INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[Philip]

Moral of the story.Never try to reinvent/rebuild a mothballed missile cruiser/hybrid flat top meant to operate VSTOL aircraft into a conventional carrier.It is better building a new one from scratch. Nevertheless,what has been achieved and even at the extra price is a bl**dy good ship.Congratulations to both Russian and Indian sides who persevered despite the numerous problems experienced.We are all wiser from the experience. It isn't as if all our naval projects are going smoothly.Look at the Scorpene fiasco for example or the LS SAM JV with Israel.We have to persevere,remain focussed and achieve results eventually.

We have to put matters into proper perspective and chronology.Until the '71 war,the IN was looked upon as a curiosity by the GOI of the day.It was the efforts of Lord Mountbatten whose affection for the country and IN ,and supported the vision of the IN's early leadership that saw us get the Vikrant and a fleet air arm.For decades the IAF tried its best to scuttle the IN's air capability,insisting that shore based aircraft could do the business and that the IN needed no carriers.There as such a tussle about who controlled and operated the LRMP aircraft too. '71 was a watershed in the history of the IN.The spectacular raids on Karachi,sinking of the Ghazi and the manner in which the Vikrant and its venerable air wing of Seahawks took over the air campaign in E.Pak,allowing the IAF to move its fighters to the western front after air superiority was achieved and the PAF put to sleep in the east,was a revelation for our strategic planners.The IN then took its first tentative steps in indigenous warship construction with the Leander class and never looked back from that day onwards.I remember a media pic of the Shah of Iran looking approvingly at a model of INS Nilgiri when on a visit.The "G" class design,based upon the Leander design, took the world by surprise and admiration,for the first time two heavy ASW Sea Kings aboard a frigate of such size,a much larger vessel with the same powerplant.Mrs.G. then began the indigenous sub building programme,revitalised the Vikrant with Sea Harriers,and Rajiv G. went a step further in the acquisition of the Hermes/Viraat plus more Sea Harriers.The vital importance of the IN to control the IOR and its maritime trade was finally realised by our planners.NIxon and Kissinger's asinine move to send the nuclear powered USS Enterprise to threaten us in '71 helped jolt our land-obsessed defence experts into harsh reality.

With the Vikrant's retirement and the expected retirement of the Viraat by 2000,the plans for a new carrier was formulated,called the ADS (air defence ship) to stave off the strong opposition of the IAF still alive and kicking despite the experience of the Vikrant in '71.The ADS too when first envisaged was smaller in size,but thankfully scaled up later on.The "lost decade" of the '90s saw the IN's fortunes once again plummet and a crisis was around the corner.Britain had no more old carriers for sale at bargain prices.There were no other suitable western carriers available too.The IN then had no alternative but to look to Russia and examine the ex-Soviet carriers which were fairly new or unfinished.I once asked an admiral who was involved in the evaluation of the Soviet carriers and his CNS why the Varyag wasn't selected instead of the Gorshkov.The reasons were the state of the Varyag's hull,requiring more work to be done,plus being a larger carrier it would also cost a lot more for refurbishment than the Gorshkov.At that time the IN had precious little funds.As we well know,the decision to buy the carrier took several years during which time the ship's condition deteriorated further.It was also built in the Ukraine,now no longer part of the USSR and amazingly, drawings were not available when the enormity of the rewiring and piping became clear.Both sides,Russia and India underestimated the enormity of the task and extra costs involved.Had we not insisted on a new cladding for the boilers,the ship would've arrived a year ago.It has been a lengthy learning experience,but which should stand us in good stead as we build our own future carriers.At today's carrier costs,the price of the vessel is still a bargain.It would cost twice as much if built in a western yard.We can also compare the Vikram's cost with that of our IAC-1 under construction.Coupled with the new carrier's invaluable assets is that of the MIG-29K fighter,the navalised version of the MIG-29.It is such a bargain at around $30-35M.With 45+ being acquired for both carriers,it is a real bonus in terms of capability and cost.

