INS Vikramaditya: News and Discussion

[venkat_r]

Arguing on the cost with hindsight is not right. It was the best descision that we could take at that time and it is history now.

Vik is still a Aircraft carrier and is needed by India - and the price is also ok. Yes, there seems to be some issues like documentation and knowledge sharing. For Russians working on the project, it is like creating the best ship of their lives and giving it to Indians, if there was extra money are not. As India tries to diversify its defence sources, more such attitude can be expected from the Russians, not less. So lets get brace ourselves and come up with multiple ways to handle it. India will be dependent on Russia for few more decades even when the diversification is going on.

It is safe to assume that building a new carrier might have costed lot more with another partner and with Indian procurement system, who knows we might have still been burried in the RFP, RFQ, evaluation stages by now. The extra money is a little tax you pay for not having the ability to do it yourself or lack of other options. Lets be prdudent and move on.

[Indranil]

Arguing on the cost with hindsight is not right.

Could not have said it better.

[Austin]

Arguing on the cost with hindsight is not right. It was the best descision that we could take at that time and it is history now.

Vik is still a Aircraft carrier and is needed by India - and the price is also ok. Yes, there seems to be some issues like documentation and knowledge sharing. For Russians working on the project, it is like creating the best ship of their lives and giving it to Indians, if there was extra money are not. As India tries to diversify its defence sources, more such attitude can be expected from the Russians, not less. So lets get brace ourselves and come up with multiple ways to handle it. India will be dependent on Russia for few more decades even when the diversification is going on.

It is safe to assume that building a new carrier might have costed lot more with another partner and with Indian procurement system, who knows we might have still been burried in the RFP, RFQ, evaluation stages by now. The extra money is a little tax you pay for not having the ability to do it yourself or lack of other options. Lets be prdudent and move on.

Quite a good post in the trash we have seen in this thread.

MOD and IN took a decision at a time and geo-political consideration that was best known them , even IN chief said that Vikram was the best they got for the money they put and he was willing to write a blank cheque if some one got it cheaper.

As long as the Navy is happy with what they got we should be happy and move on.

[Will]

Years ago... I had opened a thread on Keymags named the "Gorshkov Saga". That was when B Harry was with us(May His Soul RIP). I never imagined what a saga it would turn out to be. But finally, since its on its way to us now, lets stop debating the merits and demerits of the deal and welcome her . Discussion should now move on to its deployment and the new Vikrant and the IAC-2

[NRao]

Hind sight is what BR and such are about - there is very little in terms of real-time discussion (only because most of us do not have the info on hand).

That we should move on is a given. That we are not doing so is also a given - there is really nothing else to discuss - perhaps best to shut this thread down.

Arguing on the cost with hindsight is not right.

Without conducting research or hiding behind the skirt of a CNS is worse. There is plenty to "arguing" if one were to conduct some basic research. You should find nuggets that the IN did not want this ship - only some in the IN (perhaps the very higher ups) did. The FinMin did not want to fund the revised cost, so I am assuming that someone in the MoD wanted it bad enough to force the FinMin to find teh extra 1.15 billion from somewhere. There is even a quote from a sailor who (in Nov) said something like "Bahut tang keeya" - there is quite a bit of bad blood because of this incidence. All that if one does some research (and is not biased).

This is not a proper carrier either - she seems to be worse than the Vikrant in some respects - but that is to be expected (and many had said so then - not in hindsight) - because she was considered a cruiser and converting a cruiser to a carrier would not produce an optimal carrier.

On blank check: yes, why not. The die was cast, what else can he say?

She is an asset to do a few things, but is not an optimal asset to conduct a war, especially at that price.

But, then who does proper research?

-----------------

Moving along, with the FGFA taking a very, very similar path, IMHO it should be dumped.

[Anthony Hines]

Lot of information and discussion has taken place on this subject by folks here who have a lot more knowledge than I do. Having said that, I as a layman can tell an Apple from a Lemon when I see one. Vikky looks like a very sour Lemon.

[member_23455]

Lot of information and discussion has taken place on this subject by folks here who have a lot more knowledge than I do. Having said that, I as a layman can tell an Apple from a Lemon when I see one. Vikky looks like a very sour Lemon.

Number of posts on BR does not equate with knowledge.

Too bad the chaps who actually know how to use a carrier in a battle do not share your viewpoint.

Sour lemon is good...prevents scurvy in sailors.

[alexis]

^^
Other than Russians and resident Russophiles, i doubt anyone in the world would say that India got a good deal. I agree with NRao that we could have got a new carrier instead of Vik at this price if ordered 10 years ago.

UK got a new carrier double the size with fully outfitted with BMS and equipment at $5 billion. If we add fitting out costs for Vik, it would easily cross $3 billion. Then there is a question mark over the life of the ship - whether 10/20/30 yrs; only time will tell.

Another issue is that we dont know if we got all the design diagrams and manuals. Going by the past experiences, i doubt.

[Eric Leiderman]

Some of us seem to have our minds made up so discourse is not of a caliber worth enumerating. We also seem to be jumping to conclusions.

