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CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discussion

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Rahul M » 29 Jul 2015 08:15

KP, the COBRA's can be tasked like that. many of them are from adivasi background and would presumably have a decent idea on how to live off the land.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby prahaar » 29 Jul 2015 09:36

Viv S wrote:
Aditya G wrote:Image

Police and SWAT personnel arrive at the scene of an encounter with armed militants in Dinanagar town in Gurdaspur District of Punjab, on Monday. (Source: PTI)


What's the J&K Police doing at the scene?


I read in some news article that JK police sent the bullet proof "bunker" vehicles (two), so that the security forces can move closer in a safe vehicle.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby jamwal » 11 Aug 2015 21:16

A peek into the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah)

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a ... im-image-0

The government recently signed a peace accord with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (IM), one of the largest insurgent outfits, which has been demanding a unified Naga identity and a separate ‘Nagalim’ State for over six decades.


Image

Image


Image


Image


Are these insurgents ? :shock:

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Aditya G » 22 Nov 2015 20:00

TA Lt Col of 160 Bn injured in COIN ops against same party who killed Col Mahadik. Good to see terriers in action.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/j-k ... OiupM.html

lieutenant colonel was wounded on Sunday in Jammu and Kashmir’s Kupwara during an encounter with militants, barely a week after a colonel was killed in the same region.

Police said the second-in-command of territorial army, KS Nath, was wounded after security forces were ambushed during a search operation in the dense forests of Haji Naka.

The militants apparently belonged to the same group that had killed Colonel Santosh Mahadik, commanding officer of 41 Rashtriya Rifles, on November 17.

“Today we again had contact with the militants,” said Aijaz Ahmad, the Kupwara superintendent of police.
The army refused to confirm the officer’s identity. “I can only confirm that an officer is wounded,” said army spokesman NN Joshi.

After the colonel’s death, the army intensified its operation to hunt down militants holed up in districts along the India-Pakistan border. Commandos were airdropped to flush out militants hiding in the forests.
The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, which had masterminded the 2008 Mumbai attacks and many terror activities in Kashmir, claimed responsibility for Colonel Mahadik’s murder.


http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/gun-battl ... s-trapped/

Srinagar, Nov 21: Five militants of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) have been trapped by security forces in North Kashmir’s Rajwar forests tonight and a fierce gun battle is on and in Srinagar security forces today averted a major tragedy when they detected and defused a powerful Improvised Explosive Device (IED) planted on Srinagar-Baramulla part of National Highway at Narbal on the outskirts of Srinagar.

Army and police launched a joint operation in the Bawan Watsar forest area of Rajwar in Handwara in the frontier district of Kupwara this evening. A search party of the troops was fired upon and they have trapped around 5 LeT militants inside the forests.

Heavy firing is going on and more troops have been rushed to the area to cordon off more forest area so that the militants don’t manage to flee.

Earlier, last week Army had launched an operation in Kupwara forest area which is still going on. An Army Colonel was killed and 5 security men were injured in the operation so far.

Meanwhile, security forces averted a major tragedy on the outskirts of Srinagar today when they detected and defused a powerful IED planted on Srinagar-Baramulla part of National Highway at Narbal on the outskirts of Srinagar.

The IED was detected by the Road Opening Party of 2-Rashtriya Rifles (RR) of Army and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) under a culvert and was planted to target the security forces. The IED was wrapped in a cloth and put under a culvert.

Traffic was suspended, on the highway that remains busy during the day. The IED was defused by the Bomb Disposal Squad in nearby paddy fields without causing any damage. Senior police, CRPF and army officers reached the spot and assessed the situation. The traffic was later resumed on the highway.

A CRPF spokesman while giving details said: “An IED (Improvised Explosive Device) was recovered by CRPF along with 2 Rashtriya Rifles on HMT-Narbal route near Beacon Huts in Lawaypora area at around 0655 Hours. Immediately after receiving such information of planting an IED between Shaltang Chowk and Narbal Crossing a joint search operation was launched by 73 Bn CRPF, 44 Bn CRPF and 2RR between Parimpora and Shaltang Chowk under supervision of SK Tigga, DIG CRPF, Srinagar.”

“The search parties traced out one burnt HE (High Explosive)Bomb alongwith a container having approximate weight of 3-4 Kgs which were planted under culvert near Beacon Huts in Lawaypora on NH-1(A). The teams of CRPF and Rashtriya Rifles recovered it around 0655 hours. Later, the BDD Squad of J&K Police were informed about the recovery which was later detonated successfully at around 0940 Hours”, the spokesman said.

“Prima facie it appears that it was planted to target Security Forces deployed in the area. However, an FIR has been lodged in Police Station Parimpora in this regard for further investigations”, the spokesman added.

In the meantime, Army today recovered Artillery shells in Thajiwara area of Bijbehara in South Kashmir’s Anantnag district.

Reports said that a party of 19 RR of the Army spotted the shells. The area was cordoned off and the Bomb Disposal Squad was called in and the two shells were detonated.


Image

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Aditya G » 22 Nov 2015 20:04

http://www.risingkashmir.com/news/kupwa ... en-injured

Kupwara encounter; Lt Colonel among two army men injured
Published at 22/11/2015 18:03:02 0 Comment(s)

Rising Kashmir News

Srinagar
Two army soldiers including an officer received bullet injuries in an ongoing operation at Manigah forest area of north Kashmir’s Kupwara district on Sunday.


Official sources told Srinagar based news gathering agency GNS that army’s 41 RR, and commandos from 4 PARA, 9 PARA who had launched massive search operation in number of forest areas in Manigah following killing of army colonel on Nov 17, intercepted the fleeing militant group today in the afternoon at Haji Naka in Manigah, triggering off a fierce encounter.

