Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Shrinivasan » 14 Oct 2012 00:43

Wonder evaluated the Apache and Mi-28s? IAF or IA's AAC?

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby eklavya » 14 Oct 2012 00:53

Shrinivasan wrote:Wonder evaluated the Apache and Mi-28s? IAF or IA's AAC?


http://www.boeing.co.in/ViewContent.do?id=61402&aContent=BDS%20in%20India
The Indian Air Force is evaluating Boeing’s CH-47 Chinook and AH-64D Apache for India’s heavy lift and attack helicopter requirements.


http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsindia-14bn-helicopter-boeing
Boeing's AH-64D Apache beat the Russian Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant's Mi-28 Havoc attack helicopter for the contract by meeting all air staff qualitative requirements (ASQRs) during the air force's extensive field trials.


You know what all has happened in the Indian Army lead process to acquire 197 light utility helicopters. If the task of selecting the attack helicopters was left to the IA, they would have ended up with the civilian version of the Apache :mrgreen:
Last edited by eklavya on 14 Oct 2012 01:31, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby eklavya » 14 Oct 2012 01:17

ASPuar wrote:Its simply a fact that CAS choppers really should be with the service that uses them most.


Its not so black and white. Every armed force has its own practices and traditions that meet their specific needs. IAF operated Mi-25 did a great job supporting the IA in Op. Pawan. Many were operated by former fast-jet combat pilots, which adds an edge (like it or not). Economies of scale play a huge part. Its one thing to operate and maintain a fleet of 120 Cheetah and 60 Chetak helicopters; its a different game altogether with a system like the AH-64D, to exploit them to their full potential and to keep them in a fighting fit condition (man and material perspective), the economies of scale, the network effect and the experience that the IAF has simply cannot be replicated by the IA overnight or even over 20 years. Its best to leave the task to the professionals in the field of combat aviation.

The Israeli Air Force operates the IDF's Apaches.

http://www.iaf.org.il/211-en/IAF.aspx

http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/news100084.html

The Dutch Air Force operates the Apaches of the Dutch armed forces.

http://www.defensie.nl/english/air_forc ... helicopter

http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/news72875.html


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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby chaanakya » 14 Oct 2012 10:01

abhishek_sharma wrote:Sodiers in Business


Well Govt should continue to pay full salary during cooling off period before denying right to employment.
Such concerns arise from general lack of ethics and respect for good /moral conduct... Self before service. There are few who benefit but vast majority don't enjoy such privileges. And these few are the ones who are corrupt during service life with compromised integrity and dubious decisions.
Others, who stand up ,are hounded out by hook or crook. To Wit VKS..

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby chetak » 14 Oct 2012 11:34

ASPuar wrote:What is canard that is being spread that "they were being paid for by the IAF"? Nonsense. The aircraft are being paid for by the Government of India, out of the annual defence budget. And said government has decided that the aircraft are going to the army. End of story. The Air Force's grandfathers didnt pay money to buy these equipments. The GOI did. Rest, all bakwaas.

Its no loss for the IAF. Its simply a fact that CAS choppers really should be with the service that uses them most.

Dyou know how many Apaches the USAF owns? NONE! Dyou know how many attack choppers it has? ZERO!

Dyou know how many total helicopters the USAF owns? 191, out of a total of 5700 aircraft.

How many choppers does the US Army have? Over FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED. How many attack choppers? Over 1500.

Its pretty obvious, in America, Helicopters are with the army, and proportionately almost zero with the USAF.

Now lets look at the UK. How many choppers with the RAF? 140. How many attack helicopters? None.

British army chopper inventory? About 190.
All attack choppers are with British Army Air Corps, NONE with RAF. Surprised? I hope not.


Flowing from annual defence budget it finally and actually came out of the IA portion of the budget........... to be operated, staffed and maintained by the IAF. Incidentally the operating and maintenence funds also came from the IA budget onlee.

Finally the attack birds are going Home to roost.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby chetak » 14 Oct 2012 11:39

eklavya wrote:
ASPuar wrote:Its simply a fact that CAS choppers really should be with the service that uses them most.


Its not so black and white. Every armed force has its own practices and traditions that meet their specific needs. IAF operated Mi-25 did a great job supporting the IA in Op. Pawan. Many were operated by former fast-jet combat pilots, which adds an edge (like it or not). Economies of scale play a huge part. Its one thing to operate and maintain a fleet of 120 Cheetah and 60 Chetak helicopters; its a different game altogether with a system like the AH-64D, to exploit them to their full potential and to keep them in a fighting fit condition (man and material perspective), the economies of scale, the network effect and the experience that the IAF has simply cannot be replicated by the IA overnight or even over 20 years. Its best to leave the task to the professionals in the field of combat aviation.

