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Project 75I - It Begins

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Karan M
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 14472
Joined: 19 Mar 2010 00:58

Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Karan M » 13 Dec 2015 19:23

Yagnasri wrote:Provided it is true. The US Boat is LA class. Right?


Why won't it be true? Just because the opposite sub is Yank and can't be defeated. :)

IAF Flanker MKs scored on USAF F-15Cs.

Its a nuke sub in the littorals, plus not exactly the best they have in terms of the base platform IIRC some 2 decades old but then again so is our Kilo.
Both have been retrofitted.

Plus our crews are very experienced in our local conditions.

Karan M
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 14472
Joined: 19 Mar 2010 00:58

Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Karan M » 13 Dec 2015 19:25

Will wrote:It was last year around this time that it was said that a committee would evaluate shipyards for the P75I and submit a report in 6-8 weeks. There was hope that things would move forward at speed given the state of the submarine arm of the IN. Was just wishful thinking. Govts may change but things remain the same. One thing for DAC to clear a slew of proposals. It means nothing. Most don't even go to the CCS for clearance for ages.Even if the CCS clears something , nothing moves. More things change , more things remain the same. :- :cry:


Parrikar is not an Anthony type. He'll do his due diligence and act. The Rafale deal was an eyeopener about how broken prior processes were in MOD. From the grapevine a slew of measures have been taken at record speeds and more are underway. Wait & watch.

Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17637
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Philip » 14 Dec 2015 09:19

I think that the IN hasn't sorted out its P-75I requirements. Even if they're sorted out and the RFP issued,it will take a decade befotre the first sub is commissioned.Why there appears to be a greater emphasis on building 6 SSNs. More conventional AIP subs like extra Scorpenes,whatever may be on the cards as an interim measure.We have an advantage over other regional players in that we operate N-subs,which have a 90 day patrol time and are far swifter,carry more weaponry,etc.

Former ACM Fali major in an article expressed his doubts about the offset agenda,saying that the gvot/ servcuies had tio decide whether to obtain a weapon system that was unavailable locally (no DPSU alternative) using the G-to-G route,or experience the tortuous attempt to obtain the same lcoally using the offset route.Even in the offset route,a pvt. player does not have the freedom to choose his intl partner,chosen by the babus!

Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17637
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Philip » 15 Dec 2015 17:24

Asymmetric warfare using subs is the theme of this v.interesting article. As the IN ponders and mulls over the concepts and contours of the P-75I requirement,the versatility of the N-sub in true blue-water ops,and in the Indian context,used as a spearpoint against the Chinese,is reinforced even more. Why the decision to build 6 SSNs is most welcome,it will take some considerable time,why more Akula leases in the interim are essential.

http://www.navalsubleague.com/assets/ts ... 202015.pdf
TO THE OFFSET STRATEGY
by RADM W. J. Holland, Jr., USN, Ret.
Editor’s Note: This article is reprinted with permis-sion from the June 2015 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. It is felt there are significant differences in this Proceedings version from the Admiral’s precursor article which appeared in the December 2014 issue of this magazine.
Rear Admiral Holland devoted most of his service to submarines or submarine-related activities. He is a fre-quent contributor to The Submarine Review.
As has been the case for decades, the strategic spotlight shines once again on the U.S. Navy’s subsurface force.
On 3 September 2014 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, warning that China and Russia are pursuing and funding long-term, comprehensive military modernization programs, to include fielding an array of capabilities designed to counter traditional U.S. military advantages, promoted an offset strategy. Rather than wading into a symmetrical duel with the military modernization of potential opponents, he advocated employing technologies and associated operational skills that impose disproportionate costs on any competitor; specifically:
...key investments in submarines, cyber, next-generation fighter and bomber aircraft, missile defense, and special operations forces—putting a premium on rapidly deployable, self-sustaining platforms that can defeat more technologically advanced adversaries. Under-sea capabilities that can deploy and strike with relative freedom of movement and decision will continue to be a vital part of the mix. (Italics added).1

As an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessment some 20 years ago, now-Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Work promoted submarines as the basis for a strategy that
sought to exploit U.S. advantages in technologies for which there
was no peer. Work viewed submarines as the prime example of
investing in a weapon system in which the United States possessed
a clear advantage with a lead that could grow faster than a
potential adversary could match. Rather than trying to respond to
an opponent’s strengths, an offset strategy seeks to impose on such
a competitor burdens that will require more time and resources
than it can muster. This cost-imposing strategy’s goal is not just
victory in war but deterrence by making evident the costs to
compete and the prospect of a likely defeat in the event of war.
Any future conflict in the open ocean will start with submarines.
For the immediate future no country will have the capacity
and capability to deploy an armada to contest the sea in the face of
the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. Navy. Even should such
a navy appear, there will be no fleet actions. Any war at sea will
be fought between submarines and such antisubmarine adversaries
as can be assembled. In the words of historian and commentator
John Keegan:
...command of the sea in the future unquestionably lies
beneath rather than on the surface.... Consider the record
of the only naval campaign fought since 1945, that of the
Falklands in 1982. From it two salient facts stand out: that
the surface ship can barely defend itself against highperformance,
jet propelled aircraft and that it cannot
defend itself at all against a nuclear powered submarine
.2
Recognition of the preeminence of American sea power is
evident in the proliferation of Submarine Forces around the world.
Even small countries investing in a navy elect submarines as their
naval weapon system of choice. Many, if indeed not most, of those
countries building navies and investing in Submarine Forces are
friends or allies. Their submarines are not aimed at American
carriers. Others, however, with nascent or resurrecting Submarine Forces, are devoted to efforts that threaten U.S. dominance at sea.

