INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[tsarkar]

Is the OTO-76 CIWS system planned for the Viky the "standard" one we've licensed, or the more modern Super Rapid with DART ammo. included?

All IN & ICG OTOs are SRGM. Dart is just an ammo that can be purchased. Guidance can be via Oerlikon or Elta radars or Israeli/Indian EO suites. OTO offers extended engagement range against supersonic missiles, giving more reaction time & heavier ammo to knock them out.

But Vik already got zif 121 launchers where you said it will have air defence guns?

Sponsons can be added

Can you quote from IN sources about how they plan to use the Kolakata class ships, either independently or in a CBG?

The outfitting gives an indication of the role. Two clusters of LRSAM for air defence and two clusters of BrahMos for Land Attack.

One of the underlying themes on this thread is that we are transitioning to a new kind of CBG doctrine which will require a degree of specialization in platforms.

Again CBG is a US concept not relevant to Indian environment or operations. Most forum members either consider US or Russia/FSU as Gold Standard and then try to forcefit or benchmark Indian systems/operating procedures against it, that in reality is an exercise in fantasy.

US carriers carry 2x or 2.5x fighters as Indian (or any other) carriers. Typically they operate 3 days of intensive Air to Air or Air to Sea or Air to Land sorties (up to 200 per day) and on fourth day withdraw to repair & replenish. Neither does India (or any other nation) have the immense logistics capability that US has.

FWIW even in WW2, when the Royal Navy was at its strongest, it could not keep up with US Navy in the Pacific

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Pacific_Fleet

The British Pacific Fleet was one of the largest fleets ever assembled by the Royal Navy. By VJ Day it had four battleships and six fleet aircraft carriers, together with fifteen smaller aircraft carriers, eleven cruisers, and numerous smaller warships, submarines, and support vessels.

However, this fleet performed poorly. Reasons are -

The Admiralty had proposed a British role in the Pacific in early 1944 but the initial USN response had been discouraging. Admiral Ernest King, Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, an alleged Anglophobe,[2] was reluctant to concede any such role and raised a number of objections, including the requirement that the BPF should be self-sufficient.

The Royal Navy had been used to operating close to its bases in Britain, the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean and infrastructure and expertise were lacking.......The US Pacific Fleet had assembled an enormous fleet of oilers and supply ships of every type. Even before the war, it had been active in the development of underway replenishment techniques. The Admiralty realised that it needed a great deal of new equipment and training, in a short time and with whatever it had to hand.

On 8 February 1944 the First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, informed the Defence Committee that 91 ships would be required to support the BPF......This had to be balanced against the shipping needed to import food for the civilian population of the UK. In January 1945, the War cabinet was forced to postpone the deployment of the fleet by two months due to the shortage of shipping.

Even after 11 months from Feb 1944 to Jan 1945, the Royal Navy struggled to put together a supply train.

Some more data on logistics cost

While it was apparent that Australia, with its population of only about seven million could not support the projected 675,000 men and women of the BPF, the actual extent of the Australian contribution was undetermined. The Australian government agreed to contribute to the support of the BPF but the Australian economy was fully committed to the war effort and manpower and stores for the BPF could only come from taking them from American and Australian forces fighting the Japanese.[10] Unfortunately, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser arrived in Sydney on 10 December 1944 under the mistaken impression that Australia had asked for the BPF and promised to provide for its needs. Two days later, the Acting Prime Minister of Australia Frank Forde announced the allocation of £21,156,500 for the maintenance of the BPF. In January 1945, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur agreed to release American stockpiles in Australia to support the BPF. The Australian government soon became concerned at the voracious demands of the BPF works programme, which was criticised by Australian military leaders. In April 1945, Fraser publicly criticised the Australian government's handling of waterside industrial disputes that were holding up British ships. The government was shocked and angered but agreed to allocate £6,562,500 for BPF naval works. Fraser was not satisfied. On 8 August 1945 Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Clement Attlee felt obliged to express his regret for the misunderstandings to the Australian government

So Indian/British/Russian/French/Italian/Spanish Navies cannot have CBG type concepts.

Primary role for Vikrant/Vikramaditya/Viraat will be the same as British carriers at Falklands - Air Defence of Fleet & AEW/ASW aircraft.

Land Attack will be carried out by Destroyer fired Brahmos, Frigate fired Brahmos & Klub, Type 877 EKM fired Klub, Arihant fired Shourya & Subhadra fired Prithvi.

Secondary roles will include Anti Ship, but Destroyers/Frigates are better equipped to do that. Brahmos/Klub will take enemy ships detected 300 km away faster than MiG29K/Tejas flying 200 km subsonic & launching Kh-35 100 km away, again subsonic.

Finally, if air & submarine threats are neutralized, then MiG29K may do Chittagong type strikes, after SEAD/DEAD first.

Source? All the MSM have it down as desi AK630 but it wouldn't be the first time they are wrong, so if you know different feel free to share.

MSM gets ideas reading BR. As explained earlier, an aircraft carrier needs heavier defences.

[tsarkar]

Russian sailors roam naked on Karwar beach, cops in a tizzy

Come on, any Nordic/Slav needs Vitamin D this time of the year, and one can find dozens of Indian men & women skinny dipping in our village ponds / irrigation canals during summer (including yours truly & his siblings who as kids were often posted on sentry duty when family women went for their dip).

When journalists caught this on camera, these personnel said 'thank you' without knowing why they were being photographed. Some even shook hands with people from the media.

The police had to intervene and convinced the Russians that it was not allowed on the beaches in Karnataka. The Russians left soon after that.

They were damm well behaved. Maybe we need to open our closeted minds.

Best is to give these chaps a segregated beach of their own. Sending them to Goa 100 km away might expose them to honeytraps.

[member_23455]

Again CBG is a US concept not relevant to Indian environment or operations. Most forum members either consider US or Russia/FSU as Gold Standard and then try to forcefit or benchmark Indian systems/operating procedures against it, that in reality is an exercise in fantasy.

Some forum members tend to parachute into discussions without adequately comprehending the vast material on this thread from various sources including leading proponents of carrier warfare in the IN which point to where an Indian CBG doctrine might be headed.

Opinion is opinion. Analysis is analysis.

