India Border Watch: Security and Operations

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williams
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby williams » 04 Jun 2020 12:33

We can escalate but we need to figure out what kind of escalation will put pressure on the current Chinese regime to change course. I think they are used to our nuanced, restrained, and reactive mode. We need to do something unpredictable and something where it hurts the most. I also don't think escalation should happen in LAC. It should be something that should make them understand these skirmishes and salami-slicing strategy will have a cost.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Ashokk » 04 Jun 2020 12:44

Several strategic objectives at play in India-China border stand-off
NEW DELHI: There is a larger dynamic at work in the India-China confrontation in Ladakh, one where India faces a pushback for trying to use the communist giant’s new post-Covid vulnerabilities to reduce its ability to flex muscle on the regional and global stage.
The Chinese intrusions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in east Ladakh reflect “salami tactics” it has used to expand territorial and strategic space, not the least looking to wear down an opponent psychologically. But it may also be a recognition that India is seeking to rework an equation that has allowed China to use the unsettled border and Pakistan to keep India off balance.
The LAC face-off may be resolved yet as the Chinese side has toned down its rhetoric but a strategic tussle is on. The Modi government’s moves to scrutinise Chinese investments is effectively a means to curb it. Pitching India as a welcoming destination to investors looking to leave China and being a part of a global effort to seek an investigation into the origin of coronavirus are not casual moves.
The strategic asymmetry is not going to change in a hurry even though China's image has taken a massive blow. The Chinese leadership is adept at managing internal challenges and using the country’s huge reserves to sustain the economy. Its lending programmes will continue to lure poor countries and short-sighted leaders and its expansion in the South China Sea may not be easy to roll back.
The Indian resolve to stand its ground in east Ladakh clearly indicates that China will need to ultimately pull back. This may need some trade-offs, but India's position is clear enough — China can use the element of surprise to get into Indian territory, but there will be no give or acceptance of a unilateral reordering of the LAC.
The Doklam experience has not been lost on China as India had moved into Bhutanese territory — disputed by Beijing — to stall a road being built by the PLA. The discussion on China’s reinforcements after the stand-off ended ignores that the area has been under its influence for long. What is significant is that a threat to India's north-east was foiled.
The decision to nullify Article 370 was a bold move intended to end an ambiguity that has for decades given Pakistan and its mentor a handle to needle India. The chinks in the Chinese armour offer India a chance to further loosen the pincer grip, and China's blowback is only to be anticipated.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nam » 04 Jun 2020 13:24

khan wrote:
nam wrote:I don't get it why we haven't mounted a similar incursion somewhere else. The LAC is 3000+ km long.

I think there might be a shortage places along the LOC where, India enjoys overwhelming logistical advantage over the Chinese (to the point where India has a road and China has no road).

The only reason China is able to make camp between Finger 4 and Finger 8 is because of that road they build during Kargil, while Indian soldiers have to walk on that footpath by the cliff around finger 4.


I was wondering why the Chinese are trying to get the valley, as it does not serve any purpose. Got my answer fro twitter. Gen Panag mentions, the heights on Finger 4 to 8 are under Chinese control.

This valley control is to just mark the territory. It is a pointless fight. We seems to have lost lot territory to Salami slicing already in previous decades.

If there are not good roads. mount an ops and get the engineers to build a temp road. Since there is no firing, the Chinese have to deploy troops, across us.

We want them on the LAC, instead in their oxygen filled tent.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby manjgu » 04 Jun 2020 13:50

nam..which 'valley control' ?? which valley are u referring to.


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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Hari Nair » 04 Jun 2020 14:33

Gen Panag's analyses is worth a read :
https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-fingers-have-come-under-chinese-boots-denial-wont-help-us/435145/
He deals with the sit at Galwan, Fingers 4-8 (Pangong) and Hot Springs.

In effect his analysis for Pangong is broadly in-line with the BRF members here - the area of patrol earlier available for us from Fingers 4-8 is now being denied by the Chinese. The Chinese have dug in with new posts between fingers 4-6 and are also dominating the surrounding heights. This also bears out with OSINT posted by d-atis@detresfa in his twitter handle. Its interesting to note that chaps like Abhijeet Aiyer Mitra are downplaying this aspect, while anti-establishment fellas like Shukla are talking about a Division strength of Chinese already camping on this side of the Indian LAC / our claim line. OSINT pics definitely do not indicate such large strength of their troops on our side of LAC / claim line.

The General's assessment for Galwan is in tune with Alarmist Ajay Shukla, that almost a brigade strength (3 bn) has occupied the mouth of Galwan and surrounding heights. This is NOT supported by the OSINT pics - Chinese positions on surrounding heights with trails leading down to the valley would have been clearly visible. Also, a whole brigade in that narrow gorge-like valley is likely to have them and their support elemets simply jostling for space and would have been clearly visible in the pics. Gen Panag appears to be wrong on Galwan.

Re - Hot Springs - the Good General claims our post at Gogra has been 'surrounded' - again I don't see OSINT pics to support that claim. Other BRF members may please comment, if they have anything to add.

On the whole, it does appear that we were, in a sense, caught sleeping at the wheel by a two-month late start-up this year, in which time, the Chinese had already sensed the opening and moved in. In this context, the DSDBO road was bound to get a Chinese reaction. Way back when I was operating in that sector (SSN), the mere act of routine flying through the Shyok valley (near Galwan) used to trigger the Chinese to object. Also, the new map of the UT of Ladakh legally incorporates Gilgit Baltistan - including their crown jewel of BRI - the CPEC. Given the fact that we are now increasingly assertive, reaction by the Chinese should have been gamed in and anticipated. Instead, from the open-source information available, it appears that we were initially off-guard and were reactive in our response. This is all the more surprising given the fact that there are more than adequate numbers and types of high resolution recce platforms available for the Army, both at the Corps and National level.

For the Chinese, its all about changing the facts on the ground. At Pangong, they have already moved in are now squatting on the 'Grey' land in-between. A stand-off that deteriorates into a stalemate suits them just fine. Its now going to be an uphill task to get them to move back to status quo ante. The buggers, if at all they do move, will definitely take their pound of flesh. Its not going to be easy - and that if I may say, is an understatement.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby nam » 04 Jun 2020 14:58

The core issue is given that both side are allowed to patrol towards their perception of LAC, any side could decide to not leave and create a standoff.

We have a habit of not shaking the pot, while the Chinese can because they got away with it many times previously.

