India Border Watch: Security and Operations

[Singha]

I had predicted long ago that aka is the next preferred maun mohan after the real maunmohan retires or leaves his mortal coil. Pc has some bones left and is more unpredictable. Aka is very similar to mms...clean starchy unsoiled clothes..a high value on reputation for personal integrity and so on.

[manjgu]

yes ...in all cabinet meetings AKA is no 2. bad days ahead..hope modi ji comes to power.

[raj-ji]

foreign policy wrt pakistan is decided in the PMO.. but one must remember that AKA is no 2 in the UPA pecking order right now..and a possible PM candidate in case UPA 3 comes to power.

In that case, since AKA was a willing accomplice, when UPA3 comes to power and he becomes the PM, the first people he will sell will be the forces.

Recent events with the Pukis make my blood boil. Those Puki morons need a sound thrashing, and its very long overdue.

However, as angry as I am, if those in charge do what we want to do, they wouldn't be serving India's interests.

We are trying to play in the big leagues. We are getting more and more traction for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. If we react to everything those idiot Pukis do, we can kiss that goodbye. If Security Council status is not important for some, another compelling argument is the economy. Conflict is not good at all for the economy, and foreign investment. And let's not forget, money makes this world go round.

It has been mentioned repeatedly, the Pukis are trying to bait us. They have nothing, they are close to bankrupt, and are getting more and more isolated as the months go by. Their only strategy is to bait us into a conflict, so that they can play their recurring role of a 'victim', and get some cash from ideologically similar countries, to fight us.

There is a war going on in Pukistan, between the military establishment and the civilian government/people. The only way the military can stop this internal war, is if they are useful to the country, if there is a conflict with us. We can't take the bait. We can't get sucked in to their stupid games. It will hurt us politically, globally and economically.

Furthermore, all this political talk. History has shown that you can change the politician but the results are usually the same. Besides, I find it strange that there are more posts spewing anger at the current government than against the Puki skum. Who is the enemy here? If you think it is the current government you priorities are messed up, because you will soon have a chance to vote them out.

We need leaders that will put the countries best interests first. I know that's not me, one look at pictures of the fallen soldiers families, and restraint is the last thing on my mind.

[member_22539]

^Wow talk about simplistic and naive. Also, your loyalties are painfully obvious, so please spare us nonsense. UNSC permanent seat indeed

[Viv S]

^^

One the contrary, people clamouring for a strong response haven't been paying enough attention to events next door. No one would be happier about a war or war-like situation than the Pakistani army. At least they'd have a fight they can understand and an enemy that they can rally their disintegrating country against.

Last month 10 foreign mountaineers were shot dead in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. This week three officers investigating the shootings were shot dead as well (col, capt and police SSP). The Taliban broke out 250 prisoners from a KP prison right under the noses of the police who'd had advance warning of the attack. Baluchistan is still restless and far too unsafe for Punjabis. Kyber-Pakhtunistan is in flames and its open season on Hazaras. Karachi sees gunbattles every fortnight. The LeJ and associated Punjabi groups are murdering Shias by the dozen and Punjab is the new front for the TTP. Drone attacks have carried on regardless of the public wishes of the new govt in Islamabad. Power cuts rage across Pakistan, infuriating the public and crippling its industry. Foreign exchange reserves are dwindling - foreign investment is negligible and the country is scraping by on remittances. Its one of the few developing countries that have a bleak fortune in store, at least for the near future.

And unlike the past, relatively few people are looking at their army for solutions. If anything the army and ISI find themselves stretched and twisted by unending and brutal counter-insurgency campaigns on multiple fronts in addition to election duties, law-enforcement, disaster-relief and so on, while their budgets are prepared for a major squeeze over the next few years.

India getting involved at the national level will be the height of folly. Nor will cancelling talks achieve anything besides weakening Nawaz Sharif's political standing within Pakistan (unless that's the objective). When folks expect Pakistan to do this or that or hope to pressurize it, they're making a basic mistake in treating Pakistan as a single entity. Unlike India where there is a broad political consensus on foreign policy (the Left excepted) and no extraneous forces, Pakistan is a cart tied to four different horses straining in four different directions (and coming apart as a result). Giving it directions or making demands on it is meaningless.

As far as the raid by the PA goes, the response should be left to the local brigade or division commander, which usually means retaliatory raids against targets across the LoC, done strongly enough for the message to go across and the infuriated army units to be satisfied, but quietly enough that the national media doesn't pay too much attention.

[SaiK]

when it comes to nuclear fears, the feelings should be mutual.. if India attacks pakistan, pakistan will use nukes.. and pakis attacks India, the same fear should be there with the pakis. If that is not there, then WTF scenario only arises.

WTF is happing?

[ashish raval]

I am amazed how useless our security agencies are that they cannot take out a most wanted terrorist who openly inflames people. I don't care what pukes think, we should have single pursuit of going after pukis who perpetuated this crimes, else is worthless for any prime minister to head a nation of billion coward lambs walking on this planet.

If such things happen anywhere in the world, heads roll but what can we say, this is India.

[KrishnaK]

Viv,
You're absolutely right. That said, the PA cannot be led to believe they can lash out against Indians every time they need some relief. Being the pakis they are they'll learn that the hard way. An ass whopping is a comin.

[Victor]

I don't know why our news outlets allow pakis with fake accents to come and poop in our faces time and again. Here is some Kazi guy telling Vishnu Som that India doesn't know what exactly has happened other than the unfortunate loss of life that appears to have taken place. The proof of this he says is the conflicting statements from our leaders, ie. the saint's disgusting flip-flop. Aiyar is as usual at his slimiest.
NDTV Link

I hope someone somewhere has concrete plans to make sure that none of these traitors slip out of the country when the time comes.

[SaiK]

man's best friend dogs must be trained and enaged for each army squad, till such time a setup is established where no evil escapes or even think about entering inside the boundaries.

