Bharat Rakshak Forum Announcement

Hello Everyone,

A warm welcome back to the Bharat Rakshak Forum.

Important Notice: Due to a corruption in the BR forum database we regret to announce that data records relating to some of our registered users have been lost. We estimate approx. 500 user details are deleted.

To ease the process of recreating the user IDs we request members that have previously posted on the BR forums to recognise and identify their posts, once the posts are identified please contact the BRF moderator team by emailing BRF Mod Team with your post details.

The mod team will be able to update your username, email etc. so that the user history can be maintained.

Unfortunately for members that have never posted or have had all their posts deleted i.e. users that have 0 posts, we will be unable to recreate your account hence we request that you re-register again.

We apologise for any inconvenience caused and thank you for your understanding.

Regards,
Seetal

41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

The Military Issues & History Forum is a venue to discuss issues relating to the military aspects of the Indian Armed Forces, whether the past, present or future. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 48082
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 16 Dec 2016 04:48

Its already 16 Dec in India. Here is an article on the genocide in Bangladesh and how Pakistan got away:

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/pub ... nt_id%3D46


Fellow blames India and Bangladesh and glosses over the role of the US.

Any the idiot Nixon ended up resigning his Presidency with infamous "I am not a crook" words.

wig
BRFite
Posts: 1391
Joined: 09 Feb 2009 16:58

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby wig » 16 Dec 2016 10:37

http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/war-decisively-won/

excerpts from an article penned by a retired solider. I do wish we could do something for the 54 Prisoner of War still held by Pakistan. The

After the 71 war, while at Poonch, men would wish to walk across to Rawalpindi and pick up Benazir Bhutto. That was the state of morale. Today I think, had we attempted, we would have probably succeeded. I wish to assure my civilian friends that so long as morale of the armed forces is high, it can win any and every war, even proxy, irrespective of the adversary.
India released all Pak PoWs in good faith. Pakistan, on the other hand, released only 617, holding back 54 who are still languishing in its jails. India should have used the leverage of 93000 PoWs to get POJK vacated. A rare opportunity was wasted. The Indian leadership was taken for a ride into believing Pak sincerity. Despite assurances Pak never abided by its promises, written or verbal. Fruits of a hard-fought victory in the battlefield were frittered away on the negotiating table by the generous leadership. Hajipir, Chhamb and 93000 prisoners were given away without any strategic gains. Pakistan has hurt us the most. She should never be trusted. Whenever an opportunity arises, Pakistan must be humiliated. Celebration of Victory Day with great pomp and show is one such way besides which grand size hoardings of ‘Surrender Ceremony’ be erected outside the Pak High Commission and many other prominent places in J&K and Delhi.

Kashi
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2562
Joined: 06 May 2011 13:53

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Kashi » 16 Dec 2016 11:10

The Baki Yawn and thugboom seem to have largely ignored this day. In the years gone by, there would be a flurry of blogs lamenting the loss of the colony of East Pakistan. This year you barely see 1 or 2 and most of them are "reprints". New edict from ISPR?

Sanju
BRFite
Posts: 800
Joined: 14 Aug 2005 01:00
Location: North of 49

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Sanju » 16 Dec 2016 23:44

They are getting ready to write the loss of other areas...

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 4109
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 17 Dec 2016 04:59

Cutting Pakistan in 71 was Indian Army's finest performance while the Navy challenged the U.S. 7th Fleet
http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=189620

This day forty five years ago saw the finest feat of the Indian Armed Forces in more than a millennium. Last victory of India over a major foreign army was when Chandragupta Maurya defeated Seleucus Nicator in 323 BC. India defeated Pakistan. The capitulation was complete when Lt. General AAK Niazi, commander of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan handed over his pistol to Lt. General JS Aurora , Goc-in-C, eastern command, India. It was the biggest surrender. 93,000 personnel, both military & civilian became prisoners of war.

Indian pluralism was at its shining best during the signing of the instrument of surrender. They surrendered “to a Sikh General after negotiating terms with a Jew, both of whom reported to an army chief who was Parsi”. India had stood up to international bullying. The US seventh fleet had sailed in to the Bay of Bengal where the Indian Navy was in operation. But it was too late to alter the course of war. Captain of one Indian Naval Ship sought instructions from his fleet commander about the course of action on sighting the US Navy. ‘Wish them Bangladesh Standard Time’, the fleet commander instructed! It is no longer East-Pakistan'.

