LCA News and Discussions

[SaiK]

they should bring to the table and sort it out. we can't leave it at indicator levels. actions are needed. so, instead of indications, get down to the bottom, and list out open the defect list. khan industries were very open on defects and risks, be it LM or secret devices.. but this project is quite open, and at defect list level, there is nothing secret about it. the list can be obfuscated for public, but the list needs to be worked out. Like how IA provided list,for Arjun Mk.2.

oh, yeah, it would be for LCA Mk.2. or Mk.3 depending on the classifications of the problems.

[Indranil]

The problem is not LCA/QC/Manufacturing/Design etc. but it is with the mentality running through IAF like the HAL guy pointed out and something which ex IAF Chief Fali Major also talked about in a recent interview to Tarmak.

You say so. That might not be the fact. IMHO, there is reason to believe the contrary.

One can't be biased. The people in IAF are equally patriotic as you are (if not more). Then why do they have that mentality? If you keep giving the user substandard products, the user will lose faith in you to deliver. It was very evident from AI'13 that IAF is strongly encouraging the private sector to come in. Because it has no faith left in the DPSUs.

But you could say what could IAF do for the national interest now. I think it should encourage the DPSUs. This way, 10 years down the line we would have good competition. And all said and done the DPSUs have some very hardworking and excellent people. There is no gain by dishonouring the work such dedicated sons and daughters of the country.

[aditya.agd]

IAF must Induct atleast 150 LCA MK1 to offset the Migs

[Gurneesh]

^^^^ For that to happen HAL must first produce 1 SP LCA Mk1, let alone 150.

[Sagar G]

You say so. That might not be the fact. IMHO, there is reason to believe the contrary.

I didn't word that post properly enough I guess what I meant is that yes they are a problem but not something which cannot be overcome but due to IAF's unwillingness to get involved in the indigenization process till the 11th hr. and then complaining about delays is not going to cut through me.

One can't be biased.

IAF should remember this before coming up with a rant session.

The people in IAF are equally patriotic as you are (if not more).

Oh please leave such melodrama if you want to have a proper discussion, nobody's "patriotism" is being questioned here.

Then why do they have that mentality? If you keep giving the user substandard products, the user will lose faith in you to deliver.

What substandard products are you talking about ??? How many indigenous products has HAL developed that you are accusing them of supplying substandard products ??? QC is one thing where you can accuse HAL of sloppiness but did IAF come up with any idea to solve the QC issues or are you going to give the stale argument of "customer is the king" to defend IAF here ??? For design issues the IAF should take on mother Russia for that.

Moreover I would have brought your argument without any questioning had IN also been facing such disastrous situation as IAF paints itself to be in but no what has navy done they have integrated themselves in the process and are far far ahead in terms of a better indigenization target. So if navy can achieve this with the same DPSU's how come only the IAF and IA have all the problems in the world ???

It was very evident from AI'13 that IAF is strongly encouraging the private sector to come in. Because it has no faith left in the DPSUs.

Arrah Arrah what a solution !!!!!! Bring in the pvt. sector and all the experience,skills,capabilities will just spring out of the earth on one fine sunny day and all of India's aerospace problems will be solved. Truly path breaking thinking by IAF.

But you could say what could IAF do for the national interest now. I think it should encourage the DPSUs. This way, 10 years down the line we would have good competition.

You also think that IAF has no faith left in DPSU's then how come you are proposing that it will come up with the will to support the DPSU's and integrate itself in the process so as to achieve indigenization ???

[member_20292]

^^^

all said and done, the IAF does boast of being in the top 5 air forces in the world, all metrics combined.

1. HAL , thus, cannot compete, as an organization, amongst its peers, with the IAF, having this level of peer recognition. in some part this is due to ;
2. HAL has its hands tied to have the IAF as the only customer. I'd like them to be untied...such that, its can at least compete with lockmart boeing etc.. How bout Vietnam being the launch customer for the LCA, just as TSPA was for jf17 and India for the Su 30/35/MKI ? Govt. hobbling Indian dpsu's like this is just insane. (however, I dont know the exact fine print of the policy of exporting Indian arms, set by the govt.)

[Sagar G]

^^^^ Try and put some sense in your posts if you expect a reply for one.