[raj-ji]

^^

One the contrary, people clamouring for a strong response haven't been paying enough attention to events next door. No one would be happier about a war or war-like situation than the Pakistani army. At least they'd have a fight they can understand and an enemy that they can rally their disintegrating country against.

Last month 10 foreign mountaineers were shot dead in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. This week three officers investigating the shootings were shot dead as well (col, capt and police SSP). The Taliban broke out 250 prisoners from a KP prison right under the noses of the police who'd had advance warning of the attack. Baluchistan is still restless and far too unsafe for Punjabis. Kyber-Pakhtunistan is in flames and its open season on Hazaras. Karachi sees gunbattles every fortnight. The LeJ and associated Punjabi groups are murdering Shias by the dozen and Punjab is the new front for the TTP. Drone attacks have carried on regardless of the public wishes of the new govt in Islamabad. Power cuts rage across Pakistan, infuriating the public and crippling its industry. Foreign exchange reserves are dwindling - foreign investment is negligible and the country is scraping by on remittances. Its one of the few developing countries that have a bleak fortune in store, at least for the near future.

And unlike the past, relatively few people are looking at their army for solutions. If anything the army and ISI find themselves stretched and twisted by unending and brutal counter-insurgency campaigns on multiple fronts in addition to election duties, law-enforcement, disaster-relief and so on, while their budgets are prepared for a major squeeze over the next few years.

India getting involved at the national level will be the height of folly. Nor will cancelling talks achieve anything besides weakening Nawaz Sharif's political standing within Pakistan (unless that's the objective). When folks expect Pakistan to do this or that or hope to pressurize it, they're making a basic mistake in treating Pakistan as a single entity. Unlike India where there is a broad political consensus on foreign policy (the Left excepted) and no extraneous forces, Pakistan is a cart tied to four different horses straining in four different directions (and coming apart as a result). Giving it directions or making demands on it is meaningless.

As far as the raid by the PA goes, the response should be left to the local brigade or division commander, which usually means retaliatory raids against targets across the LoC, done strongly enough for the message to go across and the infuriated army units to be satisfied, but quietly enough that the national media doesn't pay too much attention.

^ +1

[raj-ji]

^Wow talk about simplistic and naive. Also, your loyalties are painfully obvious, so please spare us nonsense. UNSC permanent seat indeed

You attack your own, instead of talking about the pakis.

YOUR loyalties are being questioned now. Are you one of those Pukis masquerading as an Indian. If you are you should own it, you shouldn't be ashamed of what you are. But stay away from trolling and acting childish.

Is that simple enough for you to understand?

[nachiket]

We are trying to play in the big leagues. We are getting more and more traction for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Don't kid yourself. Those who play in the "big leagues" as you say do not allow their neighbors to whack them around and blow up their citizens with impunity. Especially those in the Security Council.

The UNSC seat is a chimera anyway. None of the current members want more countries in the UNSC regardless of what they say. Those who say they support our entry do so because they know the Chinese will never say yes, so there is no danger of India actually getting in.

[Rudradev]

Some dots (data points) to connect here. As always, I proffer the disclaimer that data points can be interlinked in any number of ways, potentially yielding a great diversity of patterns; my own preferred algorithm for connecting them, and the particular pattern generated, reflect the limitations of my personal knowledge, experience and reasoning capacity. Still, here goes.

I believe that the GOI's assessments and working assumptions regarding India's border security (and wider national security as well) have undergone a dramatic shift, sometime around June or July of 2013. This shift has not yet produced any discernible change in the GOI's response to border provocations (or lack thereof) between January-April 2013 and the present; yet, I believe it exists, and has profoundly impacted strategic thinking (or lack thereof) in New Delhi.

Why?

Well, let's see.

In January 2013, we had a situation where the US was gearing up to abandon Afghanistan, and badly needed the good graces of Pakistan to cover its exit rather than humiliate it with a widely-broadcast kicking on the way out. This US position has only solidified as John Kerry took over as Secretary of State. Under Hillary Clinton, the State Dept was not shy about speaking frankly on the subject of Pakistan's double-game, even if the overall policy still tended to be one of appeasing Pakistan at all costs... there was at least the appearance of sticks in addition to carrots. Now there is only GUBO, and it is Unkil who is quietly bending over.

Accordingly, in the early part of 2013, we saw a few actions on India's borders which amounted to clear attempts by our enemies to test the waters. In this Phase I of testing the waters, we first saw the beheading of L/NK Hemraj Singh by the SSG at the LOC. While the GOI came up with platitudes about how "it can no longer be business as usual with Pakistan", the following weeks and months made it clear that inaction (and uninterruptible dialogue) were still the only responses New Delhi was willing to offer.

Now we can assume that New Delhi's response to the beheading was governed by a specific Set of Assumptions (let us call this Set A). The assumptions of Set A include:

1) We should not attack Pakistan overtly, because this will provide a platform to unite the various centrifugal groups fighting each other in Pakistan, and may affect the forthcoming Pakistan general elections in a way inimical to Indian interests.
2) Keeping the US happy will present rewards.
3) Related assumption to (2)... the US will prevent the Pakis from going too far with provocations, so it is better to simply ride out whatever comes. Assaults on Internal Security in the rest of India, such as by Indian Mujahedin, can be explained away as arising from Hindu Terror; use this valve to confuse public opinion and avoid taking actions that would inconvenience the US.
4) Related assumption to (2)... the US sees India as a desirable counterweight to China. The US will not allow China to attack or humiliate India.

Unfortunately for the GOI, the Chinese incursion into Depsang in April 2012 was crucially damaging to this set of assumptions. India capitulated pathetically, agreeing to destroy our own fortifications deep within our own territory, and to restrict the ambit of the Indian Army to patrol within our own land.

This, of course, completely did away with Set A Assumption 4. It also strengthened a growing international perception that had ensued from the GOI's non-response to the beheading of L/NK Hemraj Singh: that the Indian Army was incapable of mounting any sort of effective response to cross-border provocation, either because it lacked the readiness and capacity to do so, or because it was being politically undermined to the point of paralysis as a national institution, or both.