In the firefight, two soldiers including a Lt Colonel KS Natt sustained bullet injuries, they said.

“All the injured were immediately evacuated to military hospital in Drugmulla for treatment.”

The group, according to the police official, had infiltrated on intervening night of 30/31 Oct and was trapped in the mountainous terrain due to heavy rains and snowfall.

On Nov 17, militants killed an army colonel of 47 RR in forest area of Behak near Sonwali in Manigah area of the district.

The said militant group had managed to escape four times since Nov 13 in different locations in Manigah sector.

On Nov 10, the army’s 41 RR had recovered the body of a militant in Kumkadi forests of Manigah who is believed to have died due to severe cold.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Aaryan » 23 Nov 2015 04:06

The kind of fire discipline they are showing and the tactical maneuvering they are making. They don't look like ordinary Abdul's. Either SSG or Battle hardened Afgans..

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby rkhanna » 24 Nov 2015 10:01

The kind of fire discipline they are showing and the tactical maneuvering they are making. They don't look like ordinary Abdul's. Either SSG or Battle hardened Afgans..


I recently read a Book written by Captain form the 10th Mountain with his Units Deployment in Southern Afghanistan (by the Paki Border) The guy previously had 2 Deployments from Iraq. He was at the Center of the brutal fighting against the Haqqani network. The Key observations were that the Haqqani network (with PA imbedded in them) was one of the most Sophisticated Light Infantry units they had ever encountered (between iraq and other parts of Astan). Their Weapons / Tactics / Trainings were superb.

Only matter of time before the Haqanni Network turned towards Kashmir as the Americans wind down in Astan.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Karan M » 24 Nov 2015 10:28

Well, the Americans are now discovering what the IA has been up against all these years. The chaps sent across the border are well drilled and fanatics.

Which book BTW?

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby rkhanna » 24 Nov 2015 14:44

@KM..let me get home and will give you the Full name with Author. Its an Outstanding read. Couple with the fact that these guys hated the Pakis as more often than not they were taking Art Fire from PA positions to cover Terrorist Movement and often got into gun fights with PA Troops covering the retreat of Terrorist. Sound Familiar?


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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Gagan » 25 Nov 2015 22:20

Karan M wrote:Well, the Americans are now discovering what the IA has been up against all these years. The chaps sent across the border are well drilled and fanatics.

Which book BTW?

Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, Renegades, Infidels, and the brotherhood of war in afghanistan
By
Sean Parnell

Is this the book?

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Rahul M » 25 Nov 2015 22:27


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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby vishvak » 25 Nov 2015 22:55

X-posting viewtopic.php?p=1940512#p1940512

Terrorist attack neutralized, 3 pest-e-shahided.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby rkhanna » 26 Nov 2015 12:54

Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, Renegades, Infidels, and the brotherhood of war in afghanistan
By
Sean Parnell

Is this the book?


Yup. This is it .. :) Outstanding read.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby SRoy » 29 Nov 2015 20:40

Found this in FB about the 2 I/C of 160 TA, hurt pretty bad.

Lt Col Karanbir Singh Natt

The unfortuitous bullet had slipped into one of the many chinks and exposed flanks of the body armour comprising a bullet proof patka and jacket. Unlike the death five days earlier of Col. Santosh Mahadik, CO, 41 Rashtriya Rifles, in the same area, Lt Col Natt survived that crippling gunshot wound.
''Lower half of the face gone, tongue was hanging loose, was unable to lie back as the tongue would fall back and obstruct his airway,'' is how an Army Medical Corps (AMC) officer described the unique injury.
Lt Col Natt was the second-in-command (2IC) of the 160 Territorial Army (JAK Rifles) and was formerly from the 19th battalion, the Brigade of the Guards. ''Lt Col Natt has suffered a serious injury to his lower jaw and it is virtually gone. However, he is stable at the moment. We are hoping for the best at Army Hospital Research & Referral (AHRR), Delhi, where he has been taken,'' Maj. Anoop, Adjutant, 160 TA, told HT, from Kupwara.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Aditya G » 01 Dec 2015 00:44

Image

http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/kash ... 02830.html

SHAHID RAFIQ
Manigah (Kupwara), Publish Date: Nov 28 2015 11:07PM | Updated Date: Nov 28 2015 11:07PM
Amidst siege, eerie calm prevails at Manigah
Photo: Firdous Hassan/GK
Army operation at Hajinaka Manigah area of Hayhama in this frontier district to flush out militants continued for the 15th day on Saturday.

Militants, according to sources, have believed to have given a “slip” to forces fifth time during the past two weeks.

Uneasy calm prevailed around Manigah bowl some 7 Kms away from district headquarters Kupwara as hundreds of soldiers of 4 Para, 41 RR, SOG, 160 T.A, 19 Maratha, 98 CRPF were seen rushing towards the Hajinakka forests and intensifying the combing operation in the area. Forces were using the sniffer dogs to trace the hiding militants. Army has installed sophisticated cameras at Glassdaji village from where the entire area is being continuously video graphed.

Police officials confirmed that the operation against militants in Manigah forest area of Kupwara district is still on. “Operation in the area against the militants is continuing and cordon is being tightened to prevent the militants from fleeing,” said a police officer wishing not to be named.

The intermittent exchange of firing continued yesterday between militants and forces where forces targeted some muddy hutments used by nomads during the winters near Dogyan hamlet of Hajinakka when forces were fired upon by militants when contact was established around 8:30 am on Friday. Locals of Manigah said that some residential houses of Dogyan which were vacated by army two days ago after the inputs of presence of militants returned to their homes today.