I don't believe the Chinese can man the entire LAC with couple of divisions. So if they can break the agreement, so should we.

Move forwards towards our claim line and settle down. If the chinese use force, light them up on Galwan and Pangong.

Give all signals of a Indian offensive coming and let them guard the border in force. If they want India to pull back it's offensive forces, then they better pull back as well.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Deans » 04 Jun 2020 15:56

ldev wrote:
Deans wrote:
95% of Aksai Chin was lost well before 1962. The Chinese highway running through it was completed in 1959. The actual gains for the Chinese in 1962 were relatively small - between their claim line and the posts along a line we were occupying from 1959 onwards. The largest action in ladakh in 62 involved a single infantry company (13 Kumaon) at Rezang La.


Thanks for pointing that out. Does it make a difference? Chou en Lai proposed an exchange of Arunachal Pradesh(then NEFA) in exchange for Ladakh. Nehru refused. That I believe was during the Tibet uprising in 1959. When Nehru refused China just walked in and took it over from 1959 to 1962, all 43,000 sq km of it.


It does not make a difference, given the Chinese mentality of destabilising our borders.
The problem leading upto 1962 was that we had no presence in Eastern Ladakh. We were claiming Aksai Chin on the basis of 19th century British maps that were replaced by later British maps which conceded most of this 43000 Sq km to Tibet. However, that point was moot. In 1959, the Chinese were occupying most of what they would claim. For e.g. they were already near Sirjap, in the finger 8 area of Pangong Tso.
It was really between the start of the Chinese invasion of Tibet and the completion of their highway through Akasi Chin in 1959 that the defence of Ladakh was neglected. We had a chance to firm up our defences in 1961, when it became clear that Chinese claims were more to the West of their 1959 line.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby chetak » 04 Jun 2020 16:07

China’s Belt and Road Initiative fuels Ladakh standoff


Atul Aneja
NEW DELHI,
JUNE 04, 2020,

When India abrogated Sections of Article 370 and separated Ladakh as a Union Territory from Jammu and Kashmir, China appears to have activated its plan-B, culminating in its latest intrusion
China’s latest intrusion in Ladakh, apparently to fortify Aksai Chin may have its roots in the Wuhan informal summit of 2017, after which, Beijing has juggled with a range of options to engage and restrain India to protect its core interests.

After the Wuhan informal summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in April 2018, China activated the diplomatic track in order to arrive at an understanding with India on managing the shared interests of Beijing and New Delhi in their neighbourhood. This initiative was in tune with Beijing’s broader aspiration of expanding international support for its Eurasia-centered Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Also read:
Analysis: Pakistan factor behind India-China stand-off in Ladakh

But just in case diplomacy did not work for many reasons, including India’s growing ties with the United States under the Indo-Pacific doctrine, a plan-B also began to take shape, with heavy reliance on Pakistan.

Pakistan’s inclusion in Beijing’s strategic calculus to counter India’s perceived tilt towards the Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy was spotlighted when the Chinese “invited” to Beijing all the pillars of the Pakistani state — Prime Minister Imran Khan, chief of the army staff Qamar Javed Bajwa, and head of the Inter Services Intelligence Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed on October 8, 2019. The meetings in the Chinese capital took place in the backdrop of India’s abrogation on August 5 of sections of the Kashmir centred Article 370 — a move which had already been unambiguously slammed by both Pakistan and China. Ahead of these meetings, India had also participated in the upscaled dialogue of the Indo-Pacific quad at the level of Foreign Minsters on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly session in New York.

Gilgit-Baltistan
China’s core interests have dictated that India should be firmly dissuaded from considering recovery of Gilgit-Baltistan to fulfil its long-stated goal of unifying Kashmir, in pursuit of a unanimous parliamentary resolution passed in 1994. China has also been vocal about retaining Aksai Chin — the essential link between Tibet and Xinjiang. “Aksai Chin is the essential link between Xinjiang and Tibet, and China’s national highway 219 passes through this passage. Aksai Chin is therefore central to China’s territorial unity and the one-China principle,” a Chinese academic, who did not wish to be named, earlier told The Hindu.

By the time Mr. Modi and Mr. Xi met at Wuhan, Beijing had already begun to sink billions of dollars in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which covered Gilgit-Baltistan. From Beijing’s perspective, any Indian attempt to take over Gilgit-Baltistan, would wreck CPEC — the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Mr. Xi had staked his personal prestige in the project, which would provide China with access to the Indian Ocean through the Gwadar port. It would also help reduce Beijing’s dependence on the Malacca straits, dominated by the U.S., which had declared its intent to shift its forces from West Asia and the Gulf to the Asia-Pacific, in tune with Washington’s Asia-pivot doctrine.

Closer home, the Chinese have also been uncomfortable with infrastructure development along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India, especially due to the pressure it imposes on Aksai Chin.

Revival of airfields
By 2008, India had reactivated airfields of Daulet Beg Oldie (DBO) and Fukche, reducing reliance on Leh as the main air support hub for Ladakh. A year later, the Nyoma airfield had also been revived. “DBO is on the old Leh-Tarim basin trade route through the Karakoram pass and only nine kilometers northwest of Aksai Chin. It is also important because India’s physical link with China’s Xinjiang province, and not Tibet, is routed through DBO,” says a former diplomat, who did not wish to be named.

The revival of the aviation infrastructure has augmented India’s capacity to quickly insert troops and military supplies along the LAC. “DBO, Fukche and Nyoma have supplemented Leh, providing a major boost to intra-theatre movement of Indian forces and equipment along the LAC,” Air Vice Marshal (Retd.) Amit Aneja, told The Hindu.

Indian road construction activity, with the 255-km Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) as the spine has steeled Indian connectivity along the LAC, adding further pressure on Aksai Chin.

2+1 formulation
But turning to diplomacy at the Wuhan informal summit, India and China took the first baby steps towards working jointly in the region by agreeing to train Afghan diplomats. “This was a highly symbolic move. Soon after the Afghan initiative, China began to develop a coordinated outlook with India as partner in the region, starting with Nepal by pursuing what was called a 2+1 approach. This was to further explore the possibility and range of joint management of the region by India and China,” a Chinese diplomat told The Hindu.

