India Border Watch: Security and Operations

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yensoy
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby yensoy » 13 May 2020 14:04

Chinese, who have a penchant for digging up "centuries old" maps in order to fortify their claims on international waters have been amazingly reluctant in providing their maps showing their perception of where the India-Tibet border lies. Obviously, this is deliberate.

Our engagement with the Chinese will necessarily be very different than with the Pakis. BTW, this incident is too close to the CPC meeting to be a coincidence. Who knows, maybe our own fellows are trying to needle poohbear.

Speaking of bears, Calgary zoo has returned 2 pandas to China saying that they can't ensure availability of fresh bamboo for their diets anymore. What they didn't say is that they will save a million dollars per year on panda leases. Anyway it's not like crowds are thronging to zoos. Other zoos around the world with the "gift" of pandas should do the same.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ArjunPandit » 13 May 2020 15:46

sajaym wrote:Currently there is a HUGE disparity in the way aggression & intrusion is dealt with on the Indo-Pak border and how it is dealt with on the Indo-China border. By adopting & continuing with this disparate treatment on the two different borders, we're helping to build the myth of Chinki invincibility/untouchability. The Chinkis need to feel the same Thappad that their Paki friends are getting on a regular basis. 1965 may have been laid to rest in 1971, but 1962 was apparently not laid to rest in 1987...enough. Unfortunately now is not the time to change the status quo, and the status quo cannot be changed until Bharat becomes Atmanirbhar in weapons.

perhaps we dont want to be seen as aggressor..chinese may have been more evil..but they have not been stupid to be the first one to fire in recent past (though they did until hanaut singhji's issued orders to act against our officers where chinese opened fire first). At one level chinese strategy is to needle India and not bleed. At this stage an action on both fronts is not suited to our interests too. I would prefer thrashing the dog and giving master in same currency. Afterall we are a peace loving civilization :mrgreen: :mrgreen: :mrgreen:

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Khalsa » 13 May 2020 15:57

I am very okay with out muscling them hand to hand.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ArjunPandit » 13 May 2020 16:41

Khalsa wrote:I am very okay with out muscling them hand to hand.

munh tod jawab..
oops naak tod jawab...

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Philip » 13 May 2020 20:56

Sending in the IAF was n excellent bold move,to show the Chins that we will not take their bullshit anymore and are prepared to up the ante anytime ,anyplace! The yellow-faced shitworms and their catamites,the Pakis, are trying out the prelim. moves for a two-front campaign, actually 3- front as Ladakh and Sikkim and the N- East are so far apart,in an exercise to stretch the Indian response as wide as possible. The Chins want to see how alert and quickly we react ,so as to refine their nefarious designs. We need to keep quite a few cards up our sleeves.The MSC formation,supposedly delayed due to the funds crisis ,must be continued apace. China stalls only when confronted with steel. Severing its B&R lifeline to Pak through occupied Tibet at multiple key locations should be one of the IA's strategic objectives.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RajD » 14 May 2020 16:32

An influential handle @bhootnath has posted a thread on twitter regarding a minimum 10mins. long 100km deep incursion by an IAF ELINT aircraft into paki mainland airspace, fooling their air defences.
Gurus, can this be true? Or just a hawa hawai? Here is the link below:

https://twitter.com/bhootnath/status/12 ... 02208?s=19
Last edited by RajD on 14 May 2020 16:39, edited 1 time in total.

manjgu
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby manjgu » 14 May 2020 16:37

already clarified that it shows predictive path once transponder is switched off...

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RajD » 14 May 2020 16:39

Ok. Thanks.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Ashokk » 14 May 2020 16:44

Netra (KW3556) has been quite active lately but usually switches off the transponder as soon as its airborne, probably due to the very low air traffic.
Image

IAF Boeing 707-337 (K2899) which is equipped for ELINT has also been quite busy.
Image
Last edited by Ashokk on 14 May 2020 18:27, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RKumar » 14 May 2020 18:16

Let’s not post anything yet just to win Twitter wars when it’s a matter of life n death for the men in the services. Napak will find it out some info but let them sweat. The longer, we can cover our tracks higher chances of success with lesser risk.

Of course selective info is leaked to setup the traps :P ... welcome to the fog of war :rotfl:

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ArjunPandit » 14 May 2020 19:17

if it is in public domain like twitter whats wrong in discussing it over here?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby dinesha » 15 May 2020 20:15

Strengthen counter-infiltration grid by moving 10 RR battalions from terror operations
https://www.defencenews.in/article/Stre ... ons-830621

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Ashokk » 15 May 2020 20:27

Army chief hints at Chinese hand behind Nepal’s protest against the link road to Lipulekh Pass
NEW DELHI: Nepal’s strong protest against India’s new link road to the Lipulekh Pass in Uttarakhand is probably at the behest of “someone else”, said General M M Naravane on Friday, hinting that Beijing could have instigated Kathmandu amidst the ongoing heightened tensions between Indian and Chinese border troops.
The Army chief, however, stressed he did not see “any concerted design” in the recent troop face-offs with China in eastern Ladakh and north Sikkim, which are being resolved as per established mechanisms on a case-to-case basis.
“I do not see any contradiction at all as far as the road to Lipulekh Pass is concerned. In fact, the Nepalese ambassador had mentioned that the east side of Kali Nadi (Mahakali river) belongs to them. There is no dispute in that,” said Gen Naravane, at a webinar organized by defence think-tank IDSA.
“The road which we have constructed is on the west side of the river. So, I don’t know what exactly they (Nepal) are agitating about. There have never been any problems on this score in the past. There is reason to believe that they might have raised the issue at the behest of someone else (read China). That is very much a possibility," he added.