The families belonging to Rafiq Kohli, Sayan Khan, Auyoob Khan, Rashid Khan, and Zaffar Ali returned to their homes after army minutely conducted the searches. Meanwhile, locals on Saturday had to evacuate a woman Shaheena W/O Sayan Khan (mother of seven) to Sub district hospital Kupwara for treatment after she became unconscious due to massive mortar shelling at Dogyan.

Pertinently a small group of 2-3 militants has managed to escape many times since November 13 at different locations in Manigah forests. On November 17, the group killed an Army officer, Lt Colonel Santosh Mahadek of 41 RR in forest area of Sonwali in Manigah. “On November 22, an Army Colonel SK Natt was injured in the encounter.”

The militant group has already lost two of its members. One died due to cold while another was killed in an encounter.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby sum » 01 Dec 2015 04:16

The militant group has already lost two of its members. One died due to cold while another was killed in an encounter.

Fits the definition of "being hunted down like dogs" ( no disrespect to dogs)

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Aditya G » 11 Dec 2015 03:07

https://jugalthepurohit.wordpress.com/2 ... one-wiser/

It has been a year to the crisp Monday morning when about a hundred Maoist insurgents took on over 700 men from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and won. They killed twelve jawans, two officers and stole their weapons before walking away.

The first anniversary of the ill-fated ‘Operation South Sukma 14’ fell on December 1 and was forgotten. The national discourse vacillated between ‘intolerance’ to the incessant rainfall over Chennai. Prime Minister Modi tweeted about the Parliament while his Home Minister applauded the Border Security Force (BSF) on its raising day. The CRPF too did not release a note of remembrance.

However, what took place in Chhattisgarh’s disturbed Sukma district is far too important to be forgotten.

Let us begin with a recount.

Starting November 10, troops from five battalions (74th, 150th, 201st, 206th & 223rd) began pouring in for a ‘four-phase’ operation. Most of them lacked awareness about the local conditions. By November 15, the number had crossed 600. For an operation which involved swarming rebel bastions with troops devoid of intelligence and ground experience, the warning came on November 21 when seven men were seriously injured.

It did not induce a re-think.

On November 30, malaria struck before the Maoists could. A helicopter was called in to evacuate those affected but it could not land – the operational planning had simply not catered for a fit landing spot! Unwell and tired, troops slept on a hillock and started the next day searching for a landing spot. Observing them, the sure-footed Maoists fired their first shot in broad day light, at 9:30am.

Chaos ensued. The day ended with a bloodbath.

What survived was a broken force.

I witnessed juniors dishonouring their seniors, leaders lamenting openly about the ‘quality’ of troops and the only point the two sides would only agree upon was how their counterparts in New Delhi had failed them. I left Chhattisgarh wondering whether the force had even the will to hit back.

“No more Rambo-like operations” thundered a disrobed top brass.

Officers leading battalions in the operation were relieved citing failure of command and control. “Not even the Inspector General is off the hook,” the then acting Director General RC Tayal told me. His successor, Prakash Mishra, spoke of the need to ‘not get killed’. Many in Chhattisgarh complained about a slow down. “CRPF doesn’t move out of its camps these days,” is what one commonly heard. Months later, without much ado, the Inspector General of the CRPF was replaced. In came Sadanand Date, a celebrated IPS officer from the Maharashtra, termed as a person ‘with a cool head and no ego’. Attempt was made to mend ties with the state police. As the CRPF waited for a turnaround, it also prepared a fresh pitch by re-organising itself, especially the elite force CoBRA. Meant to strike at the Maoists in their bastions, this force had been emasculated. From having inadequate number of officers to doing odd jobs like helping road contractors, the shine had long worn off. “Today, CoBRA is being deployed the way it should be and activities like road building, support to civic administration etc is being handled by General Duty (GD) battalions,” said a source.

To address the deficit in medical facilities for its injured, the CRPF in one year has established four ‘base hospitals’ in Sukma and Bijapur. Two additional copters have been requisitioned in case the Indian Air Force (IAF) or Border Security Force (BSF) is unable to take off. Facilities for helicopters to operate 24×7, even in remote jungle bases, are being created. Of the 47 mobile towers sanctioned in south Chhattisgarh, 27 are functional. Another long ignored recommendation – limited tenures for personnel in hard areas – is also being taken seriously.

The Home Ministry data is reflecting 2015 as being the year in which civilian casualties have reduced. Those among security forces have dwindled to pre-2014 levels. “Since 2000, the kill ratio has never been as good as it is today. For every jawan of ours killed, we are today killing eight Maoists,” said a source.

Reasons offered for this change are aplenty. Some say the BJP-led NDA at the centre is keen to exploit the local mineral reserves and wants it ‘cleared’, others attribute it to a personal push being exerted by the National Security Adviser Ajit Doval who visited Bastar on October 1, a visit which saw 18 Maoists being the month after. Some even say that a reluctant state government today has no option but to cooperate with the centre.

On the other side, the Maoists, smarting from surrenders, arrests and killings, are not being underestimated. “We are only today learning to fight, whereas they have survived for over five decades,” said a CRPF officer. Additionally, the Maoists do not believe in an eye for an eye. When the pressure in a particular region has shot up, they have responded by choosing other avenues, as is evident in the spurt in activities being reported from newer areas of Telangana, Odisha and Jharkhand.

Meanwhile, officially, even the fact finding in the form of Court of Inquiry (CoI) for what happened on December 1 hasn’t been completed.

