Military Acquisitions, Partnerships & Developments

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 28 Oct 2009 03:58

...
Defence minister A.K. Antony said here today the latest defence procurement policy (DPP) to be issued on November 1 would allow tenders to be issued to Indian companies. These firms may then scout the world markets for joint ventures with multinational defence companies for transfer of technology and production.

This new proviso — being allowed in the DPP for the first time — is under a new category through which the government will procure military hardware. The category is called “Buy and Make (Indian)”.

“The move is primarily aimed at encouraging pro-active participation by the Indian industry, which could establish joint venture production arrangements with any foreign manufacturer,” the minister said.

The practice so far has been to issue requests for proposals (RFPs) to known international arms majors who would then seek to tie up with Indian companies if their offers were accepted under the offsets policy.
...

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 28 Oct 2009 04:20

Years after coffingate, indigenous, low-cost aluminium caskets await govt nod

This is one casket that might get a premature burial. The Research and Development Establishment (Engineers), Pune, which had been asked to develop aluminium caskets to fit Indian parameters in 2004, delivered the goods a year later. It also developed nylon body bags alongside to fit Indian requirements. However, with the Centre putting off a decision on using them, the effort threatens to go waste.

It is seemingly immaterial that the cost stands reduced to less than one-third the rate at which the foreign version was imported during the Kargil war or that it is relatively lightweight and easy to stack. Even the prototype of the nylon fabric body bags, critical in war zones and disaster-hit areas, has been ready for use for the last four years and awaits the Defence Ministry’s approval.
...
...
The casket, weighing only 42 kg, even lighter than the originally targeted 45 kg and coming at a competitive price tag of around Rs 40,000, was designed, developed as per Ministry specifications and submitted in October 2005 to the Indian Army. The R&DE is still awaiting a response, since the casket, and body bags, have great potential for civilian use, especially in strife-torn areas — the Naxal strike in Gadchiroli being a good example.
...
“The casket we developed is made of 1.6mm thick commercial grade aluminium and we managed to reduce its weight to 42 kg and sufficient structural stability to stack three caskets one over the other, where the one at the bottom could bear a weight of up to 300 kg without any problem,” he said. The casket is made of two pieces that undergo hermetic sealing in a manner that the body doesn’t decompose for 8-10 hours. “We also developed the body bags which could withstand severe cold ( - 40 degree C) and heat ( +70 degree C),” he added.

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 28 Oct 2009 07:11

Cross-post from EVM thread.

vera_k:

Relevant to this thread. The article posits that trojans cannot be ruled out unless chips are manufactured in a secure facility.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/science/27trojan.html?_r=1&8dpc

Despite a six-year effort to build trusted computer chips for military systems, the Pentagon now manufactures in secure facilities run by American companies only about 2 percent of the more than $3.5 billion of integrated circuits bought annually for use in military gear. That shortfall is viewed with concern by current and former United States military and intelligence agency executives who argue that the menace of so-called Trojan horses hidden in equipment circuitry is among the most severe threats the nation faces in the event of a war in which communications and weaponry rely on computer technology.

A recent White House review noted that there had been several “unambiguous, deliberate subversions” of computer hardware.

The United States has used a variety of Trojan horses, according to various sources.

All the more reason to add a paper trail to the EVMs. If the Americans are having so much trouble keeping Trojans out of their equipment, our odds are worse given that the chips are not manufactured in secured Indian facilities.

--------------------------------------------------

Has there been any thought given to this in Indian Defence Acquisitions? Do people eager for kick-backs from abroad ever think about Trojans?

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 28 Oct 2009 07:39

^^^ Excerpts from the above cited article:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

But as military planners have come to view cyberspace as an impending battlefield, American intelligence agency experts said, all sides are arming themselves with the ability to create hardware Trojan horses and to hide them deep inside the circuitry of computer hardware and electronic devices to facilitate military attacks.

In the future, and possibly already hidden in existing weapons, clandestine additions to electronic circuitry could open secret back doors that would let the makers in when the users were depending on the technology to function. Hidden kill switches could be included to make it possible to disable computer-controlled military equipment from a distance. Such switches could be used by an adversary or as a safeguard if the technology fell into enemy hands.

A Trojan horse kill switch may already have been used. A 2007 Israeli Air Force attack on a suspected partly constructed Syrian nuclear reactor led to speculation about why the Syrian air defense system did not respond to the Israeli aircraft. Accounts of the event initially indicated that sophisticated jamming technology was used to blind the radars. Last December, however, a report in an American technical publication, IEEE Spectrum, cited a European industry source in raising the possibility that the Israelis might have used a built-in kill switch to shut down the radars.

