of the best-known military examples of SDR is the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program. When the program was re-scoped by the US Army last year, the key element remained the waveforms, which future JTRS-compliant radios must incorporate.

In contrast, a radio, radar or EW system with cognitive abilities can reconfigure itself not just with pre- programmed waveforms, but with wave- forms created in place and on the fly, so to speak, using cognitive abilities to make multiple, simultaneous advanced decisions about a bewildering array of questions in real-time or nearly so. In short, while the SDR is smart enough to make limited decisions based on preprogrammed capabilities, cognitive systems can make orders of magnitude more types of decisions, and act on them.
The development of cognitive techniques is a highly mathematical domain, focused on behavioral models and algorithms rather than hardware. Even with this as a backdrop. Dr. Shubha Kadambe, principal systems engineer at Rockwell Collins Technology Center (Cedar Rap- ids, IA), says that current digital components are not a limiting factor today. This is important, as the goal of every program, from DARPA or elsewhere, is to enhance the capabilities of existing systems while integrating them into many others in the future. The company, which has been working in this area for five years, has a prototype system with algorithms running on a laptop using I/Q files from spectrum captures used as the simulated environment.

Dr. Kadambe explains that there are essentially three elements encompassing cognitive EW. "The first is situational awareness, scanning the environment, determining what signals are present, their waveforms, their location and who might be transmitting them," she says. "The second is electronic attack, the es- sence of cognitive techniques, in which you jam either the physical, MAC or net work layers."
"The algorithms make optimal decisions as to which node to use and to which layer to apply jamming in order to optimize the amount of energy in the waveform while minimizing the energy elsewhere to avoid collateral damage," she continues. "We want to target only those foes whose signals have the most significant effects on friendly forces.

The last element is protection, managing the spectrum based on terrain, the type of equipment the enemy is using, minimizing jamming to friendly forces, and jamming networks. In the learning part of cognition, the system digests something it does not know, learns about it, and adapts to the new environment. It does not require huge computational resources," says Kadambe, "but this depends on the number of unknowns. Our algorithms are very efficient."
Albert Davis, program manager for Spectrum Systems Laboratories, within Lockheed Martin's Advanced Technology Laboratories (Cherry Hill, NJ), adds another element to the equation: distributed sensing, which the company's researchers have been working on in addition to other aspect of cognitive EW. "In the six years our lab has been working on these issues, "says Davis, "there have been so many sensing, processing, and networking advances that it is now possible to put some cognitive algorithms on small platforms."

"Probably our greatest strength," he continues, "is in distributed sensing, that is, using not just one sensor but multiple sensors fused to provide greater situational awareness. One of the benefits of this approach is that if you have a lot of inexpensive sensors in the field that send feedback to a central computer, each sensor needs to have much less processing capability, which gives you more flexibility than one large, expensive sensor in one location. As each sensor captures different information, and each one covers a specific frequency range, there is enhanced ability to establish situational awareness."

Davis strongly believes that a distributed approach is one of the aspects of cognitive EW that will deliver the greatest benefits in performance, cost control, and SWaP (size, weight and power), among others. "As we become a more networked world, we have to think the distributed approach," says Davis, "understanding what we are sensing, mapping, and modeling before we send information out the people who need it. To achieve this, we need smart algorithms on localized, small sensors and also bigger algorithms at a central point."
He defines some of the major cognitive EW challenges as focusing on spa- tial temporal aspects, distribution of emitters in space when they appear, if they correlate to known models or are unknown, and how various events di- verge from what should be expected (which can indicate that the situation has changed).

Ultimately, the end result is to identify targets, determine if it is the enemy, determine its weakness, jam it selectively and suppress it with very smart techniques developed over time with adaptive algorithms.
Davis presents an interesting point that is probably as important as any technological aspect of cognitive EW development - resistance to change. "The classic approach to EW is very strongly held by many people, and getting them to rely on algorithms and advanced sensing takes some time. So we have to demonstrate that the techniques work and are as effective, if not more so, as traditional barrage attacks." .....

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With funding dating back to 2008, the FSSR effort is part of ONR’s Electronic Warfare Discovery & Invention Program, which “seeks to develop and demonstrate a broad range of next- generation EW systems that exploit, deceive or deny enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum while ensuring their unfettered use by friendly forces.” The program is leveraging ONR science and technology investments in a number of areas including antennas, wideband photonic and spectral holographic processing, miniature broadband filters, multi-configurable filters and wideband gallium nitride (GaN) receiver components.

As the prime contractor, BAE Systems will be responsible for providing EW system domain expertise, threat characterization and identification processing, and system design and integration knowledge. According to Steve Hedges, BAE Systems’ FSSR Principal Investigator, the program integrates a complementary array of innovative technologies to deliver what is “essentially an extremely- high-speed (near-instantaneous) spec- trum analyzer capable of finding new energy over broad bandwidths, and at different resolution bandwidths, with 100% probability of intercept. As a staring receiver, as opposed to a scanning system, it’s not just scanning a small segment of frequencies at a time, it’s looking at all frequencies instantaneously. [And one can kind of guess what effect that has on longer ranged LPI radars and data links that rely on fast hopping, short duration signals looking to slip through the gaps]

The system is intended to cover the spectrum from 500 MHz to 110 GHz [Thats UHF to W band through one staring system], providing instantaneous bandwidth coverage over 10s of GHz at a time, with multiple bandwidths able to be linked together to instantaneously cover even larger spectrum swaths. FSSR is a three-year program with demonstrations planned for each year. ONR’s Binder says, “The FSSR demonstration system will highlight its frequency coverage, sensitivity, direction-finding accuracy and rap- id-reporting times. The FSSR system provides 100% probability of inter- cept across the entire microwave and millimeter-wave bands, even in cases where the signals of interest are short pulse/low duty-cycle or exhibit com- plex modulations, and even in dense electromagnetic spectrum environ- ments or in the presence of strong interferers.” The demonstrations will include laboratory testing in anechoic chambers, as well as field demonstra- tions, says Hedges. “We’ll be sub- jecting the system to fairly dense electromagnetic environments to show the collection capacity and sen- sitivity of the system. By subjecting the receiver to such realistic, complex environments, we can demonstrate how these discrete innovations com- bine to enable an effective EW system capability.” The first demonstration is planned to take place in the fall of this year.

^ And its Active Counter part for ' Beyond the NGJ Applications' - The Outgoing ACC Boss (Hawk Carlisle alluded to some of this work, with respect to future air-superiority missions/fighters - I had posted his comment earlier)

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The BAA [This BAA is from 2011, and pre-dates the one cited above. Essentially they had a few teams working at it between 2008-2011, another down-select starting 2011 with program conclusion in 2015 and in 2016 they started with ONE team and DEMONSTRATIONS as mentioned above - along the way the scope has increased] seeks proposals addressing technology developments in areas such as wideband electronic support (ES) sensing and processing, including cueing receiver concepts and critical receiver components that operate across the entire 1- to 110-GHz frequency range. Other stated areas of interest include wideband electronic attack (EA) components and techniques, including wideband high-power critical EA system components and wideband EA techniques (waveforms) and techniques generators that operate across the en- tire 1- to 110-GHz frequency range. [ Its easy to guess the benefits of a wideband EA setup that combines multiple payloads into one and how it effects vehicle design and architecture and ultimately survivability and cost].

