INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[NRao]

Now I know where China got that welcoming idea from.

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While I have some time, this is what I have been able to gather:

Vicky: 24 fixed wing (MiG-29K) (start with 16)
Vikrant: 20 fixed wing (12 MiG-29K and 8 N-LCA)
Vishal: 29 fixed wing (IF they go CATOBAR, then F-18, Rafale or F-35C. Cannot accept either MiG-29K nor N-LCA, neither can use the CAT) (EMALS should mean all US based air crafts I would imagine)

So....... MiG-29K (45 ordered, 36 will be on flight deck), N-LCA (8) and (more than likely F-35C (29) is what the IN will have in 2025ish.

Scary part (IMHO) is a total of 73 air crafts, with a min 44 and max of 53 deployed at any given time.

BTW, Russia offered a "joint development" for the IAC-II (in 2010) and just this year the US offered too (along with an offer for EMALS). Supposedly Italy provided some help - design guidance - on the IAC-I

[member_23455]

IAC-1 foreign design consulting as per credible reports is both from French DCNS and Italian Fincantieri (which nearly merged with the infamous Finmeccanica).

The typical aircraft loadout on Vikramditya will become clear with time - add on a minimum 50% extra aircraft strength for combat ops.

The INAS 300 business is confusing though. If those folks want to cross-train that's obvious but anything permanent in nature will be a major Whiskey-Tango-Foxtrot moment.

[merlin]

Vikad is supposed to be 24 Ks in air defence configuration or 30 Ks in strike configuration (with a corresponding reduction in embarked choppers).

A 65K ton AC will have at least 40 fixed wing.

All numbers peace time with 50% surge during war.

[Paul]

^^^If Vishal is CATOBAR, that means IN Aviation will deploy no less than 3 different types of fighter aircraft (MIG-29K/NLCA/Rafale? or F-35 or FGFA?.

How IN will work to resolve the logistical nightmare will be interesting to see.

[member_23455]

Vikad is supposed to be 24 Ks in air defence configuration or 30 Ks in strike configuration.

Hang on, this part is not clear. If the aircraft are by definition "swing-role" why does a weapons loadout change cause such a difference in numbers?

Real-world ops don't bear this out as well.

^^^If Vishal is CATOBAR, that means IN Aviation will deploy no less than 3 different types of fighter aircraft (MIG-29K/NLCA/Rafale? or F-35 or FGFA?.

How IN will work to resolve the logistical nightmare will be interesting to see.

The IN has operated at least two different airframes in CATOBAR ops with the Alize and Sea Hawk on the Vikrant, so that in itself is not a major issue.

The logistics challenges are going to be more due to:
1. Heavier/different aircraft like E-2Ds and/or carrier borne f/w ASW.
2. Significantly larger Airwing (which may create certain "political" issues as well but that's a separate discussion. )
3. Higher launch/recovery rates if we embrace US style carrier ops

[srin]

Vikad is supposed to be 24 Ks in air defence configuration or 30 Ks in strike configuration (with a corresponding reduction in embarked choppers).

A 65K ton AC will have at least 40 fixed wing.

All numbers peace time with 50% surge during war.

You are underestimating the chopper requirements. You need to have choppers for AEW, ASW, SAR ( 3 at the least, to have one flying all the time). That is about 10 choppers that are minimum required.

All that is going to eat up space for the Mig-29Ks. So, having 30 Ks is probably infeasible even in combat time

[merlin]

24 K with more choppers or 30 Ks with less choppers. Depends on the orientation of the mission. Air defence plus ASW needs lesser fixed wing airframes and more choppers. Strike needs more fixed wing.

Total airframe numbers remain the same.

[Singha]

our KA31AEW are based off the talwar class also.

[Pratyush]

We read that the ship will accomodate 16 or 24 or 30 aircraft. But my question is what is the maximum number of single type aircraft that it can carry. If the navy decides to load it with aircrafts. Will it be 40 of 50. Or just 30.

[member_23455]

24 K with more choppers or 30 Ks with less choppers. Depends on the orientation of the mission. Air defence plus ASW needs lesser fixed wing airframes and more choppers. Strike needs more fixed wing.

Total airframe numbers remain the same.

Ok, so you mean carrier mission, I was thinking aircraft mission.

You are underestimating the chopper requirements. You need to have choppers for AEW, ASW, SAR ( 3 at the least, to have one flying all the time). That is about 10 choppers that are minimum required.

All that is going to eat up space for the Mig-29Ks. So, having 30 Ks is probably infeasible even in combat time

Once there are some credible, hopefully observable baseline numbers after the carrier completes its workups, we'll have a much better idea -- The airframe numbers can change a lot based on "deck spot factor", addressed in a previous post on this thread.

