Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

[chetak]

Don't agree with everything that Sawhney says but this destructive mindset of primacy is what has buggered the Indian Armed Forces and this COArmyS has once again played right into the sly hands of the baboo(n)s as did some other service chiefs earlier.

Such a blasphemous and outmoded view in 2017??

Truly, as they say, some people's IQ and shoe size are the same.
what was the need for such an incendiary statement?? who engineered it and why was it articulated now??

<snip>

I hope I am wrong, but the bolded comment appears to be directed towards COAS. If so, then I will like to redirect you towards your own advice

what was the need for such an incendiary statement??

Surely disagreement with an opinion can be put forward without such insults?

It is not an insult to the COArmyS but a general observation.

it is not my practice to comment on officers on active duty, but a major gaffe of this nature has repercussions far beyond the uniformed services and it is like manna from heaven to the MOD baboo(n)s who will now gleefully brief the new DefMin.

So I have to wonder, like very many others, what exactly brought on this public rumination as well as the timing of it.

Many are indeed to be appreciated that their IQs touch double digits.

Incidentally, it is not any mundane, run of the mill, everyday sort of opinion delivered after generous and injudicious consumption of some expensive elixir of life and other such potent libations but one that has been deliberately considered and articulated in front of an audience and my understanding is that it has caused a blowback from some very senior types in some other services.

I am surprised that this was not picked up earlier as it is doing the rounds on many whatsapp groups accompanied by some rather pungent and unprintable comments.

[ramana]

Chetak,

As I said in the CDS thread India does not need the CDS position for its forces. The Chiefs of Staff is good enough. We are not going to fight expeditionary wars.

Hierarchy adds its own latency. Especially in a bureaucracy.

During WWII, Field Marshal Alan Brooke was able to do a great job without the CDS type of position and it was much more complex with coordination with Allies etc.

One thing I would change is to have a new Chief take over the service once the COS is appointed by rotation thus its full time job and not a dual function.


There is some thing which prompted the Chief to state this.

We don't know what we don't know.

Lets wait.

Also we should debate this in the CDS thread....

[ramana]

Indian Army primacy needs to be maintained in a joint services environment
Article is by Dinaker Peri who is a good reporter. The url has changed from earlier version so secondary remarks are getting highlighted.

Threat of two-front war real; China resorting to land grabbing, he says.


India should be prepared for a two-front war despite its nuclear weapons, Army Chief Gen. Bipin Rawat said on Wednesday even as he called for maintaining the “supremacy and primacy” of the Army in a joint services environment.

“Wars will be fought on land, and therefore the primacy of the Army must be maintained. The other services, the Navy and Air Force, will play a very major role in support of the Army which will be operating on the ground, because no matter what happens, we may be dominating the area or the air, but finally war will be won when we ensure territorial integrity of the nation,” Gen. Rawat said while speaking at a seminar organised by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

“And therefore, the supremacy and primacy of the Army in a joint services environment becomes that much more relevant and important,” he stressed.

Tri-service integration has been a touchy issue with the Navy and Air Force worried that their autonomy would be eroded. The Army has recently sparred with the Air Force for control of attack helicopters.



War is in the realm of reality

Stating that the country was surrounded by two adversaries, one on the Western border and one on the North, Gen. Rawat said that war is in the realm of reality.

“To say that in future there will be no wars if you have sufficient deterrent may not always be true… Nuclear powers don’t go to war and that nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence, yes they are. But to say that they can deter war, they will not allow nations to go to war, in our context that may also not be true,” he said.

He stressed that the nature of warfare has been changing and much before militaries get into battle, wars may commence through non-contact warfare.

For this Gen. Rawat referred to the Chinese campaign over the Doklam standoff in which Beijing mounted an aggressive pitch alleging that Indian troops have crossed into its territory.

“In fact, if you look at the recent incident that happened on our Northern borders close to Sikkim, we did see information, psychological, media and legal warfare being launched by the adversary. It did not however lead to kinetic warfare…,” he stated.

On China, in an apparent reference to Doklam, Gen. Rawat added that flexing of muscles has started.

“Salami slicing, taking over territory in a very gradual manner, testing our limits of threshold is something we have to be wary about and remain prepared for situations emerging, which could gradually emerge into conflict…,” he said.

On Pakistan, Gen. Rawat questioned as to how long the country will continue to bear the proxy war and said, “Because of the proxy war there is always scope for conflict with our Western neighbour.”

“As far as our Western adversary is considered, we don’t see any scope of reconciliation, because their military, the polity, and the people in that nation have been made to believe that there is an adversary, India, which is all out to break their nations into pieces...” he observed.

Tensions along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan have been running high since the Uri terror attacks in September last year.

[wig]

an interview with Lt Gen J S Sandhu, GOC, 15 Corps

Q. What has changed after the surgical strikes and has it made any difference on ground zero?
The surgical strikes conveyed our intent to Pakistan that we will respond to acts of violence on our posts in a powerful manner. Consequently, Pak troops and terrorists have become extremely cautious along the LoC and their freedom of movement has been affected. They do not feel totally safe near their launch pads.
Q. There has been a spurt in the level of violence in Kashmir after surgical strikes. How do you see it?
Violence in Kashmir and surgical strikes are in totally different dimensions and linking them may not be the right approach. Surgical strikes are a step in the deterrence spectrum. However, I would like to add that after these strikes, the agitation in Kashmir last year petered out. This year too, the level of violence in terms of agitations has come down drastically and violence by terrorists has mainly been against isolated targets, such as suspected informers, political workers, police personnel and some grenade-lobbing cases. A few higher-end violent actions have occurred, but largely the terrorists are in a weaker state.
Q. Can you say that due to surgical strikes there has been no major militant attack along the LoC this year?
More importantly, it is our round-the-clock vigil, our surveillance grid and strengthening of the security posture, which have contributed to foiling most of the infiltration bids. A few attempts have been made, but were successfully forestalled. The recent operation in Uri in which four fidayeens were neutralised is a case in point.
Q. What about the launchpads that were targeted during the strike?
Launch pads are dynamic in nature, temporarily rented houses. These can be changed frequently. As long as Pakistan continues to support infiltration by terrorists, they will continue to maintain launch pads.
Q If there is an Uri-like attack again, will you go for another strike?
The COAS and the Northern Army Commander have articulated our position in this regard very well and we are capable of executing our plans as per our operational requirements, whenever called upon to do so at time and place of our choice.
Q. The infiltration attempts have not reduced despite the strikes. What do you have to say?
As I have stated earlier, ISI-backed ‘tanzeems’ want to recoup their cadre losses suffered this year. Hence, their attempts to infiltrate will continue. But I would highlight that we have checked many of infiltration attempts and 58 infiltrators have been killed near LoC this year.

http://tribuneindia.com/news/jammu-kash ... 475013.htm

[uddu]

Hope this is not discussed here. Following is a comment posted and it's pretty interesting.

