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Intelligence and National Security Discussion

The Military Issues & History Forum is a venue to discuss issues relating to the military aspects of the Indian Armed Forces, whether the past, present or future. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
Aarvee
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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Aarvee » 17 Mar 2017 09:10

pravula wrote:


Tor is an outgrowth of DOD (Navy) research project and not really anonymous, especially when being tracked by nation-states. Heck, most tier 2 US Corps have access to technology that can fingerprint Tor users.



What if TOR is used from a virtual machine that is connected to the internet through a VPN provided by a company that doesnt keep logs? Does it make it hard or not really?

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby pravula » 17 Mar 2017 20:10

Aarvee wrote:
pravula wrote:
Tor is an outgrowth of DOD (Navy) research project and not really anonymous, especially when being tracked by nation-states. Heck, most tier 2 US Corps have access to technology that can fingerprint Tor users.



What if TOR is used from a virtual machine that is connected to the internet through a VPN provided by a company that doesnt keep logs? Does it make it hard or not really?


Not really.

1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canvas_fingerprinting
2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mouse_tracking

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby vasu raya » 18 Mar 2017 04:40

In addition to fingerprinting,

VM OS is not any more safe than a physical box OS, then initiating a VPN connection to a service provider is only as strong as its encryption, the encryption is based on certificates knowing which compromises the procedure. Not much different from SSL used over the internet.

if its unencrypted traffic from the other side of the VPN gateway to Tor servers, from there on your VM will still be impacted by what you access on the internet as the VPN gateway only sees it as traffic and passes it thru to your VM.

Accessing Tor needs special browsers according to the article, that software could be spiked to start with.

Tor network could profile the traffic using AI to reasonably guess the independent connections behind the VPN proxy

Aarvee
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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Aarvee » 18 Mar 2017 10:36

damn, there is no real private browsing is there,apart from using a sandboxed system that you dont use for anything else :-? :-? that doesnt use your internet access point.

vasu raya
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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby vasu raya » 19 Mar 2017 21:17

the chosen method is to use a fall guy, someone else's computer or at a grandscale the computer networks of another country fingerprinted as official.

on the target side, this is a defensive measure adopted

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honeypot_(computing)

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Austin » 23 Mar 2017 14:13

WikiLeaks Retweeted
CRN‏Verified account @CRN 18h18 hours ago

Cisco's #WikiLeaks Security Vulnerability Exposure: 10 Things Partners Need To Know

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Austin » 28 Mar 2017 19:15

RAND study: Zero Days, Thousands of Nights--The Life & Times of Zero-Day Vulnerabilities and Their Exploits

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pu ... RR1751.pdf

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Austin » 30 Mar 2017 11:02

CNBC‏Verified account @CNBC https://twitter.com/CNBC/status/847086715135250432

Cisco learned from Wikileaks that the CIA had hacked its systems

When WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange disclosed earlier this month that his anti-secrecy group had obtained CIA tools for hacking into technology products made by U.S. companies, security engineers at Cisco Systems swung into action.

The Wikileaks documents described how the Central Intelligence Agency had learned more than a year ago how to exploit flaws in Cisco's widely used Internet switches, which direct electronic traffic, to enable eavesdropping.


Senior Cisco managers immediately reassigned staff from other projects to figure out how the CIA hacking tricks worked, so they could help customers patch their systems and prevent criminal hackers or spies from using the same methods, three employees told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

The Cisco engineers worked around the clock for days to analyze the means of attack, create fixes, and craft a stopgap warning about a security risk affecting more than 300 different products, said the employees, who had direct knowledge of the effort.


That a major U.S. company had to rely on WikiLeaks to learn about security problems well-known to U.S. intelligence agencies underscores concerns expressed by dozens of current and former U.S. intelligence and security officials about the government's approach to cybersecurity.

That policy overwhelmingly emphasizes offensive cyber-security capabilities over defensive measures, these people told Reuters, even as an increasing number of U.S. organizations have been hit by hacks attributed to foreign governments.

Larry Pfeiffer, a former senior director of the White House Situation Room in the Obama administration, said now that others were catching up to the United States in their cyber capabilities, "maybe it is time to take a pause and fully consider the ramifications of what we're doing."

U.S. intelligence agencies blamed Russia for the hack of the Democratic National Committee during the 2016 election. Nation-states are also believed to be behind the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment and the 2015 breach of the U.S. Government's Office of Personnel Management.

CIA spokeswoman Heather Fritz Horniak declined to comment on the Cisco case, but said it was the agency's "job to be innovative, cutting-edge, and the first line of defense in protecting this country from enemies abroad."


The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the CIA and NSA, referred questions to the White House, which declined to comment.

Across the federal government, about 90 percent of all spending on cyber programs is dedicated to offensive efforts, including penetrating the computer systems of adversaries, listening to communications and developing the means to disable or degrade infrastructure, senior intelligence officials told Reuters.

President Donald Trump'sbudget proposal would put about $1.5 billion into cyber-security defense at the Department of Homeland Security. Private industry and the military also spend money to protect themselves.

But the secret part of the U.S. intelligence budget alone totaled about $50 billion annually as of 2013, documents leaked by NSA contractor Edward Snowden show. Just 8 percent of that figure went toward "enhanced cyber security," while 72 percent was dedicated to collecting strategic intelligence and fighting violent extremism.