Only the First Step
But a simple selection of hulls is only the first step in creating an effective Submarine Force. Developing such a capability requires serious investment of money, intellect, people, and time. Development takes years or even decades to create the kind of capability that Germany, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain wielded in World War II. Attempts by smaller countries to produce an effective Submarine Force have foundered on lack of resources, failure to enlist and retain skilled people, and an inability to construct and sustain the logistics infrastructure necessary to create and then maintain these complex machines. Some Western countries have been successful in building and maintaining an effective Submarine Force, but only in small numbers and not without difficulty. Canada, Germany and Australia, for example, all have admitted their inability to man all the submarines that they have in commission.
The United States, on the other hand, has a major force of submarines manned by experienced crews, practiced in the operations at sea and in the far corners of the world. These are supported by a construction and maintenance infrastructure that is the envy not just of other navies but of other parts of the U.S. Navy as well. The submarines this force operates are the world’s quietest and most technologically advanced. More important, behind this force is a training establishment that not only instructs a steady stream of new personnel but provides advanced training in maintenance and operations including realistic simulators in which submarine operational tactics are practiced daily. Finally, still smarting from the ineffective torpedoes of World War II, the Americans shoot real torpedoes regularly, including proof-testing war shots.

To properly employ Submarine Forces of whatever size re-quires leaders that grasp the unusual nature of their operations—the limitations as well as the capabilities of these ships and crews. Ships that intentionally sink do not follow the norms for other
seagoing vessels. In World War II the Japanese failed to employ to
their full capability talented crews and well-built submarines
because the leadership of these forces rested with admirals
experienced in battleship operations and conditioned to expect
decisive battle between surface fleets. The lack of experience and
understanding in the senior Imperial Japanese Navy leadership
often resulted in deploying submarines as if they were surface
ships, as scouts and supply vessels. Despite their misemployment,
Japanese submarines scored a number of significant blows. On 15
September 1942 the torpedo spread from the I-19 that sank the
aircraft carrier USS WASP (CV-7), fatally damaged her escort
destroyer USS O’BRIEN (DD-415), and put the battleship USS
NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55) out of action for months has to be
at least close to the most significant score from a single submarine
salvo in history. German and U.S. submarine operations in World
War II benefitted not just from leaders who knew and understood
such actions but from command climates that for the most part
encouraged honest reports and critical self-examination. Such
climates are not erected overnight or come as a result of classroom
instruction. They take time, energy, and personal investment to
create. Regular and sustained operations at sea are a vital
ingredient not only to hone the ability of the individual ships’
crews to conduct their affairs but also to set the expectations of the
command and staff personnel as they learn and exercise their
functions. The limits for radio communication with submarines
requires advanced planning, a climate of mutual understanding,
and trust that comes about only with personal investment and
routine practice. As difficult and time-consuming as they are to
create, these climates can be fatally damaged by senior leadership
that disabuses reporters of bad news, ignores symptoms of trouble
or distress, or hogs credit for successes rightly achieved by
subordinates. Societies that are based on rigid caste systems, have
formal class hierarchies, or must conform to rigid political
straitjackets have difficulty creating and maintaining such
command-and-control characteristics. But any navy that expects to
effectively employ its submarines requires these distinctive
attributes.

The operational military effort involved in a strategy to domi-nate the sea is a return to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic dictum that the first aim of the Navy is to destroy the enemy’s fleet.3 Before 1945 this meant major fleet actions but today any such action is exceedingly unlikely. As demonstrated in the Falklands Islands campaign, the ability of nuclear-powered submarines to dominate the ocean surface means that in future conflict, warships will be widely dispersed and the most important parts of a fleet will be stealthy. Engagement will be defined by the ability to locate individual units and bring them to battle. The historical parallel is the cruiser warfare of the War of 1812 and World War I rather than the major fleet actions of Trafalgar or Jutland. But the goal remains the same: the first aim of a Navy in war is destruc-tion of the enemy fleet.

Whatever the name, this effort is offensive submarine warfare. The operational aim at the heart of the strategy is to position submarines in the coastal and near-ocean areas of a potential enemy as a crisis builds and, should war break out, to quickly sink all opposing surface warships and submarines. War games have demonstrated the great advantage of “flooding the littorals with SSNs.” Properly operated, submarines become a national maritime resource not simply a component of a battle group or the launcher of land-attack missiles.


The Pitfalls
Here lie pitfalls within the Navy itself. Submarines have themselves become primary antisubmarine weapon systems. Their presence and performance as part of a task group have built an aura of security and a confidence that, when so assigned, threatening submarines will not appear undetected. This record is admirable but creates a situation that can dilute the primary task in the event of war. Commanders’ demands for submarines to be assigned to protect their task groups subvert the primary attribute of conducting unrestricted warfare against the enemy’s force in waters that otherwise are not open or accessible to others. The proper employment of submarines is as a major force to be wielded as a unit—dispersed and widely distributed under an
operational command whose task is to sweep the seas. Destruction
of the enemy fleet is the goal; protecting our own fleet by
eliminating the threat is a beneficial byproduct.

The second difficulty in properly using American submarines
in times of war rises from their new role as arsenal ships.
Recent
wars and related actions against shore targets have seen employment
of submarine-launched missiles in significant numbers—not
because the submarine is the best-fitted launch platform or situated
within an enemy surveillance and strike zone too dangerous for
surface ships. Submarine-launched weapons are used because they
are there. Surface-ship launchers outnumber the submarines’ in
most situations, but such launchers are also homes for antimissile
and antiair weapons. Where such threats may exist, the number of
land-attack weapons in the surface fleet is substantially reduced—
often leaving submarines as a significant source of land-attack
missiles.
Combatant commanders with eyes focused on objectives
and targets on the land are likely to want to add the land-attack
weapons on board submarines to those available for attacking
targets ashore at the expense of assigning their host submarines to
efforts at sea.

For at least the duration of the period in which maritime
dominance is being contested, submarines should be employed in
pursuing elimination of the enemy navy—a task for which they are
singularly fitted. In this early phase, submarines should be used as
missile shooters only when they are the only launchers within
range of high-priority targets or when the attack needs to be
launched from an otherwise-impossible azimuth
. Once maritime
dominance is established, submarine missile shooters can then be
positioned where most advantageous in regard to time of flight and
direction of attack considerations.

Nuclear propulsion not only allows the submarine to operate
under the cloak of invisibility, but it powers the ability to
reposition quickly without a logistics train and for a long duration.

These are all incalculable advantages in any time-constrained
situation. This logistic-free tail allows dispatch of submarines
singly or in numbers on short notice and with little buildup or
fanfare.
Among the advantages arising from this is an opportunity
to learn the environment first and to find the most advantageous positions in relation to expected threats and geography.

