CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

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ramana
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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 18 Feb 2018 11:22

Philip, As I said before India has a continental threat which is primarily an Army related. Until Pak is neutralized it's mainly Army primacy.

Current COS on rotation gives the other two a chance.


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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby SaiK » 19 Mar 2018 05:56

Image

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Nikhil T » 19 Mar 2018 11:05

^Not sure why this news is gaining so much attention. All it does is gives the ANC C-in-C explicit power over officers from all three services. This was always the case, atleast on paper. The ANC C-in-C is a three star officer who has three one-star officers from each of the three services reporting to him.

Frankly, it's telling that 17 years after the ANC was founded, we have to issue these "breakthrough" directives that should have been there on day one.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Philip » 19 Mar 2018 15:27

However,the fact that it has been put to paper officially,that any theatre commander can requisition and command assets from the two other services in his theatre,is a big step.I forsee a theatre commander appointed for the NEast,which would be obviously a 3* IA general. Some new designations will have to be given for the other theatres ,especially for the IOR with the enhanced maritime footprint of the IN,even unto the ICS and Pacific!

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 24 Apr 2018 22:29

http://bharatshakti.in/indias-national- ... -a-revamp/


Please post full text so it can be analyzed.

Thanks...



India’s National Security Architecture Set For a Revamp

April 24, 2018; By: Nitin A. Gokhale


The formation of Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the chairmanship of National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, reported by the media last week has naturally evoked a mix response among commentators and strategic experts. Some have predictably slammed the move, calling it an attempt to stymie appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the three services; others think the new body is just a stop gap arrangement to bring in better coordination among various arms of the government to revitalise the defence sector. Both opposing viewpoints miss the wood for the trees.

The DPC is much more than a body to just improve defence procurements or revitalise defence diplomacy. Its formation is part of a larger exercise ordered by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to review the existing structures that give inputs on vital national security issues and provide advice to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the highest decision-making body that finally approves crucial steps to protect India’s national interests.


To begin with therefore the PMO had asked, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) about a year ago to review the functioning of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and entrusted it with writing a National Security Strategy. [b]The NSAB recommended revamp of the NSCS some months ago, suggesting creation of new verticals to ensure focused attention to specific subjects. Four of those verticals–​Policy and strategy, Planning and capability development, Defence diplomacy and Defence manufacturing—have been included in the DPC. The other verticals will continue to remain under the NCSC but with more specialisation built into their functioning. So for instance, two separate sections on space and cyber security will take on board on-field practitioners for real-time utilisation of their skills.
[/b]

A draft National Security Strategy document—authored by a member of the NSAB–on the other hand is now ready to be presented for discussion at the highest level. By all indications, it is first likely to be discussed and debated at the NSA and NSAB level before being taken to the CCS and the PMO as early as mid-May. Once approved, a gist of the fresh National Security Strategy is likely to be put out in the public domain. If that happens, it would be a major departure from the past practice when India has fought shy of articulating leave alone putting out a National Security Strategy document in public. Those in the know say at least three versions of a National Security Strategy have been attempted in the past but none of them were either approved or released for public consumption.




Another development that has largely gone unnoticed is the formation of a China-specific, MEA-run and funded think tank. Called the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS), the new think tank will only study China from an Indian point of view. Manned by serving officers drawn from the MEA, the three armed forces, the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and other relevant ministries and departments, CCCS will prepare reports and undertake specific studies on China at the behest of different government departments to provide real-time policy inputs to the decision-makers dealing with China. So far instance, the CCCS can be asked to provide quick inputs by the Commerce Ministry on the impact of US trade sanctions against China and the likely advantage that can accrue to India. Or, recommend a future course of action in India’s (largely positive) relationship with North Korea post the Trump-Kim summit. The CCCS’ governing body is headed by the External Affairs Minister and the NSA is the deputy chairman.