The last part is especially relevant when your short (2020's) medium term (2030's fighter) and long term (2040+) P&T architecture goals are aggressive, well defined and extremely well funded :

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brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

On Legacy and Tactical fighter programs, there has been a sometimes slow (to acquire, but not to develop as Falcon Edge and DEWS have shown) but consistent path to adding capability leveraged from other programs (a lot form 5th generation work).

- We know for example based on AvWeek and Jane's reports that some sort of Suter capability was added to a small fleet of F-16's in addition to larger aircraft

- Both the AESA options on the F-15 (AN/APG-63(v)2 and AN/APG-82 have demonstrated Electronic Attack/Warfare modes

- AN/APG-77 and -81 have an operational EW mode

In addition to this, below is an in-depth article covering the F-15 fleet EW system upgrade (A similar path was to be followed for the F-16 fleet but has currently been shelved due to diminishing returns given the productive fleet life - The F-15E's especially are built around a long airframe life prior to airframe first SLEP (>12,000 hours without SLEP) so they have a lot of legs left in them to carry on well into the late 2030's) -

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Boeing (St. Louis, MO) has chosen BAE Systems (Nashua, NH) to develop and manufacture the Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EP AWSS) for the US Air Force's F-15C and F-15E fighter aircraft. With the F-15 now scheduled to remain in service through 2040, the next-generation, all-digital, EW system is part of a multi-billion dollar program to develop a complete, integrated aircraft protection system for the aircraft as well as provide it with improved situational awareness.

EPAWSS will replace the F-15's current Tactical Electronic Warfare Suite (TEWS) on F-15C and F-15E model air craft. Originally developed in the 1970s and upgraded several times since then, TEWS is a federated EWsystem incorpo rating BAE Systems' (Nashua, NH) AN/ ALR-56C Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), Northrop Grumman's (Rolling Meadows, IL) AN/ALQ-135(V) radar jammer, and BAE Systems' AN/ALE-45 chaff/flares countermeasures dispenser.

Intended to address both advanced RF and electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) threats, the EPAWSS will be a multispectral system that provides wideband ra dar warning and RF jamming, as well as increased chaff and flare protection. As described by Brian Walters, Vice President and General Manager of Electronic Combat Solutions at BAE Systems, "To be able to operate in the future threat environment, the F-15 is going to need a new, highly-capable EWsystem. EPAWSS really leverages a lot of the work we've done over the last 15-20 years providing EW suites to the F-22, F-35 and, recently, we were selected to provide a digital EW system, the DEWS system, for Boeing's Advanced F-15 program. As, an all-digital system, [EPAWSS] lever ages some very agile architectures and allows us to adapt to changing threats. Its processing capability, together with the way we go about processing signals, means it's able to handle an incredible level of threat density and be extremely flexible in terms of dealing with modern Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS).''
The US Air Force awarded Boeing, as the platform integrator, a $171 million contract for the Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase of EPAWSS. Boeing subsequently chose BAE Systems to develop and produce the system. As described by Evelyn Moore, Boeing F-15 EPAWSS Program Manager, "Although the total program is valued at over $4 billion, the Air Force doesn't nec essarily have $4 billion in funding for EP AWSS right now, so the program is broken up into individual phases. We've received a contract for the design phase, and BAE is leveraging the DEWS system and pieces from EW systems on other programs that all come together in this TMRR design phase for EPAWSS at Boeing."
The Air Force and Boeing began work on EPAWSS with a small characterization contract in which they conducted trade studies on potential system performance, installation and locations, removal of the old system, the volumes in which the new system would be installed, and other considerations. A source selection for the EPAWSS supplier was begun in 2014. Says Moore, "We did multiple studies. We started off with four bidders and we ran through a vigorous competition process at Boeing with oversight from the Air Force and the Defense Contract Manage ment Agency (DCMA)."
Although Boeing would not comment on the other competitors, it has been previously reported that Harris (Clifton, NJ), Northrop Grumman (Rolling Mead ows, IL) and Raytheon (El Segundo, CA) had expressed interest in the program. Mike Gibbons, Boeing Vice President F-15 Programs, says "it was an iterative down- select process, and definitely a very competitive environment. Beyond the four bidders, there were also a number of other companies that were in discussions early on to learn if their offerings might be competitive. EPAWSS is a major com ponent of the F-15's future out beyond 2040, and BAE's system is a game-changer, building a lot on what BAE has been doing with other EW systems both for the F-15 and other platforms."

BAE's Walters recalls the process as "a very efficient and disciplined pursuit," noting that "one thing that Boeing and the Air Force did that I think is a best practice, is that they wove in a Systems Requirements Review (SRR) as part of each competitors offering. This gave ev eryone an opportunity to say 'Do we all understand the requirements, and do we all understand how we will meet the requirements?' When I first heard of this, I kind of scratched my head, but in the end, it allowed all of us to bring forth the best solution for the F-15 and will serve the program well going forward."

One of the questions surrounding the design of EPAWSS has been the choice of technology that would be used to power the system's jammer transmit ters, whether a solid-state amplifier approach or more conventional traveling wave tube (TWT) technology. Walters answers that question saying BAE's approach is a GaN-based solid-state ampli fier design. "We already consider it to be in the TRL-7 to TRL-9 range, and it will definitively be TRL-9 very shortly. We're already deploying this technology on other programs."

In addition to improved aircraft pro tection, EPAWSS will also provide pilots with improved situational awareness. Says Walters, "This is possible because of the advancements that we've made in algorithm processing, as well as hard ware performance. It's enabled us to do a lot of things on the electronic support measures (ESM) side or RWR side that provide precision location, reduce am biguity, improve emitter ID, and better understand the intent of the different emitters. This all leads to providing the pilot with better situational awareness of the environment that he is operating in." EPAWSS will also improve the F-15's chaff and flare capabilities, including design work on the aircraft's tail to en able it to carry more "buckets" of both chaff and flare expendables.

Moore points out that there are extensive aircraft modifications required to put a new EW system on an aircraft ncluding, in this case, removal of the wings and replacement of the aircraft's 'tailbone' between the engine exhaust nozzles. "A lot of work has to be done all over the aircraft to support the program. We're taking off all of the TEWS compo nents, with a savings of 13 LRUs [Line Replaceable Units] going from TEWS to EPAWSS, so a lot of weight is being re moved from the aircraft, as well as pro viding for a smaller footprint." Moore adds that the determination of the com position of the Group A (cables, panels, etc.) and Group B (actual EPAWSS compo nents) modification kits, including any "swing" elements was also a challenge. Boeing makes these determinations to gether with the Air Force. "It's always the case with a system of this complex ity," says Moore. "However, we're lever aging a lot of the work that we've already performed on the Advanced F-15 and, al though that is a new aircraft build and this is a retrofit, we're able to leverage some of the design that we've already done on the platform, which is helpful."