Sources say China has been unnerved at the way Indian troops firmly stood their ground during the two violent clashes, which left several soldiers on both sides injured, along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) earlier this month.
“The fact that a young Indian Army lieutenant punched a major from the People’s Liberation Army during the face-off at Naku La sector (in Sikkim on May 9) has particularly riled Beijing. It lodged a strong protest over the incident, both over the hotline between local commanders as well as to the Indian defence attache in Beijing,” said a source. :mrgreen:

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Rakesh » 15 May 2020 21:28

https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/sta ... 14055?s=20 ----> A car jumps 2 security checkpoints, continues driving in wrong direction & ignores warning shots fired in the air. An Indian Army convoy is nearby. Do you know what that CRPF Jawan would be thinking? “I will not let another Pulwama happen”. So he pulls the trigger.

https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/sta ... 30528?s=20 ----> The CRPF soldier had mourned 40 of his brothers on 14 Feb 2019 who were target of a suicide attack carried out using a car, in Pulwama. So, when car jumped roadblocks, ignored warning shots & drove in wrong direction near an Army convoy, he had only one objective in mind.

https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/sta ... 50305?s=20 ----> CRPF jawan did the right thing & I support him. When a soldier stops you in an area where there is terrorism, don’t make the mistake of believing that his gun is ornamental. He has orders to shoot to kill.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby sajaym » 16 May 2020 11:21

https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/terrorist-hideout-busted-jammu-and-kashmir-budgam-let-operative-617632

The hideout was found some 200 to 300 m away from his house at his own land.


A strong message needs to be sent out -- any property which provides support to terrorists should be taken over and filled with security forces. In addition to being a deterrent, it will also help in changing the demographics of that locality in future, when such houses can be handed over to sympathetic population from other regions. We need Kashmir...not necessarily with the Kashmiris in it.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Ashokk » 16 May 2020 21:04

Be prepared for hot summers on the India-China border
By Lieutenant General SYED ATA HASNAIN (retd)
Two clashes have occurred between Indian and Chinese soldiers in recent days, one each in North Sikkim and East Ladakh.

These are strange clashes by military standards as no firearms were used and there were no gunshot wounds or blast injuries. Yet five Indians and seven Chinese personnel have been injured and not in any superfluous way.

It had earlier happened 30 months ago in Eastern Ladakh when patrols from both the armies threw stones at each other in another strange military standoff.

It was laughed off then as something much more serious was developing in the Doklam area of East Sikkim involving fully armed troops of both countries in a standoff that lasted 72 days.

Such incidents and standoffs create a spectre of war mongering leading to speculation in the public.

There are complex factors at play in this long developing narrative between India and China which witnesses high notes of potential peace when political leaders meet at informal summits and war drums when the armies clash at the heights along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The public deserves a simplified explanation of why this happens.
India and China have serious differences in the perception of the alignment of their border.

While treaties with intent to achieve peace and tranquility have been signed and continue to be in place, the very first step of attempting to mutually delineate an LAC has remained elusive.

The LAC remains an illusion with both sides having their own perception of it except in Sikkim where the border (not LAC) has been largely accepted with some niggles at a few places.

The areas where disputes exist include Ladakh, Uttarakhand/Himachal-Tibet border and Arunachal Pradesh.

An agreed LAC would obviously help in maintaining the peace between the forces on either side even as the long process of engagement through meetings and consultation continues.

Besides the border war of 1962, India and China clashed in 1967 at Nathu La in East Sikkim leading to considerable loss of life on both sides; the Chinese PLA reportedly suffered far higher casualties.

In 1984-1986 India postured to reinforce its capability to hold Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) in event of a war with China. The latter responded in early 1987 at Sumdorong Chu while also strengthening its deployment along the LAC in the sector. There was no clash although it seemed almost imminent.

A period of reasonable diplomacy followed with a general absence of aggression at the LAC till about 2005. The intervening period witnessed India's increasing wariness about the potential Chinese attitude in the future, leading then defence minister George Fernandes terming China as India's 'number one threat'.

The setting up of a China Study Group and allocation of resources for the construction of 3,346 km of roads in the border zone remained India's response towards better preparedness at the northern borders.

From 2005 onwards progressive increase in patrol clashes at the LAC has taken place. Each year in the summer months as both sides patrol to their claim lines they are invariably contested by the other due to varying perceptions of the LAC.