The DPC, as already reported and analysed, has been entrusted with four major responsibilities. Of the four—mentioned in the preceding paragraphs—the section on defence procurements has attracted the most attention in the public discussion so far because of recent revelations that majority of India’s military arsenal is either outdated or is getting there quickly. As a consequence, the DPC is expected to first concentrate on repairing the dysfunctional procurement process and align future acquisitions with the quantum of funds that are likely to be available in the next few years. It is here that the inclusion of Secretary Expenditure from the Ministry of Finance in the DPC is welcome. While the Defence, Foreign and Home Secretaries have always been part of committees and groups entrusted to deal with strategic issues, it is perhaps for the first time in recent years that a finance ministry official has been included in a high-powered committee dealing with issues of national security.

Similarly, the fact the DPC is headed by NSA Ajit Doval is a clear indication that the Prime Minister continues to trust his NSA to evolve a comprehensive roadmap and get it implemented. Since Doval has the Prime Minister’s total trust, he can be expected to get things moving faster than they otherwise would have. The arrangement however also has pitfalls: Mr Doval already has too much on his plate (dealing with Pakistan, China, US and Russia for instance), heading the nuclear command authority and handling the overall security situation. Now to expect him to deliver on these crucial issues looks a challenging task. However, as a trusted man of the Prime Minister, the NSA has the necessary authority lacking in earlier committees that had suggested reforms and roadmaps to bring India’s national security architecture up to speed. Moreover, the committee can derive its strength from the fact that it constitutes serving officers and therefore will not be time or personality specific.
:?: :?: :?:

However, the formation of DPC has perhaps come a year too late. Its effectiveness would be demonstrated only after a couple of financial years have gone by. With general elections exactly a year away, there is very little the DPC can show as achievement before 2019. Would that hamper the functioning of the DPC? Perhaps not given that it is only one part of a larger change is that is being sought to be brought in in the larger national security framework.

Nitin A Gokhale




So DPC will have four vertical blocks in its organization structure. Interesting that two others (space and cyber Security) are still with NSCS.

Wish Nitin had included an org chart.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Aditya G » 25 Apr 2018 12:56

In modi sarkar the NSA is effectively the CDS ...... .

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 29 Apr 2018 22:57

Aditya G wrote:In modi sarkar the NSA is effectively the CDS ...... .
First, a junior minister as RM and now an IPS cadre as an ex-officio head of defense! :(

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby deejay » 30 Apr 2018 18:27

ShauryaT wrote:
Aditya G wrote:In modi sarkar the NSA is effectively the CDS ...... .
First, a junior minister as RM and now an IPS cadre as an ex-officio head of defense! :(

No sir, not junior at all. And NSA is not the CDS. People may have their opinions.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby pankajs » 02 May 2018 11:13

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... s?from=mdr
Joint logistics node set up at Andaman & Nicobar command

NEW DELHI: In a first, a joint logistics node has been set up at the tri-services command in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands, which will provide logistical support to all three defence services. The move aims to improve utilisation of resources, manpower and remove duplication.

There are plans to set up similar nodes at 12 or 13 locations in the western and north-eastern sectors, top defence ministry officials said.

The joint logistics node comprises of three elements – the Joint Logistics Command & Control Centre (JLC&CC), which is the overall command organisation, the Tri-services Detachment at Material Organisation (TRIDAMO), which will meet logistical needs of the armed forces and the Triservices Advanced Detachment (TRISAD), based on mainland and responsible for sending troops and equipment to the nodes.

The defence services was planning for long to create such nodes in areas where two or more services are located to cater to logistical needs, officials said. Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) in Port Blair was picked as a pilot project.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 03 May 2018 23:39

My complaint is Indian military is getting Americanitis which is suffering from excessive acromania.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ShauryaT » 07 May 2018 03:56

DPC turning out, as expected, to be yet another bureaucratic pimple - Bharat Karnad

It is early days for this entity but not having defense planning within the MoD headed by the RM really undermines an entire institution, where the RM does not matter to the process. The new setup will thrive and flounder based on the occupier of the NSA office and the NSA's proximity and importance to the PM. The NSA not being a constitutional office will necessarily be by and large personality driven. The history of personalities that have occupied this office has a lot to be desired to provide leadership on defense matters.

My only ray of hope is if this setup is a temporary route to a permanent CDS....

