Viv S wrote:
You're talking about his now, when the insurgency in J&K is a pale shadow of its former self. It was a very different case in the 90s when it was at its peak. The media wasn't as active back then (and had limited access anyway) but speak to those who were on the ground back then, and you'll realise it was a very brutal, very bloody and very ruthless struggle to get to the nice comfortable situation we're in today. It was nothing like a typical UN operation. And like in the North East, at the end public sentiment was far worse than that facing the ISAF in Afghanistan today.
The crucial difference is that we were fighting on our own land and we were in it for the long haul - it wasn't an expeditionary war. The Americans will go back home by 2018, but we intend to be around, two generations from now when separatist sentiment has faded, just like it did in Punjab.
In the one actual expedition we engaged in i.e. Op Pawan, we were confronted with the same fundamental issue that faces the US in Afghanistan today - we were outsiders. So even with the best of intentions, those who we were there to supposedly assist (Tamils) as well as the Sri Lankan govt, both knew that we were an impermanent part of the landscape. And contrary to the public image of the campaign, we did eventually have the LTTE on the run and had secured most of the urban areas (at a very steep cost, paid in blood). And we didn't hold back on the firepower either. But in the end, fact remains it wasn't our home and the other side knew that it could wait us out.
North east was much worse, and true, local population was as anti army as it can get. But during those days they were activiely supported by Chinese.
J&K was in very bad shape too, riots/people stoning army convoys/ insurgents freely roaming streets. But it was still a notch down as compared to north east.
When troops started overflowing the state then only situation started to stablize. In north east, Op Rihno changed the situation. But ULFA still has active local population support.