Love the NSG's @1:06 from Britain! They saved me and my family once. I was in the Taj Hotel in Mumbai when it was attacked by the terrorists in the November of 2008. It was a really bad experience. At night, we heard gunshots so we locked ourselves in the room. All night, we could hear the gunshots and we didn't even know what was going on and were scared as ******! At 4 O'clock in the morning, someone tried to break in the room. We thought it was a hostile so my dad (an ex SAS) attacked him as soon as he broke through but he knocked my dad out in a minute. Thank god he didn't shoot. They they said they were there to save us. They handed us over to that fire brigade guy at the window. I'm still alive because of them. Love you India very much!

[ramana]

SJha, Claims he came up with concept of Deep battle with Missiles for Indian Army.

Begs the questions what was Prithvi developers thinking when they had the range of 150km and 1 ton warhead which is exactly the values for Forward Edge of Battle Area (FEBA) and what was Gen Sunderji doing raisin the RAPIDs divisions and changing the officers manning the battalions to ensure enough experience.
And did Soviets needs missile when they used the concept of Deep Battle to defeat the Nazi German troops in Kursk and other areas.

[Baikul]

As nana patekar said, there can't be any bigger heroes than our soldiers.
PC: Livefist.

For those who missed it on the last page, read the above to understand the meaning of courage and sacrifice.

Dying of snakebite, in an ambulance, probably deeply disoriented when his vehicle crashes, he gets up to save lives. There is bravery and then there is mind numbing bravery.

The balls of the man.

If this was the West, we'd have five front page news stories, two books and and a made for TV film out by now.

I am humbled just to say he was from my country.

[Baikul]

Not sure if this is the right fora to discuss but regarding Sawhney article on the previous page, while I don't disagree with his contention that sea battles should be led by the Navy, his belief (unless I misunderstood what he was saying) that

Regarding war, the Indian Air Force should be in the lead for land warfare,

is completely open to question IMO. I'm not sure of the example of breaking of the Maginot Line in WWII, as it was a mobile army, with tanks spearheading and supported (not led) by the German air force (often Stukas in close coordination) did the job.

Post WWII, while the air force has played a critical role in several wars, I am not sure whether it has done enough to take primacy in land battles.

There have been debates time and again about the air force finally developing the shiny new toys to lead in land battles, but every time it's the PBI (poor bloody infantry) that holds ground and decides the end game. I'm not seeing what Sawhney has said this time that's convinced me otherwise.

[vaibhav.n]

For ORBAT junkies....

Restructuring & Reorganisation of Combat Arms - Gen HS Panag

Indian Army inherited the regimental system from the British Indian Army. We broadly continue to follow it in the infantry, armoured corps, artillery and to some extent the corps of engineers. Where the units are not organised on regimental basis, “the corps ethos” provides the “regimentation”. Even the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy use the “service ethos” in lieu regimentation.

Regimentation has held us in good stead in all our wars and the esprit de corps to some extent compensates for the shortcomings.
However, regimentation resists change/reform in any form. Even change in unit organisations which are and should be technology, function and task driven has been resisted by the regimented system.

Most of the organisations of our combat arms are based on the World War 2 organisations or what we inherited at independence. Very little has changed despite a quantum jump in technology. No effort has been made to reduce or optimise the manpower and equipment in the combat arms despite a manifold increase in firepower and technology. Even the Shekatkar Committee has shied away from holistically addressing this issue.
Our own war experience has not been studied in detail to modify, change or reform the organisations. Eg, the maximum number of tanks lost by any regiment which engaged in most intense combat in 1965 or 1971 war has been 15. In the battle of Chawinda, (we were on the offensive) out of 225 tanks in battle as part of five armoured regiments, we lost only 29 tanks. Pakistan out of 150 tanks lost 44 tanks. In battle of Asal Uttar (we were on the defensive) out of 135 tanks we lost 10-14 tanks. Pakistan out of 220 tanks lost 99 tanks ie 20 tanks per regiment, more due to flawed tactics and boggy terrain. The biggest tank battles of the 1971 War were fought during the battle of Basantar where we lost 10-14 tanks and Pakistan lost 46 once again more due to flawed tactics.

Despite the experience of war we did not experiment with the reorganisation of the armoured regiment. We did not consider reducing the tank strength from 45 to 31 as was the case with the Red Army that routed the Panzer Corps. This would have given us more armoured regiments for the offensive. Alternatively, we did not consider reorganising the pivot corps armoured regiments on four squadron basis with 57 tanks for the defensive or offensive at short notice.

The situation in the other combat arms is no different. After World War 2 most modern armies switched over to the triangular organisation of three rifle companies instead of four in an infantry battalion as is the case in the subcontinent. The total casualties suffered by us during the Kargil War were 527 killed (out which 462 were due to actual combat) and 1363 wounded. This includes casualties of all troops in the Kargil battle zone. Approximately 30 Infantry Battalions took part in the operations. Assuming that 90 % casualties were from the Infantry, on an average each battalion suffered 16 killed 41 wounded ie just 6 % of the unit strength of approximates 800 personnel. Pakistan suffered approximately 453 killed and 665 wounded out of approximately 5000 soldiers in battle ie about 20% of the total strength. Pakistani casualties were unusually high due to our much higher artillery fire power.
Approximately 70% of our casualties were due to Pakistani artillery and mortar fire despite the meagre resources employed. These figures should have led to a serious debate with respect to the structure, organisation and equipment of our infantry battalions. Also, that better mortar and artillery locating systems were required for counter bombardment to neutralise enemy mortars and guns.

When the basic organisation is large there is a tendency to keep reserves at every level. Thus the focus remains on the tactical battle. This results in inadequate resources at the Operational Level which can be utilised for the offensive or the counter offensive.

Battles are not won by mass per se, but by creating conditions for psychological paralysis of the enemy. These conditions are a combination of tactics and fire power. In the next few columns, I shall analyse the restructuring and reorganisation of our combat arms for optimal battle efficiency.

Ever since the first tank clickety – clacked over the trenches 101 years ago, during the Battle of the Somme, on September 15, 1916, it has ruled the battlefield. The death knell of the tank has been sounded many times by new anti tank weapons and obstacle systems. However, the tank design has remarkably kept pace and continues to be the mainstay of all modern armed forces. Armoured and mechanised infantry units operate as combined arms in combat commands (brigade level), combat groups (unit level) and combat teams ( sub unit level) in varying combinations.

