Logistics

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Bala Vignesh
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Re: Logistics

Postby Bala Vignesh » 01 Nov 2010 18:57

Was just talking with my Google chachu, when he showed me this awesome book in a shop called Amazon. Seems to a be a good read on the concepts of military logistics.
The Link to the shop

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 01 Dec 2010 19:48

:rotfl:
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/11/n ... g-112910w/
JSF engine too big for regular transport at sea

Regular wear and tear, as well as mishaps such as an engine sucking a foreign object off a carrier deck, make the availability of replacement aircraft engines critical. High-tempo combat operations only increase the need. Carriers typically pack spares, but heavy demand can drain those stores, requiring at-sea replenishment.

However, the F-35C’s Pratt & Whitney F135 engine, contained in its Engine Shipping System, is too large for the cargo door on a standard carrier onboard delivery plane and for the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, the program office acknowledged in a response to a follow-on query from Navy Times. The engine can be broken down into five component parts, but just its power module and packaging alone won’t fit into the COD or the V-22.

The JSF Program Office says the V-22 Osprey, like the MH-53E helicopter, can externally carry the F135 engine module, the heaviest of the five components, at least 288 miles “in good weather.”

One outside analyst, Jan van Tol of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, wondered how the Osprey, in hover mode, could safely lower the module to the flight deck or pick up an out-of-service engine in higher sea states, given the heavy downdraft the aircraft’s 38-foot rotors generate when the engine nacelles are in the vertical position. When so positioned, with the aircraft hovering over the flight deck, the rotor wash can also affect sailors standing nearby – particularly those attaching the load sling, van Tol said. The GAO reported in 2009 that during shipboard exercises, the V-22’s downwash was so severe that in one instance, a sailor was directed to hold in place the sailor serving as the landing guide.

Heat could also be a problem. Depending on the amount of heat generated, sailors involved in sling operations could possibly be forced to wear heat-resistant suits, van Tol said.

Moreover, the Navy has no fleet V-22s and has no plans to acquire them.

<snip>

The 9,400-pound engine module and transport container also cannot not be transferred from a supply ship to a carrier during underway replenishments — when two ships are sailing side-by-side and connected by supply lines — because, Kennedy said, “It’s too heavy for the unrep station.”



er what was that someone said of the Arjun and bridges. :roll:

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Re: Logistics

Postby Manish_Sharma » 01 Dec 2010 23:37

Kersi D wrote:In one of the books, either Into the Storm or Every Man a Tiger, Tom Clancy stresses the importance of logistics during the GW I. It was then I realised the importance of logistics in warfare.

K


Also in "Bear and the Dragon" where US helps Russia fight invading chinese forces.

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 18 May 2011 13:43

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=14759
Sources said better road management, better offloading, better rail links, equipment and man management, have reduced the mobilisation time. Every strike corps has been working at reducing its own mobilisation period.

Sources said timings may differ for armoured units and artillery units and also what matters is the place and terrain from where they move, like the Dehradun-based 14 Division is a hilly terrain and the Patiala-based 1 Division is farthest when compared to the deserts, where ‘Vijayee Bhava’ was carried out.

Movement is carried out in four phases which are command elements, reconnaissance, main body and balance.

Command elements comprising the formation commanders earlier used to take eight hours which was now been brought down to two hrs.

Reconnaissance comprising two officers, the second in command of the Brigade and the mobile operations, used to take 12 hours which has been brought down to six hours.

The main body of the formation comprises all the three units in the Brigade and their administration and logistics, which used to take 18 hours earlier, has now been brought down to 12 hours.

The remaining of the troops were given 30 hours, as opposed to their 36 hours.

The mission was successful, with all the units of the 60 Brigade meeting at the destined point in 45 hours, and another couple of hours for a final check. The distance covered was around 450 kilometers, and approximately 3500 personnel moved on road, on transportation that was either hired or were army trucks.

A Division has three Brigades in it, and for a complete Division to mobilise, another 10 hours could be added to this, said asource, but for a fighting unit formation, Vijayee Bhava has proved that the target of 48 hours can be achieved.

Support elements, like engineers, logistics, doctors, medical care, artillery, and other administrative items also move along, all of which take time to fall in place. ‘Vijayee Bhava’ also tested the advanced version of the indigenous Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), with a glass cockpit.