1) V-Aditya is a lemon
2) She has a lift in the path of her runway
3) She is of little or no use against the PLAN
4) Her island is not off to one side (Please explain this in relation to sortie rate)

Can any of these enlightened gents please answer a few questions.
1) What is her sortie rate? (yes I know ,that is not as yet open source and till it is we cannot assume anything) This is one of the most important criteria
2) Has she night take off and landing capabilities (I have seen video that she has on Arror"s site)
3) Is her Airwing below par is capability (I think the 29's are a very capably platform and her air wing will be armed over time to hunt with the best)
4) Is her cruising speed below what the navy requires, (I am sure it more than meets requirements)
5) Is the Mig 29 capabilities matching or superior to any other Asian Airwing, Statistics please like take off weight , stores carriage , fuel, ferry range . Of course off the respective carriers.
AWAC capability,

Also while b..ching about her capabilities, she is coming in cheaper than IAC1 (No excuses now gents, facts only)
For her tonnage and size her air wing is about 15 % smaller than would be ideal that is a deficiency and due to the fact that she was orignally a cruiser.
She will be a bit heavy on the fuel
Any other gripes?

Reasons please.

[Singha]

imo it adds the much needed 3rd dimension to our navy to cheaply and effectively harass/sink enemy surface forces 500km away using the Mig29K and ASMs.
also enemy LRMP birds can be chased down and attacked, making them keep much further away than they would to a SAG without a carrier.
that way it definitely enhances the safety of the fleet from air attack - remember the TSP has got access not just to harpoons but supersonic chinese ASMs now and the Bander isnt as weak a performer as the Mirage-III in the maritime strike role. and block52 F-16 with amraam would be escorting.

[member_23455]

^^
Other than Russians and resident Russophiles, i doubt anyone in the world would say that India got a good deal.

Conflating being shafted on a deal with the combat effectiveness of a weapon system is where most posters with an open mind on the Vikramaditya have a problem.

Not just ship worthiness but a host of things about the Vikramaditya will be evident and proven "in time". So let's give it that instead of the 1000th post on the topic saying the same things which no one really contests.

Incidentally there's a host of corollary stuff around the Vikramaditya - CBG, doctrine, air wing etc., that is not only highly interesting but requires discussion and digging around. It's our choice where we want to take this thread.

Some of us seem to have our minds made up so discourse is not of a caliber worth enumerating.
Reasons please.

Oh no. Now you have gone and done it! The last time we went down this route, there was some breathtaking knowledge on display here. Scroll back a few pages for comedy gold.

[Philip]

For all those who fondly imagine that a new carrier could've be built on time and within budget need to look again at the UK's QE class CV fiasco as well as the progress of IAC-1,which has also suffered delays .In fact more than 75% of indigenous shipbuilding of our warships has been delayed.Just look at the follow on K class DDGs which are finished without their primary air defence SAMs from Israel in a JV. Where are the Brak-8s and why is their a mysterious silence on the matter? In fact even the French had serious problems with the N-powered CGD which I posted earlier.

The days of waiting are over,the carrier is sailing to India flying the IN's colours.There is little point b*tching about a decision taken in the last century when times were different and the Cold War was with us.It is now upto the IN to make full use of the carrier and exploit its capabilities to the maximum,a quantum leap ahead of the capabilities of the Viraat. It would also be interesting to see how our small Sea Harrier wing operates from the Vikram in conjunction with the MIG-29Ks when the Viraat is in for repairs/refit.

Just one report on our delays with IAC-1.


India's First Indigenous Carrier Faces Delays, Cost Growth
By VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI
Ship Scheduled for Aug. 12 Launch
Aug. 8, 2013 -

NEW DELHI — While India claims that its first home-built carrier, the Vikrant, will be fully operational by 2018, Indian Navy sources say that date is closer to 2020 since the ship is only about 30 percent complete.

On Aug. 12, India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-1) will be launched nearly four years behind schedule. The ship is being built by state-owned Cochin Shipyard Limited at Kochi in southern India.

The aircraft carrier will be floated out of dry dock, then redocked in order to mount the propulsion system. Work will then begin on the deck and the weapon systems before sea trials. And while Defence Ministry officials say those trials will begin by 2016, Indian Navy sources say it will not be before 2018-19.

“Launch merely means they will float the IAC-1 from the dry dock [to outfit the interior],, which includes laying of pipes, and after that it will be dry docked again for integration of propulsion systems,” an Indian Navy source said

Not only will Vikrant’s induction be delayed, but sources add that the total cost of the carrier will be more than US $5 billion, including the aircraft and weapons systems. When the project was approved in 2003, the ship was estimated to cost around $500 million. Sources said the construction of the carrier, minus the weapon systems and aircraft, will cost more than $2.2 billion.

Indian Navy spokesman Cmdr. P.V. Satish insisted that IAC-1 will be inducted in 2018.

“First and foremost, it needs to be understood that constructing an aircraft carrier is a very complex task. At the time of keel laying of the IAC in 2009, it was estimated that the ship would be delivered by 2014-15,” he said. “However, due to delays in arrival of some machinery from foreign sources, which are essential prior to the launch of the ship, the Phase I launch of the ship has been delayed by around three years. There have been certain other delays also in finalizing the detailed design aspects due to uniqueness of the systems. Things are now in place and we look forward to a targeted delivery by 2018.”

Indian Navy sources countered that at the time of the launch, only the hull and the outer structure will be completed, about 30 percent of the total work needed for the carrier.

After laying piping, the carrier will be redocked to mount the gear box, hydraulic systems, generator systems and propulsion system.

Work will then focus on the hangar deck for aircraft, berthing spaces for 1,400 sailors, boiler room and the flight deck.

Before sea trials, workers will install the Israeli-made Barak air defense system, multi-function radar system, A630 close-in weapon system and combat management system, the sources added.