“Any action, whatsoever, can happen only after that,” smiled an officer.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Thakur_B » 13 Dec 2015 15:16

I recently had long conversations with a bunch of retired Jawans that served through early nineties to middle of the last decade regarding the ops they were in, small arms and such.

On issue of INSAS, almost all were of the opinion that it was the single worst mistake to induct that gun.

Did it jam on you in cold weather?
- not really.

What about susceptibility to mud and dirt?
- not that.

Poor accuracy ?
- not an issue.

Ergonomics ?
- we carried 7.62 (1A1). Not a big deal.

Then what's the big deal ?
- The 5.56 ammunition. Betich*ds didn't die when we hit them. Like several times.

You got the AKM too, right ?
- Yeah, at least when you shot with an AK, behench*d died after a while, not with the INSAS. Me and my best friend, we hit an Afghani 25 times with an AK and the sasura was still alive, we interrogated him for almost an hour, he didn't give up his buddies.

25 times, you say?
- Yeah, 25 times, including in the head, had a part of his temple blown off. I personally got half a dozen shots into his lower body and gut. The behench*d was a tough one. Everyone gathered around to see how the hell was he alive, which was a stupid thing to do as these guys often sit on a grenade and pull the pin out, so as soon as you move their body, it explodes.

So which gun did you actually trusted the most?
- 7.62 LMG.

The Bren?
- Yes. You didn't even need to ask how many firefights a soldier had been in if he picked up the INSAS LMG (all of them laugh). The bren worked like a charm, barrel got too hot, you swapped it right out. The INSAS LMG was unusable once you unload five to ten magazines as the barrel couldn't be swapped.

So did you get many Afghanis during your tenure?
- Well they were the ones doing the fighting. The locals were horrible fighters. Couldn't shoot, badly trained, wimps.
(one of them)
I caught a Delhi boy once, from yamuna-paar. As soon as we got him surrounded, threw his weapon out and came out sobbing and yelling "Main dilli se hoon, mat maaro". Was a druggie, they promised him girls and he came to the valley.
(coming back to the topic)
The real threat were their agency guys, cream of their lot, highly trained. Before the borders were fenced they used to come in deep into our territories to set up camps.

Why do so many casualties occur in Haphruda forest?
- It's the bushes and the undergrowth. Perfect for someone to hide, hell for our men to comb through. You can't see beyond a few meters and the bushes give away our location.

What was the scene with BPJs when you served.
- BPJs and Patkas were readily available. The steel plates we used to get were 8-10 Kgs, so that makes it 20 Kg weight of vest alone. Later on we got ceramic ones from the UK, very light.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Aditya G » 13 Dec 2015 16:27

Clearly fencing was a turning point in the conflict. Facilitated by the ceasefire on LOC.

Then what's the big deal ?
- The 5.56 ammunition. Betich*ds didn't die when we hit them. Like several times


Ditto experience in A'stan as well. The situation there was compounded due to longer engagement ranges.

I wonder if we ever send in our boys there, they better revert to Ishapore 1A1 ('FN FAL') instead of INSAS?

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Karan M » 13 Dec 2015 19:20

Entire shift to 5.56mm needs to be reevaluated.

Even accounting for the story grows in the telling factor.. 25 wounds from small arms of any kind and not much will be left. Afghani or Martian or anyone else.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Karan M » 13 Dec 2015 22:46

rkhanna wrote:
Outlaw Platoon: Heroes, Renegades, Infidels, and the brotherhood of war in afghanistan
By
Sean Parnell

Is this the book?


Yup. This is it .. :) Outstanding read.


Looks like TSP types were applying lessons they learnt fighting IA in Kashmir to Afghanistan.

On reaching a site after driving off some Paks
Until the enemy showed up, it appeared, the dwelling had been abandoned for a long time. Neglected walls and dust and dirt everywhere attested to its disuse. Baldwin peered into one room and gestured for me to join him. I stuck my head into the doorway and saw several stretchers, blood still pooled on them, lined up on the floor. Crimson-stained khaki man jams lay scattered in heaps throughout the room.

“Check this out,” Wheat said, looking at a pile of discarded prescription bottles issued by a Pakistani hospital. Soiled pressure dressings, torn packages for other medical supplies, and syringes completed the scene. This was their casualty collection point. They were sophisticated enough to designate one. That took training and a lot of advance planning.


On ambush site
In several places, we discovered more sophisticated fieldworks, including covered dugouts so masterfully camouflaged that they were undetectable at anything but point-blank range. To thwart our thermal imaging systems, each dugout was roofed with logs buried under three feet of dirt and pine needles. Even a passing AH-64 helicopter, with all its sensors, would have been unable to see the men hiding in those positions.

In some of the dugouts, we found prescription bottles for antibiotics and painkillers issued by hospitals in Pakistan. After passing that up the chain of command, we later learned that the treatment facilities served as havens for wounded insurgents. Bitterly, we wondered how much of the humanitarian aid money we were giving Pakistan went to creating and maintaining those places. What an odd situation—our wounded enemy recovering in our erstwhile “ally’s” medical system. What would folks have thought if the German wounded had recovered in London hospitals in 1944, only to return to the battlefield to fight later?

The world had changed a lot since my grandfather’s day.


Beneath the Haqqani family’s leadership, the network was managed by a core of loyalists who had fought with Jalaluddin against the Soviets and in the subsequent civil war. Below their ranks were the young Turks, rising leaders within the network who earned their reputation while fighting Americans along the border.