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Re: Logistics

Postby Singha » 18 May 2011 14:11

hopefully a continuous process, with goals of 12 -> 8 -> 6 -> 4 hrs in coming years. not everything needs to reach the border at the same time, just some of the teeth, followed in nice order by the tail and rest of teeth.

better we build up road and rail the easier to do all this and mask our intentions.

btw TOI reports today that efforts are on to 'placate' sher khan over the MRCA deal and smooth over the recent 'tensions'
- GOI has sent them a message that FMS deals will go on
- IA team is flying to sher khanland to do some QC/study of XM777 howitzer parts and deal to be inked soon
- around 5-7 more C-17s will be purchased and cleared at highest levels in principle

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Re: Logistics

Postby Bala Vignesh » 18 May 2011 15:51

Noob Pooch..
The time calculated is for movement from where to the front??? And also is the number solely based on the time taken to move things by road/rail???

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Re: Logistics

Postby silod » 18 May 2011 18:45

Logistics or Supply Chain Managment is the most important and critical element in winning the war. "Reinforcement" is an often used word in warfare that can only be achieved with sound Logistics. If one really wants to know more specifically about Military Logistics, one must read " Moving the mountains" by Gus Pagonis. Gus was in-charge of the Logistics division during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. If one thinks that it was Colin Powell or Norman Schwarkopf who won that war, he is wrong. It actually was Gus who won the war for the Coalition forces.

We have also, at last,woken up to the fact that rapid deployment of the reserved forces along the border is paramount. The recent exercise "Vijayee Bhav" conducted in Rajasthan desert had one specific agenda among several others-to check our efficiency in mobilising the resources. I think, we have done far better this time as we have been able to mobilise our resources from Ambala to Jaisalmer in 48 hours flat. It is a good sign but we have a long way to go.
The real fun begins when we become the real superpower like US and our ambitions become global. That's where a true blue-water Indian Navy will play a critical role to enhance our logistical activities. Super Hercules, Globemaster, Chinook are fine but what we need is more of "Jalashwaya" in the days to come.

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Re: Logistics

Postby Lalmohan » 18 May 2011 20:15

imagine how much faster deployment would be if we had a decent highway network?

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Re: Logistics

Postby ramana » 18 May 2011 20:33

Why do you think the Golden Quadrilaterral project ofr highway linking was launched under a retired brigadier?

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Re: Logistics

Postby manum » 18 May 2011 20:50

how much logistics part can be given to private firms...like wipro, these firms specially deal in logistics part of hardware operation like dell...

How much US forces logistics part is taken care by private firms...?
what are the possibilities here?

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Re: Logistics

Postby Baikul » 18 May 2011 21:46

ramana wrote:Why do you think the Golden Quadrilaterral project ofr highway linking was launched under a retired brigadier?


If we're thinking of the same man, it was a Major General, I think.

But your point is valid, IMO.

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Re: Logistics

Postby rohitvats » 19 May 2011 10:20

Gentlemen, that report of X hours of mobilization was for an Brigade level force. One cannot mobilize and move an entire Corps to battle area in 48hours - for a simple reason that Corps, and that too something like 2 Strike Corps, is a huge-huge entity. What we may be targeting it to position some strike elements from these formation in double-quick time on border/their jump-off points.

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Re: Logistics

Postby Sri » 19 May 2011 11:24

Sappers are very heavy to move. Generally Sapper officers and Jawans are attached to moving infantry and Armored columns. This is generally to take care of the mines.

Moving Engineers with bridge building or blasting materials is extremely cumbersome. So their movement is more or less decided in planning stages only.

Also the forward thrust is decided keeping in mind the movement of Supplies. Securing bridges, is almost always a top priority for Strike force.

Other than that there are huge logistics assets with ASC (Army supply corp), even peace time movements of Regiments and formations are handled by these guys.

Also we should analyze the Logistic of Kargil war and current Siachen. One of the reason why highways in Punjab and Haryana are so good because Defense plays a large part in maintenance of these highways. During Kargil conflict, all civilian movements on some of the highways were banned.

