Logistics

[shiv]

I have been wanting to start this thread for a while. We have a lot of discussions in the other forum taking of how India should attack and take over some territory (notably POK) or how China will take over parts of India.

Whether this is possible or not depends not just on the weapons and men - but on the logistics. I am not a military logistician. I strive to be an armchair general and I am a senior armchair marshal with many Param Beer Bottles downed in discussions.

There is plenty of material on the net if people look for it. I will post some quotes and links and then do some jingogiri calculations. hopefully I can get jingos to think about logistics before they suggest attacking and holding a target area by talking weapons alone, without talking logistics. Let me as usual start with a (hopefully humorous) analogy. My late grandmother used to claim that when she was in college - a man in Karnataka (then Mysore) opted to sing a Tamil song in a college contest that went as follows. She may have been kidding. I don't know.

"Adee" endruthukke avale illai
Pilllai pere "Ramakrishna"

Roughly translated it means "I do not yet have a woman whom I can call my own ("Adee" being a way of referring to a woman), but I have decided to name my son "Ramakrishna." The man has the weapons, intent, training, morale etc - but not all the supplies to achieve his goal.

That is where logistics kicks in.

I believe it was Napoleon who said "An army marches on its stomach" . Soldiers need to be fed and armed for them to fight - and all generals know this well. One of the things that used to be mentioned in days gone by was the "teeth to tail ratio" of an army - that is the number of men required in the rear areas to support the fighting men in front. One statistic that is thrown about is that 100 men are required in the rear areas to support 65 men in front.

Here is a quote from an article:

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/co ... stics.html

Logistics is a relatively new word used to describe a very old practice: the supply, movement and maintenance of an armed force both in peacetime and under operational conditions. Most soldiers have an appreciation of the impact logistics can have on operational readiness. Logistic considerations are generally built in to battle plans at an early stage, for without logistics, the tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, helicopters and aircraft are just numbers on a Table of Organisation and Equipment. Unfortunately, it often seems that the high profile weapon systems have had greater priority in resources than the means to support them in the field, be it ammunition, fuel or spares. For it is logistics that will determine the forces that can be delivered to the theatre of operations, what forces can be supported once there, and what will then be the tempo of operations. Logistics is not only about the supply of matériel to an army in times of war. It also includes the ability of the national infrastructure and manufacturing base to equip, support and supply the Armed Forces, the national transportation system to move the forces to be deployed and its ability to resupply that force once they are deployed. Thus it has been said, "logisticians are a sad, embittered race of men, very much in demand in war, who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only with facts but must work for men who merchant in theories. They emerge during war because war is very much fact. They disappear in peace, because in peace, war is mostly theory." (Foxton, 1994, p. 9)

The practice of logistics, as understood in its modern form, has been around for as long as there have been organised armed forces with which nations and / or states have tried to exert military force on their neighbours. The earliest known standing army was that of the Assyrians at around 700 BC. They had iron weapons, armour and chariots, were well organised and could fight over different types of terrain (the most common in the Middle East being desert and mountain) and engage in siege operations. The need to feed and equip a substantial force of that time, along with the means of transportation (i.e. horses, camels, mules and oxen) would mean that it could not linger in one place for too long. The best time to arrive in any one spot was just after the harvest, when the entire stock was available for requisitioning. Obviously, it was not such a good time for the local inhabitants. One of the most intense consumers of grain was the increasing number of animals that were employed by armies of this period. In summer they soon overgrazed the immediate area, and unless provision had been made beforehand to stockpile supplies or have them bought in, the army would have to move. Considerable numbers of followers carrying the materiel necessary to provide sustenance and maintenance to the fighting force would provide essential logistic support.

Let me also quote an important point from Wiki. This is particularly important when you talk of China attacking via Myanmar or India giving military support to Fiji or Afghanistan

Geographic distance is a key factor in military affairs. The shorter the distance, the greater the ease with which force can be brought to bear upon an opponent. This is because it is easier to undertake the supply of logistics to a force on the ground as well as engage in bombardment. The importance of distance is demonstrated by the Loss of Strength Gradient devised by Kenneth Boulding. This shows the advantage of supply that is forward based

Now onto pure jingo wet dreams and arguments. Absolutely no real knowledge of numbers and weights is claimed by me here.

Imagine 10000 men and 100 tanks and 50 trucks attacking some objective;

Each man will require 5 liters of water and about 500 grams of food a day - 50 tons water and 5 tons food per day. 4 supply trucks should do the trick. In the mountains, the tanks won't go - but the men will need 250 mules carrying 200 kg each per day. Or 1000 porters carrying 50 kg each per day. Just food and water, No ammunition or anything else.

Tanks drink maybe 3 liters per km and trucks 1 liter per km. In a day of fighting where they may move 50 km and keep their engines on for say 8 hours we are looking at 20 to 30,000 liters of fuel per day. Maybe another 3 trucks worth of fuel per day. Add water, oil and spares. Another 2-3 trucks per day.

And then there is that stuff - ammunition. Assume 5000 attacking men in front using 1000 rounds per day. 500,000 rounds. At 10 grams per round that is 5 tons. One truck. Add mortar, tank and artillery rounds. Add 2 trucks. Add another 2 trucks for miscellaneous items. We are looking at 15-20 trucks minimum of supplied per day to keep the men fighting. Now no army will start like this. They will build up forward dumps and stores to supply the meant for several days - let's assume supplies for one week.

That means the supply dump has 500,000 liters of water, 250,000 liters of fuel, and about 100 to 200 tons of various supplies. You need a plot that is an acre or more in size to store this and roads leading up and down. My figures are probably a gross underestimate - with me not counting cooks, medicos, recovery vehicles, cranes, bridge layers, minesweepers, radars, communication, maintenance and repair and anti-aircraft equipment. If this supply dump is taken out the attacking army will starve and run out of ammo and water in a day. If the supply routes are blocked, the attacking army cannot fight for more than a week even if their supply dump is intact. The further the attacking army moves from its supply dump the more likely that the supply route can be cut.