One report talked about the DPC chaired by NSA Ajit Doval with the three armed services chiefs — Admiral Satish Lanba, General Bipin Rawat, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, defence secretary Sanjay Mitra, expenditure secretary Ajay Jha, foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale, and Lt Gen Satish Dua heading the Integrated Services HQrs as member-secretary writing up the minutes, surveying the “geostrategic landscape” and deciding to come up with an äction plan. Another reported that the stress was on the military services alighting on a coordinated plan to avoid developing duplication and triplication of capabilities that would be mindful of the financial constraints and keep in view rapidly advancing technologies and the likely nature of the wars of the future. In this context, the navy was asked not to push for the third indigenous aircraft carrier (that NHQ had hoped would have on board the prohibitively costly electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) that the US Navy is finding to be unaffordable. All present also apparently agreed that the flab needs to be excised. That’s all that has come out in the public realm.

This is all very good, particularly the non-sanctioning of the EMALS carrier that this analyst has long suggested is a criminal waste of money and operationally will reduce the Indian navy’s footprint in the Indian Ocean, because the bulk of the not so very large naval forces will have to be deployed to protect its prized aircraft carriers — which however many ships are tasked as escorts will be unable to do given that the near future heralds the dawn of hypersonic glide weapons speeding to targets at Mach 7+ , superceding supersonic Brahmos-type missiles that had already rendered aircraft carriers obsolete as I have argued in my writings, and extensively in my last book, ‘Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet)’.

But these are operational aspects of force planning that the DPC, perhaps, will deliberate on, hopefully with an open mind, in the months to come. The basic problem, however, is with the forces that the services HQrs have planned. I have long contended that the Indian armed services, considering their organization and history, are not transformation-minded and, therefore, not transformation-enabled. What they have in mind when talking future war capability is beefing up the force structure in place with modern versions of weapons already in the arsenal. So it is one-for one replacement, which is all that they are catering for as their force planning predicate. This defeats the entire notion of a transformed military based on genuine integration in line function and in terms of support logistics, full-spectrum command, control and communications, and procurement.

Moreover, with robotic, functionally autonomous, weapons now being experimented with in terms of man-machine interface by advanced militaries, and with cyber capabilities integral to the offensive and defensive plans and generally warfighting, what the DPC should ideally do is design a future force guided by these defining metrics. This will necessitate configuring a singular future force with air, land, and naval elements that are slimmed down, and which will require the military’s “tail” to actually be lot bigger in size than “teeth”. This goes against the grain of the flawed understanding of trending military technology in govt and military circles, which is reflected in the illiterate Indian print and electronic media, and in DPC wanting “lean and mean” military forces. (Talk of banalities!)

Such force redesign is impossible without a military organization with a single head of the military — Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). CDS is what the Modi government promised before it was elected in 2014. Four years later the country gets the NSA as CDS (as the previous post in this blog argued) and in Doval, a policeman fixated on Pakistan and smaller and weaker neighbouring states, not a strategist with the mental wherewithal for strategic thinking. All you have to do is listen to the speeches he has delivered to-date (and to be found on youtube.com) to know that not a single original idea has ever been uttered by him on national security issues in the flood of banal statements that he has mouthed over the years. Hard to imagine then that overnight he will become a tremendous intellectual defence resource for the country, and hence even less likely he will be able credibly to give imaginative guidance to the services chiefs and MEA, or instruct the defence and expenditure secretaries to fork out the monies (which task — allocation of funds for military planning being beyond his brief as NSA-cum-DPC head).

What he will end up doing is leave it to the military chiefs to draw up plans. Whence, he can be certain there will be no re-orientation of the armed forces from Pakistan to China, and no restructuring of forces to follow in train, involving the rationalizing of the armoured-mech heavy land forces into a single composite armoured-mech corps with materiel and monies thus freed up diverted to raising and forward deployment of three offensive mountain corps for rapid debouching on to the Tibetan plateau for war. This would mean paying only lip service to the “Wuhan consensus” that Modi and Xi agreed on and which the foreign secretary Gokhale is threatening to implement when the trouble is there was no consensus. Jay Ranade, the Mandarin-speaking former RAW stalwart on China ops, for instance, points out that two very different communiques were issued at the end of the Wuhan Meet. The Indian version mentions “guidelines” issued by the principals to their respective militaries to ensure there’s no Dokla La redux, but the Chinese version, typically, has no such mention. Consequently, while India will put out — as per China friendly MEA’s faulty appreciation of what transpired at Wuhan, Beijing will sit pretty and do nothing other than maintain its agro on the LAC but await the Modi govt, prompted by Gokhale and his ilk to, as usual, do its trademark tail-between-the legs routine!