It is understandable if some of the Russians appeared too busy to enlighten the queries of our sailors.Remember that Putin had issued a severe diktat to the yard to deliver the ship asap due to the delays and angst from our side.The cladding problem was unexpected (we had asked for non-asbestos firebricks) and the last straw.Thankfully everyone persevered and swung into action.We now have a great asset and must exploit it to the utmost. For a year a team of Russians will be with the ship to help train the crew and iron out any teething problems.Let's now wish the ship and crew a safe passage home to Karwar and decades of happy hunting on the high seas!

PS:The next task for the IN's carrier development is to devise an AEW asset heo,,improvement on the KA-31 AEW that can take off from a STOBAR carrier.The RN has devised a new AEW helo based upon the Merlin.There are options which require thinking outside the box.

[Austin]

Pictures on INS Vikramaditya

http://i-korotchenko.livejournal.com/779333.html


OT : What is the black thing Indian Sailors and even DM is wearing that cover their ears but dont see the Russian around there wearing it ?

[Vivek K]

That is just an ear muff to protect one's ears from the cold.

[Cosmo_R]

. The USA's carriers cost more than 7 Billion+ each, almost 3 times the Cost India paid Russia for a more than 90% New Aircraft Carrier which is a bargain. Am not sure how much INS Vikrant 92013) or the Vikrant Class carriers will cost since they are yet to become Operational / hit the Water running.

Nimitz class CVN are 3x the size of the Vik, they are nuke powered and have ?x the endurance of conventional carriers. They have CATOBAR allowing Hawkeyes, and SHs AND they were 100% NEW.

Buying a used car and renovating it is always a losing proposition versus buying a new one. The IAC 1 and 2 are the way to go.

The Russians still see us as little brown people who turn screwdrivers and worse as buyers with no choice. Any doubts? see the previous pages on how the Russkies refused to include the Indians on the Vik's trials.

The Russkies have gotten a free pass too long on BRF. Wait till you see what they do to us on the FGFA/FAK/UP (sic)

[member_25400]

. The USA's carriers cost more than 7 Billion+ each

The new Ford class supercarrier costs $13 billion (probably closer to $15 billion when all is done) not including $4.7 billion in R&D or the air complement, cost of task force etc. It is a completely different category of ship altogether (45000 ton conventional STOBAR vs 115000 ton CATOBAR nuclear)

The USS Wasp class/America class amphibious assault ship (STOVL carrier) is closer in size to Vikramaditya (~45000 tonnes). The US is able to buy a series of such light carriers and thereby achieve economies of scale (USS America https://en.wikipedia.org/wi ... ca_(LHA-6) $3.4 billion unit cost plus R&D costs of $6.7 billion.With 6-7 F-35 B and Osprey and amphibious assault roles, it is very different from Vikramaditya, but at least comparable in cost and capabilities)

I would argue that the British QE class aircraft carrier (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Queen_Eli ... ft_carrier) (marginally a conventional CATOBAR supercarrier at 70,000 tons, but relying on US systems such as EMALS/F-35) and programme cost of GBP 6.2 billion for two, (after much mismanagement and rise from GBP 3.9 bn) is a much better deal and closer to IAC-2 "should be" vision.

If Indian procurement were agile (ha!), they could have discussed with britain on the purchase of the British 2nd carrier or the construction of a 3rd. Nevertheless, I agree there were also reasons for not doing so (years later, high dependency on america, committed funds elsewhere), though not so many reasons for failing to close on a deal for the former baku closer to 1994 than 2000+.

[sourab_c]

^ Let's not forget that our purchases are based on our naval war doctrines which are quite different from that of the United States. We have a floating airstrip that is able to launch 20 Mig29ks in the middle of the ocean, that means something!

Also, it is easy to build $15 billion aircraft carriers when you can just print your cash. I am extremely happy that INS Vikramaditya is finally coming home.

[member_23455]

Hmmm...if INAS 300 White Tigers fly from Vikramaditya, what will the Viraat carry?