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Re: Logistics

Postby Singha » 19 May 2011 11:32

per a tidit on Brf - khan has moved out of process of sinking borewells on the march or installing portable surface water purification plants or potable water tankers or filter tablets for its army. they supply bottled water packaged in commercial style pallets everywhere and thats it. most of their troops buy the 'camelback' water kits and sipping pipe on their own money.

reports spoke of some troops developing urinary stones from too much minerals in these mineral water though - a problem easily fixed at the headend of supplier.

if you look at regular troops eating here, its all bottled water or cans of drink. hence water logistics is folded within any other thing like supplying pallets of goods and no special people or eqpt needed.

http://www.defenselink.mil/dodcmsshare/ ... F-002a.jpg
http://lh4.ggpht.com/_sDNF3ISY3Dw/Rs7_c ... 4L-020.JPG
Last edited by Singha on 19 May 2011 11:36, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Logistics

Postby silod » 19 May 2011 11:35

There will always be a debate between highways and Rail Network as fas as the deployment of the forces is concerned. I would anytime prefer Rail as it is hassle-free, not affected by road traffic problems, it runs faster and the manpower can really stratch their legs and bodies in the compartment which they can not do inside Military buses and trucks. But, Rail network itself is a bit of a problem in India even today. Do you know that Delhi-Jaipur (Via Gurgaon, Rewari and Alwar) train still have to ply on a single track. Any deployment on the western front (Rajasthan desert) have to take this train route and until this is upgraded to double track, the forces can not be deployed at a rapid pace. The good thing is that the work is going on to upgrade this to double track.

Manum:
With respect to the third party logistics (3PL), we have a lot of examples wherein 3PL are providing the good service to a lot of priavte sector organisation. For example, Tata's 3PL provider is DRIVE INDIA while Nokia has a national level-up tie-up with HCL to distribute and appoint the retail partners for the mobile phones. Can 3PL provide the same kind of a services to the forces.....that remains to be seen? They may provide the solutions to transport the lighter material but when it comes to transporting the big boys like Tanks and Artillary equipments, nothing comes close to Indian Railways.

Ramana:
It was Major General Bhuwan Chandra Khanduri under whose leadership, the GQ plan was launched. Major General B.C.Khanduri later became the Chief Minister of Uttaranchal and always pressed for the broadening of Rishikesh-Joshimath-Badrinath motor road. Thanks to his efforts, BRO is now actively doing the work on the same road.

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Re: Logistics

Postby abhishek_sharma » 19 May 2011 11:57

I can post this article if you guys find it relevant:

The Mandate to Revolutionize Military Logistics: Smith, Bradley E., Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 2007, Vol. 21 Issue 2, p 90-99.

Abstract: The article focuses on the significance of a military-wide distribution process owner (DPO) in conducting logistical operations in peace and war. DPO presents a new paradigm for the logistics community. It ties strategic and operational logistics for its effective distribution. It indicates that logisticians must focused on tactical warfare. It is suggested that command's unity must be established so that DPO can bring strategic, operational and tactical logistics back into alignment.

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Re: Logistics

Postby Shrinivasan » 19 May 2011 12:19

rohitvats wrote:Gentlemen, that report of X hours of mobilization was for an Brigade level force. One cannot mobilize and move an entire Corps to battle area in 48hours - for a simple reason that Corps, and that too something like 2 Strike Corps, is a huge-huge entity. What we may be targeting it to position some strike elements from these formation in double-quick time on border/their jump-off points.


Rohit, "Suman Sharma"'s narrative not-withstanding, it is not clear what formations participated. As usual she launched into a long winding narrative on the formation and hours.

She talks about Dehradun based 14 Div (she left out the RAPIDs part) and the ISt Armoured Division, thats it? after stating this, she launched into some hours-Minutes maths.

What about the rest of the II Corps.what about (Corps level) Artillery or Engineering or mechanized formations. It would be great if you can draw an ORBAT for "Ex Vijayee Bhava"?.

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Re: Logistics

Postby rohitvats » 19 May 2011 13:33

cheenum wrote:
rohitvats wrote:Gentlemen, that report of X hours of mobilization was for an Brigade level force. One cannot mobilize and move an entire Corps to battle area in 48hours - for a simple reason that Corps, and that too something like 2 Strike Corps, is a huge-huge entity. What we may be targeting it to position some strike elements from these formation in double-quick time on border/their jump-off points.


