1965 Indo-Pak War: News & Discussion

[Pratyush]

Discovery is once again showing 1965 war program. This episode is about the march on lahore.

[Karan M]

Sanju, thanks, what a travesty. This is what happens when coterie/cliques form. Still galling.

[Karan M]

vsunder saar:

I find it very interesting to read the comments of the 1965 war by people who were obviously never born then.
It is a dirty business, and the wounded not a pretty sight. It really makes me angry to see young lives wasted full of promise because of the rantings of some tinpot dictator. I was old enough to read a lot about the war, and even help out with passing magazines and snacks to soldiers passing through Kanpur on trains. This war was something that touched me.

And what exactly do you think is going on right now, if not a war? Every day, we are losing a few soldiers in Kashmir and a few get wounded, whom our great Indian media, don't cover. Occasionally, the war escalates into the mainland with 26/11s, bomb attacks and so forth.

The lay Indian public is still stupid and arrogant enough though to ignore whatever happens in Kashmir. Every other day a few army/BSF men lay down their lives, but our public either gasps about some steroid filled idiots new Bollywood flick signaling better Indo-Pak ties, or gasps about some worthless cricket game, or thinks of other pursuits. This is what we are and will be.

[vsunder]

Whatever happened to the proposal to have a proper War memorial for the wars fought post-independence? I thought Jaitley when he held the Raksha minister's post had initiated the process of land for the Memorial. I think they should list down the names of all personnel killed in 1947-48, Goa Liberation, 1962, 1965, 1971, IPKF in Sri Lanka and Kargil. There is the issue of the COINS operations which Karan M points out is always ongoing. I fear this will be a bone of contention. The few Memorials we have are incomplete with omitted names. The memorial at Halwara AFS for example is not only incomplete in it's list but in addition some names are not legible, the paint has eroded since the letters were not inscribed. It is a pitiable state of affairs.

[vsunder]

The Battle of Buttar Dograndi

https://improveacrati.wordpress.com/201 ... 16-and-17/

Lt. Col Joseph Ephraim "Jerry" Jhirad, mentioned-in-dispatches who died was a Jewish officer, Maj. Abdul Raffey Khan got a VrC, 8th Garwhalis.

Jhirad was buried in Delhi. IA had some bad eggs, read the version above. These are some names I remember and googled them. I was young and my memory has started to play tricks. Of course Tarapore is the most famous of the events of Buttur Dograndi.

http://twgpp.org/information.php?id=2961267

http://indianjews.org/images/The_Herita ... _India.pdf

[arshyam]

Link:
http://www.rediff.com/news/special/my-f ... 150904.htm
Lots of portraits.

Thanks for sharing this Ramana sir. Very evocative.

For his valour he was decorated with the highest war-time gallantry medal, the Param Vir Chakra posthumously. Among the places where his valour is remembered is in the Golden Temple in Amritsar where his name is etched on a plaque. His presence also graces two building complexes in Andheri, suburban Mumbai, named after him: Tarapore Gardens and Tarapore Towers.

As an aside, does anyone know if the Tarapore towers on Anna Salai in Chennai are named after Lt Col Tarapore? I have passed the building thousands of times without knowing its significance (it even has a famous restaurant called Mathura). Same goes for Usman road in T Nagar - apparently it is named after Brig. Mohammed Usman, MVC, who was killed in the '47-48 War.

In light of the above, it is commendable that our history books are going to have stories about our war heroes. Enough of learning about Churchill or MacArthur.

[disha]

Arshyam'ji.,

From reading the excerpts posted on rediff regarding Lt. Col. Tarapore., it seems that he comes from an illustrous family and it seems his fore-father was a general in Shiva'jis army and received a grant of some 100 villages. So given that, I will not be surprised to see others in his lineage to shine in other areas and lead to even Tarapore towers in deep south.

[Karan M]

Lt Col Tarapore IIRC was originally serving in the Nizams forces and fought the Indian Army during Operation Polo as his duty demanded. When Hyderabad state joined India, he was transferred to the Indian Army and served with honor. In short a professional soldier to the core.

[ramana]

There are a whole bunch or Tarapores in Secundrabad near Paradise Talkies. I didn't know his Hyderabad connections.

[KLNMurthy]

Link:
http://www.rediff.com/news/special/my-f ... 150904.htm
...

wow.

"kya log the woh diwane
kya log the woh abhimani"

Jaya Hind ki sena.

[Jagan]

Whatever happened to the proposal to have a proper War memorial for the wars fought post-independence? I thought Jaitley when he held the Raksha minister's post had initiated the process of land for the Memorial. I think they should list down the names of all personnel killed in 1947-48, Goa Liberation, 1962, 1965, 1971, IPKF in Sri Lanka and Kargil. There is the issue of the COINS operations which Karan M points out is always ongoing. I fear this will be a bone of contention. The few Memorials we have are incomplete with omitted names. The memorial at Halwara AFS for example is not only incomplete in it's list but in addition some names are not legible, the paint has eroded since the letters were not inscribed. It is a pitiable state of affairs.

The memorial at Halwara has been painted again..

The best memorial if you ask me is this one in Bengaluru.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/Gall ... seums/NMM/

All the names of the fallen are laser etched on these walls.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ARMY/Gall ... e.jpg.html

[Jagan]

The Battle of Buttar Dograndi

https://improveacrati.wordpress.com/201 ... 16-and-17/

wow what a fantastic link! It was just as bad as i remembered reading about it long ago. The loss of Maj A R Khan particularly poignant. He knew he was not going back alive looking at the fighting going on around him. yet chose to stay till the end.

Deaths in 8 Gharwal Rifles - 33 in one day - 43 in all.. god knows how many were wounded.

10-Sep-65 4038205 RFN Shyam Singh Panwar
11-Sep-65 4037637 LNK Pratap Singh Negi
11-Sep-65 4041867 RFN Asarh Singh Rana
12-Sep-65 4041583 RFN Abtar Singh Kandari
15-Sep-65 4038237 RFN Mahendar Singh Negi
15-Sep-65 4040984 RFN Chatar Singh Chauhan
15-Sep-65 4040994 RFN Bhura Singh Rana
15-Sep-65 4042722 RFN Girdhari Prasad Naithani
17-Sep-65 IC-3861 LT COL J E Jhirad
17-Sep-65 4034522 HAV Gabar Singh Negi
17-Sep-65 4031317 LHAV Chait Singh Gusai
17-Sep-65 4034540 LHAV Shib Singh Panwar
17-Sep-65 4035425 LHAV Keshar Singh Bisht
17-Sep-65 4034505 NK Lakshman Singh Chaudhari
17-Sep-65 4034654 NK Bhawan Singh Bisht
17-Sep-65 4036290 NK Abal Singh Gusain
17-Sep-65 4034221 LNK Keshar Singh Pundir
17-Sep-65 4035143 LNK Trilok Singh Rawat
17-Sep-65 4037137 LNK Bahadur Singh Rawat
17-Sep-65 4038937 LNK Bjijmohan Singh Negi
17-Sep-65 4038720 RFN Balwant Singh Mahar
17-Sep-65 4038795 RFN Lal Singh Jhinkawan
17-Sep-65 4039272 RFN Balwant Singh Bisht
17-Sep-65 4039476 RFN Lachhman Singh Negi
17-Sep-65 4039602 RFN Dhiraj Singh Aswal
17-Sep-65 4039681 RFN Jagdish Prasad Baundhiyal
17-Sep-65 4039721 RFN Dilwar Singh Rawat
17-Sep-65 4040266 RFN Jagat Singh Rana
17-Sep-65 4040846 RFN Birendar Singh Negi
17-Sep-65 4041293 RFN Chander Singh Negi
17-Sep-65 4041297 RFN Ghana Singh Bhandari
17-Sep-65 4041566 RFN Sabar Singh Bisht
17-Sep-65 4042598 RFN Ranjit Singh Rawat
17-Sep-65 4042776 RFN Khushal Singh Chauhan
17-Sep-65 4043572 RFN Balbir Singh Gusain
17-Sep-65 4043606 RFN Govind Ram Amola
17-Sep-65 4043908 RFN Soban Singh Bisht
17-Sep-65 4045970 RFN Diwan Singh Bagri
17-Sep-65 4045987 RFN Mahabir Singh Bisht, Sm
17-Sep-65 4044000 RFN Trilok Singh Chauhan
17-Sep-65 4044095 RFN Gaina Singh Rawat
18-Sep-65 IC-5823 MAJ A R KHAN VrC
19-Sep-65 4043961 RFN Chhotiya Singh Gusain

[shiv]

The Battle of Buttar Dograndi

https://improveacrati.wordpress.com/201 ... 16-and-17/

This entire blog post needs to be cross posted here in case it "gets lost"

1965 War; Blood, Gore. Buttur Dograndi – Sep 16 – 17; 1965 …

Posted on October 3, 2010. Filed under: From a Services Career, Personal Stuff, Personalities |

This is a personal account of a moderately intense battle by a young Capt who himself was wounded while commanding B Coy, 8th Garhwalis. This battle lasted two days,16 and 17 Sep ’65 and saw three commanding officers killed. First there was Col Taraporewala of Poona Horse and then there was Col Jerry Jhirad of 8th Garhwalis blown to pieces by a direct tank shot just after they had finished conversing on the afternoon of Sep 16. Then on the afternoon of Sep 17, Maj Abdul Rafey Khan, who had assumed command of the Garhwalis the previous day ,was killed again by a direct hit from a tank when he was personally with his Intelligence Officer and the RMO, loading casualties onto a tank on the after noon of Sep 17. Col Taraporewala was awarded an immediate PVC while Col Jhirad was given a Mention in Despatches and Rafey was given a VrC. A Story Straight from the hip – without frills or cover ups.

