CT & COIN Operations in India: News, Images and Discussion

[Jaeger]

after this terror strikes.

air force chief should now make public comment and explain, how airforce by not willing to combat maoist has helped
Indian people .

Perhaps his force has helped the Indian people by:
1. Defending Indian Airspace against external aggression
2. Supporting & supplying Army outposts in hostile environments sometimes in the face of fire
3. Performing missions known or unknown outside the territorial limits of the Republic of India

But what do I know. Perhaps you should call our Hon'ble Home Minister and ask him to make the Chief answer your question.

I'm strongly against using the Air Force against the Maoists. Note: the Air Force. The judicious use of air elements in logistical, MEDEVAC and in very specific occasions, fire suppression roles is highly justifiable and in fact probably necessary. However I believe that these elements should be under direct command of the HM and at best, mentored by the IAF. If this means the raising of a new cadre or wing with the CRPF or any such organisation, well, so be it. Can use Dhruvs and the old IAF Mi-8s (being replaced by 80 Mi-17s) in a light/heavy mix. Strict RoE for the use of firepower, which will predominantly consist of HMGs, cannon (20/23mm) and light PGMs such as this one:
APKWS
A simple inexpensive system like this will allow targeted strikes with minimum collateral damage.

I understand that the use of precision weapons is challenging if not almost impossible in a heavy jungle environment (laser designation won't work through think foliage, for one) but I believe that we're going down the Paki path if we suggest using anything heavier. Napalm, FAE, heavy dumb bombs should be a strict no-no.

What might be better are long-endurance UCAVs (armed Rustam?) with foliage penetrating radar as well as huge investment in HUMINT.

This is not just an armed conflict, it's a polito-social one. Even if we crush the Reds, we will not have answered the need for justice, empowerment and opportunity for the tribals/general population. Illegal mining, deforestation, lack of good representation in government - air power cannot even begin to solve this.

Genetic marker studies have shown that the Haplogroup M populations found here may date back to the first wave of H. sapiens immigrants to the subcontinent. These are the original Indians, not some bunch of pigs from across the border. Do we really want to do to them what the US and Australia did to their aboriginal inhabitants?

Fight fire with fire, yes. But also listen, engage, protect and rehabilitate. COIN ops against your own people are not about dealing out destruction. They're about better integration and inclusiveness.

[Craig Alpert]

Antony doesn't rule out using Army against Maoists

NEW DELHI: Defence minister A K Antony on Saturday met Indian Army chief Gen V K Singh to discuss the possibility of using the Army against the Maoist guerrillas - a possibility that Antony later didn't rule out.
a lot of talk and NO action!!!
A well-informed source said that Singh and Antony discussed the role of the Army in "assisting" paramilitary troopers in the anti-Maoist operations in east and central India, where the Left-wing extremists have grown in strength striking at security forces and civilians with impunity.

Antony later told reporters that the government will "carefully" examine the issue but didn't rule it out.

"You cannot have a debate about it in public. We will take the decision after carefully studying it," the defence minister said.I think this might be the first time he said something sense-worthy!

The meeting between the Army chief and the minister comes a day after a Maoist sabotage caused a train accident in West Bengal leaving more than 130 people dead. This was the biggest attack on civilians by the rebels after they slaughtered 76 security men in Chhattisgarh's Dantewada district April 6.

Sources said the Army is almost ready to move in into Maoist dominated areas and is waiting for the political decision about it.

"The force is finalizing its plans to meet any contingency. They may have to step in," an official said.

The Army is presently giving training, surveillance and logistical support to the central paramilitary troopers in their ongoing anti-Maoist operations.

It is establishing two sub-area headquarters at Ambarda on the Orissa-West Bengal border and Jagdalpur in Chhattisgarh.

Though the sub-area headquarters would be static they are likely to help if Army units are deployed in the region to fight the rebels along with the police and paramilitary forces.

Antony had earlier categorically ruled out deploying the Army in a direct role in the operations.

The Army has already trained around 47,000 police and paramilitary personnel for counter-insurgency battle.

[Craig Alpert]

[Gaur]

^^
It is really sad. Out of this whole terrible Naxal mess, the only silver lining I had hoped for was that finally the CPOs would be trained and equipped well enough to handle India's internal problems. We have more CPO battalions than IA infantry battalions. With so much being spent on CPOs, there is some serious Political and leadership deficiency if IA gets called in. I mean, why are we maintaining so many battalions of CPO and spending so much on them? Is it just an employment generation program?

[shiv]

after this terror strikes.

air force chief should now make public comment and explain, how airforce by not willing to combat maoist has helped
Indian people .

This is an understandable emotional comment.

