Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

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Arun.prabhu
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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Arun.prabhu » 19 May 2019 22:51

The thing with armor that no one seems to get is that apart from protecting soldiers, the armor makes them as slow as snails. The modern US infantryman's armor weighs about 7.5 kgs with SAPI inserts. That's on top of his gun, his reloads, his communication gear and whatever else he has to carry. What would be the endurance of any soldier carrying that sort of load in the tropical heat?

Then there is the issue of the helmet and its attachments. The modern US infantryman's helmet is so heavy that neck muscle injuries are a common issue.

What the IA needs is armor that affords reasonable protection - not universal, but reasonable - is light, breathable (so that the sweat will evaporate), doesn't allow our soldiers to overheat in the tropical sun, and is cheap. Tall ask. What the Americans have today is a stupid solution imposed on them by a casualty averse and morally cowardly leadership that will put soldiers and victory at risk just to avoid a few body bags.

souravB wrote:There were too many BPJs developed by too many institutions. There was
1. BARC developed Kavach BPJs
2. Amity university prof Shantanu Bhowmik developed CNT enforced Kevlar for BPJs
3. Our own industrial companies providing BPJs
and now this.

For face protection there are newer helmets with mandibles that is being tested by British army


Also for groin protection, this is newest form tinkered by US Army design dept.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby CalvinH » 20 May 2019 00:05

Arun.prabhu wrote:What would be the endurance of any soldier carrying that sort of load in the tropical heat?



With Kashmir as focus area I guess tropical heat is not much of a concern. Slow as a snail is not true. Average soldier can take that much of weight during regular patrol duties along LOC and in Kashmir. They are not expected to run continuously in CI Ops.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby souravB » 20 May 2019 00:19

Arun.prabhu wrote:The thing with armor that no one seems to get is that apart from protecting soldiers, the armor makes them as slow as snails. The modern US infantryman's armor weighs about 7.5 kgs with SAPI inserts. That's on top of his gun, his reloads, his communication gear and whatever else he has to carry. What would be the endurance of any soldier carrying that sort of load in the tropical heat?

Then there is the issue of the helmet and its attachments. The modern US infantryman's helmet is so heavy that neck muscle injuries are a common issue.

That is why a jawan during it's training should be taught to treat the BPJ and helmet as part of their uniform.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Arun.prabhu » 20 May 2019 07:10

Thus totally ignoring the theatre where there'll be a real shooting war. I'll question the sanity of a policy that tries to equip soldiers for counterinsurgency ops with low tempo, short duration engagements as against a real war. Try running short sprints up or downhill while bearing 40/50 pounds of load.

CalvinH wrote:
Arun.prabhu wrote:What would be the endurance of any soldier carrying that sort of load in the tropical heat?



With Kashmir as focus area I guess tropical heat is not much of a concern. Slow as a snail is not true. Average soldier can take that much of weight during regular patrol duties along LOC and in Kashmir. They are not expected to run continuously in CI Ops.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Arun.prabhu » 20 May 2019 07:17

The medieval European knights used to do that. Wear armor all the time so that it became almost a second skin.The armor was so well designed that they could dance in it. The knights also rode on horses and every time they fought someone competent and did not obey the unstated rules of combat as followed by their European fellows, they lost stinking.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mohi

Speed is one of the principles of war. Body armor, surprisingly is not.

souravB wrote:That is why a jawan during it's training should be taught to treat the BPJ and helmet as part of their uniform.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby souravB » 20 May 2019 17:30

Arun.prabhu wrote:
Speed is one of the principles of war. Body armor, surprisingly is not.

saar,
1. speed in op execution, not speed of individual soldier is a principle of war. unless you were talking about personal duel. It wasn't since human found gunpowder.
2. speed of a bullet is always much faster than the fastest soldier.
3. BPJs save lives from many non-direct but fatal injuries like shrapnel, IED, blunt trauma etc.
4. BPJs without the plate weighs much less and can still protect upto 7.62x39 steel core rounds from a certain distance. Regular jawan is not mid-western gunslinger where every second counts. He/she might be slow but it is better than be dead and not complete the mission.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Arun.prabhu » 20 May 2019 19:10

1. An army that isn't highly mechanized isn't going to be fast at anything if it's soldiers are overloaded with armor, weapons and what not. Reducing soldier load - patrol, march and combat - makes for faster soldiers who aren't tired out of their wits and who can think and act fast. Even in an mechanized army, depending on the shape of the terrain, one cannot depend on vehicles to haul an infantryman's ass close to the battlefield. The load an infantryman carries has an impact on how fast his team, squad, platoon or company can execute an op. You know what the Taliban called overloaded western infantymen in Afghanistan? Donkeys.

https://mwi.usma.edu/the-overweight-infantryman/

2. <ignore>Are there any other false logics and invalid keen observations you want to use to try to overawe me?</ignore> Edited response: Okay, that response was snide. My apologies. You're right that a soldier can't dodge a bullet, but that isn't what I'm asking for, is it? I want infantrymen who don't destroy their bodies bearing loads that their body isn't designed to support. I want armor that'll give them reasonable protection at a reasonable cost in mobility. I don't donkeys who can't pursue a retreating enemy and harry them to death or close with an enemy quickly during an assault. These are, I think, reasonable expectations.