Boeing anticipates receiving a follow- on EPAWSS contract from the Air Force in September 2016 for the EMD, integration and test phase of the program. This will be followed by a low rate initial pro duction (LRIP) phase currently antici pated for August 2019. As Moore notes, "EPAWSS is an Acquisition Category 1 program (a program over $2 billion), so we go through an extensive acquisition process and must pass through each of the Air Force's milestone gates to pro ceed into the next phase." In the LRIP phase, 24 F-15E model aircraft and 18 F-15C model aircraft will be modified. The remaining aircraft will be upgraded in the full-rate production phase with, ultimately, over 400 F-15E and F-15C model aircraft to be equipped with the new system. Initial Operational Capabil ity (IOC) is targeted for 2021 for E-model aircraft, and late 2022 for C-models.
In the EPAWSS Analysis of Alterna tives (AoA) phase completed last year, the Air Force and OSD made a number of recommendations for the program go ing forward. Among these were a missile warning system and a fiber-optic towed decoy (FOTD), as well as advanced geolocation capabilities for the ESM system. In order to expedite development and field ing of the most essential capabilities, however, the Air Force decided to pursue these capabilities under a follow-on "sec ond increment" of the program. However, as explained by Moore, "Although we will have growth provisions in the system for advanced geolocation and an FOTD, the Air Force has since decided not to fund the second increment at this point. There are several threats that are of concern, but we have to balance funding against the requirements and the time frame, and the most important item is to get the capability out to the fleet as soon as possible. So the delay with the FOTD was basically because we didn't want to hold up the entire program. We wanted to keep it moving forward."

Should the Air Force decide to fund the second increment in the future, Moore says they'd anticipate a second contract to start developing the requirements, "but we wouldn't see that until FY2017."
Going forward, Gibbons says they're always looking at how to link the EP AWSS EW upgrade with other ongoing activities for the F-15 in terms of life extension and other new capability upgrades. "This is, of course, always an Air Force decision, but as we look at their interest in flying the aircraft for decades through 2040 and beyond, it's obvious that there will be other up grades and life extensions. The aircraft modifications alone mean that we will want to look for possible synergies with doing other things. With an IOC in 2021, and mods ongoing through 2029, it just makes sense that there will be other up grades and life-extension components that will be added."
NRao
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by NRao »

US lifts arms sales embargo on 'Nam.


Also, 'Nam is being touted as the next place for manufacturing. Could make a dent in MII.
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

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Boeing pushes Advanced F-15

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Boeing is making a new push for its F-15 Eagle as it continues to eye now potential on the world market. In a new commerical the Advanced F-15 is shown being out through its paces.

Boeing is currently building F-15SAs for Saudi Arabia and is in line for additional orders from both Qatar and Israel.

When Boeing officials talk about their latest, and probably ultimate, variant of the F-15 they talk about the ‘Advanced Eagle’.

This taps into the host of refinements evolved over the 40-plus years of Eagle production, and which manifests in the latest — and potentially final — variant now on the famous St Louis production line. Boeing is currently building 84 F-15SA Eagles for the Royal Saudi Air Force. These feature a host of significant new capabilities including digital fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control technology, the Advanced Digital Core Processor (ADCP) 2 mission computer, the advanced crew station with Large-Area Display (LAD), Digital Electronic Warfare System (DEWS), and an AESA radar.

Many of these features were planned as part of the stealthy F-15SE Silent Eagle, which failed to attract direct interest from new customers. Indeed, Silent Eagle enhancements may never be fully realized as Boeing was largely relying on customer support to bring these to reality and the loss in South Korea effectively put paid to the key stealthy improvements. The conformal weapons bays (CWBs) were, for example, part of the industrial offset with Korean industry. The CWBs had two doors and two weapon mounts, the upper, side-opening door carrying a rail launcher for an AIM-120 AMRAAM or an AIM-9-type missile, or a launcher for a single 500lb or 1,000lb bomb or two Small Diameter Bombs (SDBs). The lower door accommodated a trapeze-plus-ejector mount for an AIM-120, or for a single 500lb or 1,000lb bomb or two SDBs. The CWBs would also accommodate a small amount of fuel. Having funded an initial test period, including firing an AIM-120 from the CWB in July 2010, Boeing was ready to develop a number of the Silent Eagle options with customer support as prospective buyers came forward.

Although Seoul opted for the F-35, the Saudi deal paved the way for some of the less noticeable elements of the Silent Eagle to come to fruition, notably the advanced cockpit, digital FBW, and DEWS. Various elements that have been taken up by Boeing’s export customers over the past decade are now on the table to be offered as upgrades for other existing F-15 customers — including the USAF. Enter the F-15 2040C.

Boeing’s Eagle strategy is delicately moving from one of new production, towards one of upgrade and sustainment, both for the international and, perhaps more importantly, the domestic market. F-15SA production and conversions of at least some existing RSAF F-15S Strike Eagles to this new standard will keep the St Louis plant busy until 2019, but by the end of this decade major orders for new Eagles may be hard to come by.

http://www.combataircraft.net/2016/05/2 ... kk.twitter
brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

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This has a potential to change many many missions once it gets scaled. EW and Air Superiority are the natural starting points but it will no doubt aid defensive capability as well -



brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

brar_w wrote:A few months ago, a few folks here had asked if I could do a series of posts or articles that covered Tactics, procedures, and the various capabilities when it came to Electronic Warfare/Attack, Cyber-Electronic Warfare and where the traditional EW intersects with more modern CEW domain.


To carry on from the previous post –



Getting to the Complex relationship in the cat and mouse game between an Integrated Air Defense System, its operators that are looking to thwart offensive operations over a section of the airspace they control and the opposing forces that are looking to attack the Air-Defense system (kinematically and through Advanced Electronic Attack increasingly also cyber-electronic-warfare) as well as conduct the various missions (Air Superiority and strike) while the IADS is fully functional, or in some state of movement (a common tactic) or degradation.

Historically, Air defenses have been giant fortresses that were largely fixed. RMA came about when they became mobile allowing for rapid relocation that provided significantly enhanced survivability and complicated the kill chain for an intruding force looking to take it out. Additionally mobility also enabled decoys and further complicated the blue force’s efforts to find, fix and target within an acceptable OODA loop.

In recent decades, solid state AESA radars, and software defined communication nodes have added another layer of complexity by shrinking jamming ranges for both stand-off, escort, and stand-in jammers (The radars are more agile, and higher power with longer ranges) and the availability of multi-mode ARM’s, low(er) cost PGM’s that are now mass produced (Gulf War was a wakeup call for Air Defense makers) has forced IAD planners to focus acquisition resources (MONEY) on developing short range, self-defense interceptors to fend off radar installations, C2 setups etc against these attacks. Additionally the IAD makers have been forced to invest heavily in lower frequency sensors and develop multi-layered sensor setup that makes the modern IAF significantly more expensive than that of the past.

