41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 16 Dec 2016 04:48

Its already 16 Dec in India. Here is an article on the genocide in Bangladesh and how Pakistan got away:

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/pub ... nt_id%3D46


Fellow blames India and Bangladesh and glosses over the role of the US.

Any the idiot Nixon ended up resigning his Presidency with infamous "I am not a crook" words.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 16 Dec 2016 10:37

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/war-decisively-won/

excerpts from an article penned by a retired solider. I do wish we could do something for the 54 Prisoner of War still held by Pakistan. The

After the 71 war, while at Poonch, men would wish to walk across to Rawalpindi and pick up Benazir Bhutto. That was the state of morale. Today I think, had we attempted, we would have probably succeeded. I wish to assure my civilian friends that so long as morale of the armed forces is high, it can win any and every war, even proxy, irrespective of the adversary.
India released all Pak PoWs in good faith. Pakistan, on the other hand, released only 617, holding back 54 who are still languishing in its jails. India should have used the leverage of 93000 PoWs to get POJK vacated. A rare opportunity was wasted. The Indian leadership was taken for a ride into believing Pak sincerity. Despite assurances Pak never abided by its promises, written or verbal. Fruits of a hard-fought victory in the battlefield were frittered away on the negotiating table by the generous leadership. Hajipir, Chhamb and 93000 prisoners were given away without any strategic gains. Pakistan has hurt us the most. She should never be trusted. Whenever an opportunity arises, Pakistan must be humiliated. Celebration of Victory Day with great pomp and show is one such way besides which grand size hoardings of ‘Surrender Ceremony’ be erected outside the Pak High Commission and many other prominent places in J&K and Delhi.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Kashi » 16 Dec 2016 11:10

The Baki Yawn and thugboom seem to have largely ignored this day. In the years gone by, there would be a flurry of blogs lamenting the loss of the colony of East Pakistan. This year you barely see 1 or 2 and most of them are "reprints". New edict from ISPR?

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Sanju » 16 Dec 2016 23:44

They are getting ready to write the loss of other areas...

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 17 Dec 2016 04:59

Cutting Pakistan in 71 was Indian Army's finest performance while the Navy challenged the U.S. 7th Fleet
http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=189620

This day forty five years ago saw the finest feat of the Indian Armed Forces in more than a millennium. Last victory of India over a major foreign army was when Chandragupta Maurya defeated Seleucus Nicator in 323 BC. India defeated Pakistan. The capitulation was complete when Lt. General AAK Niazi, commander of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan handed over his pistol to Lt. General JS Aurora , Goc-in-C, eastern command, India. It was the biggest surrender. 93,000 personnel, both military & civilian became prisoners of war.

Indian pluralism was at its shining best during the signing of the instrument of surrender. They surrendered “to a Sikh General after negotiating terms with a Jew, both of whom reported to an army chief who was Parsi”. India had stood up to international bullying. The US seventh fleet had sailed in to the Bay of Bengal where the Indian Navy was in operation. But it was too late to alter the course of war. Captain of one Indian Naval Ship sought instructions from his fleet commander about the course of action on sighting the US Navy. ‘Wish them Bangladesh Standard Time’, the fleet commander instructed! It is no longer East-Pakistan'.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 17 Dec 2016 05:03


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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 17 Dec 2016 05:11

Who says that the Indian Army doesn't have a sense of humour? Bangladesh 16 December 1971
https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/status/809611152334487552


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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 18 Dec 2016 01:10

Great series of articles! Tomorrow marks 55 years since the liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule. That ought to be remembered too. There is a small but vocal tribe of nay sayers and just plain anti-India jerks, Neville Maxwell among them, who belittle the actual operation. In their view, India's action was barely worthy of note, because the Portuguese offered little resistance. It's another matter, of course, that these d*ckheads are the same ones who condemn India for launching the liberating attack in the first place. In Canada, the Globe and Mail was most vociferous in condemning India( I looked this up on micro-film). But in the letters pages of the paper, several readers supported India, and denounced Adlai Stevenson, the secretary of state under JF Kennedy, for criticising India. The Toronto Star was far more restrained, and while not praising the Indian action, did not denounce it either.

So was it an impressive action militarily, or not really? There were 22 Indian and 30 Portuguese dead. It ended Portuguese rule of Goa, and was a catalyst for liberation movements against Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby komal » 03 Jul 2017 07:36


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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 28 Sep 2017 05:13

This Thrilling Escape by IAF Pilots from Pakistan in 1971 is Now a Crowdfunded Film!
https://www.thebetterindia.com/116354/e ... sh-sinhji/

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 05 Oct 2017 07:49

1971 War: The Battle of Fazilka
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... f-fazilka/

By Major General Sukhwant Singh

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 10 Oct 2017 03:34

Link to

1971 India-Pakistan War: A Modern War

Study by a Royal Canadian Artillery major.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Kashi » 10 Oct 2017 08:25

^^
Pakistan had humiliated India in the war over Kashmir in 1965. ... New Delhi was determined to not be defeated again by Pakistan.


The Canadian major could not hide his Pakiness could he? It seem Paki benefactors in the West were and remain desperate to give any and all accolades to Bakis, even if largely imagined.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rahul M » 10 Oct 2017 08:28

paper dates back to 1984

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Kashi » 10 Oct 2017 08:40

Rahul M wrote:paper dates back to 1984


Yes, when Pakistan was the darling of the West and the frontline state in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Pro-Pak feelings must have been high in most if not all Western military circles.