The new 2+1 formulation, where the two countries —India and China — would first coordinate a common approach with a third country was aired during Nepal Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s visit to Beijing in June 2018. “Mr. Oli had an extraordinary meeting with President Xi. The Chinese President said he was ready to consider Nepal’s requests for infrastructure development in his country, but before concretising any plans, he would like to take Prime Minister Modi into confidence,” a Nepali diplomatic source aware of the conversation told this newspaper.

“The Chinese made it clear that they were not interested in pursuing a zero-sum approach with Nepal. In fact, the hosts spoke about the Wuhan informal summit between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, including the discussion between the two leaders on achieving greater regional cooperation, which covered connectivity,” he added. Separately speaking to The Hindu then, Nepal’s Environment Minister, Shakti Bahadur Basnet, said he welcomed “the two- plus-one format as we are confident that such a dialogue will be conducted in a spirit of equality and mutual respect.”

The 2+1 formulation subsequently mutated into China-India plus mechanism, which former Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui said had guided the two countries’ response to “the Rohingya issue in Myanmar and the Iranian nuclear issue,” as reported by The Tribune.

Analysts point out that with an eye on a broader international endorsement of the BRI, China also developed a self-interest in easing tensions between India and Pakistan. “After the BRI has been launched, China was completely opposed to pursue a zero-sum approach. Relationship with Pakistan has been vital because its geography provides China access to the Indian Ocean via the CPEC. But India, with its much bigger economy, on the contrary, is also important to China as it can become a major engine of the BRI in the future,” says another Chinese academic on conditions of anonymity. But he pointed out that unless tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir are eased, China understood that India will not board the BRI ship on account of its fundamental objections to CPEC. So far, India has rejected the BRI, citing CPEC, which passes through India-claimed Gilgit-Baltistan, as an infringement of its sovereignty.

Within months of the Wuhan summit, and with BRI as the backdrop, the Chinese, while hosting the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), with India and Pakistan as full members, began to openly air their interest in encouraging a rapport between New Delhi and Islamabad. During the Qingdao summit of the SCO, Chinese Foreign Minister and State councilor Wang Yi told state broadcaster China Global Television Network (CGTN) that , “I think after their joining the SCO, maybe we can provide a better platform and opportunities for the building of relations between them (India and Pakistan).” The Hindu has learnt that the Chinese side had offered its good offices to resolve the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, which New Delhi politely declined, during the June 2019 Bishkek summit of the SCO.

But after August 5, 2019, when India abrogated Sections of Article 370 and separated Ladakh as a Union Territory from Jammu and Kashmir, China appears to have activated its plan-B, culminating in its latest intrusion, focused on Ladakh, across the LAC.

India's claim on Aksai Chin
“There appears to have been a strategic shift in Chinese thinking after India abrogated Sections of Article 370 last year and created the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh. India has always claimed Aksai Chin, but the issue appears to have been re-interpreted in China after the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was revoked,” says P. Stobdan, former ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, who specialises in trans-Himalayan studies.

Speaking in Lok Sabha on August 6 last year, Home Minister Amit Shah unambiguously nailed India’s claims over PoK and Aksai Chin — an observation that would not have gone unnoticed in Beijing. “Kashmir is an integral part of India, there is no doubt over it. When I talk about Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Aksai Chin are included in it,” he said.

Unsurprisingly, on August 12, China raised the issue of Aksai Chin and Pakistan with visiting External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. In his response, the External Affairs Minister had reassured his Chinese counterpart that the revocation of Article 370 “did not impact the Line of Control (LoC)”. Besides, “There was no implication for the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. India was not raising any additional territorial claims. The Chinese concerns in this regard were misplaced,” Mr. Jashankar told Indian media in Beijing during a press conference.

Observers say that by putting military pressure in Ladakh, the Chinese are assertively conveying multiple messages, including exhorting New Delhi to restrain itself on Aksai Chin and Gilgi- Baltistan, as well as curb the exuberance of its engagement with the Trump administration under the Indo-Pacific doctrine.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Philip » 04 Jun 2020 16:22

Caught napping again and again. The record of decades since '62. The primary reason has been to treat China like any other major power,not like a secretive fascist neo-Nazi crypto- commie entity.
Primary cause for our woes is post RG era laxity ,esp. during the Snake-Oil Singh era. The Chinese recent aggro is to challenge the mettle of the Modi regime,before Indian modernisation of the armed forces takes place. Typical of the Chins to strike in areas supposed to have no controversies about the boundaries! Sun Tzu's art of deception and duplicity,doublespeak. Remember Reagan," trust but verify".With China it should be ALWAYS mistrust and always verify,expect the unexpected esp. in areas you consider safe. The Chinese have always had the element of surprise except when Gen.Sundarji taught them a signal lesson.
We need to build up reserves,logistics enough to fight a war for a min. of 3 months. The def. budget must be raised immediately with immediate acquisitions of mil. hardware,ammo,etc. CG vessels to be modified for minesweeping duties and fitted with SSMs and MANPADS where possible.A cue to be taken from the Iranians' excellent tactics of arming small vessels with missiles.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RajaRudra » 04 Jun 2020 16:55

Philip wrote:Caught napping again and again. The record of decades since '62. The primary reason has been to treat China like any other major .


I don't think we are caught napping..all this build up and pushing..we may be returning to pre-1959 line? (atleast pre kargil line) :wink:
If there is a news that Chinese are bulking more on Sikkim/Arunachal sector, means they are trying to relieve pressure being built on LAC sector.

https://www.aninews.in/news/national/ge ... 604134315/

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ParGha » 04 Jun 2020 18:22

Sajaym, how well has that recipe worked out for Pakistan? Their country is being pummeled from both sides and the middle -- drone strikes from the west, artillery fire from the east, and IED-mubaraks from within.

Sub-conventional attacks work only when there is ability, willingness and cohesive effort to back it up with conventional forces. Case in point, Bangladesh. Even if there is ability and the other two are missing, you will have a mess on your hands that will haunt you forever. Case in point, Sri Lanka. India has learned its lessons in this regard, and doesn't need to re-learn it. Time to first build the will and the cohesive policy.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby SBajwa » 04 Jun 2020 18:28

https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/chand ... garh-94399

Amid stand-off with China, ITBP rushes to raise new command at Chandigarh
It will control all ITBP formations in the western theatre

Vijay Mohan
Tribune News Service
Chandigarh, June 4

Amidst the continuing stand-off with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) has rushed to raise the newly sanctioned Command at Chandigarh that will control all ITBP formations in the western theatre.