However, the proliferation of stealth into the strategic domain (F117 and B-2 (F117 was tactical but effect could be more strategic if allowed to go unchecked) ) and now even in the tactical fighter (started with the F-22, and continuous with the mass produced F-35) and UCAV’s has forced Air-Defense makers to trade off some of their earlier advantages in speed, mobility etc for lower frequency sensors that can provide better early warning and surveillance against LO to VLO targets depending upon the target.

Physics tells us that a 5th generation fighter would be optimized around the C and X band (we’ll get to this later as well) with probably acceptable RCS in the upper S bands. While RAM at least in the US is into its 4th generation with the current approach of baking it In (FiberMat that was designed for future blocks of the F-22, FB-22 and eventually went into the F-35) it is pretty safe to assume that when you reach into the surveillance radar frequencies, where you have L band, UHF and VHF band radars the tactical fighters would continue to have much higher RCS values (even though lower than a non-stealthy fighter) until and unless you make the physically larger and remove things like vertical tails. The flying wing is probably the most optimized aerodynamic design against the UHF and VHF radars hence the B-2, and now the B-21 have been claimed to possess “broadband stealth”.

This has been widely communicated by the mainstream media (pointing out the obvious). Bill Sweetman, and the Axe’s of the world have in the past cited CIA studies from the 1980s that predicted that the next move (counter F117) for the Soviet Air-Defense makers would be to commit more resources to lower frequency sensors. This was factored in to its CONOPS, and for future stealth aircraft development. That part isn’t reported all that much. What did they factor in? For starters, they developed the B-2 immediately after that, in a form that lends itself to be stealthy in that region (for reasons of physics that we can discuss if anyone wants clarity on that). Another way to mitigate lower-frequency radars was to pack the next generation of tactical stealth with both defensive and offensive aids (which the F117 completely lacked). For the F-22, this meant a highly advanced passive ESM system that allowed it to pin-point emitters, chart a course around the threats that its systems deemed as dangerous and of course use altitude and super-cruise to shrink engagement envelopes because ultimately no matter what sort of low-frequency sensors you have (VHF, UHF and L band) you still have to cue your S, C or X band sensor , and fire a TVM or active missile so there are a number of opportunities to delay, disrupt, or completely break the kill chain (more on this later as well).

The problem with the conventional narrative that War-Is-Boring and the Goons and Copp’s of the world have been pushing that it really doesn’t factor in tactics and capabilities or addresses how they came up with what they have in a system-design sort of way. They point to the CIA study, but fail to go into what came out of it and what followed in terms of capability acquisition.

Anyhow, the challenge of an IADS is across the entire RF spectrum. From extremely long range VHF, UHF and L band radars, to shorter range, higher quality sensors that reside in the mid band. Various generations of aircraft, and various designers have adopted various means to design around these challenges. For example, 3rd and 4th generation aircraft relied on escort jammers that went in with the strike package, to help do exactly that – break kill chains. By its very nature the escort jamming mission has a set of requirements that is a lot different from self-defense where you are essentially protecting yourself, or stand I jamming – where you are going after an emitter as a mission set rather than to aid in executing some other mission.

As 4th generation and advanced 4.5 generation aircraft came about self-defense jammers became internal (largely) but the focus was largely similar i.e. To protect the aircraft (i.e. self – defense) against the RF threats. This takes us back to design and simple physics – Radars or Jammers have to work around certain principles and since you are designing a fighter you are designing around a bunch of compromises to optimize a design for a certain mission. What are some of those trades? For starters the radar, IR suite, Communication suite, and the EW suite all compete for WEIGHT, POWER, COOLING and SIZE. For example RCS considerations, weight considerations, and performance (maneuvering) considerations all determine the size of your transmitter antennas on your internal self-defense jammers. The antenna size then dictates the frequency range you can cover (physics). Similarly, power determines these things as well. Radar and Jammer compete for power and the rule of thumb is that the more and more wider you go in terms of bandwidth the more power your radar or jammer will consume. Other considerations (weight, thermal management and space) all force a similar trade for the EW suite.

The above mentioned trades are universal. Given technology parity, no one designer can claim to be at a better position than the other since you really can’t change the laws of physics. Therefore as 4th and 4.5 generation aircraft have evolved, certain similarities have propped up in their EW suits (at least the more advanced ones) that are reflective of two things:

- Access to technology

- Similar design trades

What this has meant is that self-defense suits being designed and fielded today are largely focused around the most critical radars, data-links, and RF seekers – because those kill chains are the ones you are going to have to break if you want to defend-the aircraft and allow it to accomplish the mission. What this has meant is that the C and X band are covered very well by these jammers and they also concentrate on higher bands (seekers).



Below is an image of a survey of the available Escort and self-defense jammers in the market.

Image


http://s33.postimg.org/lj505x51b/radar_bands_NATO.png

Most cover the 4GHz and above band and for really good reason (Design and protection-optimization). Rafale’s spectra for example covers the NATO G-J band again reflecting the mission – i.e. to enhance the rafale’s survivable against the most deadly acquisition radars and active missile seekers (and TVM kill chains). These self-defense jammers won’t be able to deal with VHF, UHF or L band threats either (even the ones that cover these ranges won’t have the power to deal with these sensors that will can be placed dozens if not 100 km away from the acquisition radar) due again to physics. This is because lower frequency radars tend to have extremely long ranges within the power and size requirements Therefore, it is nearly impossible to jam or significantly disrupt an L band radar given the jamming power involved in these systems (you are talking about a few 100 kg’s worth of total EW system weight and a constant battle for power with other mission systems also critical to completing the mission). I used the L band radar as an example, but it applies to an even greater extent against UHF and VHF radars.

Now the more modern (5th generation) approach is to stealth’ify platforms. In the tactical fighters that is to gain survivability though having extremely low RCS’s in these same bands. What this translates to is PASSIVE EW in that you aren’t shrinking the radar acquisition range by jamming it but by just making it harder for it to detect you at range (again a matter of physics). This obviously has numerous advantages. The main advantage being that you can measure your RCS within individual bands while measuring EW effectiveness against every given threat radar type is obviously not possible) even though there have been some very successful clandestine and SIGNIT programs in the past) .