Buttur Dograndi is a small inconsequential village lying off the road between Chawinda and Pasrur in Pakistan. On Sep 16, Poona Horse and the Eighth Garhwalis, minus even their own supporting weapons, were tasked to capture it as it lay behind Chawinda and on the road to Pasrur because 6 Infantry Division under Gen SK Korla, would be attacking Chawinda from the front.

Typical sledge and hammer tactic to isolate Chawinda from its rear while it was hammered from the front. Sadly while the attack on Chawinda was a pathetic fiasco, the outflanking move to block it also ended in tragedy. In Churchill’s ‘My Ealy Life’ I ha read that it is near impossible to be twice wounded on the same day. This was to be proved wrong in capitals because I was twice wounded within a couple of hours and both times pretty nastily – once while repulsing the morning Counter attack and then while lying patched up near the Doc who was attending to the wounded

Funnily on 16 Sep, while my company was the Van Guard, with Poona Horse busy fighting their own battle, we had to come to a halt as we found that no one was following us. Thus with my three platoons spread eagled holding a broad front, with Lt Gurmukh Balis’ 5 Platoon near a sugar cane field on my Right and Hav Sarweshwar’s 6 Pl near a tube well on my Left, I was with Gabar’s 5 Pl also near a well – waiting for the rest of the unit to catch up. A while later, quite alone and all by himself and without so much as informing me, Maj Abdul Rafey Khan, the unit 2I/c who is now the CO as Jerry has been hit and evacuated in a 3 ton truck, comes from the rear and takes Gurmukh’s platoon without my knowing anything. He goes on to take the outskirts of the village of Buttur Dograndi, all by himself. The platoon suffers some eight casualties from the fire of a Recce and Support Battalion. End of Story!

The war had started on Sep 1 and the armored division had been launched a week later. In that time, the Indian Army had accomplished little. The Pak offensives in Chamb Jaurian had been blunted. Their offensive in the Khem Karan Sector had got mired in the post monsoon wet fields when their Pattons became sitting ducks. Hence defensively we had done better than Okay.

Our offensive on the Lahore front had been stopped by the Ichogil Canal. The one in the Sialkot sector had failed to make headway. Which speaks much about our professional competence at the time.

Six years later in ’71, Sam Manekshaw was to wrap up the Bangla Desh war and capture over 90,000 POWs in under two weeks. The Israelis took a week in the ’67 war and two weeks, even when they were caught on the wrong foot, to rally from behind to claim the ‘73 Yom Kippur War.

Armor offensives are supposed to do one of two things. Either, by passing around strongly held nodes, they drive deep into enemy territory and capture lightly held important areas to make the enemy react and fight by our rules. Or they destroy enemy armor in mobile fast moving tank battles prior to going in for the soft underbelly.

In the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis waited for Egyptian armor to move beyond its SAM umbrella and then made mince meat of it in a fast moving fluid tank battle. In fairness to the Egyptians, they moved forward only because the Syrians were yelling for them to do so in order to take pressure off them.

In our case, whatever the plans in the Sialkot sector, we seemed to have done neither as we neither penetrated deep nor destroyed any armor – most probably because there was none.

After the first week of drift, a decision seemed to have been made to use 6 infantry Division to capture Chawinda. While attacking Chawinda, it would be cut off from Pasrur by Poona horse and the Garhwalis. While Poona Horse was from the armored brigade, the Garhwalis were from the Lorried brigade. They had never trained nor worked together, so essential while fighting alongside.

We had mostly trained with Third Cavalry but they were still in the Khem Karan Sector where they won laurels shooting up the bogged down Pattons of the First Armored Division of Pakistan.

The Everest of professional stuidity was when the Garhwalis were launched without any transport (other than the CO’s jeep) and without even their own integral supporting weapons ie antitank guns, machine guns, mortars. The only other vehicle was the Battery Commander Maj Kochar’s jeep. This guy was awarded a VrC but since he was mostly with me on 16 Sep, I can vouch safe that he was never ever in contact with his guns. And the guy never even gave his jeep for the CO’s evacuation!

As Slim writes, ‘the most pathetic people in the world are Gunners w/o Guns’ Now the story of ‘B’ Company 8 Garhwal Rifles.

The Garhwalis harbored at Chak Deo Singh on night of Sep 15. I had a couple goats, found in the village, slaughtered for a Company Bara Khana. Dear Bakhtawar laid out roast hen for me.

After mid night, I led a strong patrol to near Jassoran. While checking out some dilapidated houses, we found a patrol of 9 Dogra resting. We just managed not to shoot up one another. This was the motorized unit of the armored brigade, which a year back, had returned from a stint in Gaza and with its outstanding athletes, it had out shone in various events. But now these guys certainly did not know what the hell they were doing there.

That night, Som’s Alpha and Suresh’s Delta were used by Jerry to do a recce in force. They went up to the railway line, took some casualties and fell back.

Morning of 16th, Jerry looked happy as he gave his orders. He was wearing a jungle hat and for the first time had on a holstered pistol. Most of us wore steel helmets. I preferred using only the inner part which was very light but which gave no protection. As regards a weapon, I slung an SLR as the carbine was prone to stoppages.

Jerry, cheerful as ever, ordered Bravo to lead behind the Poona Horse Centurions. Bravo was to form the firm base for the attack on Buttur Dograndi. I asked, rather cheekily, as to where exactly he wanted the firm base. Jerry smiled and said I was not to worry as he would be there right beside me. Alas!

Around 9 am the tanks of Poona Horse, with their pennants fluttering, took off, two abreast, charging full steam ahead and raising clouds of dust. It was an impressive, memorable sight. After that I only saw two tanks, one of Maj Ghorpade’s and one of Capt Ajay Singh, who was, to become the Armd Div GI in mid 70s.

As the last of tanks disappeared and the dust settled, I followed with Gabar‘s platoon in the van. Morale was very high. To my surprise and shock I found Som (OC Alpha), Sindhu, the Adjutant and some others, alongside. Most everyone was urging me on despite the fact that there was some arty and mortar shells coming our way. This was specially as we crossed the Chawinda – Jasoran road.

As I haveobserved enemy employment of arty was super duper. There seemed to be some observation guys watching us as we advanced and they were directing accurate fire on us. There was also some air activity which showed that Pakistan was now serious and no longer amused by our antics.

There was as usual no sign of our air despite a divisional attack having been launched and our mission going in deep. Sindhu was lugging one of my LMGs, ready to poop off at any Pak plane. Som was saying I must at least get an MVC for capturing enemy mortars which he swore were just around the next grove.There was a lot of euphoria. I had to tell myself that I was the joker in command, others being mere guests and that I must not get carried away.

It was in such spirits that we swung along. After a while our speed slowed as we had been advancing under a blazing sun. It was around then that I got a message from my rear that there seemed to be no one following behind us. To take stock, I cried halt next to a well which had a few trees. I swung Sarweshwar Prasads platoon to another well with a broken down hut and with a scraggly clump a couple hundred yards to my left. There was a sugar cane grove a hundred or so yards to my right and I ordered Gurmukh Bali’s platoon to that area. We were about 1500 meters short of Buttur Dograndi.