Departing NSA Deputy Director Rick Ledgett confirmed in an interview that 90 percent of government cyber spending was on offensive efforts and agreed it was lopsided.

"It's actually something we're trying to address" with more appropriations in the military budget, Ledgett said. "As the cyber threat rises, the need for more and better cyberdefense and information assurance is increasing as well."

The long-standing emphasis on offense stems in part from the mission of the NSA, which has the most advanced cyber capabilities of any U.S. agency.

It is responsible for the collection of intelligence overseas and also for helping defend government systems. It mainly aids U.S. companies indirectly, by assisting other agencies.

"I absolutely think we should be placing significantly more effort on the defense, particularly in light of where we are with exponential growth in threats and capabilities and intentions," said Debora Plunkett, who headed the NSA's defensive mission from 2010 to 2014.

GOVERNMENT ROLE

How big a role the government should play in defending the private sector remains a matter of debate.

Former military and intelligence leaders such as ex-NSA Director Keith Alexander and former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter say that U.S. companies and other institutions cannot be solely responsible for defending themselves against the likes of Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.

For tech companies, the government's approach is frustrating, executives and engineers say.

Sophisticated hacking campaigns typically rely on flaws in computer products. When the NSA or CIA find such flaws, under current policies they often choose to keep them for offensive attacks, rather than tell the companies.

In the case of Cisco, the company said the CIA did not inform the company after the agency learned late last year that information about the hacking tools had been leaked.

"Cisco remains steadfast in the position that we should be notified of all vulnerabilities if they are found, so we can fix them and notify customers," said company spokeswoman Yvonne Malmgren.

SIDE BY SIDE


A recent reorganization at the NSA, known as NSA21, eliminated the branch that was explicitly responsible for defense, the Information Assurance Directorate (IAD), the largest cyber-defense workforce in the government. Its mission has now been combined with the dominant force in the agency, signals intelligence, in a broad operations division.

Top NSA officials, including director Mike Rogers, argue that it is better to have offensive and defensive specialists working side by side. Other NSA and White House veterans contend that perfect defense is impossible and therefore more resources should be poured into penetrating enemy networks - both to head off attacks and to determine their origin.

Curtis Dukes, the last head of IAD, said in an interview after retiring last month that he feared defense would get even less attention in a structure where it does not have a leader with a direct line to the NSA director.

"It's incumbent on the NSA to say, 'This is an important mission'," Dukes said. "That has not occurred."

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby vasu raya » 04 Apr 2017 23:29

http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/the-average-hacker-is-getting-smarter-and-large-companies-are-the-biggest-targets/article17773707.ece?homepage=true

A new trend noticed by researchers is for attackers to target persons specifically rather than send out mass phishing e-mails with generic subject lines like “Invoice” or “Delivery confirmation”.

According to the ‘M-Trends 2017’ report released recently, hackers even call up potential victims to follow up on the malicious email, and obtain crucial information, like personal email IDs of top executives, to avoid the possibility of phishing mails getting caught in controls protecting official corporate emails.

One such ‘privilege escalation tool’ leveraged CVE-2016-0167, a previously unknown vulnerability. The tool allowed attackers to obtain elevated privileges in environments where the initially compromised user did not have them, says the report.

Two traditional security measures, especially in big organisations, are: network segmentation (instead of one large network, break it up into many, so even if one is breached, the entire system won’t go down) and multi-factor authentication (instead of one password, have one or two more layers of verification like one-time password or fingerprint authentication).

The report says last year, attackers managed to access e-mails by circumventing even these two security measures. “With an OAuth token, an attacker has the ability to bypass multi-factor authentication to access a target user’s cloud resources such as email, calendar and shared documents,” says the report. “The volume of email stolen through the years is likely greater than all other forms of electronic data theft combined.”

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby kit » 06 Apr 2017 14:38

cross posting ..a must read.. how the Chinese curry favour from corrupt bureaucrats in India and elsewhere


https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/unlocking-secrets-momint?id=be1ddd5371&uuid=c907e0ee-af58-4abe-9591-8cead78f096c


The old cliche goes that there's no substitute for a mother's love. But for Chinese intelligence officers, her access to classified information comes close. On March 29, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrest of Candace Claiborne, an office management specialist (or administrative assistant) with the State Department, for failing to disclose thousands of dollars in gifts and payments from Chinese officials. The criminal complaint against Claiborne notes that she was in communication with two suspected operatives with the Shanghai State Security Bureau, a regional office that reports to the Chinese Civilian intelligence service the Ministry of State Security (MSS) in Beijing. It also cites an instance in May 2011, during Claiborne's third tour in China, when a suspected Chinese intelligence officer contacted her to request internal U.S. government analysis of a recent U.S.-China strategic economic dialogue. A month earlier, Claiborne received a $2,480 payment. (It isn't clear whether she provided the document, which probably explains why she hasn't been charged with espionage.)