It's these folks who must have manned most of the senior positions at the turn of the century and thus, the continued mollycoddling of TSP.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 11 Oct 2017 05:08

tsarkar, and Philip, Try to Google for "No Easy Answers" by James Goldrick, RAN

Its an account of IN, PN and BDN from 1947 through 1972.

pdf book based on thesis of the writer at USNWC.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 12 Oct 2017 05:15

A Tribute to INAS 310 Cobra Squadron in the 1971 Eastern Theatre
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... n-theatre/

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ShauryaT » 28 Nov 2017 23:39

The Puzzle of the 1972 Shimla Summit, Or Why India Did Not Impose Its Will

In their quest to shape the post-war order, Indira Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2017 05:47

Nov 27, 1971 is when the first IAF encounters in East Pakistan started.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2017 06:37

ShauryaT wrote:The Puzzle of the 1972 Shimla Summit, Or Why India Did Not Impose Its Will

In their quest to shape the post-war order, Indira Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.



Full article with my comments

Indira Gandhi’s reputation for shrewd statecraft is widely acclaimed, even by her fiercest detractors. Her quest for peacemaking was equally bold, as witnessed by India’s approach to the 1972 peace conference at Shimla. The 1972 case, however, is intriguing for what it did not reflect – India not leveraging the fruits of the 1971 war victory to produce an advantageous geopolitical settlement. After all, for the first time since Partition, India was negotiating from a position of (POWs) strength and prestige with Pakistan; 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war , including the entire military leadership in East Pakistan, had surrendered to Indian forces. India had also captured strategic locations in Kashmir and 5,000 square miles of Pakistan’s territory in Sindh and south Punjab.


Yet, historians have never adequately resolved the puzzle of why India did not impose its will as a victor. While most interpretations of India’s approach to this post-conflict phase have been polemical, the available evidence reveals that ambitious strategic objectives informed India’s negotiating behaviour. In their quest to shape the post-war order, Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.


Indian calculus

The post-1971 international and regional context had made reaching some kind of an agreement an important policy goal for Gandhi and her national security team. Having engaged in a successful war that liberated Bangladesh, policymakers sought to further buttress India’s status by also demonstrating a credible attempt at peace. Elevating India’s image, of course, had to be balanced by attaining concrete outcomes. The most desirable outcome would have been a final resolution in Kashmir around the de facto-administered position of both sides. The evidence suggests that policymakers sought to address some of the deeper roots of the India-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir, which was perceived as a direct manifestation of Pakistan’s national identity rather than a normal inter-state territorial impasse. P.N. Haksar, Gandhi’s leading foreign policy advisor, later wrote that India’s approach was based on “a recognition that Pakistan continued to have an unresolved crisis of its national identity”. 1971 had opened the possibility for an alternative future for Pakistan.

In a memo drafted shortly after the war, Haksar described the flux across the border: “The military-bureaucratic and feudal social order had crumbled…Pakistan of Yahya Khan had suffered political and military defeat. It is a nation in ferment seeking new identity for itself.” Having framed the adversary’s precarious internal balance, Haksar introspected on how India should “act towards the emergence of new forces in Pakistan”. Invoking lessons from the past, he argued, “At the end of the Second World War, a lesson was learnt by the victorious powers not to treat the defeated nations and impose upon them a greater humiliation than that produced by the defeat itself. India, proud of its position as a responsible country in South Asia, had to act with wisdom and foresight in its dealings with the new Pakistan”.


{I think a big fundamental mistake was to think Pakistan is a modern state. It is a feudal setup and invoking lessons of WWI and WWII to imagine an alternative future for Pakistan was wrong with out breaking the feudal structure. Further in WWII, the Western allies were preparing to confront Soviet Union by rebuilding war torn Europe. and had the lessons of the Versailles Armistice and war reparations that had devastated the Weimar Republic and led to rise of Hitler. Besides a strong de-Nazification program and Nuremberg trials were undertaken to remake the German society. I think P.N. Haksar was wrong to give incorrect lessons to Indira Gandhi.}

D.P. Dhar, another important confidante of Gandhi and the lead Indian negotiator, also appeared to endorse Haksar’s basic sentiment. In his telegram to Haksar in March 1972, Dhar noted: “The (Simla) settlement will not be between the victor and the vanquished because such a settlement has in history led to renewed and more violent conflicts. A settlement on the contrary…should be and would also be made to appear as the end of a chapter of acrimony between two estranged brothers”. But we also now know that Dhar was less enamoured with the prospect of change inside Pakistan than ensuring that India was seen to be making a credible effort at peacemaking. And, most importantly, he wanted India to extract unambiguous gains during the negotiating process. For Dhar, without a resolution of the Kashmir issue there could be “no hope of permanent peace in the subcontinent”.


{If the lead negotiator was clear about the preferred outcome then where did it go astray?}

In essence, there were two rival strategies at the apex level in the lead up to the Shimla talks. Dhar as the quintessential realist “sought to take full advantage of the military victory” and make Indian concessions (i.e. Pakistani POWs and territorial gains) “conditional” on Pakistan’s acceptance of a final Kashmir settlement. If Pakistan rejected such an approach, his policy advice was that India should “continue a state of armed hostility short of war”. The alternative constructivist approach was embodied by Haksar, who in addition to immediate territorial goals also sought an ambitious vision for “subcontinental peace and stability” by assisting in Pakistan’s domestic transformation.