[Singha]

I think viraat will be carrying the sea harriers until retirement. IN has enough Mig29K to equip the Vik with some left over for land based training in goa. the sea harriers will also likely retire with the viraat.

viraat could have been used a ASW oriented sea control ship with perhaps 10 ASW helis + 3 KA31AEW but the lack of the new medium ASW helo deal means that is not possible.

we really need to get cracking on a couple of LPH ships..not so worried about amphib assault but LPHs are good to have for the ample H.

[Pratyush]

Reading the report on Indians having 'queries' every six months explains much.

They basically were using the Gorshkov refit to formulate the design and execution of IAC-1.

If the above is even remotely true. Then, this is 2.3 Billion $ in tuition fees. The ROI will give IN 2 ships that are unique and have no commonality, amongst them. Increasing the training cost and spares cost.

Unless a second ship of the Vikrant class is ordered.

[member_23455]

Questions the DDM needs to ask/Navy needs to brief wrt Vikramaditya:

1. What are the planned aircraft inventories for a standard patrol cycle as well as wartime deployment?

2. Are we just going to keep mouthing CBG as a buzzword or assign a numbered CBG to each of the carrier groups and create a formal slot for a CBG commander? To the best of my knowledge its all ad-hoc currently.

3. Will the Navy explore forward deployment of a Mig 29K detachment out of Andamans permanently? It will rub the IAF the wrong way but its been disappointing that Andamans did not merit the basing of even a single Su-30MKI squadron.

[Lalmohan]

^^^ don't Su30's operate out of car nicobar?

[Singha]

not permanently. jaguars and su30s operate there in small units for certain times but no fixed base.

[member_23455]

They have and can operate out of Car Nicobar, and there were plans to upgrade two more airstrips for all weather and fighter operation. Still not the same thing as having a squadron based permanently out of the islands.

If one accepts the premise that Vikramaditya will spend most of its time tooling around the Malacca/South China Sea region, then 6-8 Mig 29Ks "surging" out of Andamans is a very good card to have up your sleeve.

[Lalmohan]

definitely

i'd go further to say that the primary air defence of the soutern littoral should be the navy's responsibility

[Aditya G]

definitely

i'd go further to say that the primary air defence of the soutern littoral should be the navy's responsibility

Responsibility to guard India's airspace should remain with the IAF alone. It has the requisite numbers, infrastructure and attitude for same.

IN Air Arm should be focussed on fleet air protection and Anti-Ship roles. Shore based target attack should also be a second priority ideally taken care by DDGs via Nirbhay and Brahmos. The naval fighter component is too scarce a resource to waste on policing.

Question - how will IN/IAF counter other aircraft carriers? Say the Liaoning? I guess both navies will not risk throwing their prized carriers at each other ..

[chetak]

definitely

i'd go further to say that the primary air defence of the soutern littoral should be the navy's responsibility

Responsibility to guard India's airspace should remain with the IAF alone. It has the requisite numbers, infrastructure and attitude for same.

IN Air Arm should be focussed on fleet air protection and Anti-Ship roles. Shore based target attack should also be a second priority ideally taken care by DDGs via Nirbhay and Brahmos. The naval fighter component is too scarce a resource to waste on policing.

Question - how will IN/IAF counter other aircraft carriers? Say the Liaoning? I guess both navies will not risk throwing their prized carriers at each other ..

This issue has been settled a longtime ago at the government level.

The IN has exclusive control over MR and SAR (along with the ICG which also handles EEZ protection and anti smuggling roles for the DRI)

India's airspace defence is land based. Anything over water is the Navy's and ICGs domain.

There is a sqdn of maritime Jaguars of the IAF whose role is very limited.

[member_23455]

definitely

i'd go further to say that the primary air defence of the soutern littoral should be the navy's responsibility

Responsibility to guard India's airspace should remain with the IAF alone. It has the requisite numbers, infrastructure and attitude for same.

What is India's airspace? If you buy into the "2.5 acres of floating sovereign territory blah blah..." then the fundamental underpinnings of such doctrine require setting aside previous constructs. If you don't buy into it, fair enough, but guess what doctrinally, equipment-wise, and geo-strategically all the chips are stacked in favor of the Navy.