An Indian Navy official said this ship will be able to stop attacks from enemy aircraft and will have anti-submarine defense systems. All systems on board will be integrated through a combat management system.

The Vikrant will be 262 meters long and be able to accommodate around 30 aircraft, including helicopters.

“IAC-1 features a STOBAR [short take-off but arrested recovery] configuration with a ski-jump. The deck is designed to enable aircraft such as the MiG-29 to operate from the carrier. It will deploy up to 20 fixed-wing aircraft, primarily the Mikoyan MiG-29K and the naval variant of indigenous Tejas Mark 2, besides carrying 10 Kamov Ka-31 helicopters,” the Indian Navy official said.

The Navy plans to have three aircraft carriers; a final decision is awaited on the IAC-2, which would be another homemade carrier but would displace more than 60,000 tons, 20,000 tons more than Vikrant. IAC-2 is still in the design stage but will have a catapult deck.

“IAC-2 is currently on the design board. Various feasibility options for the carrier are presently being pursued. Detailed study on the type and complement of aircraft and the ships’ propulsion options is being progressed to further narrow down design options,” Satish said.

Despite the delays and ballooning cost of IAC-1, defense planners, Indian Navy officials and analysts agree that India must build — not import — its carriers.

“Getting modern carriers in the open market is not easy. Our experience with Vikramaditya [Russian-made Admiral Gorshkov] is evidence,” said Probal Ghosh, senior fellow, Observer Research Foundation, adding that the Navy should now concentrate on IAC-2 and begin construction as soon as possible.

“Personally, I don’t think India should look toward procuring an aircraft carrier from abroad. Indigenous development with foreign collaboration, transfer of technology in certain areas where we may not have the expertise as yet would be far more prudent,” said Anil Jai Singh, retired Indian Navy commodore and vice president of the National Maritime Foundation.

Having three carriers allows one to be stationed on each of India’s coasts, while the third would undergo repairs or perform other duties such as training.

“The Navy has a clearly spelt-out capability plan which factors a balanced growth and includes a plan to have two carrier battle groups,” Satish said. “This will naturally entail having three carriers with requisite support ships to form a battle group. All the components are equally important.”

[Austin]

Longish Article in Russian use Translator

Through thorns to the "Almighty"

[Aditya G]

Let me throw in a couple of doctrine related query here so that we can take this thread to a different tangent.

1. How would the Vikramaditya be employed in the Indo-Pak context? Suppose Gwadar is to be independently targetted by the Indian Navy without help from the Air Force. I have a basic doubt:

- Vikramaditya will launch fighters with land attack KH-35s. Thus, she will directly engage the target while escorts Teg, Satpura and Kolkata only screen for submarines, enemey aircraft and other dangers.

"OR"

- The facility will be attacked by Brahmos/Klub/Nirbhay launched by Kolkata/Teg while MiG-29s will secure the airspace. Thus, the carrier is only supporting the offensive.

2. What will be composition of Vikramaditya CBG? Assuming a cruise to Mauritius or similar littoral state.

[srin]

The armchair fleet admiral in me would use it to do the following:
a) total destruction of TSP surface fleet and Orions

b) Air cover to IN ships enforcing naval blockade

c) Opportunistic ALCM strikes against Gwadar and Karachi

[Peregrine]

Philip Ji :

Any idea if the INS Vikramaditya Group took the First or Second Exit at the "Gibraltar Round-About".

Cheers

[member_23455]

Let me throw in a couple of doctrine related query here so that we can take this thread to a different tangent.

1. How would the Vikramaditya be employed in the Indo-Pak context? Suppose Gwadar is to be independently targetted by the Indian Navy without help from the Air Force. I have a basic doubt:

- Vikramaditya will launch fighters with land attack KH-35s. Thus, she will directly engage the target while escorts Teg, Satpura and Kolkata only screen for submarines, enemey aircraft and other dangers.

"OR"

- The facility will be attacked by Brahmos/Klub/Nirbhay launched by Kolkata/Teg while MiG-29s will secure the airspace. Thus, the carrier is only supporting the offensive.

2. What will be composition of Vikramaditya CBG? Assuming a cruise to Mauritius or similar littoral state.

Doctrine exists at the highest level and is largely the domain of strategy. From that flows operational plans and then tactics - these two really are the relevant elements to your scenario.

Is this the first shot fired in a conflict? Why would you lose operational surprise for the low payoff of targeting secondary naval forces (despite the sub threat, which may have already dispersed) rather than go after high payoff from the primary naval threat, which also is the economic jugular of the enemy?

Once surprise is lost, it will be much more difficult to target Karachi. What weapon systems to use where depends on the kind of target. Pretty much everything will be thrown at them - surface, sub-surface, and air.

Gwader incidentally can be disrupted in...ahem, "other ways." And one needs to steer clear of counter-detection by a pretty strong Iranian and possibly Chinese presence out of Chabahar.

[Pranay]

Once surprise is lost, it will be much more difficult to target Karachi. What weapon systems to use where depends on the kind of target. Pretty much everything will be thrown at them - surface, sub-surface, and air.

Depending on where they are launched from - the Prithvi/Agni combo will always come attached with their own "surprise factor".

[Karan M]

Let me throw in a couple of doctrine related query here so that we can take this thread to a different tangent.