{So in other words Haksar approach prevailed and led to the failure. Haksar seems to be deluded with UK Liberal ideas of peace in our time rhetoric and did not read Indian history.}

These complex images are perhaps a good proxy for Gandhi’s own attitude before the Shimla summit. The perceived opportunity to exploit the possibility for an internal transformation of Pakistan’s body politic seems to have persuaded Indian policymakers to approach the Shimla negotiations by a dual, if not competing, preference to avoid weakening the new civilian leadership in Pakistan led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and, simultaneously extracting new conflict resolution norms from the same leadership.

{The perceived opportunity was a dreamy image in Indian policy makers and was never an opportunity at all. }{/I]

It was this inherent tension in these dual strategic aims that arguably conditioned India’s overall posture on the eve of the Shimla summit. Interestingly, India did have some prior insights into Pakistan’s approach to the summit after the Soviet leadership’s meeting with Pakistan’s lead negotiator, Aziz Ahmed. On June 27, Moscow cabled Delhi that although Ahmed had stressed that Pakistan intended to insist firmly on the old ceasefire line, “it seems to us that the Pakistani side had a reserve position on the problem of Kashmir…Ahmed made to understand, that Bhutto is ready, in principle, to consider the possibility of converting the ceasefire line into the permanent international frontier”.


[I]{Yet this was not pressed. What the adversary was comfortable agreeing to was not driven home.}


The actual negotiations began on June 28, 1972 and lasted five days, with India persisting with Dhar’s approach where India’s return of the POWs and occupied territory was made part of a package settlement via a durable agreement on formally defining the frontier in Kashmir. In the opening session on June 28, Dhar made it clear that concluding a peace settlement was an “essential” prerequisite for the repatriation of the POWs. On June 29, he sought a clear framework. Any “agreed formulation should be in conformity with the existing situation” and “capable of implementation”. Dhar emphasised “the world was fast moving towards bilateralism”. Ahmed, however, offered minimal commitments and strove to retain the old UN-centric conflict resolution framework. Haksar too stressed that India and Pakistan should “solve our own problems” without “involving distant countries into our disputes”.
On June 30, Dhar suffered a minor heart attack with Haksar assuming the lead for the remainder of the summit. India’s negotiating thrust, however, remained consistent.


Haksar now focused more directly on Kashmir. He said that India “would like to remove the endless curse of conflicts on the question of Kashmir” and “if there was no understanding, a new situation would be created which would require serious consideration”, the latter a thinly veiled threat. On July 1, in a session that included the heads of government, Gandhi noted that “the ceasefire line” in Kashmir had “no validity” and “did not keep the peace”. T.N. Kaul, the foreign secretary, reiterated the core basis of a deal: “repatriation and withdrawal (of Indian forces in the West)” would “have to be part of durable peace and can take place only after durable peace has been established.” A chagrined Ahmed retorted, “We have agreed to everything except Kashmir.” Bhutto then invoked domestic pressure: “My back is to the wall; I cannot make any more concessions”. But the Indian side still gave no signs of relinquishing its core bargaining strategy of a package settlement. On the fifth day, July 2, the negotiations broke down after Ahmed rejected India’s proposals saying that Pakistan “cannot accept that the ceasefire line had ceased to exist.”

Hoping to salvage an agreement, Bhutto called directly on Gandhi. During this climactic meeting, Gandhi underscored the primary advantage of India’s Kashmir proposal – neither side was required to physically relinquish territory or exchange populations. With “feeling and apparent sincerity” Bhutto admitted that while India’s proposal was the only feasible one, a formal legally binding commitment would severely weaken his domestic position and strengthen the military establishment. He could not offer more than a verbal assurance that the de facto border in Kashmir would gradually acquire, in Bhutto’s words, the “characteristics of an international border”. In contrast, India’s concession was concrete and upfront. India gave up its “package settlement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before an agreement on Kashmir is reached”.


A hope belied

The following day Gandhi admitted to Kaul that while she did “not trust Bhutto”, she “wanted to make a gesture to the people of Pakistan with whom we have ultimately to settle this question”. This was based on a belief, mistaken as it eventually turned out, that Pakistan was on the cusp of a structural transformation after its shock defeat, and, one that India should enable rather than thwart. Gandhi told parliament in August 1972: “There is a great change in Pakistan. It may be that the Pakistanis did not want that change. But the change is there regardless of whether they desire it or not”. It is apparent that policymakers were torn between seeking immediate security gains and holding out for a more durable regional order. Such an order was predicated on the possibility of a new Pakistan that might substitute Islam with a modern secular ideology.


{I]{This is type zero error. Solving the wrong problem precisely. The Indian side had no clue what was happening in Pakistan, nor understood the raison d'etere of its creation and were deluded. They squandered the 1971 victory. We can blame Indira Gandhi ultimately as Haksar was a minion. An educated but unwise minion}[/I]

Proceeding from such an overall outlook, policymakers did not fully seek to leverage the fruits of victory on the battlefield to ruthlessly bend the defeated party on the bargaining table. Key strategists, particularly Haksar, believed that a modicum of Indian benevolence might facilitate Pakistan’s internal transformation at a critical turning point in the civil-military and socio-political balance in that state’s history. For Haksar, India had to avoid adding to Pakistan’s “political adventurers who play upon Indo-phobia mixed by Islamic atavism”. Haksar’s advice to Gandhi was that India had “a vested interest in seeing there is democracy in Pakistan”. But there is evidence that a realpolitik, if cynical worldview, also had apex level support through Dhar regarding India’s bargaining posture at Simla. However, it is unlikely that this belief was ever strong enough to sway Haksar’s image of reassurance and co-existence. As P.N. Dhar, another PMO advisor at the time, recalled, “The overriding consideration for India was to put an end to its adversarial relations with Pakistan and forge an instrument that would help build a structure of durable peace in the subcontinent”. Nevertheless, Indian negotiators did take their Pakistani interlocutors to the water’s edge.

