Military Acquisitions, Partnerships & Developments

[vic]

The funny thing is that we have still not put in any RPG into production, though we are making ad hoc imports

[RoyG]

We don't import or use RPG. We use shipon, carl gustaf, etc

[tushar_m]

Interesting system




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-300

IMI Shipon

During the late 1990s, IMI introduced the Shipon, an advanced reusable multi-purpose shoulder-launched rocket system consisting of a launch tube and FCS module. The Shipon includes an advanced fire-control system, helping to aim and increasing effective range to 600 meters. The Shipon fires two types of rockets: HEAA Tandem, which penetrates 800 mm of steel armor after explosive reactive armor, and a bunker-buster rocket.

[SaiK]

49% FDI in defence sector is a good move if the objective is tech transfer, but gov must know that IP rights, and other know-hows are retained and goverened by participating nation's agenda. This does not make any sense, just by opening up FDI space without knowing the objectives..MMS gov decision is a big question.

[kshirin]

49% FDI in defence sector is a good move if the objective is tech transfer, but gov must know that IP rights, and other know-hows are retained and goverened by participating nation's agenda. This does not make any sense, just by opening up FDI space without knowing the objectives..MMS gov decision is a big question.

We need an informed, healthy, open debate on FDI. I would welcome FDI if it brought in TOT. Indian industry can deliver.
China allowed FDI in many sectors including those connected to defence on condition of transfer of technology, leveraging access to its market single mindedly. This has resulted in many sin offs in the aviation sector. Other countries have allowed FDI under offsets again with strict conditions on transfer of technology. Both experiments have been successful because indigenous companies were in the driving seat, picking their partners, laying down conditions, with Govt enforcing compliance.
Giving special incentives to FDI when our own companies face so many obstacles is unfair. The incentives should be given for all on the basis of national treatment.
There should also be a plan to develop a few indigenous projects and technologies, and use whatever way we can to build indigenous capabilities – partial funding of R & D, assurance of market, and foreign tie-ups only for real TOT.
Let us not forget there is a lot of resistance to India or any new country for that matter developing its indigenous capabilities. We need not get emotional about this, every country protects its geopolitical interests the way it knows best, and India coming up as a major industrial power may not fit into those plans, so we have to have a finely crafted policy that protects us from this blowback while quietly and swiftly developing these capabilities. China faced a huge outcry when it tried to reserve procurement to domestic innovative companies, exactly the sort we are facing now. A strategic vision informing all departments of Govt would be essential. The time has come to ensure Indian industry becomes stronger.