1. How would the Vikramaditya be employed in the Indo-Pak context? Suppose Gwadar is to be independently targetted by the Indian Navy without help from the Air Force. I have a basic doubt:

- Vikramaditya will launch fighters with land attack KH-35s. Thus, she will directly engage the target while escorts Teg, Satpura and Kolkata only screen for submarines, enemey aircraft and other dangers.

"OR"

- The facility will be attacked by Brahmos/Klub/Nirbhay launched by Kolkata/Teg while MiG-29s will secure the airspace. Thus, the carrier is only supporting the offensive.

Why not both? And not OR. There can be 16-24 MiG-29s on the carrier after all.

[Viv S]

For all those who fondly imagine that a new carrier could've be built on time and within budget need to look again at the UK's QE class CV fiasco as well as the progress of IAC-1,which has also suffered delays .In fact more than 75% of indigenous shipbuilding of our warships has been delayed.Just look at the follow on K class DDGs which are finished without their primary air defence SAMs from Israel in a JV. Where are the Brak-8s and why is their a mysterious silence on the matter? In fact even the French had serious problems with the N-powered CGD which I posted earlier.

This again? I suggest you look at the 'QE class fiasco' again before presenting it as a case study.

Of the $5 billion cost, $1.25 billion was directly a result of the delivery schedules being revised (refer MoD report posted). That was due to extraneous circumstances. And lest you suggest that the same could apply to India, we're talking about a £38 billion funding shortfall, that's about $60 billion worth of cuts.

Another $150 million was spent on the rolled-back CATOBAR conversion. Adding to that is the fact that the QE program was sanctioned long after the Gorshkov green-light, and therefore reflects a higher inflationary cost.

Bottom-line, the core cost of the QE was $3.6 billion which includes inflation as well as the cost of radars and weapon systems.


Coming to the IAC-1 -

i) Its being built domestically. Large proportion of the outlay is invested domestically.
ii) The experience gained from the production cannot be replicated through ToT or 'observation' at Sevmash. This is an investment that'll feed into many future shipbuilding programs, starting with the IAC-2.
iii) It will be far better than the Vikramaditya despite its lower tonnage. Every aspect from the propulsion and transmission, to the deck layout and internal design, to the radar and thermal signature reduction, is based on a technically superior solution. And that'll reflect not just in the sortie generation rate but also the ship's maintenance, refit and turnaround times in port.

[titash]

For all those who fondly imagine that a new carrier could've be built on time and within budget need to look again at the UK's QE class CV fiasco as well as the progress of IAC-1,which has also suffered delays .In fact more than 75% of indigenous shipbuilding of our warships has been delayed.Just look at the follow on K class DDGs which are finished without their primary air defence SAMs from Israel in a JV. Where are the Brak-8s and why is their a mysterious silence on the matter? In fact even the French had serious problems with the N-powered CGD which I posted earlier.

This again? I suggest you look at the 'QE class fiasco' again before presenting it as a case study.

Of the $5 billion cost, $1.25 billion was directly a result of the delivery schedules being revised (refer MoD report posted). That was due to extraneous circumstances. And lest you suggest that the same could apply to India, we're talking about a £38 billion funding shortfall, that's about $60 billion worth of cuts.

Another $150 million was spent on the rolled-back CATOBAR conversion. Adding to that is the fact that the QE program was sanctioned long after the Gorshkov green-light, and therefore reflects a higher inflationary cost.

Bottom-line, the core cost of the QE was $3.6 billion which includes inflation as well as the cost of radars and weapon systems.


Coming to the IAC-1 -

i) Its being built domestically. Large proportion of the outlay is invested domestically.
ii) The experience gained from the production cannot be replicated through ToT or 'observation' at Sevmash. This is an investment that'll feed into many future shipbuilding programs, starting with the IAC-2.
iii) It will be far better than the Vikramaditya despite its lower tonnage. Every aspect from the propulsion and transmission, to the deck layout and internal design, to the radar and thermal signature reduction, is based on a technically superior solution. And that'll reflect not just in the sortie generation rate but also the ship's maintenance, refit and turnaround times in port.

Viv S,
The points about the IAC being superior to the VikAd are valid - it is designed as a carrier from the keel up. The only point I would make is that we need to move on and stop flogging the dead horse.

1) Back in the 1990s when we ordered VikAd, there was simply nothing else on offer. The Invincibles did not offer anything better than the Viraat, and the french weren't putting the Foch on sale (and having them build a brand new Foch class unit at DCNS would have been prohibitive). CATOBAR wasn't an option and we already had a STOVL carrier. STOBAR became a reality due to a very bold experiment by the russians...we thought we could replicate the same with the LCA and build a mini ADS. However the LCA was nowhere close to being ready. In a nutshell, our options were:

- STOVL harrier...we already had them, and they offered limited capability, and had high accident rates
- CATOBAR aircraft...available only from the USA along with the catapult; a no-no back in the 1990s
- STOBAR aircraft...LCA was not ready and the *ONLY* option was the MiG-29k

2) At this point, with the russians in dire need for hard cash, they played their cards very well and offered the MiG-29k provided we paid for the VikAd (which was surplus to their requirements anyway). When their own country was in dire need of cash, why would they just sell aircraft and part with the STOBAR enabling technology. Let us be fair to them too.

3) Most importantly, the IAC uses russian STOBAR carrier technology (ski jump + arrester wires + fighter control/direction)...in fact, it uses the same one as the VikAd. Without purchasing the VikAd, we would simply have doubled the cost of the IAC to get these technologies. Keep in mind that western/israeli options became genuine options only after 9/11

So all in all, it's a compromise, but it's all for the best.