As we waited, word reached us that Jerry had been hit. Evidently he had finished a pow wow with Col Taraporewala of the Poona Horse. He had then got back in his jeep. Surely some alert enemy tank or antitank gunner had spotted him because the jeep was immediately hit by an anti tank shot. The jeep was torn to pieces and Jerry was nearly cut in half. But Bir Singh the driver had his big toe injured, Vijay Chandra, the IO was unscathed. Puran, the radio operator got a slight ear injury. Surely fate!

Jerry though cut in half was breathing and alive. I am not sure how he was taken to a 3 Ton vehicle. While being evacuated in this vehicle, that late evening, he breathed his last. He had only once asked for water.

It saddens me no end to narrate that a few days after the war, Jerry’s brother in law, Mr George Solomon, came to collect the body. He was led to a hastily dug shallow pit which had Jerry’s remains bundled in a hessian cloth sand bag. These were then taken by him and buried as per Jewish custom in the Jewish cemetery near Kota House in New Delhi. A year later I attended the religious ceremony for Jerry, when Mrs Jhirad reserved the adjacent grave for herself.

Around the time Jerry was hit, the enemy gunner had probably also marked Colonel Taraporewala’s tank because that too got a direct hit, killing him instantaneously. He got a PVC and Jerry was given a Mention-in-Despatches!!!. Know that the COAS was from the Armoured Corps and Shri YB Chavan was the Defense Minister!

Back to my company. My left platoon was drawing enfilade MMG fire from its left, probably from a machine gun on the outer fringes of Chawinda. I went over and directed the men to spread out more and away from the clump. The stolid Abal had taken a bullet on the temple. The poor guys brain was splattered all over. Yet he lay there breathing heavily. I remembered how couple months earlier he, all by himself, had one by one, got back his whole Kabadi team after he had been left all by himself. Tall and big built for a Garhwali, he was the quiet, introverted sort. We buried him under a pile of loose bricks, thinking we would give him a better burial once the situation stabilized.

Back in my headquarters, I got a report that there were couple deserted jeeps lying in some bushes, couple hundred yards forward to the left. I went over to the nearest tank to see if we could get them functional and found myself face to face with the squadron commander, one Maj Ghorpade. This worthy at once sailed into me charging me and my men with cowardice. He said we had not adequately protected his tanks and even the skirting on his tanks had holes.

I was totally taken aback and in no mood for such crap. Specially since I had lost my CO and some of my own men. I told him it was not my job to give him protection – specially by day. Tempers ran high and I found my SLR ominously pointing at him. It was the artillery battery commander, Major Kochar, who was in my area and who intervened. He separated and pacified both. This altercation notwithstanding, it saddened me to learn some years later that Major Ghorpade had, for some reason, committed suicide. Major Kochar got a Vir Chakra despite the fact that his artillery’s contribution, this day and the next, was zilch.

Through out the action, the BC was out of radio contact with his guns and regiment while we were being bludgeoned. How could he get us any artillery support? I maintain that Pak arty made our artllery look like an also ran.

To return. After this bit of melo drama, I got another shock when some one reported that he could not see any body from Gurmukh Bali’s platoon on the Right, in the sugar cane field area. I walked across to check and sure enough there was not a soul in sight. It looked as if the whole platoon had vanished into thin air and was not to be found on the face of the earth.

More shocked than ever, yet deep down I felt ashamed of my professional competence. Here was I who had lost one third of his command without knowing a thing. What sort of a Napoleon was I? Mentally shattered, I returned to the center platoon.

There was some machine gun fire coming from the area forward of my Left Platoon. I took a few boys and went ahead to investigate. Finding one of our Centurions standing nearby, I asked to speak to the tank commander, who was no other than Ajay Singh. I later came across him as the Grade 1 in the Division and then as Corps commander in Tezpur. I told him I suspected enemy infantry ahead and requested him to rake the area with his machine gun. A tall burly Sardar loomed up and holding the 30 Browning casually in both hands, he began to nonchalantly rake the area ahead left to right and near to far. I can recall no more memorable or inspiring sight than this stolid professional casually doing his thing in the most professional manner.

After I had come back, I espied, coming towards us, a sole rifleman with a bandolier like load of water bottles. It was the gallant Bahadur, who had been with me in my commando days. Even with his puny frame, he was a very brave, die hard, no nonsense long distance athlete. He was to die the next day under the most gallant circumstances. Unfortunately, like our RMO, he got no award.

It was from him that I learnt that unknown to us, Rafey had come from behind and led Gurmukh Balis’ platoon to the outskirts of Buttur Dograndi. Of course this platoon had come under murderous machine gun fire and taken seven casualties out of a total strength of some 20. The platoon was pinned down and badly off for water. Bahadur had volunteered to go back and get some water.

Before I could get the bottles filled from the well, I saw Gurmukh and some boys trailing back. I gave him hell for not letting me know. He said Rafey had given him no time. Just then I saw Rafey come directly from the front. I was boiling and ready to sail into him but when I saw his face, ashen and soaked with sweat and grime with his shirt caked with mud and wet, I held my piece.

Rafey looked at me, said nothing but sailed into the other company commanders, who had by now come up, lambasting them – rather unfairly. He ordered Charlie and Delta to immediately form up and clear the area he had come from. After having reorganized I was to pass through these companies with Som’s Alpha and take up defense nearest the village.

We reached the designated area and began to dig down. It had been a long day and I was bone weary but managed to check the deployment. At midnight, Bhaktawar served me some khichri. For the first ever time, I spent the night in the open trench. There was desultory shelling all night through and I did not think that if I slept out, I would have the energy to roll in, should need arise.

..

Morning of Sep 17 was bright and clear and there was a deadly stillness in the air. Having done my stuff, I wandered over to the battalion headquarters. There I found most officers had already gathered. A down cast mood prevailed and there was no contact with brigade. It was a very serious situation.

.

Som tried to be cheerful but to no avail. Rafey was serious, sombre, quiet. Then the shelling started. At first slow, it gradually picked up momentum. I did not want to say it but as no one spoke, I said that it looked as if we were about to be counter attacked and had better get back to our companies. Rafey looked at me and said nothing. Slowly we got up and dispersed.

.

As I reached my company, the shelling became heavy and we began to get plastered. And then I saw what during exercises we had done so many times while attacking some objective or the other. In the distance, well spread out was a line of enemy walking towards us slowly but steadily. They were more towards my Left and nearest to Gabars’s platoon. I yelled orders to hold fire – not waste ammunition – and to make each round count. More so as we were carrying only pouch ammunition, which came to 50 rounds per rifle and 500 per light machine gun. The unit reserve of 40 and 400 rounds respectively was supposed to be in our ‘F’ echelons vehicles but these had not followed us!

.

When the enemy line was about a hundred plus yards away, we began to fire and the line went to ground ie they lay down behind any small bund or whatever cover they could get and began to return our fire. The jokers seemed unwilling to close in and make a fight of it.

.

Ahead and to a little left of Gabar’s platoon was a sugar cane field and several of the enemy took cover behind these sugar cane. They came forward, stood up and waved, shouting to Gabar, who was manning a light machine gun, that they were the Jats of the Indian Army. Poor, straight forward, gullible Gabar was taken in, hook line and sinker. He ordered his platoon to stop firing..

.

I first thought of sending Gaina, my runner, to tell him to engage them as they damnwell were the enemy. But knowing Gabar was the stubborn sort, I knew that he would argue with Gaina. So I decided to go my self. I raced forward and standing above his trench, I heard him tell me that they were our Jats and the dust and dirt had made their olive greens turn khaki. I peremptorily told him not to be stupid and to commence firing forthwith. He did so and right then and there, an enemy machine gun burst caught him full in the chest. Seeing him slump, I raced back zigzagging.

.

Thus the situation remained. We were exchanging small arms fire and Pak artillery was no longer bothering us as their troops were too close. Suddenly a shiver went through the whole company because coming towards us were two Pattons, one behind the other. I was surprised to see them come rather hesitantly and very very slowly.

.

Poona Horse was evidently fighting its own battle somewhere and we were on our own. I got Gulab, with his antitank grenades to my command post. I thought of taking the shot myself but thinking that it would be bad for morale if I missed, I coached Gulab who was pretty jittery and forgot to rest his rifle in the corner of the trench. As he fired, we saw the grenade take a slow curved flight towards the leading tank. For a second I thought that my range estimation had been low. But no, the grenade managed to just reach the tank and it hit and burst on the tank tracks. The tank shuddered and came to a dead stop.

.

I told Gulab to duck deep as I expected the tank to swivel its main gun in our general direction and blow us to smithereens and kingdom come. For a second, nothing happened. Then we peeped up and to our astonishment saw the crew of the tank clamber down and run back to the rear tank. This tank then slowly pulled back in reverse. Well nigh the whole company took pot shots. I am ashamed to say that our shooting standard was pathetic as no one hit anything.