The network recruited its foot soldiers mainly from Pakistan, though there were plenty of Afghans in the rank and file as well. Over the years, young men inspired by their mullahs to fight infidels had become the key source of manpower for the network, and under Siraj, it had been trending toward a radical Islamic organization. Those devoted men, most barely out of their teens, had died in large numbers since 9/11, but there were always ample supplies of idealistic replacements waiting for the chance to leave their madrassas and join the jihad.

It took some time for us to understand how the foreign fighters we had killed on the mountaintop on May 8 fit into this equation. Eventually, we unraveled it. The Haqqani Network maintained a loose association with Al Qaida, which supplied it with talented jihadists from all over the globe. These experienced men, many of whom had fought in Iraq, Somalia, or Chechnya, formed the insurgents’ version of an NCO corps. They had become the backbone around which the indoctrinated, if inexperienced, sons of Pakistan coalesced. In combat, the foreigners served as small-unit leaders.


The commander they were facing
For all the intensity of these first two encounters with Galang’s men, it seemed to me that they were not throwing their full weight on us. In each ambush, we faced a platoon-sized force of insurgents. Where were the hundreds that Galang had available? Why ambush us while we were on the move? We dismounted all the time. Why not hit us when our men were not protected by armor plating?

Perhaps Galang was using our platoons as sort of a finishing school for his new men. After a winter of training in Pakistan, they had come into our area to gain combat experience and test their weapons, men, and tactics.


In short, this tells us the quantum of task the IA has been up against in Kashmir. If anything the people we face are not just Afghans but militia trained by the SSG and Pakistan Army directly.

Which SSG and Pakistan Army are trained by the Americans. The level of mind boggling silliness.. :roll:

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Karan M » 13 Dec 2015 22:48

Interesting thing I read in the 1965 war book commissioned by the MOD about Pakistani "pysche" versus the Indian one. A veteran of the war remarks TSP troops will fight as long as they are winning. When the chips are down and the odds shift, they run.

This book makes the same point.

“Where d’ya think they’re weak, sir?” Campbell asked.

Greeson chimed in and grunted, “Grit. That’s what we’ve got and they don’t. We went toe-to-toe with them, and they broke first. They ran. We stayed. That’s a huge moral victory. Look at how it affected our platoon. The men have been on a tear ever since.”

I had been going to say the same exact thing.

Again my leaders nodded. “That’s true,” Baldwin mused, thinking it over.

I continued, “So here’s what we’re going to do. We will always stay and finish the fight. Got it? We’re never going to break contact. We will never cede the battlefield to the enemy, and we’re never going to give them a moral victory.”


(far right) standing with our “allies” during a border security meeting. The other men were part of the Pakmil Frontier Corps of the Pakistani military, who routinely gave insurgents the freedom to conduct cross-border attacks on us. Later in our deployment, Pakmil Frontier troops began to attack coalition forces directly and even embedded with Haqqani Network fighters as they launched cross-border raids.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Karan M » 14 Dec 2015 00:01

Reading the book what makes it clear about why the Americans manage with (relatively) less casualties is the amount of firepower they have on call and bring down asap, at the first chance they get. We, in CT, are fighting with one hand firmly tied behind our back & relying purely on unit level weapons or at best, mortar for indirect. All depends on the skill of our men and cat & mouse.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Karan M » 14 Dec 2015 02:26

“Okay, we’ve got two Apaches on standby for you at Orgun-E. A Predator’s on its way.”

“Roger.”

“You’ll have an AC-130 overhead any minute.”

“This is sounding good, six.”

“And a B-1.”

Lieutenant Colonel Toner has scored us a strategic bomber?

I radioed my trucks. “Okay, they’re two clicks out, about a click from getting to the wadi systems. Battalion’s stacking up air for us. We won’t be alone. You know what to do. Lay the hurt on ’em, guys.”

Around our makeshift perimeter, my gunners charged their guns and dropped their night-vision goggles down over their eyes. Our dismounts spread out along the walls, weapons leveled over the Hesco bags.

At battalion headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Toner and the staff worked feverishly to pull assets from all over Afghanistan for us. As the aerial armada raced the enemy to Margah, the staff rehearsed exactly how Lieutenant Colonel Toner wanted this to go down. Three times they talked through the plan. The aircraft reached our area as they finished the third run-through. Battalion put them in orbit overhead, where they waited for the call to strike.

Our Prophet spooks reported the enemy’s radio chatter. Their northern force leader checked in: “We’re here.”

They must have reached their objective rally point. This was their last stop before launching their attack on us.

Their new enemy commander replied, “Hold there, and tell your men to take a knee.”

I checked the Blue Force Tracker. The enemy pincers had stopped about a kilometer and a half away.

Galang’s replacement gave his men final instructions: “When you overrun the Americans, cut their heads off and mount them on stakes. Good luck, and I’ll see you on the objective.”

Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered, “Hit them now.”

The satellite-guided bombs, dropped from the strategic bomber, struck first. Before the smoke had even cleared, the A-10s rolled in and unleashed all their fearsome firepower. The Predator launched its Hellfires, and the Apache batted clean up.

Around us, the night sky was rent asunder. We watched in awe as bombs burst, tracers flared, and rockets sizzled. When the AC-130 opened up, its battery of weapons only rearranged the bodies.

The strafing runs continued. Nothing that moved survived. Not a single enemy fighter got within a mile of Combat Outpost Margah that night. We stood on our makeshift ramparts and cheered wildly with every blast. Perhaps some of the men were celebrating the destruction of our enemy. I screamed for joy at our survival.

At dawn, we ventured out to conduct a “sensitive site exploitation.” This was army-speak for policing up weapons, documents, and any other intelligence we could glean from the night’s holocaust of fire, lead, and steel.

