India Border Watch: Security and Operations

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Karan M
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Karan M » 04 Oct 2013 10:28

Yes, agree. I have nothing against American weapons per se, but the political strings that they may come with. I think thats about the only real grouse folks on this board have with US made systems. But lets leave that aside as its an entire topic by itself.

The only thing I wanted to point out is that despite all the GOI incompetence, the current IA/IAF capabilities are still sufficient to use airpower to get the job done.

The only two reasons I can think of why this is not being done, one, is to project a "business as usual" spin and prevent the issue from flaring up and affecting our beloved PM's peace pipe.

There is clearly a policy that airpower use is escalation. We know this from the fact that in 1999, Tipnis had to seek cabinet approval before the IAF was used at Kargil. However, sometime after that, we had no compunction in using Mirage 2000s with LGBs to pulverize a Pak detachment which again attempted something similar.
Now, a decade later, the IAF has only grown in capabilities. It not only has better FLIR/LDPs, but also SAR pods and a wider range of PGMs.
So if the IA/IAF really wanted, airpower could be used for this.

Second reason could be that the IA thinks it can get the job done by itself and is not really keen to rope the IAF in. In 1999 too, the IA only asked for armed choppers and not fixed wing support. And that too, after it became clear that the infiltrators were heavily entrenched and the clock was ticking.

Net, I'd wager that this is clearly a policy decision, but not a technical one.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Aditya G » 04 Oct 2013 10:42

Karan M wrote:Escalation, when we have a habit of fighting on our side only, is a dicey thing. Start using gunships regularly, the PA will send across Anza's and Stingers, and who knows they might end up targeting civilian flights too. At the end of the day, if you fight on your side, and keep ceding the start the fight bit to the adversary, such a defensive play is what you will be restricted to, even if you kill the x people he sent across. The obvious answer is then to use the IAF's fixed wing assets with LGBs etc, but to do that is again a change from the defensive mindset so assiduously cultivated by GOI. ....


Au contraire escalation on our side of the border/LoC has many advantages. Though it enforces constraint on maneuver and encirclement on ground troops, it is a proven strategy from Kargil War and Loonda Post Incident. If same had been done in 1962, the results could have been different.

Regards to MANPAD threat;

1. Civilian flights do not fly parallel to LOC. They fly international routes which are 'pre-approved' and PA or PAF will not target them. They have never done so in past.

2. They are a threat, but not a magic wand to deter military operations. in Kargil at least 100 of them were fired. Our Mi-17s of today are equipped with better sensors and passive defences. Moreover, the enemy is not as deeply entrenched into own side as it was in Kargil.

Regards to attack by fighters;

There is no report of fortification by enemy troops in the area, neither there is any report of them getting artillery fire support. Thus, I don't think it is warranted.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Victor » 04 Oct 2013 10:52

Did Keran infiltrators come to drop arms?
sources said from the composition of the group and its size it is clear that all aren't terrorists. Some could well be porters and guides, and the mission could also be to dump ammunitions in strategic locations for Kashmiri militants...

..Given the fact that the infiltration happened just before winter sets in, adds further credence to the theory..

..the attack on 16 Cavalry camp in Samba on September 26 may be linked.

This is very probable. Otherwise, what would these infiltrators hope to achieve? The talk of "supply lines" being built also fit into this. The Samba attack could have been to divert attention to far away Jammu. Dogged, determined and single-minded enemy and we need to match this or suffer the consequences.
Last edited by Victor on 04 Oct 2013 10:53, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pankajs » 04 Oct 2013 10:53

Army rejects ‘mini-Kargil’ label
Unanswered questions dog the operation by the Indian Army. One officer said the nature of the operation can be disclosed only 72 hours after it is over. He will not give a timeline.

The nature of mountain warfare is such that troop movement is dictated by terrain and the advantage of height held by a defending force.

<snip>

A crucial question that is yet to be answered is why was a height of 9,900ft — that potentially could offer a panoramic view of Indian military positions — on the Indian side not occupied by Indian troops.

This does not necessarily mean that the Indian Army vacated the position. It is possible the position was not considered militarily prudent to hold because it is overlooked by a Pakistani post. But there is no such explanation yet from the Indian Army.


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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pankajs » 04 Oct 2013 11:47

Keran: Fear mounts in village General claimed does not exist
Though Khan would learn the details only later, around 35 infiltrators, including some reportedly dressed as Pakistani Special Forces, had descended from the Biswal and Ahithana posts on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, and had allegedly occupied two Indian posts, Khukri and Kullar, in the vicinity of Shala Bhata.

The army, according to official sources, had vacated the posts a week earlier amid a change of guard. When it spotted movement inside the vacated bunkers, a fierce gun-battle started.

Lieutenant-General Gurmeet Singh, the XV Corps commander, denies any posts were occupied. He also said there was no such village, a claim that mystified journalists, officials and local residents alike.

The attempt to infiltrate was strategically well-timed, sources say. It appears that the Pakistani side had an eye on recent movement of troops in the area. The infiltration attempt happened when the 20 Kumaon regiment had handed over charge to the 3/3 Gorkha Rifles.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby sum » 04 Oct 2013 12:57

around 35 infiltrators, including some reportedly dressed as Pakistani Special Force

How do you dress as a "special force"? :-?

Surely, SF posted on LoC would be in civvies and not strutting around in full ceremonial uniform?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby partha » 04 Oct 2013 13:12

Should we adopt a policy of massive retaliation to even small provocations? It looks like that is the only language these Pakis understand. Inflict maximum damage and then downplay such incidents.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Rahul M » 04 Oct 2013 14:08

sum wrote:
around 35 infiltrators, including some reportedly dressed as Pakistani Special Force

How do you dress as a "special force"? :-?

Surely, SF posted on LoC would be in civvies and not strutting around in full ceremonial uniform?

you can never tell. they are pakis after all.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pralay » 04 Oct 2013 15:57

Can it be a case that IA created a trap some rats ?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nachiket » 04 Oct 2013 17:15

around 35 infiltrators, including some reportedly dressed as Pakistani Special Force


This is too much. If the PA soldiers don't bother to disguise themselves , our media believes they are terrorists disguised as PA soldiers. :roll:

BTW, the concern about Anzas being used against civvie flights is unwarranted. No civilian flights flying in that region will be low enough to be within range of Stingers/Anzas. Even if they were, it doesn't really help the Paki cause to shoot them down at all.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nachiket » 04 Oct 2013 17:19

pankajs wrote:
The army, according to official sources, had vacated the posts a week earlier amid a change of guard. When it spotted movement inside the vacated bunkers, a fierce gun-battle started.

The attempt to infiltrate was strategically well-timed, sources say. It appears that the Pakistani side had an eye on recent movement of troops in the area. The infiltration attempt happened when the 20 Kumaon regiment had handed over charge to the 3/3 Gorkha Rifles.