MSM gets ideas reading BR. As explained earlier, an aircraft carrier needs heavier defences.

As explained earlier do you have a source for the CIWS specs? BR is no sacred cow either, as has been evidenced, sometimes most hilariously on this thread.

[tsarkar]

Some forum members tend to parachute into discussions without adequately comprehending the vast material on this thread from various sources including leading proponents of carrier warfare in the IN which point to where an Indian CBG doctrine might be headed.

I know for certain operational considerations drive doctrine. I did not know Indian Navy had official positions like "leading proponents of carrier warfare".

Officers who serve for long in a particular field, by dint of their experience, prepare doctrine as guidelines for others, collaboratively with others who've similar experience. But even they wouldn't describe themselves as "leading proponents of carrier warfare".

For certain, Indian Navy isnt trying to ape American CBG. 20 MiG29K or Tejas onboard a carrier does not match the quantum of capabilities that a CBG can provide (180-200 sorties per day via 50-60 fighters). A CBG is able to influence operations because of these capabilities.

Do you know what Project 71 was earlier called? It was called Air Defence Ship (ADS). Suddenly, ADS cannot become the centerpiece of a Carrier Battle Group. Do you know that Russian Su-33 on their carrier Kuznetsov rarely carry A2G armament? Do you know the low percentage of A2G operations by Sea Harriers in Falklands?

20 fighters on Vikramaditya will be hard pressed to provide continuous Combat Air Patrol over the fleet.

Do point me to the so called material from such "leading proponents of carrier warfare" on IN CBG doctrine. Do also let me know even one person of authority in IN who officially uses the term Carrier Battle Group in any operational manner.

As explained earlier do you have a source for the CIWS specs? BR is no sacred cow either, as has been evidenced, sometimes most hilariously on this thread.

I am the source.

[member_23455]

Some forum members tend to parachute into discussions without adequately comprehending the vast material on this thread from various sources including leading proponents of carrier warfare in the IN which point to where an Indian CBG doctrine might be headed.

I know for certain operational considerations drive doctrine. I did not know Indian Navy had official positions like "leading proponents of carrier warfare".

Do point me to the so called material from such "leading proponents of carrier warfare" on IN CBG doctrine. Do also let me know even one person of authority in IN who officially uses the term Carrier Battle Group in any operational manner.

Well, let's just agree to disagree after that comment of yours. But since it will be bad form of me to not respond after asking you repeatedly for a source, this is from 2008:

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2008/04/ ... do-we.html

t is not quite appropriate to say that an aircraft-carrier's sole purpose is to project power, and that a battle group (CBG) is therefore only an offensive unit/formation

It does seem you have no desire to go through the thread and shape your opinion. So you will excuse me if I do not indulge this discussion any further.

As explained earlier do you have a source for the CIWS specs? BR is no sacred cow either, as has been evidenced, sometimes most hilariously on this thread.

I am the source.

Good to know. You won't mind if some of us wait and watch how things pan out on the CIWS front, would you?

[manjgu]

RajitO... that link of urs does not prove anything.

i think tsarkar has explained things very nicely. BR is not a boxing ring where, one has to necessarily KO the others. one must defer to superior knowledge and experience. CBG is total misnormer in the indian context.

[manjgu]

A carrier strike group (CSG) is an operational formation of the United States Navy. It is composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates, and a carrier air wing of 65 to 70 aircraft.

composition of carrier air wing in 2003

1 fighter squadron (VF) of 10 F-14A/B/Ds or 1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18F Super Hornets
1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18C Hornets or 12 F/A-18E Super Hornets
2 strike fighter squadrons (VFA) or Marine fighter attack squadrons (VMFA) of 12 F/A-18C Hornets
1 early warning squadron (VAW) of 4 E-2Cs
1 tactical electronic warfare squadron (VAQ) of 4-5 EA-6Bs
1 sea control squadron (VS) of 8 S-3Bs (primary aerial tankers)
1 helicopter anti-submarine squadron (HS) of 6 SH-60F and 2 HH-60H
1 detachment of C-2A Greyhound aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)

[anishns]

[Viv S]

It is composed of roughly 7,500 personnel, an aircraft carrier, at least one cruiser, a destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates, and a carrier air wing of 65 to 70 aircraft.

Interestingly the US Navy has just half a dozen frigates still operational, with the entire OHP class due to be decommissioned without replacement by 2015. By 2030 the fighting component of its surface fleet will consist almost solely of Arleigh Burke class destroyers (plus upto 20 LCS ships).

[Philip]

While our carriers do not have the massive firepower of US CVs,do remember what the Vikrant achieved in '71 when the IAF had achieved total air supremacy over E.Pak skies.The vintage Sea Hawks and even ASW Alizes performed numerous strike sorties over E.Pak,destroying shore establishments,sinking vessels,riverine craft,and preventing any breakout of Paki troops fleeing E.Pak by sea.They took over part of the air campaign so that IAF assets could be swiftly transferred to the western front. While our carriers will not be able to perform long duration,ground attack and strike ops as US/UK carrier forces have done in the GWars and in the US's "expeditionary" wars.Even here the availability of Diego Garcia in the IOT with its pre-positioned logistic ships and assets has been crucial.The US has also been lucky to have allies in the Saudis and UAE sheikhdoms who provided it with base and logistic facilities during both GWars.The strike ops conducted against Libya would be more achievable.Certainly striking from the sea will be a key task and role for the IN's new carriers apart from providing air defence of the fleet.Given the long range o the 29Ks,equipped in the future with the lightweight BMos,having the same range,IN carriers could strike the enemy's coastline and naval bases from as far out as 500-600km.Surface warships would have to sail in far closer for 300km missile attacks.

It is why our "expeditionary" role/capability is misplaced.Sea control and power projection certainly,but with increased fire support for amphib landings as our 4 new amphib vessels arrive.It remains to be seen whether the amphibs also will possess some integral ground support assets,in the form of STOVL aircraft (future) and attack helos,just as the Russians plan to do deploying KA-52s aboard their Mistral amphibs built at home.

[Shalav]

...

Again CBG is a US concept not relevant to Indian environment or operations. Most forum members either consider US or Russia/FSU as Gold Standard and then try to forcefit or benchmark Indian systems/operating procedures against it, that in reality is an exercise in fantasy.