Additionally, it’s always on (unless you carry external stores) and is completely passive saving you the headache of having to fight the ESM battle as well where the ground troops generally tend to have higher access to size, power, and manpower. But tactical stealth aircraft don’t do just that. They exploit other areas as well such as ESM enabled SA (avoid sensor, and IAD sweet spots), speed, altitude (this gets better sensor coverage than flying low) and of course as a matter of last resort ACTIVE suppression of these systems where they are at a massive advantage vis-à-vis non stealthy aircraft since the ERP required is a balance between RCS of the aircraft and the detection range of the threat radar system with the goal being to generate greater jamming power than the radar return power reflected from the aircraft. Since Stealth aircraft have considerable RCS reduction against acquisition radars the radar return reflected back to the radar is significantly reduced – that then enables them to produce EW effects at significantly longer ranges compared to non-stealthy aircraft that have a much larger signature and therefore radar return. Similarly, stealth aircraft, against these target emitters can enjoy similar levels of RF suppression at equal ranges with much less power and thermal requirement (critical for other features such as IR signature management and space, weight and power trades). Of course other aids can be adopted by stealth aircraft as well such as decoys for terminal DFRM stuff against missile seekers but that applies to virtually all platforms so we won’t get into that.

So how do you tackle some of those pesky Long range surveillance radars? You do so in an integrated fashion just as they tackle your multi-faceted threat. Dedicated Stand-Off Low Band Jammers obviously go a long way especially if you move over to solid state designs and provide very high power. They’ll still need to get closer but they are your first line of ‘active’ defense. The second line is to use your Broad-band stealth aircraft to take these sensors out or to threaten them to such a large extent so as to make them mobile and on the run allowing blue forces to push offensive packages in. Additionally you distribute the EW. One drawback (again getting to physics) of these low frequency sensors is that they are not as good as higher frequency sensors when it comes to the quality of the data (hence the stepping) and this opens you up to exploit them. Just as Ground based decoys exploit long range ESM SA problem for an attacking force, airborne Decoys create similar problems for long range surveillance systems. If I put two dozen MALD’s along with half a dozen tactical fighters and you complicate the SA picture immensely. Now add MALD-J’s that are mimicking tactical aircraft RF signatures and make them penetrate the FEBA and conduct disruption against acquisition radars and you have further complicated the IAD OODA loop. That’s how you deal with the cross-spectrum threat. Its just not Self-Defense EW, its just not stealth its just not stand-in or stand-off jamming and its just not stand-off missiles and PGM’s. It’s a collection of all of them and any force that wishes to claim the mantle of being able to conduct and win a high end EMS battle must possess and exercise all these capabilities.

In the next post I’ll try covering some of the other areas in the IAD vs Strike cat and mouse and how technology is going to change both how the defender defends, and the attacker attacks. Will try getting into Bi-static and multi-static setups as well and how they aid in defense, and how to attack them in an optimized manner.
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by ldev »

Meanwhile, I'm waiting to see if SpaceX does a 3 by 3 for tomorrow's Falcon 9 launch/landing. It's a 3 ton Thai satellite to a geo orbit so the 1st stage will come down hot and hard for it's barge landing. 5.40 pm EDT.

5 launches in 5 months this year. Musk is on a roll!!
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by member_28985 »

Hello,

How did IAF perform in the recent Red Flag exercises in Alaska? I have not heard any press coverage on how well IAF performed.
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by Austin »

Soyuz completes its ninth mission with Galileo satellites

On May 24, 2016, a Soyuz rocket lifted off from its launch pad in Kourou, French Guiana, carrying the fifth pair of fully operational Galileo satellites, known as FOC-M5. Being the 15th launch of the Russian-built rocket from its South-American launch pad, the mission had a designation VS15.

Image
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

US likely to gain access to Galileo's secure signal.......

http://spacenews.com/euro-soyuz-orbits- ... re-signal/
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

Dutch F-35A's coming home to Leeuwarden Air Force Base..

[youtube]5Utf5qHMaec#t=157[/youtube]
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by NRao »

Saab’s Growing Gripen Family
On May 18, Saab unveiled the latest version of its Gripen multirole fighter aircraft. The JAS-39E Gripen is a stockier, beefed up version, with a new engine, the General Electric F414, as well as capacity for 40% more fuel (thanks to a redesigned central fuselage) and additional weapon pylons. The company has also put significant emphasis on data fusion with information from a new active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, infrared search and track, electronic warfare systems and more advanced data links, building on the systems Saab has designed. With 60 on order from Sweden, 36 from Brazil and more and more countries looking at it, the latest version of the Gripen may have as bright a future as its predecessor.

Image
Saab is hoping to keep producing the Gripen C/D in production alongside the Gripen E/F models; it has already defined a road map of development that will spinoff the Gripen E program. Several nations are expressing interest in buying Gripen C/Ds, including Slovakia and Croatia. Company officials have downplayed African media reports that Botswana was about to sign for up eight Gripens.

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The latest upgrade to the Gripen is the MS20 package, which finally delivers the much-awaited capacity to fire MBDA’s Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (pictured here on the left) and the Boeing GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, with four attached to a special launcher. The first squadrons are being given the MS20 upgrade now, and all units will have their aircraft upgraded by the fall. Meteor is expected to achieve an interim operating capability in the next few months.

Image
At first glance, the E version looks like just another Gripen, but the broader wing roots betray the type’s ability to carry more fuel. Two additional belly-mounted pylons expand its weapon load, while faceted wingtip pods enable an enhanced electronic warfare capability. Forward of the cockpit is a housing for an infra-red search-and-track radar, while buried in the canard roots appear to be missile-warning sensors. On 39-8, however, they both appear to be blanked off, suggesting that the systems may not be fitted as yet.

Image
The Gripen was rolled out carrying an array of weaponry, including eight GBU-39s, five Meteors and two IRIS-T short-range air-to-air missiles on the wingtip rails. Pictured clearly here are the additional pair of pylons under the aircraft, on either side of the centerline pylon.
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

from left wing war is boring site.........

https://warisboring.com/why-in-the-worl ... .pqfckjg86
Why in the World Does Botswana Want Gripen Jet Fighters?
Actually, the Swedish warplane makes sense for the tiny African country........
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by Austin »

Russia creates a new plasma propulsion engine

http://ria.ru/science/20160525/1439469275.html
MOSCOW, May 25 -. RIA Novosti "Chemical Automatics Design Bureau" (included in the "NPO Energomash") and "Kurchatov Institute" will prepare a project to create an electrodeless plasma rocket engine, according to the website of the state corporation "Roscosmos" on Wednesday.

"Viewed in the current version of the electrodeless plasma thruster is a new generation of electric propulsion. It is a high power engine, working medium which is in the plasma state. It has a high energy efficiency, the ability to be used as the working fluid almost any substance capable of changing the value of specific impulse "- said in a statement.

The maximum capacity of the engine is limited to "almost exclusively the power supply high-frequency generator."

It is noted that the engine of this type could potentially have a long service life due to the absence of restrictions related to the impact of energy-substance working with design elements.

According to "Roscosmos", the implementation of the ideas incorporated in the proposed development, made possible by advances in the study of plasma fusion process, the development of high-temperature superconducting technology and modern element base of high-frequency generators.

