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The state-run Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has signed a contract with Russian firm United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to manufacture 205 multi-role transport aircraft (MTA) meant primarily for the Indian and Russian air forces. The MTA will be in the 15-20 tonne class and the project is estimated to cost $ 600 million.
The state-run Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has signed a contract with Russian firm United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to manufacture 205 multi-role transport aircraft (MTA) meant primarily for the Indian and Russian air forces. The MTA will be in the 15-20 tonne class and the project is estimated to cost $ 600 million.
The joint venture partners for the $600-million multi-role transport aircraft (MTA) project, Russia and India, are set to sign a contract for freezing the preliminary design for the aircraft later this week.
Both the partners, who hold 50 per cent each in the joint venture through HAL and United Aircraft Corporation respectively, signed a contract in May to develop and produce 205 multi-role transport aircraft.
"Freezing the design" probably means that we will be doing little if any "design and development", similar to the PAK-FA. IMO, a pragmatic move. Let's just hope there are no more "contracts" to sign before metal cutting begins, hopefully next week.
Any complex multi-national program has multiple contracts, starting from even joint discussion of specifications (since this involves sharing of otherwise confidential information), to preliminary program budgeting for staff, to preliminary design, actual R&D and LSP, finally followed by formal manufacture. Joint D&D programs are hence more complex than just the usual TOT style programs, where a lot of the effort is focused on setting up infrastructure and ensuring adequate knowledge transfer. The gated process mentioned above for D&D is to ensure an accountable program with both sides getting their money's worth.
The MTA has been stuck for ages because of the flux in the Russian transport set up, with UAC finally coming as the de facto aviation conglomerate whom we could deal with. Financing is another issue. As is work share allocation. Russia, as can be expected, usually wants India to fund maximally and take less workshare, trading it off against TOT. Since they have a very highly integrated aircraft industry, employment is a big issue for them.
This has led to delays and endless negotiations before formal sign off on the basics (to start the program) occurred. On our side, anything involving foreign exchange and significant outlays has required everything to be vetted by many layers of bureaucracy as well.
As to why we don't go with Embraer for their new transport, clearly the IAF/HAL want a partner who can do a lot of the heavy lifting with subassemblies that can be sourced within a politically reliable spares network. Embraer is basically a large scale system integrator and heavily dependent on the US for many assemblies and work package allocations. Dealing with the US and getting export approvals is fraught with delays/issues and finding replacements is also not easy.
Which is fundamentally the reason why Russia, despite its umpteen issues, keeps landing more business in India, because they are more politically suitable for India to work with. India's insistence to find "cheap" deals for high end complex equipment mean investment in local infrastructure and resources is often outcompeted by either direct imports/TOT or JVs with limited TOT. This problem is not going to go away, until and unless we start spending big on our own programs in parallel, which of course means funds have to be sought, a problem when the economy is currently so mismanaged with election oriented sops eating away at capital.
So JVs will remain a preferred vehicle in some of these large programs.
The $1.4 billion contract for the 22 Apaches will also include the supply of 812 AGM-114L-3 Hellfire Longbow missiles, 542 AGM-114R-3 Hellfire-II missiles, 245 Stinger Block I-92H missiles and 12 AN/APG-78 fire-control radars, as per the Barack Obama administration’s notification to the US Congress
Why just 12 FCR? and why mentioned separate. i was always in the impression that these things comes as standard fit.
or are these spare ones?
AH-64D would not be AH-64D without the fire control radars, so these 12 must be spares. In fact it would be strange if we didn't have spares so the report is a misleading error.
DSCA et al notifications usually break out the airframe type and critical assemblies, which are listed separately along with weapons, logistics packages etc.
So the 12 AN/APG-78 wouldn't be spares but for the actual choppers themselves. The radar adds additional weight and complexity, so the IAF is probably intending to use the rest as datalinked birds.
That sounds right and is in fact how the Longbow is normally used--one chopper with FCR accompanied by more without but packing more weapons. It makes little sense to have more than one or two choppers with FCR in a formation, specially if they are datalinked.