[Viv S]

Viv S,
The points about the IAC being superior to the VikAd are valid - it is designed as a carrier from the keel up. The only point I would make is that we need to move on and stop flogging the dead horse.

My posts on the matter are primarily to rebut the 'grand bargain' idea that some like Philip have espoused. The important thing is to learn our lessons from the experience by recognizing the facts behind. Particularly with regard to programs like the MTA and FGFA that many still view through rosy coloured glasses.

1) Back in the 1990s when we ordered VikAd, there was simply nothing else on offer. The Invincibles did not offer anything better than the Viraat, and the french weren't putting the Foch on sale (and having them build a brand new Foch class unit at DCNS would have been prohibitive).

That's the point. The cost of a new carrier was not in fact prohibitive vis a vis the refurbishment of the Gorshkov. At $800 million it was a bargain, but the subsequent cost escalation cannot be explained away by just back luck or poor planning.

CATOBAR wasn't an option and we already had a STOVL carrier. STOBAR became a reality due to a very bold experiment by the russians...we thought we could replicate the same with the LCA and build a mini ADS. However the LCA was nowhere close to being ready. In a nutshell, our options were:

While the Russians were the first to implement STOBAR, it wasn't much of a technical challenge. Both ski-jumps and arrested recovery had been around for decades. That the US/UK/France didn't implement it reflects their emphasis on payload in lieu of cheaper shipbuilding. In contrast, as I understand it, the Russians emphasized employment of the carrier air wing for fleet defence (lower payloads) rather than strike (which was primarily carried out by Bears, Badgers and Backfires).

2) At this point, with the russians in dire need for hard cash, they played their cards very well and offered the MiG-29k provided we paid for the VikAd (which was surplus to their requirements anyway). When their own country was in dire need of cash, why would they just sell aircraft and part with the STOBAR enabling technology. Let us be fair to them too.

Actually they offered the VikAd provided we paid for the MiG-29K. They wouldn't have had any issues had it being operated off any other carrier (BTW the Harrier II was still available in late 90s).

And there's no STOBAR 'technology' as such that has been transferred to India.

[NRao]

flogging the dead horse

In theory I agree, but it is a slow day/thread, so pardon me.

The party line is that India did not have any options - and I agree that should be the official stated reason, no problem with that. CNS stating he will give a blank check and the Saint calling it a great project between two strategic partners, etc, etc, etc, is all fine - they have to say that (they do not mean it).

However, around 2007-8, when India came to realize that the ship will not be delivered in 2008, India did have an option. There was a debate within India and there were voices within the IN opting to decline the Vicky. Russia offered to absorb her into her Navy and also provided an option to India to come up with alternatives (India could either provide another buyer OR substitute another product (silently asking for the MMRCA was the feeling by some). Also, IMHO, the conviction in 2007-8 that Russia could not complete the task at hand fro some $947 million could not have come suddenly - that is not possible - I suspect that the Russians came to realize the total scope of the project much earlier - I would think some time in 2005-6 time frame. So, if all was really well between the two "nations" there was ample time to sit and actually deal with teh situation in a proper manner so that it was a win-win for both. So, IMHO, Russia could have been given a design (which would have taken some time granted) and Russia could have built a brand new ship. Granted for some thing more than $2.25 that the Vicky cost.

This was avoidable, granted it would have cost some more. But, if FinMin could cough up $1.5 billion, they could find some more for sure. Or cancel the whole thing until proper arrangements could be made. I do not think the current one is worth it, acceptable - because it is there, but not worth it.

OK, that horse is dead.
____________________________

Been comparing the Vicky with the IAC-1. A little too early to post, but here is what I have found. Talking of "sorties" (since someone brought it up), The IAC-1 i bet will be far superior. The vexing part is that the two ships are nearly identical - tonnage, speed, air wing, etc. Vicky is longer and very slightly broader. BUT, the IAC-1 has a much longer run (206 vs. some (160) 180 meters). And, of course, the most irritating part is the elevator on the Vicky. With a full complement it is going to be a problem, especially when compared to the IAC-1 - for sure the short run will inoperable, but the landings may also be impacted (if the 2nd elevator is in use). Use of the 1st elevator will impact the number of parking, since the parked planes (two of them) will jut out over the elevator and landings. So, I suspect that sorties will be impacted. By how much I cannot say, but I feel confident (as a total lay man) that as compared to the IAC-1 they will be.

With a longer run, I would expect that a 29K from the IAC-1 would be better equipped, again, by how much I do not know.

Both the ships have very similar hanger areas (give and take a couple of meters), so the location of the elevators also should impact operations below the main deck. Again, I am not sure how it will be impacted, but I expect the IAC-1 to have better "flow" (operation wise).

OK, dead horse II (may post if I find something imp on Vicky vs. IAC-1)

______________________________

On "they will make it work" - where did that doubt come from? After experiencing Kargil there can be no doubt on such matters. However, the point (IMHO) is that India should not impose a Kargil, especially when it can be avoided.

Dead horse III

____________________________

On IAC-1, the initial estimate was $500 million - including the techs Russia was providing. Today the cost is at $3 billion (not $2.2 billion as stated in the article posted above).

IIRC the Russians gave some problems with supplying the steel for this ship, which prompted India to develop it internally (which took time, increased the initial cost, but helped in the longer run).