Don't want to convert this into an air force bashing thread but the IAF will lose both its 'ideological' battles with the army and navy in the years to come, because it is living in the past.

Question - how will IN/IAF counter other aircraft carriers? Say the Liaoning? I guess both navies will not risk throwing their prized carriers at each other ..

This really is the fascinating warfighting and doctrinal question...and something our DDM (including Shukla-level analysts) do not have the gumption to probe and the Navy strangely, normally it is the most "open" of the three services, has also seemed very quiet about.

Wrt the Lioaning and the CBG the Chinese build around it, the ball is actually in China's court. Their submarines took a long time to come out and play because the experience of their crews was highly limited. Carrier operations are even more complex, CBG even more so. Even the Indians with their huge head start have a lot to do on this front.

The last time two near-peer navies threw their prized carriers at each other, the results were decisive at Midway. Avoiding risk is a very self-defeating concept in warfare...

[Philip]

What has happened to the IN's naval air station Baaz at great Nic? This is on of the remotest outposts of the nation.It cannot operate as a full-fledged mainland base with all the maintenance and support facilities,but has great potential as a forward base for MRP aircraft,etc. as of now and naval strike aircraft in the future.The runway has to be lengthened beyond 3500ft if the IN is to operate MIG-29Ks and heavylift aircraft from it.

http://indiannavy.nic.in/press-release/ ... oned-cns-0

The Naval Air Station at Campbell Bay on Great Nicobar Island, was commissioned as Indian Naval Ship ‘Baaz’ on 31 Jul 12 by Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of the Naval Staff. INS Baaz is situated at a distance of about 300 nautical miles from Port Blair and is the southernmost Air Station of the Indian Armed Forces.

Speaking on the occasion, Admiral Nirmal Verma said that “the archipelago, separated as it is by more than 650 nm from our mainland, offers a vital geo-strategic advantage to India. Not only do they provide the Nation with a commanding presence in the Bay of Bengal, the Islands also serve as our window into East and South East Asia”. He added that “They also sit astride some of the busiest shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean, most carrying strategic cargo for East Asian economies”.

Bringing out that the Navy has been progressively increasing the number of warships based in the Andaman and Nicobar Command, Admiral Nirmal Verma said Port Blair will be home to amphibious platforms, Naval Offshore Patrol Vessels and Fast Attack Craft as the Navy’s robust acquisition plans progress”. Emphasizing upon the strategic location of INS Baaz, Admiral Verma reminded those gathered that INS Baaz, overlooks the Strait of Malacca, while also dominating the 6 degree channel”.

INS Baaz is currently equipped to operate light to heavy aircraft capable of short field operations from the runway of about 3500 feet. The runway will be progressively lengthened to enable unrestricted operation of all category of aircraft including heavy aircraft. The base will also be bolstered with modern airfield instruments and navigation aids.

Admiral Nirmal Verma reviews Guard of Honour on arrival at INS Baaz Admiral Nirmal Verma addressing dignitaries after commissioning of INS Baaz

Congratulating the Commanding Officer, Commander SK Singh Deo, Admiral Verma acknowledged the contribution of the men in resolutely manning the remote island territories. Admiral Verma said “the work undertaken by each one of you, allows optimum exploitation of this strategic air station”. Talking about its Admiral Verma said “One of the primary functions of INS Baaz will be to provide information, based on ‘airborne’ maritime surveillance”. Admiral Verma added that airborne surveillance using aircraft and UAVs remains invaluable to building Maritime Domain Awareness.

The commissioning ceremony was attended by Lt Gen Naresh Marwah, (CINCAN) Commander-in-Chief Andaman and Nicobar Command and Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, (CISC) Chief of Integrated Defense Staff to Chairman Chief of Staff Committee.

It may be recalled that the Government of India had recently sanctioned numerous steps to fortify infrastructure in the strategically located Andaman and Nicobar chain of Islands with forward operating bases in Kamorta (Nicobar Islands) and Diglipur (Andaman) as well.