The aircraft manufacturing American company Lockheed Martin is also hopeful of getting even more orders for this aircraft from India.
In fact, Lockheed Martin is Looking Forward to Manufacture India specific C-130J aircraft in India through a Hyderabad based joint venture called ‘Tata-Lockheed Martin Aero Structures Limited’ setup in 2009.
On asking whether Lockheed Martin at some stage would think of manufacturing C-130J aircraft in India, Rose said, “We are going to see how the JV goes. I personally would like to build an India specific C-130J at the Tata facility in Hyderabad.
I’d like to be able to compete for the AN 32 replacement, for the Avro replacement. I think there’s unlimited potential for that facility down there.
So, the beauty of working with Tata is that they’re helping us drive price points down and if we can get the price point to continue to drop on the C-130J and we could get it down to a certain level and Start Competing in what’s Historically been a Twin-Engine Domain.”
Lockheed Martin and Tata had setup a joint venture in 2009 in Hyderabad. As per Government of India rules Indian company Tata have invested 74 percent whereas Lockheed Martin’s investment is 26 percent.
This Unit presently Produces Center Wing Boxes. Rose told that by next year this joint unit will produce every Tail Section on every new C-130J sold around the world to any country will be built in Hyderabad, India.
He did not specify the exact money invested into the JV but told that there has been investment of ‘tens of millions dollars’ and the partner companies are expecting business worth $300-400 millions from this JV. In fact Lockheed Martin intends to use this production as offset credit.
Lockheed Martin is also keen to compete for the ageing Russian made AN-32 and British made Avro transport aircraft fleet replacement. AN-32 fleet is the work horse of the IAF.
How do they plan to distribute the Apaches? Like.... how many squadrons/wings and attached as Strike Corps or Division assets? And that too in what specific kind of role?
they will be seen in vayu shakti and demos onlee. its the Rudra and WSI who like trench engineers will have to do bulk of work, while the distinguished engineer files the patents, attends industry confs and hobnobs with VPs and directors.
The DGCA has issued an airworthiness directive for civil variants of Advanced Light Helicopters Dhruv and asked the manufacturer, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, to sort out the flaws. “During investigations into some of the incidents of Advanced Light Helicopter Dhruv owned by defence forces, it was found that the collective eye-ends of connecting rod assembly were broken. Since an unsafe condition has been identified which is likely to develop on other ALH of similar type design, this airworthiness directive is being issued for installation of improved steel eye-ends in place of existing titanium eye-ends to achieve higher fatigue strength,” the DGCA directive said.
No tiger-themed Apaches swooping up from behind rock outcroppings and jehannumifying lead elements of the 13th Indep Amd Bde?! No grainy clippings of M230 mowing down tactically retreating TFTAs amidst a stream of choice Bhojpuri invectives?!
I have RTFFed the thread.... but I didnt spot any discussions on Apache fielding possibilities. Anybody got a link?
why really you think the apaches were signed for once the Rudra started gathering momentum. what diff will 22 make . they will replace the Mi35 with the strike corps thats all. these could have been replaced with 44 Rudras for same cost.
IAF wants to hold some prestige and high ground vs the Rudra which will proliferate in the IA under their own control.
in afghanistan they have undertaken combat ops upto around 11,000ft using the latest engines...which is merely Leh height. the base level of ops in ladakh and north sikkim is around that level.....I dunno how good they will be in the bitter cold and hot-n-high....predictably we might get to know their shortcomings a few yrs after induction...for foreign maal there is always such courtesies extended, while the desi guy needs a top10 JEE rank to get past the velvet ropes into the club.
It is all about merchandize, peoples! Let Hasbro come out with Rudra or LCH collectibles (made in cheen) or get product placement with a Halleeevood studio production and we would have 'em selling like hot cakes in India and abroad. Indian jernails and marchals love shrink-wrapped stuff.
That said, I think Apaches will be around for ages to come. Right now, it is the only serious game in town, the west of Ural-giris, since we have sort of covered the other areas with Rudra and LCH. So it is good to learn about them, their tactics, capabilities etc. It adds an extra level of complexity for an aggressor jernail, if they feel that uzhunnu-vada radar fitted crafts might be around in hilly terrains of India.