Yet China refuses to discuss the delineation of the LAC something that can prevent such clashes and assist in taking forward the political and diplomatic dialogue for eventual resolution. There are reasons for this.
So why is China hell bent at instigating repeated clashes of the kind witnessed in the last two weeks and what does this attitude reflect strategically?

To fully comprehend this, aspects linked to geo-strategy and not too distant a history need to be analysed and understood.

First is the geo-strategic issue.

China remains wary of India's potential as a competitor for power in Asia and the world. It is particularly concerned most about India's geostrategic advantage of sitting atop all major East-West sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the Indian Ocean.

From the Suez and Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca is an expanse of blue waters whose domination in naval terms is most easily affordable from ports and harbours along the Indian coastline or from similar facilities in nations in India's neighborhood; Seychelles, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Chinese energy laden sea traffic from the Persian Gulf region to the Straits of Malacca and then to the East China coast per force has to travel the SLOCs through the Indian Ocean.

It is a discomforting thought for the Chinese considering that its fascinating growth (at one time overheated to 14 percent) is contingent upon the secure movement of not only its energy traffic but also the container based shipping that carries manufactured goods to Europe, Middle East and Africa.

Link the above with the history of China's comprehensive development.

Deng Xiaoping's only apparent error in the formulation of his strategy of 'four modernisations' was in placing the development of the PLA Navy (PLAN) at the lowest rung of priority.

Had the PLAN been accorded higher priority it would today be nearing competition with the US navy; that is still some years away.

Deng's strategy for development of China's comprehensive national power focused upon agriculture, technology and industry with the military at the lowest rung (and PLAN at the lowest priority among the armed forces).

Till the comprehensive national power did not come of age, Deng looked towards peaceful and stable borders, with progressive ramping up of coercion as it neared its goal.

China is aware of India's peaceful and non-aggressive stance but perceives India's geo-strategic location providing it the potential for future power ambitions, alone or in conjunction with other nations.

A developing strategic partnership with the US and possibility of India being a part of larger strategic equation is China's worst fear.

The domination of the entire stretch of the newly coined Indo-Pacific, by a strategic combine with India as a core member does not contribute to China's self-confidence.

For China, India is not an enemy, but it has far too much potential to be one if its strategic ambitions rise or if it partners with China's adversaries.

The Himalayan belt provides the best opportunity to play out China's strategy.

No war and no peace will keep India rooted and focused to its northern borders; its threats historically have come from the land borders and it has rarely ventured to look at its vast maritime zone as a domain of opportunity.

China wishes to keep it that way; nothing like promoting an existing mindset.

The 1962 border war acts as a psychological dampener but contributes to the priority India feels compulsive about to accord to its northern borders.

To enhance that compulsion, China strategises to keep the Tibet region active; maneuvers, exercises, technology and armament demonstrations, all help to build a threat.

This is supplemented by patrol clashes and walk in operations across the perceived LAC. Under the circumstances China possibly perceives that non resolution of the LAC is actually a major psychological advantage.

It also assists in promoting the idea of a possible 'dual front war' and helps dilute Indian military capability against Pakistan in the west which in turn promotes Sino-Pak strategic relations so necessary for China's outreach to the north west Indian Ocean.

India cannot take these Chinese activities lightly and it needs to keep a strategic dissuasion in place given Pakistan's constant pin pricks in the west.

The Indian Army has done well in contesting Chinese claims and cannot accept a condescending attitude nor any form of military bullying. However, the potential of one such LAC engagement going out of control and leading to heavy casualties cannot be ruled out.

Suitable selection of personnel, training and briefing of these outsize patrols is almost a compulsion. It is unlikely that China will wish to expand the ambit of the fallout of such clashes all along the LAC; early containment will be its strategy too.

A Sino Indian border war or something more gives China no strategic gains.

With a degree of risk investment, perhaps what India needs to do is to ramp up its maritime capability and ability to play a role commensurate to its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean.

Its economic engagement with China must continue even as its multilateral approach to security does not shun its increasingly recognised role in the security of the Indo Pacific.

But given all this it should also prepare its public and its forces for increasingly hot summers along the LAC.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Vips » 17 May 2020 05:22

BSF, India’s ‘First Line of Defence’, is Not Equipped to Face an Enemy Military Attack- N C Asthana(Retd ADG - ADG CRPF and BSF).

The Border Security Force (BSF) is widely projected as ‘India’s first line of defence’ against infiltration, smuggling and military assault in their official statements. Officially, its role is defined in expansive terms of ‘security of the border of India and matters connected therewith’. The tasks of the BSF are divided into peacetime and wartime. The peacetime tasks include preventing smuggling and any other illegal activity, and unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India, etc.

The wartime tasks of the BSF include holding ground in less threatened sectors, etc. Until 1965, India’s border with Pakistan was manned by various state armed police battalions. The BSF was raised in the aftermath of the 1965 war with Pakistan. The BSF website itself says that Pakistan’s attacks in Kutch exposed the inadequacy of the state armed police to cope with armed aggression. That is why, the government of India felt the need for a specialised, centrally controlled border security force, which would be armed and trained to man the international border with Pakistan.