Rohit, "Suman Sharma"'s narrative not-withstanding, it is not clear what formations participated. As usual she launched into a long winding narrative on the formation and hours.

She talks about Dehradun based 14 Div (she left out the RAPIDs part) and the ISt Armoured Division, thats it? after stating this, she launched into some hours-Minutes maths.

What about the rest of the II Corps.what about (Corps level) Artillery or Engineering or mechanized formations. It would be great if you can draw an ORBAT for "Ex Vijayee Bhava"?.


There is no way to build Orbat of any exercise. We just have tid-bit of informations floating around.

Check this report:http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_army-mobilisation-time-48-hours_1543679

It seems that exercise was aimed at validating the mobilization timeframe of a Brigade level formation - 60 Brigade in this case. My guessestimate is that what was practised was mobilization of a Brigade level battle group - 60 Bde would have served as Brigade HQ and would have been reinforced with units from other formations in the II Corps.

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Re: Logistics

Postby NRao » 16 Jul 2011 00:52

Good to see Moscow wake up after the international tender issued by India.

Indo-Russia JV to service Talwar frigates

The title is misleading, the JV should cover more than the Talwar class.

However, this is a JV that has yet to come into existence. The model of the JV is exactly what the International tender wanted a company responding to the tender

The IAF has also clarified that the bidders need to have the support of the Ilyushin Design Bureau which is the Russian OEM in this case.


Now only if another "JV" can satisfy the IAF and IA requirements (see below).

Next, it is really sad that the OEMs could not perform their job. There is no need for a JV to exist if the OEMs had done their jobs!!!!!!

Next, this JV is between multiple Russian OEMs and what seems to be an private Indian company (true???). And that this Indian company will hire ex-IN people to support the IN!!!! Nice that they are hiring, but, that is just another person in the middle. IN should have support facilities and people and really no need for this "Krasny Marine Services Pvt Ltd as the sole Indian partner". I view this as an increase in costs of support.

Next, "Krasny Marine Services Pvt Ltd as the sole Indian partner" will be the face that the IN sees and deals with. What if it folds, which it can. It is a for profit outfit and needs to make money to be in service. Hopefully it is financially solvent enough to outlast the Talwars.

Next, the talk of signing the deal when the Navy chief visits Russia needs to be viewed in the right light - this JV has nothing to do with the IN and the Naval Chief's visit to Russia. It is a JV between 8 Russian OEMs and an Indian Pvt company.

Lastly, this does NOT resolve the issues that the IAF has (for which the IAF issued an international tender):

The stop-and-start supply of spares, the irregular maintenance and unreasonable price hikes have been a stumbling block for India. Besides the current Ilyushin aircraft maintenance issue, the IAF has been looking for countries other than Russia for special tools and spares and global tenders have been floated for parts and tools related to MiG fighters, AN-32 transport aircraft, Mi-17 helicopters and OSA-AK surface-to-air missile systems.


(The old MiG-29 related problems seemed to have been solved - as stated in some other posts, but these are new problems.)

Then:

Even the Indian Army sidelined Russia recently by issuing a Request for Information (RFI) for the acquisition of active protection and counter-measure systems for its T-90S main-battle tanks (MBT) bought from Russia.


Not to talk of my fav: barrels for the T-90!!!!

I think this JV is a joke.

added l8r:

Krasny Marine Services Pvt Ltd is an ex-IN daggha!!!!! Perfect front. I suspect this is the only way that India and Russia could agree to cost escalations.

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Re: Logistics

Postby NRao » 16 Jul 2011 16:53


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Re: Logistics

Postby VinodTK » 20 Jul 2011 07:51

Military Logistics India 2012
In the long term there is a need to integrate the logistic resources of the three Services and utilise the existing national infrastructure more profitably to economise on overall effort. An efficient logistic structure contributes greatly towards meeting the requirements of the field force. This is particularly relevant in the context of the Indian Army which is deployed over a vast geographical spread in varied terrain and climatic conditions. With advancements in C4I2SR capabilities, along with automation providing total asset visibility of the logistic support system, it will be possible to introduce a major transformation to cater to user requirements.
Indian Army Doctrine

Military Logistics India 2012 will address key issues facing the Indian defence logistics community as well as the role of maintenance, repair and overhaul on operational capability in general and equipment availability and important topics covering engineering support in deployed operations.
:
:

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Re: Logistics

Postby abhishek_sharma » 09 Aug 2011 14:43

Logistics Planning and Collaboration in Complex Relief Operations

Problems

Difficulty Identifying Initial Relief Requirements. ...