But, this ship is better designed. The entire design/dev/build cycle is known. Priceless.

[Ganesh_S]

On IAC-1, the initial estimate was $500 million - including the techs Russia was providing. Today the cost is at $3 billion (not $2.2 billion as stated in the article posted above).

Sounds Akin to saying buy American live Happy (but then it has to be the tax payer who provides for the deficit). Relatively speaking, cost overrun is the name of the game. Not speaking about F35 here.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-1 ... on-measure

The bill would increase the cost ceiling for the aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, being built by Newport News, Virginia-based Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., to $12.9 billion, making it the most expensive U.S. warship.

[TSJones]

They can never leave well enough alone. Constant mods and change requests. It runs up the tab. Everything is always "new and improved".

[NRao]

Well, when it comes to the IAC series, the priceless part is the key. As compared to the initial estimates the -1 will cost a huge amount. But then what price are you going to place on what has been indigenized? One can argue that the IAC-1 has gone from $500 million to $3 billion - which is very true. But then for one India will never have to go abroad to buy a carrier and the next one is not going to escalate as much in costs. And then there is the fallout of such an effort - what other projectS would be +vely impacted?

I would not place a cost on the IAC-1, perhaps if something similar happens to the IAC-2 may be then i would.

[Ganesh_S]

I would not place a cost on the IAC-1, perhaps if something similar happens to the IAC-2 may be then i would.

Rao Sir, Under what assumptions ? IAC-2 being a replica of IAC-1 ?

[NRao]

No, by then "India" would have been through the fire and paid for it. Granted the IAC-2, at 65K, would be a different challenge. Let us see, I expect some amount of US help - like they got from Italy/France on the IAC-1.

[negi]

Looks like this thread is F-35 part two, bean counting and continuing.

[Eric Leiderman]

This thread is now a waste of time as far as I am concerned

[Philip]

The thread isn't a waste of time because it is throwing up many issues regarding carriers in the current context of naval warfare,designs,aircraft,doctrine,sensors and weaponry,etc. Since we are to build a larger IAC-2,with a 3 carrier requirement firmly part of the IN's future plans,where there are several undecided issues like launch and recovery systems,aircraft which will operate from it,a healthy debate is required.

Nevertheless,there is no point in flogging the acquisition of the Gorshkov.In its chronological history ,it was the best option.It ws imperative for the IN not to lose its carrier skills and maintain its naval fleet air arm essential to control the IOR.What else could we have done? Acquired a UK Harrier carrier,smaller than the Viraat? There was no Harrier-2 ever developed for the RN and Harrier production had ceased.The Russians gave away for a song their Yak-141 tech to the US who used in developing the JSF.The JSF was not available then,never offered to Indiai-in fact NO US weapon systems were ever offered to India at that time too,and the JSF is only going to mature in service by 2020.The Vikram with its MIG-29Ks aboard is a far more lethal and capable carrier than the Viraat with its Harriers,which are still capable with their LUSH upgrade and can bat on for another decade,but whose numbers have dwindled to a handful.IAC-1,which is taking us at least 10+ years to build should definitely be a better design after having the experience of operating two ex-RN carriers and with the experience of the Gorshkov's modernisation with us.

If we carry the debate further beyond the two new carriers,Vikram and IAC-1,the latter whose design is frozen,IAC-2 which in size approximates that of the RN's QE class can learn from the lessons of that programme.There are some voluminous info available on the history of that class of carrier in the link,worth a detailed read, as it covers almost every aspect of its design.Two main factors,choice of aircraft and L&R system and propulsion should be noted by the IN's design team.One interesting[/b] fact thrown up is that E-2C/D Hawkeye AEW aircraft can use STOBAR/ski jumps and was offered by Northrop-Grumman to the RN.[/b]

BAE Systems (and perhaps Thales) in October 2002 re-proposed a STOBAR configuration for the carrier, primarily for AEW reasons. A STOBAR carrier would have a lower cost than a full CTOL configuration but would be able to operate a wider range of aircraft than pure STOVL. Northrop Grumman were claiming that its E-2C/D Hawkeye 2000 could launch using a ski-jump launch, while the F-35C - which was increasingly seen as a likely choice for the manned element of the RAF's then planned Future Offensive Air System - could also operate from a STOBAR carrier. The MOD was not interested.

The second is the UK's choice of the STOVL F-35B JSF variant.There are a few who scoff at STOVL,but as mentioned elsewhere,the hard fact and truth is that several navies are opting for it ,the UK,Italy,Spain,plus Japan and SoKo too.Here is why the RN chose STOVL over cats,a far more expensive system.

http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cvf1-12.htm
http://navy-matters.beedall.com/cvf1-13.htm

But by mid-2002 it was being reported (e.g. by JDW) that the higher echelons of the RAF - the service that will 'own' the aircraft and thus a very significant "player" in the decision process - was firmly inclined towards STOVL. Officially this was in part because of the greater flexibility of deployment, but also because of the lower training penalty needed to keep those predominantly RAF-manned JCA squadrons carrier qualified. And the advocates of STOVL apparently had some strong arguments, for example Major Andrew G. Shorter, USMC states in article published in the September 2003 edition of the USNI Proceedings:

Studies compared the effectiveness of conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) and V/STOL aircraft at sea. One study, conducted by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in 1980, concluded that V/STOL aircraft provide better mission performance at sea with fewer aircraft. This stems from the V/STOL's ability to generate a greater number of sorties for a given time period, primarily because it is unconstrained by the normal deck cycles of CTOL aircraft. The AIAA study points out that "the air platform from which V/STOL operates can be smaller than today's large deck carrier. The support costs, including logistics, maintenance, manpower, et al. are reduced for both the aircraft and the ship." This concept sets the stage for reducing the large overhead normally associated with sea-based tactical aviation to the point where it can be considered viable on many more seagoing platforms.

