Why civil airliners crash less often than fighter aircraft

[UlanBatori]

https://tkstales.wordpress.com/2011/06/ ... -aircraft/

Fascinating. I have always wondered about the social dynamics of desi 'chalta hai' interacting with the military requirement for rigid fixing of responsibility.

A much happier story from Ai-Ai-Chai, circa 197x. In those days, Ai-Ai-Chai Cawnpore (one has to use IAF propah terminology in these things, what-what) hosted a 1-week "Flight Testing" course for AE yaks from other Ai-Ai-Chais. They used a Cessna 4-seater, a Piper Cub and a glider. The first part of the course was with the glider. A sole pilot would take the Piper up, dragging the glider. The glider was piloted by an IAF Wing Commander, rumored to be taking a vacation there. The sole passenger in the rear seat was one of the yaks, selected by lottery. The glider would be released at 5000 feet. The WCO would set it up for various maneuvers and ask the yak to start his stop watch and measure time as the WCO called out readings of speed and altitude. These were to be converted to the glider's aero characteristics once the herrowic yak landed.

One has to set up a slight background to this. The yaks consisted of about 10 Under-Yaks (UnY) who were all terrified and excited and quite 404, and about 6 or so Uber-Yaks (UbY). The UbY were mostly EchAyEll Deputed Aphsars out to add an Em Ess to their impressive portfolios, and came with a distinctly different attitude to that held by the over-stressed UnYs of the Ai-Ai-Chais. IOW, they exemplified Chata Hai. They had plenty of money compared to the UnYs, (even the beggars around Ulan Bator at the time had more spare cash than the UnYs), and even more plentiful spare time, so they were usually found in the ********* Cafeteria and Political Discussion Facility.
So there was considerable resentment among the UnYs when the Lottery System gave half or more of the glider flight slots to the UbYs.

So the UnYs were not entirely unhappy when one UbY came back down literally shaking. "What happened, yaar?"

We reached 5000 feet and HE started gliding. And he said: "OK, ishtart the Stopwatch onlee!" And I said: "Bhaat Ishtap-Watch, hujoor, hain?" And he said: JUMP OUT, YOU PHOOL!!

HE TOLD ME TO JUMP OUT!!!

The WCO was a scary enough personality even when genially saying Good Morning, so one can well appreciate the terror of that situation.

More on Chalta Hai and its role in aircraft operations, in next post.

[shiv]

I do not know much - but aren't fighter aircrafts designed to be unstable?

Many modern fighters are unstable but they would be unflyable if they were not computer controlled. Until fly-by-wire was invented, developed and applied as a commercial/military success for the first time in a fighter (F-16) in the 1980s all fighters had to be stable. Making them agile and manoeuvrable depended on tips and tricks like powerful engine, low wing loading etc. The "low wing loading" stuff is easier to understand if you play with toy aeroplanes.

If you make wings small (i.e wing area small) the weight of the plane, compared to the area of wing available to be pushed jannatwards by air to make the plane fly becomes high (high wing loading). Such an aircraft needs to take off and land at high speeds but there is less wing to act as a resistance to air flowing by so they can fly faster. In the 60s planes were designed like this. Such planes will not glide very well - at least they need to glide very fast like space shuttle and are more likely to fall like Agni warhead heading for the ground

If you make huge wings so that the weight of the plane compared to area of wing is small (low wing loading) then the plane will take off and soar at low speeds and may be able to fly very very high. Planes with such wings can leave the ground even with strong gusts of wind. They will fall when the wind stops blowing like rock-a-bye baby. The U-2 was like this. But these planes cannot fly very fast - at low levels - they may be able to have a ball and fly fairly fast 25 km up in the sky. They also glide well.

Passenger airliners are a bit more like the latter and fighters more like the former.