Keeping this in mind I would like to ask people to mull over how an army can maintain its logistics via 1000 (or even 500 km) of foreign territory - eg like Chinese troops via Myanmar. Think also of what the US is doing and what is the intensity of conflict being fought.

[NRao]

Perhaps one of the most important threads.

IF either of the US planes gets selected, this is one thing that will beat the heck out of the rest. For sure. (Does not mean that they are the best for the MRCA.)

[shiv]

Maybe the true hallmark of a global power is the ability to maintain a logistics line over extended distances.

I am currently reading a history book and one chapter speaks of how the Portuguese (in the early 16th century) with sea power managed to have an effect on kingdoms in India because they were able to control trade - particularly the trade of horses from Goa. Horses were imported from Arabia and all armies needed them. The logistics line was long (from Arabia to Goa and thence overland). The sea was the weak link because no Indian kingdom of the time had a navy powerful enough to keep the Portuguese away.

In its last "superpower" spark Britain won the Falklands war - 8000 miles from Britain and 300 miles from the Argentinian coast. Over that range Britain managed to cut Argentinian logistics lines to the Falklands but maintain their own. The defeat of the Argentinian Navy and the fact that the Argentinian air force were operating at the limits of their range aided Britain. The Brits had Air Power by virtue of their carriers while the sole Argentinian carrier remained in port because of British Naval dominance.

The US today does not just have a string of pearls. It has a pearl necklace that spans the globe. Each pearl is a base with supplies. The US Navy and US heavy lift capability operate from these based to dominate oceans and countries at distances of a thousand Km or more from each base. It is the US's logistics capability that gives power to its teeth. US power would be nothing if its far flung fleet and aircraft could not be refuelled and re armed at extended distances.

The following map, shows in dark blue - all the US military bases with moe than 1000 US personnel in them. Sea power is the key to keeping the logistics lines open between those bases

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US_mi ... d_2007.svg

[NRao]

Maybe the true hallmark of a global power is the ability to maintain a logistics line over extended distances.
.................................................

The US today does not just have a string of pearls. It has a pearl necklace that spans the globe. Each pearl is a base with supplies. The US Navy and US heavy lift capability operate from these based to dominate oceans and countries at distances of a thousand Km or more from each base. It is the US's logistics capability that gives power to its teeth. US power would be nothing if its far flung fleet and aircraft could not be refuelled and re armed at extended distances.
..............................................

It is actually a lot more than that. Just-in-time, supply chain, real-time data integration, etc. To get a good idea:

DLA

There are also PHD level programs that deal with this topic.

[shiv]

A few informative articles:

I am rearranging the paragraphs in the following article for it to make more sense from the logistics viewpoint

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlog/20100903.aspx

.. amateurs (and politicians) talk tactics, while professionals talk logistics.

India, decades ago, decided that one way to deal with a Chinese invasion was to, well, make it difficult for them to move forward. Thus for decades, the Indians built few roads on their side of the border. But that also made it more difficult for Indian forces to get into the disputed areas.
..
When they took a closer look, Indian staff officers found that China had improved its road network along most of their 4,000 kilometer common border. Indian military planners calculated that, as a result of this network, Chinese military units can move 400 kilometers a day on hard surfaced roads, while Indian units can only move half as fast, while suffering more vehicle damage because of the many unpaved roads. Building more roads will take years. The roads are essential to support Indian plans to build more airfields near the border, and stationing modern fighters there. Once the terrain was surveyed and calculations completed, it was found that it would take a lot more time, because of the need to build maintenance facilities, roads to move in fuel and supplies, and housing for military families.
..
Putting more roads into places like Arunachal Pradesh (83,000 square kilometers and only a million people) will improve the economy, as well as military capabilities. This will be true of most of the border area. But all the roads won't change the fact that most of the border is mountains, the highest mountains in the world (the Himalayas). So no matter how much you prepare for war, no one is going very far, very fast, when you have to deal with these mountains.

India is moving several infantry divisions, several squadrons of Su-30 fighters and six of the first eight squadrons of its new Akash air defense missile systems there. Most of these will initially go into Assam, just south of Arunachal Pradesh, until the road network is built up sufficiently to allow bases to be maintained closer to the border.

[shiv]

http://defense-update.com/analysis/anal ... l#continue

THE AFGHAN WAR IS BECOMING A LOGISTICAL NIGHTMARE
Being a landlocked country without any access to riverlines or seaports, all military logistic support to supply troops deployed in Afghanistan has to be made overland or by air. About 75 per cent of these supplies and equipment are shipped to the Pakistani port of Karachi, from where they are transported over land through treacherous 1,200-mile land journey to Kabul via the notorious Khyber pass. As invaders throughout history have learned, closing the Khyber Pass linking Pakistan and Afghanistan causes a logistic nightmare for even the largest army. In the currentconflict this historic bottleneck has become a hotbed of Taliban activity, attempting to close this vital supply line. An alternative route leading from Karachi to the Afghan city of Kandahar through the northwestern Pakistan town of Chaman, has also come under Guerilla attack recently. The number of attacks on supply convoys is a closely kept military secret, but they were lately occurring almost daily. Last year 42 oil tankers were destroyed in a single attack. Local drivers are paid high wages to risk their lives, to go over the treacherous winding mountain roads over the 3,500 ft Khyber Pass and many abandon their vehicles, trying to survive.

US supplies passing through Pakistan are pilfered by motley groups of Taliban militants, petty traders and even plain thieves. The US Army is getting burgled in broad daylight and can do very little about it. The Peshawar bazaar is doing a roaring business hawking stolen US military ware. US Army and Marines Corps uniforms and equipment are openly displayed for sale. The Taliban's tactics are similar to those used by Mujahideen guerrillas in the 1980s that crippled the Soviet Army by attacking supply convoys.

The land route from Karachi over the Khyber pass may not be the only alternative for delivering military supplies inland. Afghanistan can be accessed from the northwest, but that route is much longer and would require traveling through Russia's sphere of influence. Moreover even if this problem could be solved through political negotiations- which have a price, supplies would face another obstacle going south towards the combat zone: the notorious Hindu Kush mountain range, which has haunted Soviet military logistics in their Afghanistan war thirty years ago.