Meanwhile the defence secretary will again get to play god, and play off the three armed services against each other — because the DPC does not in any way sideline the defence secretary’s role. And the expenditure secretary will report to Finance Minister, Arun Jaitley, about the proceedings, allowing him to sit back do the normal thing when funds are scarce — fund programmes in drips and drabs to guarantee that India’s military can only beat up on small states, if that, and, in the event, that national security is no better off after the DPC than it was before. This is the reason why I had warned that the DPC will amount to nothing more than yet another bureaucratic pimple on the already pock-marked face of the Indian state.


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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Mukesh.Kumar » 05 Jul 2018 13:59

Swarajya on the need for Integration

The Indian Army has been the country’s first and most important weapon against external aggression. Today, threats have evolved, and this calls for a recalibration of approach.


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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby wig » 14 Jul 2018 11:12

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-ne ... qSQJJ.html

excertpts
In rare criticism, Navy officer blames IAF for ‘trust deficit’ between forces
There is stiff resistance from the Indian Air Force to theaterisation, or setting up of integrated commands where the assets of all three defence arms would come under the operational control of a three-star officer from any of the three services.

and
The paper, titled ‘The IAF and Theaterisation — Misplaced Apprehensions,’ is a deep dive into the military’s approach towards enhancing so-called jointmanship and its progression tow-ard theaterisation. Jointmanship refers to a degree of co-ordination and integration in terms of both strategy and execution across the three services. Theaterisation refers to placing under a Theatre Commander, specific units of the army, the navy, and the air force.

There is stiff resistance from the IAF to theaterisation, or setting up of integrated commands where the assets of all three defence arms would come under the operational control of a three-star officer from any of the three services, depending on the function assigned to that command.

“By continuing to stress on a ‘do it alone’ command structure, the IAF has only harmed itself. It has resulted in a weakening of trust with the other two services who have attempted to resolve the issue by investing into integral air power,” rear admiral Monty Khanna wrote.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 15 Jul 2018 04:34

We should revist the Kargil War time in the intervening period when Gen Malik was abroad and the COSC was in charge.

Unlike Marshal of Air Force Arjan Singh who supported the IA immediately , there was a big reluctance till much later.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Kakkaji » 15 Jul 2018 08:09

I see some merit in IAF's argument that they are the only service among the three services, that can shift its assets to, and fight in, different theatres within a day. So, they say they say the theater command concept will not work for them.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby chetak » 15 Jul 2018 08:20

Kakkaji wrote:I see some merit in IAF's argument that they are the only service among the three services, that can shift its assets to, and fight in, different theatres within a day. So, they say they say the theater command concept will not work for them.


with the kinds of BVR weaponry available now, this claim is a pipe dream.

Everything works well in theory.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ManuJ » 16 Jul 2018 01:10

How does the theater command concept preclude shifting of assets around?

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby RoyG » 16 Jul 2018 03:14

CDS at this stage is unrealistic. BJP doesn't want to deal with another power center if it has to deal with Cong and Judiciary. May wait till after GE. Army would naturally be the dominant service with manpower and industries backing them. Maybe a rotational system like USA would be best.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 31 Jul 2018 00:39

An insightful article on the state of US military higher education. Could be of relevance to India too.


To Produce Strategists focus on Staffing Senior Leaders

For all the resources invested in graduate-level professional military education (i.e., command and staff, and war colleges), senior officers often lament that these schools fail to produce the officers their services need. This sentiment is captured in an informal observation made by some flag and field grade officers alike, “Why do we call them command and staff colleges, when they produce neither commanders nor staff officers?Even the 2018 National Defense Strategy remarked on the stagnation of professional military education, noting it “focused more on the accomplishment of mandatory credit” than “lethality and ingenuity.”