3. We're agreed. If you'll read up the thread, you'll note that I did not argue for infantrymen to fight buck naked to save weight. I argued for reasonable protection.

4. I sound callous for saying this, but everyone and everything is expendable to the military mind in pursuit of a military goal. Ask all the soldiers who ever fought a rearguard action or a foiling raid with very little hope of survival or the first few waves to step onto a hostile beach. You also forget the corollary to your rule. Is it better to be alive but with a failed mission because you were borne down by your armor?

souravB wrote:
Arun.prabhu wrote:
Speed is one of the principles of war. Body armor, surprisingly is not.

saar,
1. speed in op execution, not speed of individual soldier is a principle of war. unless you were talking about personal duel. It wasn't since human found gunpowder.
2. speed of a bullet is always much faster than the fastest soldier.
3. BPJs save lives from many non-direct but fatal injuries like shrapnel, IED, blunt trauma etc.
4. BPJs without the plate weighs much less and can still protect upto 7.62x39 steel core rounds from a certain distance. Regular jawan is not mid-western gunslinger where every second counts. He/she might be slow but it is better than be dead and not complete the mission.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby jaysimha » 21 May 2019 14:28


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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby jaysimha » 24 May 2019 16:31


mmasand
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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby mmasand » 08 Jun 2019 10:19

https://twitter.com/sneheshphilip/statu ... 07360?s=19

These guys are hilarious! I'd wish for this clip to be shown to MoD procurement Babu's who sleep on files.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby wig » 19 Jun 2019 19:45

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/i ... 2019-06-19

Indian Army to raise 3 battle formations along Pakistan border by October
The new battle formations will also come up on the China border after they are successfully tested and established on the front with Pakistan.

from the above article
The Indian Army has carried out successful test of the new integrated battle group concept which will be a battle formation with heavy firepower including armoured, infantry and all other war fighting capabilities. We are going to raise three of these formations by October this year," top army sources said here.

According to sources, the proposal has been cleared at the army headquarters level after a detailed discussion and will now be sent to the defence ministry for final approval.
The new battle formations will also come up on the China border after they are successfully tested and established on the front with Pakistan.
The integrated battle groups have been created with the aim of getting ability to move troops and equipment swiftly and stealthily into the enemy territory at short notice even before the enemy gets ready to tackle the trust. Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) will be smaller, meaner, self-contained fighting units of the Indian Army comprising elements of air power, artillery, amour etc.

As against the somewhat antiquated fighting formation of corps - each comprising 8-10 brigades, with a brigade having 3-4 battalions of 800 fighting men each - an IBG is likely to have just about 6 battalions.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby ramana » 20 Jun 2019 00:29

So its a heavy brigade.
How does it compare to a division and mountain division in firepower?
A division would have 3 brigades of 3-4 battalions i.e 2400- 3200 soldiers.
Therefore 7200 - 9600 soldiers.
An IBG with 6 battalions would be 4800 soldiers in other words half a division.
Now whats the fire power comparison.
How many rifles? How many MMGs, Mortars, Artillery and Tanks?

Are the armored divisions also being turned into IBGs? and how about Independent Armored Brigades?

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby ramana » 20 Jun 2019 00:30

jaysimha wrote:https://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/BaatCheet/English/May%202019.pdf

Indian army baatcheet may 2019



This one says first Dhanush guns already handed out on April 2019.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby nam » 20 Jun 2019 00:39

ramana wrote:Are the armored divisions also being turned into IBGs? and how about Independent Armored Brigades?


Here is my guess. The armor divisions and strike corps are not going anywhere.

The pivot corps are getting converted in to IBG with armor integrated with them. They will be the Rapid Reaction units. Once they initiate action, the Strike corps will steam roll through.

All Strike corps will get T90, replacing any T72. IBG will probably get combo of T90 & upgraded T72.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby ArjunPandit » 20 Jun 2019 00:41

if pakistan continues the way they are they might see some action soon.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby kit » 20 Jun 2019 02:09

nam wrote:
ramana wrote:Are the armored divisions also being turned into IBGs? and how about Independent Armored Brigades?


Here is my guess. The armor divisions and strike corps are not going anywhere.

The pivot corps are getting converted in to IBG with armor integrated with them. They will be the Rapid Reaction units. Once they initiate action, the Strike corps will steam roll through.