As for cowering paki-khakis getting roti-makered under trucks by Apache gunphyr, forget it - pakis are not that brave to explore about what will finally bring the dossiers to a halt.
Singha wrote:in afghanistan they have undertaken combat ops upto around 11,000ft using the latest engines...which is merely Leh height. the base level of ops in ladakh and north sikkim is around that level.....I dunno how good they will be in the bitter cold and hot-n-high....predictably we might get to know their shortcomings a few yrs after induction...for foreign maal there is always such courtesies extended, while the desi guy needs a top10 JEE rank to get past the velvet ropes into the club.
This post got me thinking that I had done a analysis for this for BR a couple years back when the Apache thing started getting marketed for India. I collected the brochure numbers and ran it through my simulation software (what amounts to first-order analysis, mind you) and here's what you end up with. The Afghanistan experience is correct: 11,000 feet, the Apaches were doing gun-runs and overflying said targets: no hover possible or heavier weapons.
Now granted they have upgraded the performance since, so you take your bet as it suits you. Here's my analysis anyway:
-Vivek
Added Later: Also, AFAIK, Apaches are meant for the low altitude Pakistan-centric forces onlee. High altitude stuff remains the domain of the LCH, Lancer and Rudra...
The Air Force plans to buy another 60 Hawk advanced jet trainers topping its existing order of 66, Vice Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal D.C. Kumaria said here on Friday, on the sidelines of an aerospace medicine conference.
Of the new lot of the AJTs, 20 would be to form an aerobatics team to replace the popular Suryakirans.
At the basic level, “the PC-7 [Swiss-made Pilatus] is coming to us in a very quick time. The first aircraft will be with us in March next year and the first course will start in July,” he said.
With that, he said, “The shortages [in trainer aircraft that] we have had in the past year-and-a-half or two will be made good to a very large extent.” The Pilatus instructors are to be trained in Switzerland. The government has signed a contract to acquire 75 PC-7 Pilatus Mk-II trainers. The eventual trainer aircraft line-up would be, “PC-7 in the long term; Kiran in the short term and then Kiran will be replaced by the IJT.”
Without wishing to discuss the IJT’s delivery schedule, he said, “We are keeping a close check on the IJT programme. The testing is in full swing and we hope that it joins the Air Force as early as possible. I won’t like to put a time-frame.”
maxing out with some weapons @ 16,000ft implies apaches could not self-deploy on demand from Leh base over the khardung la (to nubra valley) or over chang-la (to eastern ladakh) which are both 17,000ft at the road level. they'd have to be flown over these passes empty, with perhaps a minimal fuel load then mate with their weapons and fuel teams after descending down to the ops area.
Rudra and WSI dhruv should be able to self-deploy with weapons from bigger rear area bases to the FARPs and such near the line of battle.
may not be a major issue but just something to keep in mind.
on +ve side, the Apaches carry 16 ATGMs at peak load, twice the number for Rudra and armed with the MMW radar can fly in blind dust, fog or heavy rain conditions for targetting when typical thermals and TV sights will not work...atleast thats the claim....other issues like the pilots unable to fly in heavy rain or dust damage to engines might limit use in such regimes.
Last edited by Singha on 01 Sep 2012 12:14, edited 1 time in total.
The large order of Hellfire missiles indicates that the Apaches would be largely used as tank killers. I would not consider the mountains of Kashmir as tank territory. Rajasthan, Punjab, Sindh would be better suited to this kind of missions.
The leading Apache could be used as a mini AWACS to provide situational awareness while the real mud movers like the LCH could fire their weapons based on the location fed from the Apache. Since not all Apaches are equipped with Longbow radars, the IAF would have definitely factored this in. Moreover, the low numbers indicate that we would not be risking too many of them in frontline combat.
A fabulous commentary on Himalayan altitude a warfare:
Man-portable SAMs used by Pakistan had a slant range sufficient to require the IAF’s pilots to remain 6,000 to 8,000 feet above the ridgelines to remain safely outside their threat envelopes. This degraded weapon delivery accuracies.