Some of the gifts that Claiborne accepted, which included thousands of dollars in cash and items such as an iPhone and MacBook computer, were for her personal use. Many of them, however, went to a person identified in the complaint against her as "Co-conspirator A." The media initially ran with stories that the figure was a man deployed by Chinese intelligence to steal Claiborne's heart — and any privileged information she had access to — in a so-called "honey-trap" operation. After all, female administrators are frequent targets of these kinds of schemes, which typically dispatch attractive men (known as "ravens") to romance them. But the details of the complaint make clear that Co-conspirator A is, in fact, Claiborne's adult son, who returned to live with his mother in China in 2012 after finishing college in Maryland. Among the items he received through his mother's Chinese contacts are tuition at a fashion school in Shanghai, spending money, a furnished apartment, international vacations for him and his friends, a sewing machine, and herbal medicines.

The incident offers insight into what we have dubbed "MOMINT" — or mom intelligence. And though Claiborne is not facing espionage charges, her case provides some useful lessons about the business of spying.

Hold the ICE
It's a hard truth to break to my friends in U.S. intelligence agencies, but the people who wind up spying against their governments usually volunteer for the job. Most of the CIA's and FBI's invaluable sources are not the product of painstaking grooming; they're walk-ins who wanted to work for the Americans. The same goes for Americans who flip for foreign intelligence agencies — Claiborne among them, apparently. The FBI complaint outlines how she first contacted one of the Shanghai State Security Bureau intelligence officials (called "Co-Conspirator B") in June 2007 looking for help finding her son a job as an English teacher in Shanghai. Co-conspirator B reportedly replied that he remembered Claiborne well and that he would check with his friends to see what assistance they could offer. The next day, he emailed Claiborne's son about a job teaching English at a school in Shanghai. The three continued talking throughout 2007 and 2008 about Claiborne's son's job prospects.

The KGB, the Soviet secret police and intelligence agency, developed MICE, a now-famous acronym for its four-pronged approach to recruiting: money, ideology, compromise and ego. For Americans working with foreign intelligence agencies, however, it's clear that cash is king. In this respect, Claiborne is no different from American double agents such as Aldrich Ames, Robert Hanssen and Philip Agee. Claiborne, like these notorious figures, was in financial trouble. Despite her efforts to set him up with a job, Claiborne's son preferred to keep relying on his mother's financial support. The arrangement strained Claiborne's modest salary and left her burdened with heavy debt, including tax payments owed to the District of Columbia. And compared with many other parents in her situation, Claiborne had an unusual advantage. She realized she could use her position with the State Department and her connections in Chinese intelligence to get the help she needed for her and her son through MOMINT.

Caught on the Little Hook
Unlike Ames, Hanssen and Agee, though, Claiborne appears never to have fully committed to spying. An analysis of the criminal complaint reveals that she was merely stringing her Chinese contacts along, accepting money and gifts in exchange for classified information that she promised — but by all appearances, never delivered. Even so, the conversations with her son documented in the complaint demonstrate that she knew she was playing a dangerous game.

A common tactic that intelligence officers use in the recruiting process is known as the "little hook." In this process, a handler asks a prospective spy for a seemingly innocuous document and then pays him or her for it, all the while recording the transaction. The exchange not only proves the recruit's mettle, but it also gives the handler blackmail material to use to get the newly minted agent to give up more and more sensitive information. So though Claiborne's dealings with Chinese intelligence started with money, they quickly put her in a compromised position.

The complaint documents several occasions in which she apparently tried to distance herself from her contacts in the Shanghai State Security Bureau. Shortly after her first exchange with Co-conspirator B in 2007, for instance, she discussed the possibility of leaving the State Department. But instead she stayed on, and even bid on a post in Beijing, perhaps an indication that the MSS had already established influence over her actions. In the years that followed, Claiborne repeatedly tried to ignore requests for contact from the Chinese intelligence officers, refused to travel to meet them and told her son not to tell them where she was working. Her son, meanwhile, kept asking for more favors and financial assistance from the officers, who were only too willing to oblige. Claiborne's son kept digging the hooks of Chinese intelligence deeper and deeper into his mother until she felt trapped. At one point, she wrote to him to express her frustration that his actions kept getting her "dragged into this" time and again.

This sense of entrapment eventually led Claiborne to welcome an undercover FBI agent posing as a Chinese intelligence officer into her home in Washington to talk. MOMINT may have provided Claiborne with quick cash in a time of need, but she wound up paying the price.

A Long and Changing Game
Beyond the lessons it offers on intelligence recruiting in general, the case also offers some interesting points on Chinese intelligence specifically. For one thing, Claiborne's experience with the MSS illustrates the agency's patience in their human intelligence operations. Compared with American agents, who are typically quick to move from the little hook to gleaning more sensitive intelligence, the Chinese officers were willing to invest years developing their source. For another, that Claiborne is not ethnically Chinese is unusual. The conventional wisdom for years was that intelligence agencies in China specialized in targeting and recruiting ethnic Chinese sources. And, in fact, they still focus largely on ethnic Chinese recruits — but not exclusively. A recent Newsweek article by Jeff Stein noted that the CIA has adapted its thinking about Chinese espionage ever since the MSS recruited a Caucasian American, Glenn Shriver, in 2010 while he was studying in China. After bringing Shriver under its wing, the Chinese intelligence agency then sent him home to infiltrate the CIA.