{This is wrong reading. D.P. Dhar was out of commission after his heart attack. And P.N. Haksar was holding sway and had a deluded idea of peace with Pakistan. More could have been achieved by releasing the 93,000 POWs unilaterally to return to Pakistan and that could have set off forces of change.}


Ultimately, Gandhi emerged as the swing factor between the assertive and accommodative postures in the finale at Shimla. The alternative of calling Bhutto’s bluff and walking away without any agreement was deemed too costly for Gandhi and Haksar after India’s dramatic 1971 triumph. The self-restraint underlying India’s posture was all too palpable to the Pakistanis. Ahmed, their lead negotiator, later remarked that despite holding “all the bargaining chips”, India’s “excessive anxiety to avoid the failure of the talks at any cost became its major handicap”. Haksar later noted, “‘Negotiating from strength’ has been made part of diplomatic coinage. But to negotiate with someone who is manifestly weak is even more difficult”.

{What a bull shitter.}

In more immediate geopolitical terms, India’s main gain was the conversion of the UN-endorsed 1949 ceasefire line in Kashmir into a hardened Line of Control (LoC) based on the new December 17, 1971 ceasefire position. It was at the political and symbolic level where Indian policymakers could claim some success. The Shimla Agreement was an expression of the Indian framework for South Asian security, namely the norm of bilateralism. Ever since India’s fateful decision in 1948 to seek third-party mediation in the India-Pakistan conflict, policymakers had struggled to limit the interference of external actors in the Kashmir dispute. Krishna Menon’s UN interventions in 1957 were the first diplomatic expressions of seeking to disentangle India from third party involvement. In 1965, the norm of bilateralism had been implied, although ironically, at a third party venue in Tashkent under proactive Soviet diplomatic efforts. In 1972, Indian policymakers explicitly enshrined this principle at Shimla.

Zorawar Daulet Singh is a fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.



So we can blame Indira Gandhi and P.N. Haksar for the non-victory at Shimla.
And the root cause was delusions of grandeur.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 30 Nov 2017 06:13

Operation Trident, 1971: How Indian Navy Pulled Off One Of Its Greatest Victories
https://www.thebetterindia.com/122592/o ... -pakistan/

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 14 Dec 2017 19:42

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 444282.cms

during the intervening night of 13 & 14 dec 1971 Operation 'Mandhol' was conducted in Poonch.
the heroic soldiers waded through neck deep water to reach the objective which subsequently they utterly destroyed.
The article is dated 2013.

While hundreds of brave soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the operation 'Mandhol' carried out by 9 Para Commandos unit in Poonch sector of Jammu and Kashmir was the only classical commando raid executed by special forces in the war.
In this operation, the Para Commandos or special forces of the Indian Army had carried the first raid after their formation by entering enemy territory and eliminating their artillery guns
.

Chandigarh-based Colonel (retd) K D Pathak was then a captain and second-in-command of the company of 120 men who had carried out the remarkable operation, which made Pakistan change its war doctrine. Operation 'Mandhol' is also part of the curriculum in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, where cadets are trained as future officers of the Army.

Recalling the night of December 13 and 14, 1971, Col Pathak, 73, said his unit was posted at 'Nangi Tekri' post at the height of 4,665 feet in Poonch sector and was assigned the task of destroying Pakistan's artillery guns positioned near Mandole village, which was around 19km southwest of Poonch. Six 122mm Chinese guns of Pakistani battery were creating trouble for 93 and 120 Infantry brigades of the Indian Army.

"We started around 5.30pm on December 13 with one company comprising six officers and around 120 men of 9 Para Commando unit led by Major C M Malhotra," Col Pathak recalled.

According to Col Pathak, it was a cold night and they had to cross waist-deep water of Poonch river to reach Mandole. On reaching the village, they found it completely deserted, but the raiding party locate the enemy guns with the help of an old man. After tracing the gun positions, the party was split into six groups with each attacking one gun. After a fierce battle with the enemy all guns were destroyed with the help of pencil-cell connected timer explosives. During the fight, many soldiers of Pakistan army were killed while several fled. The raiding party of Indians lost two of its men while 20 were wounded.
"It was also an uphill task to return to our territory with wounded soldiers and the body of a soldier. Cots, taken from villages, were improvised and turned into stretchers to carry the wounded soldiers. We reached our post at 6.30am," Pathak recounted.
He, however, has one grouse that their feat was recognized only when the delegations of the Pakistan Army, after ceasefire, narrated the heroic act carried out by the Indian troops at Mandhol. "The act of the raiding team did not fetch it many gallantry awards, but for the overall operations in the Poonch sector, the Para Commandos were awarded the 'Battle Honour' in the 1971 war. What can be more proud for the Para Commandos that the operation carried out by them is part of the curriculum of IMA," Pathak said.

The 'Mandhol' operation had so deep an impact on the Pak Army that it had to raise a second line of troops to secure their artillery guns thereby making a change in its war doctrine.


Last edited by ramana on 15 Dec 2017 03:36, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Added bold and underline. Ramana

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 15 Dec 2017 03:41

Lots of takeaways from this operation.

Attacking by a company ensured sufficient force.
Attack by wading waist deep in the dark ensured surprise for the enemy forces.
And dividing into six parties to destroy the six guns ensured focus and sufficient force to attain the objective. Each gun got half a platoon attacking party.