This means that the foremost concern at the time of inception of the BSF was to create a ‘first line of defence’ against external military aggression. The BSF was supposed to take on the enemy army for duration and in areas as the situation demanded. Since there was no militancy or terrorism in that era, the question of infiltration of terrorists did not arise. Moreover, smuggling and other illegal activities had nothing to do with the 1965 War.

How the IPS undercut the BSF

Since the BSF’s inception, however, the force’s Indian Police Service (IPS) leadership, purposefully relegated the wartime role of the BSF to such an extent that it has been forgotten. They did this in order to hide their own ignorance of matters military. Since the BSF, in terms of its defences, equipment, weaponry and training, is not at all prepared for its wartime role, this means that in the eventuality of any military assault, our ‘first line of defence’ would simply crumble and we will have to fall back until such time that the army mobilises and launches a counterattack. Depending on the degree of surprise the Pakistanis are able to achieve in their attack, the army’s counterattack may take up to several days. Retreat and loss of territory in this period will result in national humiliation. The much-touted ‘first line of defence’ is actually no defence at all.

I must hasten to add that the BSF is discharging its peacetime role quite satisfactorily and is adequately equipped for it. The IPS officers in top positions in the BSF, lacking any knowledge of military science that could enable them to appreciate and address the wartime role in a professionally sound manner, promoted only the peacetime role of the BSF. Guarding and patrolling the border bore considerable similarity to the tasks performed in their policing background. However, no one ever talked about the wartime role, not to speak of preparing for it. So much so that even the government lost sight of it.

The Two Hundred Third Report of the department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, titled ‘Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions’, submitted to the Rajya Sabha on April 11, 2017, does not talk about the wartime role of the BSF even once. It talks only of its peacetime role including fencing, floodlights and roads along the borders, development of integrated check posts, and construction of strategic roads. Speaking of the ceasefire violations at Chapter 4.6.3, the report says, “There have been a large number of ceasefire violations and several jawans and civilians have been killed… The government should find a way to prevent the frequent and persistent violations of ceasefire including using diplomatic channels. Ultimately, the answer lies in diplomacy.” Fighting an enemy was never contemplated.

No idea of modern ground warfare

The founders of the BSF, including the committee of secretaries, had spoken of BSF holding ground in less threatened sectors. The very premise was flawed. In their ignorance of military matters, they could not understand that the enemy would not attack ‘tentatively’ in any sector, call it less threatened or highly threatened, whatever. Leaving aside feints, which could be in any type of sector, any meaningful attack will bear the full force of enemy’s firepower.

They nurtured a romantic but wrong presumption that the assault on the ‘first line of defence’ will be by the enemy’s ‘exposed’ infantry on foot, wielding rifles and other small arms bereft of any infantry fighting vehicle or armoured personnel carrier protection. This assault, they imagined, would be repulsed by BSF soldiers wielding similar arms. That is exactly where their ignorance of military science failed them. The romantic imagery of heroic bayonet fights is found only in period films, not in real life. Even during the First World War, all infantry attacks were preceded by heavy artillery bombardment to soften up the defences, if not destroy them outright. At the Battle of Verdun (1916), they coined the famous quote ‘artillery conquers, infantry occupies’. Now, as a rule of thumb, infantry assault, whether supported by armour or not, or even a purely armour assault on any position is preceded by as heavy and as accurate artillery bombardment as possible.

If the attacking nation could afford it, such as the US during the 1991 Gulf War (over one-lakh sorties and 88,500 tons of bombs dropped), the bombardment could be aerial also. Saddam had expected and prepared for a ground offensive; the Americans refused to open up with a ground offensive. Iraq’s national war-fighting potential was effectively pulverized by the B-52s in one single night. Lest someone think that I cite examples from the Western world only, I must mention that, according to the Official History of the 1971 War also, ‘devastating barrage of artillery fire’ (Chapter 9, page 380) by Pakistan on the western front was common.

The ‘first line of defence’ cannot withstand shelling for a minute

Our ‘first line of defence’ does not have any defensive structures or fortifications that could withstand artillery bombardment even for a minute. According to photographs available in the public domain, most BSF observation posts on the international border are ramshackle structures of tin sheets and sandbags erected on small mounds of earth, which cannot withstand a single shell. The so-called bunkers or mounds will be knocked out within minutes because the shelling will be extremely accurate—the mounds are in full view of the enemy and their locations are known to them to the last centimetre.

The IPS leadership could never understand that, even if you have to place yourself right on the fence for some inexplicable reason, there is no over-ground structure, which can withstand shelling. Even the concrete pillboxes of Germany, in the Second World War, collapsed under fire. Under fire, these ramshackle structures would not serve the purpose of even observation posts. They are good only for watching smugglers in peacetime, not for fighting an invading army!

Nothing to fight an invading army

The weaponry available to the BSF is not a secret. Photographs of the 84 mm Carl Gustaf CGRL, 105 mm Indian Field Gun and their staple, the 7.62 mm medium machinegun are available in public domain. They have been putting their MMGs on public display and organizing trips of students to forward BOPs of the BSF along the international border (for example, at RS Pura sector) to show weapons and special equipment to them.