Pivoted around the Andaman and Nicobar Command, headquartered at Port Blair, co-operative maritime engagement with South East Asian and East Asian countries is also being constantly enhanced through initiatives like the MILAN series of exercises, co-operative patrols with countries like Indonesia and Thailand and other Navy-to-Navy linkages with ASEAN countries as distant as Vietnam.

Now,as to the actual capabilities of Chinese subs and its new SSBNs,here is a report.

China's Ballistic-Missile Submarines: How Dangerous?
Christian Conroy
November 18, 2013

On October 27, China’s state-run Xinhua news agency released a slideshow showing what the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) touted as the country’s first nuclear ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN). Though the “unveiling” of China’s Type 092 Xia-class SSBN comes as no surprise, Beijing’s open display of the submarine, coupled with technical improvements to the Chinese JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), raises the question of whether China is approaching a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.

Although the Xia-class SSBN received much fanfare in both Chinese and Western sources alike, the PLAN envisions the Type 094 Jin-class submarine as playing the primary role in China’s sea-based nuclear-deterrence strategy. Even Xinhua has admitted that the Xia-class SSBN does not comprise a viable nuclear second-strike force. According to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, China maintains three operational Jin-class SSBNs and is currently constructing two more, all five of which will be outfitted with twelve JL-2 SLBMs. According to U.S. defense officials, the Jin-class SSBN is expected to begin sea patrols as early as 2014.

For China to acquire a credible survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent, the country must overcome two technical challenges that the country has been unable to surmount since first launching an SLBM from a submarine in 1988. China must build a submarine stealthy enough to avoid U.S. antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assets and design a JL-2 SLBM capable of penetrating US ballistic missile defense (BMD) with high probability.

Both the Xia-class and Jin-class SSBNs are not quiet enough to avoid detection by U.S. ASW assets. The Jin-class SSBN design if fundamentally flawed in that the large missile compartment at the rear of the vessel and the flood openings below the missile hatches create a detectable sonar signature. A 2009 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence report comparing the low-frequency noise level for China’s SSBN force to that of Russian 1970s-era SSBNs found that out of the twelve submarines profiled, the Xia-class SSBN was the most detectable and the Jin-class SSBN the fourth-most detectable. China’s JL-2 SLBM has repeatedly failed launch tests and it is still unclear whether the PLAN successfully tested the SLBM on August 16, as it claimed.

Even if China acquires the technical capacity necessary for a survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent, the highly centralized PLA has no operational experience in maintaining deterrence patrols on the open seas. China has traditionally relied exclusively on its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for deterrence and thus has never confronted the existential question of whether to predelegate SLBM launch authority to submarine commanders in case of crisis.

China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) has traditionally delegated comprehensive nuclear-arsenal command and control authority to the Second Artillery Corps, and it is unlikely that the CMC will undergo the structural transformation necessary to devolve launch authority to PLAN commanders. China’s inexperience in maintaining secure communications between SSBNs and land-based command means that a U.S. decapitation strike on command and control systems could potentially render a Chinese sea-based nuclear deterrent ineffective.

Even if technical improvements are made to the Jin-class SSBN that allow the vessel to allude sophisticated ASW capabilities, the U.S. BMD system will likely be able to engage most JL-2 SLBMs capable of reaching the continental United States from the Jin-class SSBN’s assumed launch points on the Bohai Gulf and South China Sea. Once a Jin-class SSBN launches a JL-2 SLBM, Aegis radars deployed near China’s coastal waters will immediately detect the missile launch, triggering the launch of SM-3 interceptors five seconds thereafter. In addition to already deploying additional SM-3 interceptors off the U.S. coast and ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in California and Alaska, the Pentagon is expected in 2018 to deploy the next-generation SM-3 Block IIA system the can engage all Chinese JL-2 SLBMS capable of reaching the continental U.S.