An officer of the rank of Inspector General (IG) at the force headquarters in New Delhi has been transferred to Command Headquarters Chandigarh with immediate effect “in public interest” to head the command, sources said.

He will officiate as the Additional Director General (ADG) till the posting of a regular officer, according to orders issued by the ITBP Director General SS Deswal on June 3, sources said. This would be in addition to his present duties at New Delhi.

Following a cadre review that was approved by the Cabinet in October 2019, two new commands, one based at Chandigarh and the other at Guwahati for the eastern theatre, are to be raised. These are to be headed by officers of the rank of ADG, equivalent to a lieutenant general in the Army. “An imperative need has been felt to make these headquarters functional immediately,” Deswal’s orders state.

All ITBP ‘frontiers’ located in the eastern and western theatres would now report to their respective command headquarters. At present, the force is divided into five frontiers that report directly to Force Headquarters, along with other training, logistic and administrative establishments, through an ADG based in New Delhi. The geographical responsibility of each frontier is generally aligned with the stretch of the border shared by respective states with China.

Western Command will control the Dehradun-based Northern Frontier comprising Shimla, Dehradun and Bareilly sectors and the North-West Frontier, recently moved from Chandigarh to Leh that comprises Srinagar and Ladakh sectors. Eastern Command will control the Northern Frontier and the North-eastern Frontier. The Bhopal-based Central frontier along with the ITBP’s specialist battalions and some other establishments would be under the command of the ADG at Force Headquarters.

ITBP, mandated for the peacetime management of the border with China, has 56 service battalions and four specialist battalions, out of which 32 are deployed in border guarding duties, 11 in internal security and eight in anti-Naxal operations.

The need to create commands in the ITBP was felt to streamline command, control and coordination over field formations in view of the force expansion due to new battalions being raised, increasing commitments and raising border volatility. This necessitated the creation of new posts that included two ADGs, 10 IGs (equivalent to Major General), 10 Deputy Inspector General (equivalent to Brigadier) and 13 posts of Commandant (equivalent to Colonel), in addition to more posts at lower levels.

While the Director General of all Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) under the Ministry of Home Affairs is an officer from the Indian Police Service (IPS), other higher level posts are tenable by a mix of IPS and cadre officers. Till now, cadre officers could only reach up to the level of IG, but the cadre review opened doors to the level of ADG and also created more vacancies for them at other ranks.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby arshyam » 04 Jun 2020 19:13

chetak wrote:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative fuels Ladakh standoff


Atul Aneja
NEW DELHI,
JUNE 04, 2020,

...
Observers say that by putting military pressure in Ladakh, the Chinese are assertively conveying multiple messages, including exhorting New Delhi to restrain itself on Aksai Chin and Gilgi- Baltistan, as well as curb the exuberance of its engagement with the Trump administration under the Indo-Pacific doctrine.

Can we take this as the official view of the CPC?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby arshyam » 04 Jun 2020 19:17

ldev wrote:
Deans wrote:
95% of Aksai Chin was lost well before 1962. The Chinese highway running through it was completed in 1959. The actual gains for the Chinese in 1962 were relatively small - between their claim line and the posts along a line we were occupying from 1959 onwards. The largest action in ladakh in 62 involved a single infantry company (13 Kumaon) at Rezang La.


Thanks for pointing that out. Does it make a difference? Chou en Lai proposed an exchange of Arunachal Pradesh(then NEFA) in exchange for Ladakh. Nehru refused. That I believe was during the Tibet uprising in 1959. When Nehru refused China just walked in and took it over from 1959 to 1962, all 43,000 sq km of it.

It might, if we want to exorcise the ghost of '62. At least in the northern sector, our troops gave a good account of themselves. It was not their fault that China occupied Aksai Chin almost a decade earlier.

NEFA is just their way of claiming something "extra" and then offering that "extra" back to us as some concession. Typical Chinese dissembling that Nehru rightly saw through (for once).

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby suryag » 04 Jun 2020 19:28

Sajaym your posts are poofed for the kind of sentiment and emotion that it conveys vis-a-vis our Tibetan Brothers and Sisters and Dalai Lama

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Philip » 04 Jun 2020 19:29

The ITBP technically comes under the HM.Wasn't there some discussion about integrating it with the IA not too long ago? What were the pros and cons?

If we want the Tibetans to play a significant anti- Chin role in Tibet,it has to be very seriously studied and thought out how to achieve it.See the plight of the Uighurs today,most in concentration camps. Secondly,we need to train them like we did the Mukti Bahini. If you read thc excellent book Op X about the secret naval commandos operating in E.Pak in '72,you will know what it entails. Thirdly,what is our final objective? Liberation of Tibet or what? Would they agree merely to be saboteurs for India
which would bring the wrath of thd Chins upon their people?

Unless we decide that Tibet is COT,like POK,that it is a country enslaved by China and must be set free,plus networking with like- minded entities ,global powers, thd most that we can use the Tibetans is for intelligence,which to some extent I hope is happening.However,I do,agree that more can be done on this score,as had we had good prior intel,the Chin incursion and huge supporting cast would've been nnown to us in some measure.

The statement that we were facing another " Kargil",this time by China has much merit,except that heee,the Chins have excellent infra for their logistic needs and we are in for a very long haul.
The v.tough option of doing some " salami slicing" of our own catching the Chins by surprise as a countermove is probably what we must do,but must plan meticulously and be prepared for a wider conflict on thd ground and in the air. It is in the maritime sphere where we can do the most damage.Not a single Chin tanker,MV or warship/ sub should transit the IOR to and from China without interception or destruction. In fact we should take the battle to the waters of the ICS if need be.
Last edited by Philip on 04 Jun 2020 19:46, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby putnanja » 04 Jun 2020 19:42

Hari Nair wrote:Gen Panag's analyses is worth a read :
https://theprint.in/opinion/indias-fingers-have-come-under-chinese-boots-denial-wont-help-us/435145/
He deals with the sit at Galwan, Fingers 4-8 (Pangong) and Hot Springs.

In effect his analysis for Pangong is broadly in-line with the BRF members here - the area of patrol earlier available for us from Fingers 4-8 is now being denied by the Chinese. The Chinese have dug in with new posts between fingers 4-6 and are also dominating the surrounding heights. This also bears out with OSINT posted by d-atis@detresfa in his twitter handle. Its interesting to note that chaps like Abhijeet Aiyer Mitra are downplaying this aspect, while anti-establishment fellas like Shukla are talking about a Division strength of Chinese already camping on this side of the Indian LAC / our claim line. OSINT pics definitely do not indicate such large strength of their troops on our side of LAC / claim line.