The GOI did not take any action to correct this perception, of course. Meanwhile, it continued to formulate policy based on the remaining three Assumptions of Set A.

1) We should not attack Pakistan overtly, because this will provide a platform to unite the various centrifugal groups fighting each other in Pakistan, and may affect the forthcoming Pakistan general elections in a way inimical to Indian interests.
2) Keeping the US happy will present rewards.
3) Related assumption to (2)... the US will prevent the Pakis from going too far with provocations, so it is better to simply ride out whatever comes. Assaults on Internal Security in the rest of India, such as by Indian Mujahedin, can be explained away as arising from Hindu Terror; use this valve to confuse public opinion and avoid taking actions that would inconvenience the US.

Now in the months of May, June and July, some critical events took place.

Firstly, general elections in Pakistan resulted in a victory for the PML(N), throwing up a civilian leadership under Nawaz Sharif, whose deep connections with the ISI and ties to jihadi tanzeems have been well established since 1999. In so doing, these elections abolished even the fiction that perhaps some meaningful steps towards peace had been made through engagement with the previous PPP civilian government, and that the GOI could capitalize on these steps by continuing its policy of inaction and infinite tolerance for Pakistani terrorism.

Secondly, in July, John Kerry visited India in his capacity as US Secretary of State.

We have no idea what the message was that Kerry brought to New Delhi (other than the usual platitudes about "growing strategic partnership" that were widely reported in the media.) However, my contention is that Kerry's message catastrophically changed the GOI's Set A of Assumptions into something very different. This is indicated by a few circumstantial, but distinct clues amongst the events that followed.

i) Joe Biden visited India shortly after Kerry, and was received with a remarkable degree of frostiness. The visit was so unattended, unreported and otherwise downplayed by Indian media that I would never have noticed it at all, except for some sparse mentions on Twitter. Was there even one televised press conference of Biden with any GOI official? Contrast this to the visit of Obama, who was treated like a rock star (the Indian media was buzzing and blustering about his sojourn for months before and a good while after it occurred). Biden is, after all, the second-highest office holder in the US after Obama. However, even John Kerry's own visit, at least initially, attracted more attention than Biden's.

This suggests to me that the GOI were very much angered, and felt highly betrayed, by whatever Kerry had told them on his visit, shortly preceding Biden's. The message from Kerry must have completely demolished whatever remained of Assumption Set A that I've outlined above.

ii) A second clue emerges from the fact that, shortly after the PML(N) victory in the May elections, the Chinese perpetrated a fresh border incursion in June that was strongly played down by the GOI. Moreover, after the Kerry visit, the Chinese have followed up with a whole series of incursions, each more aggressive than the last, throughout the months of July and August.

This in itself does not directly support the hypothesis that John Kerry demolished the GOI's Set A of working Assumptions during his visit; however, the GOI's response to the fresh onslaught of Chinese incursions, i.e. continued inaction and capitulation, provides some indication of the new Set B of Assumptions that they are currently left with.

iii) Finally, the 6th Aug incursion by Pakistan resulting in the deaths of five Soldiers from 21st Bihar and Maratha LI... and the ongoing non-response to this incursion as well... make it even more obvious that the GOI is foundering based on a new Set B of Assumptions, so radically different from Set A that it has no idea how to compensate in terms of policymaking.

The Ek Crore Ka Sawaal, for me, is: what did John Kerry tell the GOI in July that has so radically altered their working assumptions as to produce complete policy paralysis?

I will take a stab at guessing what the Assumptions of Set B are comprised of. This is admittedly the product of guesstimation, so if anyone here has any better ideas, please contribute them.

1) With the election of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, the idea that there is only violent dissonance between different factions within Pakistan no longer holds good. There are still many warring factions; however, there is far greater alignment than before, between the Pakistan Army, ISI, Civilian Government and Jihadi Tanzeems in terms of formulating an active strategy to re-ignite the Kashmir jihad.
2) India is on its own. It cannot rely on the US for anything. The US will not back India against China, and the US washes its hands of any commitment to pressure Pakistan against ratcheting up border tensions with India.
3) Worse yet, the US will openly support Pakistan, diplomatically and militarily, if India undertakes any retaliatory action against Pakistan that would hamper the US' exit strategy from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the US is resigned to Afghanistan falling back into the hands of the Taliban, and plans to engage with the forthcoming Taliban regime in Kabul, Indian interests be damned.

The result of being faced with this new Set B of Assumptions, radically and shockingly different from Set A, has made a fundamental difference to the GOI's policy-making apparatus. From where we sit, as observers from the ranks of common citizenry, the difference is not apparent: there was inaction and capitulation before, and there is more inaction and capitulation now.

However, I believe that earlier (January-April 2013), the GOI had willingly formulated a strategy of non-response to Pakistani provocation, and "tactical withdrawal" before Chinese incursions, based on the Assumptions of Set A. New Delhi believed that its measures provided for a superior long-term solution given the Set A Assumptions, or at least could try and justify them in this way.

Given the sudden shift in Assumptions to Set B, however, the GOI has found the floor falling away beneath its very feet. It is now a deer in the headlights, or more appropriately a headless chicken... it's "head", i.e. reliance on the US as an honest broker and reliable strategic partner, has been chopped off. Dependence on the US' best intentions was the entire basis of the Set A Assumptions; having been disabused of this notion, the GOI finds itself in complete and total paralysis. This is being exposed in many ways: most notably the open censorship, reversal and flip-flopping evident in AK Anthony's statements, and the easily discernible panic behind the blustery comments that GOI officials (such as Salman Khurshid, JP Chacko and Rajiv Gowda) have taken to making before the media in the last few days. They have completely abandoned their well-coached poise, and start off by shouting defensively about Kargil and IC 814 at the very beginning of interviews.