The Israeli Air Force operates the IDF's Apaches.

http://www.iaf.org.il/211-en/IAF.aspx

http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/news100084.html

The Dutch Air Force operates the Apaches of the Dutch armed forces.

http://www.defensie.nl/english/air_forc ... helicopter

http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/news72875.html


Negative.

Is there a turf war in the countries mentioned like in India?

Even after 20 years why was the expertise not effectively transferred to the IA which was repeatedly asking for it ??

20 years was plenty to transfer any technology if only there was a will to do so.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby member_23629 » 14 Oct 2012 12:23

1987 Siachen hero passes away

TNN | Oct 14, 2012, 01.04AM IST

NEW DELHI: The Indian military on Saturday bade farewell to the man who led one of its most daunting operations in recent memory, at a snow peak over 21,000 feet high and across frozen bodies of his fallen comrades, to evict enemy soldiers occupying a post named after the founder of their nation.

Brigadier Varinder Singh, then a young Major, led the small assault team of 8 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry that captured the Quaid Post in Siachen glacier on June 26, 1987, after weeks of laborious, logistically challenging operation and several casualties.

Singh (57) collapsed on Friday while playing basketball, and passed away a few hours later. He is survived by his wife Anita, a daughter and a son.

Once Singh's team captured it, Quaid Post was renamed Bana Top, after Subedar Bana Singh, a member of Singh's assault team, who was awarded Param Vir Chakra, the highest gallantry award for the operation. Maj Singh, who was wounded in the operation, was awarded Vir Chakra.

"We had no strength to celebrate. At 21,000 feet, nobody does the bhangra, yells war cries, or hoists the Tri-colour. Ultimately, sheer doggedness wins. If we had once hesitated, Quaid would still be with Pakistan," Singh recently told Broadsword, a defence blog run by defence analyst Ajai Shukla.

The 1987 operation, many would argue, was the peak of Indo-Pak hostilities in some sense, stretching their hatred into the highest peak in a forlorn glacier that was beyond the gaze of all invading armies and expanding empires through centuries.

Seen today, when India is reassessing its military strategies and China rises across the disputed border like a behemoth, Bana Top is a reminder of the unforeseen challenges the Indian military faces as well as a glorious statement of its professional capabilities.

The efforts to capture Quaid Post started in secrecy in May, 1987, when Second Lieutenant Rajiv Pande led a small group to fix ropes for a subsequent assault party to climb up the post occupied by 17 Pakistani soldiers, mostly commandos from the Special Services Group. Nine of these 13 Indian Army men, including Pande, were killed by Pakistani soldiers and their bodies would be retrieved only several weeks later.

The post was vital because of its dominance of the area. It could give a sweeping glance of up to 100 km, and was effectively used by Pakistani Army to disrupt Indian efforts to maintain its posts in the glacier.

It took almost a month after Pande's team fell to Pakistani bullets, to assemble the assault team of 64 soldiers under Major Singh. When the first group climbed up the ropes, bodies of the nine comrades were deep frozen along the way. With a few sips of tea, some chocolate bar and their indomitable courage, the group stayed the course and carried out the final assault.

The group was exhausted "but Pande had to be avenged, and the relentless firing from Quaid reminded us of what we had to do," Singh told Broadsword.


RIP.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby rohitvats » 14 Oct 2012 13:45

Well, one cannot escape the fact that loss of gunship control also means loss of sanctioned manpower and posts associated with these formations. It was given that with the increasing modernization of Indian Army, the increment in ability to exploit vertical element was given...While the number for top gunships like Apache would be limited to max of 10 squadrons, the real proliferation would have been in the LCH domain. IA had planned for at least 1 x Squadron for each Corps and than, some more.

Just imagine the amount of manpower increase it would entail and along with it, more avenues for promotions and command. Now, with the transfer of all gunship assets to the IA, all this is going to fall into the lap of AAC. And mind you, the biggest grouse that pilots from AAC have is the lack of growth...what does he do after moving up from the command of a Squadron? With the advent of Aviation Brigades (both gunships and transport helicopters), this element will also be taken care off.

As for the money angle - well, if the Apaches were paid from the CAPEX head of IAF, rest assured, it will now be adjusted from IA's CAPEX head. Coming to developing the nucleus (and subsequent expertise) for maintaining and operating these birds, well, all good things will happen in due course of time. TACDE can start teaching the senior helicopter pilots from AAC henceforth. AAC pilots can be embedded with Mi-35 gunship squadrons...the new Apache Squadrons can be manned with officers/soldiers/airmen from both services. If there is will, there is a way.