"When you create such an engine developers have to decide how to optimize plasma processes, the development of high-frequency generator, cryogenic magnetic systems as well as power systems and TU management Providing solutions to these problems will require the creation of experimental and test bench base.", - Said in a statement.
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

You are comparing the cost of a product (SDB-I) that has a production run of several thousand units to the product(SDB-II) that is in low rate production.
No. I am using the SDB-Increment I cost and comparing it to the overall program unit cost of the SDB-II using the SAR (through the 17000 unit production run). The reason its more expensive is because of the requirements i.e. you have a tri-mode seeker. Similarly, when they eventually get to the SDB III (or whatever they may wish to call it) they'll most likely add a motor to it, and that will also add cost irrespective of the production volume. The brits are doing that with the SPEAR III requirements.
SDB-I price listed as $40,000 USD.
SDB-II latest figure is $115,000 USD.

Plus, SDB-II has Navy as additional customer.
BY year aside the SDB-I is significantly lower for many reasons. First because its much simpler in terms of the seeker (seekers drive up cost) in that it hasn't gotten any and B ) It was available earlier so its BY$ are in the 2000's. The 14 SAR puts the SDBII Unit cost at $119,000 in 2010 dollars over its ENTIRE planned procurement for USAF and USN.
The figure that was quoted is 24,000 as USAF requirement. 12,000 met by SDB-I and remaining 12,000 to be from SDB-II. Further 5000 units of SDB-II for USN.
Certain sites (global security etc) have claimed that but that is the current production and delivery timeline. What the USAF was able to do during sequestration was offload production volume to FMS customers starting with Israel and the fairly substantial Saudi and UAE orders for 6000 units (1000 for the Saudi's and 5000 for UAE). They have received (USAF) more than 12000 weapons as of 2015 but will continue to buy more over the next few years to build up inventory. The original PO requirements were established well in excess of 20,000 units but then came sequestration. Luckily the line isn't closing down anytime soon and they have actually re-started procurement.

Here's the USAF requirement for the SDB I -

Image

Here's a Jane's article on Boeing's win in the Increment - I contract:
Boeing has been selected to supply its Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) to the US Air Force (USAF). Under a contract worth approximately US$188 million, the company will continue development of its SDB design, then begin a production run which is expected to be worth US$2.5 billion in sales to the USAF.

The SDB is a 250lb-class (113kg) inertially guided 'smart' bomb intended for launch from fighter aircraft, bombers or unmanned platforms. It will have a maximum range of more than 40 miles (64km) and be able to penetrate more than 3ft (1m) of steel-reinforced concrete. A key requirement was the ability to destroy a set of 14 typical hard and soft targets such as command control and communications bunkers; air-defence assets; petroleum, oil and lubricant sites; airfield targets; infrastructure targets; missiles; artillery; and anti-aircraft artillery.

The SDB system is the result of a series of competitive weapon research programmes conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. These included the miniature Munitions Technology, Small Smart Bomb, Smart Multiple Ejection Rack, and Small Smart Bomb - Range EXtension programmes. Boeing independently conducted development work on navigation, guidance, wing system, fuze, pneumatic ejection system, logistics and other areas of technology.

Selection of the Boeing design came at the end of a two-year competitive Component Advanced Development phase (CAD), in which Boeing and Lockheed Martin developed rival designs of weapon and carriage system. Several weeks before the selection of Boeing, Lockheed Martin completed its CAD work with the release of a bomb from an F-15E flying over Eglin AFB. The weapon separated from the F-15E at an altitude of 19,000ft and a speed at Mach 0.66, demonstrating safe separation, correct fin and wing deployment, and terminal guidance.

In addition to these full system tests, the CAD phase also included extensive subsystem and wind tunnel tests, plus qualification of the fuze and other key components. Boeing conducted five payload sled tests; four insensitive-munitions tests; two warhead arena tests; two live-fire tests; 11 captive carry trials; plus six safe-separation and vehicle launches.

The company also conducted fit checks on the F/A-22, F-16, F-117, A-10, B-1, B-2, and B-52 to verify physical compatibility and loading and handling equipment compatibility. Electronic fit checks were also done on the F-35 and unmanned combat air vehicle.

To be known as the GBU-39/B, the SBD will be 1.8m long and 19cm in maximum diameter and thus is small enough to be carried in the weapons bays of stealth aircraft such as the F-117, F-22, and F-35. It will enter service on the F-15E and subsequently on the F/A-22, F-35, Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems, and almost all other weapons platforms.

An Advanced Anti-Jam Global Positioning System-aided Inertial Navigation System will guide the weapon to the co-ordinates of a stationary target. An SDB accuracy support system uses existing communications links to provide data to the weapon to improve its circular error probable. The payload is a multipurpose penetrating blast-fragmentation warhead fitted with a cockpit-selectable electronic fuze.

The BRU-61/A smart carriage system has its own avionics subsystem and four pneumatic weapon ejectors. The carriage avionics provide stores management functions (including generating Launch Acceptability Region data for the weapons). This simplifies aircraft integration and helps with in-flight planning. The pneumatic ejectors provide a long ejection stroke with lateral constraint and selectable end-of-stroke velocity/ pitch rate.

An SDB mission planning system running on PC-based hardware will automate the integration of aircraft planning with weapon planning, allowing attacks to be made on a series of target complexes each with multiple impact points. The user will be able to plan, analyse, store, and download mission data to support use of the SDB on fighters, bombers, and unmanned combat aircraft. Planning times of less than one minute per mission have already been demonstrated.

Over the next ten years Boeing expects to build an estimated 24,000 weapons and 2,000 carriages at its production facility in St. Charles, Missouri. First deliveries are due to take place in October 2005. Other companies involved in the programme include BAE Systems, Engineered Plastic Designs, Harris, HR Textron, Honeywell, Intercontinental Manufacturing Company, KDI Precision Products, MBDA Missile Systems, Rockwell Collins, Sargent Fletcher, and SRI International.
Current USAF status is as follows :

Lot 1 through Lot 5 - 7000 Bombs
Lot 6 - 2613 Bombs
Lot 7 - 2700 Bombs

All in 12,313 weapons delivered by end of 2013 Plus around 300-500 FLM's. They didn't procure any for a few years after that but have in CY15 (FY16) re-started the program to buy them again. I predict at least another 4-5,000 weapons over the next decade both the standard Increment I and ones with improved NG features. Meanwhile the three FMS customers in Israel, Saudi Arabia and UAE (could be more) have ordered a combined 7000 weapons. Boeing is likely to be producing the SDB-I well into the 2020's for the US and other FMS customers. Much like the JDAM they'll keep building up inventory and replenishing stockpiles but the point was about REQUIREMENTS where the PLANNED number to be procured defines the capability since COST is a KPP in most of these systems. You can't buy 40,000 $119K bombs but you can buy 20,000 40K bombs and 20,000 $119K bombs.