US carriers carry 2x or 2.5x fighters as Indian (or any other) carriers. Typically they operate 3 days of intensive Air to Air or Air to Sea or Air to Land sorties (up to 200 per day) and on fourth day withdraw to repair & replenish. Neither does India (or any other nation) have the immense logistics capability that US has.

...

Primary role for Vikrant/Vikramaditya/Viraat will be the same as British carriers at Falklands - Air Defence of Fleet & AEW/ASW aircraft.

Land Attack will be carried out by Destroyer fired Brahmos, Frigate fired Brahmos & Klub, Type 877 EKM fired Klub, Arihant fired Shourya & Subhadra fired Prithvi.

Secondary roles will include Anti Ship, but Destroyers/Frigates are better equipped to do that. Brahmos/Klub will take enemy ships detected 300 km away faster than MiG29K/Tejas flying 200 km subsonic & launching Kh-35 100 km away, again subsonic.

Finally, if air & submarine threats are neutralized, then MiG29K may do Chittagong type strikes, after SEAD/DEAD first.
...

+1

[Rupak]

Rajit O,
Thanks for posting the Arun Prakash interview. It provides a very clear view of the IN's operational priorities. My reading of it, reinforces the view that the IN continues to see carriers primarily as instruments of fleet defence. We are unlikely to have the logistical (financial?) capacity to support sustained offensive operations.

Tsarkar/Rajit O,
With due respect you gentlemen maybe misreading each other. Tsarkar was commenting on the weapons fit for IAC/Vikrant, while Rajit O was talking about Vikramaditya.

Rakshit,
The first of two photos you posted seems to be from Sevmash, not Karwar.

Singha,
The Vikrant is to be equipped with same MF-STAR radar as the P-15B, and as such is meant to embark LR-SAM. In case of Vikramaditya, I was told that two options were considered (don't know which has been chosen!). First, fitting a single EL/M-2238 radar aft of the funnel. Second is fitting two EL/M-2228 one fwd of the funnel and one aft.
Tsarkar may have more accurate and recent info.

[member_25400]

Again CBG is a US concept not relevant to Indian environment or operations.
......
So Indian/British/Russian/French/Italian/Spanish Navies cannot have CBG type concepts.

Er.. what? A CBG is simply a carrier and it's escorts where the task force is in a single formation. All kinds of countries have a CBG or have had one
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_ba ... tle_groups).

WW2 Japan had their fleet carriers in a single large task force, the Kido Butai, and did not have separate/independent escorts for each..
How a CBG is used, what it is composed of, its mission, doctrine etc may vary. Even the US adds or subtracts ships based on mission, availability and doctrine. (and US has expeditionary strike groups based around its 40000 tonne amphibious assault ships.). (And US has employed Task forces with multiple aircraft carriers also)

Indian CBG concept and operation will assuredly differ from US, or Russian. But that doesn't mean much., it's par for the course.

--

manjgu, US CSG composition is relatively easily available. A sub commonly accompanies the US CSG. F-14 (Top Gun) has been retired, replaced partially by the SuperHornet. US navy calls ships destroyers that any other navy (and USN itself historically) would have called cruisers.

[Eric Leiderman]

Aditya G

Few pages back we were having a discussion on the bulbous bow of the Vik'adidya (Jan 4th 14)
You came out with a graphic depicting it without the bulbous bow, however I just came across this on you tube which shows a bulbous bow I am posting a link

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_QFvoaq9RI

if you zoom to 6.56 it clearly mentions and depicts the Bulbous bow.
Could you give more details on where you got the graphic so we both get our facts right. Maybe a date could clarify the above (If its an add on)

[tsarkar]

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2008/04/ ... do-we.html

t is not quite appropriate to say that an aircraft-carrier's sole purpose is to project power, and that a battle group (CBG) is therefore only an offensive unit/formation

The article was a response from Admiral Arun Prakash to someone who questioned the raison d'etre for aircraft carriers.

The Admiral was explaining the capabilities an aircraft carrier brings to the table and not specifically IN operational considerations or doctrine.

Also, the words in parentheses were most likely put in by Shiv Aroor either to clarify or amplify the Admiral's PoV. This is evidenced from the following -

For example: it would take many hours/days of search by LRMP (long-range maritime patrol) aircraft or ASW (anti-submarine warfare) ships to localise a diesel submarine (SSN or SSBN in the very near future) in the Indian Ocean.

Again, SSN or SSBN are again US Navy terms not used by Indian Navy. The difference between diesel electric & nuclear submarines is that the latter can dive deeper. However, IN had detection capabilities of nuclear submarines through Variable Depth Sonars of Nilgiri/Godavari/Rajput & Delhi classes since 80s. The Admiral could not have said the part in parentheses.

Good to know. You won't mind if some of us wait and watch how things pan out on the CIWS front, would you?

You'll find the LRSAM on board before the decade is out.

@Rupak
The current view is Pakistan will get supersonic missiles via China sooner or later. While current missiles can under some circumstances engage supersonic missiles (For example, US Navy pratices against Russian made Kh-31 targets http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MA-31 or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GQM-163_Coyote), higher engagement ranges are required to ensure sufficient engagement time window.

For example, rough calculations show that a Harpoon missile flying at 240 m/s gives -
AK-630 with engagement range from 4km-0.5km about 14.5 seconds engagement time window to destroy it.
Phalanx with engagement range from 3.6 km-0.5km about 13 seconds engagement time window to destroy it.
Goalkeeper with engagement range from 2 km-0.5km about 6.25 seconds engagement time window to destroy it.

A BrahMos at 927 m/s gives -
AK-630 with engagement range from 4km-0.5km about 3.7 seconds engagement time window to destroy it.
Phalanx with engagement range from 3.6 km-0.5km about 3.3 seconds engagement time window to destroy it.
Goalkeeper with engagement range from 2 km-0.5km about 1.6 seconds engagement time window to destroy it.

While Barak1 has been deemed better than Kashtan, there is a perceived need for longer ranged weapons than Barak-1 or AK-630. An LRSAM or an OTO SRGM by dint of longer engagement ranges will offer more engagement time window. While space & weight reservations have been made for LRSAM, fitting OTO is still being considered.