Despite general dissatisfaction, those leading these institutions argue they are complying with guidance to meet military and academic requirements. The former come from the Goldwater-Nichols Act requirements for joint professional military education codified in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy. The latter are guided by regional academic accreditation requirements for awarding masters’ degrees, such as those articulated by the Higher Learning Commission. What, then, is the problem? Taken together, military and academic accreditation criteria produce generic, unfocused strategic studies curricula that fail to provide specific skills the military needs.

Almost all graduate-level professional military education curricula, for example, require overview courses in strategy and policy, the international system, and key domestic actors in the national security arena. These courses are important, but only tangentially prepare officers for future responsibilities as senior commanders and strategists. Moreover, officers who attend both intermediate and senior level schools learn many of the same things twice. Curricula do include some service-specific courses on doctrine and operational approaches. But, for the most part, graduate-level professional military education schools have evolved into relatively homogenous strategic studies programs, similar to those found at places like Georgetown University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, or Johns Hopkins University, but without the reputation, and arguably the rigor, of these schools (see Nichols Murray and James Joyner for a constructive exchange on academic rigor).

To train commanders, the military services compensate for the most serious curricula shortcomings by requiring separate, stand-alone preparatory courses for various levels of command. While this approach produces competent service commanders at the field grade and even flag levels, they tend to fall short at the strategic level. As Robert Scales noted in his piece, “Ike’s Lament,” “those who rise to the top of the strategic decision-making pyramid are too often poorly qualified for the task.” Moreover, no similar fix exists for current shortcomings in the development of senior staff skills. Even for graduates of more selective courses like the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, most staff education occurs on the job. Yet, learning how to staff a senior leader effectively is an educational issue, and a strategic one at that. Working for a principal like the secretary of defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or a combatant commander, is a demanding intellectual undertaking. It means reading widely, then making concise, accessible, and persuasive arguments under pressure about topics as diverse as the impact of technology on the future of war, the best way to shape regional and bilateral military-to-military relationships, and meaningful ways to build a more lethal force. This requires understanding a principal’s responsibilities, the need to offer and prioritize among (usually unsatisfying) options, and ultimately the importance of making a single recommendation to solve a vexing problem.

To reinvigorate graduate-level professional military education, the military could carve out a unique educational niche by focusing on intense, quality staff officer education that is more relevant to understanding the demands placed on top defense leaders. This education, coupled with demanding staff assignments, will hone officers’ analytical skills, set them up for success as strategists, and better prepare them for balancing competing imperatives when they become senior leaders.

Reshaping Professional Military Education Curricula

Recalibrating command and staff, and war college curricula to produce capable staff officers does not mean abandoning current programs and courses. It does, however, necessitate rebalancing curricula to focus on the needs of service and joint senior leaders. Curricula could immerse students in how these principals understand the large, ever-changing recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and employing issues that impact their institutions.

For example, the intermediate, or command and general staff, level could focus more on the challenges facing service chiefs and military department secretaries. This could help students understand how they approach major service issues (e.g., the future of war and its impact on service roles and missions, technological and organizational innovation, regional challenges unique to the services) and how their chiefs understand their responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the senior-level war colleges, curricula could focus more on staffing the senior joint leaders like the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the secretary of defense. For the former, this could include striking the proper balance of power between the chairman and the combatant commanders; exploring benefits and concerns over creating an empowered, centralized staff; or understanding joint and coalition operations better in a technology-dependent environment. For senior civilian leadership, it could be leveraging powerful military organizational cultures to meet interagency demands or execute presidential guidance, or how to ethically integrate artificial intelligence into defense requirements. No civilian graduate program should be able to even come close to accomplishing these goals as capably as a graduate-level professional military education school.