[member_20292]

Can HAL peddle the LCA abroad ?

[Sagar G]

First it has to be inducted in good numbers in IAF before we can think about that.

[member_20292]

^^^
disagree.



I would think, that, if, it has to survive as a company, it HAS to peddle the LCA abroad.
The swiss AF bought the gripen at 80 million euros....despite the Rafale being better.
I wonder how they would react to a 40 million LCA ?

Why does the IAF have to buy the LCA in high numbers before, say it can be sold to the Swiss Air Force ?

[Sagar G]

Why does the IAF have to buy the LCA in high numbers before, say it can be sold to the Swiss Air Force ?

Because the Swiss Airforce will ask the HAL guy that your airforce hasn't bought it and you want us to buy this ??? To which HAL guy won't have any formidable answer.

But if you are happy in your make believe world where fighter aircrafts which haven't been inducted in there country of origin are bought in huge numbers by other nations, I have no problem with that you can continue with your fantasy but please take it to the appropriate thread. This is not a fantasization thread.

[member_20292]

^^^

To normal arguments about a plausible scenario, you respond by calling people names and accusing them of fantasizing.

You're pretty rude.

[rajanb]

^^^^ Interesting discussions going on.

I had the pleasure of doing a lot of work for HAL/NAL and a little bit for ADA.

My interaction with the first two started in 1983.

I find a few things missing.

1) HAL had a lot of ex-IAF officers in fairly senior positions
2) I used to spend a lot of evenings with other visitors (since I stayed in the HAL Nashik guest house at Ojhar) And I noticed that here was a lot of comraderie, both, at the social and working level, with the management of HAL and visiting IAF staff.
3) And I found that the interaction between both: a) IAF, whom some label as "Customer who is King" and HAL, the provider, to be very collaborative.

It was a very nice feeling to see the teamwork. From what I read and hear, I suspect, that such a relationship does not exist anymore.

There exist many other lacunae, which need to be overcome, but collaboration would be a positive step in improving, understanding, and delivering a better product.

In every aspect of business, collaboration between the supplier and the customer has always led to less heartaches.
JMT

[Sagar G]

^^^

To normal arguments about a plausible scenario, you respond by calling people names and accusing them of fantasizing.

You're pretty rude.

A scenario which has no logical grounding is bound to be ridiculed and for calling you "names" point out where have I done that. If you find me "rude" for being blunt about my opinion then fine by me I can happily live with that.

[RKumar]

Flight test update

From

LCA-Tejas has completed 2042 Test Flights Successfully. (17-Feb-2013).
(TD1-233,TD2-305,PV1-242,PV2-222,PV3-350,LSP1-74,LSP2-252,PV5-36,LSP3-102,LSP4-65,LSP5-133,LSP7-24,NP1-4)

to

LCA-Tejas has completed 2046 Test Flights Successfully. (20-Feb-2013).
(TD1-233,TD2-305,PV1-242,PV2-222,PV3-350,LSP1-74,LSP2-253,PV5-36,LSP3-103,LSP4-65,LSP5-134,LSP7-25,NP1-4)

[rajanb]

^^^^ Looks like these flights are taking place in Pokharan? I haven't heard the roar of the LCA in BLR for the last few days.

[symontk]

There are flights in BLR too, I saw two LCA yesterday. One had two white tanks too. it landed and another one immediately took off

[Sanku]

^^^^ For that to happen HAL must first produce 1 SP LCA Mk1, let alone 150.

This is the Arjun debate all over again.

Exactly same, exactly same.

[jahaju]

LCA Fully Loaded at Pokhran


tarmak007 link

[shiv]

LCA Fully Loaded at Pokhran


tarmak007 link

This is an old file photo

[Gurneesh]

^^^^ For that to happen HAL must first produce 1 SP LCA Mk1, let alone 150.

This is the Arjun debate all over again.

Exactly same, exactly same.

No, the case of LCA is different from the case of Arjun.

Arjun production was delayed because Army kept asking for more improvements before the tank could be inducted.

On the other hand, LCA production is being delayed because HAL has not been able to make a single SP Mk1 plane. IAF should have been flying the LSP 7 and 8 along with a handful of SP aircraft by now and atleast a squadron of SP aircraft by the time FOC arrives.