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 29 Oct 2009 08:21

^^^ Another post from the EVM thread that is very relevant to the issue of trojans in Defense equipment: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 30#p762830

Juggi G · Post by **Juggi G** » 31 Oct 2009 22:22

India's New Defence Policy to Open $100 Billion Market
TOI

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 03 Nov 2009 06:03

Have we started making 155M shells yet or still importing ?

Ankit Desai · Post by **Ankit Desai** » 04 Nov 2009 02:15

Mahindra Satyam bags Saab deal

The contract, which spread over a period of five years encompasses engineering services and technology maintenance, will enable both the companies jointly address the Battlefield Management System (BMS) for the Indian Army, according to a release.

Ankit

dorai · Post by **dorai** » 06 Nov 2009 01:56

Swedes invaded today....

Signing of new defence MoU, civil nuclear cooperation, anti-terrorism coop, environmental coop, etc.

Swedish trade minister at defence industry summit looking at new camo

SWEDEN OFFERS LONG TERM SUPPORT TO INDIAN DEFENCE SECTOR THROUGH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND CO-PRODUCTION
India seen as a strategic partner: Swedish Trade Minister

NEW DELHI, November 5, 2009. Sweden today assured India of its long term support to the development of Indian defence systems by way of technology transfer and co-production based on technologies for the future.

Dr. Ewa Bjorling, Swedish Minister for Trade, told representatives of Indian trade and industry today at a seminar on ‘India-Sweden Defence Partnership: Forging Alliances, organized by FICCI, Embassy of Swede and Swedish defence industry, “Sweden is not seeking a buyer, but a strategic partner for long term cooperation for future defence and industrial development. That would serve as a guarantor for independence instead of relying on a single partner.”

Sweden, she said, had outstanding systems, technologies and products that “we would be happy to share with India and, given the interest and the possibilities, also to develop together.” When the Swedish and Indian governments have signed the MoU concerning cooperation in the field of defence, it would be an excellent platform for cooperation between the armed forces of the two countries within mutually beneficial areas, Dr. Bjorling pointed out.

A stronger relationship between the European Union and India, the Swedish Minister said, was clearly called for as India emerges as an increasingly important and democratic power and the EU as it now consolidates its institutions for its common and foreign security policies.

Mr. Gunnar Wieslander, Swedish Deputy Minister of Trade, pointed out that Sweden was looking for long term partners in the defence sector and was offering the entire chain in the transfer of technology, from design to verification and production and validation to the feedback process. India, he said, had the right requisites to be the right partner for Sweden and as partners the two countries could develop competitive products.

Mr. Harsh Pati Singhania, President, FICCI, in his address noted that the ‘Buy & Make (Indian)’ category under the Defence Procurement Policy 2009 was intended to encourage the big foreign arms manufacturers to set up joint ventures in India. Under this new category, the production and development will be through transfer of technologies and not through R &D. This, he said, would result in the development of a robust and self reliant defence sector through true transfer of technology and the technological know-whys. The offset policy along with the provision of offset banking promises to expedite Indo-Swedish defence collaborations, the FICCI chief pointed out.

Mr. Azim Premji, Chairman, Wipro Ltd., advised Indian and Swedish defence companies to be transparent in technology transfer deals from the point of view of national safety and called for reasonableness on transfer pricing on components. “Choose your partners well. Look for companies that have expertise and integrity and build technology transfer and joint ventures based on mutual trust,” he told defence industry professionals.

Mr. Marcus Wallenberg, Chairman, SAAB, emphasized the need to build a long term relationship in defence cooperation, build partnerships with companies having a high level of competence and secure a strong supply chain over long years.

Mr. Gyanesh Kumar, Joint Secretary, Defence Production, Ministry of Defence, underlined the need for ensuring product cycle support for Indian companies through co-development based on transparency. Management of timelines in technology transfer, he said, was critical which the private players would have to manage to keep in step with the fast changing technology. The Ministry of Defence, he said, was interested in critical technologies that Indian industry could absorb.

The seminar was addressed, amongst others, by Mr. VRS Natarajan, CMD, BEML & Chairman, FICCI, Defence Committee; Mr. Ake Svensson, President & CEO, SAAB, AB; Mr. Magnus, Ingesson, President, BAE Systems AB; Mr. John Nilsson, Director, Special Projects, Kockums; and Major General (Retd.) Peter Lundberg, President & CEO, SOFF.