All Strike corps will get T90, replacing any T72. IBG will probably get combo of T90 & upgraded T72.


i suppose these integrated units would be highly mobile independent and pack enhanced firepower to punch through without any need for immediate backup, short term as said the Corps will steamroll through the battlefield or whatever is left of it.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby mody » 20 Jun 2019 14:45

From today's TOI, each IBG will have about 5,000 troops, heavy artillery support, integrated signals corp, integrated mobile air defence and also dedicated attack helicopters attached with each IBG.
Immediate plan to raise three IBGs for the western front and after carrying out proving exercises, 2 IBGs for the eastern front.

If the IBGs are being raised from the pivot corps, then I suspect if the plans are successful, we might get more then just 3 IBGs for the western front. This would give the pakis sleepless nights.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby wig » 22 Jun 2019 09:40

https://www.dailyexcelsior.com/army-to- ... er-places/

Army to raise Integrated Battle Groups in Jammu, 2 other places
excerpted from the above
Sources told the Excelsior that apart from Jammu, the two other Integrated Battle Groups could come up in Punjab and Rajasthan, the two States that also shared International Border with Pakistan like Jammu region. Jammu has 198 kilometers International Boundary with Pakistan from Lakhanpur to Akhnoor comprising three districts of the region including Jammu, Samba and Kathua. In addition, India also shared Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan in twin border districts of Poonch and Rajouri in Jammu region.
“The Integrated Battle Groups will comprise infantry, artillery, air defence, T-90s Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), Signals and Engineers. They will be backed by attack helicopters,’’ sources said.
As per the proposal, sources said, the Integrated Battle Groups are likely to be headed by the officers in the rank of Major Generals.
While the three Integrated Battle Groups of Army proposed for Jammu, Punjab and Rajasthan could come up by October this year, the similar groups alone China borders could take a little more. The Battle Groups along China border are proposed to be the part of 17 Mountain Strike Corps being raised at Pannagarh in West Bengal, sources disclosed.
“The Integrated Battle Groups will be set up to ensure that they can mobilize fast and strike hard across the borders with Pakistan as and when required. They are part of the Government’s ongoing endeavour to reformat war-fighting machinery especially along the borders with Pakistan,’’ sources said.
Each Integrated Battle Group will have around 5000 troops, sources pointed out and said they will be carved out of around 50 Divisions which have 15,000 soldiers each under the 14 Corps.
The “lethal and agile” Integrated Battle Groups have been “test-bedded and exercised” in the war-games held last month, which saw the participation of a “Strike Corps” and a “Defensive Corps” under the aegis of the Western Command headquartered at Chandimandir near Chandigarh. The Western Command covers three districts of Jammu region including Jammu, Samba and Kathua.
Sources said the Integrated Battle Groups will be both offensive and defensive. The offensive group will be tank-intensive for thrusts across the border while the defensive group will be Infantry-centric to hold ground.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby darshan » 29 Jun 2019 10:22

https://mnaidunia.jagran.com/national-d ... my-3010826
बड़ा फैसला : दारुल उलूम के युवा मौलवी सेना में बनेंगे धर्म गुरु
https://www.livehindustan.com/uttar-pra ... 89335.html
देवबंद के बाद बरेलवी मौलवी भी सेना में धर्मगुरु बनेंगे

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby MeshaVishwas » 06 Jul 2019 17:08

In Army Restructuring, Tweaks In Plans Against China-Nitin Gokhale
The Indian Army, battling depleting budget and rising security challenges in the region, has embarked on a restructuring-cum-transformation plan to make the force future combat-ready.

While the reorganisation of the Army HQ has gained momentum since last week and has been widely reported, important steps in restructuring the combat forces and tweaking the Order of Battle (ORBAT) of important formations have gone largely unnoticed.

For instance, an important change has occurred the way the 17 Mountain Strike Corps, primarily conceived for deployment along India’s northern border with China, is now taking shape. Originally planned as a three-division formation—as all Corps normally are—the Army leadership has now decided that only two divisions (approximately 10,000 to 12000 troops) would be integral to 17 Corps, headquartered at Panagarh in West Bengal.

Accordingly, only the newly raised 59 Mountain Division, co-located with the 17 Corps HQ at Panagarh, and the Dehradun-based 14 Division will be permanent part of the Mountain Strike Corps. Other formations like the Ranchi-based 23 Division and the yet-to-be-fully-raised 72 Division at Pathankot, will now have dual tasking — to be part of western command as well as get assigned to 17 Corps — when needed.

Interestingly, the 14 Division used to be called 14 RAPID (Re-organised Army Plains Infantry Division) and was part of 2 Corps. The RAPIDS (more than half a dozen of them) were formed in the mid-1980s-early 1990 because they comprised two infantry and one mechanised or armoured brigade which gave the division greater mobility.

Now, an armoured brigade located at Roorkee under 14 RAPID has swapped places with an infantry brigade at Kapurthala. So the erstwhile 14 RAPID Division has been converted into a pure infantry or mountain division placed under the 17 Corps. The plan is to deploy the tweaked 14 Division in the Central Sector of the India-China border in Uttarakhand, which so far had a bare minimum presence of the Army through a sole independent brigade headquartered at Joshimath.