LRSAM also has the following unique advantage http://www.livefistdefence.com/2009/06/barak-8.html

Especially impressive is that a radar connected to a given missile battery that may have detected the threat may not necessarily be part of the same battery that will respond to the threat. This allows us to maximize the system’s capabilities and create the most optimal interception scenario.

Er.. what? A CBG is simply a carrier and it's escorts where the task force is in a single formation. All kinds of countries have a CBG or have had one

Your PoV and that of the Wiki link is that a carrier + surface ships + submarines make a Carrier Battle Group.

However, in US Navy, Carrier Battle Group (sea to sea) or Carrier Strike Group (sea to land) is a doctrine, and not just the composition of the fleet.

It is a concept of projecting power at sea or land, with sustained effects via aircraft & cruise missiles and backed up by significant logistics effort.

I'll rest my case with an official US Navy Statement http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/cvn69 ... GROUP.aspx

The Carrier Strike Group is a flexible naval force that can operate in confined waters or in the open ocean, during day and night, in all weather conditions. The principal role of the carrier and her air wing within the Carrier Strike Group is to provide the primary offensive firepower, while the other ships provide defense and support. These roles are not exclusive, however. Other ships in the strike group sometimes undertake offensive operations (launching cruise missiles, for instance) and the carrier's air wing contributes to the strike group's defense (through combat air patrols and airborne anti-submarine efforts). Thus, from a command and control perspective, Carrier Strike Groups are combat organized by mission rather than by platform.

I know for certain operational considerations drive doctrine.

Well, let's just agree to disagree after that comment of yours.

Refer above, even US Navy thinks that.

[Singha]

the italian version of the horizon class cruiser also subscribes to having a trio of big 76mm oto guns around to blast things at long range.

http://www.imesaspa.com/upload/realizza ... _Doria.jpg

very high mast for the radar too. and nice play on compactness with the funnel and aft radar side by side.

[Austin]

^^ Looks good , Wished we had opted for SMART-L on P-15A and P-17A to replace the venerable RAWL-08

[Aditya G]

Thanks Eric. The photo posted was of the INS Viraat during refit @ Cochin. For the Vikramaditya, I have read that the bulbous bow was removed. I will check your video and also try digging up the source.

Aditya G

Few pages back we were having a discussion on the bulbous bow of the Vik'adidya (Jan 4th 14)
You came out with a graphic depicting it without the bulbous bow, however I just came across this on you tube which shows a bulbous bow I am posting a link

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_QFvoaq9RI

if you zoom to 6.56 it clearly mentions and depicts the Bulbous bow.
Could you give more details on where you got the graphic so we both get our facts right. Maybe a date could clarify the above (If its an add on)

[Rupak]

Tsarkar,
Many thanks for the exhaustive info.

[Aditya G]

Various sources describe the bow being removed or modified. Well let the pictures do the talking:

original:



Post Refit:

Thanks Eric. The photo posted was of the INS Viraat during refit @ Cochin. For the Vikramaditya, I have read that the bulbous bow was removed. I will check your video and also try digging up the source.

BTW, an interesting pic from the summer trials

[nits]

Not sure if below Video was posted here... good watch

[Eric Leiderman]

Adatya G

quote

The photo posted was of the INS Viraat during refit @ Cochin. For the Vikramaditya, I have read that the bulbous bow was removed. I will check your video and also try digging up the source. unquote


However refer to the link below which clearly shows the Virrat with a bulbous bow.

post by Peregrine dated 4th Jan 13 page 23 this thread


Also in your last post you state quote

"Various sources describe the bow being removed or modified. Well let the pictures do the talking:"
unquote

I clearly see a bulbous bow in the before and after photos which you have posted, This is once again assuming that it is the Vikramaditya , Yes it is modified and smaller but very much there.

When you posted the original image of an aircraft carrier that was supposed to be the Vikramaditya minus the B bow, I apologized for a mistake that I might have made, I withdraw that and stick to my original assumption that both our carriers have bulbous bows.

We are all here to gain info, In that search we can make mistakes, most of us acknowledge them,
( V A) in morse
as to err is human. Enough said. ---_ -_ as the morse code end of transmission signal goes
(this is for the old timers dit dit dit daa dit daa)

[koti]

Not sure if below Video was posted here... good watch

What is to note is that the Mig-29K is able to take off from the flat runway and not the Ski-jump(1:20). This means there is lot of reserve power in the engine that can translate to the Mig's taking off with a very heavy load.

Later: Wait, was it a touch and go?

[Singha]

I had wondered about the 60s chic look of the horizon class close in guns, without the next-gen chic of the phalanx type systems. after seeing tsarkar post about range and reaction time, plus we know the rapid fire mode of the Oto...I see it was a far sighted decision by the franco-italian team.

the DDG51 derivatives and offshoots in east asia put their faith in a mix of phalanx, ram and essm....though replacing the phalanx with a heavier gun might make sense now.

[Austin]

BTW, an interesting pic from the summer trials

Did the Flanker actually Took Off from Vikramaditya ? That would be interesting.

[Singha]

it must be touch and go because
1) it is not pointing up the ski ramp
2) arrester hook is not extended so not attempting a real landing

[Khalsa]

BTW, an interesting pic from the summer trials

Conversation moments later:

Pilot: Ah Comarade youuur ship is too small for se flanker. Nyet no good comrade captain. I could barely align myself in time on such purfect day.

Captain (Gorky): All right tell se Indians the boiler problem is feeexed. We are not keeeeping this boat. Go Back to Kuz Comrade Pilot.

[Aditya G]

Dear Eric, I intended the Viraat pic to be that of the same ship (it does not have a bulbous bow as seen in the pic). For Vikramaditya, yes it has technically retained a bulbous bow, though clearly not as substantial as it was.

Cheers

... I clearly see a bulbous bow in the before and after photos which you have posted, This is once again assuming that it is the Vikramaditya , Yes it is modified and smaller but very much there.

When you posted the original image of an aircraft carrier that was supposed to be the Vikramaditya minus the B bow, I apologized for a mistake that I might have made, I withdraw that and stick to my original assumption that both our carriers have bulbous bows. ...