Great Flexibility
Flexible submarine deployments can be accomplished without adding to the tensions surrounding a crisis, and with no notice or with subtle direct evidence if such is to our advantage. Early major deployments before the commencement of hostilities give the combatant commanders the assets to execute attacks and interdiction from the first moment of a war. This freedom of movement and decision that Secretary Hagel found so important is inherent in nuclear-powered submarines. This ability to enter the area of conflict without notice provides an additional benefit in that any opponent of the United States must assume that American submarines are always present on his littoral and across his maritime pathways.

Because nuclear power adds this dimension of logistic flexi-bility and rapid reaction, the capability to redeploy American’s total force of submarines on short notice places great stress on any potential opponent. Such an adversary must count on facing all active U.S. submarines within days. In any crisis the first forces to arrive at the scene are of great tactical importance and strategic significance. When those forces are not only powerful, but stealthy, the effect is multiplied by uncertainty concerning their location and strength. Regular operations by submarines in these waters are a necessary ingredient in this aspect of submarine warfare—not only to train crews but to establish the expectations that, should conflict occur, the American submarines will be on-scene early.

The potential peer maritime competitor appears to be develop-ing an anti-access/area-denial strategy based on a suspected land-based ballistic missile and an undefined ocean surveillance and targeting system aimed at large ships at sea. While the difficulties in creating and then operating such a system are enormous, its deployment might threaten major capital ships (read aircraft carriers). But a strategy based on such a system does not address the threat to the adversary’s navy and maritime assets from
submarines.

In the words of defense analyst and former assistant
Secretary of the Navy Seth Cropsey:
As a hedge against China’s anti-access strategy, submarines
are matchless…. So long as submarines remain
stealthy, they bypass the age-old technological cat-andmouse
game of countering an adversary’s technology and
in turn being countered
.4
While this recognition is well understood by those with submarine
experience, the annunciation by a nationally recognized
figure who has no investment in the Submarine Force signals the
wide awareness of the asymmetric advantages of submarines, now
and in the future.
One necessary ingredient in the success of an offset strategy is
the potential competitor’s recognition of these aspects of the
contest. Establishing this perception is not accomplished by ships
in harbor, much less ships on the building ways. Sustained
operations at sea and regular visits to the neighborhoods populated
by potential opponents create the impressions on which to lay the
ground work to effect the strategic objective. By the end of the
Cold War most public utterances of officers of the Soviet Navy
acknowledged the omnipresence of the Western powers’
submarines. That impression was one of the keys to their
adaptation of defensive tactical operations-and to the success of
the 1981 Maritime Strategy.

ENDNOTES
1. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Southeastern New England Defense
2. Industry Alliance, Newport, RI, 3 September 2014.
3. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty (London: Hutchinson, 1988),
324.
4. Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), 5.
5. Seth Cropsey “A Naval Disaster in the Making,” The Weekly Standard,
6 October 2014, www.weeklystandard.

Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 17637
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Philip » 15 Dec 2015 17:27

Asymmetric warfare using subs is the theme of this v.interesting article. As the IN ponders and mulls over the concepts and contours of the P-75I requirement,the versatility of the N-sub in true blue-water ops,and in the Indian context,used as a spearpoint against the Chinese,is reinforced even more. Why the decision to build 6 SSNs is most welcome,it will take some considerable time,why more Akula leases in the interim are essential.

http://www.navalsubleague.com/assets/ts ... 202015.pdf
TO THE OFFSET STRATEGY
by RADM W. J. Holland, Jr., USN, Ret.
Editor’s Note: This article is reprinted with permis-sion from the June 2015 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. It is felt there are significant differences in this Proceedings version from the Admiral’s precursor article which appeared in the December 2014 issue of this magazine.
Rear Admiral Holland devoted most of his service to submarines or submarine-related activities. He is a fre-quent contributor to The Submarine Review.
As has been the case for decades, the strategic spotlight shines once again on the U.S. Navy’s subsurface force.
On 3 September 2014 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, warning that China and Russia are pursuing and funding long-term, comprehensive military modernization programs, to include fielding an array of capabilities designed to counter traditional U.S. military advantages, promoted an offset strategy. Rather than wading into a symmetrical duel with the military modernization of potential opponents, he advocated employing technologies and associated operational skills that impose disproportionate costs on any competitor; specifically:
...key investments in submarines, cyber, next-generation fighter and bomber aircraft, missile defense, and special operations forces—putting a premium on rapidly deployable, self-sustaining platforms that can defeat more technologically advanced adversaries. Under-sea capabilities that can deploy and strike with relative freedom of movement and decision will continue to be a vital part of the mix. (Italics added).1

As an analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessment some 20 years ago, now-Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Work promoted submarines as the basis for a strategy that
sought to exploit U.S. advantages in technologies for which there
was no peer. Work viewed submarines as the prime example of
investing in a weapon system in which the United States possessed
a clear advantage with a lead that could grow faster than a
potential adversary could match. Rather than trying to respond to
an opponent’s strengths, an offset strategy seeks to impose on such
a competitor burdens that will require more time and resources
than it can muster. This cost-imposing strategy’s goal is not just
victory in war but deterrence by making evident the costs to
compete and the prospect of a likely defeat in the event of war.
Any future conflict in the open ocean will start with submarines.
For the immediate future no country will have the capacity
and capability to deploy an armada to contest the sea in the face of
the overwhelming superiority of the U.S. Navy. Even should such
a navy appear, there will be no fleet actions. Any war at sea will
be fought between submarines and such antisubmarine adversaries
as can be assembled. In the words of historian and commentator
John Keegan:
...command of the sea in the future unquestionably lies
beneath rather than on the surface.... Consider the record
of the only naval campaign fought since 1945, that of the
Falklands in 1982. From it two salient facts stand out: that
the surface ship can barely defend itself against highperformance,
jet propelled aircraft and that it cannot
defend itself at all against a nuclear powered submarine
.2
Recognition of the preeminence of American sea power is
evident in the proliferation of Submarine Forces around the world.
Even small countries investing in a navy elect submarines as their
naval weapon system of choice. Many, if indeed not most, of those
countries building navies and investing in Submarine Forces are
friends or allies. Their submarines are not aimed at American
carriers. Others, however, with nascent or resurrecting Submarine Forces, are devoted to efforts that threaten U.S. dominance at sea.