The 17 Corps, primarily meant as an offensive formation against China unlike the other formations deployed on the northern frontiers, is planning to test its effectiveness by undertaking a war game in the Tawang area of Arunachal Pradesh in the winter of 2019. The Tezpur-based 4 Corps which has three of its divisions earmarked for the defence of western Arunachal Pradesh, will join in the exercise.

Meanwhile, on the western front, under a plan finalised last year, the concept of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) has moved forward with “two test beds” being carried out during the current summer months. IBGs created by borrowing units from 26 and 29 Divisions have been tested under the Yol-based 9 Corps. A similar exercise under the Ambala-based 2 Corps has also yielded interesting results, Army sources said.

Essentially, the proposal was to let the Corps Headquarters (the highest field formation in the Indian Army) to directly control operations through re-organised brigades re-designated as Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs). The IBGs can be as varied as Integrated Infantry Battle Groups (IIBGs), Integrated Armoured Battle Groups (IABGs) or Integrated Artillery Battle Groups (IArtyBGs). The Army currently has 14 Corps Headquarters.

Under the proposed change, all Division HQs (except those of the three Artillery Divisions)—identified as additional friction points in the chain of command—will be done away with. Each Integrated Battle Group will consist of four to six infantry/mech battalions or armoured/artillery regiments as required. But more importantly, each of these battle groups would be commanded by a Major General. There are detailed explanations and suggestions about how to merge and utilise Divisional Combat support, logistics and service units.

The underlying concept is to make the frontline formations agile and effective in making rapid thrusts into Pakistan during a hot war and capture crucial territory. This plan, also described as “Çold Start lite” improves upon the original Cold Start doctrine that the Indian Army came up with in the early 2000s. Cold-start however proved to be non-starter since the armour-heavy large formations just could not move rapidly or silently enough before Pakistan got alerted. So in 2018, the current army leaders came up with the concept of IBGs and their presence along the frontline for rapid deployment.

The creation of IBGs was among four studies that the Army ordered in November 2018. They were: a) Reorganise the Army Headquarters, b) Right size the Army, c) Carry out a cadre review for officers and d) Review the term of engagement for personnel below officer rank.

Apart from creating test beds for the IBGs, the Army has been able to make substantial progress on the first segment with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) approving the plan to redeploy about 300 officers elsewhere and restructure different verticals in the Army HQ to increase efficiency. Conceived towards the tail end of the Modi government’s first tenure, the Restructuring of Army HQ was approved earlier this week by new Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. It will now be implemented over the next few months.

Under the plan, the directorates of military intelligence (MI) and Military Operations (MO) will now be brought under a newly created post of Deputy Chief (Strategy). Apart from MO and MI Directorates, the new deputy chief will also have a three-star ranked officer in-charge of information warfare reporting to him. Among the existing two deputy chiefs, the one looking after capital procurement and modernisation will get wider responsibilities. The Master General of Ordnance (MGO) Branch, which handles all recurring procurement for the Army worth over 15,000 crore annually, will now report to this deputy chief who was earlier called DCOAS (Planning and Systems) but will now be re-designated as Deputy Chief (Capability development). This move synergises the capital (new acquisitions) and revenue (recurring) procurement at the apex level.

https://sniwire.com/defence-security/in ... nst-china/

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby tsarkar » 06 Jul 2019 17:46

Brigades and Divisions have their own place in military operations.

Unfortunately due to Ministry of Defence downgrading Brigadiers/Commodore/Air Commodore from Flag Rank, the IA is merging Brigades (commanded by Brigadiers) and Divisions (Commanded by Major Generals) into IBG commanded by Major Generals.

The objective of this exercise is to ensure Brigadiers get promoted to Major Generals.

Unfortunately warfighting is going for a toss as the IBG will be too small for theatre operations and too large for specific actions.

You dont need an enemy with nuclear weapons - just bureaucrats and army bureaucracy will defeat our forces.

We're restructuring our forces not based on military imperatives but IAS defined hierarchy.

Wonder if Prime Minister or Defence Minister comprehends this.

Sad & Disappointed :-(

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby vivekmehta » 06 Jul 2019 19:09

tsarkar wrote:Brigades and Divisions have their own place in military operations.

Unfortunately due to Ministry of Defence downgrading Brigadiers/Commodore/Air Commodore from Flag Rank, the IA is merging Brigades (commanded by Brigadiers) and Divisions (Commanded by Major Generals) into IBG commanded by Major Generals.

The objective of this exercise is to ensure Brigadiers get promoted to Major Generals.

Unfortunately warfighting is going for a toss as the IBG will be too small for theatre operations and too large for specific actions.


You dont need an enemy with nuclear weapons - just bureaucrats and army bureaucracy will defeat our forces.

We're restructuring our forces not based on military imperatives but IAS defined hierarchy.