The 105 mm Indian Field Guns have been placed under the operational command of the army, and BSF would not be able to use them when the enemy makes first contact with them. That leaves them with their 51 mm and 81 mm mortars. The former, with just 109 grams of explosive per shell and a maximum range of 850 m is as good as useless in a war. The 81 mm mortar bomb with an explosive charge of 750 grams has a maximum range of 6000 m. The enemy artillery would in any case be firing from way beyond that range, thereby making effective retaliation through mortars impossible. Even when enemy IFV/APC or armour would come closer and in range, the smooth-bore 81 mm mortar is inherently not accurate enough to hit a moving vehicle—even the NATO rifled 120 mm mortars have a CEP (circular error probable) of 136 m.

As for the 7.62 mm medium machinegun, it is an anti-personnel weapon with the armour penetration of the M80 bullet being just 3 mm at 500m, making it useless against even lightly armoured vehicles. This means that the BSF outposts will not be able to deliver any effective fire at all on an enemy assault. Clearly, fighting the enemy army, for howsoever-short duration or in whichever sector, was never in the mind of the IPS leadership and they never equipped them for it. All they could understand and think of was chowkidari and that is why they never procured weapon systems or arranged for such training to be imparted that could enable the BSF to acquit itself honourably in any engagement with the enemy military.

The acid test they failed

The BSF faced enemy military action during the Battle of Hussainiwala in the 1971 War. Maj. Gen. (Retd ) Sukhwant Singh narrates this in detail in India’s Wars Since Independence, besides the Official History of the 1971 War. 15 Punjab was given the task of defending the Hussainiwala enclave, particularly the canal headworks. Three companies of the BSF in that area were placed under the battalion’s operational command to hold the BOPs of BP 180, Ullake and Rajoke with one company each and a platoon at Shamoke. The Pakistanis mounted a three-pronged attack supported by armour and preceded by intense artillery shelling at 6:15 p.m. on December 3. The BSF positions fell easily and the men had to be withdrawn across the river over the night. What happened to the four companies of 15 Punjab is another story but the withdrawal of the BSF left the entire right flank exposed and the Pakistani pincer movement threatened to close any time. Eventually, a final withdrawal by all units to the south bank of the river was ordered in the evening of December 4 and the Hussainiwala enclave was lost.

The IPS leadership has relegated the wartime role of the BSF to such an extent that most of them are not even aware of this battle. Other than this battle, their combat experience of half a century has been limited to being fired upon occasionally from across the border by Pakistani snipers or mortars etc. and their occasionally responding to the fire from relative safety. Their entire collective experiential repertoire of decades has thus been essentially repetitive and mechanical in character, without any opportunity or incentive to learn the complexities of military hardware and tactics applicable to war. As such, they cannot fight even yesterday’s war.

What ought to be done to salvage the situation?

While detailed professional knowledge on this subject can be provided at some appropriate platform only, the crisis calls for a paradigm shift. They have to think beyond their obsession with the pinpricks of Pakistanis firing upon them sporadically. It needs to be understood that the only defence feasible against artillery bombardment is to go sub-surface—in the form of deep concrete dugouts and fire trenches.

Forget the pathetic mound you have. This knowledge has been established by great research over hundreds of battles during and since the First World War, and often learnt at the cost of millions of casualties. So much scientific mind has been applied to it in the past 100 years that a deliberate ignorance of it by any Force would be criminal. A simplified but comprehensive review for the layman may be found, for example, in Paddy Griffith’s ‘Fortifications of the Western Front 1914–18’. A great amount of technical literature replete with drawings is available in the manuals of the German and British armies, which had survived the bombardment of up to 1.5 million shells. Keep in mind that the Pakistan army has field pieces ranging from 105 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm, 155 mm, and 203 mm tube artillery to 122 mm and 300 mm MBRLs.

Since trouble from Pakistan can be expected in making new defensive structures close to the fence, we have no option but to slide back to make these. Observation from close proximity of the fence can be made remotely through instruments. Then we need elaborate anti-tank ditches—not the primitive ditch-cum-bunds (DCBs) we have. This too has been developed into a science and the US army, for example, has whole manuals on it.

To deliver effective fire on enemy armoured and lightly armoured vehicles, and infantry operating under their protection, the BSF needs weapons which carry enough explosive payloads to tackle armour, both light and heavy. They have to forget their childish fascination with anti-materiel rifles and sniper rifles. Portability, manoeuvrability and accuracy are important considerations in the ‘first line of defence’ attacking armour—a veritable battery of ATGMs and cheaper yet accurate options like the 80 mm Breda Folgore RCL are available. Using them effectively would require defensive fighting positions interconnected by communication trenches. Research needs to be done to mount weapons like the Shipunov 2A42 30 mm autocannon on platforms faster than the BMP-2—similarly, MMGs/GPMGs need mobile platforms like Humvees to increase their survivability as well as effectivity.