And especially don't rule things out for wartime ops just yet.

[NRao]

Nowhere did I read about peace vs. War time.

So, from memory, max peace time:

Vicky: 30
Vibrant: do not recall, will assume 30 (will confirm in the am)
Vishal: 40

Some of them helos are sub hunters, iirc 2 per.

It is nice to have one CBG per coast - all those naval parades etc. But in war time I am wondering if two ships can share some helos.

[sankum]

INS Vikramaditya will carry max 24 mig 29k and 6 Helos in offensive role while normally it will carry 20 mig 29k and 8 helos of which 4 will be Ka31 aew and 4 ASW Ka28.

INS Vikrant will carry a maximum of 24 mig 29k/nlca and 12 Helos while normally it will carry 20 mig29k and 10 helos.

INS Vishal can be expected to carry 36 to 40 fighters and 4 aew EC2D/Ka31 plus 6 ASW Helos i.e, 46 to 50 aircraft.

[chetak]

Received by email

INS Vikramaditya: A Highly Questionable Symbol of Friendship
(Published in Defence and Security Alert Dec 2013)

Major General Mrinal Suman

A banner displayed prominently at the handing over ceremony of INS Vikramaditya (earlier called Admiral Gorshkov) in the Russian city of Severodvinsk on 16 November 2013 read – “Vikramaditya: Symbol of India-Russia Friendship”. Most knowledgeable observers must have marvelled at the acerbic sense of humour implied in the declaration and struggled to hide their sardonic expression.
Vikramaditya is anything but a symbol of friendship. Friends do not renege on contractual obligations, friends do not violate sovereign promises, friends do not mislead, friends do not cheat, friends do not exploit and friends do not arm-twist. In fact, Vikramaditya represents narcissistic attitude of the Russians and supine capitulation of the Indian government.
A short background will be in order here. India’s sole aircraft carrier INS Virat was due to retire in 2007 and the indigenous aircraft carrier was scheduled to be completed not before 2012. India was, therefore, on the lookout for an aircraft carrier to fill the gap.
Russia offered the 44,500 ton Admiral Gorshkov, a decommissioned hybrid carrier/cruiser lying in hibernation since 1995. It was to be a free gift from ‘one friend to another’. However, India was required to pay for its refurbishment. As an integral part of the package deal, India was to purchase 12 single-seat MiG-29K 'Fulcrum-D' and 4 dual-seat MiG-29KUB aircraft, 6 Kamov Ka-31 "Helix" helicopters and other equipment.
Originally laid as Baku in 1978, Admiral Gorshkov was launched in 1982 and commissioned in 1987. The ship has been dogged by misfortunes since its conception. To start with, major software bugs in the new command and control system delayed its completion. Thereafter, a boiler room explosion caused considerable damage in 1994.
Three different delegations of the Indian Navy had visited Russia to inspect the decommissioned ship in 1995, 1998 and 1999 respectively. They indicated that the material condition of the ship was deteriorating rapidly and the state of machinery/systems on board had worsened to that an extent that most required replacement/refit rather than repairs.
After nearly a decade of negotiations, the deal was finally signed on 20 Jan 04 and the effective date of the contract was established as 24 Feb 04. Refurbishment cost of the carrier was negotiated at $947 million. The refurbished carrier was contracted to be delivered to India within a period of 52 months, i.e. by August 2008.
Repair and Re-­equipping (R&R) work was to be carried out at the government owned Sevmash shipyard in the Russian city of Severodvinsk. The work started with due diligence. However, it was soon realised by the shipyard that the scope of work had been grossly under-estimated. Large portions of steel hull, entire length of cable, motors, turbines, boilers and other facilities had to be completely replaced or re-fabricated. For example, 1750 compartments out of a total of 2500 had to be re-fabricated/re-configured.
In November 2007, Russia shocked India by raising a demand of $2.9 billion for the ship, (three times the contracted cost) and sought deferment of delivery by additional 52 weeks. India was understandably dismayed but found itself in a tight corner with no leeway whatsoever. After months of bitter negotiations, both sides agreed to a revised price tag of $2.35 billion on 10 March 2009. New delivery date was shifted to end-2012.
Sea trials began in Russia’s White Sea in June 2012. However, they had to be called off prematurely in September 2012 due to multiple boiler failure – seven out of eight steam boilers of the propulsion machinery became out of order. Consequently, the delivery deadline had to be extended by another year.
It was no wonder that Defence Minister Antony heaved a sigh of relief on finally receiving delivery of INS Vikramaditya on 16 November. He was candid in admitting that the deal had nearly failed. The Naval Chief termed it as a result of exceptional perseverance.
The Russian Stratagem