http://www.tehelka.com/lets-be-defensiv ... roduction/

Let’s Be Defensive About Defence Production’
Spme reasons why FDI norms in the defence manufacturing sector should not be relaxed
ASHOK PARTHASARATHI
June 17, 2013
The widely argued view that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is a means for our companies to access “high-end technology” is wrong. Our companies, whether in the public or private sectors, can acquire — and have actually acquired — high-end technologies through technology transfer or license agreements without any FDI. The licence agreement also provides much greater flexibility because such agreements are time-bound. Therefore, in case an Indian company finds its foreign technology supplier has slipped and so is not in a position to offer state-of-the-art technology after the original agreement of 5-10 years expires, it can drop its original supplier and choose another supplier who does. However, if the original technology supplier had made an FDI in the Indian company, the latter would be stuck with the former and thereby be condemned to have to use an inferior technology in perpetuity. There have been many such cases that are seriously deleterious to both the Indian company and the nation.
Thirdly, the foreign company or “partner” that has made the FDI tries its level best to over-invoice the prices at which it supplies capital goods and components or parts to the Indian company so as to benefit the “mother company” back home. This leads to huge unnecessary and indefensible loss of precious foreign exchange. A recent case is that of Nokia (India) — the Indian subsidiary with 100 percent FDI by Nokia (Finland) — doing precisely that. Nokia (India) has been caught doing such over-invoicing by the Income Tax authorities and the Enforcement Directorate and has, therefore, been directed to refund the over-invoiced amount of Rs 3,000 crore along with interest and Rs 500 crore penalty.
Then, there is the important aspect of indigenisation. Many studies have shown that foreign companies do not really manufacture in depth the products they produce here. Again, Nokia is a good example. A whole decade after they began “making” handsets of mobile phones here, the indigenous content was a mere 25 percent; 75 percent continues to be imported from Nokia (Finland). This leads to huge recurring outflows of foreign exchange, and also to only a minimal transfer of the so-called high-end technology. In comparison, the far more sophisticated wireless communication sets for the defence services, incorporating truly high-end technology — proprietary microchip-based secrecy and security features totally missing from commercial handsets for civilians — have been designed and developed in India. They are being produced with 90 percent Indian content by a PSU, Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL).
Finally, there is the matter of exports. One of our leading think tanks, Research and Information System for Developing Countries, brought out a detailed report recently on how the level of exports varied as a function of FDI in companies in some ten economic sectors, including defence products exports. The exhaustive data and analysis covering the last one decade led to the following conclusion: the higher the percentage of FDI, the lower the percentage of exports in total sales.
I now turn to some specific points made by Shaili Chopra in On the defensive for no good reason? (25 May).
Firstly, the article as a whole is massively but wrongly pejorative about the Defence PSUs (DPSUs), e.g., use of terms like “monster” DPSUs; HAL is a “non-performer” etc. Sweeping, unsubstantiated generalisations that are incorrect.
Secondly, latest data from the defence ministry indicate that defence imports, which were around 70 percent a decade ago, have now decreased to around 55 percent.
Thirdly, the assertion that the current 26 percent FDI cap on production of defence equipment “is not enough to attract global players”, flies in the face of the facts. Practically every major US and European defence company has come into the country even at 26 percent. What is more, this has occurred even in one of the most sensitive of areas — Electronic Warfare (EW). Chopra quotes Air Marshal Bhavnani of the Tata Group, but fails to state that the Tatas themselves have a 74%-26% JV in the EW Systems area with the Israeli major, ELTA! Moreover, because of the technological weakness of the Tatas themselves in EW, the so-called JV is being effectively controlled by ELTA; it is they who take all the key policy and management decisions! Moreover, Bhavnani states that the supposed “wariness of foreign defence equipment manufacturers is due to the bidding process being too cumbersome”, not because theFDI cap is only 26 percent! Bhavnani’s statement that the FDI cap should be increased to 49 percent in order to “kick start” the process of indigenisation is ludicrous. There is an inverse relation between the degree of indigenisation and the level of the FDI cap as shown above with Nokia. Moreover BEL has been able to purchase state-of-art “cutting edge technologies” across the board, including in the EW area, without anyFDI. How does Bhavnani explain that? What is more, when I was Secretary of Electronics, I was able to acquire optical fibre, cable and equipment technologies, microchip technology and even a range of hyper pure silicon technologies, including for infrared night vision equipment, with zero FDI.
Fourthly, Chopra writes, “Worries of sabotage and blackmail can be addressed by putting in appropriate riders in any technology transfer agreements with the foreign company supplying the technology.” As one who, during my decade-long tenure in the Department of Electronics had negotiated and concluded some 80 agreements involving foreign technology sellers and PSU buyers, I can assure you that one may have the most comprehensive and toughest “riders” in the texts of the Transfer of Technology or the FDI agreements, but, when it comes to the crunch, those “riders” prove to be of little operational value or utility in practice.
Chopra does not deal with the clearances that not only the Indian company but also the Indian government needs to obtain from the government of the country where the foreign technology supplying, and FDI making, company is based. My experience is that obtaining such clearance becomes far more difficult when FDI is involved as opposed to only a technical collaboration or transfer of technology.