Pranav · Post by **Pranav** » 07 Nov 2009 18:25

x-post from corruption thread:

Contracting with the MoD: stealing lollipops from babies
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2009/11/ ... ipops.html

The Hawk assembly line in Bangalore. HAL claims that BAE Systems has failed to provide drawings, jigs, and parts according to the agreed schedule. BAE Systems denies the charge.

by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 3rd Nov 09

If India’s military eventually plumps for primarily American equipment, a major reason will be: soldiers, sailors and airmen are completely sick of being gypped through poorly-framed acquisition contracts that entirely favour the foreign suppliers.

Take India’s contract with BAE Systems, UK, for 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs), a billion dollar procurement that took 18 years to finalise. That contract, it now emerges, was framed so poorly that today --- with HAL Bangalore blaming BAE Systems for failing to properly transfer technology --- India’s Ministry of Defence can do nothing to twist BAE Systems’ tail.

The MoD now finds that the Hawk contract contains no provisions for liquidated damages in case BAE Systems defaults on its obligations. And, in an act of inexplicable generosity, India’s MoD paid BAE Systems an unprecedented “up-front” amount of 30% of the contract value; such a payment seldom, if ever, exceeds 15%. Now, with more jet trainers needed and the production line facing delays, fresh inquiries have gone out to global manufacturers, restarting procurement afresh.

Why do such fiascos routinely occur? Astonishingly, because India’s MoD does not have the legal experts needed for negotiating and framing complex defence contracts. The MoD’s forlorn Legal Cell, manned by 10-12 lawyers on deputation from the Ministry of Law, comes up during the framing of every defence contract against a battery of specialised contracting experts, an integral part of the establishment of every global arms vendor.

This year, the Indian MoD’s beleaguered and inadequate legal team will oversee capital expenditure of more than Rs 50,000 crores. When the MoD finalises its choice of medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), these less-than-legal-eagles will have to negotiate and frame a single contract worth Rs 50,000 crores. Supplementary contracts will be needed governing offsets worth half that value again.

Within the MoD, alarm bells have long been sounding. The Solicitor General and the Attorney General have been approached for help in accessing top-class legal advice. But, so far, there has been no response.

The complexity of a defence contract is virtually unparalleled. A “standard contract” is rarely feasible because the usage of each piece of equipment is radically different. Being an international contract, reaching agreement on arbitration is always difficult, especially considering confidentiality and non-disclosure arrangements. Defining “force majeure” is extremely important, especially when governments can invoke national interest during the execution of a contract. The MoD’s civil servants deal routinely with such issues, but without the benefit of solid legal advice.

India’s military has long suffered from flawed and inconsistent contracting, especially with Russian suppliers. Since the early 1980s, India’s strike corps --- the tank units that would spearhead a thrust into Pakistan during war --- have faced frustrating shortages of on-board fitment equipment that an ethical defence vendor would supply as a part of the contract. In an instance that generated much resentment, India’s first T-72 tanks were supplied by Russia without the tarpaulin covers that keep out dust and rain. When the military asked for tarpaulins, Russia demanded a supplementary contract, eventually supplying them at highly inflated prices.

In some contracts, especially those involving the supply of “strategically important” equipment, the vendor has the leverage to ignore his contractual obligations. Russia’s shakedown of India over the cost of the Gorshkov is an example of the limitations of any contract. Linking the Gorshkov sale with the transfer of nuclear submarine technology, Russia dismissed the initial price as “unreal, a mistake”, and demanded a renegotiated price. But, in most defence procurements, a good contract guarantees satisfactory supply as well as a healthy buyer-seller relationship.

US defence companies are confident that the experience of contracting with them --- with no hidden costs, superb product support, and a “partnership” approach towards the Indian users --- will make a big impact on the Indian military. So far, contracting with the US has been relatively smooth, but it is still too early to tell.

The MoD’s lack of capability in defence contracting is just one, especially worrisome, dimension of a broad systemic incompetence in procuring defence equipment. As a Group of Ministers in April 2000, numerous committees and, most recently, an excellent CAG report pointed out, the MoD has failed to put in place a functionally specialised acquisition organisation to handle a task that is clearly far beyond current capabilities.

But instead of a coherent system, procurement continues under 13 different agencies, each reporting to a different functional head. Contracts, after they are concluded, are managed by four different agencies with very little co-ordination among them.