.

With the damaged tank standing there, the desultory shooting by both sides went on. I thought of going onto the tank and taking charge of its machine gun, turn it towards the enemy and shoot them up ala Audie Murphy of Second War fame. Alas, I did not rate myself as a very practical sort and so had no confidence in my ability of using an unfamiliar weapon.

.

I found that Sarweshwar Prasads platoon on the Right was becoming jittery. I needed to infuse some courage as Subedar Rameshwar, my second in command, who was there, was also running scared. I got out of the trench and standing tall, yelled encouragement. I told them they were safe in trenches but would be shot down going back in the open. Just then a bullet singed past my right temple, missing my fore head by a mere fraction of a millimeter.

.

This was getting dangerous. It sent a shiver down my spine. There was a lot of muck, artillery as well as small arms, flying around. No need to be worried as most went by harmlessly. But this near miss told me that this guy had spotted me as an officer and now had me in his sights and was aiming personally at me. I rationalized that for a while at least, I must lay low till this guy’s attention went else where. I slipped into the trench, waited and watched.

.

Alas, after a short while, the Right Platoon was again making pulling back noises. I felt that the risk notwithstanding, I just had to instill some confidence in the poor guys. So, once again I stood up in the open with Bhaktawar and Gaina by my right. The enemy gunner had been waiting for this opportunity. But now there were three of us and greedy guy that he was, he wanted to take all three. His burst caught me on my right arm.

.

It felt as if a cannon ball had struck and my right arm was severed and falling down. Desperately I grabbed it with my left hand as I fell into the trench. Bhaktawars shoulders and Gaina’s left upper arm had been hit but luckily they only had flesh wounds. I got Gulab to take off the sling from my SLR and turned it into a make shift sling for my arm. The poor guy was scared to help me walk back in the open. I told him to keep me towards the enemy so that the bullets would have to pass through me before he got hit. He gave me his shoulder and we walked back to the make shift aid post. I yelled to Subedar Rameshwar to take command.

.

When I crossed Rafey, his expression was of absolute dumb founded shock. His mouth had fallen wide open and his eyes showed their whites. Maybe he thought if I could get hit, then it must be pretty bad. He seemed totally dumb struck. We had a mutual regard and may be it was just too much for him. But I felt a deep pang as I thought I deserved at least a nod or its OK or something. It was the last time I was to see him.

.

A word about Rafey’s passing away. Around 3 pm or a wee later, after he had ordered the position to be abandoned, he himself remained and was busy loading our wounded onto a Poona Horse Centurion. Vijay the IO and Sonkar the doctor, were with him. It was then that an enemy tank or antitank gun caught him plumb in the middle. It was so bad that as per the RMO he could not even be lifted. Yet he was alive though unable to even whisper. He merely waved to both these officers to get the hell out. Because now they could see the enemy infantry coming – slowly and cautiously. Sonkar later said that as a professional his estimate was that Rafey could not have lived for more than ten minutes.

.

They gave Rafey a VrC but I heard that there were some stupid idiots who enquired how a muslim could stay behind!!!

.

And consider young Vijay. The poor guy had seen his two bosses decimated on two consecutive days.

.

.At the aid post, poor Sonkar was super busy as there were a whole lot of chaps needing his attention. He saw me and as he put a splint and bandages, I asked, “Doc, is it a simple fracture or a compound fracture?” Without bothering to smile, he responded, “Don’t worry – it is part of both!”

.

The morphine made me dizzy and I moved away some distance and went down in the open. There was no cover at the aid post and as I lay half conscious, an artillery shell landed so close that I probably escaped because I was probably in its umbrella. It covered me with more mud and dust and small shrapnel pierced me all over.

.

Luckily my legs remained unhurt but both hands were now useless with some minor broken bones and flesh wounds. To be twice hit within a couple hours shattered my sense of invulnerability but it horrified me to imagine an enemy with a bayonet.. I called to the Doc to come bandage me some more. He was not amused as he seemed to be running out of bandages. But he did come and do the needful. Watching his seriousness, I refrained from banter.

.

My legs being OK, I moved further away to an open sparse field which had some crop for shade. The battle went on. Some chaps came over and cheered me up. Som made several trips. I learnt that the situation was not good. Some guys gave me water. The glucose packet I had picked up in the village street some days back, came in very useful.

.

As I lay there I wondered that the Dear Omnipotent Almighty God had probably blinked and only then I had got hit. Once was bad enough but twice within the day was a wee much. And now, should the enemy move in, I could only expect to be bayoneted. Thoughts of my folks and how they would take it came flooding in.

.

Life had been very kind and good yet I did not seem to over much mind an early departure. The morphine effect, maybe?

.

Late after noon, Gurmukh came and said that time for me to get back if I could walk. He said withdrawal had been ordered as we were hurting bad. Most guys had already pulled back. Only Rafey and some others remained. Rafey was helping the wounded on to some Centurions which had come by.

.

With Gurmukh giving me a shoulder, I started the walk back. Each time the arty shells whistled by, I wanted to go to ground. Gurmukh berated me saying I was the joker who always said that you would never hear the shell which will hit you. Because it will do so and the sound will follow. Those whistling by were the sweet ones.

.

For the first time in these two weeks of intense activity, I had cracked. With frequent rests, Gurmukh helped all the way and without him I doubt if I could have made it. Crossing the Chawinda – Jassoran road was frightening. This area seemed to have been well registered and was apparently under observation. Because if even an ant moved, it drew a barrage.. As one such shelling ended, Gurmukh urged we cross over quick.

.

A little later, we saw one of our Centurions. After it got due permission, I was taken on board. I thanked and bade farewell to the gallant Gurmukh, who himself was to be killed under the most pitiful circumstances, in Kashmir in ’91. That is a really very sad pathetic tale.

.

The tank commander was an NCO and I had no energy for small talk. He was doing his thing and his boss had evidently asked him to reach a point on the outskirts of Chawinda and await instructions. It seems I must have dozed off because suddenly I found myself in a Jat company position. I wondered why we had come here as this was really and truly being hammered by enemy artillery.

.

What we had been through compared to this was table tennis. The tank crew and I went under the tank for safety and the Jats grim and gritty in their trenches. After some half hour, the tank got orders to reach the unit night harbor area. Maybe the experience was to teach me how deafening and murderous is real shelling.

.

I found all Poona Horse officers gathered around their officiating commanding officer who seemed a nice, kind, mature man. He was hearing every body out re the days doing. Quite a few Garhwali casualties had been brought in on their tanks and this decent soul ruled that all casualties would be loaded on two tanks under a young Lieutenant, who would then take them to the nearest medicos.

.

Being an officer, I was allowed in thru the commanders hatch. As I moved my foot from the seat onto the floor, I stepped on a body. I loudly requested that the dead body be removed, I heard a JCO, who was Soms platoon commander and who had trained me for my weapons course, plead saying he had a wife and kids. Sad but plenty of such stuff which is a reality in every war.

.

It showed that the battalion no longer seemed to exist. I learnt that the unit had lost its cohesion and was dispersed all over. Evidently dear Som was now the commandiing officer as Suresh was reported to have gone off for some first aid.

.

Poor Som, or rather lucky Som, because the guy made CO in this war and then again in ’71 after Suresh, who had made CO, once again got evacuated.

.

Sadly for this gallant unit, the CO sent by Army HQ to get it up and going after Buttur Dograndi, was no other than a guy who had been brought down earlier for some financial impropriety when he was CO of the Third. But now he was again given command. Poor battalion!

.

It had gotten dark by this time and I was afraid that we might be going in circles if not deeper into Pakistan. Bhagwan Mall, who, though not wounded, had managed to get on the other tank which had the Poona Horse officer, entered into an argument with that officer as to the direction we were going. The young officer told him to mind his business or get off the tank.

.

After some going around this way and that way, the guy got his bearing and without further ado, around midnight, we reached the forward medical post.

.

I had reached adequate medical aid after some 15 hours of being patched by the regimental medical officer. How could the more seriously hit survive such ordeals? At this medical post, the doctors were very kind but the bandages had to be removed and a fresh dressing given to all my wounds. It was very, very painful. The smaller the wound, the more pain it gave. At last after a hot cup of tea, I was put on a stretcher and in an ambulance which luckily was a new model, comfortable and capable of moving around without breaking down.

.

As it drove us, for the last time, at least in this war, I heard the Pak artillery open up and this time surprisingly on such a small unimportant road. Though we could not have been under observation, yet the guys probably knew of this road being used and hence were plastering it at random for our general entertainment.