[Philip]

The bulbous bow with its sonar,may have been removed because of the extra weight of the extended ski-jump at the bows.This may have been neccessary due to stability problems,heavy pitching at the bows negating the advantages of the ski jump and affecting TOs.A sonar may have been fitted under the hull instead (any pics?).The more streamlined bow would also increase speed essential for aircraft launch as this was not needed when in cruiser-carrier format the VSTOL Yaks were not taking off STOBAR style.

[vivek_ahuja]

Cross posting from LCA dhaga to avoid OT discussion:

And do you think there is any other country that would buy Mig 29K? Not even Russia buys them in big numbers, which is why IN is the biggest operator and might have the burden to pay big times for upgrades, unless we get to integrate an indigenous AESA and Kaveri engine to them. So the unit cost we paid might be good, but more important will be the cost we need to pay in future, when there is nobody else that wants the fighter or funds upgrades.

false.

Russian navy has started ordering the mig29k in large numbers and ditched the su33, since the mig29k was well developed due to the Indian orders and money.

http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20120229/171607361.html

Since when did 20+4 aircraft become "large numbers" for Russia? For Russia, 24 airplanes is pretty penny packet when even India has a growing fleet of double that, no?

[Eric Leiderman]

The shape of the bulbous bow is determined by tank tests, A larger bulbous bow does not always impose a speed penalty, Hull shape, draft ,speed, tonnage, length to name a few of the parameters that are used in determining the shape of the BB, If the ski jump added weight to the fore of the ship, a large bulbous bow would add buoyancy (as it is basically a buoyancy chamber even with a sonar fitted.....) negating some of that weight.
The shape and size of the bulbous bow is quite a complicated iteration, best left to Naval arc's.

[NRao]

Since when did 20+4 aircraft become "large numbers" for Russia? For Russia, 24 airplanes is pretty penny packet when even India has a growing fleet of double that, no?

Dec 11, 2013 :: Russia considers funding MiG-29 successor

RAC MiG is likely to be out of production work once a current batch of MiG-29K naval fighters is completed for the Russian navy.

[Peregrine]

Adatya G

The photo posted was of the INS Viraat during refit @ Cochin. For the Vikramaditya, I have read that the bulbous bow was removed. I will check your video and also try digging up the source. unquote

However refer to the link below which clearly shows the Virrat with a bulbous bow.

post by Peregrine dated 4th Jan 13 page 23 this thread

Eric Leiderman Ji :

If you are refering to my post of 04 Jan 2014 17:17 then please note that the Vessel is The USN ACC “Gerald R. Ford”

Cheers

[member_23455]

Rajit O,
Thanks for posting the Arun Prakash interview. It provides a very clear view of the IN's operational priorities. My reading of it, reinforces the view that the IN continues to see carriers primarily as instruments of fleet defence. We are unlikely to have the logistical (financial?) capacity to support sustained offensive operations.

Tsarkar/Rajit O,
With due respect you gentlemen maybe misreading each other. Tsarkar was commenting on the weapons fit for IAC/Vikrant, while Rajit O was talking about Vikramaditya.

Rupak, good to have you on the thread.

A few points:

1. Given you are the reason we are able to have these discussions, I shall re-post an Arun Prakash article in the wake of the Vikramaditya handover. There is some hyperbole, but do try and see the underlying gist of where he is going.

http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/a ... /1196212/0

This 44,500 tonne behemoth, with its formidable air-group, will be able to exercise sea-control over a three-dimensional bubble of 400-450 mile radius. Any hostile ship, aircraft or submarine enters this zone of control at its peril. The ship has the capability of "projecting power" over a hostile shore, using the MiG-29K to deliver kinetic strikes with guns, rockets or stand-off missiles.

2. There is much more on this very thread which if people have an inclination to sort the wheat from the chaff, and connect the dots will show that Indian CBG/CSG/potato/potahto doctrine is in transition - most simply because we are under the influence of the USN for some time now.

3. Whether that automatically means we are gearing up to be a USN CBG clone is certainly not my contention, if anything it is fascinating to see how we will evolve. But evolve is the key word here and frankly the ship has sailed on "opinion" which claims we will continue with the status quo.

RajitO... that link of urs does not prove anything.

i think tsarkar has explained things very nicely. BR is not a boxing ring where, one has to necessarily KO the others. one must defer to superior knowledge and experience. CBG is total misnormer in the indian context.

Pathetic and risible attempt to stoke an argument. Must do better and keep quiet when the grownups are talking

[member_23455]

Admiral Sushil Kumar jumps on the "boatwagon"

The Indian Navy’s experience of operating carrier battle groups goes back a long way. Both our earlier aircraft carriers — INS Vikrant and INS Viraat — served with great distinction but they belonged to a different generation

Having operated carrier battle groups for more than half a century, India remains the only country in the region that has such a capability. The Chinese navy is yet to operationalise its first aircraft carrier. So the induction of INS Vikramaditya has to be seen in the right perspective.

I swear I did not ask the Admiral to write this up - so what if his bio has qualified air warfare instructor and amphibious warfare specialist in it.

[Philip]

.

[Philip]

Let's take a brief look at the evolution of the IN's carrier capabilities.In the formative years,more than one carrier was envisaged and Lord Mountbatten's vision for the IN saw the Vikrant acquired.At that time,our primary concerns were on land."Police actions" in H'Bad and Goa.Came '62 and the debacle with China,the Indo-Pak war of '65 saw very little action on the part of the IN.The IAF had for long been squeezing the IN's demand for a more capable Fleet Air Arm.It was in the aftermath of '71 that the full capability of the IN who used vintage platforms and aircraft to devastating effect along with coastal defence missile craft towed to Karachi,was realised. That saw the Sea Harriers and Viraat acquired,which gave the IN a quantum increase in capability in the '80s.The Harriers had proved themselves in the Falklands as excellent air-defence aircraft,which shot down many Argie Mirages,never losing an air combat battle.