At such extreme elevations, the IAF’s munitions did not perform as they did at lower release altitudes. The reduced air temperature and density altered drag indices and other performance parameters that had never before been calculated for such conditions. Weapons did not guide as predicted. IAF pilots had to adapt through real-time improvisation.
The stark terrain folds tended to obscure the enemy from aerial observation and to mask the effects of bomb detonations, rendering even near misses all but ineffective. They further served to canalize aerial approaches to targets, dictating ingress and egress headings and, in the process, rendering IAF fighters more predictable and susceptible to ground fire.
NLI positions in deep ravines were often immune to effective attacks by pilots attempting dive deliveries when their LOC-driven roll-in points were not tactically ideal.
The IAF rode a steep learning curve as pilots adapted to unfamiliar conditions. MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard avionics suites resorted to the use of stopwatches and Global Positioning System receivers to conduct night interdiction bombing.
Another example: The IAF took to choosing weapon impact points that would create avalanches over NLI supply lines.
The IAF pioneered what has since come to be called nontraditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. It was the first to use electro-optical and infrared imaging targeting pods for high-resolution aerial reconnaissance.
Also note
A major joint-arena shortcoming highlighted by the Kargil experience was the total absence of candid communication between the Indian Army and IAF immediately following the initial detection of the NLI incursion. That failure was a remarkable foreshadowing of US Central Command’s similarly flawed Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan three years later, in which the land component likewise sought to go it alone at first, with the air component having been brought in just in time to help ensure a satisfactory outcome in the end.
The IAF rode a steep learning curve as pilots adapted to unfamiliar conditions. MiG-21 pilots lacking sophisticated onboard avionics suites resorted to the use of stopwatches and Global Positioning System receivers to conduct night interdiction bombing.
and many were kid pilots a couple of years or less out AFA, flyinf 8 ship missions in total radio silence.
what a wake up call it was. and to those young pilots who gave a blunt account to visiting senior brass - good on you for waking those guys up
....
Sources informed us that IJT ( S-3466) which had serious crash On 28 April 2011, where both the pilots were able to eject safely but suffered serious spinal injuries and fractures was actually powered by NPO supplied Saturn AL-55I engine and the aircraft was totally destroyed . sources inform us that engine suffered technical problems resulting into crash , even LSP-1/2 IJT which had been integrated with AL-55I engines were grounded , due to which whole program suffered major set back .
Another sources have told us that due to engine change wing had to be re-aligned along with some minor changes to the fuselage and aircraft also suffered set backs in flight test since many flight characters had to be re-tested with new engines , the aircraft also suffered in spin tests as per sources .
Another Sources have told idrw.org had IJT-36 will be able to hit Production line only in early 2015 and Indian air force will be forced to use Kiran Mk-II aircraft even further then planned before it was due for retirement . Indian air force has been monitoring its flight tests closely now . But even HAL and IAF doesn’t want to set any time frame before aircraft gets its IOC or FOC .
.....
hope we are not caught napping by the next situation whatever it might be. since there was fighting in siachen since 1988, and since no studies had been on bombing at high alt to alter the release parameters, looks like we had ruled out use of IAF for bombing at such heights and were depending on artillery only.
quite a rude wake up call for sure.
Vice Chief of the Air StaffAir Marshal D.C. Kumaria, who was in Bangalore on Friday, said after an event that the IAF was tracking the progress of its projects closely. He visited HAL on Thursday evening. “There is much synergy today than there ever was.”
He said the LCA was expected to get the FOC by early 2013 and the first squadron to be operational by the end of 2013.
Mr. Tyagi said Rudra or Dhruv Mk-4 was in the last lap of certification and its first delivery was likely this year.
Two prototypes of the LCH were undergoing trials and an improved third one would follow. The LUH would have a high level of indigenous content.
Best way to tackle delay in IJT project is to try harder. Launch AJT CAT project with HAL and competing AJT LCA project with ADA. If there is any inherent problem with IJT then the AJT project will take over.