But all this apart military aircraft are put through a lot more stress in terms of high Gs and tight turns. Apart from the transient effect this has on pilots - it adds to airframe stress and airframe life gets affected. Occasionally a stress failure of some structure that is supposed to merely bend and not break is the cause of a crash. One of the things that the C-17 comes equipped with is an approach planner for landings that ensures that the least possible stress is put on the airframe so that the damage due to material fatigue is delayed/postponed. When you speak of Wing loading the C-17 is ably to extend out huge flaps from behind the mainwings that appear to increase the wing area to twice what is needed normally - allowing the C-17 to fly ridiculously slowly - along with a a mechanism that directs engine thrust downwards like fat man farting on chair.

Those extended flaps and slow flight can be seen well from this point in this video watch for 45 sec and note the pointy things hanging out of the ends of the flaps behind the wings attached to huge raft-like surfaces - the flaps themselves.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=p ... NeHE#t=126

[UlanBatori]

Why is "Chalta Hai" relevant to safety? Because it is directly related to bringing crash probability close to 1.

In the 1966 event described, with 20-20 hindsight one can see that the entire Bored Oph Enquiry was a waste of time except to illustrate the extent of silliness. The 5-step back-trace (aka the Kaizen Way of Asking The Five WHYs):
Why 1: Plane trashed: Because fuel spilled all over critical components, making everything unreliable. HAL was too lazy to figure out what parts were undamaged, safer for their careers to declare the whole thing kaput.
Why 2: Fuel spilled all over critical components: Because ppl put pressure into a fuel line/otherwise monkeyed with a fuel system without first ensuring that the tanks were empty and had been flushed out with nitrogen
Why 3: Why did ppl monkey: Because it was a forward airbase, a critical airplane was idled repeatedly, poor diagnostics, foot-dragging by Maintenance/Engineering with no explanation. Commander took initiative, but was not provided support to do the job safely.
Why 4: Why was the fuel left inside? Why did they connect high pressure to the musharraf of the system rather than the Brig. Butt (aka 'mouth') to purge the system?
Because no checklist for fuel system maintenance.
Why 5: Why no fuel system maintenance checklist provided by HAL?
Because of "chalta hai".
Q.E.D.

Back to Chalta Hai. Note the personalities and the timeframe: Those mentioned are probably retired by now as Head of HAL, Director of GTRE, Director of ADA etc. Maybe some are in Rajya Sabha by now. Defense Attache in Embassy in Stockholm/Paris/WashingtonDC/London. So this goes very much to the CULTURE of chalta hai at these organizations.

Cessna Flight Tests: Same program (only one I know of, BTW).
Procedure.
a. Cessna 4-seater rolled on to a 3-point balance (3 platform balances placed inside square holes in the hangar floor, designed specifically for this aircraft. When rolled over them, one would be under nose wheel, one under each main wheel. Record all weight readings. Sum = empty weight. Or maybe they measured with full fuel, so it was TOW minus crew/payload.
b. WCO in pilot's seat. One yak in right seat carrying notepad, STRICT ORDERS not to TOUCH the control column (yes, one did sort-of push it out of the way so he could write better..)
c. Two yaks in rear seat, to take care of the 2 or 3 delicate instruments placed there, to measure accelerations, whatever. Analog gauges requiring scientific minds to read.
d. Cessna flies up. WCO goes through various maneuvers. Front yak takes down aircraft instrument readings such as altitude, speed, climb/sink rate etc as called out by WCO. Rear passengers carefully read gauges on their instruments, cross-check.
e. Upon return, plane weighed again on 3-point balance to get the weight distribution, longitudinal position of center of gravity, Stability Margin etc etc.

Flight # 1 and 2 went off OK technically(*). Both with all-UnYs. Rest of team got data from the scratched note sheets as best they could given the (*)vomit there because the WCO insisted on demonstrating a 60-deg. bank and power-on stall over the Yamuna or Ganga river nearby. His real profession was Fighter Pilot, IAF.

Flight # 3 was All-UbY. Hot-shot Upcoming Future HAL/ADA/NAL/DRDO Directors. Cream of the Crop of Indian Engineering Excellence. Great hope for Bharatiya India-Genius Development of Aerospace Industry and Defence. See-Eph-Dee MS Theses, no doubt. They came back with readings taken with Exceptional Precision. True Scientific Minds.
Readings like 0.000035, -0.00002354, +0.0000310, -0.000002376. Awesome.