Finally, the details included in the complaint suggest that Claiborne's Chinese handlers were careless in covering their tracks. Investigators have uncovered a sizable quantity of emails, texts and other communications between them, though the Chinese intelligence officers seemed to prefer physical handoffs and in-person meetings to electronic contact when conveying sensitive information. Old-school spying techniques still have their place, even in the age of cyberespionage. And from the looks of it, Claiborne wasn't terribly tech savvy, either. She tried to obscure her ties to the Chinese officers by deleting emails in response to State Department and FBI interviews — a tactic more likely to raise suspicions than to eliminate evidence. The instructions she gave her son not to tell the MSS where she was were similarly naive, considering that she sent them from a MacBook or iPhone that the intelligence agency had furnished her, doubtless complete with keyloggers and other malware.

Claiborne wasn't a professional spy, nor was she practicing good espionage tradecraft. Nevertheless, she managed to get away with her activities for a decade before she was discovered. Based on her experience, one can't help but wonder how many other "Mama Haris" are still out there operating for foreign intelligence services.

(posted with reference to and permission ..stratfor)

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Austin » 06 Apr 2017 14:45

Stratfor is US propaganda front end arm for CIA also known as Shadow CIA

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby aditp » 10 Apr 2017 11:19

Et Tu Brutus?

Retired ISI officer goes missing from Lumbini (Nepal), a town five kilometres away from the Indian border.

An ex-army man who went to Nepal for a job interview earlier this week has gone missing, Foreign Office Spokesperson Nafees Zakaria confirmed on Saturday.

“Foreign Office is in contact with Pakistan Embassy in Khatmandu and also have established contacts with Nepalese authorities.” Radio Pakistan quoted Zakaria as saying.

Lt Col (retd) Muhammad Habib Zahir retired from service in October 2014 and had been working at Rafhan Mills in Faisalabad. Zahir had posted his resume on job portal LinkedIn and on the UN website. A month ago, a man named Mark Thomson contacted the ex-army officer through email and from a UK phone number claiming Zahir had been shortlisted for the job of vice president/zonal director with a salary package of USD3,500-8,500 per month and asked him to come to Kathmandu, Nepal for an interview on April 6.

Zahir was sent a business class ticket for April 5 to Kathmandu via Oman. According to the initial investigation, a man named Javed Ansari received him at Oman and provided him a Nepali cell phone number.

Sources said the former officer then arrived in Kathmandu on April 6 and on the same day he left for Lumbini, a town five kilometres away from the Indian border, via a Buddha Air flight. He texted his wife at 1pm informing her he had safely landed in Lumbini.

However, has not been heard from since then. Both his Pakistani and Nepali numbers are switched off. Zahir’s family has lodged an FIR.



Possible payback for the Kulbhushan Jaddhav case. But atleast we had the courtesy of sending him a business class air ticket. :rotfl:

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 10 Apr 2017 11:24

^^ Very legit cover story indeed. :roll: :roll:

innocent "Retired" afsar goes all the way to Oman and then comes to Nepal instead of easiest route of direct PIA flight ( to avoid being tailed by RAA folks) and then has a interview scheduled 5 kms from Indian border.... Sure.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby aditp » 10 Apr 2017 11:26

sum wrote:^^ Very legit cover story indeed. :roll: :roll:

innocent "Retired" afsar goes all the way to Oman and then comes to Nepal instead of easiest route of direct PIA flight ( to avoid being tailed by RAA folks) and then has a interview scheduled 5 kms from Indian border.... Sure.


Note the ROFL. The pakis surely wont admit to another daredevil capture of their operative.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 10 Apr 2017 11:51

^^ Of course sir. The comment wasnt directed at you but at the Paki effort to spin a story about his "innocent" visit.
Am very happy if we have actually pulled off this "offensive defence" tactic....time will tell us what the missing Paki was actually in the ISI ( am sure was involved in some Indians ops) and what he is currently doing. Mostly enjoying R&R in some dark godown in Bihar

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby arun » 10 Apr 2017 11:59

My thoughts were on similar lines when I posted and X posted the news item regards the so called “disapperance” “in Nepal” of “Retired” Uniformed Jihadi of the Punjabi Dominated Military of the Mohammadden Terrorism fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan named Lt. Col. Muhammad Habib Zahir on the STFUP (Clicky1) and ISI History & Discussions (Clicky2) threads.

This certainly has the apperance of the construction of an alibi by the Mohammadden Terrorism fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan consequent to India possibly arresting a senior ISI agent on a malign mission within India:

arun wrote:Hmmm………… I wonder if India has arrested a high ranking ISI aka ISID aka Inter Services Intelligence Directorate Agent committing espionage in India and the Mohammadden Terrorist fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan is consequently attempting to play victim by claiming that the high ranking agent was kidnapped and taken across the border into India.

Let me hope that it is indeed the case that India has bagged a high ranking ISID agent for espionage in India and who after a full and public confession of spying can be traded for our retired naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav who was kidnapped by Pakistan from Chabahar in Iran.

Read about the affair of the disapperance of a Uniformed Jihadi by name of Lt.Col. (Retired?) Muhammad Habib Zahir:

Gone missing: Retired army officer disappears in Nepal

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby arun » 10 Apr 2017 12:19

X Posting Anup Misra’s post on the STFUP thread which contains what is purported to be the resume of the “disappeared” “in Nepal” “retired” Uniformed Jihadi Lt. Col. Muhammad Habib Zahir.