The Russians deserve credit for managing the whole process in a highly ingenious and well thought-through manner. Enormity of their stratagem can best be illustrated by recalling major developments in a chronological order:-

a) After the break-up of the erstwhile Soviet Union, Russia found accident-ridden Admiral Gorshkov to be too expensive to be maintained. A decision was taken to do away with it in 1994-95. With no resources available for mothballing it scientifically, it remained uncared and derelict. As breaking up of a ship is a costly proposition, Admiral Gorshkov’s fate remained undecided.

b) It was at this opportune time that Russia became aware of India’s search for an aircraft carrier to bridge the expected gap during the period 2008-13. With a view to make the package irresistible, it cleverly sugar-coated the offer by making a free gift of the ship and charging only for R&R, thereby generating much needed work for its shipbuilding industry which was in deep recession. Notwithstanding the fact that the deal was linked to India’s procurement of MiG-29 aircraft, India found the offer to be too good to be declined.

c) Russia skilfully tailor-made its offer to suit India’s requirements. As a brand new aircraft carrier would have costed around $2.0 to 2.5 billion in early-2000, Russia agreed to charge only $947 million for complete R&R package, considerably less than the prevailing cost of a new carrier. Moreover, Russia promised to deliver it by August 2008, thereby meeting India’s requirements ideally. No wonder then that India accepted the offer enthusiastically.
d) Although Sevmash shipyard had neither built/repaired ships of this size nor possessed any work experience of working on aircraft carriers, R&R work was assigned to it. It was a subjective decision as Sevmash had little work at hand and needed orders urgently to avert bankruptcy. As pointed out by the Controller and Auditor General of India (CAG) in its Report 18 of 2008-09, the shipyard’s total revenue was $81 million in 2004 when it was loaded with the Indian contract worth $875 million. Worse, Sevmash enjoys poor reputation. It is notorious for reneging on contractual commitments. Norwegian firm Odfjell was forced to cancel a $544 million contract to build up to 12 tankers, allegedly for serious delays and demands for price increase.
e) Russia is claiming that it underestimated the total scope of work initially. It is hard to believe that Russia did not know the full scope of the work involved. For example, to claim that most of cable was expected to be usable in a ship with rotting hull segments is sheer baloney. Russia knew right from the beginning that both the cost and the time-schedule were totally unrealistic propositions. In any case, it had no intentions of abiding by them.
f) Once India had swallowed the bait, signed the deal and released part payments, Russia decided to spring a surprise. R&R work on the ship commenced on 09 Apr 04. Even if Russia had underestimated the work initially, it would have realised the actual scope of work by the year end. However, it cleverly chose to remain silent till November 2007. Just 10 months before the scheduled delivery date, it raised claims for additional cost and extension of delivery date. Perhaps, there is no other example of such unprincipled and deceitful breach of contractual commitments in international arms trade.
g) Absurdity of demand for additional price can be gauged from the fact that the cost of sea trials was increased from the contracted $27 million to $522.57 million, an escalation of close to twenty times. It is not understood as to what new unanticipated factors had crept in to justify such an astronomical increase. It shows dishonest and devious approach.
h) Russia had intentionally waited till end-2007 to be in a position to blackmail and arm-twist India. As India had become complacent after signing contract with Russia, it had not explored any alternate option to acquire an aircraft carrier in the required time-frame. With the scheduled retirement date of INS Virat drawing uncomfortably near, it became anxious to acquire INS Vikramaditya. Thus the timing was perfect for Russia to deliver the unexpected blow and exploit India’s desperation. It even threatened to cancel the contract.
i) While demanding that the deal be re-priced at an outrageous figure $2.9 billion, Russia shrewdly announced that it was willing to compensate India for the increased cost of Gorshkov if it got more military orders. It was blackmail at its worst, that too by a much proclaimed friend. India was finally coerced to shell out $2.35 billion for the carrier ship. Concurrently, in a linked deal, India had to place order for additional 29 aircraft MiG29K for close to $1.2 billion. It is difficult to estimate the quantum of cost of Vikramaditya that Russia has defrayed by hiking the outlay for aircraft and other equipment.
It is being claimed that since 1750 of 2500 compartments have been completely re-fabricated and a total of 234 new hull sections (using 2500 tonnes of steel) installed to achieve the desired shape, almost two third of the ship has been renovated. Russia is claiming that the ship will have a service life of 30-40 years instead of 20 years as estimated earlier. Indeed it is a laughable premise.
It is a common saying that a chain is as strong as its weakest link. Similarly, service life of Vikramaditya will not be determined by 234 new hull sections but by the state of 30-year old hull sections installed in 1978. It must also be remembered that the ship was lying unmaintained in a state of total neglect for 10 long years from 1994 to 2004.
Indian Ineptness and Capitulation
Whereas Russia handled the complete contract in a highly skilful manner, the same cannot be said for India. If India let Russia take it for a ride, the fault lies with the inept India procurement regime.
Despite repeated assertions that single vendor procurements should be avoided, India banked on Gorshkov alone. It failed to explore possibilities of ordering a brand new carrier or seeking a surplus carrier from a Western country. Resultantly, it rendered itself vulnerable to blackmail by Russia. May be India got taken in by repeated declarations of lasting friendship and the free gift. India forgot the basic dictum that ‘there are no free lunches’. Friendship means little in the world arms trade – commercial interests rule supreme.
The ship had been laid at Chernomorsky shipyard in Nikolayev (now in Ukraine), with equipment being supplied by various member countries of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, no design details and documents were available. One wonders as to how large scale design changes that are required to reconfigure a cruiser into a full-fledged aircraft carrier were realistically worked out. As is their wont, Russians were highly uncommunicative. India left major designing to Russia. Although India Navy has a highly competent ship designing bureau, India chose to sign the deal without full knowledge/analysis of the design changes to be incorporated.
As pointed out by the CAG, the contract was drafted in a highly amateurish and slipshod manner. For example, responsibility for paying insurance premium was not specified and Russia got an opportunity to demand $35.80 million for it. There was no provision to levy liquidity damages for delay at stages. For that matter, stage payments were not even linked to demonstrated physical outputs that take forward the achievement of the contractual objective. Most shocking is the fact that the contract did not include the final blueprint and design of the ship being paid for. Everything was left fluid. It was expected that the needed details would get evolved during the progress of work.