Properly Sourcing Relief Supplies ...

Disconnects Between DOD Approval Process and Reality...

Lack of Logistics Planning and Coordination Enablers. ...

Difficulty Coordinating and Deconflicting Airlift. ...

Limitations in Airfield Offload and Throughput Capacity. ...

Properly Sustaining the Flow of Logistics ...

Image

Need for Unclassified Information-sharing and Collaboration Tools ...

Need for More Humanitarian Assistance Exercises ...

Solutions

1. develop pre-crisis integrated logistics planning with the interagency

2. gain visibility of all relief supplies within the affected theater

3. define desired humanitarian assistance/disaster relief processes and outcomes

4. develop an interagency framework for collaboration in advance of HA/DR situations

5. practice and refine humanitarian assistance/disaster relief response frequently through exercises and other pre-crisis events and forums.

...


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Re: Logistics

Postby NRao » 10 Feb 2012 04:03

ksiddhartharana wrote:The importance of logistics in military campaigns

Napoleon's failure: For the want of a winter horseshoe


Very nice read.

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 17 Jan 2017 22:20

Just "upping" this topic" because this deals with the subject of what the Chinese would need if the paradropped troops near delhi

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Re: Logistics

Postby Lalmohan » 17 Jan 2017 23:10

paratroopers are highly vulnerable if they are not linked up with by regular infantry/armour or have massive resupply
light infantry by definition, their advantage is speed, shock and rapid capture of logistics nodes so that regular forces can catch up and resupply and the paras can be withdrawn

note - Sikh battalions airlifted into Srinagar airfield in 1947 - logistics node that allowed them to be resupplied and the position consolidated

any Chinese paradrop into Delhi has several problems

1. getting through the Indian ADGES
2. smog! :-)
3. response from Indian military, paramilitary and armed police units
4. no hope of resupply unless the whole IAF has been wiped out

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 12 May 2017 21:37

Cross post
vaibhav.n wrote:
Singha wrote:getting arty up there is 10% of the problem - but occupies huge mindshare. the other 90% is stockpiling enough ammo in caves and bunkers, protecting them for air and missile strikes and resupply from the depots .... these puppies all have high firing rates and can easily release say 300 rounds a day if needed before taking a breather @ 2-3 a minute.....but usually fire missions will be much shorter. fixed targets like kargil like might the all-day-pounding mode.

a artillery division operating at full tempo up there, with 3-4 regiments of 18 x 155, MLRS units, nirbhay GLCM, prithvi-2, Brahmos will need 100s of tons daily of fuel , spares and ammo. plus food, prepared scoot sites and medical tail. plus force protection and AD units with SAMs and ZSU. a single Brahmos unit might have 3 launchers, another 15 storage vehicles, C3I vehicles, weather radar, recovery vehicles fuel tankers, camp setup units ... to deliver 300 tons daily at some points in the front, means long lines of rented trucks and ASC vehicles stretched back 24x7 to depots both in theater and to bigger depots in the plains...snaking up the roads into the hills belching diesel smoke....the srinagar kargil road had that during the operation....

field armies fight with complete infra and do not expect to "leverage" anything like food cooked by villagers as syrian militias do...every nut and bolt has to be arranged for.


Thank you for pointing at something most ignore. Logistics. Field armies need hundreds of tonnes of fuel & supplies on a daily basis just to survive.

One of the reasons armies need months of build-up to shore up supplies even in a defensive role. Why every artillery battery has a battery captain (BK) whose primary job is to somehow maintain a handle on the resupply during operations.

As an aside, during WW2 the resupply rate for the UK & US divisions in the advance was in excess of 300 tonnes per day.

Self-Propelled artillery is a whole another beast. Here is a quote from a Marine Corps Officer.