The transfer of assets is a reality and IAF needs to move on.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby member_22906 » 14 Oct 2012 13:57

^^

RV, my info could be old but don't the AAC folks move up to command Arty regts, then Bde, etc?

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby rohitvats » 14 Oct 2012 14:06

^^^AS, true but from what I heard, it is not so simple. After spending time in the AAC, many loose touch with the realities on ground with respect to other/parent arms. Plus, there is so much advancement happening in each of the combat arm of the IA, that one need to be there to learn and keep pace.

There is still no substitute for exposure to Regimental Duty...a hallmark of a good officer is still the level of exposure to Regimental duties. Many of the so called 'high-flying' officers come out as shallow because they've spent too much time behind desk in this or that Staff posting.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby member_22906 » 14 Oct 2012 14:12

Agreed. Perhaps, with AAC also expanding its net in terms of officer intake (apart from Arty), this dilution must be happening. Earlier, the "Air Op" chaps used to go through the standard gunnery (LGSC etc) courses and rotations within the standard Arty Regts.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby member_22906 » 14 Oct 2012 14:20

Another point to note is that growth beyond a point will always get restricted if AAC (and Arty) is not part of General Cadre, which seems to be the case in US, UK and even Paki armies

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Viv S » 14 Oct 2012 14:48

eklavya wrote:The Israeli Air Force operates the IDF's Apaches.


Israel doesn't have a formal army and the organisational environment is not conducive for gunships to be assigned to ground forces. In fact most countries that allocate gunships to the air force like Singapore or UAE, have relatively small or non-existent army aviation forces.


The Dutch Air Force operates the Apaches of the Dutch armed forces.



List of countries where the army instead of the air force operates attack helicopters -

1. USA
2. China
3. UK
4. France
5. Germany
6. Italy
7. Greece
8. Turkey
9. South Korea
10. Japan
11. Australia
12. Pakistan
13. Spain
14. Taiwan
15. Saudi Arabia
16. Iran
17. Poland
18. Indonesia
19. Thailand


Of the top fifteen countries in the world by military expenditure, only two include air forces that operate attack helicopters - Russia and India. And Russia, which is in the midst of a major reform effort to transition from a conscripted force to a professional one, is expected to transfer its attack helicopters back to the Ground Forces in the near future.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby chetak » 14 Oct 2012 16:08

rohitvats wrote:Well, one cannot escape the fact that loss of gunship control also means loss of sanctioned manpower and posts associated with these formations. It was given that with the increasing modernization of Indian Army, the increment in ability to exploit vertical element was given...While the number for top gunships like Apache would be limited to max of 10 squadrons, the real proliferation would have been in the LCH domain. IA had planned for at least 1 x Squadron for each Corps and than, some more.

Just imagine the amount of manpower increase it would entail and along with it, more avenues for promotions and command. Now, with the transfer of all gunship assets to the IA, all this is going to fall into the lap of AAC. And mind you, the biggest grouse that pilots from AAC have is the lack of growth...what does he do after moving up from the command of a Squadron? With the advent of Aviation Brigades (both gunships and transport helicopters), this element will also be taken care off.

As for the money angle - well, if the Apaches were paid from the CAPEX head of IAF, rest assured, it will now be adjusted from IA's CAPEX head. Coming to developing the nucleus (and subsequent expertise) for maintaining and operating these birds, well, all good things will happen in due course of time. TACDE can start teaching the senior helicopter pilots from AAC henceforth. AAC pilots can be embedded with Mi-35 gunship squadrons...the new Apache Squadrons can be manned with officers/soldiers/airmen from both services. If there is will, there is a way.

The transfer of assets is a reality and IAF needs to move on.



The IA has already got trained a number of rotary wing test pilots through ASTE.

The IA already has for long had the administrative and operational capability to sustain their own helo operations and efficient deployment.

The technical competencies are also rapidly getting there if not already there.

Next immediate objective should be the CDS, taken up on a war footing. :)

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby chetak » 14 Oct 2012 16:21

abhishek_sharma wrote:Sodiers in Business



First tackle the mess that exists in the retiring judiciary and bureaucracy that forms a nexus with the government of the day and a very evident quid pro quo can easily be demonstrated in 99.99% of the cases. :twisted:

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby ASPuar » 14 Oct 2012 17:37

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 802705.cms

1987 Siachen hero passes away
TNN | Oct 14, 2012, 01.04AM IST

NEW DELHI: The Indian military on Saturday bade farewell to the man who led one of its most daunting operations in recent memory, at a snow peak over 21,000 feet high and across frozen bodies of his fallen comrades, to evict enemy soldiers occupying a post named after the founder of their nation.