I now come to the delays in designing, engineering, prototyping and bulk producing the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) and the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). In the MBT, the customer — the army — kept changing the performance specifications and the operational requirements repeatedly. For example, in the case of a key sub-system, the type of suspension to be used in the tank, it was changed suddenly by the army from hydro-pneumatic to torsion bar just when the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) laboratory concerned had successfully developed the former type originally specified by the army. Consequently, seven years of work and time were lost. Almost the same thing happened on other major sub-systems also. Another major cause of delay was the fact that the army wanted — quite understandably — the desert trials of the tank to be done only in the summer months. So, if there was even one problem from the side of the Army or DRDO, the “problem-solved” tank could be field tested only during the next summer. Then, there were delays because several components were held up due to export control by the western countries, which could not be attributed to the DRDO! However, after 15 years of effort, Arjun came out with flying colours having realised the complete technology for an MBT and with night fighting capabilities to boot.
The DRDO explicitly eschewed the “Not Invented Here” syndrome and used small, medium and large manufacturing companies in the private sector to develop and produce sub-systems and components to DRDO specifications and with DRDO “hand-holding” at all times. As a result, Arjun is around 70 percent indigenous. As a spin-off of the Arjun programme, the DRDO was able to upgrade the power of the T-72M Russian tank’s engine from 700 hp to the required 1100 hp in barely nine months and at a cost of just Rs 3 crore. This major breakthrough, which the Russians had claimed was not technically possible, led to the entirely indigenously upgraded T-72 now called Ajeya, which is a potent element of India’s tank fleet. It also disproves Chopra’s contention that “homegrown companies can continue researching with grants and doles but that could take a while before we achieve anything”.
Chopra quotes only a part of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses paper and even that is totally wrong. Having a sound domestic “Research, Design, Development, and Engineering” (RDD-E) capability is a major resource. Besides upgrading the T-72M engine, the indigenisation of T-90, which India is developing with technology acquired from Russia, was speeded up by using the huge number of sub-contractors/vendors built up as a result of the Arjun programme.
As for the LCA, Tejas, Bhavnani’s statement that it “took 25 years to make” is incorrect. Actual design work on the plane was started in 1990; the two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDAs) were made and flown in 2001-02. Then, based on the learning from the TDAs, two Pre-Production Prototypes (PPPs) were made, flown and tested in 2003-04. Thereafter, five more PPPs were made and flight tested for around 10,000 hours and cleared. Then, seven Pre-Production Aircraft (PPAs), again made by HAL, were flight tested thoroughly for three years, after which Tejas secured Initial Operational Clearance-1 (IOC-1) from the IAF in 2010. The latest flight tests with full weapon load done from January 2012 to May 2013 were also successful and so the IAF has decided to accord Tejas IOC-2 by 30 June this year. HAL has also committed to the IAF to supply the first 10 aircraft for induction by the end of 2014. The total time from beginning of design to operational induction — i.e., 24 years — compares very well with the 20 years in the case of the French Rafale and the Eurofighter, especially considering that Tejas is the very first state-of-art combat aircraft designed, developed and produced in the country and that too with 70 percent indigenous content.
Regarding the relative prices of the Sukhoi-30 imported from Russia and that manufactured in-depth in HAL, based on transfer of technology (TOT) from the Sukhoi Design Bureau, being Rs 350 crore and Rs 420 crore per aircraft, respectively, Bhavnani is again not playing straight. It is well-known worldwide that hi-tech defence weapon system suppliers always depress the price of the main system — sometimes, as in this case, even below production cost — and then, more than make it up through sale of spares and TOT fees. In the case of the Sukhoi-30, the Sukhoi company has charged HAL Rs 200 crore on TOT fees alone. Fees for training HAL engineers in Sukhoi production plants and for deputing Sukhoi engineers to HAL’s plant at Nasik, Koraput and Hyderabad “to oversee and guide” HAL engineers and technicians on the actual production line, added to Sukhoi’s mark-up in the prices of key raw materials, components, modules and sub-systems imported by the Nasik plant from Russia as part of HAL’s phased manufacturing programme, make up another Rs 800 crore, according to HAL’s top management. Besides, HAL has to amortise the above total of Rs 1,000 crore on the total number of 160 planes it is making for the IAF. These explain the Rs 70 crore difference that Bhavnani has computed.
However, I would like to point out that the French Rafale, which the government has recently chosen to be our medium multirole combat aircraft, first flew as a Technology Demonstrator as far back as in April 1986. That means design work must have started 5-6 years earlier. It was first inducted in the French Air Force in 2004. So, the period from starting of design to air force induction was around 24-25 years — the same as for Tejas! It took SNECMA, Europe’s sole military aircraft engine maker, 11 years to design and develop the M-88 engine, despite SNECMA having had many decades of experience in developing and manufacturing aeroengines for fighter aircraft from the Mirage-3 to the Mirage-5, the Mirage-F2 and to the Mirage-2000 family before the Rafale.
It is for all the reasons mentioned above that the defence ministry is not agreeable to raise the current FDI limit of 26 percent in the manufacture of defence equipment.