But it ignores one fundamental reality. The forces are not gentle kindergarten teachers. Their training is to win. The will use whatever force is needed and that force will be used on Indians. And although the orders to use such force is being given by the politicians, the same politicians will be the first people to say "The armed forces used excessive force. Don;t blame us"

Even so called "jingos" on this forum have mocked the Indian army for using a 120 man contingent to get 5 Pakistani terrorists. That is the meaning of "overwhelming force" And in Sri Lanka - the forces were asked to act with restraint.

Unless the armed forces chiefs are sure that the politicans know what they are doing, it can become a national disaster. A political disaster from idiot politicos should not be converted to a national disaster.

[sugriva]

^^^^ CRPF battalions will still be the bulwark of the forces in the fight against the Naxals. However CPO's structurally are not aligned to fight internal civil wars of the kind that the Maovandalists have unleashed in the hinterland. It will require the Army's organizational capability to take the fight into the Maovandalists' camps. What I foresee is a model where the bulk of the battalions etc are provided by the CRPF/BSF/ITBF, along with some regular IA infantry/RR battalions, but the higher command is with the army. Remember this will be the mother of all counter insurgency battles that India will face in the coming decades. The sooner the Army gets in the better. The faster they will be able to get out.

[Vivek Raghuvanshi]

Rather than having patrols with pipers / brass band marching in, maybe somebody may like to recommend to GoI to use Ghost Patrols [ covert hunting patrols ] to clean insurgency / terrorism.

[Nihat]

Rather than having patrols with pipers / brass band marching in, maybe somebody may like to recommend to GoI to use Ghost Patrols [ covert hunting patrols ] to clean insurgency / terrorism.

Exactly , this how the greyhounds hunted in AP, they went in small teams and eliminated the district leadership one by one. The Copy and paste American strategy of "Clear, hold and develop" is rather silly, it's not working in Afghanistan and it won't work in India's dense forests.

The naxals should be constantly afraid of being hunted. They should fear for their lives everytime they're planting a landmine or even sitting down to rest. Right now it seems like the opposite , our men are scared for thier lives and nnaxals can attack at a time and place of their liking and plan as long as they want. I'm not even sure the CRPF are under orders to fire at Naxals unless fired upon.

Whatever it is, some questionable people are advising PC on this suicidal "area domination" policy. Even Armchair generals like me on BR (who know nothing about CT ops. btw) can figure out that this will not work.

[Vivek Raghuvanshi]

Nihat,

Afghanistan Ops uses Special Ops and Area Domination = Hybrid Strategy with Psy Ops

[pushkar.bhat]

History is repeating. The Central police forces get licked in there teeth and then they expect the Army to come and clean the mess. This is happening again and again. I don't think the Army should get involved in the anti-nax operations. The CPF's have been provided enough resources to do the job they now need to rise up to the task...

[sum]

Good article and interesting info by Praveen Swami:
The seduction of maximum force

Aizawal woke that Thursday morning to the thunder of combat jet engines and falling bombs. Earlier that week, Mizo National Army insurgents had engaged military garrisons strung across the State. Mizoram's capital fell days later. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi responded by ordering the Indian Air Force to attack the city. “Most houses in Dawrpui and the Chhinga Veng area were reduced to ashes,” a survivor recalled. No one knows for certain just how many died.

Three decades after the March 4, 1966 bombing of Aizawal, India is once again debating the use of massive military force — including air strikes — to fight an insurgency. Last week's tragedy in West Bengal, preceded by large-scale killings of civilians in Chhattisgarh, have made clear that New Delhi's offensive against the Maoist insurgency that has torn apart swathes of eastern and central India is floundering.

Policymakers are now considering committing the Army and air assets to provide logistical and fire support to counter the Maoist campaign. For the most part, the plans envisage only a limited support role for the armed forces — the use of helicopters, for example, for transporting commandos in remote forest areas, or unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with foliage-penetrating radar to locate large Maoist formations. But as public pressure mounts on a government that promised quick success against the Maoists, more aggressive military options will seem increasingly seductive to policymakers. India's rich experience of fighting insurgencies, though, shows that maximum force not only inflicts hideous levels of civilian casualties but it rarely secures decisive outcomes.

Lessons from Manipur

In June 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arrived at an agreement with the Mizo National Front, laying the foundations for a peace that has survived more than two decades. The 1986 Accord, though, was preceded by a counter-insurgency campaign of colonial-era barbarism: hundreds were executed; thousands tortured; rape was carried out on a massive scale. Designed to crush a rebellion that seemed, at one stage, to be on the edge of success, India's use of the military in Mizoram ended up engendering an insurgency that festered for decades.