The helpless, paralyzing fear in these people is so obvious and tangible that you can taste it. What they are afflicted with is no mere crisis of governance, but a total and complete collapse in their ability to enact foreign policy or maintain national security. Meanwhile, the Chinese, Pakistanis and Americans have tasted our fear as well. We have much, much worse in store for us than we've had to face thus far.

[raj-ji]

Some dots (data points) to connect here. As always, I proffer the disclaimer that data points can be interlinked in any number of ways, potentially yielding a great diversity of patterns; my own preferred algorithm for connecting them, and the particular pattern generated, reflect the limitations of my personal knowledge, experience and reasoning capacity. Still, here goes.

I believe that the GOI's assessments and working assumptions regarding India's border security (and wider national security as well) have undergone a dramatic shift, sometime around June or July of 2013. This shift has not yet produced any discernible change in the GOI's response to border provocations (or lack thereof) between January-April 2013 and the present; yet, I believe it exists, and has profoundly impacted strategic thinking (or lack thereof) in New Delhi.

Why?

Well, let's see.

In January 2013, we had a situation where the US was gearing up to abandon Afghanistan, and badly needed the good graces of Pakistan to cover its exit rather than humiliate it with a widely-broadcast kicking on the way out. This US position has only solidified as John Kerry took over as Secretary of State. Under Hillary Clinton, the State Dept was not shy about speaking frankly on the subject of Pakistan's double-game, even if the overall policy still tended to be one of appeasing Pakistan at all costs... there was at least the appearance of sticks in addition to carrots. Now there is only GUBO, and it is Unkil who is quietly bending over.

Accordingly, in the early part of 2013, we saw a few actions on India's borders which amounted to clear attempts by our enemies to test the waters. In this Phase I of testing the waters, we first saw the beheading of L/NK Hemraj Singh by the SSG at the LOC. While the GOI came up with platitudes about how "it can no longer be business as usual with Pakistan", the following weeks and months made it clear that inaction (and uninterruptible dialogue) were still the only responses New Delhi was willing to offer.

Now we can assume that New Delhi's response to the beheading was governed by a specific Set of Assumptions (let us call this Set A). The assumptions of Set A include:

1) We should not attack Pakistan overtly, because this will provide a platform to unite the various centrifugal groups fighting each other in Pakistan, and may affect the forthcoming Pakistan general elections in a way inimical to Indian interests.
2) Keeping the US happy will present rewards.
3) Related assumption to (2)... the US will prevent the Pakis from going too far with provocations, so it is better to simply ride out whatever comes. Assaults on Internal Security in the rest of India, such as by Indian Mujahedin, can be explained away as arising from Hindu Terror; use this valve to confuse public opinion and avoid taking actions that would inconvenience the US.
4) Related assumption to (2)... the US sees India as a desirable counterweight to China. The US will not allow China to attack or humiliate India.

Unfortunately for the GOI, the Chinese incursion into Depsang in April 2012 was crucially damaging to this set of assumptions. India capitulated pathetically, agreeing to destroy our own fortifications deep within our own territory, and to restrict the ambit of the Indian Army to patrol within our own land.

This, of course, completely did away with Set A Assumption 4. It also strengthened a growing international perception that had ensued from the GOI's non-response to the beheading of L/NK Hemraj Singh: that the Indian Army was incapable of mounting any sort of effective response to cross-border provocation, either because it lacked the readiness and capacity to do so, or because it was being politically undermined to the point of paralysis as a national institution, or both.

The GOI did not take any action to correct this perception, of course. Meanwhile, it continued to formulate policy based on the remaining three Assumptions of Set A.

1) We should not attack Pakistan overtly, because this will provide a platform to unite the various centrifugal groups fighting each other in Pakistan, and may affect the forthcoming Pakistan general elections in a way inimical to Indian interests.
2) Keeping the US happy will present rewards.
3) Related assumption to (2)... the US will prevent the Pakis from going too far with provocations, so it is better to simply ride out whatever comes. Assaults on Internal Security in the rest of India, such as by Indian Mujahedin, can be explained away as arising from Hindu Terror; use this valve to confuse public opinion and avoid taking actions that would inconvenience the US.

Now in the months of May, June and July, some critical events took place.

Firstly, general elections in Pakistan resulted in a victory for the PML(N), throwing up a civilian leadership under Nawaz Sharif, whose deep connections with the ISI and ties to jihadi tanzeems have been well established since 1999. In so doing, these elections abolished even the fiction that perhaps some meaningful steps towards peace had been made through engagement with the previous PPP civilian government, and that the GOI could capitalize on these steps by continuing its policy of inaction and infinite tolerance for Pakistani terrorism.

Secondly, in July, John Kerry visited India in his capacity as US Secretary of State.

We have no idea what the message was that Kerry brought to New Delhi (other than the usual platitudes about "growing strategic partnership" that were widely reported in the media.) However, my contention is that Kerry's message catastrophically changed the GOI's Set A of Assumptions into something very different. This is indicated by a few circumstantial, but distinct clues amongst the events that followed.

i) Joe Biden visited India shortly after Kerry, and was received with a remarkable degree of frostiness. The visit was so unattended, unreported and otherwise downplayed by Indian media that I would never have noticed it at all, except for some sparse mentions on Twitter. Was there even one televised press conference of Biden with any GOI official? Contrast this to the visit of Obama, who was treated like a rock star (the Indian media was buzzing and blustering about his sojourn for months before and a good while after it occurred). Biden is, after all, the second-highest office holder in the US after Obama. However, even John Kerry's own visit, at least initially, attracted more attention than Biden's.

This suggests to me that the GOI were very much angered, and felt highly betrayed, by whatever Kerry had told them on his visit, shortly preceding Biden's. The message from Kerry must have completely demolished whatever remained of Assumption Set A that I've outlined above.

ii) A second clue emerges from the fact that, shortly after the PML(N) victory in the May elections, the Chinese perpetrated a fresh border incursion in June that was strongly played down by the GOI. Moreover, after the Kerry visit, the Chinese have followed up with a whole series of incursions, each more aggressive than the last, throughout the months of July and August.