Our hypothetical ideal requirements of mechanised forces is 97 armoured regiments and 70 mechanised infantry battalions. This is based on : 34 armoured regiments and 34 mechanised battalions for the 17 armoured brigades with 2 armoured regiments and 2 mechanised infantry battalions (2+2) for the 17 Reorganised Plains Infantry Divisions (RAPID). 18 armoured regiments and 9 mechanised infantry battalions for the 9 armoured brigades (2+1) of the 3 armoured divisions. 27 armoured regiments and 9 mechanised infantry battalions for the 9 independent armoured brigades (3+1) of the Pivot Corps. 10 armoured regiments and 10 mechanised battalions for 5 armoured brigades (2+2) for Ladakh and North East high altitude areas. 4 armoured regiments and 4 mechanised infantry battalions for 2 armoured brigades (2+2) for the amphibious role. 4 armoured regiments and 4 mechanised infantry battalions for 2 armoured brigades (2+2) for the air assault role.

We presently have 64 armoured regiments and 50 mechanised infantry battalions. We are short of 33 armoured regiments and 20 mechanised infantry battalions. Our armoured regiments consist of 45 tanks having 3 tanks in the regimental headquarters and 14 tanks each in the 3 squadrons, with 4 troops of 3 tanks each and 2 tanks in the squadron headquarters. A mechanised infantry battalion is similarly organised except that each mechanised company has three platoons with 4 BMPs each. In my last column I had highlighted the need for a relook at the structure and organisation of the armoured/mechanised formations and units for their optimum utilisation.

Due to resource constraint our ideal requirement is unlikely to be met in the near future. Restructuring and reorganisation is a better way to meet the requirement and for creating more ‘useable combat potential’. Based on the combat potential of the modern tank, we could reduce the number of tanks in an armoured regiment to 31 with one tank in the regimental headquarters and each squadron having 3 troops of 3 tanks each and one tank in the headquarters. This model is followed by the PLA and was successfully followed by the Red/Russian Army until recently. The second in commands and the adjutant can be based on ICVs. This would release 14 tanks per regiment ie 896 tanks or equivalent of 29 armoured regiments leaving us only 4 regiments short of the ideal requirement as per present structure of mechanised formations. Similarly each mechanised infantry battalion can be reduced by 14 BMPs ie one per platoon and one from company headquarter, and 2 from battalion headquarters creating approximately 23 more mechanised infantry battalions.

Alternatively without changing the squadron/company organisations, we can opt for composite mechanised regiments with varying combination of armoured squadrons and mechanised infantry companies based on the operational role. Eg 3+1, 2+1, 2+2, 1+2 or 1+3. We have 64 armoured regiments and 50 mech infantry battalions each having 3 armoured squadrons and 3 mechanised companies. Thus we can easily create 114 composite mechanised regiments meeting our entire requirement with resources to spare. Composition of composite mechanised brigades can also be varied as per requirement of the operational role. Amalgamation of existing armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions would ensure that no additional manpower is required for this restructuring.

There is a void of reconnaissance units in our mechanised formations. Ideally we require a composite mechanised reconnaissance squadron with each composite mechanised brigade and a composite reconnaissance regiment each with the 3 armoured divisions ie approximately 50 composite reconnaissance squadrons. This is an inescapable requirement and would have to be met with restructuring and new raising . The manpower requirements can be offset with the reduction of the infantry brigades in the RAPIDs.There is a case for reorganising the 3 Strike Corps into 3 division size battle groups. This is a subject by itself, however, whatever form the reorganisation may take the armoured/mechanised component will remain the same.

Structures and organisations must not remain enslaved to regimentation and must be tailor made for our operational requirements. A modern tank and an infantry combat vehicle is three times more effective than what it was 50 years ago.

Mechanised formations and units have the mobility to concentrate at the point of decision and are trained for functioning as combined arms teams with varying combinations, attaching/detaching on as required basis. Smaller formations and units are more agile and can project more ‘useable mass’ into battle on the 21st century battlefield vis a vis larger units and formations which were more suited for the set piece battle of a bygone era. While ‘concentration’ is a principle of war, its essence lies in ‘concentration of useable mass’ at the point of decision.

[tsarkar]

Vaibhav, Gen Panag argues for thinning of army units on the lines of modern western armies. I disagree.

I've responded to numerous snides and insults in the Navy thread how foreign ships are manned by 100 personnel while Indian ships have 300 personnel because we lack "automation"

We overstaff not because of lack of automation but to have multiple levels of redundancy. We follow the colonial Royal Navy policy of overstaffing for redundancy.

In the famous Battle of Trafalgar, while the French & Spanish had more ships then the British, the British had more sailors than French & Spanish combined. This surplus manpower ensured rapid handling of cannons, faster supply of shot & powder for cannons, rotation of tired crews. Strategic benefit was a superior rate of fire from British ships compared to French & Spanish ships. When crews were killed on both sides, the British had replacements while French guns fell silent. Similarly, excess manpower handled sails and rigging and gave British ships unmatched manoeuvrability.

In modern ships, multiple radar & sonar operators offer redundancy, allow rotation of crews for rest, builds skills on the job. A crew of 300 will allow 3 shifts of 8 hours of 100 personnel each for non stop round the clock operations while a crew of only 100 will get tired and overwhelmed after 8 hours. There are no attrition replacements on board, so even functional equipment will have no one to man them.

Coming to Army Infantry Battalions and Armoured + Mechanized regiments, our greater numbers enables depth during operational taskings. Even if a new threat or opportunity emerges, surplus manpower and equipment can be diverted for the new tasking from within the battalion itself rather than waiting for a new battalion that isn't acclimatised or familiarized with the region & situation. Attrition will cripple a small sized battalion quicker than a large sized battalion. During Kargil, 2 Raj Rif lost officers and men at Tololing & other battles but still had other officers and men to keep the unit fully functional. A smaller battalion would have ceased to be combat effective.

[ShauryaT]

tsarkar: What about the fact that higher man power is the primary cause for higher revenue budgets, starving capital budgets? A balance has to be attained somewhere. I am glad that a military man has recommended rationalizing the plains centric strike corps. Is there any doubt that better technology would have reduced our fatalities and time taken to prosecute the Kargil battle?

[ManuJ]

There will always be a debate about the optimal size of a formation, but size cannot remain constant with advances in technology.

[isubodh]

I've responded to numerous snides and insults in the Navy thread how foreign ships are manned by 100 personnel while Indian ships have 300 personnel because we lack "automation"

This 100 would be with automation and 3 shifts or are you saying that they don't plan for a 24x7 scenario ?

[nam]

I've responded to numerous snides and insults in the Navy thread how foreign ships are manned by 100 personnel while Indian ships have 300 personnel because we lack "automation"

This 100 would be with automation and 3 shifts or are you saying that they don't plan for a 24x7 scenario ?

We would have to ask the Americans, who have been bumping their ships quite regularly.

It seems they have effective crews, who work 15 hours a day.

[nam]

We should not thin the strength of IA. Ofcourse we should not build a 2 million army either.