[siddharth]

FDI in defence remains at 26%.

http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/busine ... 18883.html

FDI cap in defence sector will remain at 26 percent and proposals beyond that will be considered by the Cabinet Committee on Security on case to case basis, according to a government decision which showed that Defence Ministry prevailed over the Commerce Ministry.


"FDI cap is 26 percent in defence sector that stands like that. Any FDI proposal beyond 26 percent which brings state-of-the-art technology, that proposal would be considered by the CCS," Commerce Minister Anand Sharma told reporters here.

[SaiK]

bringing state-of-the-art should not be the goal.
bringing the art-of-the-state should be the goal.

basically engineering

[siddharth]

Well said Sir.

[Vipul]

Defence Ministry nod to Rs 4,000 cr acquisition proposals for services.

Defence Ministry today cleared acquisition proposals worth around Rs 4,000 crore for armed forces, including procurement of French-origin Milan 2T anti-tank missiles for the Army to do away with shortage of such weapons in the force.

A meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) chairedby Defence Minister A K Antony today also sanctioned an additional Rs 300 crore for Navy’s long-delayed Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC), under construction at the Cochin Shipyard Limited, sources told PTI here.

For the Indian Air Force, the DAC approved procurement of two more Aerostat radars worth over Rs 1,000 crore for keeping an eye on the enemy activities deep inside its territory, they said.

The Milan 2T missiles are built in India under licence from French firm MBDA by the Hyderabad-based PSU Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and more than 4,500 more of it would be built by it after today’s approval, they said.

The Army has been facing shortage of anti-tank weaponry for quite some time and it has been conveyed to the Government on several occasions by its leadership, they said.

The DAC meeting also cleared an IAF proposal for upgrading the medium lift choppers of the force including older versions of Mi-17 helicopters.

IAF has been operating these choppers for quite some time and the machines which still have age left in them would be upgraded at a cost of over Rs 1,000 crore for making them more capable including enabling them to carry out night operations.

IAF proposal for installing auto-pilot equipment in its Jaguar deep strike penetration aircraft was also approved by the DAC.

[kshirin]

This is so not on, China is developing its defence industry with full support and leading position of its Government and military, our military should support indigenous development, not root for foreign products.

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 747_1.html

Air Force at war with Hindustan Aeronautics; wants to import, not build, a trainer



In a letter to defence minister, IAF chief criticizes HAL’s proposal to design and build aircraft for rookie pilots

By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 29th July 13

Indian Air Force (IAF) chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, has assailed Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), which builds most of the fighter aircraft that the IAF flies. Writing directly to Defence Minister AK Antony in the first week of July, Browne has savaged HAL’s proposal to design and build a basic trainer aircraft (BTA) for rookie IAF pilots. Rejecting the HAL proposal, Browne has urged Antony to import 106 PC-7 Mark II trainers from Swiss company, Pilatus. These will be over and above the 75 trainers already contracted for US $640 million (Rs 3,780 crore).

Business Standard has a copy of Browne’s five-page letter to Antony. Contacted for comments, the IAF and HAL have both chosen to remain silent on the issue.

At stake is an estimated $800 million (Rs 4,750) for Pilatus, if Antony accepts Browne’s recommendation to give the Swiss company, rather than HAL, the 106-aircraft order.

On Sep 29, 2009, the ministry of defence (MoD) had cleared the acquisition of 181 BTAs for the IAF. 75 were to be procured internationally, a contract that Pilatus controversially won. Meanwhile, HAL was to design and develop 106 BTA in India.

Now the air chief has requested Antony, “To meet the immediate flying training requirements of the IAF, the ‘Option Clause’ be exercised to procure 38 PC-7 Mk II from M/s Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, as directed by [the MoD] on 29 September 2009. The subsequent requirement of 68 BTA could be met through Repeat Procurement.”

Repeat Procurement is the simplified, swift procurement of equipment that is already in Indian military service. User trials are dispensed with.

Browne argues that HAL, in its detailed project report to the MoD, has underpriced the HTT-40. Rubbishing HAL’s projected cost of Rs 32.70 crore per aircraft, Browne says the HTT-40 will actually cost Rs 43.59 crore at 2011 prices.