While neither the Xia-class nor the Jin-class submarines give China a survivable, credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, it is undeniable that the US will eventually have to respond to a China that possesses two legs of the nuclear triad. The PLA is experimenting with deploying more SLBMs bearing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) aboard stealthier SSBNs. Several Chinese sources have claimed that the JL-2 SLBM is capable of carrying between three to nine warheads. Given that the JL-2 SLBM has a 7,200 km range, a JL-2 SLBM carrying multiple warheads launched from the coastal waters near Hainan could potentially evade U.S. defenses. A 2010 U.S. Department of Defense report on Chinese military capabilities noted that China is currently developing a Type 096 Zhou-class SSBN capable of deploying sixteen newer generation SLBMs.

When China reaches the technical and operational capacity for a survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent, Washington will be forced to decide whether or not to accept mutual nuclear vulnerability with China. However, by continuing to publicly deny a sea-based nuclear second-strike capability for China, irrespective of reality, Washington avoids the tough dialogue that would have to take place to reassure allies in the Asia Pacific. Given that the “pivot to Asia” thus far amounted to nothing more than rhetoric, and regional allies like Japan are already becoming constitutionally more offense-oriented, public acceptance of U.S. mutual nuclear vulnerability with China is unlikely to assuage the security concerns of regional allies like Japan, South Korea or the Philippines. Accepting a China with a survivable sea-based nuclear deterrent may require the U.S. to redefine the perceptions of extended deterrence and its nuclear umbrella in the Asia Pacific.

Washington policymakers may temporarily delay the day of reckoning by accepting mutual vulnerability with China in a classified military-postural sense. However, Washington will eventually have to craft nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture to account for mutual nuclear vulnerability with China in the Asia Pacific. The question is whether the U.S. will respond to the prospect of mutual nuclear vulnerability with denial, by uniformly investing in retaliatory naval capabilities, or with acceptance, by reexamining what extended deterrence means in the Asia Pacific.

Christian Conroy is a Washington-based researcher that writes on issues of nuclear weapons and East Asian regional security.

[kmc_chacko]

we could have brought one of unfinished AC from Royal Navy

[pragnya]

not permanently. jaguars and su30s operate there in small units for certain times but no fixed base.

even though the ANC recommended basing SU 30MKIs at car nicobar it was decided later by the Tri-services command to base them in Kalaikunda instead with Tsunami as the major factor in the decision.

[member_23455]

The runway has to be lengthened beyond 3500ft if the IN is to operate MIG-29Ks and heavylift aircraft from it.

...No.

If in this day and age when n-reactors are being operated by India in Tsunami-vulnerable zones, an air base cannot be made resistant to such once in a lifetime events, and we'd rather operate miles away from Thanjavur and Kalaikunda, it just boggles the mind.

[sum]

From Livefist:

Got my hands on a series of photographs of an incident last year that both the Indian Navy and Russian Navy have kept under wraps until now: a NATO P-3 Orion that flew in to snoop on the Vikramaditya as it conducted trials in the Barents Sea. It wasn't just any reconnaissance mission -- the aircraft dropped sensor buoys to snoop. Russians on board summoned a MiG-29K from shore to chase away the intruding P-3, after which a the incident was raised diplomatically. But all very hush hush.

Lots of pics at:
INS Vikramaditya was spied upon by NATO aircraft and ship last year but the matter was hushed up

NATO P-3C Orion aircraft hovering over INS Vikramaditya

A NATO ship from Norway snooping on the Vikramaditya.

[Avinandan]

Very disturbing news indeed !! So gurus, what could be the implications ?

[member_23455]

And then there is the inevitable sub surface snooping. The propeller count/acoustic signature would be part of sonar databases across the US Navy by now. Par for the course.

[Singha]

routine work. yawn.

[member_23455]

Very disturbing news indeed !! So gurus, what could be the implications ?

After the NSA snooping on its own citizens, Merkel etc. the only people who would big this up are DDM soaked in the Sansani school of journalism.

We do the same to the US, if it helps.

[Aditya G]

... guess what doctrinally, equipment-wise, and geo-strategically all the chips are stacked in favor of the Navy...