Kersi D · Post by **Kersi D** » 07 Nov 2009 19:08

Pranav wrote:x-post from corruption thread:

Contracting with the MoD: stealing lollipops from babies
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2009/11/ ... ipops.html

The Hawk assembly line in Bangalore. HAL claims that BAE Systems has failed to provide drawings, jigs, and parts according to the agreed schedule. BAE Systems denies the charge.

by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 3rd Nov 09

If India’s military eventually plumps for primarily American equipment, a major reason will be: soldiers, sailors and airmen are completely sick of being gypped through poorly-framed acquisition contracts that entirely favour the foreign suppliers.

What makes anyone think that US will not do such a thing to India ?

For the final contract the US company will bring more lawyers then engineers or feence analysts or what-ever-they-may-be-called

[/quote]

Take India’s contract with BAE Systems, UK, for 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs), a billion dollar procurement that took 18 years to finalise. That contract, it now emerges, was framed so poorly that today --- with HAL Bangalore blaming BAE Systems for failing to properly transfer technology --- India’s Ministry of Defence can do nothing to twist BAE Systems’ tail.

The MoD now finds that the Hawk contract contains no provisions for liquidated damages in case BAE Systems defaults on its obligations. And, in an act of inexplicable generosity, India’s MoD paid BAE Systems an unprecedented “up-front” amount of 30% of the contract value; such a payment seldom, if ever, exceeds 15%. Now, with more jet trainers needed and the production line facing delays, fresh inquiries have gone out to global manufacturers, restarting procurement afresh.

[/quote]
Charity begins at home, eh ?

NO
Try to get a contract with any GOI company. Try and get advance payment. They will begin with a minimum 30 days credit i.e. they will pay 30 days AFTER THE GODS ARE ACCEPTED.

Of course for capitol equipment no Indian supplier may agree to this payment. But at the most he will get 10% advance and balance against delivery.

Does any one remember the Karsan fertiliser case ?

GOI imported urea from a Turkish company whose local agent was the son of a very high politician. The State Bank worked over night, over time to establish a L/C for 100% advance payment. I do not know how many kilograms of urea was finally delivered
[/quote]

Why do such fiascos routinely occur? Astonishingly, because India’s MoD does not have the legal experts needed for negotiating and framing complex defence contracts. The MoD’s forlorn Legal Cell, manned by 10-12 lawyers on deputation from the Ministry of Law, comes up during the framing of every defence contract against a battery of specialised contracting experts, an integral part of the establishment of every global arms vendor.

[/quote]
Let us subcontract the negotiations and framing of the contract to some Indian company like Reliance or Essar or Birlas or ....

I am sure we will geta good price and excellent payment terms

This year, the Indian MoD’s beleaguered and inadequate legal team will oversee capital expenditure of more than Rs 50,000 crores. When the MoD finalises its choice of medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), these less-than-legal-eagles will have to negotiate and frame a single contract worth Rs 50,000 crores. Supplementary contracts will be needed governing offsets worth half that value again.

Within the MoD, alarm bells have long been sounding. The Solicitor General and the Attorney General have been approached for help in accessing top-class legal advice. But, so far, there has been no response.

The complexity of a defence contract is virtually unparalleled. A “standard contract” is rarely feasible because the usage of each piece of equipment is radically different. Being an international contract, reaching agreement on arbitration is always difficult, especially considering confidentiality and non-disclosure arrangements. Defining “force majeure” is extremely important, especially when governments can invoke national interest during the execution of a contract. The MoD’s civil servants deal routinely with such issues, but without the benefit of solid legal advice.

India’s military has long suffered from flawed and inconsistent contracting, especially with Russian suppliers. Since the early 1980s, India’s strike corps --- the tank units that would spearhead a thrust into Pakistan during war --- have faced frustrating shortages of on-board fitment equipment that an ethical defence vendor would supply as a part of the contract. In an instance that generated much resentment, India’s first T-72 tanks were supplied by Russia without the tarpaulin covers that keep out dust and rain. When the military asked for tarpaulins, Russia demanded a supplementary contract, eventually supplying them at highly inflated prices.

In some contracts, especially those involving the supply of “strategically important” equipment, the vendor has the leverage to ignore his contractual obligations. Russia’s shakedown of India over the cost of the Gorshkov is an example of the limitations of any contract. Linking the Gorshkov sale with the transfer of nuclear submarine technology, Russia dismissed the initial price as “unreal, a mistake”, and demanded a renegotiated price. But, in most defence procurements, a good contract guarantees satisfactory supply as well as a healthy buyer-seller relationship.

US defence companies are confident that the experience of contracting with them --- with no hidden costs, superb product support, and a “partnership” approach towards the Indian users --- will make a big impact on the Indian military. So far, contracting with the US has been relatively smooth, but it is still too early to tell.