What people keep forgetting is that our most of the border we face against our adversaries are world's highest mountains. Mountains eat men. And we have the world's highest.

The TFTA-ing shown by Americans, Europeans with reduced troops numbers & gizmos, because their wars are on flat terrain. If we were going to fight the Pakis only in Thar desert, I am all for TFTA automation. Increase the teeth to tail ratio, all for it.

The Chinese marching with their shiny toys could only bark when they realize the amount of men required to put up a fight against our 12 divisions in the mountains.

If maintained only 4 brigades like the Chini, we would have been in the midst of another "lesson" by Chinis.

[Karan M]

I dont understand Gen Panags claim. He says break up existing formations into more ones which are smaller and hence it is ok? Since they will be more agile etc.
Well more formations will require more logistics, hitherto centralized at a higher level. More command and control challenges. More duplication of repair, resupply and other essential items
I think his argument has holes in it.

[ramana]

For ORBAT junkies....

Restructuring & Reorganisation of Combat Arms - Gen HS Panag

Indian Army inherited the regimental system from the British Indian Army. We broadly continue to follow it in the infantry, armoured corps, artillery and to some extent the corps of engineers. Where the units are not organised on regimental basis, “the corps ethos” provides the “regimentation”. Even the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy use the “service ethos” in lieu regimentation.

Regimentation has held us in good stead in all our wars and the esprit de corps to some extent compensates for the shortcomings.
However, regimentation resists change/reform in any form. Even change in unit organisations which are and should be technology, function and task driven has been resisted by the regimented system.

Most of the organisations of our combat arms are based on the World War 2 organisations or what we inherited at Independence. Very little has changed despite a quantum jump in technology. No effort has been made to reduce or optimise the manpower and equipment in the combat arms despite a manifold increase in firepower and technology. Even the Shekatkar Committee has shied away from holistically addressing this issue.

Our own war experience has not been studied in detail to modify, change or reform the organisations. E.g., the maximum number of tanks lost by any regiment which engaged in most intense combat in 1965 or 1971 war has been 15. In the battle of Chawinda, (we were on the offensive) out of 225 tanks in battle as part of five armoured regiments, we lost only 29 tanks. Pakistan out of 150 tanks lost 44 tanks. In battle of Asal Uttar (we were on the defensive) out of 135 tanks we lost 10-14 tanks. Pakistan out of 220 tanks lost 99 tanks ie 20 tanks per regiment, more due to flawed tactics and boggy terrain. The biggest tank battles of the 1971 War were fought during the battle of Basantar where we lost 10-14 tanks and Pakistan lost 46 once again more due to flawed tactics.


Despite the experience of war we did not experiment with the reorganisation of the armoured regiment. We did not consider reducing the tank strength from 45 to 31 as was the case with the Red Army that routed the Panzer Corps. This would have given us more armoured regiments for the offensive. Alternatively, we did not consider reorganising the pivot corps armoured regiments on four squadron basis with 57 tanks for the defensive or offensive at short notice.


{So what ensures we don't suffer from flawed tactics? BTW the Pakistanis thinned their tanks/regiment and raised the second armoured division in 1965. They went back to more tanks/regiment after their lesson. Please see accounts after Asal Uttar.}

The situation in the other combat arms is no different. After World War 2 most modern armies switched over to the triangular organisation of three rifle companies instead of four in an infantry battalion as is the case in the subcontinent. The total casualties suffered by us during the Kargil War were 527 killed (out which 462 were due to actual combat) and 1363 wounded. This includes casualties of all troops in the Kargil battle zone. Approximately 30 Infantry Battalions took part in the operations. Assuming that 90 % casualties were from the Infantry, on an average each battalion suffered 16 killed 41 wounded ie just 6 % of the unit strength of approximates 800 personnel. Pakistan suffered approximately 453 killed and 665 wounded out of approximately 5000 soldiers in battle ie about 20% of the total strength. Pakistani casualties were unusually high due to our much higher artillery fire power. Approximately 70% of our casualties were due to Pakistani artillery and mortar fire despite the meagre resources employed. These figures should have led to a serious debate with respect to the structure, organisation and equipment of our infantry battalions. Also, that better mortar and artillery locating systems were required for counter bombardment to neutralise enemy mortars and guns.

When the basic organisation is large there is a tendency to keep reserves at every level. Thus the focus remains on the tactical battle. This results in inadequate resources at the Operational Level which can be utilised for the offensive or the counter offensive.

{Division and corps level reserves are there to reinforce or exploit openings. In 1965 whole battalions melted away due to inexperience, bad leadership and casualties. At Asal Uttar two battalions were decimated and had to be regrouped with the survivors. Gen. Sunderji had to change the number of officers to ensure combat leadership in the battalions.}

Battles are not won by mass per se, but by creating conditions for psychological paralysis of the enemy. These conditions are a combination of tactics and fire power. In the next few columns, I shall analyse the restructuring and reorganisation of our combat arms for optimal battle efficiency.

Ever since the first tank clickety – clacked over the trenches 101 years ago, during the Battle of the Somme, on September 15, 1916, it has ruled the battlefield. The death knell of the tank has been sounded many times by new anti tank weapons and obstacle systems. However, the tank design has remarkably kept pace and continues to be the mainstay of all modern armed forces. Armoured and mechanised infantry units operate as combined arms in combat commands (brigade level), combat groups (unit level) and combat teams ( sub unit level) in varying combinations.

Our hypothetical ideal requirements of mechanised forces is 97 armoured regiments and 70 mechanised infantry battalions. This is based on : 34 armoured regiments and 34 mechanised battalions for the 17 armoured brigades with 2 armoured regiments and 2 mechanised infantry battalions (2+2) for the 17 Reorganised Plains Infantry Divisions (RAPID). 18 armoured regiments and 9 mechanised infantry battalions for the 9 armoured brigades (2+1) of the 3 armoured divisions. 27 armoured regiments and 9 mechanised infantry battalions for the 9 independent armoured brigades (3+1) of the Pivot Corps. 10 armoured regiments and 10 mechanised battalions for 5 armoured brigades (2+2) for Ladakh and North East high altitude areas. 4 armoured regiments and 4 mechanised infantry battalions for 2 armoured brigades (2+2) for the amphibious role. 4 armoured regiments and 4 mechanised infantry battalions for 2 armoured brigades (2+2) for the air assault role.

We presently have 64 armoured regiments and 50 mechanised infantry battalions. We are short of 33 armoured regiments and 20 mechanised infantry battalions. Our armoured regiments consist of 45 tanks having 3 tanks in the regimental headquarters and 14 tanks each in the 3 squadrons, with 4 troops of 3 tanks each and 2 tanks in the squadron headquarters. A mechanised infantry battalion is similarly organised except that each mechanised company has three platoons with 4 BMPs each. In my last column I had highlighted the need for a relook at the structure and organisation of the armoured/mechanised formations and units for their optimum utilisation.