Once curricula are rebalanced, specific assignments could be redesigned as well. Rather than assigning students long research papers, more course assignments could be structured around writing short analytical memos (one to two pages), the ubiquitous 5” by 8” issue cards found throughout the Pentagon, speeches, and congressional statements. Done correctly, these could be substantive, well-argued pieces, not collections of clichéd phrases. Feedback on student assignments could be almost daily and direct. If a writing assignment misses the mark, the student could be required to rewrite it until it meets executive writing standards. Several of the assignments could be unannounced and with short timelines to mimic the intensity and disruptiveness experienced by a staff. Brief, analytical presentations could be assigned frequently to hone speaking skills. Some small percentage of students should be expected to fail, but with the understanding that a professional military education failure does not reflect on students’ technical expertise.

Role-playing has a place in graduate-level professional military education as well. In addition to learning how to staff a senior leader, students could assume the role of principal in mock congressional testimonies or briefings to secretary of defense where they are reliant on “staff” (also role-played by students) to succeed. Faculty could provide immediate, direct feedback about their performance. Experiences like these should reinforce the importance of good preparation and the unfortunate outcomes of poor staff work. They could also drive home the strategic dimensions of serving on senior staffs, to include when to take a decision rather than elevate it. In sum, faculty could reshape curricula to graduate thoughtful, quick-acting staff officers immediately ready to assist their senior leaders.

Finally, faculty might rethink the role of the guest speaker. Senior officers in particular tend to give lectures that combine an organizational update with a motivational talk for the students, usually about the rewards of command. This is a missed opportunity for the speakers and the students. Senior leaders could venture into the classrooms to listen to student presentations and review their written work. Their briefings to the student body could devote some time to frank, specific assessments on whether their staffs help or hinder when addressing large problems, and why. It is much harder to communicate the intangible, albeit strategic, importance and challenges of staff work, rather than the visible ones associated with command. Such comments would elevate the importance of a staff assignment beyond the common notion that they are mere intermissions between operational assignments. It would also acknowledge the developmental role these assignments play in producing talented strategists and future senior leaders.

Faculty and Academic Accreditation

Paradoxically, the greatest challenge to implementing curricula changes could come from within the civilian-dominated (pedagogically, if not numerically) graduate-level professional military education faculties. These civilian professors may have extensive experience in the academic research realm, but much less, if any, in the military staff world. Thus, not surprisingly, civilian faculty members could value performance on conventional academic assignments over those intended to develop staff skills. They may also be reluctant to sacrifice research time to meet the demands of daily grading. To make staff-oriented curricula work, the faculties could be rebalanced to include high-performing field grade officers who have excelled as strategists and on the staffs, as well as some retired principals to teach in either a full-time or adjunct capacity. Together they could provide essential feedback to the students, educate civilian faculty on the nuances and unique demands of staffing a senior leader, and visibly demonstrate that officers can still get promoted after teaching professional military education.

Faculty and staff also may argue that these changes could impact these schools’ accreditation to award graduate degrees. On one level, the response to this concern might be “so what?” Better to have unaccredited curricula that serves the senior leaders’ needs than the current program that awards master’s degrees but leaves almost everyone dissatisfied. On another level, accrediting bodies may appreciate the value of rigorous, uniquely designed curricula to meet a specific need, as long as faculty leaders can explain to them what they did and why. The ultimate sign of a professional military education program’s success, however, will be a senior leader requesting more graduates as soon as possible to serve on a headquarters’ staff. The Officer Professional Military Education Policy, in particular, should be considered a work in progress until that happens.

Outstanding strategists and staff officer exemplars should inspire curricula, faculty and students at intermediate and senior professional military education schools. Students should be pushed to analyze, integrate, and recommend options quickly and effectively to senior leaders for a wide variety of issues under demanding circumstances. Graduates assigned to a headquarters should be striving from the day they arrive to be value-added to their senior service commander, service chief, joint leader, or civilian principal. If they don’t arrive on a staff wondering each day how to support their principal better, command and staff, and war colleges have failed in their missions — and missed a golden opportunity to develop the next generation of military strategists and senior leaders in the process. Conversely, without significant reform, these institutions could continue to disappoint many of those they are intended to serve — until a major U.S. military leadership failure demands they change.