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 4109
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 17 Dec 2016 05:03


Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 4109
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 17 Dec 2016 05:11

Who says that the Indian Army doesn't have a sense of humour? Bangladesh 16 December 1971
https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/status/809611152334487552


Varoon Shekhar
BRFite
Posts: 1597
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 23:26

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Varoon Shekhar » 18 Dec 2016 01:10

Great series of articles! Tomorrow marks 55 years since the liberation of Goa from Portuguese rule. That ought to be remembered too. There is a small but vocal tribe of nay sayers and just plain anti-India jerks, Neville Maxwell among them, who belittle the actual operation. In their view, India's action was barely worthy of note, because the Portuguese offered little resistance. It's another matter, of course, that these d*ckheads are the same ones who condemn India for launching the liberating attack in the first place. In Canada, the Globe and Mail was most vociferous in condemning India( I looked this up on micro-film). But in the letters pages of the paper, several readers supported India, and denounced Adlai Stevenson, the secretary of state under JF Kennedy, for criticising India. The Toronto Star was far more restrained, and while not praising the Indian action, did not denounce it either.

So was it an impressive action militarily, or not really? There were 22 Indian and 30 Portuguese dead. It ended Portuguese rule of Goa, and was a catalyst for liberation movements against Portuguese colonial rule in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.

komal
BRFite
Posts: 386
Joined: 29 Oct 2007 14:47

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby komal » 03 Jul 2017 07:36


Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 4109
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 28 Sep 2017 05:13

This Thrilling Escape by IAF Pilots from Pakistan in 1971 is Now a Crowdfunded Film!
https://www.thebetterindia.com/116354/e ... sh-sinhji/

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 4109
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 05 Oct 2017 07:49

1971 War: The Battle of Fazilka
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... f-fazilka/

By Major General Sukhwant Singh

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 48082
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 10 Oct 2017 03:34

Link to

1971 India-Pakistan War: A Modern War

Study by a Royal Canadian Artillery major.

Kashi
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2562
Joined: 06 May 2011 13:53

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Kashi » 10 Oct 2017 08:25

^^
Pakistan had humiliated India in the war over Kashmir in 1965. ... New Delhi was determined to not be defeated again by Pakistan.


The Canadian major could not hide his Pakiness could he? It seem Paki benefactors in the West were and remain desperate to give any and all accolades to Bakis, even if largely imagined.

Rahul M
Forum Moderator
Posts: 16221
Joined: 17 Aug 2005 21:09
Location: woh log gawad hai, unpad hai !
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rahul M » 10 Oct 2017 08:28

paper dates back to 1984

Kashi
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2562
Joined: 06 May 2011 13:53

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Kashi » 10 Oct 2017 08:40

Rahul M wrote:paper dates back to 1984


Yes, when Pakistan was the darling of the West and the frontline state in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Pro-Pak feelings must have been high in most if not all Western military circles.

It's these folks who must have manned most of the senior positions at the turn of the century and thus, the continued mollycoddling of TSP.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 48082
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 11 Oct 2017 05:08

tsarkar, and Philip, Try to Google for "No Easy Answers" by James Goldrick, RAN

Its an account of IN, PN and BDN from 1947 through 1972.

pdf book based on thesis of the writer at USNWC.

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 4109
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 12 Oct 2017 05:15

A Tribute to INAS 310 Cobra Squadron in the 1971 Eastern Theatre
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... n-theatre/

Image

ShauryaT
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4998
Joined: 31 Oct 2005 06:06

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ShauryaT » 28 Nov 2017 23:39

The Puzzle of the 1972 Shimla Summit, Or Why India Did Not Impose Its Will

In their quest to shape the post-war order, Indira Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 48082
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2017 05:47

Nov 27, 1971 is when the first IAF encounters in East Pakistan started.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 48082
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2017 06:37

ShauryaT wrote:The Puzzle of the 1972 Shimla Summit, Or Why India Did Not Impose Its Will

In their quest to shape the post-war order, Indira Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.