Brigadier Varinder Singh, then a young Major, led the small assault team of 8 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry that captured the Quaid Post in Siachen glacier on June 26, 1987, after weeks of laborious, logistically challenging operation and several casualties.

Singh (57) collapsed on Friday while playing basketball, and passed away a few hours later. He is survived by his wife Anita, a daughter and a son.

Once Singh's team captured it, Quaid Post was renamed Bana Top, after Subedar Bana Singh, a member of Singh's assault team, who was awarded Param Vir Chakra, the highest gallantry award for the operation. Maj Singh, who was wounded in the operation, was awarded Vir Chakra.

"We had no strength to celebrate. At 21,000 feet, nobody does the bhangra, yells war cries, or hoists the Tri-colour. Ultimately, sheer doggedness wins. If we had once hesitated, Quaid would still be with Pakistan," Singh recently told Broadsword, a defence blog run by defence analyst Ajai Shukla.

The 1987 operation, many would argue, was the peak of Indo-Pak hostilities in some sense, stretching their hatred into the highest peak in a forlorn glacier that was beyond the gaze of all invading armies and expanding empires through centuries.

Seen today, when India is reassessing its military strategies and China rises across the disputed border like a behemoth, Bana Top is a reminder of the unforeseen challenges the Indian military faces as well as a glorious statement of its professional capabilities.

The efforts to capture Quaid Post started in secrecy in May, 1987, when Second Lieutenant Rajiv Pande led a small group to fix ropes for a subsequent assault party to climb up the post occupied by 17 Pakistani soldiers, mostly commandos from the Special Services Group. Nine of these 13 Indian Army men, including Pande, were killed by Pakistani soldiers and their bodies would be retrieved only several weeks later.

The post was vital because of its dominance of the area. It could give a sweeping glance of up to 100 km, and was effectively used by Pakistani Army to disrupt Indian efforts to maintain its posts in the glacier.

It took almost a month after Pande's team fell to Pakistani bullets, to assemble the assault team of 64 soldiers under Major Singh. When the first group climbed up the ropes, bodies of the nine comrades were deep frozen along the way. With a few sips of tea, some chocolate bar and their indomitable courage, the group stayed the course and carried out the final assault.

The group was exhausted "but Pande had to be avenged, and the relentless firing from Quaid reminded us of what we had to do," Singh told Broadsword.


Rest in peace, Sir. :(

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby VinodTK » 16 Oct 2012 03:37

Ajai Shukla: Don't fight 1962 all over again

Who won the 1962 Sino-Indian war? This might seem a fatuous question, especially to those reeling under the tsunami of gloomy articles leading into the 50th anniversary of the war that began on the Namka Chu rivulet on October 20, 1962. But consider this fact: since 1962 Arunachal Pradesh has turned increasingly Indian, emphatically regarding itself a part of this country. Meanwhile, Tibet simmers resentfully as Beijing’s relationship with those easy-going people is conducted through the might of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA); a plethora of truncheon-happy Chinese paramilitaries that arrest protesters before they can protest; a demographic invasion by hundreds of thousands of ethnic Han Chinese workers; and a coercive relocation of locals that has shattered traditional pastoral lifestyles.

So how is it that, even after having been whipped in war, India is winning the peace? And that China, despite having “taught India a lesson” in 1962, and having subdued Tibet with a brutal occupation, feels challenged today from both sides of the McMahon Line — the disputed border in the Eastern Himalayas between Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh. In Tibet, since 2008, Beijing confronts a rising tide of protest. And in India it sees a growing military build-up, and a Tibetan exile organisation that amplifies worldwide the repression that China perpetuates within Tibet.

In contrast, India’s restraint and sensitivity and reluctance to use military force in establishing administration across the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) – as Arunachal was then called – certainly won over locals to the idea of India, but it also contained within it the seeds of the 1962 defeat. The aversion to overt demonstration of force was evident during India’s 1951 occupation of Tawang, when Assistant Political Officer R Kathing marched into that border town with just one platoon (36 soldiers) of the paramilitary Assam Rifles.