Paula Thornhill is a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general, educator, and a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND corporation.



Very good article. We on BRF can learn a few pointers from the author....

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby nachiket » 31 Jul 2018 03:17

chetak wrote:
Kakkaji wrote:I see some merit in IAF's argument that they are the only service among the three services, that can shift its assets to, and fight in, different theatres within a day. So, they say they say the theater command concept will not work for them.


with the kinds of BVR weaponry available now, this claim is a pipe dream.

Everything works well in theory.

Sir, what have BVR weapons to do with shifting of assets?

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby chetak » 31 Jul 2018 09:47

nachiket wrote:
chetak wrote:
with the kinds of BVR weaponry available now, this claim is a pipe dream.

Everything works well in theory.

Sir, what have BVR weapons to do with shifting of assets?


The thought of being targeted while in transit occurred to me.

Given the widespread presence of "eyes" in almost every location, it may not be able to carry out such movement with the secrecy and security required so, maybe, the possibility of advance inputs to concerned parties should be factored in during the movement of high value assets.

A strike from some distance would also serve the purpose.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby chetak » 31 Jul 2018 10:21

ramana wrote:An insightful article on the state of US military higher education. Could be of relevance to India too.


To Produce Strategists focus on Stafing Senior Leaders

For all the resources invested in graduate-level professional military education (i.e., command and staff, and war colleges), senior officers often lament that these schools fail to produce the officers their services need. This sentiment is captured in an informal observation made by some flag and field grade officers alike, [u]“Why do we call them command and staff colleges,

[b]Paula Thornhill is a retired U.S. Air Force brigadier general,
educator, and a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND corporation.



Very good article. We on BRF can learn a few pointers from the author....


Some efforts in this general direction are already going on.

Very recently, a discussion was held in Bangalore "Building the Intellectual Capacity for India's National Security System."

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 03 Aug 2018 21:20

Do you have a synopsis of that discussion?

Thanks, ramana

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 14 Aug 2018 02:57

OK. Here is a chance for history role playing buff. USI has an essay competition on

2. The essay for 2018must be on the following topic:
India’s Wars Since Independence: Would we have performed better if we had a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)?
There has been a demand for a CDS for some time but no decision has been taken so far. Would the presence of a CDS have affected the outcome of these wars? If so, in what manner?

3. Essay may vary in length between 3,500 to 4,500 words (including footnotes). .....




Link:
http://usiofindia.org/Events/MMEC/


We don't want that length but do have short paras on 1948, 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1987 IPKF.

And post here. should be all together in one post.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby deejay » 14 Aug 2018 07:18

ramana wrote:My complaint is Indian military is getting Americanitis which is suffering from excessive acromania.


Absolutely. This is the disease. Acromania is just one of the symptoms. There are other glaring symptoms from time to time.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 16 Aug 2018 21:58

ramana wrote:OK. Here is a chance for history role playing buff. USI has an essay competition on

2. The essay for 2018must be on the following topic:
India’s Wars Since Independence: Would we have performed better if we had a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)?
There has been a demand for a CDS for some time but no decision has been taken so far. Would the presence of a CDS have affected the outcome of these wars? If so, in what manner?

3. Essay may vary in length between 3,500 to 4,500 words (including footnotes). .....




Link:
http://usiofindia.org/Events/MMEC/


We don't want that length but do have short paras on 1948, 1962, 1965, 1971 and 1987 IPKF.

And post here. should be all together in one post.



All right since there are no takers I will write my short paras here.

1) India Kashmir War in 1948.

The war started with Pakistan sending raiders to occupy parts of Kashmir and force Maharaja Hari Singh to acceded to Pakistan the whole state of J&K. Indian fightback was mainly Indian Army with IAF in supporting role. Gen Cariappa was in charge of Indian Army and effectively was the CDS. However Mountbatten and Nehru were making the political decisions and the military was over ruled. The military gave a good account of themselves within the constraints allowed by the political setup. So having CDS would not have mattered.