.

Some how my own second in command, Subedar Rameshwar though not wounded, had managed to get on this ambulance and seemed to be intent on getting the hell out of the theater. At each shelling, he begged the driver to drive faster and faster. But as each bump caused me immense pain, I managed to tell him to shut up or get off the damn vehicle. In a year or so the guy became the next Subedar Major of the unit!

.

Around six am we reached the main dressing station. Fortunately the doctors did not open my dressings. After some refreshment I was put on another ambulance which took me to the army hospital at Samba. I slept through the entire ride.

[Jagan]

One of the other posts have a follow up story from a Pak reader. He found out the name of the Pak Commander of the Lead Tank that got hit by the grenade. He writes that the commander wont be amused at this story being out there

[shiv]

One of the other posts have a follow up story from a Pak reader. He found out the name of the Pak Commander of the Lead Tank that got hit by the grenade. He writes that the commander wont be amused at this story being out there

https://improveacrati.wordpress.com/201 ... -17-sep-c/

[Jagan]

There is some excellent stuff from the Pakistani side about the battle for Phillora .. a lot of it is devoid of jingoism and it will make good source material for a future study.

http://nativepakistan.com/remembering-o ... istan-war/

[shiv]

Battle of Asal Uttar, Indo-Pak War ’65: How Jesus Fought for India

“I heard the Pakistanis yelling on their radio sets – ‘Their artillery fire is playing hell into us! The man in command is called Christ!’ – we picked the tanks off like cherries”.

My Grand-dad always had a chuckle when he would narrate this story. Christ!? Fighting for India?!

The man from Warangal, Andhra Pradesh, was the elder son of a Brahmin educationist who was deeply pissed off with everyone obsessed with ‘identity’ 100 years ago. So, in a rebellion of his own, when his elder son was born on June 5, 1920, he named him Jesus. The younger son who came soon after, was called Shah Jahan. And that’s how my grand-dad came to be known as Jesus Prakash Rao.

Here is the crap they used in 1965

[wig]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday ... 35323.html

Gallantry display at Barki

The Indian Army responded to the Pakistani offensive of September 1 by launching a three-pronged attack with three divisions towards Sialkot, Lahore and Khem Karan-Kasur. The 7 Infantry Division was tasked on the Khalra-Barki-Lahore axis. The International Border was to be crossed at 4 am on September 6; 4 Sikh of 65 Infantry Brigade and 6/8 GR of 48 Infantry Brigade were to secure firm base along the road. The 48 Infantry Brigade was to advance to capture Barki by last light.
4 Sikh, of Saragarhi fame, had been moved to Ferozepur in August. The CO, (the late) Lt Col Anant Singh, an outstanding leader, tasked two companies — ‘A’ under Maj Shamsher Singh Manhas (VrC, the late Brigadier) and ‘B’ under Maj DS Sidhu (the late Brigadier), who captured two enemy observation posts. At the same time, 6/8 GR cleared the barrier; a secure firm base was established across the border.
The 48 Infantry Brigade, supported by a squadron of Central India Horse, cleared the Hudiara drain area, about 4 km from the IB. The enemy was having a field day with the Indian troops advancing in an open area. The troops dug up slit trenches after every advance and a lull, but casualties were mounting due to artillery fire. The 65 Infantry Brigade was now tasked to capture Barki and secure the eastern bank of Icchogil canal, 9.5 km from the border.
On the morning of September 8, 4 Sikh advanced and its ‘D’ Company, led by me, then a Lieutenant, captured Brahmnabad village, suffering casualties because of the severe airburst shelling. By late evening, 9 Madras and 16 Punjab had captured Barka Kalan and Barka Khurd villages. 4 Sikh was moved north of the road the same night.
The formidable defence at Barki and Icchogil behind it had 11 concrete pillboxes, besides other fortifications. Each pillbox was equipped with a medium machine gun, a light machine gun, one or two rifles or Sten guns and an ample supply of ammunition and grenades. To the left of the road was a police station, strengthened by sand bags.
A deep ditch was expected before Barki. Icchogil’s rear bank was 3 feet higher than the front, with solid fortification. Tanks were sheltered behind the canal, 150 feet wide and 17 feet deep, filled with water, which could be controlled.
After last light, the Central India Horse, equipped with Sherman tanks, was to assault Barki with lights on, firing all its armaments, followed by 4 Sikh to physically capture Barki in the first phase of the brigade attack. Ichhogil canal, which was expected to be 500 to 700 yards behind, was to be captured by 16 Punjab in the second phase.
As per the 4 Sikh plan, the ‘A’ and ‘C’ companies, the latter under Sub Sadhu Singh, formed up on the right side of the road at 7.50 pm for assault. ‘B’ company was in the rear as reserve. ‘D’ company was asked to move behind the tanks in civilian trucks full of wooden planks, to be lowered in Barki drain for the crossing over of tanks.
After this task, it was to clear the police station area. ‘D’ company formed up at 7.30 pm. Somehow the tanks did not arrive till 8 pm. The CO of 4 Sikh, confident of the tanks coming, ordered the assault companies to move at 8 pm. The artillery pounded the enemy positions. The enemy illuminated the entire area, turning it into daylight. This spurred the jawans to reach the objective as fast as possible.
After 20 minutes of the assault, the CO ordered me to complete the assigned task. The company moved at a fast pace, hardly for 15 minutes, when the tanks arrived, firing towards the objective. Assaulting troops therefore were subjected to firing from the rear.
I climbed atop the nearest tank, and the fire was then switched to the left of the road. Contrary to the plan, they had not put on their lights, which proved to be a boon for the infantry ahead.
The enemy’s intense artillery fire was augmented by direct firing weapons and tanks from behind Ichhogil canal, pillboxes and fortified positions from housetops and the police station. Our companies inched forward through fire and move tactics with grit and determination, till they were 100 yards away from the pillboxes. They shouted their war cry, “Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal”, and pounced upon the enemy, men crawling and lobbing grenades.
Once the forward crust was pierced, there were hand-to-hand fights, bayonets crossing bayonets. The enemy was crushed. The survivors abandoned their positions, running to the safety behind Ichhogil, wading through it since the bridge had been demolished.
After a stiff fight, ‘D’ Company captured the police station area; the enemy’s tanks brought in devastating fire from across Ichhogil, 150 yards away.
I conveyed to the armour not to leave the road or move forward as the objective had been captured. While this message was being passed, a 4 Sikh recoilless gun jeep with the CO of CIH, Lt Col SC Joshi, came rushing along and was blown off near the police station.
The assaulting companies found Ichhogil only 150 to 250 yards from Barki, scrambled up and secured the east bank. Maj Shamsher Singh and Capt SS Duggal (later Colonel), the Adjutant, were wounded and evacuated.
Phase II of the brigade attack thus was completed during Phase I itself, within two hours of the assault. 16 Punjab was assigned the task of capturing the area along Icchogil further north.
The enemy had fired 3,000 bombs within half an hour. Maj Aziz Bhatti, tasked to defend with two companies, was conferred Pakistan’s highest gallantry award posthumously.
4 Sikh had 39 killed and 121 wounded. It was awarded Battle Honour ‘Barki’ and Theatre Honour ‘Punjab’, besides one MVC, three VrCs and one SM.
Ironically, the defender of Barki got his nation’s highest gallantry award, but the CO of the battalion capturing those formidable defences got nothing.

[shaun]

got my hand on "the duels of the Himalayan eagle" ...first time saw a pic of Mi-4 laden with rocket pods . Wanted to upload the pic , but copyright violation that too of IAF !!!

[shiv]

1965 battle: A war of perceptions India won

India, while defending its territory from Pakistani aggression, also had to slew its inner demons (like the memory of the 1962 debacle) to take the fight to the enemy's doorstep. India's new victory narrative may be debatable, but the country undoubtedly was successful in 1965 in fighting off the perception that it was a passive state with a passive military.

Yet all of it didn't happen in a flash; there was a lot of legwork that was done to boost the morale of the Indian Army, especially after its poor show against Pakistan in the latter's Kutch offensive. The then army chief, general J N Chaudhury, is rarely given any credit for his leadership in that war but it was he who had realized the need to seize the initiative from the Pakistanis. As a result, on the intervening night of May 16 and 17 at Kargil, 34 years before a conflict there redefined Indo-Pak relations in 1999, two companies of the 4th battalion, Rajput Regiment, surprised and overwhelmed the Pakistanis perched on top of Black Rocks and Point 13620—two commanding heights from where Pakistan's Karakoram Scouts had been firing on the Srinagar-Leh Road.