If the IJT is to fly then IAF must own it and HAL must work with IAF. IAF senior brass should require fortnightly or monthly presentations of progress. We are talking about national security and it cannot be frittered away in lies and false reports like the Kaveri. With genuine hard workk the IJT cab be a success - like the ALH and LCH.
Every time an Indian plane has thought about an engine it has meant changes to the plane and attendant problems, which no one is prepared for in terms of time.
We will go through the similar pain with the FGFA.
We finally won, this matter was not merely a case but a mission for us!!!
And our patience and efforts were tried to the extreme... despite the earlier final order of the Supreme Court, the fruits of success kept on all alluding us since the UOI chose to take the most unusual course of persuing a recall application, which was heard on several dates over the last 2 years.
Today, after marathon arguments from morning till rising of the day and several anxious moments of flips and flops, the Judges were finally convinced and saw through the flimsy excuses of the Govt.
It is my priviledge and pleasure to announce that justice finally prevailed, please see the following note for details and circulate to all retired and serving officers and their kin so they can finally get their dues.
Bhati Assiciates - a registered law firm
LANDMARK DAY FOR DEFENCE OFFICERS- RANK PAY CASE
Subject : I.A. NO. 9 IN T.P. (Civil) 56 of 2007 – UOI & Others Versus N.K. Nair & Others.
• The aforesaid matter along with connected matter came up for hearing before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India before a Bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.M. Lodha, Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur and Mr. Justice Anil R. Dave before Court No.7, Item No. 9 today i.e. 04.09.2012.
• This was an application filed by UOI for modification/directions/recall of order dated 08.03.2010 passed by this Hon’ble Court in T.P. (Civil) No. 56 of 2007 and other writ petitions, by which the Hon’ble Supreme Court had agreed with the reasoning of the Kerala High Court in the case of Major Dhanapalan and directed proper fixation of rank pay from 01.01.1986 and interest @ 6% per annum.
• The core issue in these petitions is with regard to the wrong fixation of rank pay awarded by the Fourth Pay Commission by the Union of India.
• The background to the core issue is that in the fourth pay commission, the element of rank pay was introduced for all ranks from Captain to Brigadier in the Army and their equivalent ranks in the Air Force and Navy, in addition to pay in the integrated scale. The rationale of this was to make the Armed Forces an attractive career option and to continue the edge that was always provided to the defence officers vis-à-vis their civilian counterparts, owing to the difficult and challenging nature of job profile.
• However, at the time of fixation, the rank pay was first deducted to arrive at the total emoluments and thereafter added after fixation in the integrated scale. This ensured that the final fixation of the total pay of the officer became at par with his civilian counterpart and the edge was neutralized during fixation.
• The issue is particularly significant since the services have a longstanding grievance that they get a raw deal from the bureaucrats who have systematically worked on ensuring that the historic edge that the defence officers had with respect to their civilian counterparts is first neutralized and eventually reversed. Interestingly, in this case also the Armed Forces (Army-Navy and Air Force) and the Chiefs of Staff Committee had recommended not to persue the litigation further, however, the Ministry of Defence chose to press the application for recall on several grounds including a total financial liability of about Rs. 1600 crores.
• Major A.K. Dhanapalan was the first officer to challenge this erroneous fixation before the Hon’ble Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 2448/2006. The Hon’ble Single Judge, Kerala High Court vide order dated 05.10.1998 found no justification in deducting the rank pay and directed the UOI to re-fix the pay without deducting the rank pay. The Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court also affirmed finding of the Ld. Single Judge and dismissed the Writ Appeal No. 518/1999 of UOI vide order dated 04.07.2003. The UOI challenged the dismissal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 12.07.2005 in SLP (Civil) No. CC-5908/2005.
• Thereafter, several petitions were filed by similarly placed officers before different High Courts and different benches of Armed Forces Tribunal. However, because of the pendency of the aforesaid I.A., the entire issue was in limbo and no benefit had been granted to the deserving officers, apart from the individual case of Major A.K. Dhanapalan.