This in itself does not directly support the hypothesis that John Kerry demolished the GOI's Set A of working Assumptions during his visit; however, the GOI's response to the fresh onslaught of Chinese incursions, i.e. continued inaction and capitulation, provides some indication of the new Set B of Assumptions that they are currently left with.

iii) Finally, the 6th Aug incursion by Pakistan resulting in the deaths of five Soldiers from 21st Bihar and Maratha LI... and the ongoing non-response to this incursion as well... make it even more obvious that the GOI is foundering based on a new Set B of Assumptions, so radically different from Set A that it has no idea how to compensate in terms of policymaking.

The Ek Crore Ka Sawaal, for me, is: what did John Kerry tell the GOI in July that has so radically altered their working assumptions as to produce complete policy paralysis?

I will take a stab at guessing what the Assumptions of Set B are comprised of. This is admittedly the product of guesstimation, so if anyone here has any better ideas, please contribute them.

1) With the election of Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, the idea that there is only violent dissonance between different factions within Pakistan no longer holds good. There are still many warring factions; however, there is far greater alignment than before, between the Pakistan Army, ISI, Civilian Government and Jihadi Tanzeems in terms of formulating an active strategy to re-ignite the Kashmir jihad.
2) India is on its own. It cannot rely on the US for anything. The US will not back India against China, and the US washes its hands of any commitment to pressure Pakistan against ratcheting up border tensions with India.
3) Worse yet, the US will openly support Pakistan, diplomatically and militarily, if India undertakes any retaliatory action against Pakistan that would hamper the US' exit strategy from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the US is resigned to Afghanistan falling back into the hands of the Taliban, and plans to engage with the forthcoming Taliban regime in Kabul, Indian interests be damned.

The result of being faced with this new Set B of Assumptions, radically and shockingly different from Set A, has made a fundamental difference to the GOI's policy-making apparatus. From where we sit, as observers from the ranks of common citizenry, the difference is not apparent: there was inaction and capitulation before, and there is more inaction and capitulation now.

However, I believe that earlier (January-April 2013), the GOI had willingly formulated a strategy of non-response to Pakistani provocation, and "tactical withdrawal" before Chinese incursions, based on the Assumptions of Set A. New Delhi believed that its measures provided for a superior long-term solution given the Set A Assumptions, or at least could try and justify them in this way.

Given the sudden shift in Assumptions to Set B, however, the GOI has found the floor falling away beneath its very feet. It is now a deer in the headlights, or more appropriately a headless chicken... it's "head", i.e. reliance on the US as an honest broker and reliable strategic partner, has been chopped off. Dependence on the US' best intentions was the entire basis of the Set A Assumptions; having been disabused of this notion, the GOI finds itself in complete and total paralysis. This is being exposed in many ways: most notably the open censorship, reversal and flip-flopping evident in AK Anthony's statements, and the easily discernible panic behind the blustery comments that GOI officials (such as Salman Khurshid, JP Chacko and Rajiv Gowda) have taken to making before the media in the last few days. They have completely abandoned their well-coached poise, and start off by shouting defensively about Kargil and IC 814 at the very beginning of interviews.

The helpless, paralyzing fear in these people is so obvious and tangible that you can taste it. What they are afflicted with is no mere crisis of governance, but a total and complete collapse in their ability to enact foreign policy or maintain national security. Meanwhile, the Chinese, Pakistanis and Americans have tasted our fear as well. We have much, much worse in store for us than we've had to face thus far.

^ +1

Excellent post.

My 2 cents, what if the 2 US delegations told the GoI, you need boots on the ground in Afghanistan or Kabul will fall again into Puki friendly hands. Their message could be, this is your neighborhood. You get involved before we leave or live with the consequences.

That could throw some lighter fluid on our existing strategy and plans.

[Rudradev]

Raj-ji, something like that is possible... but on the other hand, India has gone in exactly the opposite direction from 2011 to the present. From a previous pledge to become heavily involved in guaranteeing Afghanistan's national security, we have come to a stage where we will not even supply them with second-hand arms and ammunition.

I would like to remind everyone of something. In October 2011, we had a lot of loud talk regarding a "new strategic partnership between Afghanistan and India". See http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 0#p1174490 for details, including proposals to become deeply involved in training and equipping the Afghan armed forces.

Now fast forward to June 6th. "India Rejects Afghan Arms Plea". http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... a/1138292/

Apparently we have done a complete U-turn in under 2 years. What happened to the October 2011 declaration, and why?

[Kakkaji]

RD ji:

Excellent analysis as usual.

The assumption set A was false to begin with and it was rank stupidity, or active treason, on part of GOI to begin with. Assumption set B is what has been general consensus on BRF for ever. If we could have seen it, the smart-@sses in GOI would have seen it too. Yet nothing was done to prepare for the scenario post the eventual US withdrawal from Afghanistan. I think the leadership was heavily compromised by the influence of vote banks within, and swiss accounts without.

The next GOI will face military and diplomatic pressure much worse than we have ever seen. It will be decision time then. If it is UPA3 or the 3rd/ 4th front, or the D4-led NDA, it will capitulate on the borders and sell it to the public as 'in the interests of peace' and the public that elected them will go back to the movies and cricket.

If it is a GOI led by a staunch nationalist like NaMo, it will be a fight on the borders and within the country that would require unprecedented sacrifices and hardships, and the outcome will be 'win some, lose some'.

Our karma is catching up with us. I don't blame just the UPA1 and UPA2. I blame all of us.

Now I understand what Duryodhan-raj must have been like.

Lord Krishna Himself is needed to lead us through this Mahabharat.