The Rajputs won the day, but lost their company commander who was given the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. Yet the significance of this operation was lost to the Pakistanis — that the Indians wouldn't remain passive defenders.

Military historian Mandeep Singh Bajwa, whose father General (then Colonel) K S Bajwa of the artillery had given fire support to the Rajputs, believes this was a pivotal moment. "When the Pakistanis launched Operation Gibraltar (sending infiltrators into Kashmir) in August, India once again quickly countered by capturing the 'jumping points' through which these infiltrations were done—Hajipir Pass is the more famous one now. India also conducted covert and overt ops across the Ceasefire Line (precursor of the LOC) and the Pakistanis knew about it. Yet they weren't alarmed. Later, when they had intel from two trustworthy sources about India's plans for launching a counter-offensive on September 6 across the Radcliffe Line, they chose to rubbish it, believing that the 'dhoti prasads' (a pejorative term used by Pakistanis for then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri and his generals) were incapable of such action," Bajwa said.

When India did cross the international border, it wasn't all too rosy for us. Pakistan had superior armour, guns and aircraft, and as troops on the ground soon found out, even better maps. Yet the grit and determination of the Indian troops eventually prevailed. Major General A J S Sandhu (Retd), who joined the Regiment of Artillery two years after the war, agrees with Bajwa. He believes Indian boots on the ground actually surmounted ominous odds to win this war of perceptions. "My father Lt Col Jaswant Singh was the CO of 7 Punjab. His battalion was tasked with the capture of the Ichhogil Canal, the Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge, and two Pakistani villages Ichhogil Hithar and Ichhogil Uttar. The bridge was first occupied by 1 Jat on September 6, but the Pakistanis retook it the same day. Then 6 Kumaon took it again at night, but was thrown back the next day. Again, 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon tried to capture it on September 7 and 8, but were unsuccessful and suffered heavy casualties. That's when 7 Punjab was deployed on September 12," Sandhu said.

The A and C companies occupied the two villages on September 12 and 13, and beat back all counter attacks by the Pakistanis. The Bhaini Dhilwal Bridge and the Ichhogil Canal were captured on September 16. Pakistan couldn't recapture them throughout the war. "The battalion won 42 gallantry awards—a record in the war, and my father won a VSM. In fact, the Western Army commander Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, along with the corps and divisional commanders, visited 7 Punjab on September 23 (a day after the ceasefire) to personally congratulate the battalion on its excellent performance. Yet this action is never talked about as the focus remains on Dograi, Barki, Phillora, Asal Uttar and other more popular battles. The Indian Army prevailed despite ominous odds; we need to remember that," general Sandhu said.

Bajwa believes there were many such gallant actions even though the Indian armed forces didn't have strategic objectives. "This war was important because we learnt from our mistakes and in 1971 we achieved the strategic objectives we had set for us. That's why 1971 was such a resounding victory. General Chaudhury deserves applaud because he rebuilt the army after the 1962 debacle, and his good example was followed by his successors — general P P Kumaramangalam and general (later field marshal) Sam Manekshaw," he said.

It may not be wrong to say that 1965 actually helped India bury its ghosts, but raised new demons for Pakistan.

[Khalsa]

Boom Boom
This looks awesome.....

Can someone care to record this ? and upload it if they don't do it themselves. Its of vital importance to hear about our 65 war from our people who were in the thick of it.

[Surya]

what channel is it on?

[ramana]

Link from vsunder:

Launch of First Armoured:1965 War

Looks like orders to move were given in end of March 1965.

[shiv]

I buy two newspapers and every day I have been reading (and cutting out) the little news clippets of what was reported 50 years ago during the war.

One of the things that I realized is the chronological order of some things. It appears that the Pakistani bombing of civilian targets started late in the war - very close to the end - around 18-19 September 1965. By this time they had lost a huge proportion of their air force and were probably avoiding combat and dumping bombs where convenient. In fact today's paper has news of the death of Gujarat Chief Minister Balwantrai Mehta in 1965. The report says "crash". It was not known immediately that this was a civilian aircraft deliberately shot down by the PAF, There is s story somewhere out there where the PAF pilot who was ordered to do it says he was hoping to be allowed to leave the obviously unarmed plane alone but was ordered to shoot it down,

Another thing that comes out is that the Chinese started making trouble at the tail end of the war - suggesting that either munna was desperately pleading for help or they were distressed to see their whore getting screwed for what the Chinese had paid for.

Today's paper (22 sep) has news that on 21 september crowds in Karachi attacked the American consulate because of lack of American help, which acknowledging the support of ummah Islamic nations in trying to screw India. It seems that Pakis knew by 21 Sep that their goose had been cooked and eaten by the vegetarian dhotis, leaving their traditional donkey meat for them

[shiv]

http://www.outlookindia.com/news/articl ... ane/730835

Almost half-a-century after he shot down an Indian civilian aircraft carrying the then Chief Minister of Gujarat, a Pakistan Air Force pilot has apologised to the daughter of the pilot of the downed plane, saying he was "not a trigger-happy person" and this happened in the line of duty during the 1965 war.

Qais Hussain was a rookie Flying Officer during the 1965 war when he shot down the Beechcraft piloted by distinguished ex-Indian Air Force pilot Jehangir Engineer.

Besides Engineer and the then Gujarat Chief Minister Balwantrai Mehta, the Chief Minister's wife Sarojben Mehta, three members of his personal staff, a crew member and a reporter of the Gujarat Samachar were killed in the incident.

Hussain, who wrote an e-mail to Engineer's daughter, decided to explain his side of the story after PAF officer-turned-blogger Kaiser Tufail researched the incident and concluded that Pakistani officials had wrongly surmised that the Indian aircraft was on a surveillance mission.

"We were at war at the time and the initial impression after I shot down the aircraft was that we had been able to eliminate a new front. We were all very happy and I got a pat on the back from my colleagues," Hussain, 70, told PTI.

Referring to the incident of September 19, 1965, Hussain said: "This happened at about 4 pm. At 7 pm, All India Radio announced the aircraft that was shot down was carrying the Chief Minister and our mood became very sombre. We all repented what had happened but the event fell by the wayside."

After Air Commodore (Retd) Kaiser Tufail researched the incident and wrote a piece on it for his blog in April, Hussain said he was spurred to convey his condolences to the families of those who died when he shot down the Beechcraft.

"I thought it was better late than never. I'm happy to have been able to do something. I wanted to say that I was not a trigger-happy person and this happened in the confusion of war," he said.

Thanks to the efforts of Naveed Riaz, a Lahore-based businessman and aviation enthusiast, and Indian military aviation expert Jagan Pillarisetti, Hussain got the email address of Jehangir 'Jungoo' Engineer's daughter Farida Singh and wrote to her on August 5.

"If an opportunity ever arises that I could meet you face to face to condole the death of your father 46 years back, I would grab it with both hands. I would highly appreciate if you please convey my feelings to the other members of your family, who were equally hurt by the untimely departure of Jungoo to the next world," Hussain wrote in his email.

He explained he had acted only after he was ordered to shoot down the Indian aircraft by his controller, who had mistakenly concluded that the Beechcraft was on a surveillance mission.

"Your father spotted my presence immediately and he started climbing and waggling his wings seeking mercy. Instead of firing at him at first sight, I relayed to my controller that I had intercepted an eight-seat transport aircraft (guessing by the four side windows) and wanted further instructions to deal with it," Hussain wrote in his email.

"At the same time, I was hoping that I would be called back without firing a shot. There was a lapse of three to four long minutes before I was given clear orders to shoot the aircraft," wrote Hussain, who left the PAF three years after the incident.

[shiv]

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/1965 ... 79256.html

As an air force pilot, he flew his English Electric Canberra plane into territories like Aksai Chin, Tibet as well as Lahore at the very peak of hostilities with Pakistan and China. He fired not a single bullet and yet he 'shot' these places in a way that the nation, twice over, conferred upon him the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), a distinction which is as rare as it gets. On Monday, he walked down the lawns of India Gate, where the government is celebrating efforts like his in the form of a commemorative exhibition and carnival titled Shauryanjali.

Wing Commander (Retd) JM Nath (87), a resident of Mumbai felt overwhelmed and said. "I am thankful for these efforts which are educating our people about a war which was long forgotten," he said.

Back then, as the Flight Commander of strategic Photo Reconnaissance Squadron No. 106, he had the unenviable task of flying unescorted on long missions into enemy territory during broad daylight to photograph enemy installations, armed forces formations and help prepare an informed response.