This seems to be a recurrent theme. The beheading incident also occurred when there was a change of battalion taking place. Their intel seems to be too accurate.

And if the above report is true, I fail to understand this tactic of vacating a post before new soldiers arrive to occupy it.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Prem Kumar » 04 Oct 2013 19:16

Victor wrote:Did Keran infiltrators come to drop arms?

This is very probable. Otherwise, what would these infiltrators hope to achieve? The talk of "supply lines" being built also fit into this. The Samba attack could have been to divert attention to far away Jammu. Dogged, determined and single-minded enemy and we need to match this or suffer the consequences.


The fact that the infiltrators have dug their heels in, display good fire discipline & have been battling our troops for 10 days shows that these are not mere porters on an arms-dropping mission. Even if there are some arms droppers, there seems to be a strong ecosystem of trained troops around them

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Prem Kumar » 04 Oct 2013 19:21

pankajs wrote:Army rejects ‘mini-Kargil’ label
Unanswered questions dog the operation by the Indian Army.


No - they dont dog the operation. Unanswered questions leave the journalists drooling for sound bites & inhibit their ability to claim scoops. Hence, they have resorted to gossip mongering and wild speculations.

Not talking to the media is helping the Army to focus on the job at hand. Not talking to Barkha Dutt has already saved the lives of some jawans

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nachiket » 04 Oct 2013 19:25

Victor wrote:Did Keran infiltrators come to drop arms?

This is very probable. Otherwise, what would these infiltrators hope to achieve? The talk of "supply lines" being built also fit into this. The Samba attack could have been to divert attention to far away Jammu. Dogged, determined and single-minded enemy and we need to match this or suffer the consequences.

If it was just an arms dropping mission, they would have gone back by now. The IA cordon can only be from three sides, the fourth being the border itself. They would have dropped the arms and made a run for it. More importantly, they wouldn't have been in a position to engage the IA for so long unless they were specifically trained for that purpose.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Prem Kumar » 04 Oct 2013 19:29

sum wrote:
around 35 infiltrators, including some reportedly dressed as Pakistani Special Force

How do you dress as a "special force"? :-?

Surely, SF posted on LoC would be in civvies and not strutting around in full ceremonial uniform?


This takes the cake. But hey, it was our Param Pujya Raksha Mantri (on orders from the PMO & in consultation with the MEA) who set the bar on this one. Saint Antony was the first one to give a clean chit to the Paki Army by stating that the beheadings were done by terrorists "dressed in PA uniform". So, why complain if the media takes the cue from that?

I think there is a good business potential for fake uniforms in the LOC region:

a) Jihadi uniform for SSG (Best seller in Jammu!)
b) Paki Army uniform for jihadis (All time favorite - never out of stock)
c) Indian Army uniform for jihadis (Seasonal - call ahead for placing bulk order. Expect 3 - 4 week delivery time)
d) Indian Army uniform for Paki Army (Brand new release. NSG, Marcos, 1 Para SF - all models & sizes available. Hurry while stocks last!! )

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pralay » 04 Oct 2013 20:28

Calling them Paki Terrorists seems better option than Paki Army Units.
1. Geneva convention does not apply as the issue becomes localized (instead of international if we call them paki Army units)
2. We can treat the captured enemy as we want, we can torture them :mrgreen: , use them as live targets, use them as specimens for testing lethal things or even as punch bags, and we wont be answerable to anyone :D
3. Calling them Paki Army units will not and have not detered them doing evil things.
4. They can not claim bodies of the dead soldiers, (might hurt moral of their units).

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Rudradev » 04 Oct 2013 20:41

Victor wrote:Did Keran infiltrators come to drop arms?

This is very probable. Otherwise, what would these infiltrators hope to achieve? The talk of "supply lines" being built also fit into this. The Samba attack could have been to divert attention to far away Jammu. Dogged, determined and single-minded enemy and we need to match this or suffer the consequences.


That actually makes very little sense to me.

If your objective is to plant caches of arms and equipment for your proxy irregulars at predetermined locations in hostile territory... the LAST thing you want to do is announce your presence by going across in larger-than-necessary numbers, occupying villagers/bunkers, and starting a loud gunbattle. That virtually guarantees that the enemy will scour every inch of the area when the incident is over, and probably discover all your caches.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Prem » 04 Oct 2013 20:59

pankajs wrote:Army rejects ‘mini-Kargil’ label
Unanswered questions dog the operation by the Indian Army. One officer said the nature of the operation can be disclosed only 72 hours after it is over. He will not give a timeline.The nature of mountain warfare is such that troop movement is dictated by terrain and the advantage of height held by a defending force.A crucial question that is yet to be answered is why was a height of 9,900ft — that potentially could offer a panoramic view of Indian military positions — on the Indian side not occupied by Indian troops.This does not necessarily mean that the Indian Army vacated the position. It is possible the position was not considered militarily prudent to hold because it is overlooked by a Pakistani post. But there is no such explanation yet from the Indian Army.


Are they trying to capture them alive to cater them with proper Mehman Nawazi?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Cosmo_R » 04 Oct 2013 21:19

partha wrote:Should we adopt a policy of massive retaliation to even small provocations? It looks like that is the only language these Pakis understand. Inflict maximum damage and then downplay such incidents.


I suggest we start small. Minimum retaliation for massive provocations. We don't even have that right now.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Karan M » 04 Oct 2013 22:08

Aditya G wrote:Au contraire escalation on our side of the border/LoC has many advantages.


It doesn't. As matter of fact, you scupper this claim by your first point itself.

Though it enforces constraint on maneuver and encirclement on ground troops,


Which was what the problem was with Kargil. For all the claims of how it brought us diplomatic brownie points and was perhaps the only option post the nuke tests (and the economic sanctions etc that were placed on us, after which we could not again spark another stand your ground issue).. the fact of the matter is that it forced Indian troops to attack from frontal avenues (causing max casualties) as versus cutting off logistics and starving the invaders or/escalating elsewhere and forcing the Pakistanis to withdraw on their own.

it is a proven strategy from Kargil War and Loonda Post Incident.


Hardly a proven strategy. An enemy comes into our territory, we lose around 490-520 (as memory serves) of our soldiers retaking our OWN territory, many others crippled, and you consider this as a good strategy?
Sometime later, the enemy repeats this, and the IAF ends up bombing the Indian side of the LOC to wipe out the infiltration?

This is success? Merely because we retake territory and inflict more casualties on Pakistan?
Short term success perhaps. But what it really demonstrates is that Pakistan continues to escalate ON the Indian side of the LOC and India continues to react defensively.

If same had been done in 1962, the results could have been different.


An entirely different debate.