The MoD’s lack of capability in defence contracting is just one, especially worrisome, dimension of a broad systemic incompetence in procuring defence equipment. As a Group of Ministers in April 2000, numerous committees and, most recently, an excellent CAG report pointed out, the MoD has failed to put in place a functionally specialised acquisition organisation to handle a task that is clearly far beyond current capabilities.

But instead of a coherent system, procurement continues under 13 different agencies, each reporting to a different functional head. Contracts, after they are concluded, are managed by four different agencies with very little co-ordination among them.[/quote]

But...

But will the legal eagles deliver the goods ? NO

As soon as these legal eagles prepare a contract which is fair (forget about being in favour of India) the defence contractos will go running to their "friend" in MOD / GOI and get the contract amended in their favour. And of course our GOI /MOD would be happy to ensure that the contract is signed quickly so that they get their share

K

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 07 Nov 2009 19:21

kersi saar, please mind the quote tags, its impossible to figure out which is your reply.

Kersi D · Post by **Kersi D** » 09 Nov 2009 19:08

Rahul M wrote:kersi saar, please mind the quote tags, its impossible to figure out which is your reply.

SORRY

I do not know what I tried to do !!!! But surely I made a BIG MESS !!!!
K

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 10 Nov 2009 08:09

Book Review of "Arming the Indian Arsenal"
Review by lt. Gen. (Retd) V.R. Raghavan

ARMING THE INDIAN ARSENAL: Deba Mohanty; Rupa & Co., 7/16, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi-110002. Rs. 595.

India is amongst the top five defence equipment importers in the world. Its main challenge in procuring the necessary equipment is made complex by the security environment in which it is placed. During the Cold War, India remained out of the purview of the most makers of advanced equipment in the West. That was more than compensated by the strategic partnership it developed with the Soviet Union. Moscow had a strategic vision that embraced India as a dependable partner in the larger matrix of U.S.-Soviet confrontation. In every defence-related area, — whether it is buying tanks, aircraft, and submarines, or technology transfers, deferred payments, or building production centres in India, —the Soviets gave India the status of a ‘most favoured nation.’

The collapse of the Soviet Union took away the massive security safety net for India. As India repositioned itself in the emerging international order, globalisation and international economic equations changed the defence industry worldwide. There is hardly any major tank, aircraft or naval craft today that is produced without international collaboration. What is more, large-scale defence equipment needs have dwindled. This, in turn, has shrunk the defence equipment markets and increased competition.

Compulsions

The defence equipment and technology scenario in the 21st century is marked by compulsions of collaboration amongst producers, laboratories, and governments in a desperate race to keep the defence industries alive. The scales of economy needed to make such industries competitive can only be found through shared R&D, and component production and assembling. All major armaments are manufactured on an international network and sold to individual countries. The Euro-fighter, which is in the race for the multi-billion dollar, 120-plus aircraft Indian market, is a multi-nation product. France’s decision to sell the Rafael fighter to the emerging power ‘Brazil’ is a case in point. After the end of the Mirage production line, French aircraft industry was staring at massive economic closures. Its attempt to supply the Brazilian needs is equally driven by the range of new aircraft coming on line from the U.S., and even China. It is also designed to offset the downturn in the sales of the business jet, Falcon.

For India, the scope for indigenous manufacturing in the prevailing, and foreseeable, global defence production scenario is therefore severely limited. Its choices have so far appropriately been based on licensed production within the country. The challenge here is that defence equipment is hugely obsolescence- prone. India’s neighbours modernise their facilities through direct military aid or clandestine transfer of technology. Indian defence forces are thus in a perpetual situation of having to catch up with the neighbours. It is therefore imperative for India to shift gears and get a foothold in the global collaborative defence production enterprise.

Challenges

In this complex scene, the book attempts to place a perspective on the Indian challenges and options. The burden of the book is on inadequate planning, funding, R&D, and private sector participation. In treading this oft-covered ground, even as it captures the new global thrust on collaborative, multi-nation defence production norms of the 21st century, it misses the important dimension of its relevance to India. Indian defence modernisation may have been slow, but it has been systematic and the envy of most comparable countries. No country is free from the burden of modernisation costs and of balancing them with current needs. For India, the key lies not in the philosophy of ‘swadeshi’, but in joining the international defence manufacturing network, a strategy that will ensure the best in terms of cost and military capabilities alike.

koti · Post by **koti** » 14 Nov 2009 14:42

Check this link http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/11/dr ... -anti.html
The weapon is remarkably similar to carl gustaf.
I read some where that the army recently acquired MkIII version of the Carl Gustaf.
Is the the same case of NTW-20??

suraj p · Post by **suraj p** » 23 Nov 2009 23:52

It might be too late to grow bigger than china BUT in a broader perspective nothing is too late.