Since World War II, newer artillery guns have increased rates of fire and use larger calibers of ammunition. In the US Army, each 155mm gun is expected to fire an average of 205 rounds a day. This means that each heavy "armoured" division with (54) 155mm SP guns needs 11,070 rounds a day, or 554 tons of 155mm ammo a day, which requires 111 5-ton truck deliveries each day.

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 12 May 2017 21:51

http://www.vifindia.org/print/1828
We are aware of the much lamented ‘tactical advantages’ enjoyed by the PLA on the open Tibetan Plateau. But we are also conscious of the fact that every item of PLA’s war wherewithal on the Indo-Tibet frontline must be carted over 1500 kilometers from their logistic hubs at Lhasa and Kashgarh, which in turn must be stocked from central China, a further 2000 kilometers away. The entire logistic connectivity by road, rail, pipeline and air depends upon tenuous lines of communication and static staging yards, all situated over a terrain that is completely open, devoid of local resources and subject to such extreme conditions as it must obtain at 4300 meters of average altitude and sub-zero cold almost throughout the year. Even if China has engineered her transportation capacity to 24000 tons a day and therefore stated to be able to build up 30 divisions, including formations already in place, in 30 days, and sustain this force in war indefinitely, such theoretical calculations may be valid under ‘test conditions’, in practice this will invariably not be so. No doubt, the whole system of induction and sustenance for PLA’s field forces in war would be ripe for interdiction by air power and special operations.

On the Indian side, the terrain south of the 4300 to 5400 meter high Himalayan passes, constricted and snow-bound most of the year, is characterised by razor-sharp ridgelines, steep slopes and narrow, gorge-like valleys generally running North to South. The Indian logistic installations are between 350 to 400 kilometers in depth, and therefore, in terms of turn around time, comparable to that of the PLA in Tibet. Road axes connecting Indian foothills to the Indo-Tibet Border, being aligned more or less along the narrow valley floors, are extremely difficult to interdict by air or ground fire; these are targetable only in some stretches and even then require super-skills, high-technology and load of chance to score effective hits. Notably, scope exists to make such hits even more ineffective by means of modern methods of camouflage, deception and repair.

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 13 May 2017 20:08

From "Collins - Military Geography"
Supply. Cold clime logistical loads expand prodigiously in response to requirements for
more of almost everything from rations, clothing, tents, water heaters, and stoves to
whitewash, snow plows, antifreeze, batteries, repair parts, construction materials, and
specialized accouterments such as snow shoes and skis. Armed forces in wintry weather
burn fuel at outrageous rates. Motor vehicles churning through snow, for example, consume
perhaps 25 percent more than on solid ground. It takes 10 gallons (38 liters) of diesel per day
to keep a 10-man squad tent habitable when thermometers register -20 °F (-29 ~Z).
Additional petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supplies are needed to keep distributors in
business. Small wonder, therefore, that centralized logistic facilities, including field kitchens
(the main source of warm meals for ground combat forces), often become tempting targets
in frigid flatlands. ~7

Combustion engines are hard to start, partly because battery output at best is far below
normal (practically zero at -40 °F and -40 °C). Tires inflated in garages at moderate
temperatures slip on rims and rip off valve stems when trucks drive out the door into extreme
cold. The value of collapsible fuel bladders is dubious below about -20 OF (-29 °C), cold-
soaked connectors, control knobs, and electrical contacts are hard to assemble and repair,
and fiberglass water trailers freeze because they cannot tolerate immersion heaters.
Flammable fuels are apt to erupt unless motor vehicles and tent stoves are properly grounded.
Maintenance man-hours required to cope with such problems balloon in the absence of
heated facilities. More of almost everything is needed: more mechanics, more battery
chargers, more replacement parts, more fuel. Different oils and greases also are required. ~°

Any tendency for armed forces to be roadbound degrades military capabilities at every
level, because frigid flatlands combine wretched cross-cou ntry trafficability with exceedingly
sparse transportation networks. All-wheel drive trucks as a rule bog down when snows on
roads measure more than one-third of wheel diameters, stall in line waiting for plows to clear
the way through deep drifts, and cannot easily traverse tundra or muskeg even when the land
is bare. Track-laying vehicles, which are better able to negotiate rough ground, lose traction
when snows are much deeper than their ground clearance. Tank drivers who repeatedly rock
back and forth trying to break through put power plants, drive trains, and sprockets under
great stress and make it difficult for recovery crews to set them free if they finally go belly up.
The utility of tractor-drawn cargo sleds, snowmobiles, air-cushion vehicles, and other special
purpose transports skyrockets under such conditions, ~ but frozen lakes and streams make
safe routes if load-bearing capacities are sufficient for vehicles of particular weights and
drivers proceed single file at specified intervals.