What yaar, Bhy are yuwar readings so much smaller than Bhat Bhee Gaat?

You UnYs have no scientific training. We measured to 4 significant digits.

Did you remember to switch on the power supply?

Bhat Power Supply?

More in next post. I don't want to monopolize this discussion. But that is Chalta Hai at its finest. Now you may begin to get a glimmer of why I seem to have some good predictive capability about the realities inside these fine organizations?

[deejay]

Human Error (Air Crew) or simply Pilot Error. There are further break downs of this.
Human Error (Technical / Engineering) or simply some wrong maintenance practices (Spanner left in the engine Nacelle)
Technical Failure - Breakdown in equipment, incorrect equipment operation, fatigue, now even Software malfunction, etc.etc.
Design / Manufacturing errors (rare, happens mostly in testing phase)
Weather (of course) and will put things like Bird Ingestion here along with FOD here as these are all part of Operating Environment.

First, let us analyse design as a cause: Well BRF is almost always discussing design - be it LCA, IJT, F 35, Rafale, PAK- FA, Su 30, J 10, etc.etc. Of course canarad, compound delta, delta, sweep back, sweep forward, anhedral, dihedral, high lift, transonic, supersonic, shockwaves, bow shock waves, etc, etc.

And we are now discussing Stability vs. Maneuverability.

Well stability is inversely proportional to maneuverability. So a Civil Liner will have a a stable, transonic, high lift, minimal sweep, design while a military fighter jet will have a body with stubs like a Mig 21 or a Mig 27 sweep back, or M2K Delta or even better an LCA compound Delta. I don't think there is a single commercial liner today that worries about shock waves. Is there a fighter being made today which does not worry about shock waves today? Please do not include trainers.

When a aircraft is made unstable to operate under greater stress and is then forced to go through the stress it is likely to fail, eventually.

Now, when an (undetected / unintended) faulty design makes in to the testing phase and sometimes even the operations phase what is the tolerance of acceptance for a Civil aircraft and a Fighter Aircraft failure / crash? Asked differently, which design is likely to be persisted for more crashes - Civilian or Military?

It has been said here that 1000's died in USA testing the Century series fighters. How many crashes and fatalities have been recorded all over the world and in testing Civilian aircraft? We can do a per capita (type of aircraft stat) because it is likely that many more fighters have been designed than Civilian aircraft.

Another important point to ponder is that if the HPT 32 would have been sold in the civilian market, would it have lasted so many crashes due to similar causes?

What I have tried to explain is that aircraft are unnatural objects (metal / composites) being made to fly through force of human will (engines) applying highly evolved scientific principles by putting at its control a pilot who nature never intended to fly. Designing such machines will lead to crashes. Such crashes will be more in military machines as they are more complicated and human tolerance to military crashes is higher so a lot more faulty designs are going to crash before being called off in case of military aircraft.

Here is an interesting anecdote (probably through someones's mental musharaff) on how safe Civilian Aircraft have become by design

> It is cold foggy winter morning around 0600 hrs at Delhi Palam. All aircraft are told to switch off and forget take off for couple of hours. An IAF Anna Batti (An 32) persists and is standing by repeatedly asking permission for start. Suddenly there is a smart Inglishman going "Delhi, the is Speed Bird xxx- permission to land". Delhi Palam in chaste Indian english says" Speed Bird xxx, Phog, Vis zero, RWR, <=100, Cat III C ILS, advise divert". Speed Bird says" Not a problem Sir, we have Auto Landing System..." Our Anna Batti pilot can't digest this and shouts in accented english " Speed Bird xxx, You have Auto Landing System? What do you get paid for?"

[Rahul M]

OT.

...

please check your PM and email me.
thx.