I expected this back in 1998-99...at least after 10 years things are moving forward.

Local industry needs more time to benefit from Indian procurement revamp
By Jon Grevatt 19 November 2009

The impact of India's updated defence procurement procedures (DPPs) on indigenous defence production will be limited unless the Ministry of Defence (MoD) allows local industries more time to draw up detailed manufacturing proposals, according to a senior academic at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi.

Although the updated DPP - which became active on 1 November - states that the MoD will publish a 15-year plan outlining a "technology perspective and capability roadmap" in a bid to assist industries' planning, Laxman K Behera, an associate fellow at IDSA, told Jane's on 18 November that domestic defence companies need to be informed at a far earlier stage that they have been selected to provide services or equipment.

"The 15-year plan will no doubt help the domestic enterprises to know, much in advance, about the requirements of the armed forces and therefore enable them to draw up a specific proposal. But this is not the end of the story," he said.

Speaking to Jane's on 11 November, Behera said the updated DPPs could provide India's defence industries with a "tremendous opportunity" to develop over the next decade.

However, in his comments of 18 November Behera explained that in order for the DPP's newly created procurement category - which is called 'Buy and Make (Indian)' - to be effective and increase levels of indigenous defence manufacturing the government needs to give industries more time between the placement of an order and the actual delivery of a system or platform.

(Ref: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdi/j ... _1_n.shtml )

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 24 Nov 2009 23:22

Honeywell And HAL Celebrate 25 Years Of TPE331 Engine Production

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 24 Nov 2009 23:39

low-level-radar-deal

Kersi D · Post by **Kersi D** » 25 Nov 2009 10:58

suraj p wrote:It might be too late to grow bigger than china BUT in a broader perspective nothing is too late.

(Ref: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdi/j ... _1_n.shtml )

It is not necesaary to grow bigger than China. What is more important is to grow big enough, with big b@$#S, so that we can sock them HARD if they act too smart.

K

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 27 Nov 2009 19:35

India raises Hawk AJT troubles with UK

Dmurphy · Post by **Dmurphy** » 01 Dec 2009 22:31

Indian, U.K. Companies To Jointly Bid on Indian Vehicle Programs

NEW DELHI - India's Mahindra & Mahindra and Britain's BAE Systems will form a joint venture to compete for sales of light strike vehicles to the Indian Army.

A senior executive of Mahindra & Mahindra, an automobile manufacturer that is part of the Mahindra Group, said the joint venture has been approved by India's Foreign Investment Promotion Board.

Mahindra & Mahindra is to initially invest $21.25 million over a three-year period. The Indian company will have a 74 percent equity stake in the joint venture and the remaining 26 percent will be held by BAE.

The joint venture will be headquartered here, with a manufacturing facility built south of Faridabad, just outside of Delhi, according to a Nov. 30 news release.

The joint venture also will likely be involved "in a number of future artillery programs, including the M777 lightweight howitzer and the FH77B 155mm howitzer. It is envisaged that the JV will become a center of excellence for Indian artillery programs," according to the release.

The Indian Army plans to purchase more than 5,000 light strike vehicles over the next five years. The Army wants a four-wheel-drive vehicle capable of traveling at 80 kilometers per hour and armed with rocket launchers and gps navigation systems.

The Army has about 2,000 Russian BMP-1 and BMP-2 multipurpose armored vehicles, equipped with antitank missiles and other weapons.

Dmurphy · Post by **Dmurphy** » 04 Dec 2009 22:51

India Rejects JV by Larsen & Toubro, EADS

NEW DELHI - India has rejected a proposed tie-up between its biggest defense contractor, Larsen & Toubro, and Franco-German aerospace and defense group EADS, according to a Dec. 3 report.

The Financial Times said EADS and L&T had planned to form a joint venture to supply electronic warfare systems, avionics and radars, but it was rejected because it would exceed caps on foreign investment.

The companies had announced the joint venture May 5.

The upper limit allowed by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) for foreign direct investment in companies in the defense sector is 26 percent.

Amit Mitra, the secretary general of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, argued that the limits on foreign ownership should be raised.

"[The defense sector] could be the next sector of massive growth, but foreign participation is necessary," Mitra told the newspaper.

India has a five-year military procurement budget of $30 billion, which is an all-time high, as the government overhauls the country's hardware.