[Avarachan]

Great post, Rudradev. However, I think something else is going on. This "News Insight" article from July 10th, 2013, is worth pondering: "The Ishrat Conspiracy." The article should be read in full, but this is a brief excerpt.

http://www.newsinsight.net/TheIshratcon ... age=page-1

An insider with intimate knowledge of Anglo-American policy towards India suggested that a virtual resolution of the historic Kashmir issue has already been negotiated discreetly through the intercession of Washington. It seems an understanding has been reached with Manmohan Singh’s government that major Indian concessions would be on the table. Apparently, this entire package would be in jeopardy if Narendra Modi were to become prime minister of India.

Pakistan, whose rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons’ capability is considered an urgent problem, including its known proliferation activities, is prepared to reciprocate with suitable steps acceptable to Washington.

[gashish]

twitter-vine has this:

Shiv Aroor ‏@ShivAroor 3m
Happy to see Shekhar Gupta's column 2day mentions the unreportable: Army begins revenge for Poonch. 3 Pak soldiers bumped off, more soon.

[member_23455]

twitter-vine has this:

Shiv Aroor ‏@ShivAroor 3m
Happy to see Shekhar Gupta's column 2day mentions the unreportable: Army begins revenge for Poonch. 3 Pak soldiers bumped off, more soon.

Shekhar Gupta...eh .

[SaiK]

When our gov is so indecisive, what ever set of plans coming from whatever external forces will also receive similar reaction.. meaning maun and do nothing. so, nothing to explain that further.. besides, all these other conspiracy aspects can be laid to rest by having standard operating procedures, where a kill is compensated by 100 kills.. what use of anlaysis-paralysis is only to console ourselves backing another 5 year term for our maun governance. when we lack confidence in building the nation, where is the confidence comes to protect it. i am in disbelieve, we have no systems and infrastructure in place to prevent few pakis or chippandas crossing over and create havoc.. this is not first time nah!?

heck, stop all these discussions and get on action folks.. vote these maunist down, and elect some body who can run us with lesser corruption and increased growth on all fronts. the enemy must fear to even dream about crossing over.. our mil setup is totally exposed.. from left and right, our mil folks have been man-handled from left&right consistently and repeatedly! what more shame is needed?

time not just to head roll count within army, but the gov as well. do or die. once we are shaken like this, we have to shake it off completely, and reinstate all things considering future options on the plate. this is bloody line crossing serious issue has seriously plagued the country now for quite sometime.

[Prem Kumar]

Rudradev: great analysis, but I know you are being consciously generous in your assessment that the basis of Set A is the long-term interest of India.

Avarachan's article reference from NewsInsight is closer to the truth. The UPA leadership, in connivance with the Track 2 sellouts and useful idiots like the media are actively working with the US and ISI to sellout J&K. I have been convinced for some time now that the UPA and ISI have a common agenda and may indeed be working together through intermediaries.

The Congress party leadership is the most dangerous national security threat to India

[ashish raval]

^^ good points, Rudradev.

The simple fact is India have a non Hindu government with idiotic and corrupt Hindus sprinkled here and there to make it even. They want Hindus to feel subjugated and powerless by humiliating them at every opportunity and forum. This is a well established psychological technique to control masses. They want also want every opportunity to divert the attention of media from corruption which plagues every sphere of India including armed forces.

We have enemy within.

[Rudradev]

Thanks to all who commented on my post. Avarachan, Prem Kumar: yes indeed, I have been consciously generous.

I think that Set A Assumptions comprise the justification that has been sold to the rank-and-file administration, especially the bureaucracy, in order to enact what is in fact a far more sinister agenda known only to a few. That agenda, as the article posted by Avarachan describes, is total compliance with US interests in the region, to the extent of selling out Kashmir.

One indication of this agenda was the trial balloon floated by the architects of this policy... traitors such as Manmohan Singh and Shivshankar Menon... regarding a Siachen pullout.

Another indication came in the form of the Sharm-el-Shaikh and Thimphu declarations, which effectively absolved Pakistan of terrorism by drawing a false equivalence with nonexistent Indian activity in Baluchistan.

Yet another indication comes in the question I posed in an earlier post:

From a previous pledge to become heavily involved in guaranteeing Afghanistan's national security, we have come to a stage where we will not even supply them with second-hand arms and ammunition.

I would like to remind everyone of something. In October 2011, we had a lot of loud talk regarding a "new strategic partnership between Afghanistan and India". See viewtopic.php?p=1174490#p1174490 for details, including proposals to become deeply involved in training and equipping the Afghan armed forces.

Now fast forward to June 6th. "India Rejects Afghan Arms Plea". http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india ... a/1138292/

Apparently we have done a complete U-turn in under 2 years. What happened to the October 2011 declaration, and why?

The answer, of course, is that Manmohan Singh has effectively reduced the Indian Government to a 400% GUBOing pawn in the hands of US Foreign Policy... a status so abject that Musharraf himself looks like a true patriot in comparison. When Washington wanted to put pressure on Pakistan following the Raymond Davis and Salala standoffs in 2011, Sepoy Manmohan Singh dutifully made a false promise to Karzai of "strategic partnership", so that Islamabad would feel threatened. Now that the US has ordered India to do Pakistan's bidding so that they can exit Afghanistan gracefully, Sepoy Manmohan Singh has coolly gone back on his word to the Afghans and refuses to give them even second-hand military aid.

India's interests are the last thing on the minds of the Maino-Manmohan regime. Afghanistan, which the NDA regime worked so hard to cultivate with generous aid programs in the post-Taliban years, has been left in the lurch as ordered... betrayed by India because Washington wanted it that way. This is exactly how India behaved with respect to Iran as well, of course... shooting ourselves in the foot, compromising our only existing route of access to Afghanistan, only because the US ordered us to vote against Iran's nuclear program at the UNSC.

And that's exactly why the Set B Assumptions pose such an interesting predicament. Manmohan Singh, Salman Khurshid and co. are now EXACTLY like the Pakistani used-condom that America discarded after evicting the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989. They have been told: thanks for your help but you are now on your own. We won't help you against China, we won't restrain Pakistan from using terrorism, and we will actually help Pakistan if you retaliate against them for terrorist attacks.