In May 2007, the then Naval Chief claimed that the ship would be delivered by late 2008 or early 2009. He went on to declare that the Indian monitoring team located at the shipyard had confirmed that the work was going on as per the schedule. Apparently, he was unaware of the fact that less than 35 percent of the work had been done by then. By August 2007, within a period of 4 months of the Naval Chief’s progress-on-schedule assertion, the work came to a complete halt at Sevmash. Russia wanted India to agree to revised cost and release additional payments.

In addition to three high level committees constituted to monitor the project, a Warship Overseeing Team (WOT) of 45 members was located at the shipyard for the entire duration of R&R work. One wonders as to what functions WOT performed. India came to know of the delay only when Russia presented the revised cost and delivery dates in October/November 2007.

Finally
Hopefully, INS Vikramaditya will perform and not become an embarrassment. It suffers from a number of major limitations. Whereas aircraft carriers of similar tonnage carry up to 40 fighter aircraft, Vikramaditya can carry only 16 fighters and 10 helicopters. Further, it will have to depend on its helicopters for airborne early warning functions with highly limited coverage and endurance. As it lacks catapult launch capability, AWACS aircraft like E-2D Hawkeye cannot operate from its deck. Most worrisomely, Vikramaditya does not possess required air defence capability at present.
As per the reports appearing in the press, Russia is blaming India for exploiting the situation when the Russian ship-building company was in a bad shape and facing closure – for that reason, it was ready to sign any kind of contract. It is a weird viewpoint. Instead of being grateful to India for saving Sevmash from imminent bankruptcy, Russia is alleging that India drove an unfair deal.
CAG has lamented that cooperation from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in taking forward the audit effort was less forthcoming than usual. MoD’s reluctance is understandable. It was a deal that should have never taken place. India erred at every stage and capitulated before the unethical seller. In CAG’s words – “The objective of induction of Vikramaditya as an aircraft carrier in time to bridge the gap in Indian Navy capabilities has been defeated. The decision to go in for R&R of a second hand ship has become questionable as a new aircraft carrier would have cost much less and would have had twice the life span”.

India should also be prepared for regular extortion by Russia. Its past track record inspires little confidence. As the Russians never share critical design details/drawings, India will need continuous Russian help to maintain the ship during its entire service life. Russia will certainly exploit such an immense leverage to extract unwarranted favours, both in terms of exorbitant financial gains and additional defence orders.

Hopefully, India has learnt due lessons from the deal and is much wiser now. India will do well to remember that even inter-government agreements between two sovereign nations carry little sanctity. The insincere will always find justification to renege on them.