Like the Maoist insurgency, the Mizoram conflict had its roots in deprivation. In 1959, the region saw a famine which claimed thousands of lives. In 1961, former Indian Army officer Pu Laldenga formed the Mizo National Famine Front to campaign against New Delhi's apathy. Laldenga later transformed the Famine Front's political offspring, the Mizo National Front, into a potent political force. But by 1963, the lack of state action to address conditions in the Mizo hills led the MNF to initiate an insurgency seeking independence from India.

The army campaign seemed, at first, to work. Forces from the Silchar-based 61 Mountain Brigade were able to rapidly recapture key towns, including Aizawal. Posts taken by the MNA were recovered and its guerrillas forced to shift their headquarters across the border into East Pakistan. The fighting was intense: the Indian forces suffered 59 fatalities, 126 were injured and 23 went missing; 95 of the MNA died and 35 were injured.

But from the summer of 1966, the MNA merged into the population and began launching guerrilla strikes against the Army. Lacking effective local intelligence, unfamiliar with the terrain, and forced to rely on a vulnerable road network for logistical support, the Army lost 95 men between March and December 1966 — more than the number killed in the first phase of fighting.

From January 1967, the security forces in Mizoram began cutting the insurgency off from its peasant base. Eighty per cent of Mizoram's population was resettled, mostly by force, into barricaded enclaves known as Protected and Progressive Villages.

In a signal 2001 essay for the journal Faultlines, the former Assam Chief Secretary, Vijendra Singh Jafa, recorded how the village of Darzo was relocated. “My orders,” a soldier he interviewed said, “were to get the villagers to collect whatever moveable property they could and to set their own village on fire at seven in the evening. I also had orders to burn all the paddy and other grain that could not be carried away by the villagers.” The officer, Jafa recounted, ordered village elders at gunpoint to certify “that they had burnt down their own village.”

Despite this massive application of force, the insurgency did not end. Even though the MNA was enfeebled by Pakistan's decisive defeat in the 1971 war, which stripped it of its bases in what is now Bangladesh, it was able to stage a series of bloody attacks. New Delhi and Laldenga were able to agree on the contours of a peace agreement as early as 1976 but the deep anger provoked by the Army's campaign made it impossible to settle the deal.

It is not hard to see why the use of massive military power against the Maoists appears seductive to policymakers. In November last year, as Central forces began to push into Chhattisgarh, Union Home Secretary announced that “within 30 days of security forces moving in and dominating the area, we should be able to restore civil administration there.” The promise has been brutally exposed. Unless New Delhi and the naxal-infested States are first able to restore order, developmental programmes targeting the Maoists' constituency are unlikely to get off the ground.

But the simple fact is this: there just aren't enough security personnel in Chhattisgarh to hold, let alone dominate, the area. The Bastar division of Chhattisgarh sprawls across 40,000 square kilometres, an area larger than the Kashmir Valley. New Delhi has pumped in 14 battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force — each made up of approximately 1,000 men — as well as 5 of the Border Security Force. There are, in addition, some 7 battalions of armed police, and some 5,000 police.

That means each battalion of security forces must engage with insurgents in areas larger than 2,000 square kilometres — and in areas where the use of roads is impossible because of the large-scale use of improvised explosive devices by Maoists. Some police stations are responsible for more than 700 square kilometres of territory.

In Jammu and Kashmir, an estimated 70 battalions of the CRPF are available for counter-insurgency duties, along with 54 battalions of the Army's Rashtriya Rifles. In addition, about a third of the Jammu and Kashmir Police's 75,000 personnel are committed to counter-terrorism work. That means approximately 145,000 personnel are available to guard the 101,437 square kilometre territory on India's side of the Line of Control—an average of one for 1.4 for every square kilometre, and one for every 53 residents of the State. Manipur, with an estimated population of 2.3 million, has 67 battalions of counter-insurgency forces, including 11 army battalions — one for 34 residents. The police in Chhattisgarh, moreover, often confront Maoist formations that outnumber them 4 to 1. Most counter-insurgency doctrines call for government forces to outnumber their adversaries by at least 12:1, or higher — the levels exceeded in both Jammu and Kashmir, and Manipur.

Read it all...

[Samay]

after this terror strikes.

air force chief should now make public comment and explain, how airforce by not willing to combat maoist has helped
Indian people .

This is an understandable emotional comment.

But it ignores one fundamental reality. The forces are not gentle kindergarten teachers. Their training is to win. The will use whatever force is needed and that force will be used on Indians. And although the orders to use such force is being given by the politicians, the same politicians will be the first people to say "The armed forces used excessive force. Don;t blame us"

Even so called "jingos" on this forum have mocked the Indian army for using a 120 man contingent to get 5 Pakistani terrorists. That is the meaning of "overwhelming force" And in Sri Lanka - the forces were asked to act with restraint.