And at Achingmori in 1953, when Tagin tribals massacred an Assam Rifles platoon, Nari Rustomji, Special Advisor to the Governor of Assam who administered NEFA, famously stopped Nehru from retaliating with a burn-and-slash military expedition or executing his threat to bomb the Tagins. Instead, Mr Rustomji sent a largely civilian expedition into Tagin country, arrested the culprits, convicted them after a procedurally impeccable trial in a makeshift bamboo courthouse, and jailed them for a few years. Word spread quickly across the area.

But placing local sensibilities above national security also created the mindset that led to the 1962 defeat. The same mistrust in force that won over the local people also underlay the reluctance to deploy the army in adequate numbers, even though that was essential for backstopping an ill-considered “forward policy” that involved establishing Indian posts along a unilaterally decided border. The result: a stinging military defeat for India that undermined its image in local eyes.

Today, 50 years later, with a wealthier and more assertive India comfortable with the idea of deploying and wielding military power, it is important to remember the lessons of the 1950s in planning how to counter any Chinese adventurism. Firstly, in-your-face military deployment is not something that Arunachalis are comfortable with, even though the military is sometimes the only government that tribal people in remote areas actually see. In the 2010s and 2020s, as in the 1950s and 1960s, local support for India will count for as much as military power in ensuring that Arunachal remains a part of India.

India’s military, like every self-perpetuating bureaucracy, has made a convincing case for raising four new divisions to defend the eastern sector, including two divisions that will be part of a proposed mountain strike corps. The two defensive mountain divisions are already functional, while the mountain strike corps and an armoured brigade are currently being cleared.

But no amount of soldiers can provide a foolproof defence along hundreds of kilometres of rugged mountain terrain. And in raising division after division of defensive troops, India risks falling into the Pakistan trap: getting involved in a competitive military build-up against a giant neighbour that has far greater resources of money and military power.

Instead, the Indian Army needs to rethink its strategy, relying on local partnership as in the 1950s, rather than on an overwhelming presence that could start being resented. This must involve a threefold action plan: firstly, recruit at least 20 territorial army battalions from local tribes, which will defend their homeland fiercely against the Chinese, rather than relying on regular army battalions that are posted into these unknown areas from their bases thousands of kilometres away. These local tribal battalions must form the first line of defence.

Secondly, rather than committing the bulk of our regular army battalions into defensive deployments aimed at stopping the Chinese at the border, reorganise these formations into offensive strike groups that are geared, trained and equipped to retaliate against any Chinese incursion with counter-incursions into Tibet. There should be 8-10 such fully developed contingency plans ready for execution, along with the resources to execute them with.

Thirdly, create the infrastructure of roads and railways in Arunachal and Assam that will be needed to mobilise the offensive strike groups and transport them to the border fast enough to pre-empt any Chinese counter-deployment. This is perhaps the most essential step needed, since it will serve both a military and civil purpose. In providing road connectivity to villages along the McMahon Line, we are providing a lifeline that ties them to India.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby alexis » 16 Oct 2012 11:41

ASPuar wrote:
Dyou know how many Apaches the USAF owns? NONE! Dyou know how many attack choppers it has? ZERO!

Dyou know how many total helicopters the USAF owns? 191, out of a total of 5700 aircraft.

How many choppers does the US Army have? Over FIVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED. How many attack choppers? Over 1500.

Its pretty obvious, in America, Helicopters are with the army, and proportionately almost zero with the USAF.

Now lets look at the UK. How many choppers with the RAF? 140. How many attack helicopters? None.

British army chopper inventory? About 190.
All attack choppers are with British Army Air Corps, NONE with RAF. Surprised? I hope not.


We need not replicate USA or UK and need to find our own way. I understand AFs of Israel, South Africa etc operate attack helicopters. So it is not black and white. In a country like India which is constrained for resources, it made sense for 1 service to operate helis. Now, if we have the moolah, we can have redundancies which would be a good thing in war.

I am more keen on IA getting LUH and LCH in meaningful numbers than a handful of Apaches.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby sum » 16 Oct 2012 12:09

From OrBat:
So how big is the Indian Army? The odd thing is that most people do not know the precise figure, and that includes your Editor. But it is certainly 1.3-million and increasing. People use a figure of 1.1-million which may have been true a couple of decades ago. That figure does not include, for example, the 70,000+ Rashtriya Rifles raised from the early 1990s as specialized counterinsurgency troops. They are called differently for legal and psychological reasons. The psychological reason is the Indian Army hates doing CI against its own people and has been clamoring for decades to be taken off this duty. The figure also does not include, for example, the latest raisings of at least 30,000 troops in two divisions. We say at least because no matter how economical you are, when you raise new divisions the support bases increases. Agreed, it is not in proportion. But some increase is inevitable. Also, formations totaling another 100,000 have been okayed, and more after that.