The old man as a guide was fortunate.

And it was a 12 hour operation from start to finish.

Casualties were two dead and 20 wounded. No men were left behind. improvised stretchers were used for evac.

Biggest impact is Pak Army had to raise second line troops to protect their batteries from commando raids.

This op would make a very good movie.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 16 Dec 2017 03:20

Weapons for 3 IAF pilots’ escape from Pakistan POW camp: a spoon, a fork & a plateful of guts
https://theprint.in/2017/12/15/iaf-pilo ... spoon-for/

Group Captain Dilip Parulkar and Wing Commander Melvinder Singh Grewal
Photo Courtesy: Bharat Rakshak

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 16 Dec 2017 03:22

Two Indian Air Force prisoners of war on their audacious escape plan from a Rawalpindi jail in 1971
https://theprint.in/2017/12/15/indian-p ... stan-1971/

A Sukhoi 7 aircraft. Both IAF pilots shot down over Pakistan were flying this aircraft
Photo Courtesy: Aeroprints.com

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 16 Dec 2017 05:56

14-16th Dec 1971 - Inside Enemy Camp
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... nemy-camp/

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 21 Dec 2017 11:05

http://www.asianage.com/india/all-india ... backs.html
India-Pak tank warfare and Pak military’s drawbacks
During the run-up to the 1971 India-Pakistan war, after one of the many operational conferences held in 4th Horse (also known as Hodson’s Horse), Maj. S.J. (later Lt. Col.) “Jiti” Chaudhary, C Squadron commander, declared that he would consider “being at war” only when a tank of Hodson’s Horse stood on Pakistani soil and fired a round from its 20 pounder gun and that he would then concede a bottle of Scotch to any person taking him on for a bet. On December 5-6, 1971 moments before this regiment’s B Squadron crossed the international border, its commander, then Maj. (later Brig.) Jasbir “Jas” Hundal called Jiti on the radio: “Jas to Jiti… standby… (in the background)… sabot 800, on tank, fire (boom), main gun destroyed enemy OP (observation post) tower… Over.” Jiti responded: “Jiti to Jas okay... okay… stop rubbing it in… you’ll get your bottle!” This is the regiment which led the advance into Pakistan across the Basantar river, known as Degh Nadi in Pakistan and remained in the lead till the end of the 13-day war. Destroying disproportionately large number of Pakistan armoured corps’ then quite new Patton tanks with World War II vintage Centurions, the CO, Lt. Col. (later Lt. Gen.) R.M. Vohra, was awarded Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), majors Govind Singh, Kamal Nanda and Jiti Chaudhary were awarded Vir Chakra (VrC). Jas Hundal was short-changed by being awarded Sena Medal (SM), because the infantry company commander fighting alongside his squadron, Maj. (later Col.) Hoshiar Singh, 3 Grenadiers, got one of the two Param Vir Chakra (PVC) of that war.

Maj. (later Brig.) Amarjit Singh Bal was commanding a squadron of 17th Horse (Poona Horse), which was to establish and defend a secure bridgehead on the Basantar river in Shakargarh area. Located at Jarpal, overlooking the river, his squadron was most vulnerable to enemy attack. Despite heavy shelling by Pakistan artillery and repeated counter-attacks while being heavily outnumbered for over two days, Maj. Bal was able to inspire his men to repel, destroying as many as 27 Pakistani Patton tanks. Maj. Bal was awarded the MVC.

Another officer of the Poona Horse and the youngest to get the PVC — posthumously — was Arun Khetarpal, whose role in the Battle of Basantar did not end with this 13-day war, resulting in the demise of East Pakistan and the creation of the newly-liberated Bangladesh. Maj. Khwaja Mohammad Nasir, the squadron commander of Pakistan Army’s 13 Lancers fighting against Poona Horse, who came bandaged the next day to collect the dead bodies of his fallen comrades, wanted to know more about “the officer, who stood like an insurmountable rock” and whose troop of three Centurion tanks was responsible for decimation of his entire squadron of 14 Patton tanks. His bandages were owing to injuries sustained by him in the final engagement of his and Khetarpal’s tank. 13 Lancers is the same regiment which exchanged its Sikh squadron with the Muslim squadron of Poona Horse during Partition in 1947.

Nasir’s tribute to Khetarpal did not end in the battlefield in December 1971. Arun’s father, Brig. (retd) Madan Khetarpal, residing with his wife Maheshwari in New Delhi, had for long nursed a desire to visit his hometown Sargodha, Pakistan. Speaking to this writer, he mentioned that in 2001 when he founded his old friend, retired Lt. Gen. Kirpal Singh Randhawa of 7 Cavalry, who after retiring had visited Pakistan a number of times, took his passport and brought it back a few days later with the Pakistan visa stamped on it. Not only that, he had also arranged with his Lahore’s Aitchison College-mate, the same Khwaja Mohammad Nasir, by then a brigadier and manager of Pakistan’s cricket team to host Brig. Khetarpal. During this visit, Nasir hesitatingly admitted that he was the one at whose hands Arun got killed. “…he (Arun) was singularly responsible for our failure. He was a very brave boy…” said Nasir to the senior Khetarpal, who even in his sorrow, stoically remained the “officer and a gentleman”.