[Kannan]

military aviation explores parts of the envelope civil aviation doesn't reach,

Most crashes occur during takeoff. A few during landings (OK, ALL occur during landings, sorry! )

Yes, it was a typo, but a 747 is higher wing loading than a F-15 as well.

On a typical takeoff I engage autopilot at around 200'. I rarely handle the plane manually unless I need to practice something for a checkride. Unless I am intentionally going somewhere remote, I let the plane track for landing and do pretty much do VFR/ILS/GPS approaches only.

Maneuvers after takeoff are always standard rate turns done after I have 1000' for noise ordinances, and at this altitude I could feasibly (assuming I don't completely screw it up ) easily return to the field on engine failure.

We have a US Army Aviation and Air National Guard presence locally, and their planes are busy doing high performance takeoffs, formation takeoffs, formation break landings. If that engine quits, they're punching out. If you look at the envelope as AOA compared to speed, relation to the runway etc. they are significantly pushing the envelope even during their terminal operations.

It's a little humbling but I don't think I've ever exceeded 30* of bank below 5000', and even above that, I've never exited the envelope outside of the "normal" or "utility" category of operation, which is a huge selling point for aerobatics professionals trying to sell lessons to people to try out the rest of the envelope in the event you need to go there in an emergency.

[Kannan]

I do not know much - but aren't fighter aircrafts designed to be unstable?

A very rough analogy -

Positive stability - civilian 'normal'/'utility' category - a bowl sitting on a table. If I push the stick to the right, the wing dips. If I let go of the stick, the plane starts to return to straight and level, just as something you put at the edge of the bowl coming back to the middle. Trim targets a speed, so if you trim the plane for 200kts, and you reduce power, the nose will respond to maintain the speed. It follows that if you pull the nose up, you will climb, but if you let go of the stick the nose comes back down to its targeted speed. It might enter a phugoid if you do it too fast, but it will home back to its natural pitch. This would be pretty much all of civil/air transport certified aircraft.

Negative stability - helicopters, fighters with broken computers - a bowl upside down. If you don't constantly jockey it to the middle, that thing will flip on you/fall off the bowl in a heartbeat. An F-16 etc. has a middleman to do this, so to the pilot it "feels" neutral.

Neutral stability - fighter jets - a flat plate. If you move the stick to the right, the wing starts dipping to the right. If you let go, it more or less holds that angle of bank. It in one way or another assumes the pilot needs and can handle full control.

[deejay]

I do not know much - but aren't fighter aircrafts designed to be unstable?

A very rough analogy -

Positive stability - civilian 'normal'/'utility' category - a bowl sitting on a table. If I push the stick to the right, the wing dips. If I let go of the stick, the plane starts to return to straight and level, just as something you put at the edge of the bowl coming back to the middle. Trim targets a speed, so if you trim the plane for 200kts, and you reduce power, the nose will respond to maintain the speed. It follows that if you pull the nose up, you will climb, but if you let go of the stick the nose comes back down to its targeted speed. It might enter a phugoid if you do it too fast, but it will home back to its natural pitch. This would be pretty much all of civil/air transport certified aircraft.

Negative stability - helicopters, fighters with broken computers - a bowl upside down. If you don't constantly jockey it to the middle, that thing will flip on you/fall off the bowl in a heartbeat. An F-16 etc. has a middleman to do this, so to the pilot it "feels" neutral.

Neutral stability - fighter jets - a flat plate. If you move the stick to the right, the wing starts dipping to the right. If you let go, it more or less holds that angle of bank. It in one way or another assumes the pilot needs and can handle full control.

One needs to further break this down in to Static and Dynamic stabilities. Something can be Statically positively stable but Dynamically negatively unstable or something else is unstable in both Static and Dynamic states. This is further divided in to which axis / plane one is referring to - as in roll, pitch or yaw.