Regards to MANPAD threat;

1. Civilian flights do not fly parallel to LOC. They fly international routes which are 'pre-approved' and PA or PAF will not target them. They have never done so in past.


On the contrary, you have misunderstood what I meant. If MANPADS come into play and are supplied to the jihadis, there is no guarantee where they will end up. On the LOC or elsewhere. Unless you are sanguine that each and every weapon supplied to LeT, HuM and others is used exactly as the ISI plans.

As regards "PA and PAF" not targeting civilian airliners or the like - sorry, but you still believe in this after what happened to Ahuja (classic case of "professional PA will not mistreat prisoners" myth being busted) or after 26/11 or Akshardham or Kaluchak (PA/ISI had never done any of these either, and kept raising the stakes without any retaliation).

India's standard policy under the current dispensation is that whenever a mass casualty attack takes place is:
-wail and chest beat loudly about terrorism (BBC responds by a 1 page response on gunmen, and kashmir)
- run to America to reign in pakistan (US responds by tut-tutting)
- send a 100 dossiers (Pakistani response.. need it be said?)

The point is that this defensive mindset is the BANE of Indian defence strategy. We are fighting on OUR side of the territory, expending valuable men and material, facing economic disruption to merely secure our own territory.

The more we bring in fancy toys to deal with this issues, the more the Pakistanis escalate by sending in new equipment or better trained men.

We sanitize Kashmir? They expand the war to Mumbai, Gujarat elsewhere.
We crack down on Dawood etc? They create IM and set off a bunch of bomb blasts.
We win Kargil? They stage Loonda sometime later. Then if that's not enough, there is the Parliament attack, and then beheadings and so forth..

2. They are a threat, but not a magic wand to deter military operations. in Kargil at least 100 of them were fired. Our Mi-17s of today are equipped with better sensors and passive defences.


In Kargil, those MANPADS caused the IAF to enforce a height rule on its operations, which meant that they had to drastically reevaluate the way they were operating. Which meant GPS timed high-alt ops (which meant lower support to direct CAS) and also LGB responses (a mere fraction of the overall strikes). They may not have stopped IAF operations, but they did complicate mission planning and restricted the impact of airpower on direct assaults (as versus strikes on logistic nodes).

Moreover, the enemy is not as deeply entrenched into own side as it was in Kargil.


The problem is not of this one time, the bigger problem is of this defensive mindset which keeps "clearing" Indian territory at the cost of Indian lives.

Regards to attack by fighters;

There is no report of fortification by enemy troops in the area, neither there is any report of them getting artillery fire support. Thus, I don't think it is warranted.


And what reports do we have till date? There appears to be a pretty good black out on exact details. There are reports stating they have taken over Indian bunkers and are entrenched in the town, and talk of cordons apart, bodies are being recovered by the Pakistanis.

If things were so easy, why is the IA taking so long to clear out these guys, caution apart?

The point is that only if India uses overwhelming force to swiftly and decisively end these sort of attacks, will the Pakistanis stop doing them. As versus meeting their expectations of a protracted, conflict which they can use internally for propaganda purposes.

The bigger point is that even after we do this, there has to be a bigger strategy to deter them, because they will activate something else on OUR side of the border.

That debate is best left off a public forum, but this entire defensive mindset - wherein we depend on the extreme bravery of YO and jawans to constantly clear Indian territory, is a big problem. We are fighting a war by the enemies rules which means they set the agenda.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby darshhan » 04 Oct 2013 22:48

Good post Karan M ji. The standard Indian response to Pakistani attacks only reflects a defensive mindset. Pakistanis know this and are exploiting this weakness of ours to hilt. Sooner or later if we will have to take the war inside Pakistani Punjab if we are to protect our territorial integrity and freedom. This includes targeting of Pakistani Army Officers in highest echelons.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RoyG » 04 Oct 2013 22:54

J-K: more militants from PoK joining in? 3 infiltrators killed in fresh bid

Peerzada Ashiq, Hindustan Times

Srinagar, October 04, 2013

The army says that by far the biggest intrusion by Pakistan-based militants in Keran sector of Jammu and Kashmir is a desperate attempt to replenish depleting militant ranks in the valley before the onset of winter. The army and 30-40 militants have been locked in a battle since September 24, a week before the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India met in Washington to discuss various issues, incursions along the Line of Control (LoC) among them.
The fight continued today also, with the army claiming it killed three militants who were part of a fresh batch that tried to infiltrate in another area, Gujjar Tur, possibly to assist those holed up in Shala Batu village since September 23. The two areas are 30km apart.

Army spokesman Naresh Vij said, “These infiltrations bids are a desperate attempt on part of militants to replenish depleting ranks before winters because the army has successfully foiled several infiltration attempts, killing about 40 militants, near the LoC this year.”

He said the army is keenly watching the new trend, as witnessed in Keran sector, whereby militants fan out only in a particular border area to engage the army for longer periods.

On Friday, he said a fresh group of militants was spotted in the wee hours in Gujjar Tur area. In the gunfight that ensued three militants were killed.
The army is not sure about the strength of the fresh group but “other accompanying militants have been pushed back,” he said.

Vij refused to comment on reports that more militants were being pushed into the valley to help those besieged in Shala Batu.

“We are gradually narrowing down the operation. Intermittent firing is on,” Vij said.

Sources, however, told the HT that the area of operation has been widened and more elite troops are being rushed to the area.

Indeed, a few areas of Kupwara, away from the flash point, are also being condoned off in a bid to stop any militant movement from the valley to the battle zone.

The army has once again denied that any post, village or territory has been captured by the militants. “These reports are rubbish,” said Vij.

Around six square km area is under operation right now. The operation is on in a tough terrain with steep rugged mountain slopes, streams and dense forests.

“We are deliberately going slower to avoid any casualty,” he added.

The hiding militants are using global positioning system and are highly trained to sustain a longer operation inside hills. Militants continue to dominate areas where the army’s Khokri and Kullar posts are located, sources said.

The army confirmed that top militant commanders visited the launching pads of five militant outfits, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Hizbul Mujahideen, in the last week of September. The commanders’ visit came just days ahead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s meeting with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharief.

Meanwhile, dozens of pro-militant social networking accounts on Facebook and Twitter claim a portion of territory is under militants and are asking “supporters to pray for the holed up militants”. The state cyber police refused to confirm the veracity of these groups and the claim.

PoK-based United Jehad Council supremo Syed Salahuddin on Wednesday also claimed that “the militants were giving a tough time to the Indian Army in border regions”.

“Militancy in Kashmir valley has not come to an end. More people are joining the ranks. We are giving a tough time to the Indian Army in border regions.