[Philip]

This was posted a long time ago and the good landlubber general's points refuted.The carrier is with us now,there is no point in debating the issue of its acquisition any longer.At least the IN has a new carrier. Wheras the IAF and IA are in sh*t street with no new arty ,no Rafales,BAe puling out because of the arty paralysis,its manufacture of light howitzers shutting down,so one has to thak the dear Lord for small (in this case large) mercies!

What is relevant is that we should operate as far as poss. the same aircraft from IAC-2,that is if it arrives within 7 years,instead of operating too many types on conventional carriers. Amphibs are another matter.An upgraded version of the 29K with AESA and conformal radars,TVC,new weaponry,will keep it relevant for at least 3 decades.I saw a piece where the Russians hacve also found the 29K better for carrioer ops than the heavier SU-33s. The Chinese are now stuck with their reverse-engineered naval Flanker,and are scratching their heads,still looking for an alternative. This not as of the NLCA is going to touch down on the deck of an IN carrier for quie some time.There is a lot of work and tsting to be done.

Yesterday,at the launch of Maj,Gen.Cardoso's comic books on the PVC awardees,one met a true war hero,the CO of one our missile boats that struck Karachi and estroyed its oil tanks. The subject cropped up later with one of the analysts present,about the IN having the largest inventory of anti-ship missiles of any navy in he world and the absurdity of it.We still use Styx missiles on the K class corvettes,Urans,Klub-in 3 variants,(Sea Eagles were supposedly pensioned off) ,Brahmos,Dhanush,Exocet for the Scorpenes shortly, Harpoons on the P-8Is,Nirbhay in the works and K-15s which could also have conventional warheads.Keeiing stock of such a varied inventory will surely give the naval QMG nightmares! The IN's recent track record on safety and maintenance is anything but satisfactory,after the latest dockyard fire that has destroyed a minesweeper.

PS:If one has followed my posts,apart from 3 carriers we need 3-4 amphib flt tops and at least 6 10,000t+ surface vessels to be flat topped,so that they can operate STOVL aircraft and ASW/muti-role med. helos,plus attack helos.The carriers with their ski jumps already have their designated type operational.STOVL aircraft have their unique qualities,ease of launch and recovery and apart from our conventional carrier aircraft would be invaluable for the multi-role amphibs and the smaller flat tops.

[member_20067]

found this pic of IL-38 upgraded deploying Kh-35

[NRao]

Received by email

INS Vikramaditya: A Highly Questionable Symbol of Friendship
(Published in Defence and Security Alert Dec 2013)

That recent? This supports the comments made by a sailor, during the handover, that the Russians had made life rather miserable for the Indians.

Anyhow, time to move on, despite the fact that India got jibbed on this one.

The one comment I found very interesting is:

As a brand new aircraft carrier would have costed around $2.0 to 2.5 billion in early-2000

I still feel that India could have got a better ship - this one is a VW Golf frame converted to support a major SUV. Just not worth it. Anyhow.

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INS Vikramaditya will carry max 24 mig 29k and 6 Helos in offensive role while normally it will carry 20 mig 29k and 8 helos of which 4 will be Ka31 aew and 4 ASW Ka28.

INS Vikrant will carry a maximum of 24 mig 29k/nlca and 12 Helos while normally it will carry 20 mig29k and 10 helos.

INS Vishal can be expected to carry 36 to 40 fighters and 4 aew EC2D/Ka31 plus 6 ASW Helos i.e, 46 to 50 aircraft.

Interesting info about the Vishal. Is that with or without CAT, do you know?

The number I had provided were for a STOBAR, where the author had assumed MiG-29Ks (for the Vishal).

IF IN goes with CAT on the Vishal that will not fly - the Russians despite their offer to help design it, have no experience with CATs as far as I know and the MiG-29K will have to be redesigned (not again) for such an operation. No RoI there. And, I just do not see how IN could lean on a STOBAR for the Vishal. Will have to wait for a couple of months.

A CAT should also dash the hopes of the FGFA/NLCA too,

I would thin a "CAT" automatically means partnering with the US in some manner for the Vishal. EMALS would force the issue.

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Vishal seems to have a decent air wing (AW), the other two seem rather stunted. What will they be used for? are there any papers out there - have not found any so far. Do not know, but, seems to me that even the Virant is an expensive tech-demo, it just does not seem to suffice for a economic-political landscape 2030ish onwards. ?????

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On nuclear, it would/should be a political decision. I would think it would also mean a much larger ship than a 65,000 ton, with a larger air wing.

