In any future war with Pak and large use of armour,inevitable,we would have a few thousand T-series tanks plus only a few hundreds of Arjuns,1&2s with us. given transportation,logistics worked out,on terrain suitable for both MBTs,we could see the IA possibly use a combo of Arjun + T-90s/72s in battle,with the MBT rated as having the superior survivability/armour possibly spearheading he attack.The Sov. tactic was to use its superior tanks to break through NATO armour and then pour in large numbers of T-series to rapidly overwhelm the enemy and penetrate deep into NATO territory. Facing two modern MBTs would also be a v.difficult task for the Paki armour to counter and since we d still have superior numbers of armour compared with Pak,unless they possess decent air support would have to give way/retreat. This is why they adopted a strategy of using tactical nukes for fear of Indian breakthroughs at several points on the border,made easier by the Cold Start doctrine.
Here is a Heritage Foundation report on countering a Sov. armour by NATO.Checking Soviet Armor's Threat to NATOhttp://www.heritage.org/europe/report/c ... hreat-nato
...and the opposite viewpoint.
Russian war strategy and tactics give Moscow ‘the edge’ over NATO, Moscow analyst sayshttp://euromaidanpress.com/2016/05/14/r ... #arvlbdata
Some analysts in response to this began talking about the mysteries of the Russian soul, but more thoughtful commentators focused on three major aspects of Russian tactical doctrine that has evolved over the last several decades. They are:
“First, Russians clearly acknowledge that in war people are killed and there is no practical sense of slowing down an attack operation because of each tank put out of commission. Vacillation in the final analysis leads to defeat and as a result to still larger losses.”
“Second, support and reinforcement should be given to those units and those directions which achieve success” instead of the Western practice of reinforcing those which are in trouble.
“Third, the Russian side devotes enormous importance to massed support of the attack by artillery” and recognizes that “for the foreseeable future,” Moscow may not be fighting in places where it has air superiority.”
“The basic error of Atlanticist doctrines was and remains arrogance,” Krutikov argues, and the assumption that airpower can always be called in to defeat any land operation. But Russia’s successes in Georgia and the Donbas, both promoted by these principles, show that confidence is unwarranted because Russian anti-aircraft weaponry eliminated this advantage.
“Russian military doctrine (not in its written politicized variant but in practice) over the last 15 years has evolved significantly,” Krutikov says, “while American (and NATO as a whole) remain in the framework they had in the 1980s and 1990s.” And that gives Russia an advantage in any conflict as recent events in Syria demonstrate.
A more detailed analysis is in this Princeton paper. reg. Sov, tactics,"echelons" where rear echelon-2 forces would be "preconnected" reserves
assigned their pre-determined objectives and goals.Reserves as contingency forces to deal with unexpected threats or opportunities.The Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Ground Forces Threat
to Europehttps://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/19 ... 871806.PDF