To the east, we found the blackened ground carpeted with human remains. We dismounted and picked our way through hundreds of meters of arms and legs, ragged half torsos, severed heads with flat-brimmed hats still covering blood-encrusted hair. The stench of death hung in the air. In places, patches of snow that had somehow survived the night had been stained red. In others, small fires still burned and sent palls of grayish smoke wisping across the battlefield.

Broken trees littered the landscape, their barren limbs decorated with ghastly pieces of human beings. From one, a web of intestines dangled from the branches, dripping gore onto the snow below.

We’d seen death’s many faces before this morning. We’d grown hard carrying the dead enemy to our Humvees and dumping them at the local mosques. But even for the most cynical and steeled among us, this charnel house had an effect. Nobody who walks among such things is ever the same again.

We focused on our job. The AKs and machine guns we gathered looked brand new. We stacked them in our rigs alongside RPG launchers that looked factory fresh. The boots scattered about were of better quality than ours. The enemy carried sophisticated radios and military-issue compasses. On dismembered legs we saw kneepads. Torn clothing—the remains of desert camouflage uniforms—fluttered in the morning breeze.

Farther east, we began to encounter more intact corpses. To our astonishment, they wore body armor. Some even had World War I–style helmets still strapped to their heads.

Suppressing our horror was no easy task that morning. But we had to do the job right. At each corpse, the men cleared it for booby traps or unexploded ordnance. They found hand grenades and hundreds of AK magazines. In the pockets of the dead were documents—visas, passports, and notebooks that we knew would be of value. And then we made a startling discovery. Some of these enemy fighters were not Haqqani or Al Qaida at all.

They were Pakistan Army Frontier Corps soldiers, Pakistan’s ragtag border militia. We found their identity cards.

In the spring, we had discovered how Pakistan was allowing our enemy to use its sovereign territory as a rest and refit area. The Haqqani Network trained in Pakistan and received logistical and medical support from our ally’s hospitals.

In the summer, at the Alamo, we had watched helplessly as our enemy used the Pakistan Army troops stationed along the border as willing human shields to prevent us from launching counterbattery fires.

In September, the president of Pakistan had made peace with Taliban representatives, freeing our enemy to throw their full weight against us.

In December, we had been sent out north of the Alamo to escort an Afghan infantry company as it conducted a site survey for a proposed border fence. The Pakistani troops on the slopes overlooking Angoor Ada opened fire on the ANA and pinned them down with those ZSU-4 quad machine guns. Afraid we would fire back and create an even more serious international incident, my platoon was ordered to fall back to FOB Shkin while a Special Forces unit sortied out to rescue the ANA. Greeson and I thought that for sure the episode would become headline news around the globe. We feared that it would spark an open war between the United States and Pakistan. But the incident was never reported.

Now, in January, miles inside Afghanistan, we had discovered that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops had launched a joint offensive with Al Qaida and Haqqani Network fighters against a U.S. combat outpost.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby rkhanna » 14 Dec 2015 10:02

In short, this tells us the quantum of task the IA has been up against in Kashmir. If anything the people we face are not just Afghans but militia trained by the SSG and Pakistan Army directly.


Add to that - now we will have a whole Generation of Cadre with a Decade of Experience fighting Americans coming towards us. They have now tons of experience fighting a mobile force equipped equipped with NVGs and Airpower. They have evolved Tactics too and as such could be a step up on our own COIN forces.

Glad you read the book.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Paul » 14 Dec 2015 12:10

I am sorry but I have been reading these fairy tales since the early 90s they make me react with contempt at the lack of understanding at what has been achieved by the Indian army in Kashmir.

In the 90s the line was Gen Aslam Beg, the grand strategist, architect of "Zarb-e-Momin" , strategic defiance etc. wanted to replicate the Afghan success in Kashmir transferring Afghan war veterans and drive the Indian forces out of Kashmir.

There was an dhoti shiver article in HT in 1997 that talked about how Nawaz Sharif was ready to unleash thousands of battle hardened Afghans against the Indian Army in Kashmir. The Afghans of Darra Adam Khel bragged about how the Pashtuns had more small arms than Indian and Paki armies combined. Paki taunt to demoralize the Indian security forces at that time was "Osama Bin Laden aa raha hai".

The soviet ground troops were far more tenacious fighters than the Americans. There were Uzebg and Kazakh units in the ground component too. Juma Namagani (name escapes me) of IMU was a former soviet trooper who fought in Afghanistan and then joined the Muj after returning to Uzekistan. The HQN fighters and other insurgents have testified the teancity of the soviet ground troops. In contrast I in the 15 years that have passed since 9/11 I have not heard of a battle like Pork chop hill in Vietnam where NATO ground troops have held off Afghan Taliban singlehandedly. This when they had far less air support and logistical tail than the NATO forces. There were not more than 115K Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 10 years. Soviet casualties in Afghanistan was about 15000 per official estimates. Indian RR will smother the insurgents in concentric rings and pulverize them, a concept which neither the Russians or Americans have been have to replicate as Afghanistan was never their home country and they did not put enough boots on the ground.

The best answer IMO given by an IPS officer speaking with a dead pan expression ( i still remember the interview) as how they were seeing Afghan elements in the infiltration and they would deal with it due course as they came. This interview was wonderfully narrated by B Raman in one of his articles.

We all know how this turned out....These Afghans will most likely be turning on a more juicy target in the Shawal valley.

Kashmir...as the IPS officer said...inhe bhi dekh lenge!