However,by the Millenium,it was obvious that even the larger Viraat and its SHs,in LUSH avatar,would have limitations in sea control and power projection,supporting amphib/overseas ops,which we were being thrust into in the aftermath of Sri Lanka and the Maldives.The "Look East" policy took wing,the vulnerability of the island territories and the rapid growth and expansion of ops of the PLAN with cafoot at "Mischief Reef" in the Indo-China Sea.There were few available old carriers that could embark the kind of multi-role 4th-gen + aircraft that the IN required.The option chosen was the Gorky-MIG-29K package signed on in 2004 after 8 years of negotiations! The same MIG-29Ks have also been chosen for the IAC-1,the new Vikrant.These aircraft will now give us when operational aboard the two carriers another quantum leap in capability over the SHs,esp. in expanding the "bubble" of fleet air defence,strike-when equipped with the light-weight BMos to 700KM+,and considerable air support for any amphib ops. in the IOR.As of now we have principal security agreements with the Maldives,Seychelles,Mauritius,Sri Lanka and some African nations,who have agreed to provide us with logistic support for IN warships.Beyond the IOR,India and Vietnam have agreements for training,etc., and the "basing rights" of a small port at Nha Trang. Once the 4 amphib vessels arrive,which will be of capability not lesser than the French Mistral,from the IN's requirements,and the third carrier too becomes operational post 2025,the IN's capability to strike far and hard at enemy land targets will be greaty enhanced. I posted a day ago the facts that Chinese industrial base is principally located all around its coastal regions, which is why the Chinese are also expanding their defensive "bubble" beyond the "first island chain",further into the Asia-Pacific seas.

Here are excerpts as to how we are trying to do to the Chines what they are doing to us,encirclement.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NG12Df01.html

There has been a particular growing fear of a "China Threat" within Indian government and strategist circles over the past decade, with many feeling Beijing is engaging in encirclement and containment strategies in a persistent attempt to tie India down to the Indian subcontinent. Responding to this perceived threat, New Delhi has gradually been undertaking a combination of internal balancing, by means of increasing its military capabilities on both land and at sea, and external balancing, via military cooperation with states in East and Southeast Asia.

Indian internal balancing has taken various forms and has been reflected in the increasing defense budget which was announced as US$41 billion for 2012-13, a 17% increase on the previous year.

Firstly, this has helped to fund an ongoing military modernization program with the recent deal for 126 French Rafale fighters to be supplied by Dassault over the coming decade in conjunction with over 200 fifth-generation fighter aircraft to be developed in cooperation with Russia by 2017.

Secondly, India has been strengthening its defenses along its disputed border regions with China; 100,000 additional troops were stationed along the Line of Actual Control in 2011, along with the deployment of the 300-kilometer range BrahMos cruise missile along the eastern border region. These deployments have been complemented by increasing infrastructural developments including new roads and the construction and upgrading of assorted air bases across the regions.

Finally, and most significantly, India has been bolstering its nuclear capabilities with its "flawless" test of the Agni-V missile, which is able to carry a nuclear warhead and with a 5,000-kilometer range can strike a majority of major Chinese cities along its eastern seaboard.

In addition to military modernization on land, New Delhi has been developing its naval capabilities with naval commanders taking a visible turn in the direction of the teachings of Alfred T Mahan and his sea-based geopolitical philosophy, with ambitious future plans for a fully fledged and highly capable blue water navy able to protect coastal waters, vital sea lanes of communication and project power deep into the Indian and surrounding oceans.

Naval modernization has included the establishment of two new deep-sea naval port facilities at Kawar on the southwest coast and near Viskhapatnam as part of the Eastern Naval Command. In tandem with the establishment of the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, the Indian Navy is able to project power across the Bay of Bengal and into the Strait of Malacca, intensifying China's "Malacca Dilemma".

These developments have been complemented by the increasing purchases and indigenous development of naval hardware, including the nuclear submarine INS Chakra on a 10-year lease form Russia and the locally developed INS Airhant. Additionally, the former Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov, renamed INS Vikramaditya, is to be commissioned into service of the Indian Navy by December 2012. These recent enlargements will make up part of a planned 160-vessel fleet including three aircraft carrier groups by the mid 2020s, outlined by Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta.

Internal balancing is taking considerable shape with increasing hardware purchases and consistent upgrading of military capabilities along the border with China and also in the naval realm, where China is undergoing rapid expansion, increasing competition in and around the Indian Ocean. This balancing has also taken considerable shape in terms of external balancing and cooperation with other states in the region.

Military cooperation with other states extends across the realms of both land and sea. On land, New Delhi has become increasingly invested in its relations with Afghanistan, establishing a Strategic Partnership in October 2011, eyeing a greater role following the planned 2014 withdrawal of coalition forces.

With Tajikistan, India has increased its interaction with Tajik security forces and has provided funding for the upgrading of the Farkhor and Ayni air bases succeeding construction of a military hospital and logistics depot. Ayni air base is of particular significance with reports that Tajikistan, India and Russia are in talks over the joint use of the base and that an Indian air force currently has Mi-17 helicopters and has leased Russian fighter jets stationed at the base.

New Delhi has also increased cooperation with Mongolia, signing an agreement on Defense Cooperation in 2001, positioning radar systems able to monitor Chinese missile tests, holding bilateral military exercises since 2004 and having a quiet discussion over basing rights.

Indian relations with Tajikistan and Afghanistan in particular also have the potential to undermine China's use of Pakistan as a proxy state against India in an attempt to split its focus along two fronts. With greater influence in Afghanistan, New Delhi can potentially undercut Pakistani influence in a country which Islamabad has traditionally considered as within its strategic sphere of influence.

Extending into the maritime realm, further cooperation and encirclement can be observed as India has developed ties with some historically contentious neighbors of the Chinese. First of all, Indo-Singapore relations have flourished in recent years with their Defense Cooperation agreement of 2003 upgrading ties and extending bilateral military exercises into all three wings of the armed forces, and most significantly the SIMBEX naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea.

Relations with Singapore have particular geopolitical importance as Singapore is at the western approaches to the South China Sea and eastern approaches to the Strait of Malacca, both vital sea lanes of communication for India and China. Close security relations between New Delhi and Singapore allow for strong power projection by the Indian navy into the South China Sea, an area of particular sensitivity to China with its claims of sovereignty over the sea; they also allow for India to threaten the closure of the Strait of Malacca, exacerbating Beijing's "Malacca Dilemma".

Next stop along India's maritime encirclement of China is Vietnam, with New Delhi and Hanoi sharing a history of conflict with China. Strong ties exist dating back to their 1994 defense agreement and include military training and bilateral naval exercises carried out in the South China Sea which have drawn much criticism from Beijing, not helped by the talk of India providing BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, presenting an undeniable deterrent to Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.