Well it can be said this way, afterall these are requirements of US.
As I said, primary target set defines weapons cost that in turn defines how many target sets you can pile on into requirements. Lockheed had a working multi-mode seeker ahead of competition and lobbied very hard for the requirements to be merged but the volumes required made the decision quite easy for them. Keep the 3 feet / 1 meter steel-reinforced concrete requirement for SDB-I and allow them to deliver a low-cost weapon while the fancy stuff for DEAD and CAS can go into the Increment II where the mission justified a higher unit cost. Had the production volume demand been lower, they could have looked at merging the requirements for the overall program cost would have been more affordable.

Also there is a HOJ variant of the SDB-Increment I that they really don't talk much about. I would guess that it would eventually be the main go to weapon for the F-22A as far as SEAD is concerned, but beyond acknowledging its test plan they haven't really spoken much about it. Perhaps this November we'll know more.

Also, the re-start in procurement is also aided by the fact that more platforms (than previously planned) are integrating the weapon into them (AC130 for example) and the fact that improvements are being made to make the SDB-I one of the first NG weapons to be able to operate in a severely GPS denied, or degraded capability such as going after a jamming source or using Image based navigation.
The US Air Force (USAF) is looking to integrate the Boeing GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB I) and GBU-39B/B Laser Small Diameter Bomb (LSDB) on board its special operation forces aircraft, it was disclosed on 23 September.

A notification posted on the Federal Business Opportunities website by the Department of the Air Force requests information on integrating and fielding the SDB I and LSDB on board its Lockheed Martin AC-130W Dragon Spear/Stinger II and AC-130J Ghostrider gunships.

The request for information (RfI) covers integration, test, training, and sustainment of the SDB I and LSDB weapon systems on the AC-130W and AC-130J, including clearance of the SDB and LSDB systems from the BRU-61/A launcher rack at 150 to 200 kt, 10,000 to 25,000 ft, and with an aircraft bank of up to 30°.

As set out in the notification, flight trials will include eight captive carry sorties out of Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) in Florida, four guided test-vehicle missions at Eglin AFB, and two live-fire demonstrations at the White Sands Missile Range and the Pacific Missile Range Facility.

Responses to the RfI are due no later than 15:00 (Central Standard Time) on 23 October.

The US Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) currently fields 12 AC-130W and 17 AC-130U Spooky gunships, and has received the first of 37 AC-130Js. Once all the AC-130Js have been received by about the mid-2020s, the AC-130Ws will revert back to their baseline MC-130W Combat Spear special mission configuration, and the AC-130Us will be retired.

The AC-130Ws and AC-130Js are both equipped with the same palletised Precision-Strike Package (PSP), which comprises a single 30 mm Mk44 Bushmaster cannon, precision-guided munitions, as well as a 105 mm cannon. The SDB I and LSDB are precision, low-cost and lightweight munitions that are intended to combine the destructive effect of much larger bombs with a stand-off range afforded by pop-out wings.

As noted in IHS Jane's Weapons: Air-Launched , the SDB I is able to penetrate more than 1 m (3 ft) of steel-reinforced concrete. A key requirement of the bomb is the ability to destroy a set of 14 typical hard and soft targets such as: command control and communications bunkers; air-defence assets; petroleum, oil and lubricant sites; airfield targets; infrastructure targets; missiles; artillery; and anti-aircraft artillery.

An Advanced Anti-Jam Global Positioning System-aided Inertial Navigation System guides the weapon to the co-ordinates of a stationary target. After release, an SDB follows its own non-ballistic flight path (gliding at Mach 0.4) calculated using its release range, altitude, speed, climb rate, and wind data. The latest Block 9 update (2009) gives the SDB I a direct attack capability for the first time and optimised short-range, minimal time-of-flight profiles. When released from 15,000 ft at Mach 0.8 against a target at 7,408 m direct range and 740.8 m cross range (offset), an SDB I with Block 9 software will take 47 seconds to hit the target. The payload is a multipurpose penetrating blast-fragmentation (steel-cased) warhead fitted with a cockpit-selectable electronic fuze, and is capable of penetrating more than 0.91 m (3 ft) of reinforced concrete.

The SDB I and LSDB are two of a number of new weapon systems that AFSOC is looking to integrate on board its AC-series gunships in the coming years. Earlier in September, the command's chief told industry that he wanted to arm his gunships with lasers by 2020.

Boeing was actually awarded a USD47 million contract to integrate the LSDB onto the AC-130W in 2012, but a company spokesperson told IHS Jane's that as this is a US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) programme she was not able to say how that effort differed from this latest one, or what the status of that original programme currently is.
Scientific Systems Company Inc (SSCI), a Massachusetts-based software house specialising in intelligent control systems and software, has won a US Air Force (USAF) Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contract to demonstrate a novel image-based navigation and precision targeting package on a GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB I) glide bomb.

Under the terms of the two-year, USD11.5 million SBIR III contract, awarded by the Air Force Lifecycle Management Center Rapid Acquisition Cell at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, on 13 January, SSCI will "flight test, demonstrate, and evaluate the technology readiness of an ImageNav-SDB advanced navigation system", according to the Department of Defense (DoD).

Developed by Boeing to meet USAF needs for a low-cost/low-collateral-damage precision strike weapon to hit fixed/stationary targets, SDB I is a 250 lb-class weapon that integrates a wing kit (affording a stand-off range of more than 60 n miles), an advanced anti-jam GPS-aided Inertial Navigation System precision guidance package, and a multipurpose penetrating and blast-and-fragmentation warhead.

Total SDB I production has run to 12,300 weapons, plus 2,000 BRU-61 bomb racks. In addition, a further 350 Focused Lethality Munitions have been delivered (these using carbon-fibre bodies to deliver more near-field blast and less collateral damage).

ImageNav (Image-Based Navigation And Precision Targeting) is described by SSCI as "a vision-based navigation and precision targeting system for use on manned/unmanned aircraft and cruise missiles [that] uses the platform's existing sensors to compare the air vehicle's flight path to a known terrain database". According to the company, ImageNav "has demonstrated target geo-location and navigation precision of <3 metres CEP [circular error probability] in high-fidelity tests on real flight data gathered by Boeing", and is currently "being transitioned to several cruise missile and UAV platforms".
Scientific Applications & Research Associates (SARA) has been awarded a Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) Phase III contract worth USD9.78 million for a Home-on-Jam (HOJ) demonstration using modified Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Small Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB-I) weapons.

Working at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, the contractor will integrate its HOJ seeker into both types of guided munition, then support government-conducted flight tests intended to demonstrate a precision-accuracy guidance capability against what the contract announcement describes as "radio frequency threat targets in an operationally relevant environment". This programme is due to be completed by mid-October 2016.

The contract is being handled by the US Air Force Research Laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. It was a competitive acquisition, and a total of 13 offers were submitted.


BTW, with the L-SDB they get a dual mode version of the Increment I with some capability against a moving target.