Wonder if Prime Minister or Defence Minister comprehends this.

Sad & Disappointed :-(


Sir with due respect.. are you Shure that definitions of theater command or action has not changed recently... Since I don't understand much of IAS vs Military hierarchy.. but what make you think that these changes are More governed by IAS lobby instead of our new principal's/objective of how to handle enemy..
May be going forward specific action's will mean taking over 50km * 50km territory. Instead of couple of posts as of today

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby tsarkar » 06 Jul 2019 22:24

The creation of IBGs was among four studies that the Army ordered in November 2018. They were: a) Reorganise the Army Headquarters, b) Right size the Army, c) Carry out a cadre review for officers and d) Review the term of engagement for personnel below officer rank.


Under the proposed change, all Division HQs (except those of the three Artillery Divisions)—identified as additional friction points in the chain of command—will be done away with. Each Integrated Battle Group will consist of four to six infantry/mech battalions or armoured/artillery regiments as required. But more importantly, each of these battle groups would be commanded by a Major General.


Slightly more than brigade sized IBG will be commanded by Major Generals. The downgrading of Brigadiers is being countered by making them Major Generals.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby nam » 06 Jul 2019 22:33

tsarkar wrote:Wonder if Prime Minister or Defence Minister comprehends this.

Sad & Disappointed :-(


If this is true, more than PM or DM understanding this, I would be more concerned about IA leadership, who consider ego fights with IAS is more important than national security.

PM or DM are not suppose to understand war fighting or ORBAT.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby ManuJ » 07 Jul 2019 00:39

tsarkar, astute observation.

But don't think that's the complete story.
IMHO IA is betting that high firepower, advanced technology and rapid mobility will give these brigade+ sized formations enough punching power as older division sized formations, while keeping them lithe and maneuverable.
Best of both worlds so to speak.
Of course, for that to actually happen, adequate infusion of technology, fire-power and mobility needs to take place.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby rohitvats » 07 Jul 2019 20:15

As per my conversation with Nitin Gokhale, not all Division HQ will be done away with. Only some.

Having said that, the concept of having a Major General command an IBG, which basis the information available, seems like a strengthened brigade, seems bizarre to me as well. For comparison, a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the US Army, which comes close to an IBG as propounded above, is commanded by a Colonel. Larger BCTs, which are armor heavy, are commanded by Brigadiers.

But the commanding bit aside, the rationalization of formations amongst various sectors and Corps, is a very welcome step. As is the creation of IBGs.

I will put out a short analysis on this soon.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby tsarkar » 08 Jul 2019 17:19

The IBG heavily borrows from US Stryker Brigade Combat Team.

The US imperative was rapid deployment and a brigade was the maximum that could be rapidly airlifted or sealifted along with its logistics. However before the US SBCT engaged, massive firepower from USN Aircraft Carrier wings, cruise missile armed submarines and destroyers, naval gunfire, USAF heavy bombers like B-52 & B2, strike aircraft like F-15E and close air support F-16 & A-10 would clear the path for SBCT.

In India, we have entrenched enemies on both Eastern & Western borders. A brigade with integral artillery and armour will be insufficient for both offence or defence.

Brigadier Mohammed Usman of Para who mostly recaptured Kashmir & Jammu for us until his tragic untimely death combined the entire divisional artillery before his Infantry attacked.

Same at Kargil - a Sikh Officer mustered entire Corps Artillery to mercilessly pound Pakistanis before each assault. Each peak required multiple battalions from one brigade to capture and an additional brigade for holding forces.

US style expeditionary warfare doesnt work for well prepared and entrenched opponents India has. Iraq in 90's was weak after Iran war. Yugoslavia was in throes of civil war. Afghanistan had tribal militias. India has to contend with well trained and equipped China & Pakistan.

Even if a Brigade made a lightning strike, it wont be able to hold on and sustain its objectives until additional forces are made available.

Personally I would have preferred modernizing existing divisions with Helicopter Attack & Lift capabilities, Armour, Artillery and Mechanization.

This is also where LCH, ALH, Arjun, Dhanush/ATAGS & BMP-2/Abhay could have cost effectively modernized instead of smaller numbers of K10 or M777.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby brar_w » 08 Jul 2019 19:37

tsarkar wrote:The IBG heavily borrows from US Stryker Brigade Combat Team.

The US imperative was rapid deployment and a brigade was the maximum that could be rapidly airlifted or sealifted along with its logistics. However before the US SBCT engaged, massive firepower from USN Aircraft Carrier wings, cruise missile armed submarines and destroyers, naval gunfire, USAF heavy bombers like B-52 & B2, strike aircraft like F-15E and close air support F-16 & A-10 would clear the path for SBCT.....

US style expeditionary warfare doesnt work for well prepared and entrenched opponents India has. Iraq in 90's was weak after Iran war. Yugoslavia was in throes of civil war. Afghanistan had tribal militias. India has to contend with well trained and equipped China & Pakistan.