The extra cost per aircraft, according to Browne, includes Rs 1.81 crore as the cost of production; and Rs 7.11 crore as the cost of design & development, of which the IAF must pay 80 per cent. A 16 per cent rise in the cost of the dollar will add another Rs 1.97 crore per aircraft, taking the price up to Rs 43.59 crore.

Then Browne adds 4.5 per cent annual inflation to these prices, which are on a 2011 base. That raises the HTT-40’s per unit cost to Rs 59.31 crore in 2018 (when the HTT-40 would start being delivered) and Rs 64.77 crore in 2020.

In contrast to this gloomy forecast, Browne paints a rosy picture for the PC-7 Mk II, stating that Pilatus costs just Rs 30 crore per aircraft, a price that will apply also to the “options clause” for another 38 PC-7 Mk II. “Hence the HTT-40 will be more expensive to the IAF when compared to the PC-7 Mk II by over 89% from 2018 onwards,” writes the IAF chief.

In fact, the Pilatus contract freezes the price only for the next 38 trainers under the “options clause”, but the final tranche of 68 aircraft would be negotiated afresh, subject to inflation and forex variations. Furthermore, since the forex component of the PC-7 Mk II is 100 per cent, compared to just 30 per cent for the HTT-40 (Browne’s figures), any adverse change in exchange rates would escalate Pilatus’ cost far more than HAL’s.

Surprising experts also is the IAF chief’s inexplicable oversight in omitting any mention of decades of heavy payout to Pilatus for maintenance, overhauls, spares and upgrades. With the MiG-21, MiG-27, MiG-29 and the Mirage 2000, these cost up to ten times as much as the initial purchase cost of the aircraft.

Amit Cowshish, former Financial Advisor (Acquisition) & Additional Secretary with the MoD says, “Over the service life of a foreign aircraft, its spares, maintenance, overhaul and upgrade from abroad could cost several times more than the basic cost of the aircraft, as we saw with many IAF fighters. It is impossible to contractually bind a vendor down to fixed prices for spares, upgrades and overhauls over the entire life cycle of the platform, which might stretch over decades. The actual cost incurred over years could be much more than what was anticipated at the time of purchase.”

Nor does Browne’s letter put a price on the design and manufacturing expertise that the HTT-40 would generate in India, and on the eco-system of vendors and sub-vendors that would be created, generating high-tech jobs and expertise.

HAL, usually on the defensive against the IAF, has reacted defiantly. Business Standard learns that work is underway on the HTT-40, financed by Rs 150 crore that HAL’s board has committed from internal funds. HAL says that foreign buyers would be interested in the trainer even if the IAF is not. So too would the navy and army, whose expanding aviation wings would lead to them training their own pilots instead of continuing to rely on the IAF.

HAL designers also claim that the HTT-40 will be far more capable and versatile than the PC-7 Mk II, which is a de-rated version of the PC-9 trainer. The HTT-40 will be a weaponised trainer that is also a light attack aircraft. For political reasons, Pilatus removed the weapons hard points from the PC-7 Mk II trainers that they sold the South African air force. The same is true for the BTAs sold to India.

The air chief’s letter cites HAL’s record of delays, specifically mentioning the Light Combat Helicopter and the Light Utility Helicopter. Browne charges, “HAL routinely seeks approval for a small project completion period… without achieving it.”

The IAF chief cites the MoD’s ruling in 2010 that more Pilatus trainers would be bought if the HTT-40 had not yet flown by the time the first Pilatus trainers were delivered to the IAF. Today, 14 Pilatus trainers have already been delivered, and Browne claims that Pilatus will deliver 30 trainers per year to the IAF.

On July 8, the first IAF batch of trainee pilots began learning to fly on the Pilatus PC-7 Mark II at the IAF Academy at Dindigul, near Hyderabad.

[member_22539]

^Bribe or fancy? I hope it is just that he fancies foreign maal, which would be pathetic regardless.

[vishvak]

Trainers' difference in price is not that straightforward in terms of rupees.For a difference of few crores about 800 million$ of ForEx$$ will be saved. Plus huge experience in terms of flying a more advanced trainer instead of some stripped off trainer. HAL chould have made a better point in terms of logistics improvement/maintenance during its life cycle and including maintenance at war times - without changing anything at all.