Located high in the Hindu Kush Mountains at an altitude of 11,100 feet, the mile and a half long Salang Tunnel - one of the highest in the world- that goes through the pass, is a vital artery that connects the north and the south of the country. But using this as a main supply route could become extremely dangerous. Beside insurgent attacks, frequent snow avalanches are blocking the tunnel and its access roads, creating dangerous traffic jams at both ends, posing lucrative targets for attacking guerillas. Furthermore, fires from exploding fuel tankers have killed many people, the worst occurring in 1982, when over 2,000 Afghans and Russian soldiers were trapped in the blazing inferno. The nearest bypass around the tunnel is through the Shibar pass, situated along the watershed between Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent, but road conditions are bad and totally unfit for massive supply convoys. Furtehrmore, security in Pakistan’s northwest is also deteriorating rapidly; the Taliban’s eastward march has created fears in the country that large sections of the North-South mountain region, could be lost to the Pashtun jihadists within the next few months.

According to the new US administration's strategic outlook, additional 30,000 troops should be deployed in Afghanistan. To implement such a plan, improving the existing logistic support is imperative. In fact, based on the present logistical infrastructure, any U.S. planned expansion of the war in Afghanistan is virtually impossible without opening the supply route through Russian territory.

Just to study the routes that such a US resupply might take, could make any military logistics expert suffer from constant insomnia! Assuming that the US would use a German Port as a main staging area, considering the route through Russia- via Moscow- southern Kazakhstan- Uzbekistan, by rail, not mentioning the still deteriorating state of Russian decrepit railways or different rail gauges en-route could become highly questionable for a dependable logistic support line. Moreover, once arriving in the region, following a reshipment from rail to trucks, these would have to cross the Amu Darya River on the way through the high-risk Salang tunnel route to Kabul. There may be alternative routes via the Black Sea over the Caspian into Turkmenistan, but these would require preventing Russian interference over this highly sensitive region.

[shiv]

http://www.stormingmedia.us/09/0994/A099492.html

Abstract:
The United States supports deployed forces by building significant supply stocks in theaters of operations. Early logisticians experienced increased requirements for ammunition and foodstuffs that made sustainment directly from the industrial base difficult. Refinement of rail and water transportation systems enabled Civil War era logisticians to create remote support bases for deployed forces. The Army refined this method of support in the World Wars and perpetuated it during both the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars. This method of operations has its drawbacks. Forward depots are prime candidates for contusion and overstockage. Notable examples of supply contusion and lack of cargo visibility occurred on the beaches at Normandy, and the area around Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam. Deployment to the Persian Gulf War saw a similar buildup, with its associated supply confusion. Units found that parts arrived more quickly when ordered directly from CONUS, although like items were in theater. Army leaders are seeking to leverage Information Age technology to prevent this situation from happening in future conflicts.

[Baikul]

Excellent thread, Shiv. Finally got me off my backside and on to posting, however long that lasts. Like you I claim no special knowledge of the subject (am indeed an amateur with less knowledge than many people on this forum). But, for what it is worth, I do believe that it is a key to understanding military strategy and indeed military possibilities is logistics.

From the little I have read, the history of many military campaigns and battles is mostly the application of logistics. Whether it was Hannibal crossing the Alps elephants in train, Napoleon's army matching on its stomach, or Nathaniel Bedford Forrest's 'getting there firstest with the mostest' dictum, or the Vietnamese managing to transport artillery piece by piece to confound the French at Dien Bien Phu, it's basically about logistics.

Understanding of logistics could also help enhance understanding of our capabilities, potential, and perhaps even current events/ decisions such as the MCRA contest (have not fully developed my ideas on the last one, though).

In the interim a book I can recommend to get a practical understanding of the subject is "Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War II". It's about the combat maintenance needs of the 3rd Armored Division and what the author did to make sure they kept fighting. So it has great insights into upkeep, repair and maintenance of one of the two heavy armored division the allied forces had in the European theatre.

For example, of the 17000 troops in this div, 1000 were ordinance staff with the armoured battalions. Another 1000 were with the other battalions in the div (field artillery. combat engineers etc). If one counts the driver and assistant driver of the vehicles in the division (230 tanks but hundreds of other vehicles such as jeeps, truck etc), some 10,400 personnel out of 17,000 were involved in maintenance.

In short, logistics, logistics, logistics.

This thread can take may directions, from discussing and understanding macro trends (of superpowers, as you have mentioned) to minor battles. Nor sure where you want to take it, or whether the above was even relevant, but will keep an eye out, read and hopefully contribute.

[shiv]

This thread can take may directions, from discussing and understanding macro trends (of superpowers, as you have mentioned) to minor battles. Nor sure where you want to take it, or whether the above was even relevant, but will keep an eye out, read and hopefully contribute.

Thank for a perfectly relevant and informative post.

If you start a thread called "Laser Vaporization of Tanks" - it will get thousands of views. Most people are not even interested in the word logistics. Not just BRF - but many of the articles and quotes above illustrate the fact that it is such a boring sounding thing that everyone just ignores it - except the forces themselves who have to fight and eat.

For example why were the Indian Navy and Air Force first off the mark providing relief after the tsunami? Ditto for the US forces in Indonesia after the same tsunami. And why did the Paki army make a name for itself after the floods using the opportunity to say how all other Pakis are useless morons? Why did the Delhi CWG authorities request the Indian army to build a bridge in 4 days?

All were simply related to the logistics capability and experience of armed force.

On the forum we say "I have Su 30. He has Bundaar. I have won". "I have T 55. He has Al Khali. I have lost" But it's not as simple as that. Logistics make a huge difference. The mention of Vietnam is interesting. Later when I have time I will quote from a book I have about what logistics meant for the soldier in Vietnam.