The General's assessment for Galwan is in tune with Alarmist Ajay Shukla, that almost a brigade strength (3 bn) has occupied the mouth of Galwan and surrounding heights. This is NOT supported by the OSINT pics - Chinese positions on surrounding heights with trails leading down to the valley would have been clearly visible. Also, a whole brigade in that narrow gorge-like valley is likely to have them and their support elemets simply jostling for space and would have been clearly visible in the pics. Gen Panag appears to be wrong on Galwan.

Re - Hot Springs - the Good General claims our post at Gogra has been 'surrounded' - again I don't see OSINT pics to support that claim. Other BRF members may please comment, if they have anything to add.

On the whole, it does appear that we were, in a sense, caught sleeping at the wheel by a two-month late start-up this year, in which time, the Chinese had already sensed the opening and moved in. In this context, the DSDBO road was bound to get a Chinese reaction. Way back when I was operating in that sector (SSN), the mere act of routine flying through the Shyok valley (near Galwan) used to trigger the Chinese to object. Also, the new map of the UT of Ladakh legally incorporates Gilgit Baltistan - including their crown jewel of BRI - the CPEC. Given the fact that we are now increasingly assertive, reaction by the Chinese should have been gamed in and anticipated. Instead, from the open-source information available, it appears that we were initially off-guard and were reactive in our response. This is all the more surprising given the fact that there are more than adequate numbers and types of high resolution recce platforms available for the Army, both at the Corps and National level.

For the Chinese, its all about changing the facts on the ground. At Pangong, they have already moved in are now squatting on the 'Grey' land in-between. A stand-off that deteriorates into a stalemate suits them just fine. Its now going to be an uphill task to get them to move back to status quo ante. The buggers, if at all they do move, will definitely take their pound of flesh. Its not going to be easy - and that if I may say, is an understatement.


Isn't there other areas that India can push into and use as a trade-off?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ParGha » 04 Jun 2020 19:44

Philip, the ITBP is a border-police force with attendant police duties and responsibilities. Generally civilized countries keep the military separate from policing duties, except under extraordinary circumstances and special legislation (like AFSPA). It is much better for the Army to raise its own Scouts battalions for military purposes, and give them relevant training like demolition, vehicle/aircraft identification, etc, that are useless for border police.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby yensoy » 04 Jun 2020 19:48

arshyam wrote:
chetak wrote:

Can we take this as the official view of the CPC?

So far, this is the theory that makes the most sense. Atul Aneja has reported from Beijing and knows how the Chinese think, so I will give a lot of credence to his reasoning. Also, with CPEC/BRI being Xi's brainchild, such action can be contemplated only when the dear leader's dear project is under threat or lacks subscribers.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Philip » 04 Jun 2020 19:50

Agreed.The ITBP are our equiv. of the BSF,but composed of troops permanently acclimatised for mountain ops. The Q I asked was why was it broached in the first place? Is the ITBP also tasked with duties beyond border policing?

The Chinese would always want us to play the role of the "Middle Kingdom's " court eunuch. Not allowed to screw China in any way,by ourselves or in a gang bang! We must be neutered and part of their court,bowing and scraping when told to do so. The great chanakyas in the empire of babudom have sadly for decades not understood the fundamental factor in understanding China.To the MK,all non-Chinese are barbarians and must be slaves.A similar mentality exists with fundoo jihadis,that all "kafirs" must be put to death. The Chinese are like soldier ants,devouring everything in their path.Only fire can stop them.
Last edited by Philip on 04 Jun 2020 19:57, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby arshyam » 04 Jun 2020 19:51

Nitin Gokhale's Twitter thread is instructive (link was already shared here, but worth quoting):

Source: https://twitter.com/nitingokhale/status ... 9511681024

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
Ahead of Saturday’s talks between India and China at Lt Gen level (to take place on the Chinese side) at Chushul, some updates on the situation in Ladakh. At Galwan (around the area of Patrol Point 14), troops from both sides are at least a km apart at the closest point

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
Troops from either side are within their own areas. Small patrols have been meeting in the area near PP 14 for discussions since May 20-21st. The larger body of troops on both sides of the LAC are much in depth—at locations 2-3 km away from the LAC.

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale · Jun 3
The Chinese buildup in Galwan, a first in many many years and diverted from an ongoing exercise in Tibet, was well coordinated with additional strength brought in in the Finger area on the Northern bank of the Pangang Tso. India, watching the movement, took appropriate steps

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
The Chinese brought in a battalion plus (about 1000 plus men) to the areas opposite Galwan and about 200-300 soldiers in the finger area, post May 5-6. An unusal aspect to this deployment: Galwan and around was never a contested area, so clearly it was a pure pressure tactic.

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
As the Chinese started deploying in Galwan, India too matched the strength, moving a battalion from the nearby DBO brigade closer to the LAC. Both sides maintained social distancing so to speak, meeting only at Patrol Point 14 to exchange comminucation.

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
The main Chinese aim here was to stop construction of the feeder road ( well within Indian territiry) joining PP 14 to the DS-DBO Road completed last year. India immediately dismissed the objection and has continued with with its plan to complete this road.

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
In Finger area (for a detailed brief on what, why and how of the dispute, watch this: https://stratnewsglobal.com/pangong-tso ... nd-effect/
), China wanted to assert its claim to the area between Finger 5 and 8, which India hotly disputes. A faceoff was imminent. And that’s exactly what has happened at Finger.

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
Earlier, small Patrols from both sides used to come face to face in this area but disengagement was also quick. This time, more troops have been deployed from either side, with neither willing to budge. Saturday’s talks are aimed at resolving this knotty issue.

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
The Indian assessment is that eventually troops from Galwan will go back sooner than later (in any case, they have neither crossed the LAC nor created any ruckus) since gradual thinning out of troops on the Chinese side appears to have begun there. Talks will not include Galwan

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
The current complication is at the Finger area. But a combination of military and diplomatic efforts are eventually likely to succeed in restoring the status quo at Finger in coming weeks, those in the know say much like what happened in 2013 (Depsang) and 2014 (at Chumur).