Unless the armed forces chiefs are sure that the politicians know what they are doing, it can become a national disaster. A political disaster from idiot politicos should not be converted to a national disaster.

Shiv sir,
great post,you have said it all in those lines
army is for external threats
police force is for internal threats
I think they[politicians] will never let them change, for the same reason brits wouldn't have let them work for a social cause but to suppress common masses,. In jungles their style isn't working,they cant snatch money from adivasis or naxals ,so motivation is already low
if police officers are trained or motivated to fight anti-national forces like naxals , and they become more and more patriotic,
then who will listen to politicos and their corruption?

[Craig Alpert]

Govt looks at direct role for Army against Naxals
while the arm chairs debates between the use of Army or CRPF towards Naxals, ANYTHING to counter these SOB's is a welcome step for both the People of India and those against development!!!! (and those who claim that these are INDIAN people, here's a thought THEY KILL INDIAN PEOPLE TOO!!)

NEW DELHI: The government is veering around to expanding the role of the armed forces in the ongoing anti-Naxal operations, with a hard look even being taken at whether they should be "directly deployed'' in the fight against the Maoists.

While an enhancement of their present surveillance, logistical and training mandate is a certainty, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting likely on Thursday will take the final call on whether to enlist the armed forces in a more direct combat role.

The decision will be influenced as much by political considerations as security imperatives. Yet, the possibility of armed forces being asked to take on the Left-wing extremists is no longer being summarily dismissed like before.

Defence minister A K Antony on Tuesday sounded out the three Service chiefs on the sensitive issue, with the 90-minute meeting with Air Chief Marshal P V Naik, Admiral Nirmal Verma and General V K Singh discussing "all dimensions'' of the security situation.

Independent of whether the government decides to push ahead with the idea, the very fact that direct engagement of armed forces is being looked as a serious option is significant.

It marks a critical shift on the part of the government, which had so far shied away from deploying soldiers in the Naxal battle. But a big cause for concern is the increasingly savage and audacious Maoist attacks, which have inflicted heavy casualties on paramilitary forces as well as non-combatants.

In May alone, as many as 172 civilians and 29 security personnel were killed by Naxals, if the derailing of the passenger train in West Midnapore on May 28 is also taken into account.

Though the meeting chaired by Antony examined the "pros and cons of different options'', it's for the CCS to decide on the exact mandate. "But one thing is certain even if the armed forces are deployed in a more direct role, it will be a limited mandate for a limited period,'' said a source.

One possible option could be to divert a few of the 63 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles, the Army's specialised counter-insurgency force operating in Jammu and Kashmir, "for selective missions'' in states worst-affected by Maoist depredations, said sources.

Successive governments have been averse to enlisting the Army in the fight because of the concern that it might lead to a perception about the Indian State not being in control of vast swathes in its own heartland.

There is also the issue of suitability of armed forces, which are trained to kill with heavy force, operating against an adversary who blends into the civilian population and is, in fact, adept at using them as shields.(I guess they didn't get the memo this is what URBAN WARFARE is ALL ABOUT!!!)

The top military brass have their own reservations, extending from the lack of familiarity with the terrain and concrete ground-level intelligence to the armed forces being already overstretched in counter-insurgency in J&K and the North-East as well along the long unresolved borders with Pakistan and China.

But underlining the government's resolve to take the battle to Maoists, PM Manmohan Singh on Tuesday said, "In dealing with the challenge of Naxalism, we will pursue a policy that genuinely seeks to address developmental concerns at the grassroots, while firmly enforcing the writ of the state.''

But the dice could still fall either way in the CCS, with the home ministry keen to bolster the fight against the Maoists with "some more help'' from the armed forces but the defence establishment remaining largely reluctant about getting sucked into "yet another internal security duty''.

There has, however, been a significant shift in Antony's position in the last few days, from earlier being a strong opponent of deploying armed forces against Maoists in a direct role to now holding they will "accept'' the government's decision and "implement it with vigour and commitment''.

IAF, on its part, feels it can enhance its "air-support'' beyond the current four Mi-17 helicopters deployed in the region but continues to maintain the use of "offensive airpower'' is not a practical option since it can lead to collateral damage on the ground.

The armed forces, of course, are preparing for the worst-case scenario by finalising action plans to meet any contingency, as reported by TOI last week.