BAE Systems also had to redraw plans for a joint venture to supply armored vehicles in partnership with Indian carmaker Mahindra & Mahindra. It had initially sought a 49 percent stake in the joint venture.

The FIPB this week approved a revised split of 26 percent for BAE and 74 percent for Mahindra, the FT said.

tejas · Post by **tejas** » 05 Dec 2009 00:13

Mahindra & Mahindra is to initially invest $21.25 million over a three-year period.

YEEEHAAH! Thats a cool $7 million for not one but three years running. And hats off to the FIPB for preventing the creeping re-colonization of India by EADS. I guess importing 100% of most weapons is better than buying them from a 51-49% joint venture with a foreign company.*

In the meantime lets keep enjoying Republic Day watching foreign made weapon systems fly and drive past us. I also look forward to continued defense exports from India such as tents, parachutes, jute ropes and uniforms ( non-digital camo. of course). With people this stupid in gov't. who needs enemies?

*( OK 70% if you believe in screw driver offsets. But more likely 130% pricing to offset the offset).

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 05 Dec 2009 00:19

Dmurphy wrote:India Rejects JV by Larsen & Toubro, EADS
NEW DELHI - India has rejected a proposed tie-up between its biggest defense contractor, Larsen & Toubro, and Franco-German aerospace and defense group EADS, according to a Dec. 3 report.

The Financial Times said EADS and L&T had planned to form a joint venture to supply electronic warfare systems, avionics and radars, but it was rejected because it would exceed caps on foreign investment.

The companies had announced the joint venture May 5.

The upper limit allowed by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) for foreign direct investment in companies in the defense sector is 26 percent.

Terrible news. This could have made L&T a major player in the domestic private defense manufacturing.

The government wants private companies in defense manufacturing but they tie their hands by severely restricting foreign investment in such vital areas.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 05 Dec 2009 00:33

the thing is that at 29% investments, we would get only screw drivers. most companies would like at least near 50-50 share.

a_kumar · Post by **a_kumar** » 05 Dec 2009 07:34

Brando wrote: The government wants private companies in defense manufacturing but they tie their hands by severely restricting foreign investment in such vital areas.

With the exception of French, I most players are likely to come around and work with the rules. In the meantime, GoI might relax a little bit too (offset definition?).

The key is to get one player going successfully, IMHO.

sunilUpa · Post by **sunilUpa** » 05 Dec 2009 09:53

Indian Panel OKs Joint Aircraft Effort With Russia

After 7 long years..atlast,

NEW DELHI - India's highest decision-making body on security matters gave its approval Dec. 3 to the joint development with Russia of a multirole transport aircraft (MTA).

The clearance by the Cabinet Committee on Security here will pave the way for a formal agreement to be signed during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Russia, beginning Dec. 6.

The plan calls for India and Russia to jointly build 210 MTAs, with Russia buying 100 and India buying the rest. The agreement will include an option for India to buy 100 more MTAs for its Army and other security forces.

Despite a 2002 memorandum of understanding to forge a joint venture to build the aircraft in India, no headway has been made on the project. The formal agreement likely will be inked during Singh's Moscow visit, an Indian Defence Ministry official said.

Russia's Irkutsk Aviation and Industrial Association, llyushin Aviation Complex and Rosoboronexport have decided to participate in the MTA program with India's state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) on an equity-sharing basis.

The Russians will finance nearly $300 million of the aircraft's development costs, the Defence Ministry official said. HAL also will supply $300 million for the effort after getting firm orders for the 15-ton MTA from the Indian Air Force, the ministry official added.

The MTA is intended to replace the Air Force's transport aircraft, most of which were bought from Russia. India has about 100 medium-lift An-32s and about 20 heavy-lift Il-76s.

In 2008, India signed a contract for the purchase of six C-130 Hercules transport planes from the U.S.

chiru · Post by **chiru** » 05 Dec 2009 14:37

The plan calls for India and Russia to jointly build 210 MTAs, with Russia buying 100 and India buying the rest. The agreement will include an option for India to buy 100 more MTAs for its Army and other security forces.

gurus can anyone clarfy that india is getting 110 MTAs rather than 45 as previosly reported..or is it DDM

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 05 Dec 2009 19:36

PM leaves for Russia tomorrow, three defence pacts to be signed

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 05 Dec 2009 20:35

chiru wrote:
The plan calls for India and Russia to jointly build 210 MTAs, with Russia buying 100 and India buying the rest. The agreement will include an option for India to buy 100 more MTAs for its Army and other security forces.
gurus can anyone clarfy that india is getting 110 MTAs rather than 45 as previosly reported..or is it DDM

I can only hope it's NOT DDM and that better sense has finally dawned on the bean counters that putting off acquisition decision actually cost much, much more in the long run.