The more HAL delays handing over the plane to IAF, lesser are the chances of getting any orders above the 40 already contracted. As at this production rate the Mk1 production run may overlap with the Mk2 induction.

And again this talk of exporting the LCA at this stage is STUPID as any self-respecting foreign customer will first ask for a proof that you have the requisite production facilities for good quality control and timely deliveries.

[NRao]

Arjun production was delayed because Army kept asking for more improvements before the tank could be inducted.

I thought it was because someone was peddling a tin can. No?

[SagarAg]

This is the Arjun debate all over again.

Exactly same, exactly same.

Arjun production was delayed because Army kept asking for more improvements before the tank could be inducted.

Just replace Arjun, Army, tank with Tejas, IAF, jet respectively and you will get LCA Tejas story.

Arjun production was delayed because Army kept asking for more improvements before the tank could be inducted.

I thought it was because someone was peddling a tin can. No?

Indeed.

[nachiket]

Just replace Arjun, Army, tank with Tejas, IAF, jet respectively and you will get LCA Tejas story.

This is not the case. In the Arjun's case the IA was never really interested in it after it got the tincans and just kept delaying the inevitable by asking for more changes and more trials. In the LCA's case, the IAF definitely wants it. But HAL hasn't finished their own tests yet and hasn't built a single aircraft in its final config. Key parts like firing a BVR missile and high AoA tests are still left. The IAF will be very happy if HAL gives them the SP-1 today. The aren't causing any delays at the moment.

[member_22906]

Interesting read... http://livefist.blogspot.in/2013/02/lca ... andid.html

Quoting the entire article

By Air Commodore K.A. Muthana, VSM


1. The Indian Light Combat aircraft (LCA) was conceived in the early eighties and is now on the threshold of entering squadron service. The legacy of this aircrafts’ development has resulted in true challenges to deployment being faced at a very late stage. There are even insinuations that this aircraft has been more of a success to the scientists in lab coats than to the war fighter in flight suits. True; this fine aircraft has been hostage to a series of systemic shortcomings. There are significant lessons here for the Indian aviation industry. It is vitally important that these lessons are imbibed in order to move forward coherently in building a strong aeronautics industry in this country.


AIM


2. Aim of this paper is to critically examine the challenges faced in transitioning the LCA from design to deployment and thus learn lessons for the future.


SYSTEMIC SHORTCOMINGS


3. Higher Defense Management. A fundamental challenge has been the structure of the Indian higher defense management. Broadly speaking, there are three verticals within the Indian Ministry of Defense that steer this program. One such vertical is headed by a war fighter, another by a bureaucrat and the third by a technocrat. In this totally State funded and State managed program, interdepartmental oversight has been lacking. It is necessary that a single political entity take charge of such projects to attribute responsibility and demand accountability. Even if private players become significant, interdepartmental co-ordination would be possible only by an informed and responsible political entity.


4. Clarity on Standards. The base document for development of LCA is a beautifully crafted Air Staff Requirement that was clearly ahead of its time and is relevant even today, nearly three decades later. This document primarily restricted itself to stating performance requirements. It is very interesting to note that the country in which aviation is widely accepted to have been born, the USA, (I say widely accepted because I have heard Russians say otherwise), through a document generally referred to as the Perry Document adopted a similar procedure in 1994! The ASR document however, mandated the use of US military specifications and standards of the day as the guiding document for design. The relevant standards and specifications were to have been culled out by D Aero at DRDO HQ. Any concessions were to be sought from IAF HQ. There is no evidence to show that a comprehensive process was followed. This apparent lapse has lead to a number of challenges in design that we face today; so close to deployment.


5. Clarity on Path to Certification. In many ways this is the first fighter aircraft design and development program in India, after a gap of about four decades. Design expertise from the old program of HF-24 was not available, and moreover, the LCA envisaged a quantum leap in technology. To the Indian certification agency also therefore, this was ‘learning in progress’. The path to certification is evolving along with the aircraft. The extent of analyses and testing required tended to be a little open ended. Comprehensive documentation of the path to certification in this program will hugely benefit future programs.