What equipment does the Navy have today or near future to protect the southern litorals from air attack?

The air arm today is a small and advanced fighting force, but a large component is focused on carrier deployment and training for same. Based on known plans at best we are going to add 2-3 squadrons of NLCA. AFAIK Navy does not operate any SAM systems or long range radars ashore. So they cannot independently secure their own bases unless they station a ship with suitable sensors and weaponry in the harbour.

Even if we consider only super-30 and Jaguar-IM squadrons, it is a much bigger force and backed up by IL-78 and A-50 force multipliers. Not to forget the wide network of radars and sensors spread around near-coast bases and landmass. From KKD and Pune we control a large swathe of sea thanks to these assets.

At best I see Naval air arm to be able to:

1. Attack invading force by coastal missile systems
2. Maintain CAP around major naval base like Karwar at ~500Km radius
3. Attack invading surface force from air at long (P-8I etc) or medium (MiG-29K) ranges
4. Maintain protective bubble of sanitized airspace around own fleet @ ~500 Kms

Expecting them to defend the air space or a large region such as A&N (forget peninsular India) is needlessly stretching the force.

[member_20292]

The hms invincible and its 14 sea Harriers accounted for 40 Argentine fighter planes in the Falklands.

That's what I expect of our carriers also.

[member_23455]

... guess what doctrinally, equipment-wise, and geo-strategically all the chips are stacked in favor of the Navy...

What equipment does the Navy have today or near future to protect the southern litorals from air attack?

Navy's responsibility does not mean only navy assets will be used, hence the angst about Su 30MKIs not being deployed in Andamans.To me it means navy-centric. If good sense prevails and ANC becomes a Navy-led command permanently then it can plan and deploy the kind of resources that would make it on par with the IAF in that theater.

There is also a "shooter" fixation in viewing the IAF through rose tinted glasses. Look at it from a "sensor/ISR" perspective and the Navy has not only better assets (remember Dornier IW in Kargil), it trains more intensively for the role, and it understands the maritime domain in a way no IAF "maritime patch wearer" can. The Phalcons are C4 assets, good for running a fight not for finding the enemy.

(Minor trivia OT..In Black Hawk Down, OIF, OEF dedicated "land" ISR was predominantly provided by USN P3C Orions)

With the Vikramaditya, the Mig29Ks (much better than SHARs), and the Ka-31s you are also logistically better placed for a showdown. Do some logistics-related math for tanker support from KKD or Thanjavur - while not as bad as the much hyped Black Buck missions in the Falkands War (another interesting Air Force vs Navy comparison where the former does not come away with too much credit) - and the IAF's stretching of resources will become apparent.

.

At best I see Naval air arm to be able to:

1. Attack invading force by coastal missile systems
2. Maintain CAP around major naval base like Karwar at ~500Km radius
3. Attack invading surface force from air at long (P-8I etc) or medium (MiG-29K) ranges
4. Maintain protective bubble of sanitized airspace around own fleet @ ~500 Kms

Expecting them to defend the air space or a large region such as A&N (forget peninsular India) is needlessly stretching the force.

You are going to have a heart attack then when in 8-10 years Indian CBGs are going to be exercising blue-water non-permissive ops in the South China Sea. Hopefully, with Su 30MKIs staging out of Cam Ranh Bay

If the conversation hasn't become too Tom Clancy-ish for you do check out a book called Red Storm Rising or Larry Bond's Harpoon naval simulation and check out how the Atlantic Naval Battle with the Soviets hinged on the US CBGs acting in close concert with Keflavik-based USAF F15Cs+P3Cs Orions and Scotland-based Tornado+Nimrod assets.

We are not going to be cloning those scenarios but the principle and logistics of warfare do not change.

The hms invincible and its 14 sea Harriers accounted for 40 Argentine fighter planes in the Falklands.

That's what I expect of our carriers also.

Umm...there was the Viraat too in its Hermes avatar. But this is an excellent example of the use of carriers in an offensive, expeditionary, and "risky" battle.