The US Army has as many, if not more, Armored BCT's (equipped with M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley and M109's) as it does Stryker BCTs. In fact recently they've upgunned a SBCT to an ABCT and are planning to fill the void left in the SBCT sphere by up gunning an Infantry BCT to a SBCT.They didn't transition out of theirlegacy divisional construct till the mid 2000's, long after the conflicts mentioned above where they operated within a divisional construct of the cold war with plenty of armor (nearly 2000 M1 Abrams were deployed to the ME during Gulf War for example). The SBCT's were indeed created with mobility and expeditionary needs in mind, particularly after the cold-war had ended resulting in a significant reduction in forward positioned troops and equipment in Europe and elsewhere. This allowed them to create BCT's that were more survivable and lethal than Infantry BCT units and more mobile and easy to deploy than ABCT's. The exact mix though is threat depending and as is happening now as they transition to higher end conflict needs of the future they will keep addressing the mix of ABCT's, SBCT's and IBCT's. The composite BCT structure though has nothing to do with it. It is just a modular unit, and can be as armored or as lethal as one would like.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby rohitvats » 09 Jul 2019 17:23

I think we need to wait for more literature to come out before commenting on the proposed Integrated Battle Groups (IBG).

Having said that, the concept of battle groups is nothing new and has existed in one form or another from before WW2.

At its most basic level, a battle group consists of a core group which is then reinforced with other supporting elements. For example, an infantry brigade of 3 x infantry battalions supported by 1 x Armored Regiment + 1 x Artillery Regiment is example of an infantry heavy battle group.

What US Army did with their BCT concept was to change the very structure of their army considering their operational requirement. And while the older US Army also had the concept of battle groups within their brigade & division structure, the new BCT set-up formalizes this concept.

One of the advantage of a formal BCT structure is that it creates cohesion between sub-components. These sub-components exercise together, train together and each knows what needs to be done. Makes command and control easier.

Within the Indian Army, the concept of battle groups has always existed.

One of the aims of various exercises done post-2001/Op Parakaram was to reduce mobilization time. Now, faster mobilization does not only mean going from your peace location to forward locations faster, it also means pairing up with your running mates.

Earlier, the units would reach their Assembly Area, pair-up with their running mates (for example: X Infantry Brigade with Y Armored Regiment), move to Forming-Up Place (FUP) and then onto Start Line.

One of the things practiced and implemented was identification of running mates in advance and meeting directly at FUP. Each sub-component knows the pairing in advance and the task at hand.

Now, alter the above set-up and think of an IBG.

Assume a hypothetical structure of 1 x Armored Regiments, 2 x Mechanized Battalions, 2 x Infantry Battalions, 2 x Artillery Regiments and other support troops.

Each sub-component is part of a formal structure which trains and exercises as a cohesive unit during peace-time.

There is one more aspect - we're going to see concentration of assets on specific points. Earlier, we'd tendency to spread fire-power like armored regiments in penny packets. With IBG, we will see them being concentrated and applied across a narrow point.

All the above is whatever I could think of. Waiting for more clarity to emerge.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby shyamd » 09 Jul 2019 20:42

^^ Great views posted. I think one of the key features of the IA IBG concept is to place these in forward locations permanently.

Interestingly, was having some chaiwallah conversations. Both sides only really ready to fight a limited conflict. Indian Armed Forces has overwhelming conventional superiority but don't really want to take over TSP or anything like that. Such comms have gone out to TSP. TSP posture is also the same - fight a limited war, develop mijjiles can target up to A&N islands.
Last edited by shyamd on 09 Jul 2019 20:54, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby ArjunPandit » 09 Jul 2019 20:51

^^rohit would this approach be more like a Sundarji style "Dash to Indus"?

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Anoop » 10 Jul 2019 07:44

In the 1965 Indo Pak war on the Pak side, command and control rested at the Corps level as opposed to Divisional level on our side. As a result, our response was generally quicker and more decentralized, resulting in being able to exploit openings better. If the IBGs are going to be controlled at Corps level, I wonder how we will avoid those problems. Communication technology has advanced in the interim which can give greater clarity of the operational picture i.e. reduce conflicting information. But a human being's ability to process information and respond may still be the limiting factor. Any thoughts?

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby rohitvats » 10 Jul 2019 13:48

Actually, in 1965 war, it was the AHQ in Rawalpindi which was controlling multiple divisions directly.

Pakistan Army had only one Corps i.e - 1 Corps. This was also very big in size and commanded a total of 8 Divisions. IV Corps was raised post-haste in 1965 itself because 1 Corps, with such large number of divisions under it, was found to be unwieldy.

Question that needs to be asked in our case is this - Are we going from Corps --> Division--->Brigade structure to Corps ---> IBG structure in some cases?

For example, the recent report says 2 x IBG have been created under Yol based 9 Corps by pooling resources from Pathankot based 29 Infantry Division and Jammu based 26 Infantry Division.