6. Agencies for Design, Development and Support. If the process of design itself is to be accomplished by two design houses working under two different verticals mentioned in Para 2 above, there would be a price to pay. While ADA had a single point focus, clearly HAL ARDC had multiple foci. HALs indigenous programs clearly have priority within that organization and therefore so do resource allocation. The aircraft would continue to develop during its lifetime and all round support would be necessary. The responsibility for, post deployment maintenance of documentation, software and their periodic up gradation remains open ended. Unless resolved, this story of an inconvenient marriage would be continuing saga and have adverse effects on the product during its entire lifetime.


7. Customer Involvement. During the design and development process itself, it is vital that comprehensive knowledge of aviation in general and military aviation in particular is made available to the program. Scientists and design engineers do not have that knowledge. The Indian Air Force is the only repository of comprehensive military aviation knowledge in this country. Either its expertise was not sought or it was denied. Also we probably have the only aviation companies in the world that do not have aviators embedded into design teams. As a result, while the designers concentrated on getting the technology airborne, the design necessities of turning the aircraft into a maintainable, deployable and employable weapon platform were missed to a large extent. Originally a reluctant customer, the Indian Air Force involved itself sufficiently only after contracting for supply of the aircraft in 2006. It was late in the program and hundreds of ‘Requests for Action’ had to be raised in order to retrieve the situation to some extent, but this lead to time and cost overruns.


8. Evaluation of Prototypes. In the process of transitioning from design and development to series production, limited or otherwise, an essential step is to undertake a formal comprehensive evaluation of the prototype vehicles. It is in this process that the platforms testability and therefore maintainability, and its suitability for deployment can be assessed and recommendations made for the required standard of preparation (SOP) for series production (SP) aircraft. Having neglected to undertake this step, limited series production aircraft are worthy of remaining test aircraft only and SOP of series production aircraft continues to evolve!


9. Development of Avionics Package. No customer would be willing to accept obsolescent equipment at induction. Slow progress of the program coupled with rapid development in the field of electronics played its part in inefficient development of the avionics package on the aircraft. The initial focus on airframe and basic platform issues led to a delay in requirement generation and creation of mission specific software modules. Staggered integration of various mission systems also precluded comprehensive global software development, and allowed development effort to be frittered away in development of patches and modules catering only for immediate needs of the hour. Lack of operational requirements expertise in design teams led to replicating Mirage cockpit logic on the aircraft without exploiting the significantly advanced hardware architecture of this aircraft.


A major course correction had to be effected when the IAF finally got into the program. Lack of realistic evaluation and simulation tools meant that evaluation in most cases was carried out in the air for the first time leading to delays due to the requirement of even small fixes having to go through the complete clearance cycle.


10. Process of Transitioning from Design to Manufacture. There are many challenges that we face in transitioning from design to manufacture. One is the necessity to convert frozen design drawings into production drawings. Purportedly an elaborate process that has to be undertaken by dedicated integration teams. These have then to be cleared by the certification agency and followed diligently by the manufacturing and quality control agencies. Other shortcomings are; inability to meet manufacturing tolerances; non availability of correct jigs, fixtures and tooling to meet DAL requirements; non availability of suitable calibrating equipment; and, lack of trained manpower. These challenges directly affect the quality of manufacture.


11. Concurrent Development of Support Systems. The necessity to concurrently design and develop support equipment like tools, testers and ground equipment (TTGE) must not be underestimated. Designers have to understand that the testers that they develop to enable the design process would be unsuitable for use by the war fighter. What is required are simple testers ruggedized to be deployable and employable in the field, by young air warriors with limited education, in order to establish serviceability of a platform to undertake a mission. Similarly, ground support equipment has to be suited well, be light and durable for easy employability and transportability. Such support is vital to deploy the aircraft quickly and repeatedly and thus exploit the inherent advantages of airpower. Development of mission support systems like planning & debrief systems, simulators etc have been lagging and will affect ease of deployment.


12. Flight & Maintenance Manuals. Before the LCA can be deployed, it is obviously necessary that the users are adequately trained to maintain and operate this aircraft. For training to be effective, prior generation of deliverable documentation is essential. These documents will have to be upgraded and supported through the life time of the aircraft. Generation and sustenance of flight and maintenance publications is a major activity and deserves the creation of a separate technical documentation group. Designer’s documents have to be culled down and adapted to the requirements of maintenance manuals which are suited to the not so highly qualified maintenance crew. Information further culled and adapted from these manuals, when enhanced by the addition of flight handling information, translate into a set of flight manuals which are used by the aircrew. Generation of documentation deliverable to the customer has been hampered by the absence of a cohesive and sustainable structure.