Having already trained around 47,000 paramilitary personnel since 2006 in its counter-insurgency and jungle warfare school in Vairengte and other institutions, the Army is also keen that a separate and dedicated counter-Naxalism training facility be established to train "homogeneous companies'' of police personnel.

[Craig Alpert]

Top LeT Commander Killed in Jammu and Kashmir

[sathyaC]

Paramilitary to get new weapons, vehicles
http://idrw.org/?p=1866
PTI

As part of its plan to arm paramilitary troops, including those operating in Naxal-hit areas, with high-tech weapons, government has sanctioned procurements of armoured and bullet proof vehicles besides arms valuing nearly Rs 300 crore. The Union Home Ministry in the last one month has sanctioned 119 TATA Light Armoured Troop Carriers (LATC) worth Rs 49.90 crore and 98 bullet proof Mahindra Rakshaks and three LATCs at a cost of Rs 37.97 crore, Home Minister P Chidambaram told reporters today.The ministry has also approved procurement of night vision devices for rifles at a cost of Rs 184.80 crore, besides 146 automatic grenade launchers and 47,030 grenades are also been bought from a Russian firm Rosoboron Export at a cost of Rs 22.95 crore. Laser range finders is also being procured from Fotono, a Slovenian firm at a cost of Rs 1.33 crore.In all, procurements amounting to Rs 296.95 crore has been approved by the ministry, Chidambaram said. Besides the above mentioned items, in the last two months alone, the Home Ministry has given sanction to a number of modernisation programmes of paramilitary forces, including procurement of 59,000 light-weight bullet-proof jackets.Official sources said paramilitary forces like CRPF, BSF NSG, ITBP are being re-equipped at breakneck speed with new weapons, bullet-proof jackets, riot gear and armoured vehicles. The NSG has recently placed an order of over 800 state-of-the-art SIG rifles, something which certain other forces are also looking at.Last month, the MHA sanctioned procurement of 378 automatic grenade launchers and related ammunition at a total cost of Rs 37.83 crore. It also sanctioned procurement of 34,377 carbines for the BSF at a cost of Rs 137.51 crore.The CISF, which guards airports, nuclear plants and other sensitive installations, already uses Glock pistols and will also procure 1,000 more such weapons at a cost of Rs 2.5 crore, the source said. Global equipment suppliers who have recently been camping in New Delhi and displaying their lethal wares, estimate that the India market for internal-security related equipment will be worth a whopping Rs 45,000 crore over the period of next two to three years.

[koti]

besides 146 automatic grenade launchers and 47,030 grenades are also been bought from a Russian firm Rosoboron Export at a cost of Rs 22.95 crore

I thought we use South african AGL's. Any idea which these new systems are or could be.
Also, which carbine got the procurement order?

[Vivek Raghuvanshi]

Insurgency is a great business in India

Funds meant to combat insurgency disappear

Insurgents collect hafta from local businesses and bureaucrats in respective states wherever there is insurgency.

Who really wants to eradicate insurgency in India?

This is why Law and Order should be a Central Subject and not a State Subject

Insurgents collect hafta from local businesses and politicians and guarantee them safe passage

Think about it.

[sathyaC]

besides 146 automatic grenade launchers and 47,030 grenades are also been bought from a Russian firm Rosoboron Export at a cost of Rs 22.95 crore

I thought we use South african AGL's. Any idea which these new systems are or could be.
Also, which carbine got the procurement order?

No buddy we use the AGS-17 Plamya 30mm automatic grenade launchers from Russia

[Nihat]

Security forces seize solar missiles in Valley

[VinodTK]

German firm insults AP, won’t sell guns

Stating that the Andhra Pradesh state police have a bad human rights record, the German firm Heckler & Koch, which manufactures small arms and assault guns, has decided not to supply 9mm pistols and MP5 submachine guns to the state police.

[Viv S]

German firm insults AP, won’t sell guns

Stating that the Andhra Pradesh state police have a bad human rights record, the German firm Heckler & Koch, which manufactures small arms and assault guns, has decided not to supply 9mm pistols and MP5 submachine guns to the state police.

They'd rather swallow BS from a 'pacifist' weapons company than order the MSMC from DRDO/OFB.

[sum]

German firm insults AP, won’t sell guns

Stating that the Andhra Pradesh state police have a bad human rights record, the German firm Heckler & Koch, which manufactures small arms and assault guns, has decided not to supply 9mm pistols and MP5 submachine guns to the state police.

What is it with Gora countries and lectures on Indian police these days?

And yet our forces will run behind these #@$% to get latest maal while not giving a chance for the Desi stuff to get field experience and be refined further..