Nitin A. Gokhale @nitingokhale
Final thoughts: Chinese aim to change status quo through coercion has not borne fruit. after initial belligerence, it has realised India is not budging so it has—unlike in Dolam 2017–dialled down the rhetoric & said that situation on border with India ‘stable and controllable’

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby khan » 04 Jun 2020 21:00

IMO, there is no need for all this Rohna Dohna. The main question is, is India prepared to escalate over this?

I think the answer is yes - which is why this mobilization is happening & that message has been communicated to China. It will be at a time & place of India’s choosing.

From everything I can tell the Chinese will not want an escalation - it will detract them from their main front - the Pacific and on top of that they are weak on their Western front. It will take time for them to redeploy their assets from the east to the west and that time India can do a lot of damage.

I am thinking of this as a game of poker, China made a move, India called their bluff and now the Chinese have to either fold or double down. I don’t think see them doubling down. If they do, they will lose Taiwan.

I agree with all the experts that there will be some Diplomatic solution for this.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby yensoy » 04 Jun 2020 21:10

We can escalate but we need an endgame. What do we want out of this? Do we want to go to war with China to push them to Finger-8, and out of the Galwan picnic area? I know most of you will hate me for saying this, but this is not a pragmatic strategy. We don't go to war with our equal sized nuclear armed neighbour for such low ends. And it won't really prove anything which can't be proven by our strategy of staying the course with construction and aggressive patrolling.

That's why we will continue to defend, aggressively if necessary, but the escalation ladder will be in their hands just as it unfortunately was in Paki hands after Balakot.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby CRamS » 04 Jun 2020 21:18

Gurus, I have a question. And this is motivated by my observation that suddenly in India, those who are normally p!ssful, constantly drumbeat themes like make love to to TSP and share Kashmir vallley with them, baad ModiJi and BJP are Hindu hyper-nationalists, rising levels of jingoism in India directed against TSP, baad ModiJI denying 4G to KMs who are demanding secession etc etc; all of them have suddenly turned into hyperventilating 'nationalists' nit-picking every little nuance on the India China standoff to argue that Chinese have invaded India.

If you listen to that puke Ajai Shukla, you won't be wrong to conclude and fearful in dhothi shivering that the Chicoms have already camped in New Delhi.

And the question I have is that be it a military victory, or a military debacle, the county's political leadership always either gets the credit or the blame and humiliation. Why is this? I find this a tad disingenuous and unfair.

So even if there is some objectivity to the loyal service Ajai Shukla is doing to his 10 Janpath Italian masters with his daily dispatches claiming Chinese occupation, question is, can that be laid on ModiJi's shoulders? Shouldn't the outrage and mockery be more equitably directed at the Indian army at the border? I mean as Rumsfeld said, you cannot fight with an army you wish you had, you fight with the army you have.

But I see that normally p!ssful libarandus turned neo hyper-nationalists say nary a word on Indian army, their entire gleeful mockery is directed at ModjI and boy are they having a field day.

So for historians and other military buffs, unless one is an absolute eunuch and naive pacifist, I cannot imagine any political leader worth his salt just sit by and watch an enemy overrun his/her country despite having the military wherewithal to resist and beat back the invasion. So in the final analysis, its the military capability one has is it not? So assuming the Chinese are occupying Indian territory as Shukla claims, who is more at fault? ModiJi or Indian army?

Now, one can argue that political leadership is responsible for building up military capabilities, but thats a long process and different line of argument. I am talking about a given instant of time when there is sudden escalation of hostilities with an enemy country like what India is faced with now.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby khan » 04 Jun 2020 21:21

yensoy wrote:We can escalate but we need an endgame. What do we want out of this? Do we want to go to war with China to push them to Finger-8, and out of the Galwan picnic area? I know most of you will hate me for saying this, but this is not a pragmatic strategy. We don't go to war with our equal sized nuclear armed neighbour for such low ends. And it won't really prove anything which can't be proven by our strategy of staying the course with construction and aggressive patrolling.

That's why we will continue to defend, aggressively if necessary, but the escalation ladder will be in their hands just as it unfortunately was in Paki hands after Balakot.

I am no expert, I am sure people much smarter than me can come with ideas that I cannot conceive in areas that I haven’t even heard of.

But one idea is Aaksi Chin. Just to illustrate my thinking, consider if Aaksi Chin is the target & that has been communicated (either directly or signaled by some troop deployment scheme).

It’s fair game because India hasn’t given up the claim and it can do a a lot of damage to China because of that highway connecting Tibet & Xinjiang.

Even in this example, there are variations of the scheme. India doesn’t have to take all of Aaksi Chin, maybe just enough to dominate their precious highway.

Or it could be a totally different area that the Chinese are squatting on which I haven’t even heard of.

I don’t think the Chinese would want any of these scenarios to play out - they were looking for an easy win and now that will not happen, I don’t see why they will want to escalate. Even if they do, it seems as if India is ready and can still grab a lot of land in the West before the Chinese can redeploy their forces.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby RajaRudra » 04 Jun 2020 21:30

CRamS wrote:Gurus, I have a question. And this is motivated by my observation that suddenly in India, those who are normally p!ssful, constantly drumbeat themes like make love to to TSP and share Kashmir vallley with them, baad ModiJi and BJP are Hindu hyper-nationalists, rising levels of jingoism in India directed against TSP, baad ModiJI denying 4G to KMs who are demanding secession etc etc; all of them have suddenly turned into hyperventilating 'nationalists' nit-picking every little nuance on the India China standoff to argue that Chinese have invaded India.


Yep, i had the same feeling during Doklam standoff. I feel there are three camps
1) The commies, Who thinks we are unnecessarily poking china (in support of Capitalist America)
2) Congressies - Who wants the current govt get into conflict with China. The same congress (if in govt) would have silently folded back on a standoff.
3) Nationalists - Who wants the border to be defended. And the army/govt should take the best of the decision at the correct time with planing and resources.

The reason, Congressies(and their pet media guys like Shoolaw) taking the line could be on their thinking that govt/army/police will be too stretched to take on the Internal(Shaheen Bhag Jihad) and External Threat(Pakistan and its terror sponsoring) .

(you asked for Gurus, so wait for their response. Mine is just a thought with out any deep analysis)

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby arshyam » 04 Jun 2020 22:29

Okay, I finally sat and watched the entire video interview of Col S Dinny by Nitin Gokhale. I'd recommend that everyone interested in the details of the Pangong area watch it.