Due to resource constraint our ideal requirement is unlikely to be met in the near future. Restructuring and reorganisation is a better way to meet the requirement and for creating more ‘useable combat potential’. Based on the combat potential of the modern tank, we could reduce the number of tanks in an armoured regiment to 31 with one tank in the regimental headquarters and each squadron having 3 troops of 3 tanks each and one tank in the headquarters. This model is followed by the PLA and was successfully followed by the Red/Russian Army until recently. The second in commands and the adjutant can be based on ICVs. This would release 14 tanks per regiment ie 896 tanks or equivalent of 29 armoured regiments leaving us only 4 regiments short of the ideal requirement as per present structure of mechanised formations. Similarly each mechanised infantry battalion can be reduced by 14 BMPs ie one per platoon and one from company headquarter, and 2 from battalion headquarters creating approximately 23 more mechanised infantry battalions.

{ Has the PLA fought a war recently? Last time it was with Vietnam and got a whipping. I think General is playing with toy formations. If wars are won by regrouped military formations then its looks good. However as he well knows they are won by bringing concentration of forces and in sufficient overwhelming numbers to swamp the opponent/enemy. So where are his overwhelming forces for offense?}

Alternatively without changing the squadron/company organisations, we can opt for composite mechanised regiments with varying combination of armoured squadrons and mechanised infantry companies based on the operational role. Eg 3+1, 2+1, 2+2, 1+2 or 1+3. We have 64 armoured regiments and 50 mech infantry battalions each having 3 armoured squadrons and 3 mechanised companies. Thus we can easily create 114 composite mechanised regiments meeting our entire requirement with resources to spare. Composition of composite mechanised brigades can also be varied as per requirement of the operational role. Amalgamation of existing armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions would ensure that no additional manpower is required for this restructuring.

There is a void of reconnaissance units in our mechanised formations. Ideally we require a composite mechanised reconnaissance squadron with each composite mechanised brigade and a composite reconnaissance regiment each with the 3 armoured divisions ie approximately 50 composite reconnaissance squadrons. This is an inescapable requirement and would have to be met with restructuring and new raising . The manpower requirements can be offset with the reduction of the infantry brigades in the RAPIDs.There is a case for reorganising the 3 Strike Corps into 3 division size battle groups. This is a subject by itself, however, whatever form the reorganisation may take the armoured/mechanised component will remain the same.

Structures and organisations must not remain enslaved to regimentation and must be tailor made for our operational requirements. A modern tank and an infantry combat vehicle is three times more effective than what it was 50 years ago.

{This 3X type of think is US think tank type of thought. Works with them as they have a huge supply chain and fight in far away countries where loss of land is not a problem. I would suggest reading Lt. Gen Harbaksh Singh memoirs in 1965 war "War Dispatches".

Mechanised formations and units have the mobility to concentrate at the point of decision and are trained for functioning as combined arms teams with varying combinations, attaching/detaching on as required basis. Smaller formations and units are more agile and can project more ‘useable mass’ into battle on the 21st century battlefield vis a vis larger units and formations which were more suited for the set piece battle of a bygone era. While ‘concentration’ is a principle of war, its essence lies in ‘concentration of useable mass’ at the point of decision.

[vaibhav.n]

Sarkar Sir/Karan,

In my defence, i had listed the blog more from an ORBAT perspective. I don’t agree with him completely, but he has put some interesting points across.

His argument is, since armoured and mechanised units already operate as combined arms units it would benefit us if we formalised the structure rather than the current ad-hoc system it is. This primarily follows the US concept of ABCT(Armoured Brigade Combat Team) where they instituted Armoured CAB (Combined Arms Battalions) of of two armoured companies plus a single mechanised infantry company or a Mechanised CAB of two mechanised companies and one armoured company.

Thing is that today with ever dwindling manpower, increasing equipment costs and stagnant budgets, firepower has become much more important and older concepts of concentration of forces is pegged lower than economy of force actions. The thrust of the argument is that smaller units can be more effectively controlled than in the past with more reliable C2I networks and create more opportunities which these manoeuvre units can capitalise.

The US Army doctrine describes it as follows;

‘’Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire.’’

‘’Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defence, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield.’’

3 tank VS 4 tank platoons are the equivalent of 5.56mm VS 7.62mm debate of the armoured forces, i would stay away from that. FWIW, even the PLA is experimenting with 4 tank platoons.

As far as infantry is concerned, this has a regular topic of debate. Some senior officers i have had a word agree that a 3 company could be easier from a C2 perspective. However, Increasing battalions numbers by doing the above will only exacerbate our singular problem of low officer strength within infantry units. This has been tried in the past and even the Paki Army reverted back to the 4 coy TOE. Our infantry units also regularly deploy in CI ops for a far greater time period than typically armies do globally.

His argument on increasing recce units within mechanised forces is completely on point.

I personally see this more as an exercise on how do the armoured forces stay relevant in future operations.

There is an rather famous RAND study on how the BCT (Brigade Combat Team) concept came up in the US Army.
Link: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_repo ... nline.html

[negi]

I do think Gen Panag's recommendations need to be discussed with an open mind as times have changed ; British believed in redundancy and so should we is not good enough reason simply because another fact is the British empire fought most of the wars using an army that was full of men from it's colonies ; when you get soldiers from other countries to fight for you at the kind of wages which British paid I am sure no one would find any merit in compromising on redundancies .

[tsarkar]

tsarkar: What about the fact that higher man power is the primary cause for higher revenue budgets, starving capital budgets? A balance has to be attained somewhere. I am glad that a military man has recommended rationalizing the plains centric strike corps. Is there any doubt that better technology would have reduced our fatalities and time taken to prosecute the Kargil battle?

Sir, India is the only nation, other than Israel at civilizational faultlines. A nation on geographic faultlines like Japan will face earthquakes and Tsunamis. A nation with two civilizational faultlines will face aggression from 1. Central Asian Islamic & 2. Sinic civilization in perpetuity. No amount of technology will prevent earthquakes and tsunamis in Japan and no amount of technology will prevent civilizational clashes.

Technology is no doubt useful, but so is manpower. The most famous British WW2 Admiral - Andrew Browne Cunningham said, "It takes 3 years to build a ship, it takes 300 years to build a Navy". Experience, Skill, Training, Knowledge, Acclimatization cannot be substituted by technology.

As regards cost benefit ratio, I'll answer that in later points

This 100 would be with automation and 3 shifts or are you saying that they don't plan for a 24x7 scenario ?

They expect technology to cover 24 x 7 but dont realize crews manning the technology and responding to threats will be fatigued with no replacement.

In my defence, i had listed the blog more from an ORBAT perspective. I don’t agree with him completely, but he has put some interesting points across.