Full article with my comments

Indira Gandhi’s reputation for shrewd statecraft is widely acclaimed, even by her fiercest detractors. Her quest for peacemaking was equally bold, as witnessed by India’s approach to the 1972 peace conference at Shimla. The 1972 case, however, is intriguing for what it did not reflect – India not leveraging the fruits of the 1971 war victory to produce an advantageous geopolitical settlement. After all, for the first time since Partition, India was negotiating from a position of (POWs) strength and prestige with Pakistan; 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war , including the entire military leadership in East Pakistan, had surrendered to Indian forces. India had also captured strategic locations in Kashmir and 5,000 square miles of Pakistan’s territory in Sindh and south Punjab.


Yet, historians have never adequately resolved the puzzle of why India did not impose its will as a victor. While most interpretations of India’s approach to this post-conflict phase have been polemical, the available evidence reveals that ambitious strategic objectives informed India’s negotiating behaviour. In their quest to shape the post-war order, Gandhi and her advisors sought to reorient Pakistan’s domestic politics and insulate the subcontinent from the next phase of the Cold War.


Indian calculus

The post-1971 international and regional context had made reaching some kind of an agreement an important policy goal for Gandhi and her national security team. Having engaged in a successful war that liberated Bangladesh, policymakers sought to further buttress India’s status by also demonstrating a credible attempt at peace. Elevating India’s image, of course, had to be balanced by attaining concrete outcomes. The most desirable outcome would have been a final resolution in Kashmir around the de facto-administered position of both sides. The evidence suggests that policymakers sought to address some of the deeper roots of the India-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir, which was perceived as a direct manifestation of Pakistan’s national identity rather than a normal inter-state territorial impasse. P.N. Haksar, Gandhi’s leading foreign policy advisor, later wrote that India’s approach was based on “a recognition that Pakistan continued to have an unresolved crisis of its national identity”. 1971 had opened the possibility for an alternative future for Pakistan.

In a memo drafted shortly after the war, Haksar described the flux across the border: “The military-bureaucratic and feudal social order had crumbled…Pakistan of Yahya Khan had suffered political and military defeat. It is a nation in ferment seeking new identity for itself.” Having framed the adversary’s precarious internal balance, Haksar introspected on how India should “act towards the emergence of new forces in Pakistan”. Invoking lessons from the past, he argued, “At the end of the Second World War, a lesson was learnt by the victorious powers not to treat the defeated nations and impose upon them a greater humiliation than that produced by the defeat itself. India, proud of its position as a responsible country in South Asia, had to act with wisdom and foresight in its dealings with the new Pakistan”.


{I think a big fundamental mistake was to think Pakistan is a modern state. It is a feudal setup and invoking lessons of WWI and WWII to imagine an alternative future for Pakistan was wrong with out breaking the feudal structure. Further in WWII, the Western allies were preparing to confront Soviet Union by rebuilding war torn Europe. and had the lessons of the Versailles Armistice and war reparations that had devastated the Weimar Republic and led to rise of Hitler. Besides a strong de-Nazification program and Nuremberg trials were undertaken to remake the German society. I think P.N. Haksar was wrong to give incorrect lessons to Indira Gandhi.}

D.P. Dhar, another important confidante of Gandhi and the lead Indian negotiator, also appeared to endorse Haksar’s basic sentiment. In his telegram to Haksar in March 1972, Dhar noted: “The (Simla) settlement will not be between the victor and the vanquished because such a settlement has in history led to renewed and more violent conflicts. A settlement on the contrary…should be and would also be made to appear as the end of a chapter of acrimony between two estranged brothers”. But we also now know that Dhar was less enamoured with the prospect of change inside Pakistan than ensuring that India was seen to be making a credible effort at peacemaking. And, most importantly, he wanted India to extract unambiguous gains during the negotiating process. For Dhar, without a resolution of the Kashmir issue there could be “no hope of permanent peace in the subcontinent”.


{If the lead negotiator was clear about the preferred outcome then where did it go astray?}

In essence, there were two rival strategies at the apex level in the lead up to the Shimla talks. Dhar as the quintessential realist “sought to take full advantage of the military victory” and make Indian concessions (i.e. Pakistani POWs and territorial gains) “conditional” on Pakistan’s acceptance of a final Kashmir settlement. If Pakistan rejected such an approach, his policy advice was that India should “continue a state of armed hostility short of war”. The alternative constructivist approach was embodied by Haksar, who in addition to immediate territorial goals also sought an ambitious vision for “subcontinental peace and stability” by assisting in Pakistan’s domestic transformation.