Mujahideen (militants) are active in Tral, Machil, Tanghdar, Poonch and other areas,” said Salahuddin in a telephonic interview to a Srinagar-based news
service from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir’s capital Muzaffarabad.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed ... 31114.aspx


More are being pushed in an attempt to divert attention from the core group. The aim is to stay as long as they can. PA will use the increasing troop buildup close to LoC as justification to push their own guys towards the hot zone. This will allow them to poke us around the area and better supply the the jihadis that are facing the brunt of our offensive. This is ugly. Just look how long it is taking us.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby darshhan » 04 Oct 2013 22:56

Victor wrote:Guilty as charged. Can't help rooting for Amriki weapons...

Bottom line-- we will be better off when the IA and IAF get what they desperately want asap.


Victor ji, IA and IAF desperately want some courageous Political leadership. Equipment is secondary.

You do not need multi million dollar gizmos to assassinate Pakistani Army and ISI officers. It is guts along with imagination that you need. America will not supply that. If anything America itself is short on this aspect. Their two thousand(approx) soldiers and marines were murdered in Afghanistan by Pakistani Army while they were paying jiziya(military aid) to the Pakis. And now like cowards they are running away leaving the job unfinished.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Karan M » 04 Oct 2013 23:09

darshhan wrote:Good post Karan M ji. The standard Indian response to Pakistani attacks only reflects a defensive mindset. Pakistanis know this and are exploiting this weakness of ours to hilt. Sooner or later if we will have to take the war inside Pakistani Punjab if we are to protect our territorial integrity and freedom. This includes targeting of Pakistani Army Officers in highest echelons.


Sir, I have been one of those who believed in the bravery and competence of the Indian Armed services and how they would constantly defend India. It took me some time to realize that there was a fundamental issue in that the IA/IAF are now being sought to be used on Indian soil! They are being forced to fight with one hand behind their back and their effects limited. Plus it is stated we have no other options beside trotting out the conventional war argument. Is this logical?

The issue is that most folks who debate this seem to be still stuck in this "defend what is ours" mindset. Our respected politicians constantly repeat the mantra "India is not an aggressive country, wants peace and will defend itself". In other words, sit tight & wait for the adversary to land blows, counter them (get hurt in the process) and then state peace talks are on.

How long will this continue? I grew up with Pakistani sponsored terrorists killing people in Indian punjab, then there were the umpteen attacks in the NE, Kargil, Kaluchak, Akshardham, train attacks...the list of atrocities does not even end.

And decades later, all we have is this mantra of peace talks and how the Indian Army will throw yet another bunch of terrorists out.

If you think this is bad. Consider this. An IAF pilot once noted that when the Kargil war occurred, they were sitting blase, thinking that it was yet another common incident in Kashmir. Only when they saw wounded IA personnel, did they realize how grave the situation was.

If this is not a case of the boiling frog syndrome, and how the Indian public is increasingly tolerant of what it should not be tolerant of at all, then what is?

Ordinary chaps like us, sit around accepting whatever is the norm, while our politicos go around with fancy security and can even shut down entire cities when they move.

Is this anyway to run a national security strategy? Is there even one? There seems to be no endgame in mind, or even a system to deter the Pakistanis over the short term.

There is a limit to chalta hain, but in India, there is no limit to chalta hain.

The war should be fought on the Pak side, not on the Indian side

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby rohitvats » 04 Oct 2013 23:52

I think we need to look at the Keran incident from a different angle.

To me, it does not appear like a run of the mill infiltration attempt to sneak terrorist into Kashmir Valley but a more elaborate plan. I think the way word ‘infiltrator’ and ‘infiltration’ is being used in discussion is confusing the issue. For sure there is an infiltration but not of the kind we associate earlier with Kashmir.

A quick summary off facts that we know based on reports in Indian media. Please add or correct if something is amiss:

1. At the time of Samba attacks, we heard of major infiltration bid by the terrorists in Keran sector which was being monitored by the army. There were multiple contacts across 4-5 km front in the sector.

2. Another report says that militants directly descended from PA posts across the LOC directly onto the Sala Bhatta village and occupied Indian position vacant in the village.

3. Sala Bhatta sits between fence and LOC.

4. The infiltrators are in large number with 30-40 being one set of number being thrown about. And that they have shown considerable fire-discipline, good tactics and are holding ground.

5. Sala Bhatta is a village situated on Indian side of LOC at about 9,000 feet on a ridge line. It seems it is dominated by two PA posts on other side of LOC. It is important to note here that mountain terrain in the region consists of various ridge lines running parallel to each other and it is said that PA positions are on a ridge line/mountain slope even higher than ours. Further, more than the height of the village, it is the height of the valley floor and gradient of the mountain slope which matters.

6. Telegraph is the first one to use term ‘fire base’ for terrorist positions in the village and also reports that we’re fighting uphill against the enemy positions.

7. We've been further given to understand that IA has limited the position of terrorists to a 800 x 400 meter zone and has cordoned off the area from 3-sides.

8. The fourth side remains open to LOC and lines of communication from across the LOC.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Based on above, here is my analysis of this incident:

1. First things first – IMO, the theory about arms drop is bunkum and apart from infiltration attempt, this was a land grab exercise with Sala Bhatta being the objective. With this clear, now read on.

2. Pakistan Army pushed in well-trained infiltrators first into the Sala Bhatta village on Indian side of LOC. They were aware of the rotation of Indian Army battalions on our side and the fact the observation posts in the village were vacant.

3. It is likely that Indian Army was aware of this movement of terrorists into Indian Territory and was monitoring them to plan its own course of action.

4. It is my hypothesis that some terrorists, most probably regular PA soldiers or SSG troops, stayed behind in Sala Bhatta village and organized it into a fire cum logistic base. Balance group of terrorists fanned out from this base and this is how multiple contacts were made across 4-5km front on or before the border fence.

5. I think the reason PA has sent such large and well trained group of terrorists is because they were hoping that these groups can fight their way out. Or at least, some of them can sneak into the valley. PA knows it cannot push the quantity like earlier times and hence, may have decided to push highly trained ones. A group like 26/11 can do much more damage and cause more spectacular attacks than your average Joe jihadi.

6. When these groups of terrorists came in contact with IA cordons and ambushes, rather than engage in a futile fire-fight, they retreated. This is again an indication of their level of training. Their fire-discipline and training during this course of withdrawal became apparent to IA.

7. When the IA talks about restricting the terrorists into an 800 x 400 meter box, we can assume that all the groups which tried to infiltrate retreated into this shell. And that their retreat was facilitated by firing from across the LOC.

8. And this shell seems to be centered on Sala Bhatta village. That is why IA is not able to close the cordon. And in spite of all the efforts by the Indian Army, some form of line of communication exists between this village and PA positions on other side of LOC.

9. Now, the terrorists did not choose to melt away to other side of LOC after having managed to retread in pretty good shape. They have dug in themselves in the village and are engaging the IA from these vantage points.