• Today, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the Application of Union of India finding no merits or grounds. While doing so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also directed the UOI to re-fix the pay of affected officers from 01.01.1986, without deducting the rank pay.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also directed the UOI to pay interest @ 6% p.a. from 01.01.2006 to all the officers, whether or not they have filed any petition before any of the High Courts or Benches of Armed Forces Tribunal, within 12 weeks from today. The Hon’ble Court has also directed that all pending petitions before any of the High Courts or Benches of Armed Forces Tribunal, by similarly placed officers will be governed by this order.
• This order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court will benefit a large number of officers who were in the rank of Captain to Brigadier in the Army and equivalent ranks in the Air Force and Navy, between 01.01.1986 to 01.01.2006.
• The matter was argued by the Ld. Solicitor General for India on behalf of UOI and defended by Mr Mahabir Singh Sr. Advocate, Gp Capt Karan Singh Bhati, Advocate-on-record and Ms Aishwarya Bhati, Advocate-on-record on behalf of a large number of individual officers and officers associations.
We finally won, this matter was not merely a case but a mission for us!!!
• Today, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the Application of Union of India finding no merits or grounds. While doing so, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also directed the UOI to re-fix the pay of affected officers from 01.01.1986, without deducting the rank pay.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also directed the UOI to pay interest @ 6% p.a. from 01.01.2006 to all the officers, whether or not they have filed any petition before any of the High Courts or Benches of Armed Forces Tribunal, within 12 weeks from today. The Hon’ble Court has also directed that all pending petitions before any of the High Courts or Benches of Armed Forces Tribunal, by similarly placed officers will be governed by this order.
detailed article on the Do-228NG. Seems like a good, cheap option for ISTAR platforms for the IN and the Coast Guard, especially considering that HAL builds the Do-228 entirely and Ruag only outfits it with the additional equipment. Supporting this platform for another 3 decades will not be difficult since HAL has all the tooling, and already supports the IN and Coast Guard's Do-228s. With its short take-off and landing capabilities, these could easily be based at the IN's bases in the Andaman islands, including the latest one INS Baaz, providing very useful Synthetic Aperture Radar/Intelligence Surveillance Target and Recon capability.
The complete airframe of the Do 228NG is built by India's Hindustan Aeronautics and shipped to Oberpfaffenhofen, where Ruag carries out final assembly and fits ancillary systems, engines and avionics.
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Although the aircraft is available in corporate or commuter versions, seating up to 19 passengers, Ruag is aiming it at the intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) market, in which it can serve as a special operations platform fitted with sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar, 360˚ search surveillance radar, electro-optical/infrared sensors, datalinks, a night-vision goggle-compatible cockpit, bubble-type observer/camera side windows and secure, encrypted communications.
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Ruag quotes €6.6 million ($8.3 million) for a passenger/commuter-configured Do 228NG. It is €2-3 million more for the ISTAR version, depending on the mission systems selected.
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My short evaluation of the Do 228NG was a revelation. The aircraft's flyability in terms of handling and performance is simply superb; its usability - given its cabin cross-section and volume, the tactical roles it can perform and the massive suite of sensors it has been designed to carry plus integrate into a mission package - for this size of aircraft is both incredibly powerful and impressive. The new digital cockpit now completely transforms the aircraft's survivability.
The aircraft is not pressurised but it is just about everything else and I do not see pressurisation as a major disadvantage given that any SAR or environmental roles will be completed at low levels and most ISTAR roles can be fully covered below 10,000ft. For anything else, supplemental crew oxygen is a perfectly acceptable option.
I was wondering that if fighters can carry Buddy-Buddy refuelling pods, so can transport and AEW aircraft. Maybe trying to integrate them into some transport A/C can be beneficial. I don't think they should cost that much, however I can see scenarios when they can do some useful stuff when the IL78s are getting calls from all around the country.
Maybe a dornear with a buddy pod and extra fuel(makeshift internal tanks) can sneak in close to the borders and do a quick refuel to our planes. Here, the primary refuellers could be too valuable, too big or too busy to be employed and say MKI with buddy pods can be unavailable due to better priorities.