Some apologists of the IPS leadership have argued that tactical brilliance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for strategic leadership. While this admits the IPS leadership’s poor tactical knowledge anyway, their having abjectly ignored the wartime role of the BSF or preparing for it is a living proof of their lack of ‘strategic leadership’. If it were argued that the wartime role is not important, it would mean that the founding vision was flawed and they should have stopped flaunting the organization as the ‘first line of defence’; something they have failed to do all these years. The problem is not so much the ‘transient nature of this parachuted leadership’; the real crisis is its intellectual bankruptcy.

One learns military science by studying it continuously by oneself or institutionally—not by virtue of having crossed the hallowed portals of the UPSC. As Napoleon had famously said, “Read and reread the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick; that is the only way of becoming a great captain, to obtain the secrets of the art of war.” Never mind that military science is not taught at the National Police Academy. That is no excuse for messing things up. In fact, a system of examination can be devised to check their proficiency before they join BSF.

The IPS leadership’s lack of interest in the wartime role of the BSF over the decades has led the country to a situation where there is every possibility of rout and retreat in the early days of the war. This issue needs to be urgently addressed by the government.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby sudeepj » 17 May 2020 05:57

sajaym wrote:https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india/terrorist-hideout-busted-jammu-and-kashmir-budgam-let-operative-617632

The hideout was found some 200 to 300 m away from his house at his own land.


A strong message needs to be sent out -- any property which provides support to terrorists should be taken over and filled with security forces. In addition to being a deterrent, it will also help in changing the demographics of that locality in future, when such houses can be handed over to sympathetic population from other regions. We need Kashmir...not necessarily with the Kashmiris in it.


Govt. of India needs to sort out the JeI over ground and under ground workers root and branch! There has to be a reckoning for jihadis. A Jihadi doesnt just go and join a 'tanzeem' on his own. Frequently, we see that entire families are highly radicalized and the fathers, mothers and brothers egg on their children to do this. They have to pay the most severe generational price! At most we have harassed these people by requiring attendance at police stations and occasional ransacking of their homes in searches. This strategy doesnt destroy the enemy but only strengthens his will to fight! Never strike at an enemy a blow that will only wound him. He will recover and come back at you with twice the hate!

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby yensoy » 17 May 2020 10:01



Good read, and coming from an IPS officer it should be taken seriously! It almost looks like we need a third cadre for the central armed paramilitary & police forces that is outside the purview of IPS. Officers of this cadre (which can be chosen via NDA/IMA or UPSC) should serve a short stint in the military such as with the 3 year program now being talked about, and there have to be secondments between the various forces to cross pollinate best practices and knowledge.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Bart S » 17 May 2020 12:23



This explains a lot, especially the purchase of those ridiculous Beretta pea shooters when CQB is rare for the BSF.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby dinesh_kimar » 17 May 2020 12:28

^ arre Sahib, why again choose from UPSC? Do we need more lessons on their effectiveness?

No such complaints ever come abt these units, which are manned and controlled by Army.

But, they were caught young, sent to army camps from recruitment itself, always under the gaze of Army Officers, no room to play the fool like this IPS cadre.

Reading abt the BSF is so shameful, the buggers were about to order Mi-17 helicopters to be "effective in their operations ."

Even our NCC, with it's pathetic budgets ( no uniforms/shoes/badges of size avbl) is run well, due to all the Sub.Majors, Officers and Colonels constantly overseeing it, and though low budget and poorly equipped, is a highly motivated and effective force, easily fullfilling it's mandate.

These Central Home Ministry Forces are an embrassment and a disgrace, and one hears all sorts of horror stories abt them.

Added to that lopsided policies such as each state should have a seperate border force.

So they made ITBF, CRPF, CISF, RPF, CAC, BSF, AR, RR, SSB, and NSG.

Only the Army controlled ones are worth the name, the IPS ones are tainted.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby TushS » 17 May 2020 12:35


It is already known to all that BSF are poorly equipped and trained against an offensive enemy. Any surprise attack will instantly damage the "first line of defence". Coming out from an IPS must be an alarm to the government. IMO the chief of all the CAPFs must be a Maj Gen Rank Military Officer. They knows much better about equipments, training and defensive offence tactics. :!:

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RKumar » 17 May 2020 19:37



Thanks to the article, I do understand why someone told me BSF and the like act as cannon fodder. Why biddi army on multiple occasions killed many BSF guys and we never responded.

Multiple proposals to merge with army has been opposed by IA as well as MHA due to different reasons.

I hope, all these different branches are at least merged into one organization even if they remain under MHA. Although, MHA has nothing to do with border - it should be pure n simple army matters during peace or war.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Vips » 17 May 2020 22:00

While the turf wars and management structure of BSF may take long to be overcome. what is simply not acceptable is how poorly the BSF is armed.Their armament may have been good for the 70's but now needs to upgraded pronto. This should not be something that cannot be done without a lot of hair splitting.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nachiket » 18 May 2020 12:35

The BSF will never be capable of withstanding the kind of combined arms offensive that the article talks about. Not unless every BSF officer is an IMA graduate and every Jawan and NCO undergoes the same training as their counterparts in the IA in addition to them being supplied with the same heavy weapons and equipment the the IA uses. At which point, why even have the BSF as a separate force? Just deploy regular Army forces to guard the IB 24x7. Raise new ones if needed.