Questions which arise are - What happens to these Divisions? And who controls IBGs?

The way I look at it - it is likely that an IBG remains directly under Corps HQ and acts as Corps reserve. Depending on the intended role, it could be for offensive or defense tasks. By concentrating resources in an IBG, we create a powerful punch.

Earlier, the most powerful punch under a Pivot Corps was the Independent Armored Brigades under Corps HQ (3 x Armored Regiments + 1 x Mechanized Infantry Regiment + 1 x Artillery Regiment + support troops).

Now, we might have a situation where instead of an (I) Armored Brigade, we've a powerful, all arms combined IBG, which is more balanced in terms of resources and has more staying power. (I) Armored Brigade might or might not exist in current form. If it does, we've an (I) Armored Brigade and an IBG under a Corps. A powerful punch, indeed.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Anoop » 10 Jul 2019 16:45

Thanks, Rohit. In addition, I believe that 26 Div was very oversized to begin with, so it could certainly shed some elements to an IBG.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby ramana » 12 Jul 2019 06:24

Rohit, based on published information could you asses the IBG firepower vs old brigade and old division.

An IBG is between these two formations.


I also asked Akshay.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby rohitvats » 14 Jul 2019 00:24

^^^I'm already working on something with respect to IBG. Will take a weeks time on higher side.

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Vidur » 14 Jul 2019 17:15

tsarkar wrote:Brigades and Divisions have their own place in military operations.

Unfortunately due to Ministry of Defence downgrading Brigadiers/Commodore/Air Commodore from Flag Rank, the IA is merging Brigades (commanded by Brigadiers) and Divisions (Commanded by Major Generals) into IBG commanded by Major Generals.

The objective of this exercise is to ensure Brigadiers get promoted to Major Generals.

Unfortunately warfighting is going for a toss as the IBG will be too small for theatre operations and too large for specific actions.

You dont need an enemy with nuclear weapons - just bureaucrats and army bureaucracy will defeat our forces.

We're restructuring our forces not based on military imperatives but IAS defined hierarchy.

Wonder if Prime Minister or Defence Minister comprehends this.

Sad & Disappointed :-(


This is not directly relavent to IBGs but I am posting after a long time since the issue of IAS/Allied Services you refer to is critical with serous ramifications. In my first posting in Raksha Mantralaya many years back I was witness to a conversation at a party. An Addnl Secy told a Lt Gen that in 15 years we will take X, Y, Z from you and you will be able to do nothing about it. The Gen was humiliated and left. Later the Addnl Secy told the rest of us that we are superior and we must humiliate these generals and beat them into submission. Maj Gen Ian Cardozo is right when he says 'they hate us'. I am sad to say that we the bureaucracy have done as we said but in the bargain we have seriously hurt national security.

One of your erstwhile colleagues Akshay Kapoor has written a nice blog on the issues.I endorse it. It is pertinent for all to read it to understand the issues. The examples in italics are most telling and issues I have seen take shape in front of my eyes. http://tejasrange.blogspot.com/?m=1

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Vidur » 14 Jul 2019 17:44

MOD needs Political Will


June 28, 2019

IAS/Allied Services control of National Defence makes India very weak
A. Critical situation:
National security policy and control of armed forces is rightly vested in the elected government by the constitution. However this control is not exercised by the elected and accountable government – RM and PM, but by unelected, unaccountable and unsuitable bureaucrats.
This has four consequences:
severe equipment gaps in critical areas
day-to-day functioning of armed forces is compromised
Armed forces morale is low and officer recruitment is difficult leading to officer shortages because armed forces officers are treated like second-class citizens by bureaucracy
trust in government is eroded and good work/good intentions of PM and RM is undone
RM and PM are unaware of these issues because they get advice only from the bureaucrats who are the source of the problem. Serving armed forces officers cannot articulate these issues for fear of military discipline, so this note is an attempt to bring the issues to the attention of political leadership and also suggest solutions.