10. This makes me believe that PA was using the BAT + terrorist cover to take-over this area. Newspaper reports talk about PA positions dominating the Indian posts – therefore, had PA decided to take-over Indian posts; it could have done so earlier as well. But is relying on the façade of terrorists to ensure no fingers are pointed at it.

11. With rear area of the village open to PA positions on LOC, this village could have well served as firm base and launch pad for terrorists inside Indian positions.

This action shows that the lines between PA and tanzeems seem to have finally vanished for good; this is further indication of how things will evolve in the future. After withdrawal of US from Afghanistan, PA can use well trained fighters from these fronts for use along the LOC.

Such infiltration attempts of highly trained and battle hardened fighters can be replicated to both push in fighters and make attempts to augment the LOC. PA is again being careful to no cross the artificial threshold set by MMS and GOI; even in present case, it has flatly refused the involvement of its troops in the action. On the contrary, IA will have to perforce use heavy artillery to tackle such situations and will be accused of cease fire violations. Further, given the lack of clarity from GOI on such issues, we’ll be simply forced to react and escalation control and LOC domination will be ceded to PA.

Such firm bases with lines of communication to PA posts and which serve as fire-bases can be replicated at various points inside Indian territory - IA will be forced to retaliate INSIDE Indian territory. Further, since PA involvement is officially denied, IA will be forced to restrict action to positions of terrorists inside our territory and launch assaults to take what may well be tactically useless piece of land. Why? Because it is occupied by terrorists. Normal course of action would be to cordon such an area and obliterate PA positions supporting such enclaves. But that would require clear political directions.

Gentlemen, PA has just laid the framework for next round of fighting along LOC.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Rudradev » 04 Oct 2013 23:56

Karan M wrote:
The war should be fought on the Pak side, not on the Indian side


You know KaranM ji, I want to agree with you. I would like nothing more than to see India choose options that involve seizing the initiative and punishing the Pakis on their side of the border. It would make all of us feel good to see this happening.

But to take the argument any further, we all have to show that making this investment... because it IS an investment... will have an advantageous cost-to-benefit ratio in cold, hard terms. Let's undertake a serious exercise to do that.

There are many things to consider.

1) What action do we take on our own initiative?

One way of categorizing this is what kind of operation we will launch.
1A: Go into Pakistan/POK, destroy identified Pak military and subconventional assets, then return.
1B(x)(y): Go into Pakistan/POK, seize and attempt to hold x sq.km of territory for y weeks. "y" can be assigned a value of "permanent" .

Another set of categories is the when and where.
i) We launch the op PURELY on our own initiative, and in a sector of our own choosing.
ii) We launch the op in response to a Paki incursion/provocation, but in a different sector than where the provocation occurred.
iii) We launch the op in response to a Paki incursion/provocation in the same sector where the provocation occurred, then overrun into Paki/POK territory.

So we can denote the nature of the action as for example "1Aiii" (Aimed at destruction of assets in same sector as Paki provocation occurred); 1B(40)(10)i (Aimed at seizing and holding 40 sqkm of Paki/POK soil for 10 weeks minimum, launched purely on our own initiative) etc.

The first task is to come up with a matrix of these classifications. Then, make an educated estimate of what each class of action can be expected to achieve in terms of political goals. Simply saying "teach them a lesson" is not good enough. When we fight on Indian soil at least we have a totally clear idea of why we are fighting... to defend Indian soil. Such a clear, definite idea must be associated with each class of action we could take on Paki soil. Are we trying to push infiltrators in? Are we trying to destroy specific terrorist infrastructure in a sustainable manner? Are we trying to sabotage some TSPA/PLA joint project there? Does taking any category of action under (1) help to achieve the goal specified, and if so how?

So in general, let us designate the Class of Action plus its well-articulated political goal as 1______

Now that's just articulating the benefits. Now we have to consider the costs.

2) A) Escalation. How far are we willing to match and exceed direct military escalation from the enemy?
This is a whole ladder which goes from
2Aa) Involvement of artillery locally by Pakistan
2Ab) Involvement of air forces in sector by Pakistan
...
2Ax) Army-group strength offensives simultaneously carried out by PLA and TSPA in different theatres
2Ay) "Coalition of the Willing" military assault by US, EU, GCC, China on Pakistan's behalf
2Az) Nuclear exchange with Pakistan and/or China

I am NOT putting this list up to be a scaremonger. Please do not think I'm that shallow. I'm putting it up because we have to consider the level of escalation we are willing to match, in order to achieve the operational goal (e.g. 1B(100)(52)iii ) and then relate that to the benefits of the ultimate political goal (e.g. destroy Karakoram-Gwadar highway XYZ section).

Then there are direct economic costs
2B) (a) Materiel costs- ammunition and spares per week (b) Fuel expenditure per unit reserve per week (c) Forex expenditures per week etc.

There are indirect economic costs

2C) (a) cost of repurchase to get around oil embargo from Gulf countries (b) cost of repurchase to get around arms embargo from XYZ countries (c) loss to current account from flight of foreign capital etc.

Then there the harder to quantify costs: 2D (diplomatic, or overseas political costs) and 2E (domestic political costs).

Now even if you say, fug everybody and let's ignore 2D and 2E... 2A_, 2B_ and 2C_ have to be considered.

So at the very least you have to show that

1____ > 2A_ + 2B_ + 2C_

Otherwise, no dice boss. Not even the most "nationalist" government we could come up with is going to OK an operation on Paki soil EXCEPT in response to something the Pakis do.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Eric Leiderman » 05 Oct 2013 01:32

The answer to Asymetrical warefare is to reply in kind

So where will it hurt the pak army ISI complex the most?

The answer has to be economically.

The Pak army personnel hold widespread commercial operations, Take them out.

Go after Big D and his counterfiet operation as a cut goes to Kayani and gang.

I could go on and on , but you get the gist.

Thats the sort of things we do.

If we do not have the b....lls to do it ourself, hire Mossad who will salivate doing the job based out of Bharat mata and using our coin.

And yes keep talking to them and denying any involvement and show sympthy for the carnage.

Pay back in the same coin.

But that will never happen as they will go after our politicians. And our big boys have a lot of assets that can be targeted too.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nachiket » 05 Oct 2013 01:40

Eric Leiderman wrote:If we do not have the b....lls to do it ourself, hire Mossad who will salivate doing the job based out of Bharat mata and using our coin.

Having the b..lls and having the capability are two different things. Mossad can provide capability (assuming we lack it and they are willing to provide it which is quite far fetched in itself) . It can't remedy the lack of b..lls.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Victor » 05 Oct 2013 01:43

Per wikimapia, here is Shala Bhata. If this is the correct location, it is right on the LOC and in a small river valley, not a ridge. It is possible of course, that the terrorists have dominated the surrounding ridges using Shala Bhata as a base. Just for referrence.