[Lalmohan]

excellent thread - some thoughts (semi random):

the viet cong used the laos jungle trails to manhandle war supplies down to the south. men and bicycles porting ammunition mostly down hundreds of miles of jungle trails. food and water was sourced locally

unkil uses data links to build up a real time picture of not just where units are physically, but also what their supply situation is like. this data then pulls materials through the supply chain forward from the rear storage areas

another issue to bear in mind - as forward units shock n awe their way over enemy territory and bypass or make redundant enemy combatants, the supply chain has to keep up with them. this makes them more vulnerable to sporadic and systemic attacks by the enemy troops who have been bypassed. therefore, a significant proportion of the force has to be kept on guarding the logistics chain

even historically this was a big issue. there was a 'battle' between the welsh and english in the medieval period which the welsh lost without anyone actually making armed contact on the field. it seems that the stronger welsh force formed up in a commanding position over the english camp, but whilst waiting for the various alliances to be agreed, the welsh started running out of food, and after a few days had to disperse or starve - handing the english a de facto victory and the control over part of the welsh kingdom

i think that the marathas at panipat also had similar problems before the battle actually began

[Pratyush]

Shiv,

Logistics, my understanding of the word is to provide your people with something that is not available on the ground. Now what I will say next is based upon my simplistic understanding of the word.

The logistics of any campaign will be different from the next. The things that are needed to be consider will be as follows.

1.The number of people who need the given Item (Quantity)
2.Consumption of the given item in a given time period.
3.The nearest location from which the Item can be provided.(Distance, how near or far the needed Item is from the front line)
4.The time taken to ship the Item (Capability / bandwidth of the physical infrastructure, and available transport assets, Ie how many trucks can pass through a particular point on a high way in one hour and of what tonnage )

On the basis of the above four points(Perhaps more, but I can only identify the 4 ), one will have to possess multidisciplinary skills and knowledge to design an conduct a good logistical campaign.

The skills will vary form Inventory management to mathematics.

JMT.

[shiv]

Here is an informative single scanned page from a book called "Armed Conflict: The Lessons of Modern Warfare" by Brian Steed. It is about one disastrous battle in Vietnam:

[ParGha]

The question of logistics has been historically addressed by a combination of decreasing the tooth's needs (increasing self-sufficiency) and/or increasing the tail size. However, recently the trend seems to rely more and more on the latter approach. It is ultimately a debilitating process that opens up new vulnerabilities and may ultimately become a fatal strategic liability in itself.

Anyone who comes up with technologies/organizational means to increase the fighting units' self-sufficiency without majorly compromising their fighting capabilities automatically stands in a better situation than those who depend on logistical lines. The Punic Wars offer a good lesson in how a farming nation (Rome) was able to overcome a sea-faring nation (Carthage), beat them at their own game, and destroy them so utterly. More relevantly the Chinese campaign of 1962 also offers many useful lessons in this regard on how technology/organization was used to overcome massive logistical problems by decreasing the fighting units dependancy on shaky logistics through semi-hostile territory. For example, consider their choice to abandon artillery in favor of muscle-portable mortars; or choice of more SKS and SMGs instead of MMGs and HMGs at unit level.

[Lalmohan]

shiv, did not our canadian colonel explain a few years ago how the PLA has self contained armies that will bash on regardless until spent, and will stand aside for next army to push through, rather than itself be replenished? whilst i find this conceptually interesting, i am not convinced that such a force will have sufficient weight of firepower to penetrate substantial defences

[ParGha]

Lalmohan,

I believe you are talking about the Soviet Bloc and old PLA practice of holding back only 1/6th (or less) of a force in reserve, while Western and Indian doctrine calls for holding back 1/4th of the force in reserve. It has changed considerably these days, given the changes in overall conditions. No Chinese parent of a single son is going to tolerate such bindas use of soldiers for long. Their doctrine has evolved significantly since mid 1980s (when USSR started falling apart and the existential threat disappeared). The new WZC campaign doctrine is much more sophisticated.

[nikhil_p]

While we are on the topic of Logistics can we also list out the logistical vehicles of the Indian Army.
The backbone of the medium requirement for a long time now is the AL Stallion

http://www.ashokleyland.com/subproducts ... uct_id=127

[shiv]

shiv, did not our canadian colonel explain a few years ago how the PLA has self contained armies that will bash on regardless until spent, and will stand aside for next army to push through, rather than itself be replenished? whilst i find this conceptually interesting, i am not convinced that such a force will have sufficient weight of firepower to penetrate substantial defences

Well this may be yet another illustration of logistics of one side versus logistics of the other. I think what you have described is "human wave" by another name. The Indian army faced human waves in 1962 till their ammo ran out. The US army faced that in the Korean war but I think their ammo did not run out and they massacred the Chinese to a standstill.

I am certain that China will use such a tactic and it will have to be met with tremendous firepower as well as interdiction of supply lines. How do you keep your frontline supplied with enough ammo, spares, supplies and manpower to cut down endless waves of soldiers pouring in? Your own logistics support has to be superlative.

[shiv]

While we are on the topic of Logistics can we also list out the logistical vehicles of the Indian Army.
The backbone of the medium requirement for a long time now is the AL Stallion

http://www.ashokleyland.com/subproducts ... uct_id=127

Related facts
http://www.topnews.in/mules-proving-be- ... es-2202200

Mules proving to be Indian Army’s lifeline in high altitude zones
Submitted by Mohit Joshi on Sat, 08/15/2009 - 20:59.
Mules are playing a crucial role in the lives of Indian Army personnel stationed at Angan Pathri, a high altitude region in Jammu and Kashmir.

In order to carry ration, ammunition and other essential supplies at an altitude of 13,000 feet, army turns to mules, since no vehicle can traverse the treacherous narrow path in the region that is situated at the Line of Control.

Soldiers of Army''s Mahar regiment that are currently posted at the region believe that mules are playing a crucial role in their survival.

http://www.idsa.in/events/militaryrobots_alele_170409

Robotic animals could be of use to states like India which depend on mules for supporting their mountain divisions. The mules with the Indian army have significant utility for carrying logistic supplies to higher mountain ridges. Robots could help in this regard and over a period of time if found useful could replace animals.