{So in other words Haksar approach prevailed and led to the failure. Haksar seems to be deluded with UK Liberal ideas of peace in our time rhetoric and did not read Indian history.}

These complex images are perhaps a good proxy for Gandhi’s own attitude before the Shimla summit. The perceived opportunity to exploit the possibility for an internal transformation of Pakistan’s body politic seems to have persuaded Indian policymakers to approach the Shimla negotiations by a dual, if not competing, preference to avoid weakening the new civilian leadership in Pakistan led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and, simultaneously extracting new conflict resolution norms from the same leadership.

{The perceived opportunity was a dreamy image in Indian policy makers and was never an opportunity at all. }{/I]

It was this inherent tension in these dual strategic aims that arguably conditioned India’s overall posture on the eve of the Shimla summit. Interestingly, India did have some prior insights into Pakistan’s approach to the summit after the Soviet leadership’s meeting with Pakistan’s lead negotiator, Aziz Ahmed. On June 27, Moscow cabled Delhi that although Ahmed had stressed that Pakistan intended to insist firmly on the old ceasefire line, “it seems to us that the Pakistani side had a reserve position on the problem of Kashmir…Ahmed made to understand, that Bhutto is ready, in principle, to consider the possibility of converting the ceasefire line into the permanent international frontier”.


[I]{Yet this was not pressed. What the adversary was comfortable agreeing to was not driven home.}


The actual negotiations began on June 28, 1972 and lasted five days, with India persisting with Dhar’s approach where India’s return of the POWs and occupied territory was made part of a package settlement via a durable agreement on formally defining the frontier in Kashmir. In the opening session on June 28, Dhar made it clear that concluding a peace settlement was an “essential” prerequisite for the repatriation of the POWs. On June 29, he sought a clear framework. Any “agreed formulation should be in conformity with the existing situation” and “capable of implementation”. Dhar emphasised “the world was fast moving towards bilateralism”. Ahmed, however, offered minimal commitments and strove to retain the old UN-centric conflict resolution framework. Haksar too stressed that India and Pakistan should “solve our own problems” without “involving distant countries into our disputes”.
On June 30, Dhar suffered a minor heart attack with Haksar assuming the lead for the remainder of the summit. India’s negotiating thrust, however, remained consistent.


Haksar now focused more directly on Kashmir. He said that India “would like to remove the endless curse of conflicts on the question of Kashmir” and “if there was no understanding, a new situation would be created which would require serious consideration”, the latter a thinly veiled threat. On July 1, in a session that included the heads of government, Gandhi noted that “the ceasefire line” in Kashmir had “no validity” and “did not keep the peace”. T.N. Kaul, the foreign secretary, reiterated the core basis of a deal: “repatriation and withdrawal (of Indian forces in the West)” would “have to be part of durable peace and can take place only after durable peace has been established.” A chagrined Ahmed retorted, “We have agreed to everything except Kashmir.” Bhutto then invoked domestic pressure: “My back is to the wall; I cannot make any more concessions”. But the Indian side still gave no signs of relinquishing its core bargaining strategy of a package settlement. On the fifth day, July 2, the negotiations broke down after Ahmed rejected India’s proposals saying that Pakistan “cannot accept that the ceasefire line had ceased to exist.”

Hoping to salvage an agreement, Bhutto called directly on Gandhi. During this climactic meeting, Gandhi underscored the primary advantage of India’s Kashmir proposal – neither side was required to physically relinquish territory or exchange populations. With “feeling and apparent sincerity” Bhutto admitted that while India’s proposal was the only feasible one, a formal legally binding commitment would severely weaken his domestic position and strengthen the military establishment. He could not offer more than a verbal assurance that the de facto border in Kashmir would gradually acquire, in Bhutto’s words, the “characteristics of an international border”. In contrast, India’s concession was concrete and upfront. India gave up its “package settlement by agreeing to withdraw troops from the international border before an agreement on Kashmir is reached”.