[sathyaC]

Assam Rifles tipped for Bengal rebel zone
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100608/j ... 541626.jsp
New Delhi, June 7: The Centre has decided to re-deploy the army-led Assam Rifles from border duties in the Northeast to Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhattisgarh in a blueprint that is being drawn up for a renewed stage in the counter-Maoist offensive.

The re-deployment is contingent on three factors: the situation on the ground wherever the forces are currently deployed, the availability of civil police to replace the units that will be re-deployed and the weather (the onset of the monsoon could make a large-scale redeployment tardy).

A large-scale attack by the Maoists after a series of killings in the past two months could well mark the tipping-point that would convince the Centre that police action was less-than-sufficient and it would switch gears in the drive against the rebels.

The director-general of military operations (DGMO), Lt General Anand Mohan Verma, currently on a force-projection exercise if the army were to be deployed in Left Wing Extremism-affected areas, was in the eastern command headquarters in Fort William, Calcutta, on June 4 and subsequently on a tour of Manipur, where the blockade by NSCN(IM) is snowballing, and to army formations in the Northeast to assess the availability of manpower and resources for duties in the hinterland.

Sources in the defence and home ministries have confirmed to The Telegraph that a re-deployment of forces was on the agenda of the cabinetcommittee on security, scheduled for June 10.

A senior home ministry official said the ministry wanted to put the BSF in charge of the Indo-Myanmar border and re-deploy the Assam Rifles, headed by a major general, for “counter-insurgency”.

The Assam Rifles is deployed not along the border but 20km inside, leaving scope for infiltration. Moreover, with insurgency on the decline in the Northeast, the other duties obviously lie in east and central India.

On Friday, the DGMO was given a briefing by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C), Eastern Command, Lt General Bikram Singh, on the situation in the Northeast and especially on the situation in Lalgarh and the Bengal-Jharkhand and Bengal-Orissa border zones.

The army’s central command monitors Maoist activity but the Bengal area falls under the eastern command. The DGMO was himself the general officer of the Bengal Area as a major general.

The re-deployment of the Assam Rifles, and also, possibly, battalions of the Rashtriya Rifles from Jammu and Kashmir, need the concurrence of both the defence and home ministries and the army. The Assam Rifles is officered by the army. The Rashtriya Rifles, also officered and mostly staffed by the army, was raised specifically for counter-insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and its mandate would have to be amended. It is likely that the RR’s U (Uniform) force could be pulled out of currently responsibilities in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Assam Rifles has nearly 50,000 men in 46 battalions and the Rashtriya Rifles about 40,000 soldiers in five “forces” — Delta, Kilo, Romeo, Victor and Uniform. The Assam Rifles is raising an additional 20 battalions in this, its 150th year.

While the possible deployment of the Assam Rifles and the Rashtriya Rifles “in support of” the counter-Maoist offensives still means that the army’s role will be short of a full-scale commitment, the army, through the defence ministry, will seek legal provisions in support of its actions.

This essentially means it will insist on the extension of the Disturbed Areas Act and include the Armed Forces Special Power Act in specified zones in eight states where the army’s central command has assessed the Maoists are active.

Section 3 of the AFSPA allows the government to decide whether a state or areas within it are “in such a disturbed or dangerous condition that the use of armed forces in aid of the civil powers in necessary”. Though law-and-order is a subject in the state list under the Constitution, the power to declare an area “disturbed” also vests with the Centre.

A preliminary assessment projects the need for 10 battalions (each of between 900 and 1,100 troops) spread over three sector headquarters commanding troops in Chhattisgarh, Orissa and in the Bengal-Jharkhand-Orissa zone. This deployment will be in addition to the state and central forces already in operation.

In addition to the establishment of the sector headquarters — one in Chhattisgarh (Raipur) and another in Orissa (Koraput) are already being developed — the army has agreed to set up more schools for specialised training to state and central forces in jungle warfare.

Till now, the army has trained some 47,000 policemen.

While the army’s involvement in the counter-Maoist offensive could run just short of a full-deployment (unlike Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast), the Indian Air Force has issued strict directives to its crew in support of the counter-Naxalite offensive to keep their signatures low and stay out of the line of the fire as far as possible.

In the standard operating procedures that have been drawn up for the IAF in these areas, helicopters are flying with the IAF’s own armed Garud special forces soldiers while transporting the police or while evacuating casualties.

This has caused some consternation because the IAF’s insistence on foolproofing landing sides has often meant a delay in sorties. One officer pointed out, for example, that in the April 6 incident in Mukram, many of the CRPF troopers bled to death even as they were being flown to a hospital in Jagdalpur.

The IAF has insisted that the central and state police guarantee “perimeter security” around helipads, ensuring that they are out of the range of small arms fire. The Garud is tasked specifically with securing the IAF’s own assets.