Only the First Step
But a simple selection of hulls is only the first step in creating an effective Submarine Force. Developing such a capability requires serious investment of money, intellect, people, and time. Development takes years or even decades to create the kind of capability that Germany, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain wielded in World War II. Attempts by smaller countries to produce an effective Submarine Force have foundered on lack of resources, failure to enlist and retain skilled people, and an inability to construct and sustain the logistics infrastructure necessary to create and then maintain these complex machines. Some Western countries have been successful in building and maintaining an effective Submarine Force, but only in small numbers and not without difficulty. Canada, Germany and Australia, for example, all have admitted their inability to man all the submarines that they have in commission.
The United States, on the other hand, has a major force of submarines manned by experienced crews, practiced in the operations at sea and in the far corners of the world. These are supported by a construction and maintenance infrastructure that is the envy not just of other navies but of other parts of the U.S. Navy as well. The submarines this force operates are the world’s quietest and most technologically advanced. More important, behind this force is a training establishment that not only instructs a steady stream of new personnel but provides advanced training in maintenance and operations including realistic simulators in which submarine operational tactics are practiced daily. Finally, still smarting from the ineffective torpedoes of World War II, the Americans shoot real torpedoes regularly, including proof-testing war shots.

To properly employ Submarine Forces of whatever size re-quires leaders that grasp the unusual nature of their operations—the limitations as well as the capabilities of these ships and crews. Ships that intentionally sink do not follow the norms for other
seagoing vessels. In World War II the Japanese failed to employ to
their full capability talented crews and well-built submarines
because the leadership of these forces rested with admirals
experienced in battleship operations and conditioned to expect
decisive battle between surface fleets. The lack of experience and
understanding in the senior Imperial Japanese Navy leadership
often resulted in deploying submarines as if they were surface
ships, as scouts and supply vessels. Despite their misemployment,
Japanese submarines scored a number of significant blows. On 15
September 1942 the torpedo spread from the I-19 that sank the
aircraft carrier USS WASP (CV-7), fatally damaged her escort
destroyer USS O’BRIEN (DD-415), and put the battleship USS
NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55) out of action for months has to be
at least close to the most significant score from a single submarine
salvo in history. German and U.S. submarine operations in World
War II benefitted not just from leaders who knew and understood
such actions but from command climates that for the most part
encouraged honest reports and critical self-examination. Such
climates are not erected overnight or come as a result of classroom
instruction. They take time, energy, and personal investment to
create. Regular and sustained operations at sea are a vital
ingredient not only to hone the ability of the individual ships’
crews to conduct their affairs but also to set the expectations of the
command and staff personnel as they learn and exercise their
functions. The limits for radio communication with submarines
requires advanced planning, a climate of mutual understanding,
and trust that comes about only with personal investment and
routine practice. As difficult and time-consuming as they are to
create, these climates can be fatally damaged by senior leadership
that disabuses reporters of bad news, ignores symptoms of trouble
or distress, or hogs credit for successes rightly achieved by
subordinates. Societies that are based on rigid caste systems, have
formal class hierarchies, or must conform to rigid political
straitjackets have difficulty creating and maintaining such
command-and-control characteristics. But any navy that expects to
effectively employ its submarines requires these distinctive
attributes.

The operational military effort involved in a strategy to domi-nate the sea is a return to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s classic dictum that the first aim of the Navy is to destroy the enemy’s fleet.3 Before 1945 this meant major fleet actions but today any such action is exceedingly unlikely. As demonstrated in the Falklands Islands campaign, the ability of nuclear-powered submarines to dominate the ocean surface means that in future conflict, warships will be widely dispersed and the most important parts of a fleet will be stealthy. Engagement will be defined by the ability to locate individual units and bring them to battle. The historical parallel is the cruiser warfare of the War of 1812 and World War I rather than the major fleet actions of Trafalgar or Jutland. But the goal remains the same: the first aim of a Navy in war is destruc-tion of the enemy fleet.

Whatever the name, this effort is offensive submarine warfare. The operational aim at the heart of the strategy is to position submarines in the coastal and near-ocean areas of a potential enemy as a crisis builds and, should war break out, to quickly sink all opposing surface warships and submarines. War games have demonstrated the great advantage of “flooding the littorals with SSNs.” Properly operated, submarines become a national maritime resource not simply a component of a battle group or the launcher of land-attack missiles.


The Pitfalls
Here lie pitfalls within the Navy itself. Submarines have themselves become primary antisubmarine weapon systems. Their presence and performance as part of a task group have built an aura of security and a confidence that, when so assigned, threatening submarines will not appear undetected. This record is admirable but creates a situation that can dilute the primary task in the event of war. Commanders’ demands for submarines to be assigned to protect their task groups subvert the primary attribute of conducting unrestricted warfare against the enemy’s force in waters that otherwise are not open or accessible to others. The proper employment of submarines is as a major force to be wielded as a unit—dispersed and widely distributed under an
operational command whose task is to sweep the seas. Destruction
of the enemy fleet is the goal; protecting our own fleet by
eliminating the threat is a beneficial byproduct.

The second difficulty in properly using American submarines
in times of war rises from their new role as arsenal ships.
Recent
wars and related actions against shore targets have seen employment
of submarine-launched missiles in significant numbers—not
because the submarine is the best-fitted launch platform or situated
within an enemy surveillance and strike zone too dangerous for
surface ships. Submarine-launched weapons are used because they
are there. Surface-ship launchers outnumber the submarines’ in
most situations, but such launchers are also homes for antimissile
and antiair weapons. Where such threats may exist, the number of
land-attack weapons in the surface fleet is substantially reduced—
often leaving submarines as a significant source of land-attack
missiles.
Combatant commanders with eyes focused on objectives
and targets on the land are likely to want to add the land-attack
weapons on board submarines to those available for attacking
targets ashore at the expense of assigning their host submarines to
efforts at sea.

For at least the duration of the period in which maritime
dominance is being contested, submarines should be employed in
pursuing elimination of the enemy navy—a task for which they are
singularly fitted. In this early phase, submarines should be used as
missile shooters only when they are the only launchers within
range of high-priority targets or when the attack needs to be
launched from an otherwise-impossible azimuth
. Once maritime
dominance is established, submarine missile shooters can then be
positioned where most advantageous in regard to time of flight and
direction of attack considerations.