Note the various mentions of stints with the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate aka ISID aka ISI:

From here: Clicky

anupmisra wrote:Paki ISI operative's resume. Read the "Achievements" section.

Image
Image
Image
Image

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby manjgu » 10 Apr 2017 15:42

do officers retire at 49 or 50? or is it a case of premature retirement?

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 10 Apr 2017 16:03

^^ The guy was IT chief at GHQ and ISI station chief at Sukkur during 26/11 timeframe ( according to DFI, this was the station that the 26/11 attackers were always in touch with, esp a Col posted there).

So he definitely isnt a small fish and no wonder, TSP-ains have immediately decided to put the noose on Shri Kulbhushan. Just hope they dont do their usual Pakiness on the poor guy at this current moment.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Aditya_V » 10 Apr 2017 16:19

sum wrote:^^ The guy was IT chief at GHQ and ISI station chief at Sukkur during 26/11 timeframe ( according to DFI, this was the station that the 26/11 attackers were always in touch with, esp a Col posted there).

So he definitely isnt a small fish and no wonder, TSP-ains have immediately decided to put the noose on Shri Kulbhushan. Just hope they dont do their usual Pakiness on the poor guy at this current moment.


Now they wont cause if they put a noose on Shri Kulbhushan. We havent acknowledged anything on arresting him. SO no Human rights, Overground workers can go to court to seek his welfare.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby rkhanna » 10 Apr 2017 16:50

"Now they wont cause if they put a noose on Shri Kulbhushan. We havent acknowledged anything on arresting him. SO no Human rights, Overground workers can go to court to seek his welfare."

IMO 2 scenarios:

1. I think India probably had intel that this 'death sentence' was imminent and renditioned above paki (of some importance) for a future Barter

2. Pak reacted to covert abduction with "death sentence". to get their man back.


Either way Moscow rules seem to be in play

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby nam » 10 Apr 2017 17:15

Kidnapping and executing Indian citizens is declaration of war.

If we don't retaliate, Paki can randomly pick up an Indian citizen and execute them.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby suryag » 10 Apr 2017 19:26

hope the death sentence is to pressurize us to release the captured guy quickly so that he doesnt spill the beans too much, either way we should get our person back

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby chetak » 10 Apr 2017 19:38

suryag wrote:hope the death sentence is to pressurize us to release the captured guy quickly so that he doesnt spill the beans too much, either way we should get our person back


what captured guy??

what if they have staged an elaborate charade of picking up their own guy??

All this allegedly happened inside nepal, a nation obliged to the hans and also not too friendly to us and but also paki pasand too.

all very unbelievable and very suspiciously coincidental, if it actually happened the way it is said that it went down, no??

phones switched off, coming alone and so close to the Indian border. A paki army guy with intelligence ops exposure. None of it makes sense.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby suryag » 10 Apr 2017 20:20

Sir they don't need to stage this to pass the death sentence right ?

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby chetak » 10 Apr 2017 20:33

suryag wrote:Sir they don't need to stage this to pass the death sentence right ?


They will blame us for any escalations on this count, as well as the missing paki asset. I long suspected that it would come to this, death sentence I mean. Whether they actually go through with it or not depends on what they want because it is their opening gambit.

This would have already come through back channels some time ago. Making things public may be a sign that all is not going well or as expected.

we should be pragmatic and know when to write off losses. Squaring of accounts will take some time but Modi is not the forgiving type.

we may not even know when the Indian riposte takes place but the counterstroke will most definitely be delivered.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 11 Apr 2017 06:03

All this allegedly happened inside nepal, a nation obliged to the hans and also not too friendly to us and but also paki pasand too.

If things are to be believed, the last few years have seen Nepal being a stomping ground for IB and assorted agencies and TSP-ians have been picked left right and center from there.So i wouldnt be so cynical.

The fact that TSP-ians promptly released cover stories in all major news outlets means that they panicked when their man went missing and followed the standard protocol of all agencies of making it public with a cover story to ensure that their man is atleast accounted for and not "missing" in some dark dungeon. That and the immediate death sentence for Shri Yadhav means something is cooking

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby krishna_krishna » 11 Apr 2017 06:45

^+++1 Our intelligence agencies deserve more credit than they get. They planned it in response to porki kidnapping of our ex armed forces officer, we can play this better than them. Standard Intelligence craft protocol, they got their chuddies twisted, this guy must have been caught some time ago. When they realized it is too late.

This death sentence game is to force our hand, key is timing of how soon they pretend to pass the sentence. If they potray it its gonna be sooner than that means this guy from Nepal is a big fish and they dont want him singing like chicanery. India will not accept the arrest till we got everything from him and then he will be traded. Its a long game of wait , moves and counter moves

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby GopiD » 11 Apr 2017 08:50

Watch out for shrill voices in Indian media asking GOI to take a softer stand on Pakistan and help release Kulbushan Yadav. They might find and interview Kulbushan's family to make an emotional story and will put pressure on GOI to release the Paki (if GOI agrees that we have him). These are the people in the media to watch out for, because they may be on ISI payroll. JMT.


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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 11 Apr 2017 10:04

^^WTF is wrong with these ToI folks?

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby sanjayc » 11 Apr 2017 10:16

India's response. Looks like there will be a swap.