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 06 Dec 2009 04:38

3 pacts? Any guesses? Extra Naval fulcrums? Extra MKIs? MRTA? What else?

CM

KrishG · Post by **KrishG** » 06 Dec 2009 04:55

Cain Marko wrote:3 pacts? Any guesses? Extra Naval fulcrums? Extra MKIs? MRTA? What else?

CM

MRTA, BrahMos Hypersonic CM, MiG-29 upgrade

Cain Marko · Post by **Cain Marko** » 06 Dec 2009 05:31

MiG-29 upgrade? What more is there to be signed? Almost everything has been agreed upon afaik. The upgrades are already underway and a couple of a/c should be ready by 2011.

CM

sanjaykumar · Post by **sanjaykumar** » 06 Dec 2009 06:05

The prime minister of India does not negotiate nor sign pacts involving tactical weapons.

VijayKumarSinha · Post by **VijayKumarSinha** » 07 Dec 2009 03:39

This link says that, "The P-3C Orion is now a front runner to meet the Indian Navy’s requirement for six Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft."

Didn't we buy 8 P-8A's for ASW role? Then, what is this about?

But, the good thing is that they got our map right.

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 07 Dec 2009 05:06

VijayKumarSinha wrote:
But, the good thing is that they got our map right.

Probably a mistake on their part. "Our" map is a myth they teach school children who are gullible enough to not question their text books. They should disregard that map and issue more "realistic" maps.

Cybaru · Post by **Cybaru** » 07 Dec 2009 22:15

VijayKumarSinha wrote:This link says that, "The P-3C Orion is now a front runner to meet the Indian Navy’s requirement for six Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft."

Didn't we buy 8 P-8A's for ASW role? Then, what is this about?

But, the good thing is that they got our map right.

The long range order was met.. ( 8 on order and 8 options )

This is the medium range 6 MPA that IN was looking for. ( 6 looking for + ??? Number of options ). 14 - 20 odd MPA will pretty much secure all of Indian Ocean.

Dmurphy · Post by **Dmurphy** » 07 Dec 2009 22:44

VijayKumarSinha wrote:This link says that, "The P-3C Orion is now a front runner to meet the Indian Navy’s requirement for six Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft."

Didn't we buy 8 P-8A's for ASW role? Then, what is this about?

IIRC, Boeing was offering a modified P-8I as the MRMR and was the "front runner" for the deal.

Brando · Post by **Brando** » 08 Dec 2009 05:24

It makes more sense to stick with the aircraft that the IN already has made a commitment to than add another new aircraft to the already limited resources of the IN. With more similar aircraft, training and maintenance etc become cheaper and easier. I don't see why a Long range aircraft like the P-8 cannot be used for "medium" range operations as well given that the P-8's sensor suite is supposed to be much more advanced than the P-3C's and also more versatile. How is the P-3C superior to the P-8 in medium range ASW operations ?

srai · Post by **srai** » 08 Dec 2009 05:54

Cybaru wrote:
VijayKumarSinha wrote:This link says that, "The P-3C Orion is now a front runner to meet the Indian Navy’s requirement for six Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft."

Didn't we buy 8 P-8A's for ASW role? Then, what is this about?

But, the good thing is that they got our map right.

The long range order was met.. ( 8 on order and 8 options )

This is the medium range 6 MPA that IN was looking for. ( 6 looking for + ??? Number of options ). 14 - 20 odd MPA will pretty much secure all of Indian Ocean.

The number for medium ranged MPA was 12. Here's an article with the details:

Medium Range Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft (MRMR) procurement on fast track

...
A request for proposal (RFP) for supply of six Medium Range Maritime reconnaissance (MRMR) aircraft was floated by India's Ministry of Defense in June 2008.

The new aircraft, which will replace the aging fleet of 12 Islander aircraft in service, are to be equipped with an Airborne Early Warning system. The Indian Coast Guard has an additional requirement for six MRMRs without an Airborne Early Warning system. The MRMR is required to have a range of 500 nautical miles and an endurance of 6 hours.

Bids against the RFP were received from Boeing (P-8, a variant of P-8I), Russian Illyushin (IL-38 variant), French Dassault (Falcon 900MPA), EADS (Case C-295) and Israel's Elta System electronics (EL/W-2085).