HAL has perhaps a very valid point of trainer being developed anyway for the Army and the Navy. So common maintenance pool will reduce cost too.

[Sid]

Wonder why IAF chief is personally favoring this trainer aircraft.

It was surprising when IAF showcased it during Pokheran live fire demo even before it was formally inducted into squadron service.

Where as LCA made a small blimp during the show. If it was not of ADA in house video, no one would have seen its performance.

[Lalmohan]

possibly the chief has had incomplete or inaccurate financial planning advice from his staff... who may or may not be convinced by the salesmen from pilatus and their rosy projections

[John]

Here we go all over again, If IAF listened to all the Hawk bashing and not ordered Hawk. Waited for HJT-39 what do you think would have happened? Former proved to be the best decision and lets wait till HJT-36 is in production status before approving another project. IMO the best solution is letting the private industry in on trainer development.

[Surya]

err there was no local option for AJT??

all the options were foreign

Our problem with Hawk was not that it was selected but how long it took to select it and then in some people's case which model was finally selected.

[nachiket]

Our problem with Hawk was not that it was selected but how long it to select it and in some people's case which model was finally selected.

What is the problem with the selected model (Hawk 132)?

[Singha]

HAL needs to FOC the IJT before anyone will take them seriously on such "quick" projects. IJT also went from drawing board to first flight in 18 months, nearly a decade ago...and then what.

[NRao]

Then it is my understanding that the use wanted a more powerful engine.

...............................................

BTW:

July 29, 2013 :: IAF diluted al least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft

The IAF has a finger in this mess too. To what extent is the question.

[Surya]

nachiket

check the archives - there were discussions on the engine choice etc between versions

[putnanja]

Then it is my understanding that the use wanted a more powerful engine.

...............................................

BTW:

July 29, 2013 :: IAF diluted al least 12 benchmarks for trainer aircraft

The IAF has a finger in this mess too. To what extent is the question.

Some pretty damning info there in the article. But that has always been the case for indigenous projects compared to imported maal. Whether it is Arjun or Pilatus or LCA. I am actually in favour of Pilatus as it ensured quick buy. What I am more against is how domestic products are held to high requirements compared to imported stuff.

Look at the statement below by the ex-Chief of IAF from the article. It is almost admitting that IAF was setting up HAL for failure by imposing tight requirements for HAL.

Asked for comments, N V Tyagi told Business Standard the PSQR of March 2009 set unrealistically high standards for HAL to meet. These were lowered in the October 2009 ASQR because the IAF was going for global procurement. Lower standards would bring in more vendors and generate competition.

Says Tyagi, "The earlier PSQRs matched the performance of the Embraer Super Tucano, which many IAF officers considered a good trainer. But the IAF didn't believe that HAL could build such a trainer quickly. After a series of HPT-32 crashes (then the IAF’s basic trainer), it was decided in September 2009 to buy 75 basic trainers from the global market. Fresh QRs were framed in order to bring as many vendors as possible into the tender."

The question remains — why were exacting standards set for a HAL-built trainer lowered when it came to an international purchase?

[John]

err there was no local option for AJT??

all the options were foreign

Our problem with Hawk was not that it was selected but how long it took to select it and then in some people's case which model was finally selected.

I recall lot of us in pitchforks demanding IAF throw more money at HAL on IJT and eventually CAT. I still remember the predictions from after AI 2005 about how we will it up and flying by 2010. Also there were was Russian crowd which wanted to buy Mig-AT powered by everybody's favorite al-55 engine.

[Sid]

Pilatus deal has all the tell tell signs of a future corruption scandal. A deal executed is a hurry, with backing by service chief who is against making a systems at home.

Is there any technical arm in IAF, which can be mandated to initiate an aircraft design project?

[nachiket]

nachiket

check the archives - there were discussions on the engine choice etc between versions

It was several years ago and BRF has too many threads to trawl through. Do you remember what the objections were in a nutshell?

[A Deshmukh]

But the IAF didn't believe that HAL could build such a trainer quickly. After a series of HPT-32 crashes (then the IAF’s basic trainer), it was decided in September 2009 to buy 75 basic trainers from the global market. Fresh QRs were framed in order to bring as many vendors as possible into the tender."

IMHO the answer lies in the above.
IAF did not believe HAL would deliver. After a series of crashes, IAF sped up the procurement of basic trainer bypassing HAL.