Retd Pakistan Lt Col goes missing from Indo-Nepal border

Following the sentencing of Kulbhushan Jadhav to death by a Pakistani military court, social media buzzed through out Monday, linking the development with the recent disappearance of a retired Pakistani army officer from Nepal.

Lt Col (retd) Muhammad Habib Zahir went to Nepal on April 5 for a job interview and the next day, according to his family, he went missing from Lumbini, around 6km from the Indian border.

The officer contacted his family last on April 6, and after that he could not be reached, his family said on Monday.

Unconfirmed reports said Pakistan suspected the role of RAW in the abduction of the retired officer. Pakistan media reports said Islamabad was in touch with the Nepal foreign ministry over the issue. Indian authorities denied any knowledge about Habib.

Saad Habib, the Colonels' son, suspect his father was kidnapped for ulterior motive by anti-state elements (hinting at RAW). "Enemy's intelligence agencies could also be involved in the kidnapping of father," he reportedly said.

There were reports on websites that a probe by the officer's family and friends showed that the UK telephone number, from which he had received the call for the interview, was computer generated, while the email domain and its associated website were registered in India. Sources said this prompted concerns that the Indian spy agency RAW could have been behind the kidnapping.


http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 118740.cms

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 12 Apr 2017 01:28

sum wrote:^^WTF is wrong with these ToI folks?



Same with the idiot Praveen Swami in Indian Express.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 12 Apr 2017 01:33

X-post with my highlights:

Karan M wrote:https://thewire.in/120052/nscs-doval-budget-increase/

Behind a Mysterious Budget Increase, the National Security Need for ‘Make-In-India’ Chips

By Manoj Joshi on 30/03/2017

The National Security Council Secretariat, headed by top spy Ajit Doval, may have received a staggering 311% increase in funds this year to tackle issues at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear weapon delivery systems.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with NSA Ajit Doval before a meeting in Ufa last Friday. PTI Photo by Manvender Vashist

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with NSA Ajit Doval. Credit: PTI

This year’s Union budget appeared to be a mostly humdrum affair when it came to India’s defence interests. Although the total sum allocated towards our defence sector was a hefty Rs 2.7 lakh crore, it was only a modest increase of 5.6% when compared to last year.

What raised eyebrows, however, was the staggering 311% increase in the outlay of the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) – its budget went up from Rs 81 crore to Rs 333 crore. The one line explanation given read “The provision is for meeting the administrative expenses of the National Security Council Secretariat.”

A certain parsimony has been a rule of thumb with regard to budgets relating to defence, so why this generosity? Behind this lies a complicated story.

The NSCS officially services the National Security Council (NSC) whose members are the prime minister and the home, defence and finance ministers. While the composition is essentially similar to the Cabinet Committee on Security, the NSC is advised by the National Security Adviser (Ajit Doval) and in that sense, he is the head of the NSCS.

The NSC comprises of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), which is an advisory board of non-government or retired specialists, and a strategic policy group (SPG) comprising secretaries of key departments, the heads of the three services and the intelligence chiefs.

As of now it is not clear just how frequently the NSC or the SPG meet. NSA Ajit Doval did without an NSAB for nearly two years but has now established a compact body under the chairmanship of retired diplomat P S Raghavan.

Another component of the system is the Joint Intelligence Committee which pre-dates the NSC system and is autonomous, though embedded in the NSCS.

Neither the NSC, JIC, nor the NSAB requires the kind of money that has been appropriated. Neither did the NSCS need it in the past when it was mainly a think-tank for the NSA and a mechanism to coordinate intelligence tasking.

But the NSCS is now fleshing out its hithertofore additional tasks relating to cyber security and nuclear weapons. While the costs relating to the nuclear weapons and missiles come from the budgets of the DRDO and Department of Atomic Energy, there are some additional areas that need urgent attention. These are primarily at the intersection of cyber security and nuclear weapons and delivery systems.


It may be recalled that [u]one of the more important tasks of the NSA is being the chairman of the executive council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). Since 2012, the government has created a Strategic Programme Staff to assist him in this task which is essentially to ensure that if the political council of the NCA orders the use of nuclear weapons, they are ready for use.
[/u]


Integrated circuit R&D

One major weakness of the Indian deterrent has been the fact that India uncomfortably depends on imported integrated circuits (ICs) for its command and control systems, even though domestic chips have been used in missiles and satellites. In an era where there is considerable worry that foreign origin chips may contain “kill switches” or other means of cyber intrusion, it is important for the country to ensure that its nuclear command and control system is fool-proof on this front.

The money appropriated is likely to help with the R&D relating to the ICs and their fabrication.

India has considerable expertise in chip design but does not have the capability to manufacture them. In 2012, India unveiled a new semiconductor policy aimed at encouraging the setting up of fabrication units within the country. Two consortiums were identified by the government – one led by Hindustan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (HSMC) and the other by Jaiprakash Associates. :?: HSMC has since tied up with ST Microelectronics, Silterra and AMD to set up a $3.5 billion facility in Gujarat while Jaiprakash has dropped out, leaving its partners IBM and TowerJazz looking for investors. A third plant is expected to come up in MP through Cricket Semiconductors of US.