[shiv]

One of the early classic discoveries about airliners crashing due to fatigue fractures was the example of the De Havilland Comet (that later became the British Nimrod refuelling tanker and failed AWACS). While searching for some information on fatigue I came across this pdf which explains in simple terms why civil airliners can simply fly high and safe following a flight routine that is totally useless for military aircraft. Military aircraft cannot simply climb to a cruise altitude and fly steady and high. Military aircraft need to flow low, high, fast, slow. through bad and good weather. This makes military flying more challenging.
http://faculty.washington.edu/nsniadec/ ... /comet.pdf

[Philip]

Enjoy this! Anyone flying Air India shortly?

Air India co-pilot starts fight with captain in cockpit minutes before flight – report
April 06, 2015

Verbal abuse and a fistfight reportedly took place in the cockpit of an Air India flight when the co-pilot attacked the captain before takeoff. The incident attracted extra attention after last month’s Germanwings crash in the French Alps.

"The commander told his co-pilot to take down critical take off figures for the flight. This involves writing critical facts like the number of passengers on board, takeoff weight and fuel uptake on a small paper card (trim sheet) that is displayed in front of the pilots for the entire duration of the flight. The co-pilot took offense at this and reportedly beat up the captain," the Times of India cited an airline source as saying.

Air India Flight 611 was reportedly minutes away from taking off from Jaipur for Delhi when the incident happened.

The claims by the source weren’t confirmed by Air India (AI) as the carrier’s spokesman, GP Rao, said that instead of a violent fight, “there was an argument between the two and nothing more.” He added that the pilots “have settled the issue.”

According to the spokesman, the commander made a decision “in the larger interest of the airline” not to delay the flight any further and move ahead as planned. The correct procedure would have been to report the incident, but that would result in everyone’s plans being ruined and the flight canceled.

Despite no violence in the cockpit, "both the pilots have been de-rostered [taken off flying duty],” and an inquiry has been ordered into the incident, Rao said.

The captain did mark the incident in a log entry with AI movement control after the pair landed the plane safely in Delhi.

It later turned out that the airline had previously received complaints over the co-pilot’s behavior while duty.

"Three years back, he asked the commander of a flight to come out of the cockpit, remove the stars on his shirt collar [epaulettes] and then fought with him. A year later, another commander complained about his 'rude and unbecoming' behavior in the cockpit and questioned his state of mind," a senior AI commander told the Times of India.

"AI and the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) should examine this latest problem in the cockpit. If the complaints about the said co-pilot's behavior are found true, then in the interest of aviation safety the authorities must act," another pilot said.

The incident takes place amid rising concerns for passenger safety among the AI staff. Recently an association representing Air India pilots wrote to the DGCA a complaint that co-pilots were being “forced to work overtime.”

“These co-pilots have being receiving an ad-hoc payment for more than 18 months which amounts to less than 1/3rd of their actual salary. They are being forced to work overtime without any remuneration and also are not allowed to take any kind of leave,” said the letter by the Indian Commercial Pilots’ Association as cited by PTI. “Putting these highly-stressed and financially over-burdened co-pilots in the same cockpit... is a perfect recipe for disaster.”

The Air India incident comes as aviation authorities in Europe and around the world are implementing new safety regulations after the death of 150 people in the Germanwings Flight 9525 crash in the French Alps on March 27.

The investigators believe the crash was intentionally caused by the co-pilot, Andreas Lubitz, who was declared “unfit to work” by a doctor due to his suicidal tendencies, but kept this information from his airline.

While in the air, Lubitz locked the captain out of the cockpit and initiated the decent of the plane, which saw the aircraft colliding with a mountain.

In response to the tragedy, European Aviation Safety Agency as well as Canada, New Zealand, Germany and Australia implemented new regulations, requiring two authorized personnel, including at least one pilot, to be present in the cockpit at all times.

http://rt.com/news/247133-air-india-pilot-fight/

[shiv]

http://idrw.org/why-the-indian-air-forc ... rash-rate/

Why the Indian Air Force has a high crash rate
Published June 4, 2015 | By admin

SOURCE : RUSSIA & INDIA REPORT

More than 200 Sukhoi Flankers currently form the core of the Indian Air Force’s strike element, for a planned force of over 272 Su-30 fighter-bombers. India received the initial batch of Sukhois in 2002. The first of these aircraft crashed in 2009, and since then five more have crashed.