13. Simulators. It is important that maintenance and flight simulators are available to train the customer ground crew and aircrew. Based on the contract between the IAF and HAL, ADA did develop maintenance simulators. With the flight simulators, however, it was a strange story. While the ASR did envisage the requirement of a simulator before deployment, no such development was undertaken. Along with the contract for supply of aircraft, funds were allocated by the Government of India for a simulator to be built by HAL on ‘Build, Operate and Maintain’ (BOM) basis. This was a new concept and years were lost in deciding whether funding would be on the capital route or on the revenue route. As a result there would be no representative flight simulator available for use by the customer aircrew. The situation will be aggravated by the non availability of a trainer variant of the aircraft in the required time frame.


14. Operating Infrastructure. Infrastructure necessary for operating the aircraft has to be created at the intended base of operation, well in time for deployment. Although the requirement was projected well in time procedural delays have ensured that the work on ground is yet to start.


15. Professional Program Management. It is inconceivable that a program of this complexity can be run efficiently without the assistance of professional program managers who constantly advice the technocrat leadership. This would avoid a large number of issues cropping up at random, the thread being lost and the same issues cropping up again months later with little progress having been made! Critical path has to be continually identified and attended to. Cost and time overruns have to be tracked by professional program managers using powerful software. Only then can the customer be given a viable timeframe for deployment to enable his planning process. If he has to repeatedly throttle back, he will lose interest and look for alternatives. And that would be a tragedy for aeronautics in this country!


CONCLUSION


16. Tejas is a wonderful flying machine. It deserved to be in squadron service years ago. Remedial action on many of the shortcomings commented upon, if implemented even now, will favorably impact timelines for IOC and FOC of the Tejas Mk 1 aircraft. Favorable impact on Tejas Mk 2 and other future programs will be enormous.

[Gurneesh]

Arjun production was delayed because Army kept asking for more improvements before the tank could be inducted.

I thought it was because someone was peddling a tin can. No?

That would be one of the causes, but the end result was a never ending series of USER trials which resulted in delay of the production.

Please note that till date there has not been a single official user trial for LCA. Despite of this IAF has ordered 40 Mk1's and close to 100 Mk2's (numbers that are not insignificant for aircrafts).

Just replace Arjun, Army, tank with Tejas, IAF, jet respectively and you will get LCA Tejas story.

SagarAg, the generalizations made in your statement (and perhaps most of your posts regarding this issue in the past few pages) show a lack of understanding about the two issues. I suggest you atleast read what nachiket has just posted with a calm mind (and without any preconceived notions) and determine for yourself as to what is the cause of delay in LCA seeing squadron service.

[Lalmohan]

ACde Muthana's article nails the issues right on the head - excellent analysis

[Indranil]

You say so. That might not be the fact. IMHO, there is reason to believe the contrary.

I didn't word that post properly enough I guess what I meant is that yes they are a problem but not something which cannot be overcome but due to IAF's unwillingness to get involved in the indigenization process till the 11th hr. and then complaining about delays is not going to cut through me.

The world over researchers tell the armed forces what should be the characteristics of the next generation and not the other way around. Designers use the forces inputs only on human interface to the machinery.

One can't be biased.

IAF should remember this before coming up with a rant session.

So, in your opinion IAF should get all the bricks and DPSUs all the flowers?

The people in IAF are equally patriotic as you are (if not more).

Oh please leave such melodrama if you want to have a proper discussion, nobody's "patriotism" is being questioned here.

I did not bring in patriotism for melodrama. I brought it specifically for the great armchair generals who know or believe that they know what is best for the country.

Then why do they have that mentality? If you keep giving the user substandard products, the user will lose faith in you to deliver.

What substandard products are you talking about ??? How many indigenous products has HAL developed that you are accusing them of supplying substandard products ??? QC is one thing where you can accuse HAL of sloppiness but did IAF come up with any idea to solve the QC issues or are you going to give the stale argument of "customer is the king" to defend IAF here ??? For design issues the IAF should take on mother Russia for that.