LOC in area
Image

Huts
Image

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Karan M » 05 Oct 2013 01:47

Rudradev ji,

You know KaranM ji, I want to agree with you. I would like nothing more than to see India choose options that involve seizing the initiative and punishing the Pakis on their side of the border. It would make all of us feel good to see this happening.


Otherwise, no dice boss. Not even the most "nationalist" government we could come up with is going to OK an operation on Paki soil EXCEPT in response to something the Pakis do.


I reiterate, why are you thinking in terms of conventional warfare and the stuff we are conditioned to think with? EL got it.
My point is this fight their fires with the kind of conflicts they cause, with the forces they have us employ, is playing into their hands.

My simple question is that has this even been thought? With serious efforts being put into building a capability in recent years, that is beyond just conventional warfare (never mind even that has been kept in limbo in many areas).. the answer, is quite clearly no.

When I say the war has to be fought on their side of the border, that is what I mean. Not T-90s parked x km from Islamabad and IAF jets bombing Pak Army on their side all the time

That is the backup plan. That is the deterrence to give them a bloody nose when they think they can wage all these conventional type conflicts and inflict attrition to get back at us.

Pakistan has a 1000 fissure points. Do what PVNR did but with a proper strategy and a hard headed realization that a peaceful Pak playing nicey nice with India is only going to happen when the bigots in the PA realize they are beaten hollow fighting their own kind

And yes, it will also require that Indian agencies become competent at their job, that is national security instead of playing political favorites

The do nothing stuff has occurred because our wonderful leaders have surrounded themselves with high funda security and hence fear nothing. And they get voted into power by people who are poverty stricken and hence terror strikes et al are but one more thing to face. They don't even realize how they are being used.

No other nation would accept such a pathetic state of affairs. For all the big named intellectuals we have produced, the ones that are given public play are those who never say that the emperor has no clothes. Those who are concerned, are kept in obscure think tanks or rant in also ran defence magazines bemoaning the state of affairs.

It is not that India does not have options.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Rudradev » 05 Oct 2013 02:42

Karan M ji,

Karan M wrote:My simple question is that has this even been thought?


Oh yes, it has been thought of, and it has been done too. There's not much in the public domain, but see what you can find out about RAW's CIT-X and CIT-J operations. After ISI started the proxy warfare game with the Khalistan movement in the '80s, these guys wreaked retaliatory havoc to the point where MQM's Altaf Hussain virtually ran a parallel government in Karachi in the early '90s.

Those networks were rolled up by IK Gujral's WKK government circa 1997, in an ill-advised confidence building measure. This was a damnable act in itself, because it amounted to outright betrayal of many assets, including Pakistani citizens who had risked the lives and the safety of their families and loved ones in our cause.

Despite the betrayal aspect of this, however, there was STILL the question of cost-benefit ratios. CIT-X and CIT-J did not dissuade Pakistan from continuing a proxy war in J&K and elsewhere in India. It did not impose any kind of prohibitive "cost" on Pakistan that served as a deterrent. In fact, by fighting this kind of war we had acquiesced to fight on a far more level playing field than conventional war... the advantages of India in conventional military superiority, having a larger economy etc. were neutralized, because in subconventional terms we had about the same capacity as the Pakistanis to inflict damage on each other. To fight "asymmetric" war makes sense only if the conventional "symmetry" is not in your favour... by definition, no? If it IS in your favour then fighting a proxy covert war changes the playing field to one where you lose the advantage!

Pakistan has a 1000 fissure points. Do what PVNR did but with a proper strategy and a hard headed realization that a peaceful Pak playing nicey nice with India is only going to happen when the bigots in the PA realize they are beaten hollow fighting their own kind

And yes, it will also require that Indian agencies become competent at their job, that is national security instead of playing political favorites

It is not that India does not have options.


Boss, it's true they have 1000 fissure points. Under PVNR we raised hell, as you observe, along several of those fissure points.

But Pakistan survived, and not only continued but escalated their asymmetric war against India. What eventually happened to Altaf Hussain and the MQM? We all know... they became part of Pakistani mainstream politics just as Badal, Tohra and other erstwhile Khalistanis did in India.

The question is, why did Pakistan survive?

Because Pakistan is not really a country at all. It is ITSELF a proxy in the guise of a state. It is the wooden horse within which our far more powerful and resource-rich enemies hide to take aim at us while minimizing their own exposure. This is the problem with ANY strategy we come up with to "punish Pakistan"... conventional or subconventional. The Pakis don't have any money in the first place, they freaking survive on udhaar and renting their arses... why should they worry about "costs"? Any and all costs will be borne for them by those who write their monthly cheques! We paid through the nose for every LGB we dropped on them in Kargil. Meanwhile, they are the one of the largest recipients of military aid from you-know-who, and also of financial aid that they funnel back into their benefactor countries' armaments industries for yet more military capability.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Karan M » 05 Oct 2013 02:51

Rudradev wrote:Oh yes, it has been thought of, and it has been done too. There's not much in the public domain, but see what you can find out about RAW's CIT-X and CIT-J operations. After ISI started the proxy warfare game with the Khalistan movement in the '80s, these guys wreaked havoc to the point where MQM's Altaf Hussain virtually ran a parallel government in Karachi in the early '90s.

Those networks were rolled up by IK Gujral's WKK government circa 1997, in an ill-advised confidence building measure. This was a damnable act in itself, because it amounted to outright betrayal of many assets, including Pakistani citizens who had risked the lives and the safety of their families and loved ones in our cause.

Despite the betrayal aspect of this, however, there was STILL the question of cost-benefit ratios. CIT-X and CIT-J did not dissuade Pakistan from continuing a proxy war in J&K and elsewhere in India. It did not impose any kind of prohibitive "cost" on Pakistan that served as a deterrent. In fact, by fighting this kind of war we had acquiesced to fight on a far more level playing field than conventional war... the advantages of India in conventional superiority, having a larger economy etc. were neutralized, because in subconventional terms we had about the same capacity as the Pakistanis to inflict damage on each other. To fight "asymmetric" war makes sense only if the conventional "symmetry" is not in your favour... by definition, no? If it IS in your favour then fighting a proxy covert war changes the playing field to one where you lose the advantage! Why is this a good way to go?


I am aware of these. The point is these networks were rolled up. So the question of their cost benefit not being proven is based on doubtful data at best. Since you did raise CIT-X and CIT-J and what they did, they were supposed to have directly led to Pak going easy on the Khalistan ops and also, not shelling the fencing done on the Indo-Pak border across Punjab, which played a huge role in limiting infiltration.

It also gave India vital time, which PVNR used to push for economic reforms and get India onto a new footing. Quite similar to how Op Parakram had things stabilize when it was launched (even if it didn't result in a hot war).