Recalling a sordid saga which the IAF had to take in its stride in the run up to the war, Nath said, "In the IAF there was a mole, that too at a very senior level in the form of an officer in Western Air Command who controlled all the flight movements of ours. He'd give Pakistanis all they wanted and that is how when our reconnaissance plane went over Pakistan on the morning of April 10, 1959, the pilot found the PAF Sabres actually waiting and obviously bombed him."

According to him, even before the war, reconnaissance flights over Pakistan had to be conducted. "The Pakistanis were creating some or the other trouble and the army had sensed something would come up so we were asked to help army prepare. Generally, our plane would fly at over 48,000ft, which was inaccessible to the Pakistani planes. However that day, at about 30,000ft the Sabres were waiting. When we found out, the said officer, a Group Captain was thrown out. This event helped us become tighter and more secretive. In fact, the then Air Chief, Marshal Arjan Singh gave me the code name 'Professor' and would directly assign to me missions."

"When Pakistan initiated trouble in J&K in August 1965 and followed it up with Operation Grand Slam, attacking Chamb-Jaurian sector in Jammu, we had to open a second front. But how do you decide where to do so? That is where I got involved in the '65 war," he said.

Recalling his days, "My task was to fly into Pakistan and shoot pictures to help army know what they were up against. One day, I was asked to fly to Pathankot and into Pakistan to take photos of Lahore, Icchogil canal and Sargoda to see how their army was deployed and find their weakest spot. Decision to hit Burkee came from that."

On that day, since the air war hadn't fully begun, the IAF positioned two MiG21s near Amritsar to help Nath in case the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) crossed over. However, in the Pakistani skies, he was on his own. And he did fare well.

"I would fly at tree top level and climb up to shoot and would remain so for about 5-10 minutes and again drop down to evade radar. So the window to hit me was quite small," he said. To his own surprise, he completed his task and was happily going back when he picked up four Pakistan Sabre fighter jets on his tail. "I did multiple manouvres and evaded them and reached Indian skies in a way that our MiGs thought I was an intruder and almost shot me!" he remarked.

Since Nath had actively participated in the 1962 war with China, he had some harsh words for the government of that day. "I flew over Aksai Chin and right up to the far east and could remain air borne for three, four hours. The Chinese saw me but could not do a thing. That is because they did not have an air force to speak of. We had asked our big bosses that India should step in with the air force to hit them but our politicians were scared that China would bomb Delhi! They never cleared us. They had no faith in armed forces," he added.

The octogenarian, an alumni of the Government College in Lahore and origin inhabitant of Layyah in Pakistan said what he did would be done and bettered if things came to such a pass. "We need to keep an eye over that country especially its army," he said.

Who is Wing Commander (R) JM Nath?

-> Twin Maha Vir Chakra (MVC) awardee for actions in 1962 and 1965 wars

-> Canberra plane pilot, was flight commander of 106 photo reconnaissance squadron

-> Flew unescorted in day light over enemy territory for images of installations, formations etc

-> Images he brought back were used by Army and IAF for planning attacks

-> One of the most decorated IAF officers of all times

-> Upon retirement, flew commercial flights

[sum]

Recalling a sordid saga which the IAF had to take in its stride in the run up to the war, Nath said, "In the IAF there was a mole, that too at a very senior level in the form of an officer in Western Air Command who controlled all the flight movements of ours. He'd give Pakistanis all they wanted and that is how when our reconnaissance plane went over Pakistan on the morning of April 10, 1959, the pilot found the PAF Sabres actually waiting and obviously bombed him."

Who was this mole?

[rohitvats]

Link from vsunder:

Launch of Firs Armoured:1965 War

Looks like orders to move were given in end of March 1965.

From the link:

In Artillery we were totally and completely outclassed by the Pakistanis. And that from Day One and right up to the Cease Fire. Sadly this was both in concept, organization and employment as well as in the type and quantum of equipment and ammunition used with such deadly effect.

The Indian Army learnt about the massed use of this great arm from Pakistan. Included was the seemingly lavish expenditure of the apparently abundant and limitless ammunition. Then we also learnt a thing or two about the bold, audacious and imaginative use of Observatin Officers and their inclusion in Stay Behind Parties. Indeed in Artillery, India and Pakistan were not on the same page. We were mere also rans.

The above mentioned performance of PA Artillery was the direct result of pretty solid training and guidelines which it received from the Americans. Before anyone else, it was the Americans who had pioneered the concept of massed artillery fire using all the guns in a theater - and this they did in WW2 using radio sets!

Many a infantry assaults of IA were broken up by accurate fire from PA.

[Manish_P]

I hate these pakistanis

Extracts from the diary of Yashwantrao Chavan, the defence minister of the time

News came in the evening that (Pakistan's foreign minister Zulfikar Ali) Bhutto left Pakistan on way to New York to address the Security Council. I think he will bark and bark there and ultimately agree to the ceasefire.

Army and air force have become now for us the symbols of our national pride and glory. A great day for me. A great day for Chaudhuri and Arjan Singh.

It was just then (that I) remembered a talk with (former defence minister V K) Krishna Menon only a week ago. He told me that I depended too much on Chaudhuri and he is a general who will never fight. I told him that I disagreed with him. He was going by his personal dislikes. I have told him that from what I have seen of him (Chaudhuri) in the last 3 years, I am sure if it comes to vindicate the honour of (the) Indian army, Chaudhuri will fight.

And today, I was vindicated in my judgment of the man. He fought and fought well.

Air Marshal Arjan Singh is a jewel of a person; quietly efficient and firm; unexcitable, but a very able leader.

I have a feeling that this is the real beginning of trouble in this part of the world. How we utilise the respite that we are getting is going to decide the future of the country.

The dangerous process of encirclement of India by hostile countries is complete. The leading powers of the UN, including the USSR (then the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, now Russia), are not with us on (the) Kashmir issue. We are tragically alone.

[manjgu]

Gen Kalkat in a news programme said that IA was prevented by political leadership to go into Lahore and cut up Pakistan. the political leadership of the day did not know how to handle a divided pakistan... the political leadership did not want to deliver a death blow to concept of pakistan.

[SSridhar]

MRC relives the Battle of Kalidhar of 1965 - The Hindu

Two hundred and fifty veterans of the Madras Regiment gathered at the Madras Regimental Centre (MRC) in the sweeping Shri Nagesh Barracks at Wellington on September 19 and 20, to revisit a significant battle against the enemy in the 1965 operations. Twenty of them present actually took part in that war.

The veterans relived the fierce battle where under their Commanding Officer Lt. Col C.P.A. Menon, they had engaged in fierce battle to win back Malla on the Kalidhar Range, Sundarbani in Jammu & Kashmir. Malla was of great strategic importance to India and it had been taken by the enemy two days earlier. The 1st battalion of Madras Regiment (designated as the Mechanised Infantry) showed exceptional courage and gallantry in the face of the enemy. Two Junior Commissioned Officers and eight Other Ranks lost their lives in the engagement. The battalion was finally awarded Battle Honour “Kalidhar”. The 1{+s}{+t}Madras won two Sena Medals and five Mention-in-Despatches for this battle.The 20 veterans from 1965, who were present, were given commemorative medals by Lt. Gen V.K. Singh of 1 Madras. This was in recognition of their participation in the 1965 operations. Four veer naris (widows of the soldiers) and a son of one of them were also felicitated.

Colonel of the Regiment Lt. Gen. S.L. Narasimhan was the guest of honour on the occasion. Wreaths were laid at the War Memorial by the Colonel of the Madras Regiment, Lt Gen SL Narasimhan, AVSM, VSM, the Commandant of MRC, Brig S.K Sangwan, VSM, and the war veterans of 1965. A banquet for the officers, a burra khana and a sainik sammelan were also held. The veterans also visited the MRC Museum where the 1965 corner was the highlight.

The Madras Regiment is the oldest Infantry Regiment in the Indian Army having been raised in 1758 by Robert Clive.

[Austin]

Mole in IAF helped Pakistan plan attack: 1965 war hero

Nath, who was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra twice for flying several secret reconnaissance missions over Pakistan on his Canberra aircraft during the war, said the "mole" was a group captain handling flight movements at the WAC.

He had given information to Pakistani intelligence that led to the shooting down of an Indian surveillance aircraft over Pakistan in April 1959. The Pakistani Sabre fighters were waiting for our plane on that day," Nath told TOI.

The group captain was later removed from his post. "Why take his name? He is no longer alive. But to maintain top secrecy during the 1965 war, the then IAF chief Arjan Singh used to directly give me, a lowly squadron leader, orders for the surveillance missions to be flown," Nath said.