It is not possible for Pakistan to carry out 65 or 71 style offensive operations with complete surprise where we have nothing but the BSF at the border and the IA is caught completely unawares. If that happens then it is not the BSF which is to blame for the situation and they shouldn't be expected to withstand or repel such an attack.

I am not saying there are no issues with the training of BSF personnel as well as decision making at the top (including buying those ridiculous Beretta SMG's) but the author of that article wants to convert the BSF into a smaller version of the IA which is not what it is supposed to be and is not feasible.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Vidur » 18 May 2020 14:56

dinesh_kimar wrote:^ arre Sahib, why again choose from UPSC? Do we need more lessons on their effectiveness?

No such complaints ever come abt these units, which are manned and controlled by Army.

But, they were caught young, sent to army camps from recruitment itself, always under the gaze of Army Officers, no room to play the fool like this IPS cadre.

Reading abt the BSF is so shameful, the buggers were about to order Mi-17 helicopters to be "effective in their operations ."

Even our NCC, with it's pathetic budgets ( no uniforms/shoes/badges of size avbl) is run well, due to all the Sub.Majors, Officers and Colonels constantly overseeing it, and though low budget and poorly equipped, is a highly motivated and effective force, easily fullfilling it's mandate.

These Central Home Ministry Forces are an embrassment and a disgrace, and one hears all sorts of horror stories abt them.

Added to that lopsided policies such as each state should have a seperate border force.

So they made ITBF, CRPF, CISF, RPF, CAC, BSF, AR, RR, SSB, and NSG.

Only the Army controlled ones are worth the name, the IPS ones are tainted.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Vidur » 18 May 2020 15:06

The IPS sees it self as part of the bureaucracy but also wants the trappings of military - rank badges, stars, flags.

IPS was the Imperial Police Serive of British Raj meant to keep the natives in place and ensure no resistance while the Raj exploited natural resources to be sent to UK to be turned into manufactured goods.

Our police forces have 3 levels of recruitment each harden the hierarchy but not endgender espirit d'corps. Policemen are recruited separately, Inspectors (equivalent to subedars in Army) separately and IPS officers separately. There is virtually no connection between leaders and men, no mutual respect. Army recruits jawans who go onto become Subedars/JCOs after getting lot of experience. Officers are recruited separately but by an exam that tests their ability to lead these men. Every stage of their training reinforces this, ethos is units strongly reinforces this. Bond is strong.

In short you are right Dinesh Kumar. IPS needs massive restructuring, rethinking for policing. And should have nothing to do with CAPFs

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nam » 18 May 2020 16:44

CCP Mouth piece has started talking about Ladakh standoff. We might start seeing some Chini foreign affairs blowing air soon.

The standoff is at Galwan valley, close to DBO. The pressure must be to reduce our built up at DBO.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby dinesh_kimar » 18 May 2020 18:37

Vidur wrote:The IPS sees it self as part of the bureaucracy but also wants the trappings of military - rank badges, stars, flags.


Oops, Im sorry, forgot abt you Sir!

No disrespect meant, some of closest friends and family are UPSC cadre with good influence. They have helped me on few occassions, I'm actually greatful for this backup, it's certainly helped in various ways such as jobs, contacts, securing various connections, etc. In multiple ways.

Actually, it's pointless for someone like me to be idealistic, when I've been able to make use of the system to my advantage on few occasions.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Vidur » 18 May 2020 19:32

dinesh_kimar wrote:
Vidur wrote:The IPS sees it self as part of the bureaucracy but also wants the trappings of military - rank badges, stars, flags.


Oops, Im sorry, forgot abt you Sir!

No disrespect meant, some of closest friends and family are UPSC cadre with good influence. They have helped me on few occassions, I'm actually greatful for this backup, it's certainly helped in various ways such as jobs, contacts, securing various connections, etc. In multiple ways.

Actually, it's pointless for someone like me to be idealistic, when I've been able to make use of the system to my advantage on few occasions.


I agreed with what you said, no apology needed for truth

What you have described is the patronage system which works for very few. India has been independent for almost 75 years now. Law and system must work for all. That is another reason why a drastic overhaul and rethinking of entire bureaucracy is needed.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Bala Vignesh » 18 May 2020 20:24

Vidurji,
As a thought exercise, if we were to amalgamate all CAPF involved in border protection under a single entity, how would we go about that?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Vidur » 18 May 2020 20:30

BSF+ITBP+SSB should be amalgamated. Top echelons commanded by Army officers instead of IPS. Control should be moved to Defence Ministry, DMA. Budget should move also. Training institutions for their officers should be amalgamated to one. Jawan training institutions should be rationalised and regional training centres for combined BSF can be created using existing training institutions.