Also as I recall, it was his experience with these very orgs that had our RAW bird taken off to Khan land. Clearly, Khan saw the value of what he did (or claimed to have done).

As things stand today, by not waging a proxy war, and by being under the nuclear backdrop, our deterrence capabilities have already been limited. We can't wage conventional war and besides conventional war, we dont have any other options.

So India loses nothing by also waging a proxy war, also waging an economic war, and also buttressing its conventional capabilities, its BMD capabilities, its n-capabilities...in short creating a bunch of simultaneous costs on Pakistan that it is currently NOT facing.

By doing so, it gives itself a range of options to constantly keep Pakistan at heel, instead of the current, its war or nothing option which gives GOI the shivers per public reports.

Boss, it's true they have 1000 fissure points. Under PVNR we raised hell, as you observe, along several of those fissure points.

But Pakistan survived. What eventually happened to Altaf Hussain and the MQM? We all know... they became part of Pakistani mainstream politics just as Badal, Tohra and other erstwhile Khalistanis did in India.


So find more. There are no shortage of Altaf Hussains. There will be Bugtis, Khans, this, that...many folks who will do what they do, for purely mercenary reasons. My point is I dont want proxy war to continue to the point that Pakistan implodes.

That's not a good thing. Do we want all these Pakistanis flowing into India?

We want them to continue to "survive". There are degrees of survival though, some of which should make even the Zaid Hamids, Guls, Babars, Musharrafs realize that India is not to be messed with.

The question is, why did Pakistan survive?

Because Pakistan is not really a country at all. It is ITSELF a proxy in the guise of a state. It is the wooden horse within which our far more powerful and resource-rich enemies hide to take aim at us while minimizing their own exposure. This is the problem with ANY strategy we come up with to "punish Pakistan"... conventional or subconventional. The Pakis don't have any money in the first place, they freaking survive on udhaar and renting their arses... why should they worry about "costs"? Any and all costs will be borne for them by those who write their monthly cheques! We paid through the nose for every LGB we dropped on them in Kargil. Meanwhile, they are the one of the largest recipients of military aid from you-know-who, and also of financial aid that they funnel back into their benefactor countries' armaments industries for yet more military capability.


That's all fine. But when those multiple interest groups within Pakistan are constantly at each other's throats, they have that much less energy and resources to dedicate towards India. Right now, they have all the time and energy in the world. Heck, even France could hire thugs to have PN admirals punished for having its workers bombed. The message clearly did go through.

And they would worry about costs, because the point is not to go after the state or be as amoral as they are in terms of targeting civilians. The point is to target all those state actors who run terror campaigns with the help of proxies.

And also to constantly target each and every resource gathering capability that they have to constantly limit their modernization. Even the US and China cannot run the entire PA modernization.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pankajs » 05 Oct 2013 12:17

As gunfight continues in Keran, pressure mounts on army to do a Kargil
The road to the battle zone is desolate and littered with rocks and boulders with hardly any sign of human life. Columns of army trucks carrying heavily-armed soldiers to the Shala Bhata break the eerie calm. Several kilometers up on the mountains, a nerve-racking situation prevails with the army preparing for a kill to cleanse the area off infiltrators.

Brigade-size troops backed by fresh reinforcements of special forces are now eyeball to eyeball with 30 to 40 well-entrenched Pakistani militants and special troops, who are receiving regular supplies from across the Line of Control to sustain and take on the might of the Indian Army.

For the past 11 days, the army’s response has been calibrated. Given the topography of the area, possible danger is lurking behind the boulders, pine trees and thick vegetation where the militants have taken cover.

Shala Bhata, a ghost village termed as barbad gam (destroyed hamlet) by the locals, has suddenly flashed on the security radar of the army. Nestled in the mighty mountains, Shala Bhata, once a peaceful hamlet housing not more than 50 families, is now a hotly contested piece of land. The villagers had migrated to Pakistan during the early nineties as the area became the favorite infiltration route for militants.

The village extends to the other side of the LoC, which the locals call Pak Shala. Locals say Pak Shala houses Pakistan army posts with little presence of civilians. That explains the supply chain to the infiltrators at Shala Bhata.

Sources said the infiltrators and the army are exchanging heavy volume of gunfire at Lodder Post. “The militants and the army have been fighting intense battle near this post for the last so many days,” said a soldier who returned from the war zone.

Along with thousands of troops that have been mobilized, the local units serving in the hinterland too have been directed to spare some of their men to augment the forces. Top army commanders have moved from their offices in Kupwara district to command the operations.

Since the face-off started, the army has restricted the movement of the people living close to the LoC. “We have been asked not to venture out of our homes after dusk. The bakerwals (shepherds) have also been asked to restrict their movement,” said Bashir Ahmad Khawaja, a local resident, here.

Meanwhile, the Pakistani army opened another front in the same sector by pushing in more militants. However, alert troops foiled their attempts.

A defence spokesman said the militants have suffered heavy losses in the operations in Keran sector. Five soldiers have also sustained injuries.

“The terrain in the area of operation is rugged, forested and high altitude with heights varying between 9000 to 10,000 feet, which necessitated deliberate operations to ensure minimal casualty to own troops and at the same time flush out remaining surviving militants. The entire area has been effectively cordoned off by the army, thereby pinning down the militants within the cordon,” the spokesman said.

As tense stand-off continues, pressure is mounting on the Indian Army to do a Kargil (evict Pakistan backed-infiltrators and special troops like the troops did in 1999). “The intermittent firing is going on. The operation against the ultras is continuing” said Naresh Vij, defence spokesman at Srinagar.

Pakistan army on Friday opened another front in Keran sector when it tried to push in a group of militants from the adjacent Gujjurtur area. However, troops foiled their attempts and killed three of them in the early hours of Friday. “Three militants were eliminated. Two dead bodies have been recovered along with three AK 47 rifles, four pistols, one Yeasu radio set. The body of third terrorist is lying just across the LoC along Kilpara Nar,” a defence spokesman said.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pankajs » 05 Oct 2013 12:29

Naresh Agarwal accuses Centre, Army of 'covering up' Pakistan infiltration
After Indian Army Chief General Bikram Singh asserted that there is no Kargil-like situation in Jammu and Kashmir's Keran sector, Samajwadi Party leader Naresh Agarwal on Saturday alleged that the Centre and the Army was hand-in-glove in covering up the truth of the ongoing infiltration operation, and advised that India should go to war to reach a final solution to the matter along the Line of Control (LoC).

"We want that the only solution to this problem is to go to war with Pakistan to sort out the issue once and for all," Agarwal said.

Agarwal specifically targeted Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh for embarking on talks with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in New York, last month, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, and said that the initiative portrayed a weak India in the light of the recent violations along the border.