Deserts
are but not how to set true courses). ~
Any tendency for armed forces to be roadbound degrades military capabilities at every
level, because frigid flatlands combine wretched cross-cou ntry trafficability with exceedingly
sparse transportation networks. All-wheel drive trucks as a rule bog down when snows on
roads measure more than one-third of wheel diameters, stall in line waiting for plows to clear
the way through deep drifts, and cannot easily traverse tundra or muskeg even when the land
is bare. Track-laying vehicles, which are better able to negotiate rough ground, lose traction
when snows are much deeper than their ground clearance. Tank drivers who repeatedly rock
back and forth trying to break through put power plants, drive trains, and sprockets under
great stress and make it difficult for recovery crews to set them free if they finally go belly up.
The utility of tractor-drawn cargo sleds, snowmobiles, air-cushion vehicles, and other special
purpose transports skyrockets under such conditions, ~ but frozen lakes and streams make
safe routes if load-bearing capacities are sufficient for vehicles of particular weights and
drivers proceed single file at specified intervals. Soviet forces during the winter of 1941-42,

Demands. Water rationing, once a popular but ill-conceived part of the acclimatization
process, has been discredited because performance suffers and dehydration poses ever
present dangers. Sweat evaporates so rapidly in dry desert heat that humans commonly lose
about 1 pint of water per hour even at rest, yet never notice adverse effects or feel thirsty until
the deficit reaches four times that amount (2 quarts, or 2 liters), by which time heat
prostration may be imminent. Heavy exertion requires much greater intake, but Rommel's
Afrika Korps in the summer of 1942 carried only 15 quarts per day for trucks and tanks as
well as personnel. His parched troops made every drop count, yet still ran dry during one
offensive and survived only because they captured British water supplies, s~ U.S. military
personnel in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who were much better endowed logistically,
consumed approximately 11 gallons per day (42 liters), plus 10 to 12 gallons more per
vehicle. Refrigerated vans kept a good deal of it palatable despite intense desert heat. ~


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Re: Logistics

Postby symontk » 14 May 2017 08:48

shiv wrote:Keeping this in mind I would like to ask people to mull over how an army can maintain its logistics via 1000 (or even 500 km) of foreign territory - eg like Chinese troops via Myanmar. Think also of what the US is doing and what is the intensity of conflict being fought.


Myanmar is really a "Poland" between India and China. Once Chinese reach its shores, Indian initiatives will be reduced to cut chinese supply lines rather border pushes in Himalayas. Thats because once they reach Myanmar coasts, they can be resupplied thru Chinese naval vessels

Now how those Chinese vessels get supplies? Maybe they will get from Srilanka, Pakistan, Indonesia... Chinese strings of pearls strategy should help them or so they think. Again Indian defence forces will have fight multiple fronts just to cut chinese supplies

But can we ignore chinese contacts in Myanmar itself? The logistics, warehousing, petroleum, truck, food processing companies in Myanmar will give enough head room for Chinese to occupy and dugin

Just my cents.. they should be prevented from reaching BOB shores at any cost. But we should also discuss how Indian armed forces will be supplied if we decide to take chinese territories? Thru vietnam? do we have that much close relationship with them? What should be done here?

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Re: Logistics

Postby Singha » 14 May 2017 09:34

India meeds to cultivate myanmar thailand laos and cambodia the buddhist pocket through all means

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Re: Logistics

Postby Karthik S » 14 May 2017 09:59

Right now, I don't think any of them will be taking us seriously. Just a buddhist connection will not help form a strategic formation.

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 14 May 2017 10:22

symontk wrote:
Myanmar is really a "Poland" between India and China. Once Chinese reach its shores, Indian initiatives will be reduced to cut chinese supply lines rather border pushes in Himalayas.