From the Book "Operation Red Lotus" (Tatya Tope
http://tatyatope.wordpress.com/2010/02/ ... -stomachs/

Troop movement in the 1850s in India was a long and arduous process and the logistics involved was enormous. Three to five camp followers accompanied each soldier. With this calculation, when two divisions of troops were on the move, the total number of human beings marching exceeded 20,000. In addition, there were thousands of horses, camels, elephants, mules, and bullocks. The elephants would drag the cannons. The bullock carts would transport the soldiers. The camels would be needed to carry the supply of grain for the cavalry and artillery horses. The supply for one day for 8,000 horses would need 200 camels for its conveyance. More camels would be needed to transporting the hospital stores, wines, medicines, quilts, beds, pots pans of all sorts and sizes. In addition, ‘troop stores’ were also transported. These included horse clothing, head and heel ropes, pickets, nose bags and spare shoes. In addition, there was the private baggage for the soldiers and the tents for officers. With this complicated logistics, typical troop movement was about 12-15 miles per day.

[ParGha]

Well this may be yet another illustration of logistics of one side versus logistics of the other. I think what you have described is "human wave" by another name. The Indian army faced human waves in 1962 till their ammo ran out. The US army faced that in the Korean war but I think their ammo did not run out and they massacred the Chinese to a standstill.

The PLA operations in the 1962 conflict may be best described as "skirt, envelop, overrun/pummel". It was not a simple "human wave", as the terrain in the Himalayas does not permit such action nor did the strategic objectives of the CCP justify such wastage. The front line posts were bypassed initially, enveloped from all sides (incl the logistics and reinforcement lines being cut off), and the isolated units overrun by infantry or pummeled into submission by mortar fire. It was a text-book perfect operation, straight out of Mountain Warfare 101; something India should have done in 1999, but did not do so.

[Singha]

the soviets planned to attack at many places but only units breaking through would be resupplied and helped with breakthrough units. the rest would presumably be expected to keep fighting and keep enemy units tied down.

in the indian context one also has to take into account will the indian leadership lose its nerve if the chinese start biting at 50 places at once? this is something PLA and beijing will also think deeply about.

we better be having a plan to take care of all such scenarios from the army of ants attack to herd of elephants (big attacks on a few select places)

[shiv]

The PLA operations in the 1962 conflict may be best described as "skirt, envelop, overrun/pummel". It was not a simple "human wave", as the terrain in the Himalayas does not permit such action nor did the strategic objectives of the CCP justify such wastage. The front line posts were bypassed initially, enveloped from all sides (incl the logistics and reinforcement lines being cut off), and the isolated units overrun by infantry or pummeled into submission by mortar fire. It was a text-book perfect operation, straight out of Mountain Warfare 101; something India should have done in 1999, but did not do so.

I don't know anything about the strategic objectives of China but the fact that Indian logistics lines were cut off by "skirt and envelop" - just goes to illustrate something that has been known from the dawn of time and has come even into fairy tales and folklore - i.e the strategy of "laying siege". A siege is simply the cutting off of logistics lines. Either you have the resources to survive a siege, or the siege must be broken.

Of course the fact that Indian soldiers were not acclimatized, clothed or equipped was icing on the cake - as was the fact that the IAF was not used either to supply them or cut off Chinese logistics.

[Johann]

shiv, did not our canadian colonel explain a few years ago how the PLA has self contained armies that will bash on regardless until spent, and will stand aside for next army to push through, rather than itself be replenished? whilst i find this conceptually interesting, i am not convinced that such a force will have sufficient weight of firepower to penetrate substantial defences

Well this may be yet another illustration of logistics of one side versus logistics of the other. I think what you have described is "human wave" by another name. The Indian army faced human waves in 1962 till their ammo ran out. The US army faced that in the Korean war but I think their ammo did not run out and they massacred the Chinese to a standstill.

I am certain that China will use such a tactic and it will have to be met with tremendous firepower as well as interdiction of supply lines. How do you keep your frontline supplied with enough ammo, spares, supplies and manpower to cut down endless waves of soldiers pouring in? Your own logistics support has to be superlative.

The PLA concept of operations in Korea was based on the Soviet model, where entire divisions were treated as expendable, fighting until they ran out of ammunition, fuel, food and men. Instead of trying to resupply a division in combat, you simply pushed the next division behind them forward. Survivors are reassembled and reconstituted and divisions rebuilt in the pause after the advance or campaign is completed.

Victory is achieved through a combination of mass and speed, and of course the massive expenditure of human life. What the Chinese Red Army specialised in addition was night-time movement and infiltration where you'd wake up to find the enemy had closed with you in the hours of darkness and was practically in your foxhole before you realised it. This was partially to compensate for the fact that they didn't have the massive artillery formations of the Russians to soften up the enemy's fixed positions before an assault.

The Russians have abandoned such concepts of operations for the simple reason that Russian life is not so cheap any more. China too in a nation of only children which can not, and does not plan to fight the same way either. Rather than than using the weight of numbers, the challenge will be separating signal from noise to determine tactical objectives, the direction of the main effort and defeat them in a fast-paced environment where wars and skirmishes will be over after theyve barely begun.

[Kanson]

>>The PLA concept of operations in Korea was based on the Soviet model, where entire divisions were treated as expendable, fighting until they ran out of ammunition, fuel, food and men. Instead of trying to resupply a division in combat, you simply pushed the next division behind them forward. Survivors are reassembled and reconstituted and divisions rebuilt in the pause after the advance or campaign is completed.

The tactic was used during medieval period, isnt it? or Napoleonic wars?

[Lalmohan]

PLA relied on simple tactics that could be followed by a peasant army fired up with revolutionary zeal
has its own shock n awe impact

[vivekmehta]

Dear All

as a newbie i dont have much authority on this subject but to clear my concepts and gain some more understanding . i want to build a logistics scenario . in which i will like to calculate logistics for 1 army division moving from our north east border to -Lahasa . i dont want it to make a war heavy scenario in first version. hope Gurus & other knowledgeable members on forum will help me on this

this is just a template to start with everyone is welcome to add or remove any thing from this as required.