Are you kidding? How many products has HAL developed?!!! Why should IAF solve DPSU's QC issues?

Moreover I would have brought your argument without any questioning had IN also been facing such disastrous situation as IAF paints itself to be in but no what has navy done they have integrated themselves in the process and are far far ahead in terms of a better indigenization target. So if navy can achieve this with the same DPSU's how come only the IAF and IA have all the problems in the world ???

The Navy personal at the talk was categorical in saying that Navy has the same problems with DPSUs.

It was very evident from AI'13 that IAF is strongly encouraging the private sector to come in. Because it has no faith left in the DPSUs.

Arrah Arrah what a solution !!!!!! Bring in the pvt. sector and all the experience,skills,capabilities will just spring out of the earth on one fine sunny day and all of India's aerospace problems will be solved. Truly path breaking thinking by IAF.

Nobody other than you is suggesting that it will happen in a day.

But you could say what could IAF do for the national interest now. I think it should encourage the DPSUs. This way, 10 years down the line we would have good competition.

You also think that IAF has no faith left in DPSU's then how come you are proposing that it will come up with the will to support the DPSU's and integrate itself in the process so as to achieve indigenization ???

Because IAF has no other choice. And unlike what you think IAF does support indigenization. IAF spent more than 60% of its procurement in the last 5-year plan to indigenous purchases. Next 5 years, it is going to go higher. I think it has dawned on everybody that monopoly of DPSUs is neither serving the country, nor the DPSUs well. There has to be competition. So IAF/MoD are trying to nurture the other players while handholding the DPSUs till a healthy competition springs up.

[SaiK]

LCA Fully Loaded at Pokhran
tarmak007 link

This is an old file photo

this one?
http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-wjRVOJmCtHU/U ... 1+(11).JPG

[Sanku]

Arjun and LCA are EXCATLY the same story, with a lag of about 10-15 years, between them.

Arjun production was delayed because Army kept asking for more improvements before the tank could be inducted.

Untrue, the last major change in GSQR was in 84, and minor change in 94. The other changes are all in Mk II. Of course anyone can make a big deal of "they asked us to change the color of the camo hence we took 4 years more onlee " but that sort of defense aside.

On the other hand, LCA production is being delayed because HAL has not been able to make a single SP Mk1 plane.

When 124 Arjuns were ordered in 1998 -- there were only 5-6 Tech demonstrators.

IAF should have been flying the LSP 7 and 8 along with a handful of SP aircraft by now and atleast a squadron of SP aircraft by the time FOC arrives.

Exactly true for Arjun in 2002.

The more HAL delays handing over the plane to IAF, lesser are the chances of getting any orders above the 40 already contracted. As at this production rate the Mk1 production run may overlap with the Mk2 induction.

20 ordered + 20 tentative, just like 124 ordered and 124 in principle ordered.

And yes, Arjun Mk I was delayed in delivery from 2004 to 2012.

And again this talk of exporting the LCA at this stage is STUPID as any self-respecting foreign customer will first ask for a proof that you have the requisite production facilities for good quality control and timely deliveries.

The same has been done for Arjun in the tank thread in the 2002-2008 period by numerous posters.

Arjun and LCA story are exactly same -- and just like Arjun, LCA will prevail but it will take time.

[Sanku]

Arjun production was delayed because Army kept asking for more improvements before the tank could be inducted.

I thought it was because someone was peddling a tin can. No?

That is theory offered by some who want to peddle american toys at 10000000000000 price without testing it at all.

[Sanku]

Just replace Arjun, Army, tank with Tejas, IAF, jet respectively and you will get LCA Tejas story.

This is not the case. In the Arjun's case the IA was never really interested in it after it got the tincans and just kept delaying the inevitable by asking for more changes and more trials. In the LCA's case, the IAF definitely wants it. .

Well people here have already alleged that IAF does not want it. In fact Philip Rajkumar's book also had such allegations, OTOH there was never really any one of Philip Rajkumar's status saying the same about Arjun.

In fact Arjun was supported strongly by the IA even after it kept missing one milestone after next with 5-6 years period.

And the army asked for change hence delay is already shown to be untrue, the last major GSQR change was in 1984, and a minor change in 1994.