No defence required from you, my friend, this is just an exchange of ideas & views.

Coming to the US doctrine

‘’Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure
to enemy fire.’’

The above is good only when the enemy is known. However, when an enemy like Viet Cong or Taliban simply melts away when faced with massed effects and re-groups where you're weak, then the above strategy doesnt work. You launch Tomahawks at Osama's tents for great "massed effects" but outcome is zilch.

And answering Shaurya's point, the Tomahawks & associated targeting system costs were wasted.

India, with Counter Insurgency Grid with dedicated forces like RR ensures boots on the ground to prevent the enemy from grouping. The troops are based locally, with local intel, with know how of the terrain and fully acclimatized. Which is why unlike the Taliban and Haqqani Network that regroup in Afghanistan, no group has been able to grow beyond worm levels in Kashmir.

The biggest counter of thinning of personnel is the Obama Afghan surge of 2009 and Trump Afghan surge of 2017

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/che ... 6d3fd8a603

‘’Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible; allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.’’

This logic flies in the face of strategies adopted by Khalid bin Walid, Chengiz Khan, Stalin and Võ Nguyên Giáp.

Khalid bin Walid and Chengiz Khan mounted multiple thrusts. If one faltered, the focus shifted to the other.

In November 1942, the Soviets simultaneously mounted Operation Mars in Rzhev & Operation Uranus in Stalingrad. The Germans defeated the Soviets in Operation Mars but were defeated in Operation Uranus in Stalingrad.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mars
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uranus

The Germans couldnt counter both thrusts.

In 1971 Bangladesh, Gen T N Raina attacked from West while Genl Sagat Singh attacked from East. The Pakistanis actually stalled Raina's offensive. Just before Dhaka, the Pakistanis mustered forces to stop Sagat. Then General Gandharv Nagra attacked from North and just walked down the open road.

Both Soviet and Indian thrusts would not have been possible with fewer personnel irrespective of technology.

General Võ Nguyên Giáp besieged the US camp of Khe Sanh. As US rushed battalion after battalion to defend Khe Sanh, Giáp infiltrated South Vietnam and started Tet Offensive. The US was confused which was the real thrust - Khe Sanh or Tet. The US completely lost the strategic initiative.

In later interviews, Giáp said he just played two thrusts irrespective of which one would succeed. The US abandoned Khe Sanh.

Coming to the original US doctrine, it is heavily flawed since its common military strategy to have multiple thrusts, pincers, envelopment - all of which require manpower.

[Vidur]

T Sarkar,

I found your insights very useful and agree with you. I also think the article does not say that forces should be reduced, it is merely advancing a way of creating more reserves which can be employed as needed to better effect.

Interaction with domain experts like you is one reason I came on the forum. I have some questions on Naval issues as will post them on that thread. I would welcome your comments on the budgetary issues and 5 year defence planning issues I have highlighted on another thread.

[Sanju]

T Sarkar sir, your posts on this page contains information lucidly explained with examples that strongly back your POV. Thank you for them posts.

[nam]

The total casualties suffered by us during the Kargil War were 527 killed (out which 462 were due to actual combat) and 1363 wounded. This includes casualties of all troops in the Kargil battle zone. Approximately 30 Infantry Battalions took part in the operations. Assuming that 90 % casualties were from the Infantry, on an average each battalion suffered 16 killed 41 wounded ie just 6 % of the unit strength of approximates 800 personnel. Pakistan suffered approximately 453 killed and 665 wounded out of approximately 5000 soldiers in battle ie about 20% of the total strength. Pakistani casualties were unusually high due to our much higher artillery fire power. Approximately 70% of our casualties were due to Pakistani artillery and mortar fire despite the meagre resources employed.

If the General is telling us that Paki caused us more causalities with less resources, then it is not because they were efficient, but because we employed horrible tactics.

Not many men will survive attacking uphill with no cover at 15000 feet and enemy artillery observers on top. The day was saved by these men, who went in towards certain death.
When Pakis tried the trick with Col Rai and he called in artillery, there was nothing left of the Pakis.

We did it because we were caught pants down with IAF not having enough PGM. So lets not take wrong lessons.

Today if there was another Kargil, IAF would pound every Paki position with PGM. We are not going to send in men on another frontal attack.

[nam]

Question: Lets say we went all high tech and reduced our manpower.

Pakis and Chinis attack us together. Can anyone gurantee me that GoI/IA will not call for mobilization of men in to the army? or we will call in only 10,000 men least the "restructuring" go out of the window?

Where does that leave all the fancy RMA?

[anjan]

T Sarkar,

I found your insights very useful and agree with you. I also think the article does not say that forces should be reduced, it is merely advancing a way of creating more reserves which can be employed as needed to better effect.

I think it's more that he's advocating moving those reserves up to Corps/Army level instead.

When the basic organisation is large there is a tendency to keep reserves at every level. Thus the focus remains on the tactical battle. This results in inadequate resources at the Operational Level which can be utilised for the offensive or the counter offensive.

Tsarkar, to your point:
Sleep deprivation in the US Navy
There's a silent threat plaguing the Navy, and it may be related to recent accidents at sea

[Kartik]

MKU Ltd to manufacture newly developed bulletproof jackets for IA and paramilitary forces

Indian defence firm MKU Limited will be manufacturing newly developed bulletproof jackets for Indian Army (IA) and paramilitary forces personnel, it has been announced.

The jackets were developed by the state-owned Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which recently transferred the technology to the Kanpur-based company during a 4 October ceremony held in New Delhi, where documents and the related licence agreement were exchanged, according to a statement by the Indian government’s Press Information Bureau (PIB).

“This technology is challenging and one of the most significant matured personal protection systems developed by the DRDO among the various General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) of the IA meeting NIJ III+ Standard,” said the PIB.

[vaibhav.n]

Sarkar Sir,

Couple of points;

1. These joint doctrines are specifically in the conventional construct of operations against a peer or near peer adversary. Low intensity CI ops fall out of its ambit. We could argue that in the current age of hybrid warfare if these are relevant but that would be another discussion.

2. The principle of mass is usually more relevant for offensive operations. In defensive situations the commander is not aware of where the blow will fall and thus is unable to concentrate his forces with any certainty; his dispositions will be a compromise. At best he can earmark sub-units in a counter-penetration role.

It is easy to lean on manpower heavy attrition focused war fighting against the Paki’s as we hold a numerical and firepower advantage across the board.

Against China on the other hand it will be a completely different ball game. Their smaller but more mobile formations backed with superior logistics can go toe to toe against ours creating more opportunities and they would focus on massing effects via arty, air and missile forces to cut-off any large forces and logistic nodes off the roster. They can and will endanger our rear areas and civilian centres more easily than we can.

One of the reasons i feel we must let go of this paki obsession, concentrate on the chinese and have a somewhat leaner army with superior firepower across all combat arms.