[Sanju]

MRC relives the Battle of Kalidhar of 1965 - The Hindu

Link corrected.

[wig]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/commen ... 36474.html


Who won the '65 war? by Gen VP Malik (retd)

IT is rare to see two adversaries celebrating the same war as their respective victory! On September 6, 2015, Pakistan celebrated the 50th anniversary of Youm-e-Difa, or Pakistan Defence Day, with a 21-gun salute and a victory parade to commemorate its successful defence of Lahore against the Indian Army. The Youm-e-Difa, however, distorts its history to the extent that this war was initiated by Pakistan, not India. Also, it glosses over Pakistan’s failure to annex J&K, and its most successful operation of the war, wherein Pakistan army almost reached Akhnoor to severe India’s Jammu-Akhnoor-Naushehra-Rajauri-Poonch road.
India, too, is commemorating the 50th anniversary of this war: a war that many Indians thought had been forgotten and assessed as a stalemate by many. The fact that the Indian Government has woken up this year to celebrate the victory, for which 2,862 soldiers laid down their lives, is a reflection of its lack of strategic culture, apathy towards the profession of soldiering and the partisan politics that dominates our country.
Geopolitically, 1965 was the most appropriate time (and the last opportunity) for Pakistan to annex J&K by force. Politically, India was shaken after the demise of its first Prime Minister Nehru in May 1964. In comparison, Pakistan was politically stable with a higher percentage of economic growth. It was a strategic ally of the US and had been receiving the latest weapons and equipment, like Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre and F-104 Starfighter combat aircraft and the sidewinder air-to-air missile — the only usable air-to-air missile in that conflict. By ceding Shaqsgam Valley to China in 1963, it had established a long-term strategic partnership with China. Its only problem was of a false sense of optimism and strategic superiority; a common factor in all wars between India and Pakistan.
India was yet to recover from the ignominy of its horrible military defeat in the China-India war of 1962 and in the midst of making up strength of the armed forces which had been mindlessly reduced in the years before. The emphasis in the military facelift was on mountain warfare.
The war plan to ‘finish the unfinished agenda of J&K’ was approved by Pakistan military dictator Field Marshal Ayub Khan on May 13, 1965. Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar by infiltration of nearly 10,000 armed soldiers and mujahideen into J&K on the night of 5/6 August to cause a revolt against India. When this failed and India succeeded in capturing strategic heights in Kargil and Hajipir Pass, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam on September 1 to capture Akhnoor with its strategic bridge over the Chenab. This led to India’s counteroffensives in the Sialkot and Lahore sectors and the decimation of Pakistan’s armoured offensive in Khemkaran and Asal Uttar. Pakistan celebrates defence of Lahore which was never a military objective of the Indian forces.
It was not a short 22-day war, as mentioned by some historians, but one which began with Pakistani infiltration on August 5 and ended on September 22, when both sides agreed to a ceasefire.
So, who won that war?
In the classic military treatise On War, Carl von Clausewitz states that the “political objective is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes”. Pakistan, who initiated the war, failed in its political objective. It lost more territory (lost 1800 sq km of territory and captured 540 sq km), suffered more casualties, lost more tanks and guns and more importantly, faced domestic and international humiliation.
In a recent lecture in Lahore, Pakistan's historian and political economist Akbar Zaidi dispelled the Pakistani victory myth, saying that “there can be no bigger lie as Pakistan had lost terribly”.
With major advances in warfare technologies and their huge impact on operational art and tactics, our interest in the 1965 war should now be more to draw strategic lessons from than operational art and tactics. The first thing that strikes me is the near similarity with which Pakistan took the war initiative, under cover of its non-state actors. They were led by Pakistani regular army officers in 1947-48 and in the 1965 war. In Kargil war, they were replaced by some regular army personnel wearing mujahideen clothing. The mujahideen façade continued, although none had participated in that war. In all these wars, there was distorted and disjointed version of Pakistani capabilities and intentions by our intelligence which enabled Pakistan to achieve strategic surprise. We reacted to adverse circumstances — always a bigger challenge — and yet kept the war scope limited. There was no political objective except to force Pakistan to vacate our territory. Such a strategy violates Sun Tzu’s dictum: “Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.”
What’s the relevance of a formal declaration of war which activates directions contained in the inter-ministerial War Book? And what about the ‘rules of engagement’ which are different for the usual terrorists and those who cross over to wage a 1965 or 1999-type war? Shouldn’t that discretion be left to the Chiefs of Staff Committee?
India’s defence and security report card has, by and large, been more positive than negative. Despite reactive strategic policies, ad hoc defence planning and decision-making, intelligence failures and surprises, the armed forces have maintained the country’s security and territorial integrity better than any other democratic, developing nation. And yet, many a time, we have failed to convert sacrifices and hard-won operational achievements into long-term strategic successes. That is because there is inadequate politico-military dialogue or political guidance in peacetime. Like, approaching the UN when we were doing well in 1947-48 or finishing the J&K issue in 1971, giving up Hajipir Pass was a strategic error in the 1965 war. Unfortunately, despite the important national security roles envisaged and expected of them, the armed forces are not adequately involved in strategic policymaking and planning level.
No two wars are fought in an identical strategic environment. To quote Sun Tzu again: “Just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare, there are no constant conditions.” At the strategic level, one requires a long memory but a longer vision. The next war, if there is one, will be different. The nuclear threshold, cyber capabilities and real-time information, assessments and actions will dictate political and military strategy, operational art and tactics. The uncertainty of peace with Pakistan requires continued vigilance and being ready for the next generation armed conflict.

[JE Menon]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t7chgqMoY-w

1965 War - Tashkent: DD News

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WI5J0CDh8Jc

Seedha Samvad interviews Col. Rasool Khan.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fbCZQ79eoDQ

Air Marshal Denzil Keelor speaks

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBGo71V6olE

Col. Baljit Singh Joon speaks
_________________________________________________

Hope the above have not been posted already, if yes apologies.

[Surya]

new book on 65 war

The Monsoon War: Young Officers Reminisce
By Amarinder Singh and Lieutenant General Tajinder Shergill
Publishers: Roli Books, New Delhi

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2015/09/b ... -blow.html

[ramana]

We owe a lot to Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh for his decision to fight in Punjab.

He has not only read history but has understood History.

I read a lot of war histories and try to understand and draw lessons.

Gen J.N. Chaudhri did not understand History when he ordered withdrawal of forces.


The mess we see in TSP now is direct consequence of Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh defeating TSP armored forces in Assal Uttar.

It made the TSPA lose its mojo and become a monster feeding on its own people.

[Paul]

Gen Harbaksh Singh is the most underrated General of independent India, unlike Maneckshaw who appears to more of a highly efficient manager, Harbaksh Singh would definitely have been more active on the western frontin 1971. There would definitely have been stronger action by India in Zafarwal,highly competent division commanders like Zoru Bakshi were waiting in reserve on this front near Zafarwal and hardly saw action in 1971. It should be recalled that Zoru played a key role in Haji Pir capture in 65.

Results on the westrn front would have been much different with Gen Harbaksh Singh at the helm

[ShauryaT]

Thanks to the efforts of Naveed Riaz, a Lahore-based businessman and aviation enthusiast, and Indian military aviation expert Jagan Pillarisetti, Hussain got the email address of Jehangir 'Jungoo' Engineer's daughter Farida Singh and wrote to her on August 5.

Jagan: Keep up the good work.

[member_29190]

We owe a lot to Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh for his decision to fight in Punjab.

He has not only read history but has understood History.

I read a lot of war histories and try to understand and draw lessons.

Gen J.N. Chaudhri did not understand History when he ordered withdrawal of forces.

.

I have been trying to gather more info about Gen Chaudri. Found these

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/1965 ... iver-beas/

Also on this link, which is quite harsh on Gen Harbash Singh:

https://improveacrati.wordpress.com/201 ... tor-story/

Much has been made of Harbaksh’s War Diaries, published much after Gen Chaudhri’s death, where in he has postulated that he had disobeyed Gen Chaudhary’s order to with draw South of the Beas River after Khem Karan had fallen and the offensive on the Lahore front was stymied courtesy the Ichogil Canal.

What is not disputable is that it was the Corps Commander, Jogi Dhillon, who before the War, had located his HQ, North of the Beas at Raiya – thereby exhibiting his intention of fighting from up front. And damned be any thought of safety behind a river!

Also Mandeep Bajwa has mentioned on twitter that Gen Chaudhury was not liked by the babus and has been one of the reason for bad stories about him.