So far, India has been making do with chips fabricated by the Bharat Electronics, Gallium Arsenide Enabling Technology Centre in Hyderabad and the the Semiconductor Complex Ltd (SCL) in Mohali for its space programme and defence. The GAETEC is a DRDO lab which provides GaAs chips for highly specialised communications applications.

The SCL was set up in 1983 at a cost of $70 million with technology from American Microsystems Inc and Rockwell International and Hitachi. However, the company was wound down to a semiconductor laboratory although it continues to provide chips for the strategic sector. One weakness of the outfit is that it focuses more on R&D to enhance technology that it acquires from abroad. Manufacture is a weak area because the demand of SCL products is not sufficient to justify the financial investments for upgrading its foundries.


However, SCL and GAETEC are boutique solutions. For a robust defence set-up, India ideally needs to have critical systems that are entirely designed and fabricated in India especially with regard to our military and space-related equipment.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby sum » 12 Apr 2017 07:43

X-post:
Guddu wrote:Indian Exphttp://indianexpress.com/article/india/missing-pakistan-operative-was-in-team-that-trapped-kulbhushan-jadhav-death-sentence-india-4609708/
‘Missing’ Pakistan operative was in team that trapped Kulbhushan Jadhav
Zahir retired from the Pakistan Army on in 2014 but was said to have been engaged thereafter by the ISI for its covert operations.

Written by Rashmi Rajput | Mumbai | Updated: April 12, 2017 5:17 am
Kulbhushan Jadhav, Kulbhushan Jadhav spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav death sentence, Kulbhushan Jadhav death penalty, India-Pakistan, nawaz sharif, pakistan, indo-nepal border, missing pakistan operative, Muhammad Habib Zahir, Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan Army, Death Sentence, Spying, Pakistan PM, world news, india news, indian express news Kulbhushan Jadhav
Muhammad Habib Zahir, the retired Lt Colonel of the Pakistan Army who disappeared from Lumbini near Nepal’s border with India and now suspected to be in Indian custody, was in the team that nabbed Kulbhushan Jadhav in March 2016.
Sources in the security establishment have told The Indian Express that Indian agencies had been on Zahir’s trail for long. He was last seen in Lumbini. Monday’s announcement of the Pakistan military court’s decision to award the death penalty to Jadhav, sources said, was tied to the disappearance of Zahir.
India Summons Pakistan Envoy Abdul Basit After Court Sentences Kulbhushan Jadhav To Death
“Zahir was at the Indo-Nepal border last week. He was in the team that had trailed Jadhav. There is definitely a connection between the two cases,” an officer said. “No sooner did the Pakistani authorities learn of Zahir’s disappearance, Jadhav was pronounced guilty of being a spy. The purpose is clear. They didn’t want any Indian agency to go public,” the officer said.
Also Read: There will be consequences…will go out of way to get justice for son of India: Sushma Swaraj
Zahir retired from the Pakistan Army on in 2014 but was said to have been engaged thereafter by the ISI for its covert operations. In 2015, he picked up conversations between Jadhav and his family members and started tracking him, sources said.
“Jadhav used an Indian passport issued in the name of Hussein Mubarak Patel to carry out his dhow business in Iran. Pakistani agencies heard him speaking to his family members in Marathi. Zahir started trailing Jadhav. A trap was laid and Jadhav was apprehended in March 2016,” the officer said.
Sources said Zahir was lured to Nepal with the promise of a “big catch”. The man who turned in Zahir connected with him through a UK phone number to pass “information on a mole”. He met Zahir a couple of times in Oman.
“Zahir arrived in Oman on April 2 and reached Kathmandu the next day. On his arrival in Nepal, he was handed over a SIM card at Bhairawa. Zahir was told that this was to facilitate his communication with a point person. From there, he was made to travel to Lumbini near the border,” the officer said.
Zahir’s family also told the press in Pakistan that he was likely picked by an “enemy spy” agency. A PTI report from Islamabad Monday said Zahir’s son Saad lodged an FIR with Rawat police station near Rawalpindi, saying his father was received in Nepal by one Javed Ansari who took him to Lumbini.
“We suspect that my father has been abducted and enemy spy agencies might be responsible for it,” a police officer quoted Saad as saying. “Enemy” word is often used for India in Pakistani security circles. Zahir last contacted his family on Thursday afternoon and since then his phone numbers have not been reachable

Job well done by our agencies

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Yagnasri » 12 Apr 2017 08:12

We may not be going to get our man back. Beard boots of pak will see to that. Going back openly will be very difficult for their egos now. On the other side they may say Modi said sorry or some other story and release him. I do not think they give a damn about their colonel. Remember their conduct during Kargil.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby chetak » 12 Apr 2017 09:37

sum wrote:X-post:
Guddu wrote:Indian Exphttp://indianexpress.com/article/india/missing-pakistan-operative-was-in-team-that-trapped-kulbhushan-jadhav-death-sentence-india-4609708/
‘Missing’ Pakistan operative was in team that trapped Kulbhushan Jadhav
Zahir retired from the Pakistan Army on in 2014 but was said to have been engaged thereafter by the ISI for its covert operations.