Nuclear propulsion not only allows the submarine to operate
under the cloak of invisibility, but it powers the ability to
reposition quickly without a logistics train and for a long duration.

These are all incalculable advantages in any time-constrained
situation. This logistic-free tail allows dispatch of submarines
singly or in numbers on short notice and with little buildup or
fanfare.
Among the advantages arising from this is an opportunity
to learn the environment first and to find the most advantageous positions in relation to expected threats and geography.

Great Flexibility
Flexible submarine deployments can be accomplished without adding to the tensions surrounding a crisis, and with no notice or with subtle direct evidence if such is to our advantage. Early major deployments before the commencement of hostilities give the combatant commanders the assets to execute attacks and interdiction from the first moment of a war. This freedom of movement and decision that Secretary Hagel found so important is inherent in nuclear-powered submarines. This ability to enter the area of conflict without notice provides an additional benefit in that any opponent of the United States must assume that American submarines are always present on his littoral and across his maritime pathways.

Because nuclear power adds this dimension of logistic flexi-bility and rapid reaction, the capability to redeploy American’s total force of submarines on short notice places great stress on any potential opponent. Such an adversary must count on facing all active U.S. submarines within days. In any crisis the first forces to arrive at the scene are of great tactical importance and strategic significance. When those forces are not only powerful, but stealthy, the effect is multiplied by uncertainty concerning their location and strength. Regular operations by submarines in these waters are a necessary ingredient in this aspect of submarine warfare—not only to train crews but to establish the expectations that, should conflict occur, the American submarines will be on-scene early.

The potential peer maritime competitor appears to be develop-ing an anti-access/area-denial strategy based on a suspected land-based ballistic missile and an undefined ocean surveillance and targeting system aimed at large ships at sea. While the difficulties in creating and then operating such a system are enormous, its deployment might threaten major capital ships (read aircraft carriers). But a strategy based on such a system does not address the threat to the adversary’s navy and maritime assets from
submarines.

In the words of defense analyst and former assistant
Secretary of the Navy Seth Cropsey:
As a hedge against China’s anti-access strategy, submarines
are matchless…. So long as submarines remain
stealthy, they bypass the age-old technological cat-andmouse
game of countering an adversary’s technology and
in turn being countered
.4
While this recognition is well understood by those with submarine
experience, the annunciation by a nationally recognized
figure who has no investment in the Submarine Force signals the
wide awareness of the asymmetric advantages of submarines, now
and in the future.
One necessary ingredient in the success of an offset strategy is
the potential competitor’s recognition of these aspects of the
contest. Establishing this perception is not accomplished by ships
in harbor, much less ships on the building ways. Sustained
operations at sea and regular visits to the neighborhoods populated
by potential opponents create the impressions on which to lay the
ground work to effect the strategic objective. By the end of the
Cold War most public utterances of officers of the Soviet Navy
acknowledged the omnipresence of the Western powers’
submarines. That impression was one of the keys to their
adaptation of defensive tactical operations-and to the success of
the 1981 Maritime Strategy.

ENDNOTES
1. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Southeastern New England Defense
2. Industry Alliance, Newport, RI, 3 September 2014.
3. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty (London: Hutchinson, 1988),
324.
4. Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), 5.
5. Seth Cropsey “A Naval Disaster in the Making,” The Weekly Standard,
6 October 2014, http://www.weeklystandard.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Will » 01 May 2016 16:54

With the French winning the Australian Submarine competition with their Barracuda spin off wonder whether India will go down the same route for the P-75I program specially keeping in mind the Indian SSN program where it has been rumoured that French help is being sought.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby krishna_krishna » 02 May 2016 06:02

I believe our SSN will have resemblance for barracuda. I believe that is why you see rafale price go up. But not scorpene or barracuda due to vertical launched cruise missiles launch unavailability plus aussies already have the tech. I believer it would german or russi

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Philip » 02 May 2016 11:04

The French openly promised the nation of Oz NOT to give India its latest sub tech in order to clinch the deal. Therefore ,it would be foolish to go along with the French especiallyas its Scorpenes,non-AIP ones too,are prohibitively expensive,$500m a pop when more lethal armed Kilos are available at just $300M.An IN Kilo also outfoxed a USN N-sub in the last round foe exercises. Russia is building a new class of Kalina conventional AIP subs. We have expressed a desire for advanced Yasen sub tech too. A desi design could be tailor made for the IN incorporating the best of the best,but first we have to finalise the config of the 6 SSNs which need to be built as fast as poss. To keep numbers happy,another 6+ diesel boats could be acquired./built at home of a cost-effedtive design ins ervice like the Kilo or extra U-boats. The Scorpene's torpedoes haven't even been ordered as yet!

Latest news from the Paki front.
KSEW WILL PRODUCE 4 ‘NEXT-GENERATION’ AIP-EQUIPPED SUBMARINES



Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works Ltd will produce four “new-generation” AIP-equipped submarines for the Pakistan Navy

By Bilal Khan

During the handing over ceremony of two landing craft mechanized (LCM) amphibious landing ships, Rear Admiral Syed Imdad Imam Jafri (the Commander of Logistics in the Pakistan Navy) congratulated Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works Ltd. (KSEW) for winning a contract to produce four “new generation” air-independent propulsion (AIP) equipped submarines (for reference: AIP enables a conventional submarine to operate underwater without snorkeling for oxygen for a relatively long period – potentially weeks).

Although the gradual and incremental progression of Pakistan’s amphibious capabilities is good news, the open recognition that KSEW will construct four new submarines seems to suggest that the landmark deal for eight submarines from China has been inked. Under the agreement, KSEW was to produce four of the eight submarines.

In the aftermath of the Pakistan Navy (PN) walking away from a purchase of three Type 214 submarines from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in Germany, the PN initiated talks with China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Co. Ltd (CSOC) for six AIP-equipped submarines in 2011. In April 2015, the Pakistani government approved the purchase of eight submarines from China, and the contract was submitted to Beijing for final approval in July of that year.