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby member_22539 » 14 Dec 2015 12:36

As the americans themselves admit, no afghan, however experienced, is as good as the SSG pigs our soldiers have had to deal with in Kashmir. Killing pigs is an art-form that IA is currently the world grandmaster at, no one compares, no matter how much NVGs and air support they have. Frankly, going on a foray into Kashmir, fighting the IA and surviving long enough to escape back to porkistan is a badge of honor for these scums. Of course, none of the regular porkies get to do that. Such things are reserved for the higher ups and kids with money and connections (i.e. surviving and going back).

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby RoyG » 14 Dec 2015 12:59

Paul really highlights three fundamental aspects of our CI strategy - National resolve, experience, and boots on the ground. With around 300,000 troops including paramilitary and police with an extensive intelligence network, these jihadis will never be anything more than a nuisance. Our officers lead from the front and none of the troops are afraid to die. We'll gladly send these so called SSG AfPak/Punjabi pricks into the next life. If these Kashmiris one day decide to really turn up the heat the whole country will gladly swamp them with another 300,000.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby member_22539 » 14 Dec 2015 14:14

RoyG wrote: the whole country will gladly swamp them with another 300,000.


:rotfl: Indeed. Thats why it is so difficult to defeat manpower rich nations like India with such low burn tactics (not that anyone can beat us with conventional wars). These things only succeed in fragile Eastern European and African countries. It is only porki foolishness that makes them think they have any hope in Kashmir.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Manish_P » 14 Dec 2015 16:49

It is only porki foolishness that makes them think they have any hope in Kashmir.


I wonder..

Sometimes even the wise lose sight of the woods for the trees

With the porkis, it was never just about Kashmir.

When the critical mass is reached at other corners (West Bengal, Kerala...) will we still be very comfortable doing the swamping around with 300k here and 300k there..

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Karan M » 15 Dec 2015 19:36

I have to agree with Paul that the IA is far more capable of handling this threat than people give it credit for.

First axiom of war. Tactical surprise. In these the Afghans had the edge.
Basically the book on 10th Mountain ops makes it clear the Americans did not dominate the countryside or close the border. They were too few. Hence the enemy - Haqqani Afghans, Pakmil had near complete ownership of the terrain to stage ambushes as they wished & constantly, despite the Americans efforts, retained an edge over them. In our case see the above reports, we are actually hunting down the Pakistani/AFghan infiltrators. There is no respite. The ambushes that we do trigger are often balanced out by the numbers we keep constantly, which cut down the jihadis.

What made it really dangerous for the Americans was the difference in numbers. At times it was 8:1 (last fight) to 4:1. And this leads to the 2nd axiom of war.

Second: Concentrate your force. Americans relied on firepower to hold the ground against superior numbers. This was sometimes unreliable or simply arrived too late. In the second fight, the Americans nearly got overrun and their own troops arrived too late (almost). In the Indian case, the Indian Army has created interlocking rings of steel. This constantly attrits the Pakistani effort to send in reinforcements, and also prevents them from facing the Indian side with the kind of overwhelming force that might overwhelm the Indian side. At best, they have managed to send in BAT- Border Action Teams to attack isolated outposts, but even there, we take revenge in spades and constantly seek to create mutually defensible positions. So the Indian CT effort begins with fencing, then multiple rings of regular IA units at the LOC/IB either in fixed overwatch positions plus ambush sites created by patrolling IA units. Most jihadis are killed in these ops. The ones that somehow survive, then make it deeper but run into the HUMINT plus TECHINT maintained by the regular IA,IB and BSF plus RR. These units then encircle and hunt down the Pakistani infiltrators without any respite. In short, the Pakistanis are constantly on the move, harassed, unable to create a coherent force to challenge the Indian's overwhelming grid based security system which creates concentric coils squeezing the life out of the infiltrator.

Third, tactical awareness. The Americans were unable to rely on their so called allies the local Afghans who were either corrupt or inept and the locals were nearly all in bed with the opposite side, because they'd support those who'd stay. In Kashmir, the locals know who has boots on the ground and who is a staying force, and its not the Pak terrorists. Also, the final and 3rd fight mentioned by the American author was a success because an Afghan grandfather whose child was brutally assaulted and tortured by the depraved Pakistanis, decided to help the Americans out and tell them they were being attacked by a large force. If not, the Americans would have been wiped out to a man. It was this warning which enabled them to bring in airpower and support. This help was because the Americans were good to the forgotten village and gave some one off help. In Kashmir, the Indian Army and GOI "run" entire villages via Operation Sadbhavana, We have eyes on the ground and ears to the walls everyplace. That apart, we know the language and have our own intel network. The Americans depended on interpreters, treated their best one as a 2nd class citizen which even the author admits and when he was killed by the 2nd interpreter's machinations they didn't even realize and went on happily till the latter was outed as an agent. Basically, outnumbered strangers in a strange land, setting the occasional ambush and only depending on technology to know what's what.
No wonder their entire Afghan outing was such a mess.

In short, the IA is nowhere in the same league as the above. We have a world class professional army which has created a methodical approach to deny the Pakistanis any element of dominance. Our only failings are firepower, but then again, we are fighting on our own territory so we cannot use overwhelming force the way Americans are. But a case should be made to use more firepower and induct more COIN specific ISR for events in non urban, non populated terrain.

Next technology, but even this is being addressed. We will see the results in the next few years. A whole list of items are in procurement as the Indian system gets ready to induct systems en masse to offset help to TSP via the so called fraud war on terror in which they killed Americans yet took their help. Unbelievable.