Written by Rashmi Rajput | Mumbai | Updated: April 12, 2017 5:17 am
Kulbhushan Jadhav, Kulbhushan Jadhav spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav death sentence, Kulbhushan Jadhav death penalty, India-Pakistan, nawaz sharif, pakistan, indo-nepal border, missing pakistan operative, Muhammad Habib Zahir, Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan Army, Death Sentence, Spying, Pakistan PM, world news, india news, indian express news Kulbhushan Jadhav
Muhammad Habib Zahir, the retired Lt Colonel of the Pakistan Army who disappeared from Lumbini near Nepal’s border with India and now suspected to be in Indian custody, was in the team that nabbed Kulbhushan Jadhav in March 2016.
Sources in the security establishment have told The Indian Express that Indian agencies had been on Zahir’s trail for long. He was last seen in Lumbini. Monday’s announcement of the Pakistan military court’s decision to award the death penalty to Jadhav, sources said, was tied to the disappearance of Zahir.
India Summons Pakistan Envoy Abdul Basit After Court Sentences Kulbhushan Jadhav To Death
“Zahir was at the Indo-Nepal border last week. He was in the team that had trailed Jadhav. There is definitely a connection between the two cases,” an officer said. “No sooner did the Pakistani authorities learn of Zahir’s disappearance, Jadhav was pronounced guilty of being a spy. The purpose is clear. They didn’t want any Indian agency to go public,” the officer said.
Also Read: There will be consequences…will go out of way to get justice for son of India: Sushma Swaraj
Zahir retired from the Pakistan Army on in 2014 but was said to have been engaged thereafter by the ISI for its covert operations. In 2015, he picked up conversations between Jadhav and his family members and started tracking him, sources said.
“Jadhav used an Indian passport issued in the name of Hussein Mubarak Patel to carry out his dhow business in Iran. Pakistani agencies heard him speaking to his family members in Marathi. Zahir started trailing Jadhav. A trap was laid and Jadhav was apprehended in March 2016,” the officer said.
Sources said Zahir was lured to Nepal with the promise of a “big catch”. The man who turned in Zahir connected with him through a UK phone number to pass “information on a mole”. He met Zahir a couple of times in Oman.
“Zahir arrived in Oman on April 2 and reached Kathmandu the next day. On his arrival in Nepal, he was handed over a SIM card at Bhairawa. Zahir was told that this was to facilitate his communication with a point person. From there, he was made to travel to Lumbini near the border,” the officer said.
Zahir’s family also told the press in Pakistan that he was likely picked by an “enemy spy” agency. A PTI report from Islamabad Monday said Zahir’s son Saad lodged an FIR with Rawat police station near Rawalpindi, saying his father was received in Nepal by one Javed Ansari who took him to Lumbini.
“We suspect that my father has been abducted and enemy spy agencies might be responsible for it,” a police officer quoted Saad as saying. “Enemy” word is often used for India in Pakistani security circles. Zahir last contacted his family on Thursday afternoon and since then his phone numbers have not been reachable

Job well done by our agencies



don't believe too many stories in the Indian presstitute media. All it needs for a story like this in the IE is administration of a little bit of vitamin M in the right mouth.

this is the Indian express, after all. It's usually full of lies and anti govt innuendo.

this article is not too flattering either or even factual, for that matter. The false name in the Indian passport is meaningless and misleading.

The german ambassador to pakiland as well as the irianians have said that the taliban kidnapped jhadav and sold him to the pakis.

looks more like some local taliban talent spotted a business opportunity and took the initiative to cash in.

Our "great friends" the iranians seem to be keeping very quiet for something that went down in their territory. Would they keep as quiet if some iranian was picked up in dilli and sold off like a bag of potatoes??

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby ramana » 12 Apr 2017 10:15

Chetak, Why does our press have to write all that stuff? And retired officers speak. All the while Mr. Yadav is in Pak custody.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby Marten » 12 Apr 2017 10:32

sum wrote:^^ The guy was IT chief at GHQ and ISI station chief at Sukkur during 26/11 timeframe ( according to DFI, this was the station that the 26/11 attackers were always in touch with, esp a Col posted there).

So he definitely isnt a small fish and no wonder, TSP-ains have immediately decided to put the noose on Shri Kulbhushan. Just hope they dont do their usual Pakiness on the poor guy at this current moment.

This is the critical bit of information that caused Pakis to work a noose around Jadhav. There might be no question on both sides about whether Jadhav is a field operative or not. Fact is that he was picked up and sentenced. I'm sure there have been others who were not paraded on TV, but simply summarily executed. More likely the Iranians sold our man out and the Bakis got lucky.

suryag, there is no question of spilling beans etc. All handlers etc. would have moved back long ago. Under duress, one must expect that Jadhav has indeed spilled whatever he was privy to. That is the basic reason that info is always on a need to know basis.

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Re: Intelligence and National Security Discussion

Postby chetak » 12 Apr 2017 10:48

ramana wrote:Chetak, Why does our press have to write all that stuff? And retired officers speak. All the while Mr. Yadav is in Pak custody.


There is a handsome payment involved per appearance. Plus 15 minutes of fame and peer group recognition of ill informed neighbours and hangers on who do not see the damage done to our interests.

in the area where I live, there are two-three TV OB vans visiting on a daily basis. there are at least three jokers that I am personally aware of who make a pretty penny out of this racket.

On days of crises, the numbers of OB vans increase. some jokers make upwards of 45-60 thou per night while the crises last.


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