While the base design of Pakistan’s forthcoming submarines is widely believed to be a variation of the CSOC S20, the export variant of the Type 039A/041 Yuan-class diesel electric submarine (SSK), it was not clear if the PN had also ordered AIP systems. The S20 is not offered with AIP by default, CSOC requires the customer to acquire AIP systems separately.

Rear Admiral Jafri’s statements clearly confirm that Pakistan’s submarines will be equipped with AIP, but the origin and type were not disclosed. China developed a Stirling-based system, but fuel-cell powered solutions are also (or at least were) under development at the Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics. It will be interesting to see which route the PN chooses, and whether a portion of the submarine deal would go towards supporting the development of a Chinese fuel-cell AIP solution.

Armaments have not been disclosed either. At the minimum, it is very likely that the submarines will be armed with at least six 533mm torpedo tubes to launch heavyweight torpedoes and anti-ship missiles (AShM). In terms of the latter, the PN could opt for the newly revealed CM-708UNB sub-launched AShM. The CM-708UNB has a marketed range of up to 290km.

Pakistan may also try to align the new submarines into its goal to develop an assured second-strike nuclear deterrence capability. The torpedo tubes onboard these submarines may be designed such that they could take on the Babur land attack cruise missile (LACM), which in turn would house a miniaturized plutonium warhead. This is a guess on our part, as with much of this submarine deal, the details have not entirely been confirmed. It will also be interesting to see how the PN equips the submarines’ internals, especially in terms of the on-board electronics as well as command and control systems. In any case, it seems specific details are finally beginning to trickle down, we will keep an eye on how this program develops.

- See more at: http://quwa.org/2016/04/28/ksew-will-pr ... gEG2Y.dpuf
Last edited by Philip on 02 May 2016 11:17, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Karan M » 02 May 2016 11:07

Instead of buying yet another Russian white elephant which will sit rotting in some hanger, better to build on what we have. Order a few more Scorpenes if they work well and have an all India 75I like the Arihant class.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Cybaru » 02 May 2016 11:13

I think we need to take a page out of the french design book. Scaled down version of Arihant without the nuke would do just fine. I am sure they spent countless hours testing that design. It should work and we already know how to make it. Pack in huge quantities of Li-ION batteries/ Couple of AIP blocks / Large RTG for heat production and we should be fine.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Philip » 02 May 2016 11:39

Rotting white elephants? Surely you mean rottting whales or sharks! :rotfl:

But seriously,brand new Kilos of the latest variant are being built in number for the RuN,Vietnam,etc.They are the best cost-effective diesel boats available. We however already have 9 Kilos,but old in the tooth despite their upgrades,sailing on into their 3rd decade.maybe a couple more to keep numbers happy at low cost could be envisaged,but a new design is needed for conventional boats. Trying to lace a conventional boat with steroids to turn it into an ersatz N-boat is however frankly both expensive and the wrong route. That is what Oz is trying to achieve at huge cost. A mix of conventional AIP and N-boats is the best solution.Unlike the USN,the RuN is more pragmatic,using diesel boats where they perform best,in the littorals and smaller seas,Baltic,Black Sea,Meditt,etc..

The Arihant is based upon (from open info) on an Ru design.The next batch will carry more silos and strat missiles.An attack sub will require more advanced features that are found on the Akulas and newer Yasens.Some commonality of eqpt. also on all our N-boats would be desirable as it would make training and support of these highly complex subs be easier. Our N-submariners should be able to
serve ideally on both SSBNs and SSGN/SSNs.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Karan M » 02 May 2016 11:48

A white elephant is a white elephant, by any name.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Singha » 02 May 2016 12:06

I have posted my pov in the IN thread about way forward for P75I

my proposal:
- retain Arihant hull
- delete 2 of the 4 tubes
- delete the reactor and steam plant
- license and TOT the soryu diesel engine + next gen Li-ion battery pack + DRDO AIP to recharge that
- keep everything else same rest of the sub
- resulting sub will be perhaps 500t lighter
- will have a huge transit range due to good bunker for diesel
- the next gen japani Li-ion batteries will give it a respectable submerged speed around 20knots hopefully
- 12 nirbhays / 8 K15/brahmos in the two UVLS tubes

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby member_20453 » 02 May 2016 12:07

Singha wrote:I have posted my pov in the IN thread about way forward for P75I

my proposal:
- retain Arihant hull
- delete 2 of the 4 tubes
- delete the reactor and steam plant
- license and TOT the soryu diesel engine + next gen Li-ion battery pack + DRDO AIP to recharge that
- keep everything else same rest of the sub
- resulting sub will be perhaps 500t lighter
- will have a huge transit range due to good bunker for diesel
- the next gen japani Li-ion batteries will give it a respectable submerged speed around 20knots hopefully
- 12 nirbhays / 8 K15/brahmos in the two UVLS tubes


Lovely idea sir ji, I would retain the 4 tubes though, more ammo

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Singha » 02 May 2016 12:11

I deleted them to reduce weight and improve speed. 12 nirbhays ought to be enough to spoil anyones day.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Will » 03 May 2016 21:19

Well if the IN is looking for bigger ocean going subs makes more sense to go in for SSN's specially looking at the cost. Numbers can be made up with more scorpenes and kilos in the mean time. Looks like the only reason the IN may go in for the P75I is because of the tech for the SSN's and that about seals the deal in favour of the French. Having said that didn't the Germans offer their 216 for half the price that the French did for the Aussie competition?

As many have pointed out better to go in for an indigenous design for conventional subs. A start has to be made somewhere. Private industry can bring in partners for consultancy.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby nachiket » 03 May 2016 22:44

The IN can make it's life infinitely easier if they drop their insistence on VLS in the P-75I. Just work on adding either the French or if available the DRDO AIP system on the Scorpenes without changing anything else. They will be able to induct the new subs much much faster than waiting for a new design and then begin building it.