Helicopter pilots have been asked to go only for “steep approaches” while landing and “steep take-offs” while taking flight. This means that they must fly as high as possible to keep out of firing range of insurgents.

The IAF currently has six helicopters doing duty in these areas and the BSF has two. The home ministry has asked for up to 35 additional helicopters from the army and the IAF. A proposal is afoot to lease more choppers from Pawanhans for logistics and evacuation.

The home ministry is yet to receive views from other ministries prior to the CCS on the proposal for deployment of army in Maoist-affected areas.

[merlin]

German firm insults AP, won’t sell guns

Stating that the Andhra Pradesh state police have a bad human rights record, the German firm Heckler & Koch, which manufactures small arms and assault guns, has decided not to supply 9mm pistols and MP5 submachine guns to the state police.

One karaara tamacha after another. I'm liking it

[ParGha]

Some of Indian security forces' love of H&K - and their higher authorities' tolerance of it - really surprises me.

H&K has had a long relationship with Pakistan: much of regular Pakistani small arms are H&K licence productions - G-3, MG-3, MP-5s etc.; Pak acts as a front-man to help sell H&K products in countries that German Govt. won't allow H&K to trade in (like Zimb.). That alone should raise their hackles.

But since it apparently doesn't, let us consider the operational performance of these weapons. From all that I have heard, H&K weaponry - while highly accurate and very well made - are maintenance whores and intolerant of the rough conditions they will most likely be put into in India. Are there really any capabilities which are offered by H&K tht isnt offered by "friendlies" (FN, IMI) or local industry? I don't think so.

[Prabu]

German firm insults AP, won’t sell guns

Stating that the Andhra Pradesh state police have a bad human rights record, the German firm Heckler & Koch, which manufactures small arms and assault guns, has decided not to supply 9mm pistols and MP5 submachine guns to the state police.

Now Germany wants to do Joint Air excercise with Indian Army. India shoudl pay back in the same coin and refuse to do joint excercise saying Germany supplying Arms to Paki terrorist Army !!

[Viv S]

German firm insults AP, won’t sell guns

Stating that the Andhra Pradesh state police have a bad human rights record, the German firm Heckler & Koch, which manufactures small arms and assault guns, has decided not to supply 9mm pistols and MP5 submachine guns to the state police.

Now Germany wants to do Joint Air excercise with Indian Army. India shoudl pay back in the same coin and refuse to do joint excercise saying Germany supplying Arms to Paki terrorist Army !!

H&K and the German government are separate entities. The joint exercises would be an excellent learning opportunity for the IAF(and Luftwaffe).

[Karan M]

Some of Indian security forces' love of H&K - and their higher authorities' tolerance of it - really surprises me.

H&K has had a long relationship with Pakistan: much of regular Pakistani small arms are H&K licence productions - G-3, MG-3, MP-5s etc.; Pak acts as a front-man to help sell H&K products in countries that German Govt. won't allow H&K to trade in (like Zimb.). That alone should raise their hackles.

But since it apparently doesn't, let us consider the operational performance of these weapons. From all that I have heard, H&K weaponry - while highly accurate and very well made - are maintenance whores and intolerant of the rough conditions they will most likely be put into in India. Are there really any capabilities which are offered by H&K tht isnt offered by "friendlies" (FN, IMI) or local industry? I don't think so.

Very interesting point and well made. I constantly wonder how much procurement has to do with organizational inertia and lobbying versus what is required.

At any rate, the GOI should (it has any spine) take this issue firmly up with Germany given the latters emphasis on defence ties with India.

No reason why any firm should get substantial business from the Indian citizens tax money either, if it practices dubious discriminatory policies.

[wig]

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/
A number of youths from southern and western Indian States were also reportedly undergoing training in Pakistani camps of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) outfit, Intelligence inputs and questioning of some of the recently arrested militants have revealed.

The inputs have given a new dimension to the militancy as, hitherto, only the youths from different parts of J&K, Pakistan and occupied Kashmir were being trained by Pakistan Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) with the help of Lashkar commanders in the training camps.

Official sources said some of the recently arrested militants have confirmed that few youths from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat and Maharashtra were being trained in militancy by Pakistan Army and LeT commanders in selected training camps in Pakistan.

According to some of the militants, who were captured after their return from Pakistan from different routes, the youths of southern and western Indian States who were being trained in handling of sophisticated weapons and explosives by Pakistan Army, were kept isolated from the ultras of J&K.

These youths are, in fact, being trained in separate camps and only the commander rank militants of the Lashkar outfit were aware of their training, sources said.