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ct-387804/

At the moment the munitions directorate and programs are focusing on acquiring a lot of JDAM”s across the FYDP. Between FY16 and FY20 they will be procuring just over 48,000 JDAM Kits. SDB – Increment I procurement (USAF) restart will naturally be gradual but larger lots will probably follow in the post 2020 time-frame. Even the Increment II will be acquired In larger quantities eventually but the price difference would naturally remain since it just requires higher and more expensive technology given the mission challenges. Both the Increment I and Increment II are designed to absorb technologies that come out of the GBU-X program that will demo a JDAM replacement with 180 km range (probably powered) in 2019. A lot of the work to provide similar CEP without GPS (in a denied environment) is already happening both behind the scenes and out in the open.
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

Orbital ATK wants to establish a cislunar habitat.......

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2016/05 ... sls-orion/

Orbital ATK has unveiled preliminary plans to place a four-person habitat in cislunar space by 2020. The announcement during testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Space would not only see the creation of a permanent human presence in lunar orbit by the start of the next decade, but would potentially provide a wealth of regularly-scheduled missions for SLS and Orion.
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

NASA has problem with inflatable habitat aboard ISS.

https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2016/05 ... expansion/

The International Space Station (ISS) was to gain a new module for the first time since March 2011 on Thursday, as the Bigelow Expandable Activity Module (BEAM) was to be expanded to its full size, bringing an end to an almost two-decade long effort to place an inflatable module on the station. However, the expansion process did not go to plan, resulting in further work being postponed.
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by ldev »

And my man Musk makes it 3 by 3 with this landing, inspite of launching that satellite to a geo-synchronous orbit!!

The big news going forward will be when one of the four 1st stages Space X has recovered up until now is relaunched. That will truly be when costs start decreasing rapidly.
TSJones
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

BEAM module fully expanded on space station

http://spacenews.com/beam-module-fully- ... e-station/

here is what beam module will eventually look like......

http://twitter.com/NASAWatch/status/736 ... 12/photo/1


:D :)
Austin
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by Austin »

"Soyuz-2.1b" with the upper stage "Fregat" brought into the calculated orbit spacecraft "Glonass-M"

http://sdelanounas.ru/blogs/78253/


May 29 at 11:44 MSK on the State test spaceport of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Plesetsk Cosmodrome) conducted a successful launch of the carrier rocket "Soyuz-2.1b" with the upper stage "Fregat" and the spacecraft "Glonass-M" number 53. Start Run the joint calculation of the Ministry of Defense of Russian experts and enterprises of space-rocket industry. After 9 minutes of the start of the space head as part of RB "Fregat" and the spacecraft "Glonass-M" separated from the third stage rocket "Soyuz-2.1b". The upper stage "Fregat" began at the conclusion of the spacecraft into orbit. Branch spacecraft "Glonass-M" from RB "Fregat" passed in a regular mode on the calculated orbit at 15:16 MSK
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brar_w
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by brar_w »

DARPA issues XS-1 RfP
The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on 23 May released a request for proposal (RfP) for a satellite-launching space plane.

According to DARPA, the XS-1 is envisioned to employ "structures made of advanced materials, cryogenic tanks, durable thermal protection, and modular subsystems", and a reusable, reliable unmanned propulsion or booster vehicle. The booster vehicle would launch, fly to hypersonic speeds at a suborbital altitude "where one or more expendable upper stages would separate, boost, and deploy satellites into low Earth orbit (LEO)", then return to earth for another flight with rapid turnaround.

Responses are due by 22 July, according to the solicitation.

The programme has four primary technical goals. The craft must fly 10 times in a 10-day period (not including weather, range, and emergency delays), demonstrate aircraft-like access to space, and eliminate concerns about the reliability of reusable launches; achieve flight velocity sufficiently high to enable the use of a small, expendable upper stage; insert a representative payload of 408 kg to 680 kg to orbit with the goal that the same vehicle could eventually insert future 1360 kg or greater payloads by using a larger expendable upper stage; and finally, reduce the cost of access to space with a goal of approximately USD5 million per flight for the operational system including the reusable booster and expendable upper stage.

DARPA's Tactical Technology Office held an event on 29 April to provide information to potential proposers on the objectives of the XS-1 programme in advance of the planned Phases 2 and 3 programme solicitations. Based on the results of Phase 1, DARPA anticipates that Phases 2 and 3 will be a "full and open" competition for a single contract worth up to USD140 million for the development of a prototype and subsequent trials.

In Phase 1, DARPA awarded prime contracts to Boeing (working with Blue Origin, LLC), Masten Space Systems (working with XCOR Aerospace), and Northrop Grumman Corporation (working with Virgin Galactic) to "evaluate technical feasibility and methods". Phase 3 will include flight test campaigns that incorporate propulsion systems which will be flight ready by fiscal year 2020.

The XS-1 programme is expected to transition any successful technology and derived systems to industry and to commercial launch sectors in order to build new government launch markets and services. Military-relevant applications would enable future capabilities such as disaggregated spacecraft architectures and next-generation, reusable space-access aircraft.
Make a New Note

member_23694
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by member_23694 »

http://spaceflightnow.com/2016/06/01/re ... next-week/

Record double-satellite payload mated to Ariane 5 for launch next week

Nearly 10 tonne to GTO .. cool!!!
TSJones
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

Soyuz upper stage “irregularity” mars successful Glonass launch

http://spacenews.com/soyuz-upper-stage- ... ss-launch/
TSJones
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by TSJones »

Russia delays next Soyuz, Progress launches to ISS

http://spacenews.com/russia-delays-next ... es-to-iss/
ldev
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by ldev »

Great shot of the most recently landed SpaceX Falcon 9 first stage arriving in port following it's barge landing.

Image
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by NRao »

NRao
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Re: International Military & Space Discussion

Post by NRao »

World’s first 3D printed plane THOR unveiled by Airbus
The world’s first 3D-printed aircraft THOR was unveiled by European aerospace company, Airbus at the International Aerospace Exhibition held in Schoenefeld, Germany.

The THOR is short for Test of High-tech Objectives in Reality. It resembles a large, white model airplane but is windowless.

Key features of THOR

THOR has just 3 parts. It is lighter, faster and cheaper. It is windowless, small, pilotless, propeller aircraft. It weighs 21 kilo grams and less than 4 metres long. All it parts (except the electrical elements) are 3D printed from a substance called polyamide.

THOR’s inaugural flight was conducted near Hamburg, Germany in November 2015. Aerospace companies like Airbus and Boeing already are using 3D printing technology to make parts for their huge passenger jets A350 and B787 Dreamliner.

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About 3D printing technology 3D printing is a process of making 3-D (three dimensional) solid objects from a digital file with extreme precision. This technology is also termed additive manufacturing as the 3D printed object is created us additive processes i.e. by laying down successive layers of manufacturing material on each other until the entire object is created. This technology has limitless possibilities and can create almost anything with just raw material and a computer generated model.

Read more at: http://currentaffairs.gktoday.in/worlds ... 33426.html
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