B. Heart of the problem:
Unlike any other country in the world, the Raksha Mantralaya and many parts of military service delivery and administration is run by IAS, IDS and IDAS officers who have no interest, passion or expertise for national security issues. Sadly they also have no empathy and concern for the nation’s soldiers.
This leads to them applying completely unsuitable frameworks borrowed from their experience as revenue collectors, license givers and civil administrators to a highly dynamic domain defined by high technology, complex multi-dimensional threats, life and death decisions and highly complex equipment, logistics and procurement issues. Some examples of the problem:
5 Year Defence plans are not funded – Armed forces make perspective plans which are then translated into 5-year equipping plans and approved by govt i.e. CCS. But these are just paper exercises as budgetary support comes from the annual budget. So these 5 year plans are meaningless unless they are funded at formulation i.e. once CCS approves. CCS approval carries no weight because all funding decisions will be decided by exigencies of annual budget.
Procurement process – There is an 11-step procurement process from AON (Acceptance of Necessity) to signing of contract. This process is simply not functioning and the issues are well known so I will not elaborate here. Key issue is that a non-domain expert and non-caring bureaucrat needs to approve every level. And our enemies can sabotage at any level by asking a question or raising an objection. The system is designed to stop procurement, not support it.
Higher Defence Management – There are 5 Secy level officers in Raksha Mantralaya. They are technically equal to COAS and are from IAS/IDS + 1 from DRDO. They run the ministry, control information flow to RM and are the main advisers. Shri Parrikar and Shri Fernandez tried to break their stranglehold and instil some empathy for armed forces. For example, Shri Parrikar discovered $ 3 billion lying in a forgotten account, he also ordered Raksha Mantralaya to stop fighting court cases against veterans where lower courts had already decided in their favour – there were 1000s of cases where the entire might of the government was being used against veterans. He found cases where Indian firms exported shoes to western armies but were not allowed to supply to Indian army. Shri Fernandez famously asked bureaucrats to go to Siachen when they refused to sanction heating stoves for the army in Siachen. It is absurd and sad that bureaucrats can decide on simple things like heating stoves for the army.
Armed Forces are losing faith in Modi govt due to bureaucracy – Despite great efforts by Modi government, IAS/IDS/IDAS lobby has destroyed all the good work. MES (IDES) civil officer status has been made higher than the army officers they report to and so they refuse to attend station commander's conferences. Recently TA/DA of officers proceeding on official duty was cancelled because of shortage of funds. This created a lot of pain and bad blood. NFU is another issue https://theprint.in/opinion/bjp-is-usin ... ey/208732/
C. Solution - Civil service raj has to go:
The above examples are a very small sample of the problems created by overarching civil service raj in defence. This is hurting not only national defence but destroying trust. If the government wants India to have a credible defence then the following is needed :
1. Restore status of armed forces : COAS/CAS/CNS should be equal to Minister of Sate Independent Charge. Army Commanders should be equivalent to Minister of State/Governor of States. Lt Gens below Army Commanders should be equal to Secy Govt of India, Maj Gens to Additional Secy and so on and so forth.
2. Domain experts should run Raksha Mantralaya : Of the 5 Secy Level officers in MoD, all except Secy Defence Production and Secy R&D should be from defence forces. Secy Defence Production should be a senior professional from Industry (not PSUs). No IAS/IDS/IDAS officer should be at any Additional Secy level and at Jt Secy level 50% officers should be from armed forces and 25 % from industry. Balance can be from civil services but they should have served at least 5 years in the armed forces.
3. Abolish the 11 Class A services in defence: There are 11 Class A services in defence including the IAS. Some prominent ones are – IDS (Indian Defence Service), IDAS (Indian Defence Accounts Service), IDSE (Indian Defence Service of Engineers), IOFBS (Indian Ordnance Factory Board Service). This creates a massive bureaucratic stranglehold not only on higher defence management, but also in day-to-day functioning at cantonments and fighting formations. Some examples were given in Section B para 4. About 30% of entire defence salaries budget goes in these. Accommodation, perks etc are same as IAS and take a big toll on cantonment resources where army officers who have come from harsh border environments do not get houses but these civil officers do. About 60% of these jobs are redundant. The rest should be done by armed forces officers on deputations to these roles. This will reduce waste, bring much better management and also solve the massive career progression issues in armed forces. This will ensure that armed forces become a more lucrative career option and shortages of officers will reduce.

Detailed proposals can be given if there is genuine interest in resolving the issue. The intention of this note is to give a high-level picture of the critical issue with national defence to the political leadership. The author hopes that a study group of civil services officers will not be constituted to look at these proposals. That will defeat the purpose of this analysis.
These issues can only be resolved by political will.






Comments

RAMAKANT TIWARI6 July 2019 at 08:44
PM and RM act on advice / recommendations of three Service Chiefs. So they should speak out first.
Reply

Vidur12 July 2019 at 00:11
Please see my comment below





Vidur12 July 2019 at 00:11
I am a IAS officer currently posted in the Rakhsha Mantralaya. I endorse the article and would like to point out to the commenter above that Service Chiefs are constrained by need to maintain morale and so cannot speak out publicly. It will shatter morale which is already severely stressed. They do make their views known to the government but cannot be as comprehensive and candid as the issue demands for obvious reasons. Also it would be very pertinent to remember the case of Lt Gen Sinha, Lt Gen Bhagat, Admiral DK Joshi and Gen VK Singh. The first two were outspoken and were superseded for army chief. The third was forced out and the last was hounded.
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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Manish_P » 14 Jul 2019 22:24

Hear, hear. Good post!

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Re: Indian Army News & Discussions - 11 June 2014

Postby Atmavik » 16 Jul 2019 02:33

great post Vidur Ji,

here is another hard hitting article that looks at the other side.

https://twitter.com/SandeepUnnithan/sta ... 6617467905


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