Both N V Tyagi and Browne have very good reputations. We should be careful, before jumping to conclusions.

We would all like IAF to buy Indian made planes, but we cannot risk pilot lives waiting forever for HAL to develop.

A decision was taken about 4 yrs back.
After 4 years is HAL ready with planes with reduced specifications?

[Austin]

Air Chief Marshal Browne gives thumbs down to HAL aircraft

[NRao]

The issue has to be about dilution. Other aspects have a place. However, just to get a plane should one dilute the requirements? Could they have obtained a plane that met the requirements and yet made it on time? Clearly the costs would have been much higher. It is the dilution that allowed the current selection to be made, else it would not made the cut.

[Lalmohan]

were the requirements appropriate in the first place? or reaching too far?
this is a circular flawed process - set overhigh requirements, no one can meet, hal promises to get work, iaf not convinced, other vendors are cool, time is wasted, requirements are dropped, etc., etc.

[NRao]

We are confusing the issues. Leave HAL out of this dilution topic. IF we were to stick to the first RFP that was written I am sure there were aircrafts that met that RFP - has got to be. So, why did they dilute it then? Tyagi seems to claim to include more vendors.

IMHO they should have stuck with the original stuff. This current selection would not have made that list.

IF the IAF is happy with this machine - so be it. But it seems like a very weak argument having changed the requirements mid way.

[Ramu]

The problem with diluting requirements for a foreign product is, you can never bring it back to where you wanted for atleast half of its 30-40 years lifetime. Midlife upgrade/overhaul will again cost an arm and a leg.

At the same time you can afford to dilute the same for an in-house product. Every 3-5 years will bring the next block - just like Dhruv.

If IAF really did dilute their requirements in favour of Pilatus, I wonder how they can explain their logic if there is any.
I am sure IAF did have all the time in the world for the last 10 years to nurture HTT-40 via HAL. Does it really have to wait till a number of its aircraft starts crashing around 2009?

[NRao]

Just BTW, the IAF re-wrote the specs for the Apaches too. Talk has it that it was a cut-paste effort.

So, go figure. Who knows.

I just hope that the Indian efforts get more dekho.

[John]

The problem with diluting requirements for a foreign product is, you can never bring it back to where you wanted for atleast half of its 30-40 years lifetime. Midlife upgrade/overhaul will again cost an arm and a leg.

At the same time you can afford to dilute the same for an in-house product. Every 3-5 years will bring the next block - just like Dhruv.

If IAF really did dilute their requirements in favour of Pilatus, I wonder how they can explain their logic if there is any.
I am sure IAF did have all the time in the world for the last 10 years to nurture HTT-40 via HAL. Does it really have to wait till a number of its aircraft starts crashing around 2009?

I believe the delays with IJT have amplified this issue and IAF seems to be planning for scenario where latter might never reach production.

[Sid]

If that is the case then why IAF cannot dilute requirements for LCA as pilots are still dying due to old Migs?

It's a clear lack of vision and strategic thinking from IAFs point of view. Instead of acting like a spoilt rich kid, they should start taking some responsibility in such matters.

[member_22539]

^+1 Whenever there is a demand to nurture indigenous products, there comes the "lives of the soldiers" argument. Any type of outrageous and fanciful purchase can be justified by such arguments. This is a ploy to take logic out of the argument and just win it by emotion. People should stop using such cheap tricks and the rest of us should stop falling for them. If they really cared about pilot survival, they would have gotten rid of the MIGs as soon as possible. Instead they refuse to induct LCA Mk1 in more numbers and make it jump through more hoops (even though its much superior to what they have) aka LCA Mk2. Our indigenous products will never be good enough, because their specs would have been butchered out of multiple brochures, covering the best features. It is like making an animal with the strength of an elephant, speed of a cheetah and bite of a hyena, quite paradoxical. But, when it comes to foreign acquisition such specs will be immediately watered down. If someone points this out, out comes the cry "think about the soldiers!!!!!!"

[John]

I know it is waste of time trying to arguing with people who are convinced everything is conspiracy theory to bring down indigenous development.