Turns out I had misunderstood the location of the fingers 5-8 having gone by the map shared by Abhijit Iyer-Mitra in his articles. Col Dinny showed his map in the video, which I'd say is more accurate given that he had commanded troops at Pangong. Net net, fingers 5-8 don't stretch all the way to Khurnak (which is our IB), but end just before Sirijap. Apparently, the points of ingress of land into the lake waters are the fingers, not the mountain ridges themselves.

As of 2017, when he was posted there, our troops did patrol till Finger 8 using the Chinese built "road" itself. But the Chinese never went west beyond Finger 4 - they always turned back at Finger 4.

Apart from that, there were a few points of confirmation for what a few of us had been saying here:
1. It is impossible for a vehicle to drive west of Finger 4.
2. The un-authenticated video of the scuffle of troops with the Chinese humvee, if from that area, is definitely east of Finger 4, and somewhere between Finger 4-8.
3. The Chinese "road" up to finger 4 was built during Kargil, when we apparently had no troops in the area. Food for thought given our two-front threat.
4. My hypothesis that the Chinese road up to Finger 4 is not metalled is validated by the video, assuming that it happened in the Pangong area.

Link to the video:

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Philip » 04 Jun 2020 22:30

To be fair to the current govt., with a border so vast as ours,in such inhospitable terrain, where it is impossible to defend every km. in worthwhile manner, our strategy for a long time has been to as quickly as possible throw in as many reinforcements needed at
the point of dispute or intrusion. Reactive,not pro-active. Neither did we seriously anticipate a simultaneous intrusion/ attempted intrusion at multiple places. It was thought our grand diplomatic gestures ,royal welcomes,etc., would please the Chin.fuhrer and resolve complicated border issues and other disputes.
Sadly,we never studied the past which would've given clues to the mind of the Chin mandarins.

When Nehru magnanimously declined the UNSC seat vacated by the KMT,and instead proposed China to take it on a matter of principle- not realpolitik,it was not viewed by China as a favour
but as an insult! Mao and Chou felt India was being patronising to them and planned their vengeance,which took place in '62. Our grand welcomes to the current fuhrer from Chin has been viewed in similar fashion,as if Modiji was saying in none too subtle terms,that our ancient culture was/is superior to theirs! Impossible for XI to stomach.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ParGha » 04 Jun 2020 22:34

CRamS wrote:And the question I have is that be it a military victory, or a military debacle, the county's political leadership always either gets the credit or the blame and humiliation. Why is this? I find this a tad disingenuous and unfair.


Because to be the leader of a democracy, it means...

Image

If you don't understand it, please go back to 8th Standard Civics and re-learn the organization of the government.

You give up a lot of your rights when you join the military -- no free speech (OSA), no right to assembly or free association (Army Act), no right to appeal or due process (men have been shot dead on spot for retreating without orders), etc. When you surrender your rights to the leadership, you surrender the responsibility to the leadership as well. Rights and Responsibilities come as a package deal.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby SBajwa » 04 Jun 2020 23:08

Not sure where to put this news item but India and Australia have signed a major deal to use each other's military bases.


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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby khan » 04 Jun 2020 23:10

ParGha wrote:
CRamS wrote:And the question I have is that be it a military victory, or a military debacle, the county's political leadership always either gets the credit or the blame and humiliation. Why is this? I find this a tad disingenuous and unfair.


Because to be the leader of a democracy, it means...

Image

If you don't understand it, please go back to 8th Standard Civics and re-learn the organization of the government.

You give up a lot of your rights when you join the military -- no free speech (OSA), no right to assembly or free association (Army Act), no right to appeal or due process (men have been shot dead on spot for retreating without orders), etc. When you surrender your rights to the leadership, you surrender the responsibility to the leadership as well. Rights and Responsibilities come as a package deal.

Yes. In a way what “Shooklow” is doing - holding the Government of the day accountable, is what happens in any healthy democracy. It might upset some people, but they just need to learn to develop a thick skin.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Philip » 05 Jun 2020 00:01

To be fair to the current govt., with a border so vast as ours,in such inhospitable terrain, where it is impossible to defend every km. in worthwhile manner, our strategy for a long time has been to as quickly as possible throw in as many reinforcements needed at
the point of dispute or intrusion. Reactive,not pro-active. Neither did we seriously anticipate a simultaneous intrusion/ attempted intrusion at multiple places. It was thought our grand diplomatic gestures ,royal welcomes,etc., would please the Chin.fuhrer and resolve complicated border issues and other disputes amicably.
Sadly,we never studied the past history of our relations with China enough which would've given us insight and clues to the mind of the Chin mandarins and their behaviour.

When Nehru magnanimously declined the UNSC seat vacated by the KMT,and instead proposed China to take it on a matter of principle- not realpolitik, it was not viewed by China as a favour
but as an insult! Mao and Chou felt India was being patronising to them and planned their vengeance,which took place in '62. Our grand welcomes to the current fuhrer from Chin has perhaps been viewed in similar fashion,as if Modiji was saying in none too subtle terms,that our ancient culture was/is superior to theirs! Impossible for XI to stomach.

India showing to the world and China in particular that it is no less than an equal to China in many respects and even superior in some like its democratic credentials, independent courts,is in human terms everything that China isn't.These very qualities plus our support for an international rules- based code of conduct especially in the maritime domain in Asia, plus our military strength and geographical uniqueness is what makes us so attractive as a military ally to many allies of western powers in the region plus NATO. India joining a coalition of anti- Chinese western nations is a nightmare that it cannot tolerate.

In short India is the proverbial itch that China needs to scratch at regular intervals,this Han emperor more so than his predecessors. The pretender to Mao,wanting a life term as pres. like the great helmsman, now under intense global pressure for the first time, is nakedly revealing his fangs both at India and at the people of Hong Kong.Any sign of weakness on our part could prove to be fatal.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ManuJ » 05 Jun 2020 04:13

Given Nitin Gokhle's tweet and the general wisdom:
China wanted to assert its claim to the area between Finger 5 and 8, which India hotly disputes

How can India "hotly contest" China's claim and yet allow China to first build the road (during the time of Kargil war) and then let it operate the road continuously for 20 years? China's road leads right up to the Chinese post in Finger 8 area. India's road up to Finger 4 area is not connected to the Chinese road, with a large outcrop acting as a natural barrier. All this seems to indicate India having accepted the status quo as a fait accompli for the last 20 years.