Lt. Col. (later Brig.) Sukhjit Singh was commanding 14 Horse (Scinde Horse), which was deployed in Shakargarh. On the night of December 8, the regiment crossed into enemy territory and established itself near Nainakot. On December 10, Pakistan forces launched a powerful armoured attack which the regiment resisted determinedly. Leading from the front, Sukhjit directed his tanks with great skill and courage. The enemy having lost one of its tanks retreated. The next day Sukhjit led an operation to capture enemy tanks at Malakpur under heavy artillery and mortar fire. Unruffled, he surged ahead and in the ensuing engagement eight tanks and some Pakistani officers were captured. Sukhjit was awarded the MVC for his inspirational leadership.

7 Cavalry deserves mention for Maj. (later Lt. Gen.) M.S. Shergill getting a Vir Chakra for capture of Chak Amru railway station and pushing two enemy tank regiments 15 km backwards.

Eastern Theatre
Interestingly, the war in the Eastern sector began on November 20, 1971. In the Eastern sector there were three-plus regiments — 45 Cavalry, 69th Armoured Regiment (both holding Soviet Russian amphibious PT 76 tanks), 63 Cavalry and 7 Cavalry’s independent squadron. 45 Cavalry’s tanks crossed the Kabadak river under heavy enemy fire which they returned while afloat and along with the other mentioned armoured units hastened the end of war by destroying Pakistan’s armoured regiments. Pakistani troops vented out their frustration by mutilating Lt. Chandavarkar, the youngest of 45 Cavalry officers. Unfortunate to be caught by the enemy, he was tied to a tree and for each question that was not answered, he lost a limb or an organ. The Pakistani JCO in charge chopped off his ear lobes, fingernails, toes and fingers, and finally gouged out his eyes before shooting him in the chest.

45 Cavalry’s CO, Col. Sidhu saw death at close quarters when his tank came under fire from the enemy forces. “One of the enemy tanks opened fire and shot me as well as my tank. My gunner died. The rest of the crew came out and started crawling back to our positions. I waved a white handkerchief at our own infantry while crawling back so that they don’t shoot me. I had around 200 splinters in my leg and could not walk. My face was absolutely white,” he recalled. Brig. Balram Mehta, author of The Burning Chaffees wrote: “When the word came that our Squadron Commander Maj. Narag was martyred, my tank’s gun started malfunctioning and could not fire... And then suddenly, three Chaffee tanks came in front of us. We ultimately destroyed one of them and saw its driver coming out. My gunner asked my permission to fire (at him). But I didn’t let him do it. When he was later brought as a prisoner of war, he thanked us for the cup of tea.”


the Pak army mutilated Lt Chandvarkar. It seems to be standard Paki behavior. In 1999 it was Lt Kalia and the troops under his command who suffered a similar fate.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 09 Feb 2018 17:52

The Hero of Beriwala Bridge,
This is the story of the battle where Major Narain Singh, Vir Chakra, 4 Battalion, The Jat Regiment made the supreme sacrifice
The paki army -with usual perfidy - attired as civilians infiltrated the outskirts of Fazilka township
excerpts

Fazilka town is testimony to one of the fiercest battles fought during 1971 Indo-Pak War ; its soil still sings the saga of Major Narain’s bravery. During 1971 in a surprise action, Pakistan made an attempt to capture Fazilka town. However, the grit, determination and courage shown by the brave Indian soldiers thwarted the enemy’s sinister designs and left him with a bleeding nose.
It was on the evening of 3rd December 1971 that the enemy ,disguised as civilians and under heavy shelling, infiltrated along with fleeing villages of Beriwala into Indian territory and captured Beriwala Bridge on Sabuna Ditch Cum Bundh (DCB).
Pakistan attacked the Indian defense with approximately one infantry brigade of 2500 men and 28 tanks. Supported by heavy artillery fire, they captured village Pakka by the dawn of 4th Dec 1971. Thereafter the enemy headed towards Fazilka with tanks and heavy force. Their attacks however, were beaten back with heavy casualties. 4 JAT attacked valiantly from Gurumukhkhera village to prevent the enemy’s advancement further from Beriwala Bridge towards Fazilka. Fierce battle was fought for fourteen days to prevent the enemy from making any further gains. Both sides suffered very heavy losses in hand to hand fight around Beriwala Bridge.
In Pakistani folklore, it is one of the most talked about battles of 1971 war; one of the few operations glorified in an otherwise despondent time for the nation. It was the battle of Majors-one from each side, both hot-blooded and fierce-who wrestled for the control of a key bridge which finally ended in hand-to-hand combat. Major Shabbir Sharif, a company commander of the 6 Frontier Force who had already been decorated in the 1965 war, was asked to capture a bridge on the ditch-cum-bund(DCB) near the Indian town of Fazilka which he managed to do on December 3-4 by over running BSF positions on the border. The attack on Beriwala was a crucial Pakistani move on the western front in early December to divert Indian resources from the east where General Niazi’s men were facing a rout.
Major Narain Singh, a company commander of 4 JAT was chosen to launch a counter attack a day later and recapture the key bridge which could be used by the Pakistani Army for a strong armor attack. Pakistan Army’s Major Shabbir Sharif died in the battle in Punjab’s Fazilka sector. His heroics won him the Nishan-e-Haider, the nation’s highest gallantry award. Major Narain Singh, who led the Indian counter attack also laid his life in the battlefield; he was awarded the Vir Chakra.
Though these facts are well established but there are two contesting versions of what had actually happened in the battlefield. The Pakistani version, which was spread by word of mouth and also mentioned in a book ‘Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership’ by Pakistan army Maj Gen(retd) Fazal Muqeem Khan which was written with an aim to make analytical introspection to find out why the nation lost the war against India in 1971. Major Gen Fazal Mukueen Khan, says: “In the ensuing hand-to-hand fight, this brave Indian Major Narain Singh was killed by another extremely brave company commander Major Shabbir Sharif. ” According to another Pakistani version, Singh charged on their positions with his company and lobbed a grenade at Sharif, injuring him slightly. When Indian soldiers prepared to fire at Sharif, Singh stopped them and opted for a ‘ man-to-man’ combat. He was killed by Sharif who died a day later at the same bridge after he was shot at by an Indian T54 tank.
The author regrets “… had soldier like Maj Narain Singh been with Pakistan army, the story would have been different.”
Col. (retd) Vijay Singh, the then adjutant of 4 JAT who received the body of Major Narain Singh on 18th December 1971 after cease fire, narrates a different story. According to him Sharif was killed by Major Narain Singh as it was a very brave and courageous battle between the two. He asserts that Maj. Narain did not die on the spot. He breathed his last while he was being taken by the Pakistani authorities to their medical room. “Major Singh managed to reach the Pakistani positions after going through a hail of fire but was badly injured by the time they invaded stronghold, ” he added . He recounted proudly that the Pakistani side treated Maj. Singh with respect. They picked up the unconscious Major and were taking him for treatment when he died. Singh’s official citation for the Vir Chakra also reflects this:
” Major Narain Singh led his men and charged the objective. In the process, he was hit by a burst from a machine gun but he continued to direct the operation during which he was mortally wounded.”