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BTW, I did come across another nugget: Russians suggesting that IN use 2-3 MiG-29Ks to replace the likes of a EC2D. IIRC we had talked about that possibility with the MKIs, until of course the IAF got the Phalcons.

[venkat_r]

It is a pretty sad affair. It should not be acceptable that India does not have enough knowledgeable people about how Russia was dealing with the lack of dollars and if there were some, they not being used. One way to eliminate such stuff is to build some competency about the mili-industrial complexes in the world, and to have a competent teams to draw and monitor the contracts. Such things cannot be adhoc - India might have gone a bit wiser with time, but should develop matured orgs that can advice the GOI on such matters.

But this is the cost you pay when you want something that you do not have capability to build yourself. Thankfully this time around GOI has the $ - I am sure there are multiple arms sellers watching and rubbing their hands and smacking their lips - I am sure if we look deep enough there might be similar stories burried in other contracts too.

[koti]

Quote:As a brand new aircraft carrier would have costed around $2.0 to 2.5 billion in early-2000I still feel that India could have got a better ship - this one is a VW Golf frame converted to support a major SUV. Just not worth it. Anyhow.

This is one thing everyone keeps ignoring... The cost of the aircraft. We got 48?

[member_27808]

Reading all the second and third hand reports it is clear India came off somewhat worse off in this buy. Having been involved in large commercial acquisitions with the private and military sector, I can confirm the complexity with Military purchases are many times multiplied that of the private sector.

Armchair critics simply do not appreciate the numerous instances (in the west and east) that Military contracts run into trouble. When you throw in the numerous addition layers of complexity in military contracts with a foreign vendor and/or nation, there is always a potential perfect storm. A perfect storm formed from nationalism, national self interest, politics and then the contract itself. Then where your foreign vendor does not speak and contract in English you have another layer of issues.

The other major issue I found was that the state apparatus when a purchaser and contracting part is notoriously inefficient when it comes to military contracting. You will find this in a vast range of nations from the west to the east. The reasons for this are manyfold and probably best to leave for another time.

Leaving aside nationalistic sentiments etc, if I was acting for the Russians, I would have driven a similar hard bargain and attempted to leverage every loophole and ambiguity in the agreement/s and in the political/national situation to get more money and maximise the final benefit.

Although I think India came off worse off, again from all second, third hand etc accounts, it does appear India did well to extricate itself and regain some ground when things went way off course. I suspect the involvement of various are government departments probably helped.

[NRao]

That is the nature of things: procurements are very, very complex and sites like BR attract and retain armchair people. Experienced people can and should provide some insight or even guidance as far as possible.

However, on the topic of the Vicky, there is another topic: has this relationship deteriorated? Since the days of the MKI, mid 1990s, I think it has gone down hill and today it is pretty bad. In fact there is an article out there, that states that the Saint may have given the Russians an ultimatum on the FGFA.

On the Vicky itself, yes, it is here and India needs to deal with it. However, I do not think the support has been worked out yet.

The MTA seems to be muddling along. India is now pressuring Russia to deploy the Brahmos. All in all, not a good situ.

The only (good?) news we keep hearing is that some high level guys keep going back and forth and that the two have teams in each other's countries and data is exchanged. The Indo-Russo relationship is not a mature, robust one that it is expected to be.

[Hitesh]

We got the Nerpa so I think that makes up for the Vicky debacle. Hindsight is always 20/20. But I can tell you that in 2004, there were simply no options except Vicky and IN was desperate to get a carrier in short order. Little did IN know about the upcoming troubles. But now India has a budding indigenous AC program.

Despite what Phillips think, I still think that we are better off taking US's help than Russia because US has unrivaled experience and supremacy in building ACs.

[Prasad]

IF IN goes with CAT on the Vishal that will not fly - the Russians despite their offer to help design it, have no experience with CATs as far as I know and the MiG-29K will have to be redesigned (not again) for such an operation. No RoI there. And, I just do not see how IN could lean on a STOBAR for the Vishal. Will have to wait for a couple of months.

A CAT should also dash the hopes of the FGFA/NLCA too,

I would thin a "CAT" automatically means partnering with the US in some manner for the Vishal. EMALS would force the issue.

I wouldn't be too pessimistic here. The carrier is still on the drawing board. If we decide to have a CAT, we should be able to design a naval variant based on the needs of a CAT in the time it takes to build the carrier with time to build the planes themselves.

[NRao]

^^^^^

Which aircraft do you have in mind?

[Prasad]

Naval version of lca mk2? Or would that be way too much to do?