Which begs the question - why has India suddenly woken up now and decided to reassert its claim to the disputed area of Finger5 - Finger 8? Is it the new road, along with political backing and China's isolation post COVID-19, that has provided India this newfound confidence? Was it India that first reasserted its claim in the Pangong Tso area that led to China increasing pressure in other areas?

In other words, are we sure that it's India that's reacting to Chinese pressure and not the other way around?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Davidrock » 05 Jun 2020 05:57

1. Col Dinny : Area between finger 4-8 is grey area. IA Patrols were conducted till fingre 8, even though the chinese had constructed road till finger
arshyam wrote: I haven't seen this interview yet, but does he give a timeline of when this was? Does he mention till what point did the Chinese patrol?


Yes, Col Dinny mentiones that we patrol till finger 8, and chinese patrol till finger 4. He was CO in 2017, and I see no reason why it should not be done today.

Davidrock wrote:2. Col Dinny : Our road is till the ITBP base between finger 3-4.


arshyam wrote: Not anymore, if you look at Google satellite view, you can make out a kachcha un-metalled(?) road going beyond the ITBP base, all the way up to the foxhole on Finger 4, and ends a few hundred meters short of the southern most point on the north shore (33°43'36.8"N 78°45'41.8"E). Beyond this, the options are: either we need to use explosives and carve out space for a road from the cliff (big no-no right next to the LAC) or reclaim land from the lake edge, or simply cut across the ridge. The latter is perhaps the best option, what we had been doing for our patrols beyond Finger 4 (and conversely, what the Chinese did during their patrols). But I don't see a motorable track over the cliff, whereas there is a kachcha road on the side of the cliff going to Sirijap. So it does not look like either side can drive across Finger 4.


Agree with options, however we cant drive to the grey area (4-8) from our side, but they can drive on it right from sirijap.

arshyam wrote:Be that as it may, what is the Chinese perception of the border - were they patrolling west of Finger 4 up to some location? The way I see it, both sides have asserted control at finger 4 and neither can go beyond it now. Sure, we can call it a loss, but it is also a loss for them.


Disagree. It is not a loss for them. The grey area is finger 4-8, and they have complete control there. We do not have any infrastructure there.

Davidrock wrote:With all this info, it appears that we were patrolling finger 4-8 until recently, though chinese had built their roads there in 1999. Chinese probably deployed repidly between finger 4-8, taking advantage of their roads and engaged ITBP patrol pary and injured them.

arshyam wrote:Once again, the devil's in the details - how recent was "recent", and till where did the Chinese patrol?



Recently as per Col Dinny is 2017, and there was no war/pact after that, so it should be happening now.

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Davidrock » 05 Jun 2020 06:06

khan wrote:
NRao wrote:The Chinese resurfaced the road you mention during the Kargil episode. India should have destroyed it then. Today it is The Norm. It may be too late for that.

Today, whatever the Chinese have built, since last summer, needs to be destroyed. Else that will be the new norm.

China has - as usual - prepared the plan very well. No matter what India does, they will say India has become a pawn of the US. Does not matter what India does. Uness India is prepared to take a rather large economic hit, I do not see this noose being loosened.


The main thing that matters is IA’s *perception* of the LAC. If IA keeps patrolling until Finger 8, they will keep the claim alive and that new camp will mean as little or as much as that finger 4-8 road.

Also, if you remember last week there was a video that was “leaked” which showed IA (or was it ITBF) beating the tar out of some Chinese soldier and damaging their hummer clone. This has now assumed new significance for me.

Because no Vehicle can go past finger 4, this had to have happened between finger 4 and 8. So in-spite of the Chinese having the advantage of a metaled road between finger 4 and 8, the “real” message being telegraphed with the video is, IA/ITBF is still patrolling until finger 8 and giving a good account for themselves.


Yes this is interesting to note. Since they have road from sirijap to finger 4, this incident has happened to the east of finger 4, and not on the katcha road to west of foxhole.

However, from the video itself, the road does not look good, so we need to identify where exactly the suv incident happened.

Also can anyone tell me where did the 2017 fist fight happen ?

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Davidrock » 05 Jun 2020 06:18

arshyam wrote:
khan wrote:Wasn’t aware of that. If that is the case & the status quo cannot be reestablished diplomatically, then an escalation is in order.

Nope, I'd suggest to see for yourself on Google earth. All the images are recent (2020 vintage), and note the contrast between how the road surface appears on our side up to the ITBP camp at Finger 4, and the road on the eastern side of Finger 4.

The Chinese road does not look like a metal road, or even a concrete one - a properly finished road would have some signs of culverts, bridges, causeways, etc. We can see these on our road up to finger 4 (look for the frequent white patches - they are concrete causeways to let the water drain. The 2017 road construction video I shared a few pages back also shows them in close-up). The road east of Khurnak camp at the end of Finger 8 (33.763005N, 78.990581E) has some such signs. To some extent, I could see some signs of permanence on the road up to the Sirijap camp at the end of Finger 6 (33°44'28.1"N 78°52'35.8"E). But west of this point, the road is definitely kachcha and is only a dirt track. Heck, we can even see signs of water overflowing/washing off the dirt track (see at 33°44'15"N, 78°47'59"E and 33°44'50"N, 78°50'52"E). The only part where it appears to be a road is on the eastern edge of the Finger 4 fox hole just before the u-turn point at 33°43'11"N, 78°45'48" - it's perhaps sheltered from the elements there are there appears to be no river/glacier draining into the lake. But even here, it does not appear like any sort of metalled surface.

Now, if after a close inspection and comparison with our road, anyone still maintains that the Chinese road is metaled, it only speaks to their quality, I guess 8)


Excellent observation !

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby Rakesh » 05 Jun 2020 06:21

ParGha wrote:Because to be the leader of a democracy, it means...

+108 to you SIR!

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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ramana » 05 Jun 2020 06:33

CRS wrote:
And the question I have is that be it a military victory, or a military debacle, the county's political leadership always either gets the credit or the blame and humiliation. Why is this? I find this a tad disingenuous and unfair.


India is a civilian-led government.
And the victory or debacle should be born by the leadership.
In military dictatorships it's different.
Even in the Soviet Union the victory or defeat was born by Stalin.

Please don't ask such questions here.

ramana
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Re: India Border Watch: Security and Operations

Postby ramana » 05 Jun 2020 06:37

Folks am going to lock this thread and start a new thread with title change.

India's Border Security with China and Pakistan- 2020


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