The STOVL JSF greatly reduces the training and currency requirement for fixed-wing operations afloat. This increases commensurately its ability to be adopted and employed jointly as the Air Force is no longer excluded from non-land-based operations. With the large power margins, enhanced stability control, and pilot augmentation systems the STOVL JSF will incorporate, safe and efficient landings at sea will become easy and straightforward. This should lead to streamlined training and extended currency limits—so much so that non-naval-trained pilots could become ship-qualified in just a few days. Consider the flexibility of being able to jointly sea base all of the services' primary tactical air assets, not only in the context of the tenets mentioned earlier, but also in the form of indefinite sustainment for the force structure. The STOVL JSF squadrons from any service, with minimal effort, could provide forces for surged or sustained sea-based maritime operations—a force planner's dream.

Fewer aircraft require less hangar space, fewer maintenance and support personnel, and for STOVLs, fewer ship systems to support them and a much smaller air department. STOVLs require 30% less deck space for operations, which leads to increased operating efficiencies. Those efficiencies allow generation of more sorties given equal mission performance. For example, STOVL aircraft can generate 30% more sorties than CTOL aircraft for targets out to 400 nautical miles, and 15% more for ranges to 700 nautical miles. The affordable combination of multiple missions within one hull design can become a reality based on our emerging technology.

The Defence Procurement Minister, Lord Bach, finally announced on 30 September 2002 the selection of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as the JCA. He said that choosing the STOVL variant of JSF would build on the RAF and RN's "unique and valuable knowledge of STOVL aircraft acquired during nearly four decades of operations of Harrier on land and sea". He went on to cite the STOVL variant's short runway and land-basing flexibility as a major discriminator in the down-selection decision.

* The last point is why I've always been a staunch advocate of STOVL aircraft for the IN to operate primarily from our amphibs,carriers too in conjunction with conventional aircraft using STOBAR,so that they can operate from any flat top,converted merchantman in a crisis as we allegedly contemplated during Kargil when the Viraat was in the dockyard,and from anywhere in our island territories from small roads and clearings.In any spat with China we would face massed missile attack against our air and naval bases.The Chinese have made no secret of this in their doctrine and they have thousands of tactical missiles at their disposal apart from an array of BMs.It took 3.5 months to resume ops at Car Nic by the IAF in the aftermath of the Asian Tsunami,that too at record speed. Which type of aircraft would be able to operate from the A&N islands if our air bases and airfields have are kaput? Only STOVL aircraft and amphibs apart from helos.

*Now the size of the carrier based upon other inputs:

The Assessment Phase began in 1999, and just some of the factors that the rival BAE and Thales design teams had to consider were:

The required air group capacity and sortie generation;

Flight deck layout – including lifts and weapon routes;

Hangar type and capacity, and aviation support facilities;

Aviation magazines and Aviation fuel capacity;

Hotel facilities for ships crew, flag staff, and ship aviation personnel, both squadron and ship air departments;

Speed and propulsion type. What was the ship’s maximum speed requirement due to demands from the aviation capability (i.e. wind over deck to enhance launch) and other needs (e.g. compatibility with other RN warships such as the Type 45);

Endurance and range;

Sea keeping, stability, strength;

Survivability and damage control;

Extent and location of C4I facilities.

Almost inevitably, their every attempt at meeting the requirements seemed to drive up size.

Initial CVF studies in 1999 indicated that the smallest practical design for a STOVL carrier able to support a permanent air group of 40 aircraft, and temporarily an extra 10 aircraft, would be about 38,000 tonnes. Early published artist's impressions for the STOVL variant of the new carrier showed a ship of about 274 metres (900 ft) length. However, both the catapult launched (CTOL) and the Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) variants would require a larger conventional carrier design equipped with an angled flight deck and arrested wires for landing. The smallest practical design for a STOBAR or CTOL carrier able to support the required size of airgroup was determined by the DPA to be about 43-46,000 tonnes. BAE Systems stated that a CTOL or STOVL design would have to be about 10,000 tonnes larger than a STOVL design. Both the DPA concepts published in 1999 and the early BAE concepts published in 2000 showed CTOL and STOBAR CVF designs significantly larger than the STOVL designs.

From about this stage the CVF design began to very much reflect the strong influence of Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, then First Sea Lord and later Chief of the Defence Staff, who's maxim is "Air is free, and steel is cheap".

It was recognised that size is not directly related to costs - the Royal Navy demonstrated (and not just to its own satisfaction!) that a large ship is not only cheaper to build in terms of cost per tonne but also has lower maintenance costs.

Final stats:

The CVF Delta design, probably dating to early 2006, the common baseline design has evolved from this.
In April 2006 the MOD website stated that the key characteristics of CVF were:

Displacement: 65,000 tonnes
Length overall: 280 meters
Beam: 70 meters
Draught: 9 meters
Complement: 1500 (including Joint Force Air Group (JFAG)
Airgroup size: 40.