Distance

from different sources i have got a difference of approx 400 km from border to lahasa . but if we tale logistics chain inside India it may stretch upto 650 Km. please validate it.


Duration of operation

Can someone advice how much distance could be covered on that type of route per day. Right now I am taking a estimate of 100Km per day. + 5 days fighting scenario . so a total of 12 days .

Total troops

A division has Approx 15500 Combat and 8000 Support Staff.


Composition of Division

I don’t have any idea that what should be the composition of the troops to fight on that terrain . so currently I am taking RAPIDS as standard.

Our advancing division will consisting of

2 infantry brigades

AUTHORISED PERSONNEL:
Battalion Level Brigade Level(4 Battalion) Invasion Force(2 Brigades)
Officers 19 76 152
JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) 24 96 192
Other Ranks (Ors) 787 3148 6296
NC(E)s 40 160 320
Officer (Army Medical Corps) 1 4 8
OR (Army Medical Corps) 22 88 176
OR (Army Educational Corps) 6 24 48
OR (Electrical & Mechanical Engineers) 8 32 64
OR Others 2 8 16
Total 909 3636 7272

1 heavy armored brigade(T90)

AUTHORISED EQUIPMENT - REGIMENTAL LEVEL:

Motorcycle - Enfield 350CC 7
Jeep/Jonga 20
Jonga (Recce Troop) 7
Truck - 1 Ton (Nissan) 9
Truck - 3 Ton (Ashok Leyland Stallion) 38
Tank - T 90 45
Armoured Recovery Vehicle 3
Trailer 22
Hand Cart 4
Water Truck 4
Total 159

1 mechanised brigade (BMP2)

AUTHORISED EQUIPMENT - REGIMENTAL LEVEL:

Motorcycle - Enfield 350CC 7
Jeep/Jonga 20
Jonga (Recce Troop) 7
Truck - 1 Ton (Nissan) 9
Truck - 3 Ton (Ashok Leyland Stallion) 38
BMP 2 45
Armoured Recovery Vehicle 3
Trailer 22
Hand Cart 4
Water Truck 4
Total 159

1 artillery brigade(Mix off 155mm light/heavy)

Artillery brigade has approx 100 guns .
Can pls someone tell what will be total no of troops and support vehicles required in operation.

1 recon & support battalion(Para )
Almost same as Battalion above


1 Battalion from force 22. (obliviously we need someone locals to lead )
Almost same as Battalion above

1 engineer regiment
No idea of strength and equipments
Pls help

1 one signals regiment.
No idea of strength and equipments
Pls help



2 AN/TPQ-37 FIREFINDER WEAPON LOCATING SYSTEM
10 Smerch or Pinaka batteries for heavy fire support .
10 30mm Tunguska-M1 or ZSU-23-4 air defence systems
4 Batteries of Akash in Area defense role.
Approx 5 radars to support air defense network.
2 Prithvi Batteries-Not shure
2 Brahmos Batteries-Not shure
10 RPV’s of different ranges


Apart from this I will like to add
15 MI-17s for support
15 ALH – Troops carriers and armored support .
10 LCH-Close Air Support .,


Support Stations/Dumps

I am planning to have 1 Base at Indian border and 1 Base around 300Km further up.
I will be putting a infantry battalion and 1 squadron of armor to protect the dump on route.


Consumptions

I am trying to compute consumption on following

Food- 750 grams for per person perday
.75* 25000(Total troops) * 12(Days)/1000= 225 ton


Water- 3 liter per person perday.= 900000 Liter
10000 liter per day for other purpose = 1200000 Liter
Total =2100000 liters


Fuel

Support Vehicles= I am taking a average of 3 KM per liter
Tanks= average of 1 km per liter
BMP= average of 1.5 km per liter


Ammunition Small arm
Approx 500000 bullets perday

Ammunition HMG MMG
Approx 100000 bullets perday

Ammunition – Artillery
10000 rounds perday

Ammunition-Tanks
1500 rounds perday

Ammunition- Mortar
1000 rounds perday

Ammunition for smerch or pinaka
150 ton per day

Other ammunition for air defense
15 ton per day



Spares for Support vehicles
20 ton perday

Spares for Tanks
20 ton perday


Medical supply
No idea for now


Fuel for air wing
Approx 100 sorties per day with increase in duration every day


Ammunition for air wing
No idea for now



This is just a first cut it would be full of inaccuracies but I am trying to work on it and also preparing a excel sheet to support the numbers . pls pitch in to complete the numbers


Regards

Vivek

[shiv]

Nice try Vivek mehta. Most of us are clueless here anyway - so your effort will not go waste. Keep it up - it makes interesting reading and if nothing else will likely get other people's memories and grey cells working.

[abhik]

Talking about mules, here's another kind called M.U.L.E
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kAiJr_gB ... re=related
no comments.

[Airavat]

Logistics of Canada's pullout from Afghanistan

[shiv]

The Hump
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Hump

The Hump was the name given by Allied pilots in the Second World War to the
eastern end of the Himalayan Mountains over which they flew military transport
aircraft from India to China to resupply the Chinese war effort of Chiang
Kai-shek and the units of the United States Army Air Forces based in China.