2) India's China War in 1962

The war started with Chinese aggression on newly deployed Indian Army troops along the Northern borders. The IAF had no role expect to drop supplies to forward deployed troops. It was mainly an Indian Army fight. Here Gen. Thapar was the Chief of Army Staff. The civilians in control were Nehru and Krishna Menon and they rode roughshod over the Indian Army leadership and bypassed chain of command to Lt. Gen B.M. Kaul. Again CDS would not have mattered.

3) India-Pakistan War 1965

The war was started by Pakistan sending irregular troops into Kashmir and India responding. Gen. J.N. Chaudhri was the Indian Army chief. Marshal Of the Air Force Arjan SIngh was in charge of IAF. The political control was PM Lal Bahadur Shastri, Defence Minister Y.B Chavan. By all accounts, Shastri and Chavan gave operational freedom to Gen Chaudhri who was de-facto CDS. The war was well fought but at strategic level was badly led. Opportunities opened up by field victories were not used. Again CDS would not have mattered.

4) India-Pakistan War 1971

The war resulted in liberation of Bangla Desh. The political leadership was Mrs. Indira Gandhi with the Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram. The Indian Army was led by Field Marshal Manekshaw and IAF By ACM P.C. Lal and IN by Admiral S.M. Nanda. Here again Manekshaw was the de-facto CDS and the war was well coordinated with the other services and the CAPF. Here again it was the character and leadership of FM Manekshaw that he coordinated and gave proper advice to the civil leaders and enough operational flexibility to his field commanders to exploit the field victories. So he was de-facto CDS and very effective without the title.

I leave the IPKF, Kargil and Parakram to the readers.
In the Indian context the CDS role is superfluous in an operational sense.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby dinesha » 17 Aug 2018 21:21


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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 17 Aug 2018 22:26

He is making the ACM PC Lal case.
Would be stronger to say all of India is one theater with Western and Eastern sector. Southern Command is strategic reserve with training thrown in. Theater commands for IAF eould reduce AHW to a central logistics pool. This will effect chain of command.

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 21 Aug 2018 10:37

We need to add Defence reforms to the title

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... 1E.twitter

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 21 Aug 2018 10:39


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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby ramana » 23 Aug 2018 00:51

Circa 2009 CLAWS report on Kargil and has interviews with KS Garu and retired officers on the KRC report Defence reforms

http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc ... r_2009.pdf

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Re: CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

Postby Vips » 25 Sep 2018 03:04

Unified tri-service command to handle cyberspace, space, special operations.

The government is finally moving ahead to approve the creation of tri-Service organisations to handle the critical domains of cyberspace, space and special operations in modern-day warfare, but has virtually junked the proposal to establish a separate procurement body to streamline mega arms acquisitions.

The defence ministry (MoD) has found the recommendation to set up a centralised defence procurement organisation, with some autonomy to integrate the long-winded and cumbersome arms acquisitions, offsets, defence production and other such processes, to be “impractical and unworkable” as of now.

Government sources, however, say “at least two, if not all three” of the proposed agencies to handle cyberspace, space and special operations will soon be approved by the cabinet committee on security led by PM Modi. Modi is slated to address the combined commanders’ conference at the Jodhpur airbase on September 28.

At the last such interaction with the military brass, held at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun in January 2017, Modi had stressed the need for better “jointmanship” among the armed forces, which need to become far more agile and lethal with better teeth-to-tail ratios.

India certainly needs a tri-Service chief or chief of defence staff to inject some much-needed synergy in logistics, planning, procurements and training among the three forces, who often pull in different directions, as well as to provide “single-point” military advise to the government.

Similarly, there is no getting away from the need to have theatre commands in the long run to integrate the air, land and sea assets under single operational commanders for a greater military punch from limited budgetary resources. But politico-bureaucratic apathy, inter-Service turf wars and lack of long-term strategic planning have stymied systemic reforms in the defence establishment so far.

The original proposal, for instance, was for full-fledged commands under Lt-Generals (three-star generals) to handle the rapidly-expanding challenges in space, cyberspace and clandestine warfare, especially with China making huge investments in all the three domains. But it has been gradually truncated to setting up much smaller tri-Service agencies under Major-Generals (two-star), as was first reported by TOI earlier.


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