Replying to earlier suggestion, it was not IAF that insisted IJT be fitted with more powerful engine but it is HAL that started looking for different engine: in late 2003 after initial flights and HAL noted that only issue was aircraft was underpowered. Snemca offered to work on improved version of Larzac noting the higher costs HAL started looking for other vendors and settled on Saturn Al-55 in 2004. Contract signed in upcoming year.

If you want institutions like HAL to succeed you either throw a lot of cash at it and govern them thru fear (like China) or you rely on private industries. Our current model is simply a lesson in insanity.

[member_22539]

^^^dude, get a grip - nobody's refusing to induct anything. Try and read up/understand how the TD--> PV--> LSP succession works

The LCA Mk1 is stuck now because HAL cannot work out manufacturing. Period.

The Technology part is being worked and is working. Specs/ Flight metrics have already been diluted/compromised to a reasonable level- why do you think we have staged goals in IOC-1, IOC-2, FOC etc ? The IAF cannot "nurture" more beyond saying YES - perhaps you want all the IAF guys to stand on their heads while saying YES - and that will "nurture" HAL some more and help them get the LCA out faster ???

Ya, another trick. Call others ignorant and then refuse to answer the question. You still haven't answered why specs are diluted for foreign maal when domestic projects need to meet unrealistic demands. All this IOC 1, 2, FOC etc. still does not make the LCA Mk2 any less a factor in more LCA orders. All the while pilots are dying on antiquate MIGs, where is your love for them? IAF can do a LOT MORE than just say YES. It is not some kid in a candy store, buying the most colorful lollipop. It has a strategic duty to nurture HAL and other domestic developers/manufacturers even at the cost of slightly lower specs. Again, we see some in the IAF and some of their outside supporters behave like short sighted kids, insisting on getting the best goodies rather than make a more mature investment. We buy fighters to protect the interest of the nation and to defend it, not to satisfy the fancies of some officers and their fans.

[member_22539]

I know it is waste of time trying to arguing with people who are convinced everything is conspiracy theory to bring down indigenous development.

Replying to earlier suggestion, it was not IAF that insisted IJT be fitted with more powerful engine but it is HAL that started looking for different engine: in late 2003 after initial flights and HAL noted that only issue was aircraft was underpowered. Snemca offered to work on improved version of Larzac noting the higher costs HAL started looking for other vendors and settled on Saturn Al-55 in 2004. Contract signed in upcoming year.

If you want institutions like HAL to succeed you either throw a lot of cash at it and govern them thru fear (like China) or you rely on private industries. Our current model is simply a lesson in insanity.

HAL like most other PSUs is grossly inefficient, no one disagrees with that. But until we get to real privatization, we need to create an research and development ecosystem and the necessary infrastructure (however skeletal), so that we don't have to wait for more decades while our private players create that by themselves (which is unlikely). Besides, which private player will be willing to bet so longterm and so much money if such an infrastructure does not exist? If HAL does not have the capability to make an LCA or IJT, you can bet your bottom dollar that no private player will have that or be able to create that within the foreseeable future. It took as 60 years of get here and should we stop and let others smother whatever little we have achieved?

PS: Yes, I do believe there is a conspiracy to bring down indigenous development (after all, we are not talking about aliens here).

[member_26622]

The kickback must be some serious load of money to flame up to this point. Seriously, It is the 'current' IAF chief not even a retired one trying to stop an indigenous basic trainer development.

The wise will figure out that their is no point in carrying any further development on LCA and LCH...or anything indigenous for IAF.

Wait...HAL can always sell the indigenous fighter (trainers) to the Maoist. That must be the business plan (Sarcasm hitting the roof here)

[Sid]

This might sound like rhetoric to some readers here, but its not just some random conspiracy theory by crazy jingos to prove arms deal wrong.

I knew chaiwalas dealing with acquisitions (with first hand accounts on such matters). Foreign weapon dealers have really strong lobby, and they can influence military acquisitions through obvious means. If stakes are high, they will anything possible.

Pilatus, Apache, C-130, C-17, Chinook, MMRCA, Phalcon AWACS, Su 30MKI, Mirage upgrade, Mig upgrade, and LUH. Just sheer amount of money involved here is mind boggling.

IAF is practically changing their whole wardrobe. If anyone thinks that IAF is resource starved and their hand is forced to buy things from outside then please think again.

[Austin]

IAF-HAL tiff threatens to shatter indigenization quest