· When you take a close at the PLA, you wonder why it even has 1.25-million troops – if it really does. Public Enemy Number 1, Taiwan, is down to a handful of active brigades. Public Enemy Number 2, Russia, is down to 24 brigades for its entire army, the bulk of which is west of the Urals. There are no plans to teach Public Enemy Number 3, Vietnam, another lesson; particularly as Vietnamese had their own lessons to impart to the PLA. As for Public Enemy Number 4, the PLA has for decades known full well that the Indian Army is very large, the Chinese assessment is that because of psychological factors, the Indians are no threat. And to be perfectly honest with readers, the Chinese assessment has, up to now, been absolutely correct. An example: India’s permanent deployment against Tibet is 8 divisions, each larger than a PLA division. So how many divisions does China keep in Tibet? The equivalent of one, and even then its main job is internal security.



· On top of this, China after First Gulf has fallen into a swoon over high-tech warfare. It honestly, really, truly believes it no longer has to go head-to-head with mass armies. Intelligence, reconnaissance, electronics, airpower etc etc are supposed to be the decisive weapons. Much as Rumsfeld of the USA envisaged, the Chinese really believe that ground troops are now to seek and pin down the enemy, high-tech will take care of the rest. Well, if the Chinese want to delude themselves, far be it for us to argue. They might note the Indians believe in quantity AND quality, but that isn’t our point here. Because the PLA no longer sees corps, army, and army group type battles as a Good Thing, it has been cutting down its corps (armies in PLA parlance) to 3 and 4 brigades. So right or wrong, they don’t see the need for a large army anymore. And look, if they cut the PLA to half, they would still remain the world’s second biggest.



· When you take a casual look at the Indian Army, you see 36 divisions. Because the IA is not an expeditionary force, it does not need the huge number of support troops that, for example, the US requires. In World War II, US had 100,000 men (roughly) for each divisions. This number had not significantly fallen by Second Indochina. Today the US Army has 50,000 men per division, but of course this is misleading because of the very high number of contracters. They don’t quite bring the figure to 100,000 per division, but still. There is nothing wrong with this: the further you are from home base the more troops you need.



· But India makes do quite nicely on <30,000 men per division because all it does is protect India’s borders. You will now say: wait a minute, if it’s somewhere south of 30,000, then how come Editor is saying the manpower total is 1.3-million. Even including the CI troops. Should not the Indian total be around 1.1-million?


· Well, here’s where the Indians get a bit sneaky. In addition to the 36 divisions, they have a rather large number of independent brigades and many divisions have extra brigades. And they’ve started adding artillery divisions, replacing the old corps artillery of one brigade plus the occasional reinforcement from a handful of army level artillery brigades. Etc. etc. We can’t go into more detail, but really 1.3-million is a more realistic figure. We of course include what the Indian Army calls Non Combatants Enrolled – barbers and washermen and so on that are part of every unit. Also good to remember, Indian infantry/mechanized battalions run to 850 troops as opposed to China’s 500.


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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby rohitvats » 16 Oct 2012 12:16

alexis wrote:We need not replicate USA or UK and need to find our own way. I understand AFs of Israel, South Africa etc operate attack helicopters. So it is not black and white. In a country like India which is constrained for resources, it made sense for 1 service to operate helis. Now, if we have the moolah, we can have redundancies which would be a good thing in war.

I am more keen on IA getting LUH and LCH in meaningful numbers than a handful of Apaches.


I don't think anyone is replicating any of the foreign models here. The decision to equip IA with gunships is based purely on merit of the requirement...there is no escaping this fact. The fact that most countries when faced with this question chose the same path as India is indicative of the thought process on the subject. Israel and SAAF are exceptions to the norm and hence, while quoting these examples, one needs to dig deeper to understand the peculiarities driving their decisions.

Coming to gunships - well, I don't think there are any redundancies being created here. IMO, the initial redundancy will exist simply because AAC will take some time come to speed on gunship deployment. BTW, those handful of Apaches carry enough firepower to fry a strong PA Armor Assault. With IA planning to deploy all three Strike Corps in Desert/Semi-Desert, a Squadron each of Apaches and Mi-35 in the Pathankot-Sambha-Jammu Corridor will serve a useful deterrent against breakthrough by PA's Army Reserve North.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby alexis » 16 Oct 2012 12:16


Instead, the Indian Army needs to rethink its strategy, relying on local partnership as in the 1950s, rather than on an overwhelming presence that could start being resented. This must involve a threefold action plan: firstly, recruit at least 20 territorial army battalions from local tribes, which will defend their homeland fiercely against the Chinese, rather than relying on regular army battalions that are posted into these unknown areas from their bases thousands of kilometres away. These local tribal battalions must form the first line of defence.