[venkat_r]

About the carrier killers, Bazzalat seems to be a good system from Russia and Brahmos is a great system for it, if it just has some longer legs, then..

Video in Russian with eng subtitles

[John]

Oniks (Brahmos) was replacement for Granit it was supposed to be universal missile and offer similar range with smaller footprint. However the original ramjet engine intended for Oniks ran into issues so it was fit with engine that was derived/based of Moskit's ramjet engine hence the lower range. Brahmos 2 could very well be the original Oniks. As mentioned in another thread our equivalent to Granit is Shaurya.

[NRao]

Naval version of lca mk2? Or would that be way too much to do?

Oh. Absolutely possible.

However, my initial suspicion was that the aircraft carriers would be insufficient. To prove/disprove that thinking I have been chasing the Indian naval doctrine. And, I still feel that the planned response (the current three ACs) would be insufficient - more on that later.

NLCA would be a welcome solution for the Vishal (IMHO of course). One should be able to pack more planes on that ship (as compared to the 29K), but, then I am not sure how the two compare to figure out if that would decrease some other capability. But, for sure, with a CAT they would be able to launch more - if that is a good criteria.

However, I think India would be better served with a properly designed naval AMCA. In fact, it would be better if the Indian labs started with a naval version of the AMCA and then migrated to a land version of it.

_________________

About the carrier killers

China is trying to take the fight as far away from Taiwan as possible + achieve A2/AD around China itself. The DF-21D is supposed to have a range of some 1100 miles. Fully expect them to increase that with time. However, the Chinese *killers* are BM - unlike other solutions, which are mostly CMs.

A well placed DF-21D (in Tibet) can threaten both the Eastern (V'patnam/ANC) and Western (Mumbai) sea boards of Indian interest. A well placed missile in the southern corner of China could even reach the Malacca Straits. This in context of a Indian CNS who stated that the Malacca could be bottled up with one carrier and two subs.

There is quite a bit out there on sea games in the IOR - if anyone is interested.

Another nugget I found is a former CNS who was very critical about raising the strike corps for the IA. He thought it was a waste of funds, etc.

______________

This is a very interesting topic and with plenty of TBDs. I am fairly convinced that the current doctrine will not hold in say 2030ish time frame. India last issued a doctrine in 2009 (prior to that in 2004). Let us see what happens, but I expect one to come out in a year or two.

[vasu raya]

the Su-33 on the Chinese carrier operates at the edge of safety limits, other than that why would be a Mig-29k be a better choice according to Russians?

[NRao]

I do not for sure, but I think there are three major factors that impact the MiG: The Russian naval doctrine has changed dramatically, the Su-33 is no longer economical (especially in relation to the small "carrier" that Russia has - it is really not even called a carrier by them, if that matters) or MiG itself needs funding or else it will sink this time around.

I am inclined to believe that it is the last one that is most critical - MiG seems to be on life-support. Given what Russia is up to, does she *really* need a carrier? Do not know, but even a few year old literature indicates that Russians have a very unique situation - cold in the northern parts - that dictates a LOT of what they *do* (can do and cannot do). As an example I found out that their efforts to develop a catapult was shelved partially because in winter the cat mechanism itself needed to be heated - else due to the cold it would not function.

So, who knows what are the driving factors.

However, one think I do know - I feel India should close this MiG pipeline. India has done her part in keeping MiG alive. Just MHO.

[vasu raya]

ok, maybe another reason was they got ripped off by the Chinese on the Su-33 and we are the 'good guys' by paying up

It would be a tragedy for Russians for all the haggling and bad blood over Vikramditya still can't keep Mig floating, maybe IN will be in the dock for spares?

[toot]jet engine driven cat would work in the Arctic as well [/toot]

OTOH F-35 can lead to a single vendor situation which we can't substitute indigenously over time, utility aside

[TSJones]

I do not for sure, but I think there are three major factors that impact the MiG: The Russian naval doctrine has changed dramatically, the Su-33 is no longer economical (especially in relation to the small "carrier" that Russia has - it is really not even called a carrier by them, if that matters) or MiG itself needs funding or else it will sink this time around.

I am inclined to believe that it is the last one that is most critical - MiG seems to be on life-support. Given what Russia is up to, does she *really* need a carrier? Do not know, but even a few year old literature indicates that Russians have a very unique situation - cold in the northern parts - that dictates a LOT of what they *do* (can do and cannot do). As an example I found out that their efforts to develop a catapult was shelved partially because in winter the cat mechanism itself needed to be heated - else due to the cold it would not function.

So, who knows what are the driving factors.

However, one think I do know - I feel India should close this MiG pipeline. India has done her part in keeping MiG alive. Just MHO.