The official Army Air Forces history of the airlift stated:

The Brahmaputra valley floor lies 90 feet (27 m) above sea level at Chabua.
From this level the mountain wall surrounding the valley rises quickly to 10,000
feet (3,000 m) and higher. Flying eastward out of the valley, the pilot first
topped the Patkai Range, then passed over the upper Chindwin River valley,
bounded on the east by a 14,000-foot (4,300 m) ridge, the Kumon Mountains. He
then crossed a series of 14,000—16,000-foot (4,300—4,900m) ridges separated by
the valleys of the West Irrawaddy, East Irrawaddy, Salween, and Mekong Rivers.
The main "Hump", which gave its name to the whole awesome mountainous mass and
to the air route which crossed it, was the Santsung Range, often 15,000 feet
(4,600 m) high, between the Salween and Mekong Rivers. East of the Mekong the
terrain became decidedly less rugged, and the elevations more moderate as one
approached the Kunming airfield, itself 6,200 feet (1,900 m) above sea
level.[7][14]

The airlift began in April 1942, after the Japanese blocked the Burma Road, and
continued on a daily basis from May 1942 to August 1945, when the effort began
to scale down. Final operations were flown in November 1945. The Hump airlift
delivered approximately 650,000 tons of materiel to China during its 42-month
history.

In 1942 Chiang Kai-shek insisted that at least 7,500 tons per month were needed
to keep his field divisions in operation, but this figure proved unattainable
for the first fifteen months of the Hump airlift.[68] The 7,500 total was first
exceeded in August 1943, by which time objectives had been increased to 10,000
tons a month. Ultimately monthly requirements surpassed 50,000 tons.[7]

ATC operations accounted for 685,304 gross tons of cargo carried eastbound
during hostilities, including 392,362 tons of gasoline and oil, with nearly 60%
of that total delivered in 1945. ATC aircraft made 156,977 trips eastbound
between December 1, 1943, and August 31, 1945, losing 373 aircraft.[1] Though
supplemented by the opening of the Ledo Road network in January 1945 and by the
recapture of Rangoon, the airlift's total tonnage of 650,000 net tons dwarfed
that of the Ledo Road (147,000 tons).[2] In addition to cargo, 33,400 persons
were transported, in one or both directions.

CNAC pilots made a key contribution to Hump flight operations. During 1942 to
1945 the Chinese received 100 transport aircraft from the United States: 77
C-47s and 23 C-46s. Of the eventual 776,532 gross tons and approximately 650,000
net tons transported over the Hump, CNAC pilots accounted for 75,000 tons (about
12%).[38] The Hump airlift continued beyond the end of the war. The final
missions of the ICD-ATC, made after most of its attached organizations had
departed, were the transporting of 47,000 U.S. personnel west over The Hump from
China to Karachi for return to the United States.[7]

The maximum aircraft strength of the India-China Division, ATC (July 31, 1945)
was 640 aircraft:[1] 230 C-46s, 167 C-47s, 132 C-54s, 67 C-87/C-109s, 33 B-25s,
10 L-5s, and 1 B-24.[88]

Gen. Tunner's final report stated that the airlift "expended" 594
aircraft.[38][89] At least 468 American and 41 CNAC aircraft were known lost
from all causes, with 1,314 air crewmen and passengers killed. In addition, 81
more aircraft were never accounted for, with their 345 personnel listed as
missing. Another 1,200 personnel had been rescued or walked back to base on
their own.[2][77]

The final summary of logged flight time in the airlift totalled 1.5 million
hours. The Hump ferrying operation was the largest and most extended strategic
air bridge (in volume of cargo airlifted) in aviation history until exceeded in
1949 by the Berlin airlift, an operation also commanded by Gen. Tunner.[6]
Tunner, writing in Over the Hump, described the significance of the Hump
Airlift:

"Once the airlift got underway, every drop of fuel, every weapon, and every
round of ammunition, and 100 percent of such diverse supplies as carbon paper
and C rations, every such item used by American forces in China was flown in by
airlift. Never in the history of transportation had any community been supplied
such a large proportion of its needs by air, even in the heart of civilization
over friendly terrain...After the Hump, those of us who had developed an
expertise in air transportation knew that we could fly anything anywhere
anytime."[90]

[Rampy]

One book I read a while back on Logistics was " Moving Mountains". by Lt Gen Pagonis. This is based on Gulf war. Quoting from the book below. If we can achieve even 25% of the logistic supply we can win two front war I guess

Between 1990 August and 1991 August, Supply units pumped 1.3 Billion Gallons of fuel (7 times fuel cosumption of Washigton DC); 122 Million Meals ( This is equal to feeding all residents of wyoming and vermount three meals a day); during the war supply units and contract drivers drove 52 million miles which is 100 round trips to moon; they moved 500 short tones of mail per day; erected 500 new traffic lights in desert to find direction

Logistics is careful integration of transportation,supply, warehousing,maintenance, procurement, contracting and automation into a coherent functional area

Gulf war US processed on an average 35 Planes and 2.1 vessels per day. On full deployment they offloaded 12,435 tracked vehicles, 117,157 wheeled vehicles and 33,100 containers

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

AUTHORISED PERSONNEL:
Battalion Level Brigade Level(4 Battalion) Invasion Force(2 Brigades)
Officers 19 76 152
JCOs (Junior Commissioned Officers) 24 96 192
Other Ranks (Ors) 787 3148 6296
NC(E)s 40 160 320
Officer (Army Medical Corps) 1 4 8
OR (Army Medical Corps) 22 88 176
OR (Army Educational Corps) 6 24 48
OR (Electrical & Mechanical Engineers) 8 32 64
OR Others 2 8 16
Total 909 3636 7272

1 heavy armored brigade(T90)

AUTHORISED EQUIPMENT - REGIMENTAL LEVEL:

Motorcycle - Enfield 350CC 7
Jeep/Jonga 20
Jonga (Recce Troop) 7
Truck - 1 Ton (Nissan) 9
Truck - 3 Ton (Ashok Leyland Stallion) 38
Tank - T 90 45
Armoured Recovery Vehicle 3
Trailer 22
Hand Cart 4
Water Truck 4
Total 159

<SNIP>

VivekMehta,

My guess is that the figures quoted above (and other similar ones in your post) are coming from a certain 'book'. If that be so the case, I'd advise you not to post from it. There is certain information about IA Orbat which is available online and is open source. However, lot of it is still not openly available.

In case I'm mistaken, please correct me and post the link/back up for the above figures.

Thanx.