Now let’s look at the Sukhois in other air forces.

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has 150 Flankers of Russian origin and 229 Chinese knockoffs. That’s a total of 379 aircraft, for an eventual figure of 400 Russian made Flankers, derivatives and illegal copies. And yet the PLAAF has lost fewer Sukhoi in crashes. Are the Chinese Sukhois better maintained, better built or are Chinese pilots simply playing it safe? More on that in a moment.

The Russian Air Force has a total of 438 Flankers. Again, the Russian Sukhois don’t tumble out of the air at a rate close to the IAF’s. Similarly, there have been no reports of Flankers of the Vietnamese and Indonesian air forces being involved in crashes.

Why the Flanker force matters

The IAF calls the Su-30 its “air dominance” fighter for a good reason. The arrival of the Sukhoi has decisively tilted the balance of power in favour of the IAF in the region. The Flanker’s super-maneuverability, its armoury of advanced beyond visual range missiles and extraordinary range of 3000 km (extendable to 8000 km with aerial refuelling) are aspects that make it the wolf of the skies.

The Su-30 is also equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which gives it greater long-range reconnaissance capabilities. Armed with the SAR pod, the IAF Sukhois are known to engage in aggressive patrols along the China-India and India-Pakistan borders.

Considering the Flanker’s hunter killer reputation, anyone who questions its capability is clearly living under a rock.

So what explains the loss of six IAF Flankers in crashes? Let’s go into the various probable causes and also dissect the theories floating out there.

Crash No.1: 30 April 2009

The first ever Su-30MKI crashes in the Pokhran region, Rajasthan. The IAF’s Court of Inquiry establishes Wing Commander Vishwas Munje mistakenly switched off the warplane’s fly-by-wire system.

Crash No.2: 30 November 2009

Sukhoi crashes near Jaisalmer, Rajasthan, after a fire warning. An IAF investigation attributes it to accidental ingestion of a foreign object in the engine intake.

Crash No.3: 13 December 2011

Aircraft crashes 20 km from Pune. IAF says the crash is due to a malfunction in the fly-by-wire system.

Crash No.4: 19 February 2013

Aircraft’s right wing explodes over Pokhran, shortly after completing a training mission.

Crash No.5: 14 October 2013

Fly-by-wire system malfunctions yet again and the Sukhoi goes down near Pune. Russian experts blame pilot error but the IAF says the Court of Inquiry is yet to pinpoint exact reason.

Crash No.6: 19 May 2015

Su-30MKI flying from Tezpur in Assam develops a technical snag and the pilot is forced to abandon the aircraft. Cause is yet to be established.

Now that you have a good idea of what exactly happened in those six crashes, let’s look at the possible reasons why jet fighters crash in India.

Possible reason No.1: Intense training

The IAF is one of the few air forces in the world that conduct intense, year-round training. Benjamin Lambeth of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace says the IAF trains for a “high intensity, high stakes” conflict. Keeping in mind the possibility of a two-front war, the IAF puts its pilots and aircraft through the wringer.

Mock air combat can involve hundreds of aircraft flying thousands of kilometres. During such a war game in 2013, Sukhois flew 1800-km bombing missions from Chabua in Assam to the western front, with mid-air refuelling. In fact, IAF pilots are known to lead missions over 10 hours in their Sukhois.

Such training places a great deal of stress on aircraft, pilots and air crews, which means potentially more accidents. But that’s the way the IAF trains for war. In fact, a former air force chief has gone on record that he would rather lose pilots during training than during war.

The strategy has been amply rewarded. In the 1971 War, for instance, the IAF was able to conduct a wide range of missions – troop support; air combat; deep penetration strikes; para-dropping behind enemy lines; feints to draw enemy fighters away from the actual target; bombing; and reconnaissance.

In contrast, the Pakistan Air Force, which was solely focused on air combat, was blown out of the subcontinent’s skies within the first week of the war. Those PAF aircraft that survived took refuge at Iranian air bases or in concrete bunkers, refusing to offer a fight.