The counter attacks at this warfront have been discussed at various levels including visits by the Higher Command Course. The unit of Major Narain presented its version in 1979 at the actual location. There is no denying the fact that though the actions of Bravo Company find special mention in the said presentation, the heroism of Major Singh becomes synonymous with the B Company’s achievements. The counter attack launched on 5/6 Dec 1971 by B Company was the third by 4 JAT, the first two were on the nights of 3rd Dec and 4th Dec 1971.
Lt. Gen. BS Nagal PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd) freshens up his memories that Major Narain Singh was his first Company Commander when he joined 4JAT in July 1970. “My introduction to him was in nature of directions through which I got to know the man in command. Thereafter I reported to him further for next set of directions. After a couple of days he gave a long list of duties and assignments which would make one familiar with the administration of the company, handling of personal problems, training of man, welfare measures to ensure transparency and preparation for training maneuvers due in the winters.”
Reminiscing the aura of his Commander, Lt Gen Nagal writes that he was very deliberate in his action, took his time to evaluate options but once he had made up his mind, he would demonstrate great resoluteness in completing them. This personality trait came to the fore during the counter attack where he had laid down his life in the service of the nation. “He opened up very gradually revealing some of his sterling qualities to us. He was not given to becoming familiar hastily, slowly but surely he made known his desire to excel in all that sought to be part of his career and personal life. He had a burning desire to be a winner in all that he did, be it a low level company issue or, as demonstrated by him, a National cause”.
Quoting an eye-witness Lt. Gen Nagal says that the counter attack that Major Narain Singh led on the intervening night of 5/6 Dec 1971 was a day after I was injured by a machine gun burst in the counter attack earlier night: “I came to know about his gallantry and bravery from injured JCOs and men of B Company who were admitted to the hospital along with me.” Though Major Narain Singh along with many others died in the counter attack, but Major Narain Singh was truly a very brave and daring person, with courage of conviction rarely seen amongst middle level officers. There is a famous quote ” Born to be remembered”, I with humility submit, it was he who knew that one day he would be in the league of such people.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 11 Apr 2018 10:41

obituary of Brig NS Sandhu, MVC,
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation ... 71026.html
There are heroes and there are heroes. So goes the popular perception of bravehearts. In the military sense, heroism is often an event, an episode or a happening quite often unplanned but sometimes planned as well. This is when there is an opportunity; a chance to do something unexpected; something out-of-the-box; something extraordinary either individually or in a buddy pair, sub-team or team action. The soldier gets involved in a manner led by gut instinct, grit, enterprise, cold courage tested almost always against impossible odds. Such a braveheart is led by selflessness and unit/country-first ideals… always and every time.
So, there are heroes and there are heroes. By implication, this means that some heroes rise above heroism itself. When they do, they need to be respected, admired; placed on an altar where only the finest examples of humanity belong: deathless heroes. I was proud to come across one such person: Brig NS Sandhu, MVC.
Then Lt Col NS Sandhu was in command of 10 Dogra in the climacteric Battle of Dera Baba Nanak (DBN) during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. This 3 Cavalry veteran of the Battle of Khemkaran (1965 Indo-Pak war) had, as a Major, delivered a gritty performance during that battle (his ‘C’ squadron destroyed 14 Patton tanks) which saved Punjab for India. As CO of 10 Dogra, he handled the enormously complex challenge of capturing the strategically important DBN Bridge as only a high-grade war veteran could — with admirable presence of mind, courage, coolness and situational awareness.
Everything that could go wrong went wrong but Lt Col Sandhu was that kind of person who brought order to a convoluted battlefield situation rapidly spiraling out of control. He did this on a pitch-dark night amidst elephant grass (sarkanda)-driven disorientation of vital battlefield force-multipliers; accurate enemy ground fire and artillery fire. He did the right thing — he took charge leading from the front. He handled the amorphous battlefield situation with the instinct of a seasoned veteran instead of ‘taking counsel of his fears’; an escapism which the iconic British-Indian General, Bill Slim, had learnt to avoid while assiduously converting ‘defeat into victory’ in Burma during World War II.