[Sanku]

That would be one of the causes, but the end result was a never ending series of USER trials which resulted in delay of the production.

Please note that till date there has not been a single official user trial for LCA. Despite of this IAF has ordered 40 Mk1's and close to 100 Mk2's (numbers that are not insignificant for aircrafts).

When the IA ordered 124 Mk I in 1998 there were no user trials, how could there be, no Arjun was NOT formally given to user. 1998 order was even before the IoC or FoC.

Similarly IAF will have user trials when they get their first squardan.

the second 20 a/c order is also a in principle order. Probably with Mk II. Just like for Arjun.

Blaming IA and IAF is no longer meaningful -- the fact is -- it is taking India a long time to make the products, and instead of blame game (note I am not blaming DRDO either), real solutions for why it takes us time should be undertaken.

[Gurneesh]

@ Sanku

One critical difference between LCA and Arjun is that there is no light fighter acquisition planned in the foreseeable future. And nothing that Pakis or Chinese buy is likely to change that. Unlike Arjun whose orders were eaten by T90. As of now, IAF has put all it's Light fighter eggs in LCA bucket.

Additionally, the initial order of 40 (and 80 Mk2) planes is much more significant than the initial order of 124 tanks. For example, we have about 50 - 60 of both M2000s and Mig29s. Even the ever important MMRCA is of 126 initial plane order. Compare this to the more than 300 initial order for T90 along with the follow on order of 300 some tanks (which had to be bought because ruskies did not give the promised TOT) and finally the 1000 licensed production.

So LCA story is not the same as Arjun story.

Untrue, the last major change in GSQR was in 84, and minor change in 94. The other changes are all in Mk II. Of course anyone can make a big deal of "they asked us to change the color of the camo hence we took 4 years more onlee " but that sort of defense aside.

I know that it is futile to discuss this with you, but thousands of km of user trials over the many years following the initial order tells us something about the IA's interest in Arjun. We all know what happened to the T90's engines when it tried to run in our deserts or how it's TI performed or how the army wanted to buy it after testing in Siberia !!!

[suryag]

folks humbill req please take this arjun vs tejas elsewehere

[Sanku]

folks humbill req please take this arjun vs tejas elsewehere

One last point, kindly excuse.

@ Sanku

One critical difference between LCA and Arjun is that there is no light fighter acquisition planned in the foreseeable future.

But MMRCA and other a/c have been inducted. Similarly, Arjuns will not take T 90s place anyway. They are in different slots.

Stopping now to not cause pains to others -- stepped in to point that IAF/ADA-HAL debate was exactly turning out like the IA/CVRDE-Avadi debate 5 years back and then on.

[Sanku]

I know that it is futile to discuss this with you, but thousands of km of user trials over the many years following the initial order tells us something about the IA's interest in Arjun.
[/qu0ote]

Yes it tells us that they were very interested in making sure it worked even when it would fail often.

We all know what happened to the T90's engines when it tried to run in our deserts or how it's TI performed or how the army wanted to buy it after testing in Siberia !!!

Those a BRF legend with no real sanctity. There will be such legends for LCA too, its already starting

[PratikDas]

The only legendary aspect about the LCA relevant to the above post is that it is as non-Russian as it gets. Jai Hind.

[Sanku]

The only legendary aspect about the LCA relevant to the above post is that it is as non-Russian as it gets. Jai Hind.

LCA being russian or non russian is entirely irrelevant, (ditto for FGFA with Russia, the Embrarer based DRDO EW system, Arjun with German parts, Isralie joint venture or whatever) -- wrong prism to look through.

The only prism is "what can India do to make sure its products are made quickly" -- unfortunately for some Indian patriotism is based on not worry about what is good for India but whose pro and anti camp one is in.

And therein lies the problem.

[PratikDas]

There is nothing bad about the LCA, despite what you say, Russophile.

Your exact comment was "Those a BRF legend with no real sanctity. There will be such legends for LCA too, its already starting" in response to issues with testing the T90 in Indian conditions. So don't try to make it look like you're now concerned about making products quickly. Your post count has no sanctity with me - yours or Austin's or Philip's.

Shall we talk about the "quickly" made AL-55I engine for the IJT? Shit flows out of Russia too.