This seems to be a sensible suggestion that can be implemented relatively easily.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby sum » 16 Oct 2012 12:22

^^ isn't the raising of the Arunachal scouts a step in that direction?

Arunachal Scouts 2nd bn accorded financial nod

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby rohitvats » 16 Oct 2012 13:15

Well, AS seems to asking to do the same thing as IA has already initiated.

1. There is no 'mindless' raising of new divisions for defensive purpose. Only 2 have been raised so far and these, IMO help to plug the gap in terms of existing shortages. For example, 3 Corps had grand total of 1 Mountain Division under it. After the new round of raising, both 3 and 4 Corps have 3 division each which I think are required for undertaking the task at hand.

2. IA is raising the MSC to do exactly what AS is saying - take the battle into Tibet and counter-strike. The very steep price tag for the MSC seems to be due to requirement of organic helicopter assets to achieve this objective.

4. The Artillery Division sanctioned for Eastern Command also helps in achieving the above objective.

5. On the contrary, after having raised the 2 x divisions for NE, there seems to be no rational for raising further 20 TA battalions. 20 TA battalions amount to 6 additional bdes worth of infantry (@ 3 battalions per brigade and them some more) and this is exactly what AS does not want IA to do...This suggestion only makes sense if AS knows that IA is going to raise more Divisions for 'defensive' purpose and instead of raising fresh battalions under various regiments for these new formations, he wants the manpower to be raised locally.

6. If the above is true, the suggestion makes some sense. But TA nomenclature is misleading...it means that manpower will be activated to full strength in times of crisis. Rest of the time, the units are maintained at partial strength.

7. Anyone who has dealt with TA issue in IA will know that at Jawan/Solider level, the units operate as full strength. Simply because the men get paid for the service and this is one revenue stream which a person hailing from these parts would not want to give up. Such battalions will most likely operate at full strength and on the lines of Scouts Battalions.

8. To more administrative question - affiliation for these units to regiments or requirement for raising fresh regiment.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby alexis » 16 Oct 2012 13:48

rohitvats wrote:
I don't think anyone is replicating any of the foreign models here. The decision to equip IA with gunships is based purely on merit of the requirement...there is no escaping this fact. The fact that most countries when faced with this question chose the same path as India is indicative of the thought process on the subject. Israel and SAAF are exceptions to the norm and hence, while quoting these examples, one needs to dig deeper to understand the peculiarities driving their decisions.

Coming to gunships - well, I don't think there are any redundancies being created here. IMO, the initial redundancy will exist simply because AAC will take some time come to speed on gunship deployment. BTW, those handful of Apaches carry enough firepower to fry a strong PA Armor Assault. With IA planning to deploy all three Strike Corps in Desert/Semi-Desert, a Squadron each of Apaches and Mi-35 in the Pathankot-Sambha-Jammu Corridor will serve a useful deterrent against breakthrough by PA's Army Reserve North.


I am not questioning the merit of IA operating attack helis. I was just pointing out the constraints in resources we had earlier. The redundancies i had in mind are wrt manpower, helipads, spares, logistics etc which would be duplicated and not on machines per se.

If the resource constraint is not a factor, it is better for Army to have organic airpower.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby kulhari » 19 Oct 2012 02:42


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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Raman » 19 Oct 2012 05:22

Does the IA getting organic air-power mean that it no longer needs the IAF for CAS, and that IAF can just concentrate on BAI?

Similarly, my take on the Garuds is that the IAF is looking to its own for FAC and covert lasing/destruction of enemy air defence, rather than depend on army: their training and kit simply doesn't seem to square with their alleged mission of "protection of critical Air Force bases and installations; search and rescue during peace and hostilities and disaster relief during calamities" (per wiki).

Don't quite know what this would mean for the "jointness" between the two forces on the ground ...

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby vaibhav.n » 19 Oct 2012 13:58

The Tawang Tunnel

Links:
http://www.arunachalfront.info/article.php?ArticleID=85564
http://www.constructionupdate.com/products/constructionworld/2006/cwdecember2006/027.html

NHPC will also be constructing a 10 km long road tunnel at a cost of about Rs 300 crore to bypass Sela Pass which is expected to significantly curtail travel time to Tawang, thereby opening up more tourism avenues.