That's perhaps the biggest reason for the panic that these criminals, who for so long have prostituted Indian national interest at the US altar, now find themselves faced with. They have used Set A Assumptions to convince the entire administration, including the bureaucracy and security forces, that doing the US bidding with respect to Pakistan was in India's best interest. Now the US, while zipping up its trousers, has told Manmohan Singh: "Bye Bye, Keep the Change."

[pragnya]

fine analysis Rudradev.

my own view is pretty simple and straight forward. GOI has neither the clue, nor the will, nor the gut to face up to/deal with Pakistan. the edited "tough talk" after much confusion, downplaying, indecisiveness, dilly dallying and totally varying with army statement only confirms that. even if the tough talk is the 'toughest' - point is, Pakistan simply doesn't care!!! besides 'talks or no talks' has no meaning (in India - Pakistan context) as decades of history will testify.

since GOI will not allow any 'overt' action, a covert 'payback' by the IA and the intelligence agencies is in order.

[Aditya G]

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2013/08/d ... -will.html

....

If Antony were correct, this would be the first instance of Pakistani Army regular troops playing second fiddle to jihadi elements in a confrontation with Indian troops. Since the 1990s, the Pakistan Army has often fired on Indian posts to facilitate jihadi infiltration. However, the Pakistan Army has avoided operating alongside jihadis, who lack discipline and training. It remains unclear whether the Poonch attack, if it were indeed a joint operation featuring primarily jihadi fighters, was local tactical expediency, or a strategic shift in the Pakistan Army's employment of its longstanding, non-state instruments.

While jihadis often cross the LoC, that de facto border has always been held by regular army troops from both sides, with low-threat areas held by paramilitary "Mujahid" battalions on the Pakistan side, and Border Security Force (BSF) battalions on the Indian side, both functioning under the army. Effectively, many tens of thousands of heavily armed soldiers, backed by heavy weaponry, are deployed eyeball-to-eyeball, at hair-trigger alert, along the 776-km LoC.

Before the 2003 ceasefire, both sides occupied themselves in an unending, unprovoked duel to gun down or kill with mortar and artillery fire as many opposing soldiers as possible. Tens of thousands of bullets were fired everyday, and the casualty count on either side often crossed a hundred soldiers each year. To put the current year's count of 57 ceasefire violations in context, each day before the ceasefire would see those many exchanges of fire.

Bizarrely, an occasion like an India-Pakistan one-day cricket match would see soldiers get killed or wounded. Each wicket taken or boundary hit would see intense celebratory gunfire - directed at a nearby, or especially vulnerable, enemy post.

Even with the current ceasefire, the daily operational routine on the LoC carries the risk of confrontation and conflict. Military ethos demands that a unit in contact with the enemy - and the Indian and Pakistani armies certainly view each other as that - conducts aggressive patrolling, ambushes, and operations to establish "psychological and moral dominance" over the enemy. This game flashes out of control, when casualties occur and retribution follows. The Indian Army will almost certainly retaliate for the Poonch killings.

Confrontation is also inherent in the counter-infiltration deployment posture that Pakistan has forced on the Indian Army by training and infiltrating jihadis to sustain the Jammu & Kashmir insurgency. To block jihadi infiltration, India has fenced the LoC with hundreds of kilometres of razor wire, floodlights, surveillance cameras, and seismic and audio sensors that are monitored from control rooms. But the fence must be physically monitored and so, small groups of Indian soldiers patrol the gaps between posts. These "area domination patrols" are particularly vulnerable whilst in the sliver of Indian territory ahead of the LoC fence. In Poonch, the patrol was ambushed ahead of the fence.

For carrying out such ambushes and for attacking small enemy posts in tactically favourable terrain, both India and Pakistan have contingency plans worked out and rehearsed. When one side needs to send a signal, or to retaliate, one of those plans is implemented at short notice.

During the Kargil conflict in the summer of 1999, an Indian Army platoon had crossed the LoC at the Munawar Tawi River near Jammu and wiped out an entire Pakistani post, triggering a vicious cycle of revenge killings and counter-killings (Yes, it is India's fault ... PA invasion of Kargil was justified) . At that time, Pakistan refined the concept of "border action teams", or BATs, specifically earmarked for sneak killings along the LoC. Some BATs feature commandoes from Pakistan's elite Special Services Group (SSG), while others are constituted from local forces. The beheading of an Indian soldier in January has been ascribed to a BAT.

Ultimately, only LoC de-militarisation can eliminate the ever-present danger of an escalation of tensions. For India, de-militarisation would require a double assurance - first, that Pakistan would not ingress across the LoC, something it did in 1999, leading to the Kargil conflict. Second, Pakistan would need to assure India of an end to cross-border infiltration.

...

[ASPuar]

Ajai Shukla has sold his soul. Poor fellow. Its hard for a man to get on in the World without becoming someones stooge.

[member_23455]

http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-new ... px?hts0021

[Akshay Kapoor]

Ramana,

Thank you. Will do. There are enough tactical options to inflict local damage. You just need the okay.

A few ex officers who have been very vocal on recent issues are Maroof Raza (journo but ex major of the Grenadiers), Maj Gen GD Bakshi, Lt Gen PN Hoon (Op Meghdhoot was his baby). Ex Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan Mr Parthasarthy was also very vocal and said 'this jappi shappi' is all nonsense and 'they understand only one language'.

We can easily talk in that language with no danger of any full scale or even half scale war, or fall out with US, or a nuclear war or any of the other bullshit that is used to justify us silently taking blows. In fact I would say that strong action is essential if we want to prevent a bigger issue. Remember the Pakis always think India is weak (the hindu will run after a strong kick, baniya hain sar lad nahin painge etc) and embark on adventures. Even when our govt is weak they loose (Kargil and 47) and when its strong and policy is joined up and coherent they suffer the biggest post WW2 defeat in history.