A hope belied

The following day Gandhi admitted to Kaul that while she did “not trust Bhutto”, she “wanted to make a gesture to the people of Pakistan with whom we have ultimately to settle this question”. This was based on a belief, mistaken as it eventually turned out, that Pakistan was on the cusp of a structural transformation after its shock defeat, and, one that India should enable rather than thwart. Gandhi told parliament in August 1972: “There is a great change in Pakistan. It may be that the Pakistanis did not want that change. But the change is there regardless of whether they desire it or not”. It is apparent that policymakers were torn between seeking immediate security gains and holding out for a more durable regional order. Such an order was predicated on the possibility of a new Pakistan that might substitute Islam with a modern secular ideology.


{I]{This is type zero error. Solving the wrong problem precisely. The Indian side had no clue what was happening in Pakistan, nor understood the raison d'etere of its creation and were deluded. They squandered the 1971 victory. We can blame Indira Gandhi ultimately as Haksar was a minion. An educated but unwise minion}[/I]

Proceeding from such an overall outlook, policymakers did not fully seek to leverage the fruits of victory on the battlefield to ruthlessly bend the defeated party on the bargaining table. Key strategists, particularly Haksar, believed that a modicum of Indian benevolence might facilitate Pakistan’s internal transformation at a critical turning point in the civil-military and socio-political balance in that state’s history. For Haksar, India had to avoid adding to Pakistan’s “political adventurers who play upon Indo-phobia mixed by Islamic atavism”. Haksar’s advice to Gandhi was that India had “a vested interest in seeing there is democracy in Pakistan”. But there is evidence that a realpolitik, if cynical worldview, also had apex level support through Dhar regarding India’s bargaining posture at Simla. However, it is unlikely that this belief was ever strong enough to sway Haksar’s image of reassurance and co-existence. As P.N. Dhar, another PMO advisor at the time, recalled, “The overriding consideration for India was to put an end to its adversarial relations with Pakistan and forge an instrument that would help build a structure of durable peace in the subcontinent”. Nevertheless, Indian negotiators did take their Pakistani interlocutors to the water’s edge.

{This is wrong reading. D.P. Dhar was out of commission after his heart attack. And P.N. Haksar was holding sway and had a deluded idea of peace with Pakistan. More could have been achieved by releasing the 93,000 POWs unilaterally to return to Pakistan and that could have set off forces of change.}


Ultimately, Gandhi emerged as the swing factor between the assertive and accommodative postures in the finale at Shimla. The alternative of calling Bhutto’s bluff and walking away without any agreement was deemed too costly for Gandhi and Haksar after India’s dramatic 1971 triumph. The self-restraint underlying India’s posture was all too palpable to the Pakistanis. Ahmed, their lead negotiator, later remarked that despite holding “all the bargaining chips”, India’s “excessive anxiety to avoid the failure of the talks at any cost became its major handicap”. Haksar later noted, “‘Negotiating from strength’ has been made part of diplomatic coinage. But to negotiate with someone who is manifestly weak is even more difficult”.

{What a bull shitter.}

In more immediate geopolitical terms, India’s main gain was the conversion of the UN-endorsed 1949 ceasefire line in Kashmir into a hardened Line of Control (LoC) based on the new December 17, 1971 ceasefire position. It was at the political and symbolic level where Indian policymakers could claim some success. The Shimla Agreement was an expression of the Indian framework for South Asian security, namely the norm of bilateralism. Ever since India’s fateful decision in 1948 to seek third-party mediation in the India-Pakistan conflict, policymakers had struggled to limit the interference of external actors in the Kashmir dispute. Krishna Menon’s UN interventions in 1957 were the first diplomatic expressions of seeking to disentangle India from third party involvement. In 1965, the norm of bilateralism had been implied, although ironically, at a third party venue in Tashkent under proactive Soviet diplomatic efforts. In 1972, Indian policymakers explicitly enshrined this principle at Shimla.

Zorawar Daulet Singh is a fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.



So we can blame Indira Gandhi and P.N. Haksar for the non-victory at Shimla.
And the root cause was delusions of grandeur.

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 4109
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: 41st Anniversary of decisive Indian victory in 1971

Postby Rakesh » 30 Nov 2017 06:13

Operation Trident, 1971: How Indian Navy Pulled Off One Of Its Greatest Victories
https://www.thebetterindia.com/122592/o ... -pakistan/


Return to “Military Issues & History Forum”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Cain Marko, Karthik S, Kartik, Vamsee and 29 guests