The youths of south and west India might have been lured by upper ground network of the LeT outfit in the country and taken to Pakistan either via Nepal or West Bengal route (through Bangladesh). Pakistan might use the similar route to push them into India after completion of their training.

These militants, sources said, could be used in terror attacks in different parts of the country by Pakistan especially the States they belonged to. They added that Lashkar commanders of Pakistan were personally involved in training of these youths besides looking after them.

According to sources, the under training militants of southern and western Indian States were getting more focus not only in terms of training but also other facilities like boarding, lodging and food. These youths were being housed in quarters as against tented accommodation provided to the under training or even trained militants of Jammu and Kashmir, they said.

Almost all these youths were unemployed and were stated to be in the age group of 18 to 23.

[Singha]

given ParGha's comments, these weapons look unsuitable for deployment in anti-naxal ops where services of repair shops would be hard to get. for NSG it is ok because they dont deploy in the field for extended durations and can take crates of extra weapons along for any "situation" lasting upto a few days.

are there other weapons in the MP5 category perceived as more rugged and capable of being thrown around?

[D Roy]

H&K is now british owned AFAIR.

[somak]

Nice to see a rifle grenade used by the paramilitary against maoists:

http://beta.thehindu.com/news/national/ ... epage=true

[vivekmehta]

http://news.rediff.com/report/2010/jun/ ... napore.htm

some good news. but just see the ammunition recovered , they seem to be very well armed now....

[Prem Kumar]

In the attack before this one (where a dozen Maoists were killed), Claymore mines were recovered. All in all - some serious ammo in their hands. The fear is that, if unchecked, this can go the LTTE way. Many similarities: similar terrain suited for guerrilla warfare , idealogical motivation, front-organizations support, external support for both ideology & ammunition.

[CalvinH]

^^ every insurgency has these things. Do they have something similar to Sinhala-Tamil divide which was successfully exploited by LTTE and fuelled its success.

We have very successfully dealt with bigger insurgency in Punjab so IMO its just a matter of right planning and tactics.

[Samay]

nope, this one is different ,
they are about to enter cuban ways
forces should wipe them out as soon as possible
remember what they are called,,'mao'ists

[Prem Kumar]

CalvinH: granted every insurgency will have some common elements. But look at the factors I have listed + some more below:

a) Attacking in large numbers

b) Willingness to fight some level of pitched battles

c) Improvised use of mines/IEDs against trucks, armored vehicles and personnel

d) Controlling large areas & running a parallel government

Add to the fact that this insurgency is still in its infancy & their capability is growing.

Now, which insurgency does this resemble the most: Punjab, J&K, North East or LTTE?

P.S. I didnt say that the Maoists ideology/motivation was the same as the LTTE ideology. But the grievance that they are tapping into is as strong as the Tamil-Sinhala grievance

[CalvinH]

The factors that you mentioned are typical of an insurgency with added variables facilitated by terrain. As an example the attacks in large no. are possible because they can assemble in a jungle and than raid the nearest camp. For a flat terrain like Punjab it would not have been possible.

Every insurgency shows these trends including evenutal control of large areas but its usually a result of initial Govt inaction rather than the result of support of people. Calling this control or influence through fear grassroot support is the same misunderstanding people had about punjab insurgency. Once the Govt decides to act and get back the control this will support will melt like thin ice.

IED etc are just the equipments used at present. The equipement keep changing with time. Weapons used now will be different than 90s just because of that.

[Sanku]

I dont think it would be possible to compare the LTTE situation with the Maoist, when the Tamil issue began, there was no LTTE, the opposition by Sri Lankan Tamils took a variety of forms, including democratic and also violent/semi-violent with a large number of parties. LTTE built on top of this.

Here there is ONE party, attacking every one else who does not follow its ideology, including other people of same similar ethnic group. There is no ethnic, lingual or any other "cultural" division around which the fight is happening. There is not really even a development issue (the richer Maoists are extorting from and killing poor tribals too)

This is more like Khemer Rouge if a comparison has to be made.

[Debal]

Day by day Maoist problem is becoming more complicated than paki terrorist or any insurgency problem. They are very much regimented, cash rich-naturally well armed also. General army can't do much harm to them because they used to melt down among common people very quickly & we can't do a all out war like Srilanka, so, a very well planned and managed vertical operation line of development and armed option should be opted. First flash them out sector wise with para forces in heavy numbers, start social development work and then go offensive in guerrilla way by well trained army commandos in forest warfare. Without the help of common people you can't win this situation. Airforce will also have some logistic, medical & reci role only. But, GOI hv to take the call immediately in a very well planned way, any hasty reaction would not be effective.