CISF and RPF should be amalgamated. Top echelons commanded by their own officers not IPS. Control should stay with Home Ministry. IPS officers should be sent on deputation only as ASP so that they can learn the trade and stay on with the force in a continuos unbroken assignment for 5 years. All mid and senior echelons should be officered by own officers of CISF not IPS. IPS officers on deputation can continue with the force but once they go back to policing they should not be allowed back

CRPF should stay as is but should go through overhaul of training, tactics and ethos using expertise of army officers on deputation for 5-7 years. Top echelons should be commanded by their own officers. IPS officers can come on deputation as ASP and stay on as per same conditions as in CISF and RPF. Once they are repatriated to parent cadre they should not come back
Last edited by Vidur on 18 May 2020 20:43, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Sumair » 18 May 2020 20:36

Considering that Police is the first line of defence for everything from law and order, terrorist attacks, Intel gathering, natural calamities, medical emergencies etc ets It is high time for major two front police reforms.
1) Officers: IPS needs to be decoupled from UPSC. Most IPS officers do not have policing acumen. There is a need for a NDA like institution for the Police officers.
2) Jawans: Centralized constabulary training. Most states do not have the resources or do not prioritize the constabulary training.

First step for a modern India is well trained police force.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby srin » 18 May 2020 20:46

We also need the paramilitaries to do COIN. Headed & trained by Army/RR, gradually to take over COIN. And take the burden off the army.

Case in point, the terrorist population in J&K increased during the Kargil war. You need a special COIN force to be deployed in the hinterland and keep the rear areas safe from enemy irregulars.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nam » 18 May 2020 21:12

I don't know why we are expecting such a change in the Central force structure. The parallel Home Ministry "army" with IPS heading it, was setup for the fear of IA doing a coup. It seem to be the lesson learnt from our neighbor. Different organisation to prevent one organisation ganging up with IA...

You just need to go through the IPS Association twitter handle and you will soon figure out, the lot is convince IA will take over the country in a coup some day.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Bala Vignesh » 18 May 2020 21:28

Vidur wrote:BSF+ITBP+SSB should be amalgamated. Top echelons commanded by Army officers instead of IPS. Control should be moved to Defence Ministry, DMA. Budget should move also. Training institutions for their officers should be amalgamated to one. Jawan training institutions should be rationalised and regional training centres for combined BSF can be created using existing training institutions.

CISF and RPF should be amalgamated. Top echelons commanded by their own officers not IPS. Control should stay with Home Ministry. IPS officers should be sent on deputation only as ASP so that they can learn the trade and stay on with the force in a continuos unbroken assignment for 5 years. All mid and senior echelons should be officered by own officers of CISF not IPS. IPS officers on deputation can continue with the force but once they go back to policing they should not be allowed back

CRPF should stay as is but should go through overhaul of training, tactics and ethos using expertise of army officers on deputation for 5-7 years. Top echelons should be commanded by their own officers. IPS officers can come on deputation as ASP and stay on as per same conditions as in CISF and RPF. Once they are repatriated to parent cadre they should not come back


Thank you, for your response, Vidurji!!
This is how I envisioned it to be too!! What would be, for lack of a better word, the bureaucratic process to do the same? Would it require passing of a bill or an ammendment of a bill to start this?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Sumair » 18 May 2020 21:35

Staffing paramilitary forces with army officers is not the answer. We do not need to put any more burdens on army. Instead we should be training our police officers better. I would argue that training of the police force is even more important than that of army. Scope of training is far more diverse than army considering the responsibilities. Thus the need for elite training infrastructure both for officers and jawans.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RKumar » 19 May 2020 23:03

All indicators are showing that Chinese are coming to NaPak's rescue. They are ensuring security services are busy at multiple places - beside NaPak border, Nepal, and China. It seems Indo-Sino are getting ready for Doklam v2 but at a much bigger level - multiple locations at the same time. Xi needs to clam his people at home, so what better distraction than border friction and potentially 2 front war.

Chinese troops resort to aggressive posturing in Ladakh, North Sikkim

Both the Indian and Chinese armies have brought in more troops in sensitive locations like Demchok, Daulat Beg Oldie and areas around Galwan river as well as Pangong Tso lake in Ladakh.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RKumar » 19 May 2020 23:12

Global Times
China-India border tension flares up in Galwan Valley, won’t lead to another ‘Doklam standoff’: experts

In a fresh flare up in tensions along the China-India border, the Chinese troops' new move, believed to be the strongest military response to India's illegal trespassing incident along the border since the Doklam standoff, demonstrates the strong determination of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) to defend its sovereign territory, analysts said.

But the latest border friction started by the Indian side won't lead to another "Doklam standoff" which brought serious tensions between China and India in 2017, as India is merely seeking to divert its domestic attention and pressure since the COVID-19 pandemic impacted its economy, and China has a military advantage in the Galwan Valley region. So, the Indian military won't escalate the incident, analysts said.

.....

Hu Zhiyong, a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that the Galwan Valley is not like Doklam because it is in the Aksai Chin region in southern Xinjiang of China, where the Chinese military has an advantage and mature infrastructure. So, if India escalates the friction, the Indian military force could pay a heavy price.


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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Rakesh » 19 May 2020 23:28

Chinese newspaper piece. Filled with the usual Chicom propoganda.


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