Hanoi has also recently granted the Indian Navy basing rights at the Nha Trang port, providing a foothold in the South China Sea and intensifying Chinese fears, demonstrated by the July 22, 2011, confrontation of INS Airavat when operating off the Vietnamese coast.

Indo-Japanese security relations provide a real security dilemma for China, as close ties between these two historically contentious neighbors pose the possibility of a pincer movement by two great powers and complete the encirclement of China by land and sea.

Ties between India and Japan are continuously growing and expanding further into the security field with the MALABAR naval exercises. These relations and encirclement of China is further complemented by expanding ties with Japan's old ally and China's greatest threat, the United States. While ties between New Delhi and Washington remain fairly low key, partially due to India's non-alignment strategy, they hold the greatest potential for containment of China. Both sides hold their relations in high esteem, with President Barack Obama proclaiming that their relationship "will be one of the defining relationships of the 21st century".

Despite the constant rhetoric emanating from India proclaiming it has no intention of encirclement or containment of its communist neighbor, its actions, as so often found in international relations, speak much louder volumes about its intentions and reveal a great concern over China's rise to Great Power status.

However, these concerns may be well placed as China has been undertaking many actions which can easily be interpreted as an effort to encircle India and contain its rise, tying it down to the Indian subcontinent. So depending on which angle one observes the situation from, either side can be construed to be the aggressor or just acting in a defensive manner.

Daniel Thorp is an International Politics graduate of Brunel University UK, specializing in Asia-Pacific security and international relations

PS:The ref. to Mahanian thought in the IN appears to be misplaced.We seem to have settled for one more inclined towards the British theoretician,Corbett ".that since men live upon land and not the sea....issues between great nations have always been decided by what the army can do to an enemy's territory and national life.....and what the fleet makes it possible for the army to do".

[member_23455]

Let's take a brief look at the evolution of the IN's carrier capabilities.

PS:The ref. to Mahanian thought in the IN appears to be misplaced.We seem to have settled for one more inclined towards the British theoretician,Corbett".that since men live upon land and not the sea....issues between great nations have always been decided by what the army can do to an enemy's territory and national life.....and what the fleet makes it possible for the army to do".

That's a red herring used to drive a certain bias against "shacking up with Yanks". If that is what is happening in the first place.

There's a Robert Kaplan, Yoshi Toshihara, Monroe Doctrine, Naval War College, Rhode Island, NAS Whiting and Pensacola dimension to this debate as well.

Analyzing these might be equally useful in constructing a hypothesis which remains very fluid, and therefore interesting.

[Akshay Kapoor]

Question for TSarkar sir,

What are the thoughts on the hull states of Godavari's and Rajput, Rana and Ranjit? Some of these ships are over 30 years old. And when will P17A start? I'm just wondering when we will move significantly above 20 destroyers and frigates. Soon we will have to think about replacements for the khukri class and the Veer class missile boats too.

[Anthony Hines]

Let's take a brief look at the evolution of the IN's carrier capabilities.In the formative years,more than one carrier was envisaged and Lord Mountbatten's vision for the IN saw the Vikrant acquired.At that time,our primary concerns were on land."Police actions" in H'Bad and Goa.Came '62 and the debacle with China,the Indo-Pak war of '65 saw very little action on the part of the IN.The IAF had for long been squeezing the IN's demand for a more capable Fleet Air Arm.It was in the aftermath of '71 that the full capability of the IN who used vintage platforms and aircraft to devastating effect along with coastal defence missile craft towed to Karachi,was realised. That saw the Sea Harriers and Viraat acquired,which gave the IN a quantum increase in capability in the '80s.The Harriers had proved themselves in the Falklands as excellent air-defence aircraft,which shot down many Argie Mirages,never losing an air combat battle.

However,by the Millenium,it was obvious that even the larger Viraat and its SHs,in LUSH avatar,would have limitations in sea control and power projection,supporting amphib/overseas ops,which we were being thrust into in the aftermath of Sri Lanka and the Maldives.The "Look East" policy took wing,the vulnerability of the island territories and the rapid growth and expansion of ops of the PLAN with cafoot at "Mischief Reef" in the Indo-China Sea.There were few available old carriers that could embark the kind of multi-role 4th-gen + aircraft that the IN required.The option chosen was the Gorky-MIG-29K package signed on in 2004 after 8 years of negotiations! The same MIG-29Ks have also been chosen for the IAC-1,the new Vikrant.These aircraft will now give us when operational aboard the two carriers another quantum leap in capability over the SHs,esp. in expanding the "bubble" of fleet air defence,strike-when equipped with the light-weight BMos to 700KM+,and considerable air support for any amphib ops. in the IOR.As of now we have principal security agreements with the Maldives,Seychelles,Mauritius,Sri Lanka and some African nations,who have agreed to provide us with logistic support for IN warships.Beyond the IOR,India and Vietnam have agreements for training,etc., and the "basing rights" of a small port at Nha Trang. Once the 4 amphib vessels arrive,which will be of capability not lesser than the French Mistral,from the IN's requirements,and the third carrier too becomes operational post 2025,the IN's capability to strike far and hard at enemy land targets will be greaty enhanced. I posted a day ago the facts that Chinese industrial base is principally located all around its coastal regions, which is why the Chinese are also expanding their defensive "bubble" beyond the "first island chain",further into the Asia-Pacific seas.

Here are excerpts as to how we are trying to do to the Chines what they are doing to us,encirclement.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/NG12Df01.html

There has been a particular growing fear of a "China Threat" within Indian government and strategist circles over the past decade, with many feeling Beijing is engaging in encirclement and containment strategies in a persistent attempt to tie India down to the Indian subcontinent. Responding to this perceived threat, New Delhi has gradually been undertaking a combination of internal balancing, by means of increasing its military capabilities on both land and at sea, and external balancing, via military cooperation with states in East and Southeast Asia.

Indian internal balancing has taken various forms and has been reflected in the increasing defense budget which was announced as US$41 billion for 2012-13, a 17% increase on the previous year.

Firstly, this has helped to fund an ongoing military modernization program with the recent deal for 126 French Rafale fighters to be supplied by Dassault over the coming decade in conjunction with over 200 fifth-generation fighter aircraft to be developed in cooperation with Russia by 2017.