Let the silent-killers do what they are meant to do. We have enough surface combatants which can fire Brahmos and Klubs.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Philip » 05 May 2016 11:29

Surface combatants can be easily spotted and tracked,why the USN has in recent times in Libya for example,fired salvoes of Tomahawks from its N-subs.A sub can stealthily park itself close to the enemy coastline and launch its cruise missiles to hit targets far inland and then vamoose. If there are no VLS silos,torpedo racks will have to house missiles and valuable space in the torpedo racks will reduce the number of torpedoes carried.The model shown aeons ago for a BMos Amur variant,1650t ,had 10 BMos silos aft in addition to the 18 torpedoes.What the GOI should complete as far as poss is the BMos-M project where a smaller version of the missile can be carried in larger number by a wider variety of aircraft ,surface combatants and subs. A second set of larger tubes aboard our newer planned subs will allow larger dia missiles to be carried,which like Israel's Dolphins could be N-tipped.

The IN unfortunately has sev tasks to accomplish reg its sub force inventory.First immediate enhancement of the conventional sub fleet as all the aging Kilos are being upgraded,but will allow us another decade of service only. The 4 U-209s are in the same "boat",pun intended. They are equally old and have limited upgrade capability. The 6 Scorpenes have only Exocet missiles,inferior to our Klubs/Klub variants in range,speed and lethality. Any new VLS sub type,whether conventional or nuclear will take at least 4-6 years to arrive.In the interim, leasing out more Akulas armed with BMos,etc. in silos is the most logical way in which the capability of the IN's sub force is kept at the highest level possible until the new sub classes start getting commissioned. Hopefully Nirbhay when perfected will also be aboard our N-subs. The new Akulas could incorporate as suggested some of the advanced tech of the Yasen,whose latest versions are also getting upgrades.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gyan » 05 May 2016 12:44

MY proposal:- Follow USA, UK, France and do not order more conventional submarines for Indian Navy and go only with SSNs.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gagan » 05 May 2016 18:08

Philip wrote:The model shown aeons ago for a BMos Amur variant,1650t ,had 10 BMos silos aft in addition to the 18 torpedoes

Philip saar
That was the Amur 950. It had preloaded 6 or 4 torpedos in its TT only. No reloads were available, as there was no fore torpedo room in that tiny boat.
It did have a 5x2 plug for Brahmos / Klub which was to be LACM / Anti ship.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gagan » 05 May 2016 18:15

IN still needs to replace the 8 or 7 877's and the 4 209s, all of which have about a decade or so left.
The littoral waters and the offshore installations are inadequately covered. Trade is growing, offshore facilities are ever expanding.
There are more offshore oil rigs, soo there might be offshore windmills and the like.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Will » 06 May 2016 10:50

How come the Germans have offered the 214 for the P75i in a govt to govt deal? Wasn't the requirement for a larger sub? Unless the IN has decided to do away with its VLS requirement and concentrate on the SSN's as Ocean going subs while the conventional ones will continue with littoral duties.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Philip » 06 May 2016 14:15

If BMos-M is perfected swiftly,then the smaller sized U-boats and Scorpenes could carry the missile,ideally in a VLS plug so that the full torpedo load can be retained.Russian designs can accommodate the existing missile as shown in the link below.

Gagan,this td shows a cutaway of the BMos Amur with topedo reloads.There were probable variants.
http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthre ... re-Brahmos

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Austin » 06 May 2016 14:40

^^ U-214 was the same sub that lost out to Scorpene in 2004 , even then the German government provided a good deal with Fuel Cell AIP etc.

Not sure if HDW is still blacklisted in India

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Peregrine » 06 May 2016 15:40

Germany offers India deal for next generation submarines

NEW DELHI: In a departure from its traditional approach to business in India, Germany is for the first time offering a military deal under the government-government umbrella for its new-generation conventional submarines that have exceptional underwater endurance.

While in the past the German government had kept away from contracts being bagged by its arms industries in India, the HDW 214 submarines are being offered as a special case for Indian Navy's requirement of six boats, which are to be made in India at an estimated cost of over Rs 60,000 crore.

Sources told ET that the formal proposal is being shared with the defence ministry in which the German government will give assurances on fair price, technology transfer and quality.

Russian and French submarines are, too, competing for the mega P 75I project, which is likely to see a private sector yard in India carry out a major chunk of the work. India will be mandating Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) - a technology that enables the submarine to remain underwater for several days at a stretch instead of coming up to surface frequently to replenish oxygen needed to burn the fuel — for the submarines.

"The offer has certain assurances that the product will meet Indian requirements," an official involved in the process told ET. Russia, which is developing its own AIP system, has already advised India to conclude the P 75I project under a government deal as it has too many complexities of technology transfer.

German company Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems that manufactures the submarine said it "is not in a position to comment on talks between the governments of the two nations", but said it was interested in offering its 214 class boats with "robust transfer of technology, training and meeting offset obligations". "We define this as a 'no-holds barred' transfer of technology in line with Modi government's 'Make in India' push," the company spokesperson said ..

Cheers Image

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Singha » 06 May 2016 19:24

the U214 is btw a export version pig of the domestic only U212 which has all the classified goodies, though as with all export versions its dressed up as being superior. if we look at greek and turkish experience its no great wunderkinder of a sub. its just ok thats all.

a scaled down arihant SSK or pindigenized scorpene will lead to a much deeper understanding of sub design, production and testing. writing 10 lines of code from scratch is a lot harder than googling and copying it from stackoverflow :oops:

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Singha » 06 May 2016 19:32

quote from a forum that cannot be mentioned here:

myth_buster_1:

U-212 and U-214 are answers to different problems, and therefore they are different.
U-212 is the result of a german requirement for a submarine with a non magnetic hull. This requirement has to do with the average depth of the Baltic Sea (56m). In those circumstances, the most important defence method of a submarine is just to go to the bottom and try to disappear in the sonar. Hence, the need for a non-magnetic steel hull.
Unfortunatelly, non-magnetic steel is also known in the industry as «sweet.steel.» Meaning that it is «softer» than the steel used in the U-214. Thats why a U-214 can go deeper than a U-212, although in the shallow water of the Baltic the U-212 would go un-notices while the U-214 would probably be caught by sonar.

Actually the family legacy of U-212 is not U-209, but the Thyssen project from the 1970s that resulted in the TR-1700 submarine from Argentina. The fastest Diesel-electric submarine in the world. The same basic layout with two decks is also found in the Dolphin class from Israel, although without non-magnetic steel nor AIP.