The survey for the ambitious tunneling project bypassing Sela Pass to bring Tawang - the Last Shangri La on Earth - closer and make the journey less strenuous, was conducted on January 28, 2010, to finalize the site. Once the tunnel is completed, and the double-laning of the Bhalukpong-Tawang road is complete, Tawang, located at 10,200 feet above sea level on the Sino-India border and the abode of the 400-year-old Buddhist monastery, will attract many more tourists from far and wide than ever before.


Things just got wayy interesting!! A double laning of the Bhalukpang immensely increase the logistics ease for the IA. Could open at Sapper and onwards to Jang.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Victor » 19 Oct 2012 14:21

Double laning my Arsenio. Let us first get a motorable SINGLE lane road to Tawang, something we have not done for 60 years. My gut feel is that the GoI is still scared that good roads will make things easier for the Chinese and are simply blowing bakwaas for the benefit of the poor locals. Nothing new.

BTW, the Chinese built a 40km road from Bumla to Tawang in 1962 in a matter of 2-3 weeks and it is still one of the best roads in Arunachal.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby aniket » 19 Oct 2012 15:12

+ stil don't understand how not building infrastructure will help. Isn't it better to try and defend with the help of good infrastructure instead of accepting defeat before even fighting ?
I know this is a topic that has been extensively discussed, but i still dont get it.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby alexis » 19 Oct 2012 16:51

aniket wrote:+ stil don't understand how not building infrastructure will help. Isn't it better to try and defend with the help of good infrastructure instead of accepting defeat before even fighting ?
I know this is a topic that has been extensively discussed, but i still dont get it.


Nobody other than GoI seems to get it :(

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Lalmohan » 19 Oct 2012 16:54

IA has good transportation and roads on an E-W axis - the line of defence
the N-S axis down the valleys is the line of attack - where the roads are bad

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby nakul » 19 Oct 2012 17:49

Does it have anything to do with the difference between IA & PLA? We know that IAF is technically superior to PLAAF. The gun saga & various small but important procurements for our soldiers are portrayed as outdated. Is the IA equipped well enough to take on the PLA?

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Lalmohan » 19 Oct 2012 20:30

nakul - get hold of tellis's book on indian recessed deterrence - he explains it very well

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Victor » 19 Oct 2012 21:55

Lalmohan wrote:IA has good transportation and roads on an E-W axis - the line of defence
the N-S axis down the valleys is the line of attack - where the roads are bad

If you mean E-W axis in Arunachal, that is totally incorrect. This connectivity is still on paper and there is no road running E-W across Arunachal. Besides, what good will the IA do running from E to W when the front is in the North and the supply line in the South? A usable E-W roadway would provide much needed intra-state connectivity to Arunachalis but is just the usual Delhi bakwaas meant to fool the locals. In spite of all the talk over the past decade, there is absolutely no sign of any activity whatsoever. Zero. Right now the only way go from Tawang to Along is by chopper, on foot or via Assam where the infrastructure is only slightly to better. Absolutely no change over the past 60 years.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Victor » 19 Oct 2012 22:16

nakul wrote: Is the IA equipped well enough to take on the PLA?

In terms of quality and quantity of material, no. In terms of defensive capability, there is no way at all for the Chinese to walk into Arunachal in a repeat of '62. Every inch of the state is zeroed in with arty and missiles from both within and outside Arunachal and the PLA wouldn't get very far even if the roads were autobahn-grade 4-laned. This is why the apparent GoI reluctance to improve the roads is so frikkin baffling. The only answer is sheer cowardice.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby aniket » 19 Oct 2012 23:22

Or maybe there is less money to be made in this process, therefore it is undesirable.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby nakul » 19 Oct 2012 23:24

^^^

That is one thing I like about arm dealers. Thanks to their well oiled networks, India will never find herself unarmed even though it will be through foreign maal ;)

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby Yogi_G » 20 Oct 2012 00:27

nakul wrote:Does it have anything to do with the difference between IA & PLA? We know that IAF is technically superior to PLAAF. The gun saga & various small but important procurements for our soldiers are portrayed as outdated. Is the IA equipped well enough to take on the PLA?


Very little is known of the PLAAF to dismiss it as being technically inferior to us.

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Re: Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

Postby nakul » 20 Oct 2012 00:47

Not much is known about their ability is true. Yet their inability to manufacture basic components & relying on Russian imports, Pakistan's desire to replace Chinese components with French & the ability of a country to match those with 50-60 yrs of exp in weapon building gives a rough indication. We are facing the same problems but using imported maal like Rafale & MKIs that are clearly superior to their Chinese counterparts.


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