[tushar_m]

The hms invincible and its 14 sea Harriers accounted for 40 Argentine fighter planes in the Falklands.

That's what I expect of our carriers also.

Actually Falkland was embarrassment for mighty royal navy where they suffedr major losses

we know the name "exocet" because of that war.

see this video , its worth every minute

Discovery Channel Sea Wings: The Falkland Surprise

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dHsYhuXeZw

[Hitesh]

If Russia or any other adversary would try to do that with US carriers, they would have been shot down. US hypocrisy is mind boggling.

[Karan M]

There is also a "shooter" fixation in viewing the IAF through rose tinted glasses. Look at it from a "sensor/ISR" perspective and the Navy has not only better assets (remember Dornier IW in Kargil),

Wouldn't be too sure about that. Times are a changing. Even the IAF has a handful of aircraft kitted out for such roles and had the edge on the Navy in terms of ECM even then (Dorniers had a combination of ESM & active radar). Given how sensitive the topic is, I don't expect many big "reveals" from the IAF - but suffice to say, they have been picking up much of the same stuff that the IN has access to, since a lot comes from the same sources.

The Phalcons are C4 assets, good for running a fight not for finding the enemy.

This is completely incorrect. The Phalcons pack a lot of ESM gear as well. The local AEW&C committed for, also include both COMINT & SIGINT stuff which is yet to be confirmed for any naval aircraft.

[Karan M]

The hms invincible and its 14 sea Harriers accounted for 40 Argentine fighter planes in the Falklands.

That's what I expect of our carriers also.

With the Argentines fighting at the limits of their range and barely able to defend themselves. Falklands kill ratios were an outlier.

[srin]

This is where a "theatre" command helps, where a commander has all assets that matter in a particular theatre.

If you want to control the Bay of Bengal and - in event of conflict - bottle up the Malacca straits, you need the subs, you need the Mig-29Ks and you need Sukhois from Andaman and from the main landmass, launching Sukhois.

[member_23364]

Snooping on Aircraft carriers/Navy ships is pretty common, everyone does it. I would not be surprised if we discover that a couple of subs were following it during its trials. Or the fact that Paki submarines would try to snoop on Vikramaditya on its way back/when it goes out to sea.

And Hitesh-Russian Tu-142 Bears have made a career out of snooping/circling around USN carriers, not for a round or two but for hours. You cannot do anything in International waters.

[Hitesh]

Guru,

But the USN mandates and enforces a no fly zone around their carriers. They will shoot down anything that is not friendly that comes close to their carrier, peacetime or not.

[Singha]

in theory & hollywood yes, in practice no when dealing with a non-jihadi type known intruder esp russian. case in point a lumbering Tu95 flew 600m height over the deck of the nimitz in 2008
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/02/11/russian.bomber/
there was another incident where I think a pair of fighters did this in the far east and the only thing that was already on deck was a C2 supply plane which was launched. the pilots had some fun climbing all over his 6'o'clock and then left.

few interesting pics here incl a IL38 flying low over a supercarrier and a B52(!) over a kiev class
http://img74.imageshack.us/img74/9207/m ... 56bno5.jpg
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2639137/posts

there seems to be some unspoken or track2 'rules' to this game and some dos and donts both parties are aware of. so long as these rules are followed the game goes on, because the costs are too high otherwise.

[vinod]

I'm not surprised by this, but what surprises me why russians didn't see them coming and didn't take any action. Atleast the Norweign boat could have been harrassed.

[Singha]

the Vik was probably with no other escort barring a tugboat. the barents sea is supposed to be their 'bastion' so probably the radar operators were sleeping or they just dont care as its not their ship to sail anymore.

[Pranay]

Guru,

But the USN mandates and enforces a no fly zone around their carriers. They will shoot down anything that is not friendly that comes close to their carrier, peacetime or not.

Where ever did you get such ideas?? Pray tell!!

Having served in the USN - on an Aircraft Carrier - have seen many Bear's and Badger's doing close in recon.... fyi.