So for the Paki lovers I would say its good for the Pakis if we hit them hard now to prevent them from thinking we are weak and launching a bigger adventure and getting hurt more !! Mr PM and Soniaji are you listening ?

On the bigger picture Rudradev and Avarchan's scenarios are both very worrying the latter a bit more. If we have let this happen then its only we who are to blame as a people and a civilisation. Our fundamental problem is that we have no vision, clarity of thought and conception of national security. Take Pakistan for example. We just do not understand that it is very largely a society driven by hard core Islamic agenda. Its ingrained and subliminal. Maroof Raza and others said that on Times Now 3/4 days ago.

Talking about that has anybody seen Times Now coverage of the events. Arnab Goswami was brilliant! God Bless him. I would encourage every one to see long 10 pm program that was broadcast on Thursday night on the Bihar minister Bhim Singh's comments. Maj Gen GD Bakshi was also there. He really tore into the politicians when they were trying to defend Bhim Singh. I could see the pain in his eyes and voice as he said 'maine logon ko apne haathon mein dam todte dekha hai. Dard hota hai jab aap log aisi baatein karte hain'.

I wonder if there is any country on this planet rich or poor where politicians can get away with saying such things about soldiers.

[Akshay Kapoor]

Please see this video. Shocking ! I have not been following the int angle too closely. Int gurus could this be true? Can the penetration be this deep? The Bihar connection and recent statements by Bihar ministers.. are these dots to be connected? Rudradev what do you think?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DSrg3TLufs

Also attaching a brilliant video of Maj Gen GD Bakshi from the same conference. Keep a look out for minute 40 when he talks about what his paltan did to 29 Baluch. I love Gen Bakshi. He should have made at least to GOCnC. Absolutely brilliant officer.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Twbh6_ZRDVo

[AbhiJ]

Rudradevji,

There is a personal Swarth of Biden in whatever he said to GOI.

Biden’s trip to India follows in his established pattern of providing “reassurance” to countries that have concerns about Obama administration policies. It also seems to reflect a division of labor in the administration whereby the vice president focuses on some of the quieter, longer-term issues in U.S. foreign policy as the White House as a whole deals with the immediate crises of the day.

The success of Biden’s “reassurance” missions rests on two factors. The first is that he is seen as a credible representative of the president, able to speak for Obama and make commitments on his behalf. The White House has never hidden the close relationship between the two men; Biden is certainly no isolated figure biding his time in a corner office while Obama and his team govern. In particular, on foreign policy during the second term, the line coming out of the White House is that both men are in alignment and share the same mindset, with the implicit signal being that when Biden now travels and holds meetings with other foreign leaders, whatever message he delivers comes from the president—and whatever commitments or assurances he makes, Obama himself will honor. Biden himself has made this perfectly clear, declaring that “when I speak, no one doubts that I speak for the president.”

The second factor is less clear-cut: Biden’s political future. On a number of domestic and foreign policy issues, there is a growing sense that Obama himself will not be in office to see the fulfillment of his policies—that, in the words of Douglas Brinkley, there will be “too much Obama-era unfinished business” left on the table. Some of Biden’s foreign interlocutors also have gotten the sense that the vice president, in taking over some of the strategic dialogues with key countries, is positioning himself to be Obama’s heir. This, of course, would enhance his credibility in his current talks with other leaders, by offering the promise of continuity beyond 2016, should Biden win the Democratic nomination and then the presidency.

Link

[Aditya G]

....Also attaching a brilliant video of Maj Gen GD Bakshi from the same conference. Keep a look out for minute 40 when he talks about what his paltan did to 29 Baluch. I love Gen Bakshi. He should have made at least to GOCnC. Absolutely brilliant officer.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Twbh6_ZRDVo

Well this "badmaash paltan" was responsible for Jan 2013 attacks:

https://twitter.com/timesnow/status/288881546159611905

29 Baloch Regiment identified as Pak Army Unit behind ceasefire violation
9:35 PM - 8 Jan 13

[ramana]

Rohitvats, is the constant terrorist attacks by TSPA in Jammu & Kashmir due to their perception of teh lack of sufficient troops in the setor to carry out retaliatory strikes in the area without invovlving troops across the Intl Border? May be there needs to be a couple of mtn divs with independent arty brigades raised but not called as MSC?

PS: Thinking more after your khat.

[koti]

This is said to be in LEH. Apart from the good view what is to be noted is the good quality road that look brand new.

[manjgu]

leh kargil road has improved dramatically...over the last 3/4 years... they were laying fresh tar on the highest pass on kargil leh road. Should be done by now. Even the leh manali road has improved quite a bit.. . leh to pang is quite good thru the moreh plains and on the tanglala pass. road ahead of pang is still bad as it passes thru big mountains. but short of keylong it improves once again. but the section from say keylong to rohtang is still bad though road is being made on rohtang..and whatever has been made is quite good. i was surprised to see the improvements !!

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>This is said to be in LEH. Apart from the good view what is to be noted is the good quality road that look brand new.

Well, you'd be surprised to hear what all has been moved to Leh by these very road...but all in good time.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>PS: Thinking more after your khat.

Have sent another mail. Forgot to add a data point - look at it from the perspective of discussion above about Srinagar-Leh road.

[manjgu]

yes.. i have personally seen tanks being moved ahead of zoji la.. on trailers... held up the traffic for long...

[rohitvats]

yes.. i have personally seen tanks being moved ahead of zoji la.. on trailers... held up the traffic for long...

You broke the secret....

IA has moved a T-90 Regiment by road to Leh. It seems they took special exercise to strengthen the bridges en-route (waiting for the info to be used for sniping to start in Arjun thread )

[manjgu]

arey bhai.. i am on the highway very often... seen all that goes on it. the road quality has improved considerably... T 90 + APC's both were seen... but the real test is how it shapes up after the winters/snow. the build quality looked quite good.