Narinder Sandhu too achieved spectacular success despite casualties to his officers/men and he himself getting wounded. It came as no surprise when the DBN Bridge was captured by 10 Dogra on the misty morning of December 6, 1971. Equally unsurprising was the award of Maha Vir Chakra to Lt Col Sandhu for his exceptional leadership.
This was a straight-legged narration of the officer’s heroic acts in two successive wars, but we were talking about a bit more; about deathless heroism, remember?
November 22, 2016 was a day which the young Research Team members of the Directorate of Defence Services Welfare, Punjab, are unlikely to forget in a hurry. On this day, Brig NS Sandhu was host to the Research Team at his gracious, well-appointed home in Chandigarh. The association of young researchers with this real life hero goes back to the time in early 2015 when the Punjab State War Heroes Memorial and Museum research work began with initially raw research rookies on board. He was one eagerly awaited veteran who always met them with a smile, encouraged them with kind, motivational words, leaving them spell-bound.
The meeting on November 22 was therefore planned as a brief ‘get well sir’ visit to check on their mentor’s health which, they were aware, had been under severe stress and scrutiny.
Dressed in a French grey jacket-and-black-trouser combination with a peach pocket square and attitude to match, Brig Sandhu was waiting on his lawn with a smile that matched his jaunty pocket square. Expecting to find him bed-ridden and surrounded by tubes and catheters, the Research Team was far too shocked to ask about his well-being because the inquiry seemed so irrelevant. It was only later that the young researchers learnt, albeit reluctantly, from their deathless hero how he had combated grave health-related adversity without losing his infectious smile, composure or equanimity.
There are real life heroes after all… and a few of them are deathless.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby arun » 04 May 2018 09:25

X Posting Echendee aka H&D aka Honour & Dignity destroying news item from the Bangladesh News and Discussion thread.

Bangladesh does not have a “regional game changer” :lol: like CPEC aka the Conning Pakistan to Enrich China aka China Pakistan Economic Corridor to talk brag endlessly about nor indulgent john’s like the United States of America and the Peoples Republic of China, but they are doing a fine job in rapidly closing the per capita income gap created by the years of neo-colonial economic exploitation they as erstwhile East Pakistani’s were subject to by their fellow Momin Mohammaddens of the Punjabi Uniformed Jihadi Dominated Deep State of the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Ridding Bangladesh of the Mughal grandeur aspiring economic leeches of the Punjabi Uniformed Jihadi Dominated Deep State of the Mohammadden Terrorism Fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan can be chalked down as one the many dividends of India’s liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 8) .

Bangladesh, once a ‘hopeless’ economy, is leaving Pakistan behind, says Kaushik Basu

The Op-Ed by Kaushik Basu which the Financial Express cites from the Brookings website:

Why is Bangladesh booming?

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby komal » 04 May 2018 10:41

^
the Brookings article has a rather vicious anti-Hindu paragraph towards the end.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby g.sarkar » 11 May 2018 04:00

Cross posted from Terroristan sutra:
http://www.sify.com/news/forgetting-the ... hcebg.html
Forgetting the most influential non-political Indian on his 100th birthday Source :
SIFY By : Satyen K Bordoloi Last Updated: Thu, May 10, 2018 10:16 hrs
"A couple of weeks after 25 March 1971 when the Pakistani army began their genocide of Bengalis in East Pakistan, the influx of refugees into India put Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in a perilous position. A poor country, we struggled to feed our own people, how could we feed the lakhs - soon to cross over a million - refugees pouring in? Besides it was clear now that a belligerent Pakistan under Yahaya Khan could be made to listen to only one argument – war. But the Army chief put his foot down. He couldn’t guarantee a win if they went to war immediately. He needed months to prepare. This was a unique conundrum because retaliation was needed immediately. The fear was that acting too late would wipe out the entire Bengali - Muslim and Hindu - population. No one seemed to have a solution. No one except one man. The man, Rameshwar Nath Kao, was the head of the newly formed Research and Analysis Wing, carved out from a begrudging Intelligence Bureau (they even refused to part with due furniture) – on the lines of CIA of the USA. Barely two and a half years old, no one took the agency seriously and its reports were routinely ignored by Indian bureaucrats.
.....
May 10, 2018, is Rameshwar Nath Kao’s 100th birth anniversary. And in what seems to be a coup orchestrated by Kao from beyond his grave, there perhaps isn’t a single function to commemorate this. A grateful nation should have launched into homage, critics lambasting him for his share of failures. Instead, what we have is a cacophony of silence. On the 100th birthday of India’s most influential non-politician post-independence, we remember by forgetting him.
.....
There is, however, one consolation that we can take on behalf of R N Kao – that even as his friends forget him, those who shouldn’t – his and India’s enemies – continue to shudder at the memory of his exploits."
Gautam

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Karan M » 11 May 2018 04:12

komal wrote:^
the Brookings article has a rather vicious anti-Hindu paragraph towards the end.


Which makes the entire article a political screed and calls into account whether Bangladesh is indeed anywhere a success story or is it merely one in Kaushik Basu's biased eyes because it suits his agenda to claim so.

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Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 11 Jun 2018 23:49

https://twitter.com/indiandefence11/sta ... 5355170816 ---> An Indian Army T-55 providing cover to Indian troopers from Sappers Company during 1971 Indo-Pak War in Bangladesh. Note the interesting fume extractor on the T-55 barrel which was an ingenious measure to differentiate it from similar looking Pakistani Type 59 tanks.

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