[vivekmehta]

rohit sir

most of information used is from BRF only .http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORC ... ut=default.

rest is my guesswork or built up on what ever i have read over sometime.

admins can remove it if they want

regards

vivek

[rohitvats]

Self Deleted earlier contents.

Vivek, thank you for the link. It is fine by me.

[Johann]

A couple more things worth noting;

- logistical challenges don't just increase with distance (esp fuel/water transportation reqs) or size and complexity of the force to be supported; they multiply with the number of obstacles to be crossed - water bodies and mountains in particular. This is what makes bridges and tunnels such important targets when you're trying to choke the other side's supplies, as well as their freedom of movement.

- Having to cross *over* or *around* third country/ies to conduct your campaign exponentially complicates things, which is why neutral countries often get sucked in by combatants who refuse to let that get in the way.

- the logistics of supporting a regular force operating in a conventional manner are *far* greater than the logistics of supporting irregular (or regular) forces fighting in an unconventional manner.

Insurgencies are first and foremost political rather than military struggles, but the critical military challenge is to extend and secure your lines of communication because that determines the political objectives of state presence and influence.

To give you an idea of how different the challenge of rear area security is in an insurgency, consider which elements of ground forces are considered part of the 'combat arms' - usually infantry, armour, artillery, and army aviation. i.e. those who directly engage the enemy at the front.

Military Police, whose primary wartime function is to maintain rear area security, especially along logistical routes are not placed in that category. Yet in the 360 degree battlefield in places like Iraq and Afghanistan MPs suffered some of the highest rates of attacks and casualties.

In places like Iraq and Afghanistan the insurgencies have not been able to actually prevent Coalition forces in going anywhere they were determined to go, or prevent them from being sustained. On the other hand they have multiplied the logistical challenges, and thus the effort and cost of sustaining those forces. The operational level choice conventional forces have faced has been between relinquishing a presence areas, or boosting troop numbers, or in some cases (both surges) doing both simultaneously.

Either way, it takes an enormous number of forces (which can be local and irregular as well) to establish rear security and go after the insurgents own lines of supply, which are often much more diffuse and simple.

[Bala Vignesh]

vivekmehetaji,
I believe you are using the strike RAPID here for the move to Lhasa..
if so, then there will be 2 Armoured Regiments and 2 Mech Inf Battalions that make up the Armored Brigade...
Also in the break up that you have given, you have forgotten to add the Field Ambulances(1/regt)..
The arty brigade consists of approx 70 guns and a Surveillance Battery ( if available) with vehicles totaling about 500 and about 108 officers, 132 JCO's and 2252 OR's...
The engineering Regt consists of 3 engineering Coys... I am sorry i don't have the vehicles and Man power break up..
Has scribbled it down while attending a NCC camp in days gone by...
Apart from the above there are: EME battalion-1 no, consisting of 4 workshop company; MP PROVOST Battalion- 1no; Recce and Obs Flight-1 no, and an Field Post office unit..
Hope this helps...

[vivekmehta]

thanks bala sir

i was pretty clueless on it.

sir can any one tell me that. in a maneuver like this will Prithvi or Brahmos will move with the group or not. also what kind of structures are used to erect a base camp to store goods .

thanks

[Bala Vignesh]

AFAIK...
Both of them are strategic weapons, not tactical... So they would be independent of any Corps attachment and be directly under the theatre commander and the NSC...

[Kersi D]

In one of the books, either Into the Storm or Every Man a Tiger, Tom Clancy stresses the importance of logistics during the GW I. It was then I realised the importance of logistics in warfare.

K

[FalconAJ]

Tanks are the essential part of mobility warfare but their own mobility depends upon the long haul transportation system which is taken care of by the Indian Railways. I read in a few blogs that India will require newer rail carriages(which was perhaps seen as an argument against its acquisition) which can take its load?

T-90 - 46.5 tonnes
T-72 - 41.5 tonnes
as compared to
Arjun MBT - 58.5 tonnes (57.6 long tons; 64.5 short tons)....Whatever that means??

So can someone shed some light on how that problem be solved? Actually from my gut feel i see this to be a 'very small' issue. Has this issue been blown out of proportion? or is it really this big? Can't a country that spends $1.23 billion on buying tanks spend a few more bucks to buy rail carriages?

And if push comes to shove
Cant we have a standard Arjun issue rail carriage that can be used to replace all other tank carriages?

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>

So can someone shed some light on how that problem be solved? Actually from my gut feel i see this to be a 'very small' issue. Has this issue been blown out of proportion? or is it really this big? Can't a country that spends $1.23 billion on buying tanks spend a few more bucks to buy rail carriages?

And if push comes to shove, Cant we have a standard Arjun issue rail carriage that can be used to replace all other tank carriages?

Front this link:

http://frontierindia.net/arjun-mbt-weight-implications

The existing BWTA wagons have pay load capacity of 60+ tons ; the Arjun weighs 58.5 tons. The only issue is that the width of the tank is more than that of the flat and so, the tracks protrude on both sides. A six inch wooden sleepers when placed on the floor of the wagons before loading the Arjun MBT ensures that the tank tracks move over adjacent platforms without fouling with them. With this arrangement Arjun MBT’s were moved as class ‘A’ ODC on Chennai-Delhi, Delhi-Suratgarh, Delhi-Jaiselmer, Chennai-Balasore and Balasore-Delhi lines, on several occasions

In addition, Ministry of Railways, RDSO, Lucknow were approached in 1992 to conduct a feasibility study for rail transportation of MBT Arjun. The study was based on a two pronged approach i.e. design of a new wagon and modification of existing BWTA wagon. The feasibility report was submitted along with all-India broad gauge railway maps showing sectors where the loaded wagon could move as class ‘A’ ODC and the empty wagon could be run as non-ODC. In consonance, the Army HQ, Q Move (Rail) approved both proposals. The RITES / Texmaco team has delivered prototypes of the new wagon for field trials in 2006, it has been proposed that the case for modification to existing BWTA wagons be foreclosed because the population of the new rail wagons can comfortably match the production schedule of the Arjun MBT.

Hope this helps.