Some Key CVF Design Features

Twin island arrangement
Islands Ship Control/Flyco – Antenna/Exhaust
3m deck to deck
Bulbous Bow/Trim Tabs
Extensive use of sponsons
Architecture linked to build zones
Complement of c1500, maximum c1650
c500 cabins - mixture of 1,2, & 6 berth cabins
2 main galleys & integrated provisions complexes
Magazine complexes
Automated weapons handling system
Integrated full Electric propulsion (IEP)
2 x shafts
4 x T45 derivative Induction Motors
2 X MT30 gas turbines sited in sponsons
4 x diesels, in pairs in two main machinery spaces

In April 2007, the CVF IPT Team Leader gave the following "Design Principal Particulars" for the UK's CVF variant:
Parameter Number
Total Airgroup 40
Ship life [years] 30+
LBP (Overall) [m] 263 (280)
Beam waterline (overall) [m] 40 (70)
Start of Life Deep displacement [te] 65,000
Start of Life draught [m] 9.5
Through life growth [te] 10,000
End of Life Deep displacement [te] 75,000
Depth of main hull [m] 30
Overall height [m] 55
Number of decks 9
Deck to deck height [m] 3

A long list of commercial std. eqpt. is been used to bring down costs.
However,what emerges from the UK's experience is that 40.45,000t is the min. optimum size for a STOBAR carrier,which is what IAC-1 is and enlargening the design to 65,000t (for IAC-2) is beneficial in many respects.The RN turned down offers of ex-USN Cvs,being too large,too old and costly to maintain and operate.

There was a query about the role of the IN's carriers against Pak ,Gwadat,etc.Will post views in the naval td.

[Singha]

what exactly is the benefit of a CVF style twin island design.....I see no benefit other than occupying more floor space. other than a bridge & a ATC room/ground movement center and space to mount comms/radar , there is hardly any need for anything in the island. decoy launchers, guns and missiles are mounted on sponsons along the sides. the bridge and ATC could be housed on different floors in same island.

I think we should follow the gerald ford design than hankering for the cvf template...with the largest and most operational carriers, khan knows this game inside out...better than bartania and france for sure with their 1 carriers
http://ctovision.com/wp-content/uploads ... -78-02.jpg

they have gone really minimal on the island pushing it nearly to the stern....most of the island is nothing more than large mast for radars with just the bridge and ATC .... they must have all round cameras with the bridge so far back.

[NRao]

Two island: One for ship navigation, the other for air ops. The French too were considering that design.

[Singha]

ship navigation is highly automated function. only around 2 people are really needed on the bridge and they are mostly huge but empty on the merchant ships.
the CVNs probably have bridge on top and ATC on the floor below and so does the latest gerald r ford carrier. if they can manage 90 aircraft from one small island, so can we manage our 60. having less island improves the balance of the ship probably and gives cleaner wind flow over the deck one hopes.

I am actually all for no island if it can be managed through a bridge right at the bow below the flight deck and a ATC (with lots of remote cameras) located at the stern.
thats how the earliest carrier were.

http://www.steelnavy.com/images/NHC/Lan ... ngley1.jpg

[NRao]

well, dunno .............. if that is an option. Someone proposed two decks, one for takeoffs and one for landing. Apparently the Japanese had it at one point in time.

However, here is something I just found (about IN):

Navy needs more Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups

First of all, from a strategy perspective, three aircraft carriers are grossly insufficient for the new battle lines being drawn in the Indian Ocean shipping lanes that carry oil from the volatile Middle East and the new threats arising anew in the South China Sea. Next, neither the Bay of Bengal, nor the Arabian Sea, nor the southern seaboard are small lakes the size of a Black Sea where one CBG each could suffice; India’s exclusive economic zone, alone, amounts to an area that is 70% of the Indian mainland, which is huge for a navy to patrol, leave alone the fact that the entire Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea are many times larger.

My kind of guy!!

[member_23455]

they have gone really minimal on the island pushing it nearly to the stern....most of the island is nothing more than large mast for radars with just the bridge and ATC .... they must have all round cameras with the bridge so far back.

The island on the Gerald Ford is shorter in length but slightly taller (by 20 feet) compared to Nimitz class. Yes, cameras and additional watch standers will be required to sort out the close-in visibility issues, which were a problem even on Nimitz class.

The "claim" by the designers of the Ford class is that a 33% increase in sorties will be possible due to the redesign--which is purely theoretical of course, since the guys who fight with these things know sortie rates are dependent on a range of real-world issues.

[NRao]

2008 :: Aircraft Carriers and India’s Naval Doctrine

[NRao]

The "claim" by the designers of the Ford class is that a 33% increase in sorties will be possible due to the redesign--which is purely theoretical of course, since the guys who fight with these things know sortie rates are dependent on a range of real-world issues.

More than likely they meant the diff is under similar circumstances. ?????

[member_23455]

The "claim" by the designers of the Ford class is that a 33% increase in sorties will be possible due to the redesign--which is purely theoretical of course, since the guys who fight with these things know sortie rates are dependent on a range of real-world issues.

More than likely they meant the diff is under similar circumstances. ?????

That's a matter of detail "designers" are usually silent on. Hence the devil shall always lie in those details, especially for arcane topics like sortie rates which are part science, part art, part black magic.

More empirical, observable stuff like a 700 reduction in crew, is a no-brainer.

[NRao]

especially for arcane topics like sortie rates which are part science, part art, part black magic

Under empirical and arcane topics, badly placed elevators too.

But you just poured very cold water over some heads. Not good.

Anyways, let us move on.