[sudeepj]

What Gen Panag is advocating is a trade off of reserves at the tactical level for reserves at the strategic/operational level. The British model of deployment, for instance in infantry battalions, 4 rifle companies with three fighting and one as reserve wastes a lot of resources. I think someone had done an analysis of this in WW II and concluded that at any given time, the British Army in Northern Africa was able to bring only 1/3 of its strength to bear on the enemy in any given battle, the rest being wasted as reserves at different levels! IIRC, we have roughly 15 tanks per armored regiment based on the T72 as war wastage reserves, he is arguing that this may be excessive, since the max we lost in our subcontinent battles is 15-20. If instead he had these reserves at the operational level, he would be able to 'materialize an extra armored div. out of thin air' at a point that is weak and achieve breakthroughs etc. Not a new idea, and can certainly work.

[Karthik S]

Delhi Defence Review‏
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Indian Army peacekeepers operating under a UN mandate in the DR of Congo have thwarted an attack on their post by 'Mai Mai' rebels.

I am personally against sending our troops on UN missions. No point in soldiers risking their lives for somebody else's cause.

[chetak]

Whatsapp forward

The first-ever Param Vishisht Seva Medal of the Indian Army was awarded to Lt Gen B M Kaul in 1960, notably for the successful completion of Operation Amar – the construction of 1,450 barracks/family quarters for troops in Ambala – which was inaugurated by the Prime Minister on August 20, 1958. This project was the brainchild of the Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon. To save on cost, the project entailed using troops as labour for the construction. Gen Thimayya, the Chief of Army Staff, was opposed to the project, but during his absence for a visit to the USA, Maj Gen B M Kaul, then General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 4 Infantry Division at Ambala, directly approached the Defence Minister and got the necessary approvals. The famous Red Eagle division rose to the occasion under his dynamic command and successfully completed the projected in a record seven months.

During his command tenure, in 1956, he had also given a fire-power and manoeuvre demonstration by an infantry battalion to the visiting Chinese delegation led by Prime Minister Chou En Lai at the Naraingarh field firing ranges. All that our army and air force had was put on display. Troops had rehearsed the demonstration for months to achieve perfection. The Chinese were awestruck and a visiting General was compelled to ask, "General would such immense resources be available to a battalion in war?" Thus 1956-1959 was spent by 4 Infantry Division in organising great spectacles to showcase nationalistic spirit by constructing accommodation using troop labour and in impressing the Chinese by using disproportionate assets in support of a battalion attack.

In end 1959, 4 Infantry Division was despatched to NEFA. Lt Gen B M Kaul, having earned his PVSM, was now the Quarter Master General responsible for housing of the army. War clouds were looming, but the General was still obsessed with his pet projects. Rather than staying in tents and focusing on preparing defences, the ever-efficient 4 Infantry Division was tasked to construct bashas (temporary mud and tin-roofed accommodation) under Operation Amar 2. Representations were brushed aside and construction began on a war-footing. Operation Amar 2 was inaugurated by none other than the Prime Minister on April 14, 1960.

In the early 1960s, the unit lines, messes and bungalows were also used for ‘grow more food’ campaign to grow wheat and other crops. It was a common sight in Meerut Cantonment to see troops engaged in farming. Bullocks and ploughs had been bought from regimental funds and old Persian wells had been reactivated. A still older method of drawing water out of conventional wells using a buffalo hide as a water bag and pulled by bullocks or male buffaloes, was also put to use. Once during a locust attack, it was a comical sight to see troops in hundreds beating empty peepas (metal canisters) to frighten the locust away from the wheat being grown.

In 1961, it was clear to all that war with China was imminent. However, the government at this juncture decided to throw the Portuguese out of Goa. Operation Vijay to liberate Goa was a classic tri-service operation against a very weak enemy and was all over in two days. However, great publicity was given to this 'feat of arms' with high-pitch political rhetoric and public adulation. The only sour note was that some units indulged in looting and were forced to march on foot on the way back. The liberation of Goa was long overdue but in hindsight, the timing, by design or default led to public attention being diverted from what was happening on the northern borders. Also, it brought in a false sense of complacency about our military prowess.

Such was the prevailing environment, ethos and culture in the armed forces in the Fifties and early Sixties. Grassroots training, the primary preoccupation of an army in peace time, had been neglected, generals were bending backwards for political favours. The Army chief had resigned due to reckless political orders for taking over the northern borders to execute the forward policy without requisite infrastructure. He was cajoled into withdrawing his resignation but was later humiliated during discussions in the Parliament.

Note the irony, when war came in October-November 1962, it was 4 Infantry Division that faced the brunt in the Kameng Division. 4 Corps, responsible for the defence of NEFA, was commanded by none other than Lt Gen B M Kaul. During the final conference held by the Chinese Politburo on October 6, Marshal Ye Jianying informed all present that during his 1957 visit to India, he had met General Kaul, the Indian Commander in NEFA. He said that though Kaul had served in Burma during World War II, he had no actual combat experience. He added that Kaul seemed, "to be very rigid, even if an impressive looking soldier. Still, he was one of India's most outstanding commanders". Mao cut him short and sarcastically said, "Fine, he'll have another opportunity to shine."



Alas, the rest is history. The Indian Army with 200 hundred years of unblemished history was routed in just eight days of fighting, four days each in October and November 1962. Of course, we have come a long way. It took us three years of concerted training and 'detoxification' to keep our heads above water in 1965 and another six years of hard work to redeem our reputation in 1971.

With the above backdrop, I appeal to our political leaders and our generals, that while participation in non-military 'national causes' is a noble effort, do not forget that our primary mission is to safeguard the nation.

Gen HS Apnay

[ramana]

tsarakr, Thanks for your insight on the Soviet Nazi battles and the Indian attacks to liberate Bangladesh. No one has described the three pronged attack in you terms. I always wondered how did Gen Nagra's troops liberate Dacca so easily?

1971 Bangladesh War Map

Illustrates your point. 101 Communication Zone reached Dhaka while the other two thrusts kept the Pakis busy.


Have you by any chance looked at US attacks on Occupied Europe from Overlord to battle of Bulge?

how did they develop?

[ks_sachin]

tsarakr, Thanks for your insight on the Soviet Nazi battles and the Indian attacks to liberate Bangladesh. No one has described the three pronged attack in you terms. I always wondered how did Gen Nagra's troops liberate Dacca so easily?

1971 Bangladesh War Map

Illustrates your point. 101 Communication Zone reached Dhaka while the other two thrusts kept the Pakis busy.


Have you by any chance looked at US attacks on Occupied Europe from Overlord to battle of Bulge?

how did they develop?

ramana sir,

Dad was with 101. He was at Commando Wing and just prior to hostilities went off. they entered Bladesh before reg army - training the mukti bahini. They then linked up with (I think he got attached to the Marathas when they linked up).