Similarly, the PLAAF has nearly 2,000 planes, but only a fraction of the peace-time accident rate. According to Foreign Policy, this suggests Chinese pilots are not spending sufficient time in the air or training under pressure. “(Chinese) pilots are neither trusted nor properly trained. Drills are regimented, centrally controlled, and divorced from realistic combat conditions.”

A PLAAF fighter pilot would most likely be reprimanded if he deviated from the flight plan set by his commanders. Losing a plane would be cause enough for a court martial.

Thankfully, the IAF does not believe in having robots but values superior training and innovativeness. IAF pilots have truly internalised what Sergei Dolgushin, a Russian Air Force ace with 24 victories in WWII, said is a prerequisite to be a successful fighter pilot: “A love of hunting, a great desire to be the top dog”.

Possible reason No.2: Harsh environment

Harsh is normal in India. Tropical India is an unforgiving environment for any aircraft. The hot air means aircraft engines produce less thrust and the wing produce less lift compared to similar aircraft flying in European skies. Sun baked runways are also known to impact landing safety. These are factors IAF pilots have to live with.

Bird hits are another huge factor in aircraft accidents over India. The IAFattributes around 10 per cent of accidents to bird hits. Most IAF bases are located near populated areas, where birds are a constant menace.

The situation has got so dire that the IAF last year issued global bids to four companies for 45 bird detection and monitoring radar systems to be installed at airports and air bases across India.

Possible reason No.3: Missing trainers

According to figures released by the Ministry of Defence in March 2013, the IAF was losing the equivalent of one fighter squadron (approximately 18 fighters) in accidents every two years. This was primarily because of the lack of adequate number of trainers.

Rookie fighter pilots begin on basic trainers, then move on to intermediate jet trainers (IJTs) before finally graduating to advanced jet trainers (AJTs). These three stages are critical elements of fighter pilot training and any shortcuts will certainly lead to disaster.

But what was happening was that in the absence of an AJT, rookie pilots were moving straight from the IJT to frontline warplanes such as the MiG-21. The upshot – young pilots died at an alarming rate.

With the induction of the Swiss Pilatus basic trainer and Hawk AJT from Britain, the crashes have come down – but not stopped.

Possible reason No.4: Shoddy maintenance

India is notorious for its ‘chalta hai’ or ‘it’ll be alright’ attitude. In this backdrop, shoddy maintenance could well be a factor. Although the IAF is known for its high standards, those standards are largely of its pilots; maintenance crews may not share that quality. Of late, there have been a number of incidents reported widely in the media about IAF ground crew involved in all sorts of serious crimes. The IAF should look at establishing an elite division of ground crews to service its high-end aircraft.

Possible reason No.5: Depleted air force

The IAF’s fleet strength is currently down to 34 squadrons or around 600 warplanes. The sanctioned number is 42 squadrons. In a country as vast as India, with multiple threats, such depletion in fighter aircraft means fewer aircraft have to perform more missions to get the same job done. It also means less down time in maintenance hangars. This is where India quickly needs to induct more locally built Tejas interceptors and more locally assembled Su-30s.

Silver lining

The good news is that aircraft crashes in the IAF have shown a declining trend over the last three years. From a high of 30 in fiscal 2011-12, they declined to six in 2012-13 and an equal number in 2013-14.

The IAF is now looking to improve overall fleet serviceability. The air force recently told a parliamentary committee that fleet-wide serviceability stood at 60-65 per cent, but could be increased to 77-80 per cent, provided spares were made available.

During a visit to Bangalore in December, IAF chief ACM Arup Raha said: “Budgets remain a constraint, especially the revenue budget, to maintain spares for the aircraft to maintain high operational readiness.”

While the IAF is clearly doing its best under the circumstances, it needs to do better. Bringing the crash rate down to US or European air force levels should be the goal. Losing a Sukhoi each year is akin to burning Rs 350 crore in cash.