When I lived in Illinois my next door neighbor had a heated driveway, sidewalks and porch steps. He never had to shovel snow and ice. Russians can't heat a catapult?

Addendum: The people of Tanana Alaska heat their water system in the winter with a municiple wood fired boiler in the winter. It's probably covers just a few square miles but that would be still quite a few feet of water lines to keep functioning in the winter.

[member_23061]

When I lived in Illinois my next door neighbor had a heated driveway, sidewalks and porch steps. He never had to shovel snow and ice. Russians can't heat a catapult?

Addendum: The people of Tanana Alaska heat their water system in the winter with a municiple wood fired boiler in the winter. It's probably covers just a few square miles but that would be still quite a few feet of water lines to keep functioning in the winter.

Moscow has centrally heated water.

Naval doctrine was just different for the Soviets. Submarines v/s Carriers and we all know who chose which side [Though the Americans had a decent submarine wing]

However I would like to repeat a question asked earlier. Doesn't the 2.3 billion tag include the MiG 29k ?

[NRao]

Doesn't the 2.3 billion tag include the MiG 29k ?

No. I think the first 16 cost some $1 billion. The next 29 - I do not know.

When I lived in Illinois my next door neighbor had a heated driveway, sidewalks and porch steps. He never had to shovel snow and ice. Russians can't heat a catapult?

(I want to meet your ex-neighbor.)

Primarily, a non-cat option was cheaper, simpler and far less weight, among others - to operate in the environment they had to operate in.

[Prasad]

Ha. The AMCA is two decades away. Is the IAC2 that far off? How long would it take for us to build a carrier bigger than the IAC1 ? Mao has hinted many a time that the NLCA is just a stepping stone for the navy and their sight has always been set on a medium weight fighter for their carriers. So I'm sure they'll wait, assuming they can get the NLCA to work.

[member_27808]

The only (good?) news we keep hearing is that some high level guys keep going back and forth and that the two have teams in each other's countries and data is exchanged. The Indo-Russo relationship is not a mature, robust one that it is expected to be.

Seeing how wide ranging and deep the Indo-Russian military relationship is, I have always wondered how many in the Indian military est. and the Govt speak and write Russian? This, I think, is an important factor in any long term relationship.

[TSJones]

Doesn't the 2.3 billion tag include the MiG 29k ?

No. I think the first 16 cost some $1 billion. The next 29 - I do not know.

When I lived in Illinois my next door neighbor had a heated driveway, sidewalks and porch steps. He never had to shovel snow and ice. Russians can't heat a catapult?

(I want to meet your ex-neighbor.)

Primarily, a non-cat option was cheaper, simpler and far less weight, among others - to operate in the environment they had to operate in.

Go to garagejournal.com then to the forum tab, then to the garage gallery topic section. You will see the kind of guys I am talking about. Not them, but their garages. I.....I was stunned when I first went there.

There are people from all over the world that post their garages there. But I'm telling you some of the guys in the US have obsesseive compulsive disorders. There is a guy from India that now lives in San Antonio that posts. He's now got the disorder too.

Highly off topic. No more from me on this.

[sanjaykumar]

When I lived in Illinois my next door neighbo(u)r had a heated driveway, sidewalks and porch steps. He never had to shovel snow and ice.


From Canada that looks like science fiction.

[Vayutuvan]

When I lived in Illinois my next door neighbor had a heated driveway, sidewalks and porch steps. He never had to shovel snow and ice. Russians can't heat a catapult?

[OT]Where in the town of your alma mater? Had I bought that home, today I wouldn't have had to run a powerful snow blower for 1.5 hours. May be the owner would like to sell [/OT]

[Viv S]

This was posted a long time ago and the good landlubber general's points refuted.The carrier is with us now,there is no point in debating the issue of its acquisition any longer. At least the IN has a new carrier.

Refuted? Which would imply that you can explain why the contract for refurbishing the Gorshkov was given to Sevmash, a submarine-builder, that had never built a surface ship since the 1950s, let alone an aircraft carrier.


And this debate on the acquisition is still relevant because similar results have been seen in previous buys (eg. T-90) and it still has a bearing on future defence purchases from Russia, most importantly the PAKFA/FGFA where again Russia is trying to get India to fork up half the cost of development while offering as little workshare/ToT as they can get away with.

[member_28305]

I recall reading here at BR that Russia never had shipyards capable of building Large warships (Read aircraft Carriers), because the one Aircraft Carrier they have was built at Ukraine during Soviet Era...

So Building Viky, essentially was a training program for them.