In short, whether it be Haqqanis or Pakmil or ISI or regular Afghans. Cross the border into India and the Indian Army will kill you. There is no ambiguity whatsoever.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Aditya G » 16 Dec 2015 00:10

Further to above, India, and Indian Army in particular is perhaps the only one in the world who can claim to have defeated Jihad. We have been fighting it since Oct 1947, and the current one for close to 30 years now.

We overcame the two bad 5 year spells - late 80s & early 90s (when it started) and then between 1998-2003 when it peaked. The two year period between Kargil war till ceasefire announcement was pratically undeclared war compared to situation today.

Our COIN grid strategy, coupled with intensive border control is our #1 reason for success. Since the LoC fence was constructed, things have only improved in our favour. This was a repeat of similar strategy followed in Punjab. Unfortunately it took time to apply in North East.

I also like the concept of Counter Insurgents (ikhwaanis), though their overall contribution needs to be studied. Our SFs have also executed and proven advanced tactics such as blending into the militants by wearing their dress and speaking their language - awesome stuff.

Image

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Surya » 16 Dec 2015 02:34

to be fair to the Americans you cannot compare our battles inside our country or even next door to deploying 10000 miles away into a completely alien environment

They are both good professional armies who try their best to adapt and deal with the problem with the resources they have

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby shiv » 16 Dec 2015 06:24

Surya wrote:to be fair to the Americans you cannot compare our battles inside our country or even next door to deploying 10000 miles away into a completely alien environment

They are both good professional armies who try their best to adapt and deal with the problem with the resources they have

The US Army is undoubtedly professional and well trained. But ever since Vietnam the US has applied psychology and science to increase soldier efficiency by inculcating active "hatred" of the "other" or the "enemy" so that the men actually use their weapons and shoot and achieve kills, and "kill ratios" that provide data regarding battle outcomes.

I think the huge difference between the IA and the US army as was pointed out in joint training exercises (and in UN deployments) is the Indian Army's efforts to understand and integrate with a local population - efforts that were absent from the US army's early efforts in Afghanistan. The IA is less likely to shoot first and think later. This also means more army casualties and worse "kill ratios" but better long term success in COIN. It is particularly important for the IA fighting on its own soil rather than the US soldier who does a tour of duty and is flown back to Idaho or some place like that for leave.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Surya » 16 Dec 2015 07:00

It is particularly important for the IA fighting on its own soil rather than the US soldier who does a tour of duty and is flown back to Idaho or some place like that for leave.


Right and we don't know how the IA would do in a long war in the middle of South America. Or how the US would adapt tomorrow if there is some sort of insurgency inside the US.
Hence why I would not judge one or the other in such comparisons.

If you talk to the troops who have been in these joint exercises as well those involved with exchange programs you will hear both sides get pointers from the other experience.

American officers take copious notes on our experiences. Their fundamentals are well grounded.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby shiv » 16 Dec 2015 07:25

Surya wrote:Right and we don't know how the IA would do in a long war in the middle of South America.

We do know how the IA conducts itself in faraway countries in UN operations. The conduct of IA troops in UN operations is exactly the same as in home COIN. From what I have read US troops have conducted themselves poorly in relations with locals but well in terms of killing. That may be fine for hot war but not for COIN.

It may not be the army men's fault but the political milieu in which they must operate. The US army never really lost any battles in Vietnam. But..

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Paul » 16 Dec 2015 07:31

I must confess that I have not read a lot on US army operations in Iraq/Afghanistan for 2-3 years since there is no B&N where I live now.

But it does strike me that increased reliance on air assets like AC-130 gunships, Helicopters, and A10 Warthogs would have reduced the effectiveness of Long range artillery.

This will have debilitating effect on their Army effectiveness in the long term.

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Surya » 16 Dec 2015 07:36

UN missions are not the heavy combat missions - barring Somalia which ended quickly - (and the US acknowledges our approach but does not care do it themselves -)


The IPKF is the closest - and had very mixed results- in spite of the different approach

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Re: CT and COIN operations in India: News, Images and Discus

Postby Viv S » 16 Dec 2015 07:51

shiv wrote:I think the huge difference between the IA and the US army as was pointed out in joint training exercises (and in UN deployments) is the Indian Army's efforts to understand and integrate with a local population - efforts that were absent from the US army's early efforts in Afghanistan. The IA is less likely to shoot first and think later. This also means more army casualties and worse "kill ratios" but better long term success in COIN. It is particularly important for the IA fighting on its own soil rather than the US soldier who does a tour of duty and is flown back to Idaho or some place like that for leave.


You're talking about his now, when the insurgency in J&K is a pale shadow of its former self. It was a very different case in the 90s when it was at its peak. The media wasn't as active back then (and had limited access anyway) but speak to those who were on the ground back then, and you'll realise it was a very brutal, very bloody and very ruthless struggle to get to the nice comfortable situation we're in today. It was nothing like a typical UN operation. And like in the North East, at the end public sentiment was far worse than that facing the ISAF in Afghanistan today.

The crucial difference is that we were fighting on our own land and we were in it for the long haul - it wasn't an expeditionary war. The Americans will go back home by 2018, but we intend to be around, two generations from now when separatist sentiment has faded, just like it did in Punjab.

In the one actual expedition we engaged in i.e. Op Pawan, we were confronted with the same fundamental issue that faces the US in Afghanistan today - we were outsiders. So even with the best of intentions, those who we were there to supposedly assist (Tamils) as well as the Sri Lankan govt, both knew that we were an impermanent part of the landscape. And contrary to the public image of the campaign, we did eventually have the LTTE on the run and had secured most of the urban areas (at a very steep cost, paid in blood). And we didn't hold back on the firepower either. But in the end, fact remains it wasn't our home and the other side knew that it could wait us out.


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