U-214s legacy is the U-209, although much changed. It is narrower and longer that U-212. It was not thought for the Baltic, but for open deep sea operation. Therefore U-214 will have no bottom of the sea limit, other than the limit imposed by the resistance of its stronger hull.

Both U-214 and U-212 can operate in shallow waters or deep waters, but U-212 has the edge on shallow water, while U-214 has the edge on deep water.

The systems can be changed and installed on either vessels, depending on the requirement of the users.
U-212 has older systems than the U-214 (which is just natural as the projects are almost 10 years apart).

Note that U-212 was never offered as an option to a navy. When it was offered to the Italian navy, there was no U-214 yet.

U-212 uses an imported combat system partially made in Norway by Kongsberg, known as MSI-90, while U-214s combat system is made in germany.by Atlas-Elektronik, being the latest version of the ISUS-90 system.

There are many differences in combat systems, but one of the most important results in U-212 being only able to fire torpedoes, while U-214 can fire both torpedoes and submarine launched sub harpoon missiles. This will change in future versions of U-212 though.

The consolidation of german naval industry ended with the competition between both models in the 1990s.

One cant just say which of them is better. The U-212 was an absolute german need for the Baltic conditions. Italy wanted an AIP submarine, and there wasnt really any real choice at the time. When a navy makes an option for a model, the most logical option is to stick to it, and thus Italy is going to get an additional two U-212.

For a navy that is going to protect shallow waters, there is no doubt about the clear superiority of U-212. In deep sea operations away from the shores, U-214 will fare better.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gagan » 06 May 2016 20:16


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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Will » 06 May 2016 20:23

I think the original requirement for the P75I was that the contending submarines should be in production and not just a design. We seem to have moved away from that. It would be good to go with the latest designs though they come with their associated risks like cost overruns and the unknown actual performance.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gagan » 06 May 2016 20:26

The germans offered the 214 or the 216?
U-216 was specifically targeted at Aus, Ind, Canada
This is a larger 4000 ton 90 m x 10 m long, 80 day claimed endurance with Li ion battery, boat as compared to the 214 which is a 3000 ton 65 m x 8 m boat

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Will » 06 May 2016 20:37

Well seems to be they offered the 214. Unless there are behind the scenes negotiations with the French for SSN's I think the French have lost out on the P75I by promising the Aussies not to give high end tech to India with reference to the shortfin Barracuda.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby nachiket » 07 May 2016 03:11

The Amur model with VLS plug is pure vaporware. The Russians have had lots of problems with the Lada class and Amur is its export (read downgraded) model. Let them commission and operate 1 Lada and iron out all its problems before we ask them to fit Brahmos VLS on it.

As things stand, there isn't a single SSK available which can fire Brahmos or Nirbhay. A redesign of any existing class including U-214/Scorpene/Amur will take lots of time and there will no doubt be compromises involved due to their small size.

Meanwhile, our sub-force continues to shrink, while the Chinese one grows. Best is the enemy of good enough here. We need several AIP equipped regular SSK's NOW, to replace out U209's and Kilos which are getting old. Build more Scorpenes now or we will rue this indecision a few years down the line, just like we regret not buying 126 Mirage 2000's when they were available. Meanwhile we can work on a sister class to the Arihant which can be a cruise missile carrier carrying large numbers of Brahmos/Nirbhay. Sort of like a small Oscar class. It is definitely achievable.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Karan M » 07 May 2016 03:21

well the french made out like bunnies with UPA sarkaar.. won the rafale deal and got all the positive PR and revamped their export push. made a monkey out of MOD, HAL, IAF all by constantly spreading FUD about all 3 entities (mostly the first two) and now we are left with nothing but cribs.
so, dump the rafale and DCNS for P75I.. what difference does it make to the french.. they know we need them for scorpene support and mirage spares. plus FPAs for HHTI, Nag etc. plus as a consolation they'll get MBDA Maitri deal and some stuff here and there.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Karan M » 07 May 2016 03:24

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-bu ... rman-13791

Sonar, weapons and discretion will be key. IMHO, we should go for a proper 4k ton sub.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Cosmo_R » 07 May 2016 03:43

Singha wrote:I have posted my pov in the IN thread about way forward for P75I

my proposal:
- retain Arihant hull
- delete 2 of the 4 tubes
- delete the reactor and steam plant
- license and TOT the soryu diesel engine + next gen Li-ion battery pack + DRDO AIP to recharge that
- keep everything else same rest of the sub
- resulting sub will be perhaps 500t lighter
- will have a huge transit range due to good bunker for diesel
- the next gen japani Li-ion batteries will give it a respectable submerged speed around 20knots hopefully
- 12 nirbhays / 8 K15/brahmos in the two UVLS tubes


+1

We know how to make the Arihant. We shouldn't buy boats anymore just sub-systems. Repurposing the Arihant hull and other stuff adds to economies of scale. An SSK based on the Arihant has got to be easier and cheaper than another line.

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gagan » 07 May 2016 03:58

Problem still is to find western suppliers for components that go into subs.
Then DRDO will have to develop its own sub management system, hopefully they've done this for the Arihant class already.
I really want the IN to develop an Indiginous sub from scratch

Give scorpene a few more orders to shore numbers, but the 75i should be a desi sub

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gagan » 07 May 2016 04:05

Optics / optronics, engines, pumps, steel, electronics, radars, batteries will have to be prolly imported.
Just like the tejas program had to first establish an entire exosystem of suppliers, the sub program will have to do the same
But a start has to be made. Which other country in the world will buy double digit conventional subs in the next 2 decades?

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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby member_23370 » 07 May 2016 04:49

U-216 is paper sub and U-214 lost to scorpene. Why not just build more scorpenes with DRDO AIP plug and Brahmos-M VLS? Import whats required from Russia or France.

Singha
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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Singha » 07 May 2016 05:08

China took kilo template and made yuan class

Gagan
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Re: Project 75I- It Begins

Postby Gagan » 07 May 2016 05:15

They got the engine from the Germans, then reverse engineered it.
The chinese had a window period in the 90s when the europeans and the americans opened the floodgates for tech transfers.
The cheeni made hay while that lasted
That was when they got that Lavi cooperation and were getting the Phalcons from the israelis
The attack chopper from the turks,
Even the blackhawk from the US. They reverse engineered that too!


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