Secondly, India has been strengthening its defenses along its disputed border regions with China; 100,000 additional troops were stationed along the Line of Actual Control in 2011, along with the deployment of the 300-kilometer range BrahMos cruise missile along the eastern border region. These deployments have been complemented by increasing infrastructural developments including new roads and the construction and upgrading of assorted air bases across the regions.

Finally, and most significantly, India has been bolstering its nuclear capabilities with its "flawless" test of the Agni-V missile, which is able to carry a nuclear warhead and with a 5,000-kilometer range can strike a majority of major Chinese cities along its eastern seaboard.

In addition to military modernization on land, New Delhi has been developing its naval capabilities with naval commanders taking a visible turn in the direction of the teachings of Alfred T Mahan and his sea-based geopolitical philosophy, with ambitious future plans for a fully fledged and highly capable blue water navy able to protect coastal waters, vital sea lanes of communication and project power deep into the Indian and surrounding oceans.

Naval modernization has included the establishment of two new deep-sea naval port facilities at Kawar on the southwest coast and near Viskhapatnam as part of the Eastern Naval Command. In tandem with the establishment of the Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, the Indian Navy is able to project power across the Bay of Bengal and into the Strait of Malacca, intensifying China's "Malacca Dilemma".

These developments have been complemented by the increasing purchases and indigenous development of naval hardware, including the nuclear submarine INS Chakra on a 10-year lease form Russia and the locally developed INS Airhant. Additionally, the former Russian aircraft carrier Gorshkov, renamed INS Vikramaditya, is to be commissioned into service of the Indian Navy by December 2012. These recent enlargements will make up part of a planned 160-vessel fleet including three aircraft carrier groups by the mid 2020s, outlined by Indian Naval Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta.

Internal balancing is taking considerable shape with increasing hardware purchases and consistent upgrading of military capabilities along the border with China and also in the naval realm, where China is undergoing rapid expansion, increasing competition in and around the Indian Ocean. This balancing has also taken considerable shape in terms of external balancing and cooperation with other states in the region.

Military cooperation with other states extends across the realms of both land and sea. On land, New Delhi has become increasingly invested in its relations with Afghanistan, establishing a Strategic Partnership in October 2011, eyeing a greater role following the planned 2014 withdrawal of coalition forces.

With Tajikistan, India has increased its interaction with Tajik security forces and has provided funding for the upgrading of the Farkhor and Ayni air bases succeeding construction of a military hospital and logistics depot. Ayni air base is of particular significance with reports that Tajikistan, India and Russia are in talks over the joint use of the base and that an Indian air force currently has Mi-17 helicopters and has leased Russian fighter jets stationed at the base.

New Delhi has also increased cooperation with Mongolia, signing an agreement on Defense Cooperation in 2001, positioning radar systems able to monitor Chinese missile tests, holding bilateral military exercises since 2004 and having a quiet discussion over basing rights.

Indian relations with Tajikistan and Afghanistan in particular also have the potential to undermine China's use of Pakistan as a proxy state against India in an attempt to split its focus along two fronts. With greater influence in Afghanistan, New Delhi can potentially undercut Pakistani influence in a country which Islamabad has traditionally considered as within its strategic sphere of influence.

Extending into the maritime realm, further cooperation and encirclement can be observed as India has developed ties with some historically contentious neighbors of the Chinese. First of all, Indo-Singapore relations have flourished in recent years with their Defense Cooperation agreement of 2003 upgrading ties and extending bilateral military exercises into all three wings of the armed forces, and most significantly the SIMBEX naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea.

Relations with Singapore have particular geopolitical importance as Singapore is at the western approaches to the South China Sea and eastern approaches to the Strait of Malacca, both vital sea lanes of communication for India and China. Close security relations between New Delhi and Singapore allow for strong power projection by the Indian navy into the South China Sea, an area of particular sensitivity to China with its claims of sovereignty over the sea; they also allow for India to threaten the closure of the Strait of Malacca, exacerbating Beijing's "Malacca Dilemma".

Next stop along India's maritime encirclement of China is Vietnam, with New Delhi and Hanoi sharing a history of conflict with China. Strong ties exist dating back to their 1994 defense agreement and include military training and bilateral naval exercises carried out in the South China Sea which have drawn much criticism from Beijing, not helped by the talk of India providing BrahMos missiles to Vietnam, presenting an undeniable deterrent to Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.

Hanoi has also recently granted the Indian Navy basing rights at the Nha Trang port, providing a foothold in the South China Sea and intensifying Chinese fears, demonstrated by the July 22, 2011, confrontation of INS Airavat when operating off the Vietnamese coast.

Indo-Japanese security relations provide a real security dilemma for China, as close ties between these two historically contentious neighbors pose the possibility of a pincer movement by two great powers and complete the encirclement of China by land and sea.

Ties between India and Japan are continuously growing and expanding further into the security field with the MALABAR naval exercises. These relations and encirclement of China is further complemented by expanding ties with Japan's old ally and China's greatest threat, the United States. While ties between New Delhi and Washington remain fairly low key, partially due to India's non-alignment strategy, they hold the greatest potential for containment of China. Both sides hold their relations in high esteem, with President Barack Obama proclaiming that their relationship "will be one of the defining relationships of the 21st century".

Despite the constant rhetoric emanating from India proclaiming it has no intention of encirclement or containment of its communist neighbor, its actions, as so often found in international relations, speak much louder volumes about its intentions and reveal a great concern over China's rise to Great Power status.

However, these concerns may be well placed as China has been undertaking many actions which can easily be interpreted as an effort to encircle India and contain its rise, tying it down to the Indian subcontinent. So depending on which angle one observes the situation from, either side can be construed to be the aggressor or just acting in a defensive manner.

Daniel Thorp is an International Politics graduate of Brunel University UK, specializing in Asia-Pacific security and international relations

PS:The ref. to Mahanian thought in the IN appears to be misplaced.We seem to have settled for one more inclined towards the British theoretician,Corbett ".that since men live upon land and not the sea....issues between great nations have always been decided by what the army can do to an enemy's territory and national life.....and what the fleet makes it possible for the army to do".

So what is your point?