Will ask...

[Y I Patel]

The big argument for manpower heavy formations is that they are incredibly well suited for a defensive posture. This is especially true in Eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, where the infrastructure is atrocious and the only viable posture is to dig in and slug it out. This is even true in the plains with Pakistan in an offensive posture, because the Pakistan Army has densely packed its defensive lines and applied the same principles of redundancy of forces.

So that speaks to continuing with the tried and tested, but there are other scenarios were formations that are less manpower heavy will be better suited. This would apply first to offensive operations in mountainous areas against both China and Pakistan. Think about what worked in Kargil - company level attacks from multiple directions after stealthy infiltration close to defensive outposts, supported at the right time by disproportionately heavy artillery firepower. This is the template of the future, of how IA can prevail over both Pak Army as well as PLA.

The need for lighter, more agile, and more autonomous formations will also be felt for more futuristic scenarios that the Indian military will do well to start thinking about, such as, for example, a seaborne offensive against a Chinese base in Djibouti. That would require a more "modern" expeditionary force that calls for a western/soviet style combined arms approach to warfare. Such units will also work better in defensive mountain warfare scenarios once infrastructure initiatives finally catch up to their acutely felt need. Here's an example of the latter: consider a two lane all-weather link through Saser La. Such a link will afford secure, rapid communication and will permit shifting of reserves in hours between two high-altitude theatres, Siachen and DBO. The great irony about the Kargil War was that it was triggered by Pak's desire to wrest Siachen, and foiled, in the main, by IA reserves shifted from the Siachen theatre! So long as IA continues to maintain a watchful presence on the Saltoro heights, they can be held against much larger attacking forces, and the units rotating in or out to the very high altitude sub-sectors constitute a substantial and battle ready reserve for high altitude contingencies anywhere but particularly in neighboring theatres if reliable LCs exist. The point in this context being that if infrastructure improves, mountain warfare is more effectively conducted by less manpower and more firepower intensive units.

PS
Is PM functionality permanently disabled or would admins consider enabling it? If any admins are hovering, could you please enable PM functionality for me? Thanks!

[manjgu]

Karthink S...soldiers and officers look forward for UN posting and there is a fairly tough selection process... its like onsite assignment for software people... folks can build houses and marry their daughters with money earned at UN missions...

[Ashutosh Malik]

tsarakr, Thanks for your insight on the Soviet Nazi battles and the Indian attacks to liberate Bangladesh. No one has described the three pronged attack in you terms. I always wondered how did Gen Nagra's troops liberate Dacca so easily?

1971 Bangladesh War Map

Illustrates your point. 101 Communication Zone reached Dhaka while the other two thrusts kept the Pakis busy.


Have you by any chance looked at US attacks on Occupied Europe from Overlord to battle of Bulge?

how did they develop?

If one hasn't, I would certainly recommend reading the following book by Brig. Onkar Singh Goraya.

"Leap Across Meghna Blitzkrieg of IV Corps 1971". Covers all aspects of Gen. Sagat Singh's IV Corps as well as 101 Communication Zone.

https://www.amazon.in/Leap-Across-Meghn ... 9384901083

[wig]

http://tribuneindia.com/news/nation/acr ... 79970.html

ACRs not enough, Army may tweak selection criteria for officers
excerpts

The proposal is to restructure assured career and empowerment of officers, sources say. It says promotions and selections for courses like Higher Defence Management Course, the National Defence College and UN missions should not be overwhelming dependent on just ACRs and should be made “broad-based” to have a more objective criterion like written examinations and submission of military-related papers.

laudable

The argument is that the present system offers “no protection” and was leading to skewed personality development as officers try and keep away from a “righteous path” to ensure progression of career. It cites “frivolous complaints” that cause undue scare among officers, who fear losing out on the next rank.
Courage and conviction get downplayed as the existing ACR-based system provided no protection. The Army believes there is a need to ensure personality development among officers by allowing them to express freely as leaders. It says that officers should be provided with legal protection for actions that are taken for progression of military aim.

[Bishwa]

UN posting has been given to units which performed well in the field.

For example 18 Grenadiers was sent to United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000 just after the Kargil war in 1999. 18 Grenadiers is involved in a number of battles in Kargil including Tiger Hill (Grenadier YS Yadav got a PVC)

[Philip]

We hear from time to time reports about the IA/DRDO developing a new combat package/gear for the infantry.Here is a report on the RuA's Ratnik-3 gear which will succeed the current Ratnik -2 gear being used.The IA/DRDO should study this and other gear from other nations in developing our own cost-effective design.Such gear could have agame-changing force-multiplying effect on the battlefield ,which could perhaps even lead to smaller numbers of infantry in the various units.Ck the pics in the link,real Star Wars helmets!

Russian working on third generation of Ratnik combat gear
Military & Defense September 29, 8:33 UTC+3
The third generation of the Ratnik combat gear may appear by 2022
Valeriy Sharifulin/TASS

MOSCOW, September 29. /TASS/. The third generation of the Ratnik combat gear may appear by 2022, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Ground Forces Col. Gen. Oleg Salyukov said in an interview published on Friday.
"We are completing the scientific research on creating the future layout of the Ratnik-3 combat gear. The implementation of the project will allow to increase the performance of a soldier by 1.5 times in completing various tasks," he said in an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda paper.
READ ALSO

Ratnik combat gear enters service, delivery to army begins

According to Salyukov, the total weight of the gear will be reduced by 30%
The Ratnik kit comprises five integrated systems that include life support, command and communication, engaging, protection and energy saving subsystems. It is designed to be used round-the-clock in all weather conditions.
The Ratnik comprises a total of 59 items including various bulletproof vests and protective helmets, a combat one-piece garment, a headset with active protection, protective glasses, a grenade launcher, assault rifles, sniper rifles, munition, a combat knife, round-the-clock reconnaissance devices and unified optical and thermal imaging sights.
Salyukov was earlier quoted by the media as saying that the Ratnik-3 kit being developed by TsNIITochMash will comprise an exoskeleton suite. A target designation system will be mounted on the helmet`s faceshield, while the bulletproof vest will be able to stop several bullets. "[The kit will] use exoskeleton mechanisms, a display system to show information on faceshield or protective glasses and microclimate control and health monitoring devices," Salyukov was quoted as saying by the Rossiyskaya Gazeta daily in October 2016

http://tass.com/defense/968052

[SBajwa]

Indian soldiers missing Diwali song. must watch (it is in Punjabi)

[Karthik S]

Shiv Aroor‏Verified account
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Spotted this in the obituary section of the papers this morning. A blink-and-you-miss-it remembrance for an Army man killed 14 yrs ago. 1/n

Apparently Late Lt Atri's sister contacted Shiv in the thread itself. We all owe such family immense gratitude.