I translated a Tamil poem in the first post of this thread in which a man with no woman has already selected a name for his son.

With respect your post is an exact analogy of that.

You need to look at the geography of Burma before you talk of China reaching the shores. The purpose of this thread was to ask people to apply their minds to reality rather than build on fancies

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Re: Logistics

Postby chetak » 14 May 2017 13:27

Karthik S wrote:Right now, I don't think any of them will be taking us seriously. Just a buddhist connection will not help form a strategic formation.


we pissed off most of them with the nalanda university controversy, no??

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Re: Logistics

Postby Karthik S » 14 May 2017 14:02

chetak wrote:
Karthik S wrote:Right now, I don't think any of them will be taking us seriously. Just a buddhist connection will not help form a strategic formation.


we pissed off most of them with the nalanda university controversy, no??


Which controversy?

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Re: Logistics

Postby symontk » 15 May 2017 16:09

shiv wrote:
symontk wrote:
Myanmar is really a "Poland" between India and China. Once Chinese reach its shores, Indian initiatives will be reduced to cut chinese supply lines rather border pushes in Himalayas.

I translated a Tamil poem in the first post of this thread in which a man with no woman has already selected a name for his son.

With respect your post is an exact analogy of that.

You need to look at the geography of Burma before you talk of China reaching the shores. The purpose of this thread was to ask people to apply their minds to reality rather than build on fancies


China and Burma has several roads in their border region. China has few airports also near to border. If you search for "irrawaddy river at Bhamo" you will get photos of a calm river which means you can push troops thru water transport too down south without much noticing

I see several possibilities. It would remain fancy until someone executes that

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Re: Logistics

Postby Singha » 15 May 2017 16:19

sounds like myanmar has not yet signed up for cheen funded railway to yangon from kunming. the current approval is only upto the border.

https://www.travelchinaguide.com/china-trains/myanmar/

ofcourse they could comandeer myanmar railway network if they invade
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/or ... 7bd385.jpg

i suspect myanmar is not a pushover and canny enough not to be a puppet dog of cheen but get what it can from all sides. they have a large vietcong style army and probably can make life hell in the hills and jungles if pushed to defend their own land. segway scooters and vehicular PLA fist units wont have it easy in the marshes and hills.

the railway network is MG and infra quite weak
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar_Railways

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 15 May 2017 17:19

symontk wrote:China and Burma has several roads in their border region. China has few airports also near to border. If you search for "irrawaddy river at Bhamo" you will get photos of a calm river which means you can push troops thru water transport too down south without much noticing

I see several possibilities. It would remain fancy until someone executes that

There are nearly zero possibilities of moving heavy equipment. Men can come directly into India. No need for Burma. I think you have had only one cursory look. The devil is in the detail - the geography of the Chinese side and how they get to a Burmese river and where that river will take them.

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 15 May 2017 17:25

Singha wrote:sounds like myanmar has not yet signed up for cheen funded railway to yangon from kunming. the current approval is only upto the border.

https://www.travelchinaguide.com/china-trains/myanmar/

ofcourse they could comandeer myanmar railway network if they invade
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/or ... 7bd385.jpg

i suspect myanmar is not a pushover and canny enough not to be a puppet dog of cheen but get what it can from all sides. they have a large vietcong style army and probably can make life hell in the hills and jungles if pushed to defend their own land. segway scooters and vehicular PLA fist units wont have it easy in the marshes and hills.

the railway network is MG and infra quite weak
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar_Railways


There is an India-Thailand rail route via Myanmar planned and parts of the construction have already started.

Again Myanmarese geography does not allow easy movement of troops. North-South mountains and rivers and thick jungle make it difficult to move east-west. The geography on the Chinese side is even more deadly. Not the ideal route for an invasion. China has much better access via alternate routes if they want to come into India - the area near Tawang being a case in point

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Re: Logistics

Postby Singha » 15 May 2017 19:39

During ww2 the japanese suffered a lot in north myanmar due to lack of supplies. They tried to attack manipur but without the heavy eqpt which could not be brough across the hills.

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Re: Logistics

Postby shiv » 11 Feb 2018 17:11

up
<excyoos folks - was searching for some info on this thread...>
Also found a useful docu..
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241430.pdf


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