"In one way, the Government is hiding a mini-Kargil situation. The Army General is also hiding it. Pakistan is hell-bent on war. Pakistan wants to fight, so why don't we go ahead? Our Prime Minister goes on his feet before the Pakistan Prime Minister, in a way that shows how weak a Prime Minister he is. Though, it is true, if a Prime Minister is weak before his own Party, how can one expect him to be the strength of the nation?" Agarwal asked.

The longer this drags out the more the pressure mounts on the gobermind.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pankajs » 05 Oct 2013 14:14

As in Poonch, Army patrol was the likely target in Keran
With the military operation against infiltrators in Kupwara's Keran sector almost over, the Army is conducting final mopping-up operations in the rugged terrain, with troops moving with extreme caution to clear the area of possible booby traps or mines

The gun battle is said to have ended as there has been no exchange of fire for four days now, with militants in a tightly cordoned area near the Line of Control, where 30-40 militants had tried to sneak in for a likely raid on an Indian patrol party.

While it seems that most of the militants, who were first engaged on the night of September 23, have escaped the area and the bodies of any of the 10-12 claimed to be killed are unlikely to be recovered, the unusual pattern of the incident suggests that it was more than a simple infiltration attempt.
Suggest a different picture of the current ongoing ops.
As reported, troops were being changed in the Keran sector with the 3/3 Gorkha regiment taking charge from 20 Kumaon. The changeover is a delicate period as troops take time to get familiar with the terrain and the suspected militants are believed to have been tasked to take on a patrol party.

Such an attack had taken place in Poonch in August and five soldiers were killed in a cross-border raid.

Possible and would better explain MMS's abrupt change to "Pakistan the epicenter of terrorism" from his usual "both India and Pakistan are victims of terror". Imagine if the pakis had succeeded in doing another Poonch while MMS was addressing a joint press conf with NS singing the usual tune of "Aman and Asha".

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Lalmohan » 05 Oct 2013 15:18

i am not sure why artillery and/or air options are not being considered - even if it means escalation or steps up the escalation ladder

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby member_23455 » 05 Oct 2013 15:53

pankajs wrote:As in Poonch, Army patrol was the likely target in Keran
With the military operation against infiltrators in Kupwara's Keran sector almost over, the Army is conducting final mopping-up operations in the rugged terrain, with troops moving with extreme caution to clear the area of possible booby traps or mines

The gun battle is said to have ended as there has been no exchange of fire for four days now, with militants in a tightly cordoned area near the Line of Control, where 30-40 militants had tried to sneak in for a likely raid on an Indian patrol party.

While it seems that most of the militants, who were first engaged on the night of September 23, have escaped the area and the bodies of any of the 10-12 claimed to be killed are unlikely to be recovered, the unusual pattern of the incident suggests that it was more than a simple infiltration attempt.
Suggest a different picture of the current ongoing ops.


Media reports are likely to be very differing and often contradictory... I am sure some anonymous email will surface on the incident on the forum answering some questions but raising even more.

This "tight cordon" seems rather improbable given the terrain does not allow for it and in certain places our chaps will be sitting ducks for Pakistani forces across the LoC if we try and do that. For that reason alone some of the bad guys would have slipped back for sure.

The 30-40 infiltration force is very intriguing though and on first glance does not seem a repeat of the "patrol ambush" scenario--it's overkill, and once compromised, you would get the hell out of Dodge.

Is there a large Indian post in that area like one of these American FOBs, which they were trying to overrun, Taliban-style? No idea since not enough info.

Finally, if all it was, was a large scale infiltration then the Pakis have really lost it - their most audacious/foolhardy bid was in the late 90s IIRC, losing 60-70 chaps in a four-five day firefight.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Karan M » 05 Oct 2013 16:13

pankajs wrote:As in Poonch, Army patrol was the likely target in Keran
With the military operation against infiltrators in Kupwara's Keran sector almost over, the Army is conducting final mopping-up operations in the rugged terrain, with troops moving with extreme caution to clear the area of possible booby traps or mines

The gun battle is said to have ended as there has been no exchange of fire for four days now, with militants in a tightly cordoned area near the Line of Control, where 30-40 militants had tried to sneak in for a likely raid on an Indian patrol party.

While it seems that most of the militants, who were first engaged on the night of September 23, have escaped the area and the bodies of any of the 10-12 claimed to be killed are unlikely to be recovered, the unusual pattern of the incident suggests that it was more than a simple infiltration attempt.
Suggest a different picture of the current ongoing ops.
As reported, troops were being changed in the Keran sector with the 3/3 Gorkha regiment taking charge from 20 Kumaon. The changeover is a delicate period as troops take time to get familiar with the terrain and the suspected militants are believed to have been tasked to take on a patrol party.

Such an attack had taken place in Poonch in August and five soldiers were killed in a cross-border raid.

Possible and would better explain MMS's abrupt change to "Pakistan the epicenter of terrorism" from his usual "both India and Pakistan are victims of terror". Imagine if the pakis had succeeded in doing another Poonch while MMS was addressing a joint press conf with NS singing the usual tune of "Aman and Asha".


The attack the troops theory does not explain why after being daylighted, the Pakistanis did not withdraw and are instead holding ground. This is plain and simple a repeat of the Loonda post incident. They occupied Indian positions left vacant.

Swami, who basically repeats what the GOI of the day tells him, wrote

On July 29, India used air power for the first time since the end of the Kargil war to attack Pakistan-held positions at Loonda Post on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in the Machil sector. Eight Mirage 2000 aircraft dropped 1,000-pound precision-guided bombs to obliterate four bunkers occupied by Pakistan, while 155-millimetre Bofors howitzers hit troops dug into forward trenches prepared by Indian troops in earlier years. At least 28 Pakistani soldiers, military intelligence officials believe, were killed in the fighting. The daylight air assault was intended to demonstrate that India would not hesitate to escalate the conflict if provoked, a belief that is gaining ground among the Pakistani military.


Note the last line. Clearly, this attempt to create a perception amongst the Pak Mil, was reversed during the past 8 years given the pappi-jhappi sensibilities of the new GOI admin. Whether it be reversal of POTA, or this talky-talk (and no hard options) with Pak - the overall trend is pretty solid and results are clear, on national security.

What PA is doing here is neither new or surprising. Army folks have on public record frequently alluded to such attempts by Pak over the years. The point is deterrence that was sought to be established was given up, and hence this result.

pankajs
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby pankajs » 05 Oct 2013 16:31

Saar both you and RajitO saar have valid objections to the news report.

However note that the report suggests that the pakis have retreated. Have they retreated or are we still fighting to push them off? That confirmation can only come from IA/GOI.

Was it a plain infiltration attempt, or a ambush and retreat or was it ambush and land grab or plain land grab? Perhaps we may never know or it will come out much later.


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